28 U.S.C. § 1391

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the sole defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Water Tower Square Limited Partnership · filed 2026-03-23(b)

The general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 allow a plaintiff to bring suit in: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the state in which that district is located; ... It is undisputed that Defendant resides within that district. ... Thus, venue lies in the Northern District of Ohio.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (b)(2) do not provide venue in a district where no defendant resides and no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Stracco · filed 2026-03-31(b)(1), (b)(2)

Because Plaintiff could not have originally brought her claims in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) (1) or (b)(2), the Court has no basis to transfer this civil action to the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia.

Section 1391 determines federal venue by judicial district; its requirements are satisfied if the case qualifies anywhere in that district.

Madill · filed 2026-04-16

Venue is proper if the case meets § 1391 requirements anywhere in the District of Montana (the “District”), as was the case here.

Section 1391 supports venue in a district where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Mastr Asset Backed Securities Trust 2007-WMC1 v. WMC Mortgage LLC · filed 2012-07-19

In the Minnesota Action, the Trustee asserted that venue was proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because WMC was subject to personal jurisdiction there. WMC submitted to litigation in the District of Minnesota and has not disputed venue. The Court therefore finds that this action could have been properly brought in the transferee forum.

Section 1391 governs venue by judicial district, while a local rule may determine the proper division within that district.

Beaton v. Amazon.Com, Inc. · filed 2019-11-27(b)

As the venue statute specifically speaks in terms of districts and not divisions, many cases find that if venue is proper in one division it would be proper in any division within the district.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate plaintiff as residing only in the judicial district where it maintains its principal place of business.

Olive Group Fz-Llc v. Afghanistan Civil Aviation Authority · filed 2026-05-05(c)(2)

And under the venue statute, a corporate plaintiff “reside[s] . . . only in the judicial district in which it maintains its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).

Section 1391(e)(4), read with subsection (c), permits suit against federal officers in a district where a corporate plaintiff resides, including a district where it does business.

Upjohn Company v. Finch · filed 1969-07-10(e)(4)

In conclusion, after a thorough review of the cases and comments for and against a liberal interpretation of § 1391 (e) in the light of § 1391(c), this Court is of the opinion that it was the intent of the Congress to permit the bringing of actions against Government officers, employees and agencies in the place of “residence” of the plaintiff, be it an individual or a corporation. ... For the reasons herein stated this Court concludes that venue in this case is properly in this District.

Section 1391(e)(4) permits venue in the plaintiff's district of residence; continuing probation supervision can make that district the plaintiff's residence for venue despite a move abroad.

Meir Kahane, Plaintiff-Petitioner-Appellee v. Norman Carlson, Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Defendants-Resp · filed 1975-11-26(e)(4)

We need not pass upon Kahane's contention that venue can be sustained under subdivision (2) since the circumstances do qualify the case under § 1391(e)(4), which establishes mandamus venue in the district of the plaintiff's residence. ... Under these circumstances we hold that, until he had successfully completed probation and had been released from supervision, Kahane should have been considered a resident of the Eastern District for the purpose of venue, entitled to turn to the court for that district.

Section 1391(e)(4) does not let a corporate plaintiff claim residence in every district where it does business by using subsection (c)'s rule for corporate defendants.

General Electric Co. v. Federal Trade Commission · filed 1976-03-23(e)(4)

I do not think that the definition of subsection (c) can be so easily transposed on subsection (e)(4) because their purposes and subjects are very different. Subsection (c) deals particularly and only with corporations as defendants while subsection (e)(4) refers generally to plaintiffs without any reference or allusion to corporate status. In any event, I — R is neither a corporate-defendant in the instant action, nor under any reasonable definition, does it reside in every district where it does business.

Section 1391(c) does not make a corporate plaintiff a resident of a district merely because it does business there when the proposed transferee court is bound by precedent limiting the provision to corporate defendants.

McLouth Steel Corp. v. Jewell Coal & Coke Co., Inc. · filed 1976-06-14(c)

Although the Fourth Circuit’s decisions are not binding on this Court, they are binding on the proposed transferee court in the Western District of Virginia. Thus, if this case were originally filed in that District, the Court would have been required to dismiss it had venue been challenged. For this reason, we are constrained to hold that venue is improper in the Western District of Virginia on the theory that plaintiff, by virtue of its doing business there, is a resident of that District.

Section 1391(e)(4) treats a prisoner's domicile, rather than the district of incarceration, as the prisoner's residence for venue purposes.

Holmes v. United States Board of Parole and United States Bureau of Prisons · filed 1976-09-10(e)(4)

We see no reason for purposes of venue under section 1391 to ascribe to Holmes the residence of his district of incarceration rather than the district of his domicile. Accordingly, we hold that venue existed in the district court under section 1391(e)(4).

Under § 1391(e)(4), a federal prisoner’s involuntary and temporary presence in a district does not make him a resident there for venue.

