28 U.S.C. § 1391

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where material operative facts giving rise to the claim occurred.

Aguero v. Christopher · filed 1980-01-03(b)

Because these “operative facts” occurred in Laredo, the Court finds that venue is proper in this district.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where a claim against both defendants arose.

Apex Construction, Inc. v. Huron Manufacturing Corp. · filed 1980-01-14(a)

Venue is proper as to both defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), since one of the claims against both arose from events in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho.

Section 1391(a) permits a court to consider the plaintiffs’ convenience when determining where a diversity claim arose.

Akbar v. New York Magazine Co. · filed 1980-02-12(a)

Because venue may be had under § 1391(a) in the judicial district where all the plaintiffs reside, it would follow that we could consider the convenience of plaintiffs in determining where the claim arose. We shall do so, but we conclude we would have reached the same result without weighing this factor in this case.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a transitory trademark claim in a district where the alleged infringer has significant activities; sending goods or sales literature there alone is insufficient.

Gold Eagle Co. v. Li · filed 1980-03-17(b)

Thus, under Section 1391(b), venue in a “transitory” cause is proper only in those districts in which the trademark infringer has had significant activities. The mere fact that the infringer sent goods or sales literature bearing the infringing mark into the district cannot be the basis of venue.

Under § 1391(a), a diversity claim arises for venue purposes in a district where the transactions giving rise to the claim support personal jurisdiction.

Oce-Industries, Inc. v. Coleman · filed 1980-04-07(a)

As an alternative basis for decision, we find that because the defendant was subject to jurisdiction in this forum on a cause of action arising out of the “transaction of business” in Illinois within the meaning of the Illinois long-arm statute, this claim necessarily arose in Illinois (more particularly, the Northern District of Illinois) for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the operative facts giving rise to a claim occurred, even if an alleged breach occurred elsewhere.

Gurrola v. Griffin & Brand Sales Agency, Inc. · filed 1980-04-21(b)

Venue is also proper in the Southern District under § 1391(b), as this is the district “in which the claim arose.” For venue purposes, “claim” means the aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforcable in the courts.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim is likely to arise.

Cervi v. State Department of Offender Rehabilitation · filed 1980-04-22(b)

Furthermore, although the office of the Georgia Department of Offender Rehabilitation to which plaintiff Cervi would ordinarily be delivered is in the Middle District, there is sufficient likelihood both by the requirement of law and allegations of the plaintiff that the transfer could occur within the Southern District of Georgia. Accordingly, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because plaintiff’s claim for deprivation is likely to arise in this district.

In a diversity action, the claim arises for venue purposes in the district with the most significant contacts.

Lieb v. American Pacific International, Inc. · filed 1980-04-24(a)

Given these facts, I find that the contacts weigh most heavily in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Accordingly, I deny the motion to dismiss for lack of proper venue.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where plaintiffs suffer the injury giving rise to their claim, even when the challenged policy is administered in another district.

Sanchez v. Pingree · filed 1980-05-16(b)

Although the statute is administered in the Northern District, the effect of the statute is felt by Plaintiffs in the Southern District and the injury to Plaintiffs occurs in the Southern District. Therefore, the claim arose in the Southern District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the defendant agency maintains a large office and the payments at issue were due.

Florida Nursing Home Ass'n v. Page · filed 1980-05-16(b)

Applying this standard, then, it is clear that venue properly lies in this matter in the Southern District of Florida. Not only does appellant maintain a large office there but the payments which Golden Isles is seeking were allegedly due it within the Southern District where Golden Isles and the other plaintiffs-appellees are located. This is sufficient in the circumstances of this case to justify the placing of venue in the Southern District of Florida.

For nationwide infringement, § 1391(b) permits venue where significant sales cause substantial injury or another significant element of the offense occurs.

Finance Co. of America v. BankAmerica Corp. · filed 1980-07-01(b)

Of course, where the allegedly infringing name is used on a nationwide basis, passing off may occur in every district. In such an instance, the appropriate test is whether “significant sales causing substantial injury were made in the district in which venue is asserted, or some other overt act constituting a significant and substantial element of the offense occurred there.”

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where a complex contract claim arose in part.

