28 U.S.C. § 1391

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a claim arose; a fraudulent conveyance claim arose in the district where the property was located and its transfers were recorded.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Beall · filed 1987-09-09(b)

With regard to the latter claim, the applicable venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), provides for venue in the district “in which the claim arose.” Since the Echo Lake property is located in this district and all relevant transfers of that property were recorded within this district, the FDIC’s claim under Pennsylvania’s Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act arose in this district.

Under § 1391(b), the district where a plaintiff feels an economic injury is not necessarily the district where the claim arose.

First Financial Leasing Corp. v. Hartge · filed 1987-09-21(b)

In addition, although plaintiff suffered the economic impact of defendants’ allegedly wrongful conduct in Illinois, the law is clear that the place of injury, while significant, is not determinative for purposes of venue.

The trademark claim arose in Maryland for purposes of § 1391(b).

Transamerica Corp. v. Trans-American Leasing Corp. · filed 1987-10-09(b)

The foregoing considerations make clear that plaintiffs claim arose, for purposes of § 1391(b), in the District of Maryland.

Section 1391(b) governed venue for the federal trademark claims, which the court found arose in Connecticut.

Whelen Engineering Co. v. Tomar Electronics, Inc. · filed 1987-10-26(b)

Because the plaintiff brings his action under federal trademark law, venue as to those claims is controlled by 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b), which provides in pertinent part that this suit may be brought only in the judicial district where the claim arose, or in Arizona, where the defendant resides. ... Furthermore, because it is clear that Whelen’s federal trademark claims as framed arise in Connecticut but not in Arizona, the Leroy convenience scrutiny is not germane.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where the claim arose, including where alleged tortious conduct injured property, even if another district is also a plausible locus of the claim.

Frontier Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. National Hotel Corp. · filed 1987-11-04(a)

Frontier suffered its injuries and felt the effect of Williams’ wrongful acts with respect to its Utah property. Accordingly, the court holds that venue is properly laid in Utah under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(b) permits venue for pendent state claims where the claims arose.

Countryman Ex Rel. Upstate New York Pension & Retirement Fund v. Stein Roe & Farnham · filed 1987-11-23(b)

Venue for those claims is based on 28 U.S. C. § 1391(b) and is proper where the claim arose. ... The plaintiffs’ alleged claims against the Trustees arose in the transferee district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a substantial portion of the acts giving rise to the claim occurred.

Miceli v. Stromer · filed 1987-12-29(b)

The prevailing test for venue under the “claim arising” provision of § 1391(b) is whether a substantial portion of the acts giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim occurred in this district. ... These allegations lead me to conclude, for purposes of the defendants’ motion for change of venue, that a substantial number of the acts giving rise to the plaintiffs’ claims against ULC and Stromer occurred in Colorado. I conclude, therefore, that the claims against ULC and Stromer arose in Colorado and venue is proper in this district.

Section 1391(b) determines where a claim arose for venue purposes by weighing the contacts underlying the claim.

Abeloff v. Barth · filed 1988-02-17(b)

In sum, the “weight of contacts” is not in this Commonwealth and, therefore, venue over the plaintiffs’ RICO claims against the three individual defendants is not proper in this forum under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where substantial acts giving rise to the claim occurred.

US Sprint Communications Co. v. Boran · filed 1988-02-19(b)

In sum, venue in this district is proper because the injury and substantial acts occurred here.

Under § 1391, a claim arises in a district for venue purposes when a substantial portion of the acts giving rise to it occurred there; enforcement there of an out-of-state judgment does not suffice.

Silva v. Silva · filed 1988-02-29

The prevailing test for venue under the “claim arising” provision is whether a substantial portion of the acts giving rise to the plaintiffs claim occurred in this district. ... Thus I find and conclude that the claim did not arise in Colorado, and, therefore, venue is not proper in this district.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where the claim arose, determined by the most significant contacts related to the claim.

Heller Financial, Inc. v. Shop-A-Lot, Inc. · filed 1988-03-01(a)

In actions based on diversity of citizenship, venue is proper “only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1982). ... In the present case, an examination of defendants’ contacts with this district indicates that Heller’s claim arose in Illinois.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue against a manufacturer merely because a minor distributor resides in the district when the claims arose elsewhere and the defendants do not both reside there.

Scotch Whisky Ass'n v. Majestic Distilling Co. · filed 1988-03-03(b)

The causes of action alleged in this suit did not arise in this district, and both defendants to the lawsuit do not reside in this district. Although venue is proper as to Valley Liquors, this Court will not allow plaintiff to join a minor distributor to lodge venue in a district inappropriate as to the manufacturer.

Section 1391(b) permits a civil action not founded solely on diversity to be brought where all defendants reside or where the claim arose; the location of the operative acts bears on where the claim arose.

National Mortgage Network, Inc. v. Home Equity Centers, Inc. · filed 1988-03-15(b)

In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides “A. civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.” ... In applying these tests to the case at hand, we find that the alleged operative acts giving rise to this cause of action were committed by defendant Hestor entirely within the States of Georgia and Alabama, even though the effects of his alleged acts were fully felt in Pennsylvania.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the claim arose.

Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Insurance · filed 1988-03-18

Since the plaintiff resides in the Northern District of Mississippi and the claim arose in this district as well, venue lies in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a claim arose, determined here by the district where the relevant contacts weigh most heavily.

Delong Equipment Company v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co. · filed 1988-03-23(b)

The most widely utilized method, which we choose to rely upon here, is the “weight of the contacts” test, which establishes venue in the district where the contacts weigh most heavily. ... We conclude that these contacts satisfy the “weight of the contacts” test and hold that venue with respect to the claims against BCS and Robert Biebel is proper in the Northern District of Georgia.

Under § 1391(b), venue for a trademark infringement claim depends on whether the district is approximately as plausible as another district in terms of witnesses, evidence, and the defendants’ convenience.