Brimer v. Edward Levi, Attorney General of the United States · filed 1977-05-19(e)(4)

Clearly, the first three subdivisions of § 1391(e) have no bearing on the present case. Thus, the only possible basis for venue in the Western District of Missouri would depend upon petitioner’s residence in Missouri. Petitioner does not allege that he is a resident of Missouri or that he is domiciled in Missouri. A review of the record reveals no ground for believing that Brim-er’s presence in Missouri is anything other than involuntary and temporary. We conclude, that Brimer is not a resident of Missouri and that venue, accordingly, is not proper in the Western District of Missouri.

Under § 1391(e)(4), a corporate plaintiff resides in its state of incorporation for venue purposes.

Amoco Production Co. v. United States Department of Energy · filed 1979-04-20(e)(4)

Under this line of cases, it is clear “that the residence of a corporate plaintiff for purposes of § 1391(e)(4) is restricted to the place of incorporation.”

Section 1391(e) permits venue in an action against the United States where a corporate plaintiff resides, including its state of incorporation.

Southern Packaging & Storage Co. v. United States · filed 1984-02-06(e)

2. The venue of this action is properly laid in the District of South Carolina under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), in that this is an action against the United States and So-Pak-Co’s residence, for venue purpose, is the State of its incorporation, South Carolina.

Under § 1391(e)(4), a corporate plaintiff resides in the district where its principal place of business is located.

Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States · filed 1985-01-22(e)(4)

Having concluded that venue is not properly laid in Colorado on this alternate basis, I hold that venue is proper here on the basis that Johns-Manville resides in Colorado for venue purposes because its principal place of business is located here.

Section 1391 permits venue where the plaintiff has its principal place of business.

Bellante, Clauss, Miller & Partners v. Alireza · filed 1985-12-20

Venue of this court is proper because plaintiff has its principal place of business within the venue of the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where the corporate plaintiff has its principal place of business.

AM International Leasing Corp. v. National Council of Negro Women, Inc. · filed 1986-01-31(a)

Venue was proper in the Northern District of Illinois because Leasing’s principal place of business is here (see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)).

A federally chartered corporation headquartered in the District of Columbia resides there for venue purposes under § 1391(e)(4).

Jewish War Veterans of the United States v. United States · filed 1988-08-30(e)(4)

If a federal corporation has a district of federal incorporation, it surely is the District of Columbia, the seat of the federal government. The District of Columbia also is the JWV’s principal place of business, as it is headquartered at 1811 R Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. Thus, the District of Columbia is both the JWV’s place of incorporation and principal place of business. The Court joins Judge Pratt in considering the JWV a resident of the District of Columbia. Thus, venue is proper in this District.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a nondiversity case merely because the plaintiff resides in the district.

Juliano v. Kane · filed 1988-12-20(b)

This is a critical distinction: Congress intended that § 1391(b) not allow venue to lie where plaintiffs reside.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in the state where the sole corporate plaintiff is incorporated and has its principal place of business.

TWC International Inc. v. Greene · filed 1989-11-15(a)

Venue under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(a) is proper only "where all plaintiffs reside or all defendants reside, or ... where the claim arose." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(a) (1982). ... The complaint clearly alleges that TWC has its principal place of business and is incorporated in Montana. Venue in that state was therefore proper.

Section 1391(e) permits an action against federal officials acting in their official capacities in the district where the plaintiff resides; incarceration does not necessarily change that residence.

Agunobi v. Thornburgh · filed 1990-09-17(e)

An action may be brought against government officials acting in their official capacities in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). ... The circumstances of this case, however, make the finding that the plaintiff has retained his residence in Chicago, Illinois most reasonable. Accordingly, venue is proper in this district.

Section 1391 makes venue improper when the individual defendant is a citizen of another state and no other basis for venue is identified.

Trauma Service Group v. Keating · filed 1995-11-20

Since Keating is identified as a citizen of Georgia, venue in this district is improper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(a) does not allow a plaintiff to establish venue based on the plaintiff’s district of residence.

Speros v. York · filed 1997-04-21(a)

Section 1391(a) no longer allows a plaintiff to establish venue based on his district of residence.

Section 1391(c) permits venue in a district where a corporate defendant resides.

The TINGSTOL CO. v. Rainbow Sales, Inc. · filed 1998-09-03(c)

Venue is also proper in the Middle District of Florida as that is where Rainbow resides. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(a) does not make venue in a diversity case proper merely because the plaintiff has an office in the district.

GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORPORATION v. Laser Hair Removal, Inc. · filed 2000-05-18(a)

As to venue, Complaint ¶ 6 purports to base bringing suit in this judicial district on GE Capital maintaining an office here, although 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) — which is applicable in diversity cases — makes that fáct a total irrelevancy.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where a corporate defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Goddard, Inc. v. Henry's Foods, Inc. · filed 2001-08-10(b)(1)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), venue is proper in “a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State.” For purposes of venue, a corporation resides in “any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” There does not appear to be any dispute that Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in this district. As a result, venue is proper here and the case will not be transferred under section 1406(a).

Section 1391(c) deems a corporate defendant to reside in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Spring Patents, Inc. v. Avon Rubber & Plastics, Inc. · filed 2001-08-29(c)

Because Avon Rubber is subject to personal jurisdiction in Hawaii on the present record, Avon Rubber is deemed to reside in Hawaii for purposes of venue.