Hi Fi Corner, Inc. v. Inflight Cinema International Inc. · filed 1980-07-18(a)

It is clear that in somewhat complex litigation, a claim may arise in more than one district. ... For that reason, and for the reason that this cause of action allegedly arose in part in Tennessee, venue is properly found in the present forum.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in every district where a defendant sells its product; the claim must have substantial ties to the district.

Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Seabrook Brothers & Sons, Inc. · filed 1980-08-19(b)

In sum, we find that defendants’ contacts with this district are insufficient to support the proposition that plaintiff’s claim “arose” in this district, as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue against individual defendants in a district where the claim arose.

Marquest Medical Products, Inc. v. Emde Corp. · filed 1980-09-10(b)

Venue here is proper against these individual defendants if the “claim arose” in Colorado. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). I have concluded that the claim did arise in Colorado. Therefore venue is proper irrespective of the waiver of the defense of improper venue.

Section 1391 permits venue in the judicial district where the claim arose.

Heritage House Frame & Moulding Co. v. Boyce Highlands Furniture Co. · filed 1980-09-18

Likewise, venue is proper in the Eastern District of New York. A civil action may be brought in the judicial district in which the claim arose.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where the claim arose, considering which district has the most significant contacts with the claim.

Haeberle v. Texas International Airlines · filed 1980-10-08(a)

Thus, one viable approach to the problem of laying venue under this provision is to determine “whether, in comparison with other possible forums, the most significant contacts underlying the cause of action took place here.” ... Defendant has offered no candidate more likely than the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as the district in which the claim arose. ... Venue is thus properly laid here.

Section 1391 permits venue in a diversity action in the district where the claim arose.

Marder v. Dembinski · filed 1980-10-17(a)

For one thing, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 permits diversity venue in the district “where all plaintiffs reside, or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose” (emphasis added). Because the alleged accident took place in Massachusetts, proper venue there (contrary to Marder’s assertion) was uncontestable.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where the claim arose.

Southeastern Equipment Co. v. Union Camp Corp. · filed 1980-10-20(a)

The threshold requirement for transfer is met since plaintiff’s claim for property damage allegedly resulting from the negligent emission of gases from defendant’s tank car, arose in Jacksonville, Florida, and thus venue would be proper in the transfer forum. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(b) places venue for an action not founded solely on diversity where all defendants reside or where the operative events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Chancellor v. Lawrence · filed 1980-11-05(b)

On the basis of the matters alleged, it is difficult to conclude that the proper venue of this lawsuit against Texas residents is Illinois rather than Texas. The operation, the allegedly deficient surgical and post-operative care and the alleged lack of disclosure to the plaintiff all occurred in Texas. Indeed, although plaintiff was a ward of Illinois, it appears that all events having “operative significance” in the case are centered in Texas. Venue, providing access to particular federal courts, is a Congressional determination which may not be and is not co-extensive within the reach of the due process clause. Congress has not provided access to this Court. Accordingly and alternatively, the venue objections are sustained.

Under § 1391(b), an antitrust claim arises where the contacts weigh most heavily, and venue must be assessed for each defendant even when a conspiracy is alleged.

Health Care Equalization Committee v. Iowa Medical Society · filed 1980-11-05(b)

The Court next must determine if venue as to Dr. Sabatier is properly laid in this district under the general federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. ... An antitrust claim arises “where the contacts weigh most heavily”. ... Further, even when a conspiracy is alleged by plaintiff, the Court must evaluate the appropriateness of venue in the forum as to each individual defendant. ... Based upon the above principles as applied to the circumstances of defendant Dr. Sabatier, the Court finds that plaintiff’s claim against this defendant arose in Iowa.

Section 1391 places venue where the claim arose, determined by weighing the defendant’s contacts concerning the claim in the districts at issue.

Coface v. Optique Du Monde, Ltd. · filed 1980-12-17

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue in this case properly lies in the district where the claim arose. Determining the district in which a claim arose for venue purposes requires an examination of the weight of defendant’s contacts regarding the claim in the various districts concerned.

In a diversity action, Section 1391(a) permits venue in the district where the claim arose.

McAlister v. General American Life Insurance · filed 1980-12-30(a)

Venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391 which reads in part: ... Under the undisputed facts set out above the claim involved herein obviously arose in Houston, Texas. ... Therefore, the instant action might have been brought in the Southern District of Texas.