Off-The-Wall Products v. Hyman Products, Inc. · filed 1988-04-12(b)

In deciding whether venue is proper in this district, this Court must consider the convenience of the defendants, accessibility of evidence and availability of witnesses. Only if this District is approximately as plausible as another district in terms of those factors will venue be proper in this District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a tort claim in the district where the injury to a business occurs.

Velcro Group Corp. v. Billarant · filed 1988-04-12(b)

Therefore, since the injury complained of is damage to VELCRO’s business operations in Manchester, New Hampshire, venue is appropriate under section 1391(b) as to all defendants.

Under § 1391(b), a trademark infringement claim arises in a district when the defendant’s sales there satisfy the more than minuscule or substantial contacts test.

Premier Herbs, Inc. v. Nature's Way Products, Inc. · filed 1988-05-09(b)

Applying the Honda Associates “more than minuscule” — “substantial contacts” test, the Court finds therefore that that the claim arose in this district. Accordingly, venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in the judicial district where the claim arose.

New South Communications, Inc. v. Family Group Broadcasting Operating, L.P. · filed 1988-06-09(a)

In this diversity action, the applicable venue provision is 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), under which venue is proper in “the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” ... Here, however, in addition to the fact that defendant resides in this district, the claim arose in this district and in particular, in the Eastern Division.

Section 1391 permits a diversity action to be brought in the district where the claim arose when that district has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Rowles v. Hammermill Paper Co., Inc. · filed 1988-07-06(a), (c)

Plaintiff could have brought this action in the District of Maryland pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and (c), since Maryland is the situs in which the claim arose and the District of Maryland has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside or where the claim arose, determined by the operative events and the location of witnesses and records.

Servicemaster Co. L.P. v. Ramsay · filed 1988-07-15(b)

Because plaintiff relies on both diversity and federal question jurisdiction, venue for this case is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... We conclude that venue is improper in this district because the defendants do not reside here and the claims did not arise here.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside or where the claim arose; a small number of mailed solicitations did not make New Jersey the place where this trademark claim arose.

United States Golf Ass'n v. U.S. Amateur Golf Ass'n · filed 1988-08-05(b)

Venue is proper only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the “claim arose”. The statute controlling venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, provides in pertinent part: ... Thus, unless it can be held that the claim arose in the District of New Jersey, venue is improper here. ... The Court must defer to the place of origin.

Under § 1391(a), a court determines where a claim arose by considering the totality of the parties’ dealings, including dealings in other states and interstate negotiations.

Lexington Investment Co. v. Southwest Stainless, Inc. · filed 1988-09-01(a)

Plaintiffs have attempted to rely upon this erroneous theory to convince us that “the claim arose” in New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). We do not agree. The Court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including dealings in Texas as well as interstate negotiations.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in a district where the claim arose, including where a substantial share of the sales underlying a commission claim occurred.

Eastern Scientific Marketing, Inc. v. Tekna-Seal, Inc. · filed 1988-09-30(a)

The venue statute states that in diversity suits, venue is proper in any district “in which the claim arose.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). As established in the Virginia long arm statute discussion, all of ESM’s claims arose in Virginia because that is where a large number of the sales in issue (according to ESM, nearly 50%) occurred. Accordingly, ESM’s claims arose in Virginia, and venue is appropriate in this court.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity case where the claim arose, including a district where a substantial part of the relevant events occurred.

Hasenfus v. Corporate Air Services · filed 1988-10-27(a)

Our Court of Appeals has held that for purposes of venue, a claim arises in any district in which a substantial part of the acts, events or omissions at issue occurred. ... Since no substantial acts in connection with plaintiffs’ claims occurred in the District of Columbia venue does not properly lie here.

Section 1391(b) and (c) does not permit venue based on corporate residence when the defendant is not doing business in the district, or based on where the claim arose when the events giving rise to it occurred elsewhere.

Trenwyth Industries, Inc. v. Burns & Russell Co. · filed 1988-12-16(b), (c)

Because Burns is not “doing business” in the District of Columbia for purposes of 1391(c), and therefore is not a resident of the District of Columbia under 1391(b), and further because the District of Columbia is not the jurisdiction in which Trenwyth’s “claim arose,” the Court holds that venue with respect to this action is improper in this Court.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim arose.

Construction Technology v. Lockformer Co., Inc. · filed 1989-01-10(b)

Venue is proper in this district only if plaintiffs claims against Orange Systems arose in this district, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), or if Orange Systems resides in this district, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Either will suffice to establish venue. As I find that the claim arose here, I do not reach the question whether Orange Systems is doing business here.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in the district where the claim arose.

Empire Gas Corp. v. True Value Gas of Florida, Inc. · filed 1989-01-11(a)

For the reasons stated, we conclude the Middle District of Florida is a district in which plaintiff’s “claim arose” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and that venue is proper in that district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a substantial part of the claim arose, including a district where the property allegedly targeted by the defendant is located.

Expoconsul International, Inc. v. A/E Systems, Inc. · filed 1989-01-13(b)

The Court notes, however, that venue also is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... This test is satisfied in the present case because the property which defendant allegedly seeks to destroy, plaintiffs AEC EXPO, is located in New York City.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in every district where a defendant sells its products.

Population Planning Associates, Inc. v. Life Essentials, Inc. · filed 1989-01-17(b)

The purpose of § 1391(b), however, is not to allow a plaintiff to sue in every district where the defendant sells its products.

Under § 1391(b), a claim may arise in more than one district, and venue is proper in a district where the challenged policy’s effects are substantially felt.

Sharif Ex Rel. Salahuddin v. New York State Education Department · filed 1989-02-07(b)

Venue in this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides: ... Thus, while plaintiffs’ claims also arise in the Northern District, they arise in the Southern District as well.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a substantial portion of the acts or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

M.F. Fletcher & Associates, Inc. v. Caramanica · filed 1989-03-17(b)

The Court has reviewed the complaint, as well as the motion and response, and concludes that the Middle District of Florida is an appropriate venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The Court finds that the district is where a substantial portion of the acts or omissions giving rise to the claims arose, and, additionally, that pursuant to the “weight of contacts” test this district is appropriate.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity case in a district where a substantial part of the acts giving rise to the claim occurred.