Under § 1391(a)(1) and (c), venue is proper where the sole corporate defendant resides, and a corporation resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Robinson Corp. v. Auto-Owners Insurance · filed 2003-02-12(a)(1), (c)

Auto-Owners is a corporation and the only defendant in this action. Auto-Owners is subject to personal jurisdiction in Hawaii, and this District is the only Federal District embracing that forum. Therefore, venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

In a nondiversity action against a sole corporate defendant, venue is proper in a district where the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action commenced.

One Beacon Insurance v. JNB Storage Trailer Rental Corp. · filed 2004-04-07(b), (c)

JNB is the only defendant to the declaratory judgment action; thus, venue is proper under § 1391(b) in the Eastern District of Louisiana if JNB would have been subject to personal jurisdiction there at the time the declaratory judgment action was commenced. ... The exercise of personal jurisdiction over JNB would not have violated the Due Process Clause. Therefore, the Eastern District of Louisiana would have been a proper venue for the filing of One Beacon’s declaratory judgment action.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins, allowing venue there under § 1391(b)(1).

Broadcast Marketing International, Ltd. v. Prosource Sales & Marketing, Inc. · filed 2004-11-22(b)(1), (c)

The court concludes, however, that venue is proper under section 1391(b) and (c) of Title 28 of the United States Code. ... Therefore, because the court has concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is appropriate over the defendant in the District of Connecticut, venue is also proper.

In a federal question case, a district where a corporate defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction is a proper venue when that defendant is the only defendant.

Barham v. UBS FINANCIAL SERVICES · filed 2007-08-02(b), (c)

Because Maryland has personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the District of Maryland is a proper venue for the plaintiffs’ claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing, for venue purposes, in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Clergy Financial, LLC v. Clergy Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2009-02-17(c)

For purposes of venue, “a defendant that is a corporation is deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Defendant does not dispute that it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of Minnesota. Accordingly, the Court finds that venue is proper in the District of Minnesota.

Section 1391 permits venue where a corporate defendant resides, and a corporation resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Invisible Fence, Inc. v. Fido's Fences, Inc. · filed 2009-08-20(b)(1), (c)

Accordingly, venue here is proper because the defendant legally resides here, being a corporation subject to personal jurisdiction here.

A corporate defendant resides where it is subject to personal jurisdiction, so Gerber’s consent to jurisdiction in California made venue proper there.

Wiley v. GERBER PRODUCTS COMPANY · filed 2009-10-23(c)

A corporate defendant resides “in any jurisdiction in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Here, Gerber has consented to personal jurisdiction in California and the action, therefore, “might have been brought” there.

Section 1391(b) does not make a plaintiff’s residence a basis for venue.

Madison v. Alves · filed 2010-06-02(b)

Significantly, a plaintiffs residence is irrelevant in determining venue under this provision.

Section 1391 permits venue where a defendant resides, and a corporate defendant resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Sleepy Lagoon, Ltd. v. Tower Group, Inc. · filed 2011-08-19(a), (c)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), venue is proper in any judicial district where a defendant resides. A corporate defendant resides "in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Thus, venue in this Court is proper under § 1391.

Section 1391(e)(3) permits venue in the district where the plaintiff resides in a suit against a federal officer if no real property is involved.

Hill v. Napolitano · filed 2012-03-16(e)(3)

Nevertheless, even accepting Hill’s arguments as true that few events associated with the case occurred in Oregon or the Eastern District of Virginia, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(3) expressly provides for venue in the district in which the plaintiff resides. That district here is Oregon.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as a resident of a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

McNulty v. J.H. Miles & Co. · filed 2012-12-19(c)(2)

For purposes of venue Defendant J.H. Miles is a resident of Virginia because it is admittedly subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Virginia with respect to this action.

In a state with multiple judicial districts, § 1391(d) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Wright v. Zacky & Sons Poultry, LLC · filed 2015-05-15(d)

That court thus has personal jurisdiction, and venue is proper there. ... 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (stating that- venue is proper when “a defendant that is a corporation ... reside[s] in any judicial .district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced”).

Section 1391(b) does not make venue proper in the plaintiff’s home district solely because the plaintiff lives there when the defendants and the events at issue are elsewhere.

Thomas v. Disanto · filed 2019-02-27(b)

Here, both named defendants are residents of Ohio, and Thomas wants to challenge Ohio state court proceedings. Thomas resides in Georgia, and that’s the only connection between the State of Georgia and this case. Thus, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Thomas filed his petition in the wrong venue.

A plaintiff's change of residence alone does not establish a right to transfer a case to another venue under § 1391(b).

Jacob v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC · filed 2019-07-17(b)

8. Plaintiff's "Request for Permission to Relocate," (Dkt. 17), which the Court construes as a Motion to Transfer Venue is DENIED . See e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) ; Fla. Stat. §§ 47.101, 47.122. Venue is dictated by federal law and Rules of Procedure. Plaintiff should review all applicable rules before reasserting a right to transfer the case to a different jurisdiction based solely upon a change in her residency status.