Section 1391(a) permits venue where the claim arose.

Alewine v. City Council of Augusta, Ga. · filed 1981-01-13(a)

Venue is proper in the Augusta Division of the Southern District of Georgia where the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the claim arose even when some alleged acts occurred elsewhere.

Cooper v. Molko · filed 1981-02-03(b)

While it is true that some of the acts described in the complaint did or may have taken place outside the Northern District of California, a fair reading of the complaint reveals that this district is quite clearly the locus of Plaintiff’s claim.

Under § 1391(a), tort claims and analogous statutory claims arise where the plaintiff suffers the injury for venue purposes.

Lachman v. Bank of Louisiana in New Orleans · filed 1981-03-20(a)

The statutory causes of action, involving as they do the alleged breaches of a legal duty, are closely analogous to a common law tort, and thus tort principles should apply in determining where the statutory claims “arose.” It would appear that any loss as a result of either of plaintiff’s statutory or tort claims would have been suffered in the Northern District of Ohio. Thus the claims “arose” here.

For a federal antitrust claim, § 1391(b) permits venue where the plaintiff suffers business injury because the claim arises where the damages occur.

Myers v. American Dental Ass'n · filed 1981-03-24(b)

Because the ADA and some of the individual defendants do not reside here, venue will only lie in this Court if the cause of action arose in the Virgin Islands. ... Furthermore, civil antitrust actions arise where the damages occur. The injury that flows from an illegal conspiracy sounds in tort. Thus the antitrust claim can be tried where the injury (i.e. the business damages) occurs. ... The restraint of trade caused injury in the Virgin Islands and therefore the cause of action arose here. Defendants’ motions based on improper venue will be denied.

Section 1391(b) determines where a claim arose by considering the events central to the case and the accessibility of witnesses and records.

Sharp Electronics Corporation v. Hayman Cash Register Company · filed 1981-05-04(b)

In this circuit, we have determined that where the claim arose should “be ascertained by advertence to events having operative significance in the case, and a commonsense appraisal of the implications of those events for accessibility to witnesses and records.”

In a diversity action, venue based on where the claim arose lies in the district that is the locus of the claim.

Robbins v. First American Bank of Virginia · filed 1981-05-21(a)

The action here is not unusual and the locus of the claim is clearly Virginia. The alleged diversions of funds providing the basis for this action resulted from activities taken by Virginia residents in Virginia.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim arose, including where allegedly unlawful calls were completed and caused harm.

Gachette v. Tri-City Adjustment Bureau · filed 1981-06-26(b)

Because this Court concludes that venue is proper under § 1391(b), it will not discuss the applicability of § 1391(c) to corporate defendant Tri-City. ... The phone calls, allegedly in violation of the Act, were initiated in Virginia; they were completed in Georgia, and the harm occurred here.

Section 1391(b) requires the court to weigh the events’ and parties’ contacts with the district when deciding where a claim arose; miniscule contacts do not establish venue.

Agra Chemical Distributing Co. v. Marion Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1981-06-29(b)

In determining where a claim “arises” under § 1391(b), the court must weigh the contacts between the events and parties involved in the action and the forum. ... The court finds that these are not significant contacts, and “miniscule” contacts will not sustain venue.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a federal-question action in the district where the claim arose, based on the significant events giving rise to the claim.

Goldhaber v. Foley · filed 1981-07-16(b)

Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) since the plaintiffs’ claim arose in this district.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in the district where the claim arose.

Jacobs v. Lancaster · filed 1981-08-27(a)

Under the undisputed facts set out above the claim involved herein arose in Idaho. ... As the contract and promissory note involved in this action were entered into in Idaho and Plaintiff’s claim arose in Idaho, the Court determines that the instant action might have been brought in the District of Idaho.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a nondiversity case where the claim arose, taking account of the principal foreseeable consequences of the defendants’ conduct.

Rios v. Marshall · filed 1981-11-23(b)

Although the Florida sugar defendants’ alleged actions relevant to this lawsuit occurred in Jamaica, Florida and New York, the principal and foreseeable consequences of that allegedly unlawful conduct were in New York, in the Southern District and elsewhere, where plaintiffs were employed during the years in question. The court finds that the venue requirements of § 1391(b) are satisfied and the Florida sugar defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue is accordingly denied.