National Computer Ltd. v. Tower Industries, Inc. · filed 1989-03-24(a)

Because plaintiffs claims are based in significant part upon defendants’ alleged actions in Milpitas, California— while defendant TLI, a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant Tower, maintained a sales office and manufacturing facility in Milpitas—venue is proper in the Northern District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a claim arose, determined by the district’s significant contacts with the claim.

Anchor Glass Container Corp. v. Stand Energy Corp. · filed 1989-03-28(b)

Because the court finds that the claim did not arise in Mississippi, venue is therefore not proper as to any of the claims against any of the individual defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside or where the claim arose; venue is improper in a district that satisfies neither condition.

General Bedding Corp. v. Echevarria · filed 1989-05-26(b)

Section 1391(b) provides that venue is proper in the district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose. ... Because the plaintiff’s claims did not arise in the district of Kansas, venue is improper here.

Under § 1391(a), a claim arises in the district where the defendant’s contacts with it are most significant.

Schur v. Porter · filed 1989-05-30(a)

In determining where plaintiffs’ malpractice claim arose, I apply the “weight of contacts” approach which has been followed by the courts in this district. ... Under this approach, a claim arises in the district in which the defendant’s contacts are the most significant.

Section 1391 permits venue where a claim arose when that district is a plausible locus of the claim based on the witnesses, evidence, and defendant’s convenience.

Finest Fruits, Inc. v. Bertuca · filed 1989-06-01(b)

Applying Leroy, the Court finds that New York venue is proper in this case. The produce was examined pursuant to PACA in New York by New York expec-ters. Damages were calculated in New York and the goods were allegedly sold in New York. The goods were in New York when the purported consignment agreements were made. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs’ choice of forum should not be disturbed.

Under § 1391(b), a trademark infringement claim does not arise in a district merely because an infringing product is sold there.

Curtis Management Group, Inc. v. Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences · filed 1989-07-13(b)

In this case, under the restrictive interpretation of § 1391(b) mandated by Leroy wherein the plaintiff is given little if any consideration, there are only two judicial districts in which it can be said that the claim against the Academy arose. ... Unfortunately for the plaintiff, there is no evidence from which it can be said that the claim against the Academy arose in the Southern District of Indiana. ... Thus, venue as to the claim against the Academy is improper in this district.

Under § 1391(a), a claim arises for venue purposes where the defendant’s contacts related to the claim are most significant.

Schubert v. Gay & Taylor, Inc. · filed 1989-08-07(a)

The “weight of contacts” test entails “an examination of the defendant’s contacts with the various fora related to the plaintiff’s cause of action. The plaintiff’s claim arises (and venue is therefore proper) in the forum in which the defendant’s contacts are most significant.” ... Applying this test to the instant case, this court concludes that Schubert’s various claims did not arise in Illinois.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim arose, including where the alleged injury and relevant acts occurred.

Delta Education, Inc. v. Langlois · filed 1989-08-08(b)

In actions where jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity of citizenship, venue is proper “in the judicial district ... in which the claim arose____” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... These actions demonstrate that the claims arose in New Hampshire for venue purposes.

Section 1391(a) permits venue for claims that arose in the district, even when other claims in the same action arose elsewhere.

Wilson v. Wilson-Cook Medical, Inc. · filed 1989-08-18(a)

The remaining portion of count three and counts four, five, six and seven will be retained because the claims did “arise” in this district as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Under § 1391(a), a breach-of-contract claim does not arise in a district merely because contract negotiations occurred there.

General Electric Capital Corp. v. Selph · filed 1989-08-21(a)

Even if negotiations for this contract did in fact occur in Kansas, as the plaintiffs contend, this does not mean that plaintiff’s claim arose in Kansas for purposes of § 1391(a).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim arose; the court located the claims where the contacts weighed most heavily and each defendant performed a substantial act related to them.

Radcliffe v. Founders Title Co. · filed 1989-09-15(b)

Plaintiffs agree with defendants that venue would not be proper in the Middle District of Georgia under 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a), but further states that venue would be proper with regard to the claims of all plaintiffs under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) which provides that the action may be brought in the judicial district “in which the claim arose.” ... Upon consideration of the arguments of the parties and the relevant case law and in accordance with the court’s discussion above, this court finds not only that the “weight of the contacts” rest most heavily in the Middle District of Georgia, but that each defendant has performed in this district such a substantial or significant act related to the claims of each plaintiff in order to establish venue as to each defendant, and that the claims of each plaintiff arose in this district. Therefore, this court finds venue proper in this district as to each defendant.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim arose, based on the events giving rise to the claim and the weight of the defendants' contacts.

Onderik v. Morgan · filed 1989-10-10(b)

Venue is proper in the judicial district "in which the claim arose." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(b). ... Thus, because plaintiffs' claim arose in the forum and the weight of defendants' contacts were made in the forum, we are persuaded that the district court properly found venue in the Eastern District of Michigan.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in the district where the claim arose; the court located a defamation claim by weighing its contacts with possible forums.

Klauder & Nunno Enterprises, Inc. v. Hereford Associates, Inc. · filed 1989-10-25(a)

This court thus concludes that the defamation claim arose, for the purposes of § 1391(a), within this district.

Under § 1391(b), the district where a claim arose is determined by the weight of the contacts.

Obee v. Teleshare, Inc. · filed 1989-11-22(b)

If venue lies at all as to them, it must be under the provisions of section 1391(b). ... Having considered the various approaches taken by the courts over the years, the Court concludes that the weight of contacts approach is the most sound and not inconsistent with Leroy. ... Applying this form of analysis to the facts, it is clear that the weight of the contacts lie in the Eastern District of Michigan.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the judicial district where the claim arose.