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Paciotti S.p.A. v. Dellamoda, Inc. · filed 2019-12-16(c)(2)

As explained above, Paciotti has not established even a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction over Dellamoda, and therefore has not satisfied the residency requirement of § 1391(c)(2), nor its burden to establish that venue is proper in this Court.

Section 1391(b) does not make a plaintiff’s residence a basis for venue in a Bivens action.

Jones v. Kaine · filed 2020-02-28(b)

Nor does Plaintiff’s residence support venue in this District. For purposes of either a § 1983 or Bivens action, Plaintiff’s own residence is not relevant. See 28 U.S.C. 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) does not base venue on the plaintiff’s residence.

Russell v. Warden, Lebanon Correctional Institution · filed 2020-11-13(b)

Although the Plaintiff is now incarcerated in a prison located within Ohio’s northern judicial district, venue is not based on the residence of the Plaintiff.

Section 1391(b) does not make venue proper based solely on the plaintiff’s residence when no relevant events occurred in the district and the defendant has no connection to it.

Nagy v. United Schutzhund Clubs of America · filed 2020-12-09(b)

Specifically, no event relevant to the instant claims occurred in this district, nor does USCA have any connection with this district. ... The only connection between the instant action and California is Nagy’s residence, which has no bearing on whether venue, in the first instance, is proper.

Section 1391(b) does not make a plaintiff’s residence a basis for venue.

Yates v. Town of Wallace NC · filed 2021-01-21(b)

However, as explained in the R & R, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) generally governs the venue of civil actions, and a plaintiff’s residence is not among the three categories listed in § 1391(b).

An entity suing as a plaintiff resides in the district where it maintains its principal place of business.

Extended Care Clinical, LLC v. Scottsdale Insurance Company · filed 2021-03-04(c)(2)

A plaintiff entity is deemed to reside where it maintains its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2)). Here, two of the four Plaintiffs, the ECCs, maintain their principal places of business ... in this district. (Dkt. 1-1 at 6). Thus, Plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to at least some deference.

An entity plaintiff resides for federal venue purposes only in the judicial district where it maintains its principal place of business.

Western Watersheds Project v. National Park Service · filed 2021-12-08(c)(2)

The federal venue statute states that an entity plaintiff is deemed to reside, for venue purposes, “only in the judicial district in which it maintains its principal place of business[.]” 28 U.S.C. 1391(c)(2).

Section 1391(b) does not make a plaintiff’s residence alone sufficient to establish venue.

Tobias v. Yale New Haven Health Services Corporation · filed 2022-04-19(b)

Moreover, the only connection to this District is that Plaintiff is a resident of Westchester County—which contrary to Plaintiff’s allegation, does not by itself establish that venue is proper in this District.

A plaintiff’s residence alone does not establish proper venue under §1391(b).

Strickland v. Hegedus · filed 2022-06-27(b)

The sole ground for bringing the action in this district, as asserted in the complaint, is that “[p]laintiff resides in Rochester, NY.” (Dkt. #1 at 1). This is not a proper basis for venue under §1391.

Section 1391(b) does not make venue proper based solely on the plaintiff’s Ohio address when the defendant is not alleged to reside in Ohio and no event giving rise to the action occurred there.

Yamamoto v. Kong · filed 2022-07-11(b)

Even under the most liberal reading of Plaintiff’s complaint, his allegations have no relationship to Ohio, other than Plaintiff now representing that he has an Ohio address. He has not represented that the Defendant resides in Ohio, or that any event giving rise to the action occurred, here. As such, this Court is an improper venue for this case.

Section 1391(e)(1) permits an action against a federal government defendant that does not involve real property to be brought in the district where the plaintiff resides.

Normantiene v. Cissna · filed 2022-11-07(e)(1)

But that argument, even if accepted as true, does not change 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) and § 1404(a), which together provide that for purposes of transferring venue in a case not involving real property, the action “might have been brought” in the district where plaintiff resides.

In suits against federal agencies, § 1391(e)(1)(C) permits venue where the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved; an intended future residence does not count.

Scarlett v. Office of Inspector General · filed 2022-12-21(e)(1)(C)

The venue statute, however, does not contemplate jurisdiction in which plaintiff intends to reside—only where “plaintiff resides.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(C).

A plaintiff’s residence in a different district does not establish venue in the district where suit was filed.

Fink v. Bishop · filed 2023-01-25(b)

The fact that Plaintiff is a resident in the Eastern District of New York also does not make this Court the appropriate venue for this action.

Section 1391(b) does not make a plaintiff’s residence a basis for venue.

NY Stone Manhattan, LLC v. Cowan Logistics, LLC · filed 2023-03-01(b)

As the Court previously held, Plaintiff's residence in New York is not a proper basis for venue.

Section 1391(c)(2) defines an entity plaintiff’s residence as the district of its principal place of business, including when applying FOIA’s venue provision.