Section 1391(a) permits venue where the greater part of multiple defendants’ acts or omissions occurred, even if some defendants acted in other districts.

Hodson v. AH Robins Co., Inc. · filed 1981-11-25(a)

If the Congressional purpose of closing venue gaps is to be achieved under § 1391(a) in a case where the only possible ground for venue is the locus of claims against multiple diverse defendants, venue must be found proper in a district in which the greater part of the defendants’ acts or omissions occurred, even though some of the defendants have conducted activities in other districts.

Sections 1391(b) and (c) can independently require dismissal for improper venue even when personal jurisdiction is considered separately.

Accutest Corp. v. Accu Test Systems, Inc. · filed 1982-01-06

Rather, upon an inquiry separate from our decision on personal jurisdiction, we conclude that improper venue constitutes an independent ground for dismissing this action since neither § 1391(b) nor § 1391(c) provides a basis for venue in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside or where the claim arose; a claim arises where the defendant's complained-of acts or omissions occur.

Shayer v. Kirkpatrick · filed 1982-01-07(b)

We determined that according to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976) venue was proper only in the Western District. Section 1391(b) allows a claim to be brought only where all defendants reside or where the claim arose. A claim arises where the complained-of acts or omissions of a defendant occur.

Section 1391(b) requires consideration of convenience to the parties and witnesses when deciding where a claim arose for venue.

Sarf v. Arnovitz · filed 1982-03-17(b)

This teaching calls for an analysis of where the litigation may be conducted most conveniently to all involved — parties and witnesses. ... Although defendants did things which are a sufficient basis for a court in New York to exercise long-arm jurisdiction, the convenience of the parties and witnesses points more to the Middle District of Pennsylvania than to this district as the proper venue for this suit.

Section 1391(b) permits an action to remain in a district with no resident defendants only if the claim arose there.

Aluminum Co. of America v. Utilities Commission · filed 1982-04-12(b)

Since none of the defendants reside in this district, the case may remain here only if this is where the claim arose. ... We find that North Carolina is the “only one obvious locus.”

Under § 1391(b), a claim ordinarily arises in the district with the weight of the relevant contacts; a plaintiff may choose among districts only when their contacts with the claim are approximately equal.

Catrambone v. Bloom · filed 1982-05-24(b)

In other words, since a plaintiff will be permitted to choose among alternatives only in the rare case where there are two or more districts having approximately equal contacts with the claim, a plaintiff seeking to lay venue in the district in which the claim arose in the ordinary case is confined to the single district where the weight of the contacts is located.

Section 1391(e) permits venue where the operative events giving rise to a claim and the alleged injury occurred.

Mansfield v. Orr · filed 1982-06-25(e)

The defendant Secretary of the Air Force challenges venue in this District for the reason that none of the venue-determining factors, set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), exist or arose in this District. The Court has determined that the defendant’s challenge is without merit. Although the matter now comes before the Court following the action of the Air Force Board of Correction of Military Records, the operative events, namely, the alleged non-payment of AFROTC course tuition and subsistence, occurred in, and have their nexus with the State of Maryland.

Under the version of § 1391(b) applied here, venue for a nondiversity action lay where all defendants resided or where the claim arose.

Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt · filed 1982-07-16(b)

Section 1391(b) provides that a civil action not founded solely on diversity of citizenship (such as this one) may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside “or in the judicial district where the claim arose.” ... As a result, application of either of the arguably relevant standards for ascertaining where a claim “arose” reveals that venue does not exist in the District with regard to the private defendants.

Under § 1391(b), venue for a challenge to a state statute lies where the statute was enacted and will be enforced when that district is the more plausible locus of the claim.

District No. 1, Pacific Coast District, M.E.B.A. v. State of Alaska · filed 1982-07-27(b)

We merely hold that, under the analysis of Leroy, venue in this case, involving a constitutional challenge to an Alaska statute, lies only in Alaska.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for declaratory relief in the district where the claim arose.

Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n · filed 1982-09-15(b)

Venue is proper for purposes of declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1980), as the plaintiffs’ claim arose in this district.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity case in the district where the claim arose; insertion and removal of the device there supported venue for the claim against its manufacturer.