Casco Standards v. Verichem Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1989-11-27(b)

Venue may be exercised by a federal court in a civil action in the judicial district “in which the claim arose....” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Because this action arose from Defendant’s contacts with the State of Maine, Maine is an appropriate venue.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a trademark infringement claim where the defendant’s sales and marketing contacts are substantial enough to locate the claim there.

Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc. · filed 1989-12-04(b)

Though The Jack Company has no other contacts with New York — no office, no property, and no sales agent — the fact that it took advantage of New York to sell its product, and sold it to many New York businesses, is sufficient to locate venue in this Court under the “weight of contacts” test.

For a claim not based solely on diversity, § 1391(b) limits venue to a district where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Tang-Fortaleche v. Donald O. Lincoln, Jr. Douglas Driver Thomas Telles · filed 1989-12-11(b)

Because Tang-Fortaleche's claim is not based solely on diversity, venue is proper only in the district in which all defendants reside or in which the claim arose. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... Therefore, lacking any allegation that material witnesses or evidence exist in the Western District of Virginia, or that the convenience of the litigants would be served by trying this case in the Western District of Virginia, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed Tang-Fortaleche's claim for improper venue.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where an antitrust claim arose, including a district within the market allegedly harmed by the challenged conduct.

Monument Builders of Greater Kansas City, Inc. v. American Cemetery Assn. Of Kansas · filed 1989-12-19(b)

The 1966 amendment to the general statute broadened the relevant standard by providing for venue in the district where the claim arose. Consequently, Scophony can no longer be described as the ultimate test. ... The claim arises not from an individual cemetery’s sale of graves, but from the alleged illegal conduct’s adverse impact on consumer welfare within the relevant market. Because this market covers both Kansas and Missouri, the alleged antitrust violation occurs in both Kansas and Missouri.

Section 1391(a) uses the weight of the contacts test to determine where a claim arose for venue in a diversity case.

Broadcasting Company of the Carolinas Robert A. Schmid v. Flair Broadcasting Corporation John N. Boden J. Timothy Harrin · filed 1989-12-27(a)

We believe that the “weight of the contacts” test is the most appropriate means for determining venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(b)'s claim-arose venue alternative does not apply when all defendants reside in the same district and no venue gap exists.

Advanced Dynamics Corp. v. Mitech Corp. · filed 1990-01-02(b)

Therefore, the “claim arose” language of § 1391(b) does not apply, and venue is proper in Ohio, since no such venue gap exists in the case at hand: both Defendants are residents of Ohio.

Section 1391(a) permits venue for diversity claims in the district where the claim arose; for fraud and veil-piercing claims, relevant meetings and conduct can establish that district.

Home Insurance Company v. Thomas Industries, Inc. · filed 1990-03-22(a)

If The Home's claims are understood as fraud and veil piercing claims, then venue is proper in the district where meetings and actions took place that bear a direct relationship to the claims asserted by The Home.

Section 1391(b) determines where a claim arose for venue purposes by looking to the operative events underlying the claim.

Vanguard Financial Service Corp. v. Johnson · filed 1990-04-03(b)

Upon examination of the “operative facts” underlying Vanguard’s fraud and RICO claims, the Court concludes for purposes of § 1391(b) that these claims arose in the Northern District of Texas.

In a diversity case, § 1391(a) permits venue where the claim arose; significant acts in more than one district can make venue proper in each.

Aquatic Amusement Associates, Ltd. v. Walt Disney World Co. · filed 1990-04-05(a)

This court cannot help but conclude that significant acts with respect to plaintiff’s claims took place in both New York and Florida. Venue could be assigned to either location with “approximately equal plausibility.” ... Therefore, the court holds that the Middle District of Florida would be an appropriate venue for the adjudication of this action.

Under § 1391(b), venue based on where a claim arose turns on the events of operative significance to the case.

Clark v. Harp · filed 1990-05-11(b)

Venue is only proper in the District of Columbia if the plaintiffs claim arose in the District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... In the instant case, the alleged improper act or omission giving rise to the action was the procurement of a Virginia arrest warrant from an Arlington magistrate. This action is clearly the operative significance of the plaintiffs case. ... The venue for this case is properly in Virginia.

Under § 1391(a), a claim arises for venue purposes in the district where the defendants’ contacts with the cause of action are most significant.

Fink v. Declassis · filed 1990-06-26(a)

Only one of the defendants resides in the District of Massachusetts and, therefore, venue will be proper in Massachusetts only if the claim arose there. ... Based on defendants’ extensive contacts with Illinois, the court concludes that the cause of action arose in Illinois. Because plaintiffs’ cause of action arose in Illinois, venue is not proper in the District of Massachusetts.

Section 1391 permits venue in the district where the claim arose even if a defendant resides elsewhere.

Wallace v. Chrysler Credit Corp. · filed 1990-07-27

Venue is correct under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which provides that venue is proper in the judicial district in which the claim arose. Although it is true that defendant King is not a resident of the Western District of Virginia, the claim arose from his alleged actions in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the claim arose, including where broadcasts caused the alleged injury.

Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Semaphore Advertising, Inc. · filed 1990-08-16(b)

However, as stated by plaintiff, it was the broadcasting of the commercials in Georgia which caused the alleged injury to plaintiff and gave rise to plaintiff’s cause of action. ... Accordingly, defendant Semaphore’s motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for a change of venue is DENIED.

Section 1391(b) does not make venue proper for a trademark infringement claim solely because retailers sell some allegedly infringing goods in the district.

Dakota Industries, Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc. · filed 1990-08-27(b)

The clear weight of authority requires a holding that sales to regional retailers, who in turn sell infringing goods in South Dakota, are insufficient to give South Dakota courts proper venue under the “claim arose” provision of § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) places venue where a substantial portion of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, considering access to witnesses and evidence.