Defense of Freedom Institute for Policy Studies, Inc. v. US Department of Education · filed 2024-03-19(c)(2)

While the Court agrees that 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) governs proper venue in a FOIA action, the Court ultimately disagrees that the general venue statute cannot supplement the FOIA-specific venue provision with the meaning of a term that the respective statute, and interpreting case law, has left undefined.

Section 1391(e) permits venue where one of multiple plaintiffs resides.

Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Federal Trade Commission · filed 2024-05-03(e)

On the other hand, if plaintiffs here intervene or otherwise join in Ryan as plaintiffs, venue there would remain properly laid because only one among many plaintiffs need reside in a judicial district for venue to be proper there under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

Section 1391(b) does not make the plaintiff’s district of residence a proper venue when another district qualifies under its venue rules.

El v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2024-05-28(b)

Venue, however, is not based on Plaintiff’s district of residence where there is a proper district for filing under Section 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) does not make venue proper in a district solely because the plaintiff currently resides there when the defendants reside elsewhere and the events giving rise to the claim occurred elsewhere.

O'Reilly v. Medical Facilities of America · filed 2024-10-07(b)

The only connection to the Middle District of Florida is Plaintiff’s current residence. This is insufficient.

Section 1391(e)(1)(C) permits a suit against federal officers or agencies in the plaintiff’s district of residence when no real property is involved.

Patel v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security,et al · filed 2024-11-27(e)(1)(C)

The suit could have been brought in the Eastern District of Louisiana under subsection (C) because both Plaintiffs reside in Louisiana and the case does not involve real property.

Section 1391 permits venue where a corporate defendant resides, including the district where it is incorporated and headquartered.

Doe v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board · filed 2025-01-15(b), (c)

Here, there is no question that venue is proper in District of Columbia because that is the location of the Board’s incorporation and headquarters. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c).

Section 1391(b) does not make a plaintiff’s residence alone a basis for venue.

MacKwashie v. Mensah · filed 2025-02-07(b)

However, Plaintiffs’ residence is not a proper basis for venue under § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) does not make a plaintiff’s current or planned residence a basis for venue.

Greene v. St. Vincent De Paul - Cardinal Manning Center · filed 2025-06-04(b)

Although Plaintiff states that he plans to move to Missouri, his state of residency is not relevant to the venue provisions of §1391(b).

Section 1391(e)(1)(C) permits venue in an action against federal officers in the district where the plaintiff resides when no real property is involved; residence is assessed when the complaint is filed.

Liu v. Mayorkas · filed 2025-06-18(e)(1)(C)

As such, I find that Ms. Liu has failed to satisfy the relatively low burden of making a prima facie showing that venue is proper in this district based on her residence at the time she filed her complaint.

A plaintiff’s residence in a district alone does not establish venue under § 1391(b).

Do v. Orange County SSA, WPD · filed 2025-07-30(b)

As far as the Court can discern, the only allegations the Amended Complaint makes in relation to venue is that he is a resident of San Diego, California. This is not sufficient to confer venue.

Section 1391(b) does not make the plaintiff’s residence a basis for venue in a federal civil action.

Buffalo Biodiesel, Inc. v. Lifecycle Renewables, Inc. · filed 2025-08-05(b)

Here, Plaintiff fails to establish proper venue in this court. First, Plaintiff alleges venue is proper based on Plaintiff’s residence in this district. ... While this may be a proper basis for an action in New York state court, see N.Y.C.P.L.R. 503(a) (“Except where otherwise prescribed by law, the place of trial shall be in the county in which one of the parties resided when it was commenced . . ..”), it is wholly erroneous as to a federal civil action such as the instant case.

Under § 1391(c)(2), a corporate defendant resides in a district for venue purposes when it is subject to personal jurisdiction there for the action.

ALDAWOODY v. CANDELA CORPORATION · filed 2025-08-26(c)(2)

For the purposes of venue, “an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). ... Because the District of Maine lacks personal jurisdiction over Candela, venue here is improper.

Section 1391(b) does not make a plaintiff’s address a basis for venue when no defendant resides in the district and none of the events underlying the claim occurred there.

Gaylon Teslaa d/b/a Alpen Pet Hospital v. Vereuck Properties LLC · filed 2025-09-03(b)

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that venue of Plaintiffs’ action is not proper in this District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Plaintiffs have not alleged that any of the defendants reside in the Southern District of New York and none of the events underlying the Complaint took place in this District.

Section 1391 does not make the plaintiff’s residence a basis for venue.

Columbia Strategic Counsel, Inc. v. Innovative Rail Technologies LLC · filed 2025-12-11(b)

Because the current version of the statute does not determine venue based on where a plaintiff resides, and because plaintiff raises no other arguments, the Court finds that venue is not proper in Oregon.

A plaintiff’s residence alone does not establish venue under § 1391(b) when no connection between the district and the claim is alleged.

Gilot · filed 2026-01-27(b)

Because no connection to this District is alleged, aside from Plaintiff’s residence in this District, the Court finds that transfer of this action to the Western District of Texas is appropriate.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) makes the defendants’ residence, rather than their citizenship, the criterion for venue.