LaBrier v. AH Robins Co., Inc. · filed 1982-09-29(a)

The fact that the Daikon Shield was inserted and removed in this judicial district, and that it was allegedly removed because the plaintiff complained of heavy bleeding upon menstruation and intermittent vague pelvic pain, leads this court to conclude, at least preliminarily for the purposes of the motion, that the claim, insofar as it relates to Robins, arose in this district. Thus Robins motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) must be denied.

Section 1391(b) provides venue in the district where the claim arose when the special venue provision does not apply.

Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Watt · filed 1982-09-30(b)

Thus, this Court must turn to the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides venue within this district as the place where the claim arose.

Under § 1391(b), a trademark infringement claim arises for venue purposes where the defendants’ contacts are most significant; an appearance at a trade show alone was insufficient here.

Windsor Industries, Inc. v. U.S. Diamond Imports · filed 1982-10-22(b)

Although there is no precise formula for determining whether a defendant’s contacts are so significant as to support venue, the defendant’s contacts in this case are insufficient to establish that the claim “arose” in this district, as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Under the established standards, venue is improper in this district.

Section 1391 permits venue where the claim arose or where a corporate defendant is doing business.

Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Industries, Inc. · filed 1982-10-22(b), (c)

The Court has found that at least a part of the cause of action has arisen in Minnesota since the contract was made with a Minnesota resident and was to be completed in Minnesota and because advertising materials were sent into the state with a resident. And, in view of its substantial, long-time sales to Minnesota customers, it is irrefutable that defendant Malone is doing business in this state. Therefore, this Court finds venue to be properly laid in this forum.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in the district where the cause of action arose.

Schmidt v. Leader Dogs for the Blind, Inc. · filed 1982-07-15(a)

Venue exists in the Eastern District of Michigan because that is where the cause of action arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a consumer receives allegedly unlawful debt collection communications when those events are substantial to the claim and the district is generally convenient for all.

Murphy v. Allen County Claims & Adjustments, Inc. · filed 1982-10-29(b)

We reject defendants’ argument, and find that venue is appropriate in this district. Although no facts have as yet been established, defendant concedes that communications were made to plaintiff after he had moved to the Southern District of Ohio. Assuming that such communications did violate the FDCPA, we can conclude that plaintiff suffered an injury in the Southern District.

Under § 1391(a), a contractual claim can arise for venue purposes in a district where the contract was to be performed and a substantial part of the underlying events occurred.

In Re Nine Mile Limited, D/B/A Serco Administrators and American Warranty Corporation · filed 1982-11-02(a)

The “place of performance” rationale, coupled with the “substantial part” test, is sufficient to sustain the district court’s determination that South Carolina was a jurisdiction in which the petitioners’ claims arose for purposes of the federal venue statute.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides and the claim did not arise when jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship.

Meaamaile v. American Samoa · filed 1982-11-12(b)

Here, the cause of action arose and all defendants reside in American Samoa, which is not within the judicial district of Hawaii.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in the district where the cause of action arose.

Manning v. Mundock · filed 1982-11-29(a)

As the plaintiffs point out, under the 1966 amendment to § 1391(a), venue may also rest on the fact that the cause of action arose within the Middle District.

In a diversity action, the court determines where a claim arose for venue purposes by weighing the contacts with each forum.

Mercantile Financial Corp. v. UPA Productions of America · filed 1982-12-02(a)

Having weighed the contacts in the instant case, the Court is of the opinion that the claim arose, for purposes of § 1391, in California.

Section 1391(b) governs a false designation of goods claim with no special venue provision; when the claim did not arise in the forum district, venue lies in the district where the defendant resides.

Micromanipulator Co., Inc. v. Bough · filed 1982-12-06(b)

The claim for false designation of goods brought pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125 has no special venue provision and thus comes under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Any reasonable reading of the complaint indicates that this claim did not arise in Nevada and that venue then properly lies in the district where defendant resides.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside or where the claim arose, determined by the location of significant operative events.

Leech v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston · filed 1982-12-10(b)

Venue in this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... In this case, we believe that the significant operative events occurred in the Southern District of Florida. ... In summary, we find that venue properly lies in the Southern District of Florida rather than in this District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the claim arose.