Cone Corp. v. Florida Department of Transportation · filed 1990-09-07(b)

The Court is satisfied that a substantial portion of the events having “operative significance” occurred in the Northern District of Florida and does not find it approximately equally plausible to bring this cause of action in either district. Therefore, this Court concludes that the claim arose in the Northern District of Florida, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the defendants reside or where the claim arose.

United States v. Pearson's E.F. & C., Inc. · filed 1990-09-19(b)

Because both defendants reside in this district and alternatively because the claim arose in this district, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a contract claim in the district where the parties agreed payment would be made.

Resolution Trust Corp v. Cumberland Development Corp. of Mississippi, Inc. · filed 1990-10-23(b)

As an alternative ground, the court is satisfied that under § 1391(b) plaintiff has submitted enough evidence to show that the claim arose here in the Jackson Division of the Southern District of Mississippi.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim arose.

Asbury v. Germania Bank · filed 1990-11-01(b)

Moreover, venue would be proper in that court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because the claim arose there.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim arose.

American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 International Importing Enterprises, Ltd. · filed 1990-11-19(b)

Under the provisions of section 1391(b) ... venue is in this court. The RICO claims arose in this district.

In a diversity action, the district where a claim arose is determined by weighing the claim’s contacts with each district.

Jim Crockett Promotions, Inc. v. Action Media Group, Inc. · filed 1990-11-19(a)

Under the test, venue is proper in the district having the most significant ties to the claim. ... Therefore, the Court believes that New York has the most significant ties to this matter and that venue is proper in the Southern District of New York.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the claim arose.

United Savings Bank v. Rose · filed 1990-11-20(b)

Moreover, venue would be proper in that court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because the claim arose there.

Section 1391(b) requires significant ties between the claim and the district when venue rests on where the claim arose; a minor or secondary connection is insufficient.

Medoil Corp. v. Clark · filed 1990-12-18(b)

The Court believes that only a minor or secondary connection to this forum constitutes an insufficient showing for purposes of meeting the “weight of contacts” test enunciated by the Fourth Circuit in Flair Broadcasting. Accordingly, the Court concludes that venue is not proper in this matter pursuant to § 1391(b).

Under § 1391(b), a trademark infringement claim cannot arise in a district where no infringing activity is alleged.

Nine Point Mesa of Nashville, Inc. v. Nine Point Mesa of Lexington, Inc. · filed 1991-01-08(b)

In a trademark infringement case, therefore, this Court holds that a claim can not “arise” in a district where no infringing activity is alleged.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in the district where the claim arose.

Jaffe v. Julien · filed 1991-01-11(a)

This cause of action arose from an alleged breach of contract and misrepresentations in the Southern District of New York and thus “could have been brought” there. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside or where the claim arose; the location of the claim depends on the availability of witnesses and evidence and the defendant’s convenience.

Gutierrez v. Virginia Agricultural Growers Ass'n · filed 1991-01-18(b)

The applicable venue provision is 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), placing venue either in the judicial district where all defendants reside or that in which the claim arose. ... Considering availability of witnesses, accessibility of other relevant evidence, and the convenience of the Defendant, it cannot be said “with approximately equal plausibility” that the Southern District of Texas is the locus of the claims in this case.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the predominant contract claim arose when related contract and trademark claims form one cause of action.

Burger King Corp. v. Thomas · filed 1991-01-28(b)

Section 1391(b) provides that venue is proper in the district where all the defendants reside, or in which the claim arose. ... This Court finds that Plaintiffs cause of action is primarily one for breach of contract arising in this district, that Plaintiffs trademark infringement claim derives from the breach of contract claim, and that venue is proper in this district for the breach of contract claim. Accordingly, based on the foregoing and application of the “weight of the contacts” test, this Court concludes that venue is proper in this district for all claims made by the Plaintiff.

Section 1391(b)'s claim-arose rule calls for weighing a district's contacts with the claim and, when needed, the availability of evidence and witnesses and the defendants' convenience.

Heinz v. Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation · filed 1991-02-06(b)

After considering these precedents, I conclude that a three-step approach incorporating the “weight of the contacts” test is the most appropriate analysis for determining questions of proper venue under § 1391(b).

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in the district where the claim arose, determined by the weight of the operative contacts.

Spier v. Erber · filed 1991-03-18(a)

In this action founded only on diversity of citizenship, venue is proper “in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). ... Here, the claims must be said to have arisen in the Southern District of New York.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a nondiversity case where the defendants do not all reside in the district and the claim arose elsewhere.

Shuman v. Computer Associates International, Inc. · filed 1991-04-25(b)

The court finds that venue is not proper as to defendant Caughey in this action under either 18 U.S.C. § 1965 or 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) allows venue where all defendants reside or where the claim arose, determined by the weight of the claim's contacts with each district.

Northern Kentucky Welfare Rights Ass'n v. Wilkinson · filed 1991-05-24(b)

In summary, under either component of section 1391(b), venue in this case was proper only in the Eastern District of Kentucky. That is where all of the defendants below have their official residences; it is the district most convenient to the defendants; and it is the district which has the weightiest contacts with the plaintiffs' claim. Under these circumstances, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in overruling defendants' motion to dismiss or transfer this case to the Eastern District of Kentucky.

Section 1391(a)(2), as then enacted, allowed venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Peregrine Corp. v. Peregrine Industries, Inc. · filed 1991-06-24(a)(2)

Pursuant to the second basis for venue, there can be no doubt that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim of trademark infringement occurred in the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in each district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred; in a trademark case, likely confusion and harm to the mark can establish venue.

Sidco Industries Inc. v. Wimar Tahoe Corp. · filed 1991-06-25(b)(2)

The new language contemplates that there may be more than one district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, and that venue would be proper in each such district under subsection (2). ... Thus, Sidco has alleged facts indicating that a substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in the District of Oregon. Defendants’ motion to dismiss this action for improper venue is denied.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred; distribution that triggers a challenged payment can establish venue in that district.