Jacques Arley and Charlotte Arley, Husband and Wife v. United Pacific Insurance Company, a Washington Corporation · filed 1967-08-01(a)

Granting that defendants’ supporting affidavits showed them to be citizens of Nevada, that fact was immaterial for the venue statute appropriate to this case (28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)) provides that where jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship — as this one was — venue shall be laid only in the district where all defendants reside. The statutory criterion is residence, not citizenship. The terms are not synonymous.

Section 1391(e)(4) permits a suit against a federal officer or agency in the district where a plaintiff resides, even when other plaintiffs reside elsewhere.

Holtzman v. Richardson · filed 1973-06-13(e)(4)

There is no doubt of the proper venue of this action as originally brought by plaintiff, a Brooklyn resident, since express provision in 28 U.S. C. § 1391(e)(4) permits suit against a federal officer or agency in any judicial district where the plaintiff resides. Suit by the airmen might have to be brought in some other district if they were not joined in this action, or if plaintiff Holtzman did not have standing. Their presence as plaintiffs in a suit properly brought by Congresswoman Holtzman, however, does not prevent the venue being proper for all plaintiffs, since only one plaintiff need be a resident of the district.

Section 1391 does not establish venue in a district merely because limited events connected to a nationwide dispute occurred there.

JAVELIN CORPORATION v. Uniroyal, Inc. · filed 1973-07-03

Venue is attacked under the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c), as well as the specific venue statutes applicable to antitrust actions, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 22. ... Without reviewing them here in detail, the Court has carefully examined the allegations, affidavits and briefs and has concluded that neither venue nor personal jurisdiction (under Federal Civil Rule 4(e) and Calif. C.C.P. § 410.-10) is present in this District.

Section 1391 supports dismissal for lack of venue when the action has no relevant connection to the district.

Boruski v. U. S. Government · filed 1976-02-19

As a separate and second ground for dismissal I rule that this case may not be filed in the District of Massachusetts because of the lack of venue. The cause of action did not arise in Massachusetts, the plaintiff does not reside in Massachusetts, no Massachusetts real property is involved, and no alleged act of omission on the part of defendants occurred in Massachusetts. Accordingly, I rule that this case should be dismissed for lack of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1402 or 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391 makes venue improper when neither party resides in the district, the claim arose elsewhere, and no property involved in the action is located there.

McCoy v. Cardamone · filed 1986-11-06

28 U.S.C. § 1391 establishes venue requirements. ... Neither plaintiff nor defendant resides in the District of Columbia. Plaintiff’s claim did not arise here but in Phoenix, Arizona. No property is involved in this action. Thus, however plaintiff’s complaint is read, the District of Columbia is an improper forum, and defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) must be granted.

Section 1391(b) does not permit suit in the Central District of Illinois against a Massachusetts or Washington, D.C., resident on the facts presented.

Pusch v. Social Security Administration · filed 1993-01-29(b)

The plaintiff may not sue Kennedy, a Massachusetts or Washington, D.C., resident, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois. See venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) governs where a civil action may be brought.

Lewis v. Bayh · filed 2007-04-24(b)

The district court properly dismissed without prejudice Lewis’s claim against Senator Bayh, because venue was improper in the Central District of California, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), and Lewis neither sought to have the claim transferred nor showed that a transfer to the proper venue would be in the interests of justice, see King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir.1992) (per curiam).

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where the defendants do not all reside, no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, and another district is available.

Ballard v. Holinka · filed 2009-02-27(b)

Venue is not proper in this district under any of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b): defendants do not all reside in the District of Columbia, no substantial part of the events giving rise to plaintiffs claim took place here, and this is not a case in which no other district is available.

Section 1391 does not provide venue in the District of Columbia for personal-capacity claims arising from events at a Virginia prison.

Davis v. Mukasey · filed 2009-11-16

They also argue that venue in this Court is improper, subjecting the case to dismissal on that ground. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391; Fed. R. Civ.P. 12(b)(3). Defendants are correct on both accounts.

Section 1391(b) makes a complaint subject to dismissal when venue in the district is improper.

Merriweather v. Lappin · filed 2010-05-11(b)

Additionally, the Court notes that the claims against defendants Gregory and Wilson are also subject to dismissal because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them, and that the complaint is subject to dismissal because venue in this district is improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district with no alleged connection to the defendants, events, or property at issue.

Azubuko v. Irish · filed 2011-10-14(b)

We agree with the district court that Azubuko’s complaint does not qualify under any of the § 1391(b) prongs.

Section 1391 did not provide a basis for venue in the District of Columbia in this action.

Liu v. Hopkins County Sulphur Springs · filed 2016-08-05

The district court also correctly determined that venue in this district is improper, either under 18 U.S.C. § 1965 or otherwise, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391 does not permit an action to be maintained in a district where venue is improper.