Farmland Dairies v. McGuire · filed 1991-08-13(b)(2)

It is “distribution” of milk in the state of New York which triggers compensatory payments under the challenged statute and regulations. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that their New York milk distribution occurs primarily in this district. Thus a substantial part of the events giving rise to plaintiffs’ claims occurs in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where a retaliatory transfer claim arose.

Fullerton v. Maynard · filed 1991-08-29(b)

Count II of appellant's amended complaint states a retaliatory transfer claim that arose at JBCC, making venue proper in the Eastern District of Oklahoma.

Under § 1391(b), venue in Missouri depends on whether the claim arose there when the defendant resides in Nevada.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Sullivan · filed 1991-09-18(b)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) venue is proper in the judicial district where all defendants reside or in which the claim arose. Defendant Sullivan presently resides in Las Vegas, Nevada. Thus, plaintiff may establish venue in the Eastern District of Missouri only if the claim arose in this district.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if relevant events also occurred elsewhere.

United States v. Hartbrodt · filed 1991-09-10(b)(2)

I conclude that the mailing of postcards into this district constitutes “a substantial part of the events * * * giving rise to the [government’s] claim,” making venue here proper.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action in the district where the injury giving rise to the claim occurred.

Fogle v. Ramsey Winch Co., Inc. · filed 1991-09-20(a)(2)

Moreover, the injury giving rise to the action took place in the District; this constitutes another justification for venue in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(e)(2) requires a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim to have occurred in the district; the plaintiff’s incarceration there when he filed does not suffice.

Flanagan v. Shively · filed 1992-01-16(e)(2)

Venue is proper under subsection (2) only if “a substantial part of the events ... giving rise to the claim” occurred in this district. Plaintiff does not allege that any recited events occurred in this district. The only link to this district is plaintiffs incarceration here at the time of filing, and that is insufficient to justify venue under section 1391(e)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) requires a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim to have occurred in the district.

Magic Toyota, Inc. v. Southeast Toyota Distributors, Inc. · filed 1992-01-21(b)(2)

Although some courts still appear to apply the weight of the contacts test when deciding whether venue is proper under § 1391(b)(2), and the parties look to such factors in making their arguments in this case, this Court believes that under the new provision, the Court should only look to where a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. ... Upon review of these allegations and an analysis of whether the events alleged to take place in South Carolina constitute significant events sufficient to establish venue here under newly revised § 1391(b), the Court concludes that venue is improper here.

Section 1391(b) considers where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred when assessing venue.

Castro v. New York City Board of Education · filed 1992-02-11(b)

In the alternative, the Motions to Dismiss must also be dismissed because Puerto Rico is the improper venue for the instant action, because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in New York. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if another district had more substantial activity.

Merchants Nat. Bank v. Safrabank (California) · filed 1991-10-09(b)(2)

In applying the new language of section 1391(b), we find that a “substantial part” of the activities out of which the plaintiff’s claims arose took place in Kansas. ... Accordingly, venue is proper here, even though the defendants’ activities in California might have been more substantial, or the most substantial.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity case when a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the district.

Charles River Data Systems, Inc. v. Oracle Complex Systems Corp. · filed 1991-12-02(a)(2)

I find that for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1391, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that venue is proper in this district as against all defendants because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred here.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the claim arose, and the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that venue is proper there.

Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc. · filed 1992-04-22(b)

“In actions where jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity of citizenship, venue is proper in the judicial district ... in which the claim arose_” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The plaintiff has the burden to establish that venue is proper in this district. ... The court has jurisdiction and venue for reasons which in some instances overlap. ... The following acts took place in whole or in part in New Hampshire.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the claim arose.

Kerns v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co. · filed 1992-04-22(b)

Venue is proper in this district as this is where the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc. v. Metro Distributing, Inc. · filed 1992-06-12(b)(2)

Cottman relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) as the basis for venue in this district, alleging that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,” and one in which “a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated.” Based on the facts set forth above, as well as the factors considered in connection with defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court has determined that venue is proper in this district and will therefore deny defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including the mailing and publication of an allegedly defamatory letter.

Wachtel v. Storm · filed 1992-08-20(a)(2)

Because these events are crucial to plaintiff’s cause of action for defamation, Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 175 N.E. 505 (1931), venue in the Southern District of New York is proper under § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a nondiversity civil action in the judicial district where the claim arose.

Der-Tex Corp. v. Thatcher · filed 1993-03-09(b)

Plaintiffs claim arose in Massachusetts and therefore venue is proper in Massachusetts.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in each district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Radical Products, Inc. v. Sundays Distributing · filed 1992-10-28(b)(2)

It therefore seems clear that confusion over the “trade dress” is likely to occur in Washington. Following the reasoning in Sidco, venue in this case is proper in either California or Washington, with a substantial part of the events taking place in both states.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a debtor receives a collection notice because receipt is a substantial part of the events giving rise to an FDCPA claim, even if the notice was forwarded there.

Phillip E. Bates, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Defendant v. C & S Adjusters, Inc., Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Claimant · filed 1992-12-02(b)(2)

We conclude that receipt of a collection notice is a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Section 1391(b)(2) requires a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim to occur in the chosen district; an unsupported assumption about policy decisions there does not establish venue.

Cameron v. Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General · filed 1993-01-22(b)(2)

Appellant’s complaint did not allege a single rule or policy emanating from Washington that had affected his case. It seems abundantly clear that the “events and omissions” relevant to this case took place predominantly at Terre Haute, and that the proper venue for this case under § 1391(b) was the Southern District of Indiana where the prison is located.

Receiving a debt collection letter in a district is a substantial part of the events giving rise to an FDCPA claim and supports venue there.

Russey v. Rankin · filed 1993-03-05(b)(2)

Moreover, venue is proper if a “substantial part of the events ... giving rise to the claim” occurred in the judicial district. ... Because Mr. Russey received the dunning letter in New Mexico, a change of venue is not warranted.

Section 1391 permits venue where the claims arise.

Sease v. School Dist. of Philadelphia · filed 1993-01-04

Since Plaintiffs’ claims arise in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(a)(2) requires a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim to have occurred in the district; a later assignment to a district resident and deposit checks drawn on district banks did not satisfy that requirement.

Miller v. Meadowlands Car Imports, Inc. · filed 1993-03-30(a)(2)

The only Connecticut activities connected to the contracts are the assignment nearly two years later to plaintiff, a Connecticut resident, and the two $25,000 deposit checks drawn from Connecticut banks. The court finds that these activities do not constitute a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims. Plaintiff has failed to show that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in this district. Therefore, venue is not proper in Connecticut pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) does not make venue proper where a plaintiff purchased securities merely because the claim concerns allegedly misleading financial statements received there.

United Liberty Life Insurance v. Pinnacle West Capital Corp. · filed 1993-06-08(b)(2)

Following the Supreme Court’s holding that an offering from a certain district to purchase stock in that district does not confer venue, purchasing debentures in Ohio does not confer venue in Ohio. For these reasons, venue in Ohio is improper under the second prong as well as the first and third prongs of section 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits a civil rights claim to be filed in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to it occurred.

Lusero v. Charles D. Marshall, Warden · filed 1993-07-09(b)

Because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Lusero's claims against the Tehachapi defendants occurred in the Northern District, where the Pelican Bay prison is located, Lusero's claims against the Tehachapi defendants, who made the initial classification decision, were properly filed in the Federal Court for Northern District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (Civil rights action may be brought in "judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred."); see also Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1487 (9th Cir.1986) (applying § 1391 to civil rights action against state officials).

Section 1391(b) did not establish venue in the district when the defendants’ connection to it was insufficient.

Eastman v. Initial Investments, Inc. · filed 1993-07-26(b)

I find that venue here is not proper under § 1391(b), that defendants’ connection with this district is insufficient to establish venue under § 1965(a), and that “the ends of justice” do not warrant my exercising nationwide venue here under § 1965(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claims arose.

Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co. · filed 1993-09-01(b)

Venue lies in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b), because the claims asserted arose in this District, and because the alleged “release” or threatened “release” of “hazardous substances,” as those terms are defined in 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(14) & (22), occurred and may occur in this District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the judicial district where the claim arose.

United States v. Selland · filed 1993-09-14(b)

Venue is proper in the judicial district in which the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(b). Because the property subject to foreclosure was located in the District of North Dakota, venue was proper in the court there.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the claims arose.

Friend v. Dewey Sowders John Parker · filed 1993-10-01(b)

Since Friend's claims arose in the Eastern District of Kentucky, proper venue is therefore within that district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where an allegedly improper debt collection letter was received.

Sluys v. Hand · filed 1993-09-13(b)

Venue is proper in the location into which the allegedly improper mailing was sent, based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) as amended in 1990, which permits suit in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the. claim occurred.”

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the matter arose.

Pottgen v. Missouri High School Activities Ass'n · filed 1994-04-29(b)

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) as this matter arose within the Eastern District of Missouri.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the claims substantially arose.

Soignier v. American Board of Plastic Surgery · filed 1996-09-19

Soignier’s claims arose “substantially within" the Northern District of Illinois, and thus satisfy the venue requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1391, as the Board is an Illinois corporation and heard Soignier’s internal appeal in Chicago.

Venue is proper under § 1391(a) where the defendant agreed to and executed the contract giving rise to the action.

Lawrence-Leiter and Co. v. Paulson · filed 1997-04-24(a)

Venue is proper in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) because defendant ... agreed to the terms and executed the contract that gives rise to this action in Kansas.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the judicial district where the claim arose.

Pfullman v. Texas Department of Transportation · filed 1998-10-16(b)

3. Venue for this action properly lies in the Western District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because this claim arose in this judicial district.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including where plaintiffs felt an injury akin to invasion of privacy.

Myers v. The Bennett Law Offices, and Doug McCallon Timothy Myers v. The Bennett Law Offices · filed 2001-02-05(b)(2)

On the venue issue, because subject matter jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, the applicable statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Under that statute, venue is proper in a judicial district if “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in that district. ... As noted above, at least one of the “harms” suffered by Plaintiffs is akin to the tort of invasion of privacy and was felt in Nevada. Accordingly, a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Nevada. Thus, venue was proper.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a plaintiff receives a debt collection letter that gives rise to an FDCPA claim.

Maloon v. Schwartz, Zweban & Slingbaum, L.L.P. · filed 2005-11-07(b)

Also, the majority of FDCPA cases have held that the plaintiffs claim arises in the district in which the plaintiff received the offending communication or debt collection letter. ... For these reasons, venue is proper in this Court.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the contract and tort claims arose.

Exhibit Icons, LLC v. XP COMPANIES, LLC · filed 2009-03-26

The causes of action for contract and tort arose in the Southern District of Florida. Therefore, venue is proper in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

A defendant’s contractual relationship with a federal agency does not by itself establish venue for related tort claims under § 1391(b)(2).

Estate of Abtan v. Blackwater Lodge & Training Center · filed 2009-04-27(b)(2)

Thus, the contractual relationship between Blackwater and the Department of State does not by itself give the District of Columbia a “substantial connection” to the plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where the claims arose.

Nunez v. BNSF Railway Co. · filed 2012-08-09(a)

Defendant conducts business in Henry and Rock Island Counties, Illinois, and the claims involved in this litigation arose in Henry County, Illinois. Venue exists in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(e)(1) permits an action against a federal agency or official in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Harris v. United States Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2016-07-07(e)(1)

Because Maryland is where "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred," plaintiff could have brought this case in the District of Maryland.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the cause of action arose.