Perales v. City and County of San Francisco Sheriff Department · filed 2017-12-26

Finally, the action cannot be maintained in this Court because venue is not proper in the District of Massachusetts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b) does not provide venue in a district where no defendant resides, no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, and no defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Matlin v. Spin Master Corp. · filed 2018-07-20(b)

The Court further grants the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for improper venue without prejudice as well for failure to meet any one of the three provisions set forth under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b).

Section 1391 does not provide venue in a district with no ties to the claims when the plaintiff resides elsewhere.

Simon v. United States Department Of Justice · filed 2018-11-19

The defendants correctly point out that venue does not exist in the District of Massachusetts. The claims raised in this action lack any ties to the District of Massachusetts, and Simon represents that he resides in New York.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district where neither defendant resides and none of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, when another district provides a proper venue.

Aldino v. I.K. Systems, Inc. · filed 2019-09-30(b)

Applying the venue statute to the instant case, it is clear that venue is not proper in the Eastern District of New York (“EDNY”).

Section 1391 makes venue improper in a district with no connection to the defendants or the events giving rise to the claim.

Lietzke v. City of Montgomery · filed 2019-10-22(b)

However, from the face of the Complaint, it is clear that venue is improper in the District of Nebraska.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district where none of its listed grounds for bringing a civil action is present.

Hurt v. American College Dictionary · filed 2020-02-13(b)

In short, none of the requirements of § 1391 are present in this case. Therefore, venue in the Eastern District of Missouri is not proper.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district where no defendant is alleged to reside and none of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

McCray v. GNL · filed 2020-02-21(b)

Under both Title VII’s venue provision and the general venue provision, this District is not a proper venue for this action because (1) the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Atlanta, Georgia, and (2) Plaintiff does not allege that any defendant resides in this District.

Section 1391(b) requires a basis connecting a civil action to the district where it is filed; venue is improper when none of its requirements is met.

Hurt v. U.S. Constitution · filed 2020-04-16(b)

In sum, none of the requirements of § 1391 are present in this case, and venue is therefore improper.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district when the events giving rise to the suit occurred elsewhere and the defendants' relevant connections are elsewhere.

Stone v. Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP · filed 2020-06-05(b)

Because this suit arises from events occurring in Florida and Defendants are connected to Florida, venue is improper in this district.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district when none of its grounds for venue is present.

Clervrain v. Schimel · filed 2020-06-09(b)

In sum, none of the requirements of § 1391 are present in this case and venue is therefore improper.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district that satisfies none of its venue requirements.

Hurt v. U.S. Constitution · filed 2020-06-25(b)

In short, none of the requirements of § 1391 are present in this case, and venue is therefore improper.

Section 1391 makes venue improper when no defendant resides in the district, no events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred there, and no other statutory basis for venue is shown.

Hurt v. U.S. Constitution · filed 2020-06-26(b)

In short, none of the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 are present in this case, and venue is therefore improper.

Section 1391 requires a basis for venue in the district, such as a defendant’s residence or events giving rise to the claim.

Hurt v. U.S. Constitution · filed 2020-06-29

In short, none of the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 are present in this case, and venue is therefore improper.

Venue under § 1391 depends on where defendants reside and where events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Hurt v. U.S. Constitution · filed 2020-07-02(b)

He lives in Washington, D.C., no defendant resides in this district, and there is no indication that any events or omissions that could be understood to give rise to any claim occurred in the Eastern District of Missouri. In short, none of the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 are present in this case, and venue is therefore improper.

Section 1391 does not establish venue in a district where no defendant is shown to reside and no event or omission giving rise to the claim is shown to have occurred.

Hurt v. American College Dictionary · filed 2020-07-21

He lives in Washington, D.C., he provides no support that any defendant resides in this district, and there is no indication that any events or omissions that could be understood to give rise to any claim occurred in the Eastern District of Missouri. In short, none of the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 are present in this case, and venue is therefore improper.

Section 1391's venue requirements were unmet where no defendant resided in the district and no events or omissions giving rise to a claim occurred there.

Hurt v. United States · filed 2020-07-23

He lives in Washington, D.C., it does not appear that any defendant resides in this district, and there is no indication that any events or omissions that could be understood to give rise to any claim occurred in the Eastern District of Missouri. In short, none of the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 are present in this case, and venue is therefore improper.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper where the defendant does not reside, the claim’s underlying conduct did not occur, and the defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction for that claim.

Hawkins v. Well Path, LLC · filed 2020-07-27(b)

Venue is improper in this district because defendant does not reside in New York, the alleged conduct giving rise to Barnett’s claims did not occur in New York, and defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York with respect to Barnett’s claims.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district with no connection to the case when the defendant is located in another district.

MERTSOCK v. SHINGLEHOUSE BOROUGH POLICE · filed 2020-10-29(b)

This District has no connection to the case, and venue here is improper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue where the defendants do not reside and no substantial part of the events occurred when another district is available.

Bennett v. State of Indiana · filed 2020-12-08(b)

As a result, the Northern District of Ohio is an improper venue for this suit.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where the defendants do not all reside, no relevant conduct occurred, and another district is available.