Gonzalez v. Seal · filed 2017-01-31(b)

Here, the original lawsuit was brought in the Eastern District of Louisiana, which was the proper venue for the case because the cause of action arose in Washington Parish. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), 98(a).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Batres v. Cortazar · filed 2019-08-02(b)(2)

In this case, the claim arose in Riverside County, which is in the Central District of California. (See ECF No. 1 at 1.) Therefore, plaintiff’s claim should have been filed in the ... United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits a civil action to be brought in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC) Hodge v. Mendoza · filed 2019-11-18(b)(2)

In this case, the claim arose in Los Angeles County, which is in the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC) Black v. Voong · filed 2019-12-09(b)(2)

In this case, the claim arose in Los Angeles County, which is in the Central District of California. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim should have been filed in the United States District Court forthe Central District of California.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC) Drumm v. CD.CR · filed 2020-02-06(b)

In this case, the defendants are located and the claims arose in San Bernardino County, which is in the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Doe v. Macleod · filed 2020-02-20(b)(2)

Venue is proper because the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred within the District.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a judicial district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC) Garcia v. Landevazzo · filed 2020-02-24(b)(2)

In this case, the claim arose in Los Angeles County, which is in the Central District of California. Therefore, plaintiffs claim should have been filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC) Nava v. Villanueva · filed 2020-03-04(b)

Therefore, plaintiffs claim should have been filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in the district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC) Fuentes v. Diaz · filed 2020-03-05(b)(2)

In this case, the claim arose in Riverside County, which is in the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits a civil action to be filed in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC) Hill v. Bright · filed 2020-04-09(b)(2)

In this case, the claim arose in Monterey County, which is in the Northern District of California. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim should have been filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Lonnie Mo nique Williams-Turner v. Sylmar Juvenille Hall · filed 2020-04-20(b)

In this case, the claim arose in Los Angeles County, which is in the Central District of California. Therefore, plaintiff's claim should have been filed in the United States District Court forthe Central District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits a civil action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Brown 367927 v. Just Detention International · filed 2020-05-27(b)(2)

In this case, the claim arose in Manistee County, which is in the Western District of Michigan. Therefore, plaintiffs claim should have been filed in the United States District Court forthe Western District of Michigan.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in the district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC) Doss v. Diaz · filed 2020-06-05(b)(2)

In this case, the claim arose in Los Angeles County, which is in the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits a civil action to be brought in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Doss v. Diaz · filed 2020-06-05(b)(2)

In this case, the claim arose in Los Angeles County, which is in the Central District of California. ... Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is transferred to the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Blackwood v. Florida Child Support Disbursement Unit · filed 2020-07-01(b)

Venue is therefore proper in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. See § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the defendants reside or where the claim arose; venue is improper in a district where none of the alleged conduct occurred.

Paige v. Washington · filed 2020-07-02(b)

Venue for plaintiff’s civil rights lawsuit is not proper in the Eastern District of Michigan, because plaintiff has failed to allege that any of the acts, events, or omissions which form the basis of his lawsuit took place in this district.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits a civil action to be brought in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC) Hill v. Tyler · filed 2020-07-24(b)(2)

In this case, the claim arose in Monterey County, which is in the Northern District of California.

Section 1391(b) permits a civil action to be brought in the district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC) Lamon v. Foss · filed 2020-08-03(b)

In this case, the claim arose in Monterey County, which is in the Northern District of California. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim should have been filed in the United States District Court ... forthe Northern District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Hill v. Black · filed 2020-08-21(b)(2)

In this case, the claim arose in Monterey County, which is in the Northern District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits a civil action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC) Stanley v. Broomfield · filed 2020-08-26(b)(2)

In this case, the claim arose in Marin County, which is in the Northern District of California. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim should have been filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits a civil action in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC) Garcia v. Diaz · filed 2020-09-10(b)(2)

The federal venue statute provides that a civil action “may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this action, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). In this case, some of the defendants work in Sacramento, but others are located in and the claim arose in Riverside County, which is in the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b) permits a civil action to be brought in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC) Hendrix v. Diaz · filed 2020-09-10(b)

In this case, while some of the defendants work in Sacramento, two of the defendants are ... located and the claim arose in Riverside County, which is in the Central District of California. ... Therefore, plaintiffs claim should have been filed in the United States District Court for the ... Central District of California.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred.

(PC)Espinoza v. Garcia · filed 2020-09-11(b)

In this case, the claim arose in Los Angeles County, which is in the Central District of California. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim should have been filed in the United States District Court ... for the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b) permits a civil action to be brought in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC)Chacon v. Diaz · filed 2020-09-14(b)

The federal venue statute provides that a civil action “may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this action, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). In this case, the claim arose in Riverside County, which is in the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b) permits a civil action to be brought in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC)Martinez v. Diaz · filed 2020-09-29(b)

In this case, plaintiff’s claims arose in Riverside County, which is in the Central District of California. Therefore, plaintiff’s claims should have been filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits a civil action in a judicial district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC) Castro-Verdugo v. Diaz · filed 2020-10-27(b)(2)

The federal venue statute provides that a civil action “may be brought in ... (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, ...” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... In this case, the claim arose in Riverside County, which is in the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits a civil action in the district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Castro-Verdugo v. Diaz · filed 2020-10-27(b)(2)

In this case, the claim arose in Riverside County, which is in the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Banks 571876 v. Martin · filed 2020-11-16(b)

A civil action may be filed in: (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all the defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... As noted above, the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s Complaint occurred at the Chippewa Correctional Facility in Kincheloe, Michigan, and Defendants are all employed there. ... Therefore, the proper venue for this action is the Western District of Michigan.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Perez v. Diaz · filed 2020-12-03(b)

In this case, the claims arose in Riverside County, which is in the Central District of California. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim should have been filed in the United States District Court forthe Central District of California.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a judicial district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC) Carranza v. Diaz · filed 2021-01-12(b)

In this case, the claim arose in Riverside County, which is in the Central District of California.