Scaperotta v. Rhue · filed 2020-12-15(b)

Here, Section 1391(b)(1) does not apply because all Defendants do not reside in Hawaii. ... Section 1391(b)(2) does not apply because none of the complained-of conduct has any connection to Hawaii. ... Finally, Section 1391(b)(3) does not apply because Scaperotta could have brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. In short, venue in this district is improper.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides and no relevant conduct or property is located when another district is available.

Ballering v. State of Utah Department of Professional Licenses · filed 2020-12-16(b)

Here, Section 1391(b)(1) does not apply because no Defendant resides in Hawai‘i. ... Section 1391(b)(2) does not apply because none of the complained-of conduct or property at issue has any connection to Hawai‘i. ... Finally, Section 1391(b)(3) does not apply because Ballering could have brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, where the property at issue appears to be located. Thus, venue in this district is improper.

Section 1391(b) permits venue based on defendant residence, a substantial part of the events or property, or, when no other district qualifies, personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Hernandez v. TransUnion Inc · filed 2020-12-30(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides that venue is proper in: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; ... However, PHEAA does not reside in Louisiana.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue where no defendant resides and no events giving rise to the claim occurred when another district is available.

Crane v. City of Dunsmuir · filed 2021-01-04(b)

In any event, this does not suggest a basis for venue here under Section 1391(b) as none of the Defendants reside here, none of the events giving rise to Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim occurred in the Northern District of California, and finally, there is a district—the Eastern District—wherein Plaintiff could have brought her claims.

Section 1391(b) makes the Western District of New York an improper venue for claims against defendants located in the Northern District and arising from events there.

Caggiano v. Rees · filed 2021-02-22(b)

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert claims against Vanostrand, Sowich or Russell for events that allegedly occurred at Auburn, Mohawk, Mid-State, and the Central New York Psychiatric Center, this Court is not the appropriate venue to hear this matter. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b); 1406(a).

Section 1391(b) requires a basis for venue in the chosen district, such as defendants’ residence, substantial events or property, or the fallback personal-jurisdiction provision.

Johnson v. Illinois Child Family Services · filed 2021-04-05(b)

In sum, none of the requirements of § 1391 are present in this case and venue is therefore improper.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue where no defendant resides and none of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, when another forum is available.

Siruk v. Mazur · filed 2021-04-29(b)

District of Minnesota is not the correct venue because Defendants do not reside in Minnesota; the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims did not occur in Minnesota; and Plaintiff could initiate an action in state or federal court in North Carolina, where the alleged harm occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district where no defendant resides and no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

BARBER v. DEPUY SYNTHES PRODUCTS, INC. · filed 2021-07-21(b)

Having determined that the Court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants, the Court notes that venue in this district is also improper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides: “[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may . . . be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if any defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.”

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in the District of Columbia when the claims have no apparent connection to that district and the alleged events occurred in Nevada.

Christian v. Boulware Jr. · filed 2021-08-12(b)

Consequently, venue here is improper, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), and the ability of this court to exercise personal jurisdiction over these defendants is, at best, uncertain, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2); International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that due process of law requires that, in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, the defendant must either (1) be present within territory of forum, or (2) have certain minimum contacts with it such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Section 1391 does not support venue in a district when the relevant events occurred elsewhere and the alleged local connection is frivolous.

Ash, Davenell v. State of Wisconsin · filed 2021-08-26

The only allegation tying these incidents to the Western District of Wisconsin is the alleged multi-state conspiracy to harass Ash. That frivolous allegation cannot support personal jurisdiction against the Illinois defendants. For the same reasons, Ash’s allegations make clear that venue is improper in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391 makes venue improper in a district where no defendant resides and none of the events underlying the complaint occurred when another district provides proper venue.

Kim v. Stephens · filed 2021-10-27

Plaintiff’s complaint brings claims against individuals who all ostensibly reside in New Jersey: New Jersey Judges Tarantino and Cifelli, New Jersey Prosecutors Theodore Stephens, II, Mira Ohm, and Joseph Giodano, and three individuals (John Strangefeld, Caroline Feeney, and Michael Saccento) who work at Prudential’s New Jersey office. (Complaint at 2-3.) The complaint is based on events and criminal proceedings that took place in New Jersey. (/d. at 5-8.) The complaint thus fails to meet any of the requirements provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1391 making venue in this Court improper. This case is therefore dismissed.

Section 1391(b) requires a connection between the chosen district and the defendants or the events underlying the claim.

Peacemaker-El v. Krauss · filed 2022-01-11(b)

None of the requirements of § 1391 are present in this case. Accordingly, venue in the Eastern District of Missouri is not proper.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides, no substantial part of the events or property is located, and no defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

El Bey v. Dogdig · filed 2022-03-15(b)

Thus, under Section 1391(b)(1), (2), or (3), this court is not a proper venue for any of Plaintiff’s remaining claims.

Section 1391 makes venue improper in South Carolina for this action concerning alleged constitutional violations at a Florida facility.

Gamble v. Kirkendall · filed 2022-05-11

venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 is not appropriate in the District of South Carolina. ... Accordingly, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Report (ECF No. 8), and the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.