Clayton v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America · filed 1983-01-10(b)

On the record presently before the Court venue appears to be properly laid in this District since this is the place where the alleged claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) does not establish venue where an antitrust plaintiff suffered injury merely because the injury occurred there.

Myers v. American Dental Association · filed 1983-01-10(b)

In the case at bar the district court erroneously concluded that an antitrust claim, in essence a form of tort alleging business injury, can be brought under section 1391(b) where the injury occurs, i.e. at the plaintiff's residence. Defendants' affidavits establish that none of its potential witnesses are located in the Virgin Islands, and that the deliberations that led up to adoption of the Code did not take place there. Under Leroy, Chicago and not the Virgin Islands is the proper situs for a venue based on where the cause of action arose. We therefore conclude that venue does not lie in the Virgin Islands by virtue of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(b).

Under § 1391(a), a court determining where a contract claim arose for venue considers the parties’ entire relationship and weighs their contacts with each district.

NTN Bearing Corp. of America v. Charles E. Scott, Inc. · filed 1983-02-28(a)

Facts do not come neatly packaged with weights attached. We must look to the entire relationship between the parties, analyzing all the facts in light of that relationship, in order to determine where venue is proper. Doing so, we conclude that venue is proper in this district.

Under § 1391(a), when a diversity claim has significant contacts with several districts, venue based on where the claim arose generally lies in the district with the most significant contacts.

Turner v. Pemberton · filed 1983-03-11(a)

Of course, venue is then established in the judicial district where the most significant contacts with the cause of action exist. Only in a very “unusual case,” where the contacts with various judicial districts are essentially equal, may a cause of action be found to have arisen in more than one district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where defendants’ significant conduct within the district supports the claim.

Eaby v. Richmond · filed 1983-03-11(b)

We, therefore, conclude that the intradistrict activity of the Richmonds, conducted through their agent Snavely and the authorship of and mailing letters to this district by defendants Nau and Dawson, amounts to sufficient activity within the district to support venue.

Section 1391(b) does not place venue wherever a plaintiff feels the economic effects of an injury; the court looks to where the claim arose.

Medical Emergency Service Associates, S.C. v. Duplis · filed 1983-03-15(b)

We, therefore, do not agree with plaintiff that “place of injury” means the same thing as “place where the economic effects of the injury are felt” (although in some cases those places may be the same).

Under § 1391(b) and (e), venue was improper in a district where no defendant resided, no relevant property was located, and the claim did not arise.

Jones v. United States · filed 1983-04-13

Neither § 1391(b) nor § 1391(e) supports bringing this suit in this Court. None of the defendants in this action reside in this district and there is no real property involved. Moreover, it appears to the Court that the claim arose in Kansas.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the alleged violation physically occurred, even when defendants directed the conduct from another district.

Lightner v. Tremont Auto Auction, Inc. · filed 1983-04-22(b)

Based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation, Lightner’s “claim arose” in the Northern District of Illinois, the District in which he was physically deprived of property, and perhaps in the Eastern District of Missouri where some of the federal defendants’ acts occurred. Under § 1391(b), then, venue is proper in this district.

Section 1391(b) and (c) permit venue where all defendants reside and acts of trademark infringement occur.

Visa International Service Ass'n v. Visa Hotel Group, Inc. · filed 1983-04-08(b), (c)

Venue is proper in the federal district court where all defendants reside and where acts of trademark infringement occur under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c).

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where the claim arose, including where alleged conspirators met and discriminatory acts occurred.

Textor v. Board Of Regents Of Northern Illinois University · filed 1983-07-06(a)

Venue in this action lies only in the judicial district "in which the claim arose." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). ... Those contacts are sufficient to establish that plaintiff's claim arose in the forum district.

When the place where a claim arose is uncertain, § 1391(a) permits a district to be treated as its locus based on the location of witnesses and evidence and the defendant’s convenience.

Credit Alliance Corp. v. Crook · filed 1983-07-26(a)

Under the applicable venue provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), venue is proper “only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” ... In any event, under the Great Western formulation, it is more plausible that the Central District of California “be assigned as the locus of the claim” since 1) most, if not all, of the witnesses are located there; 2) much of the relevant evidence — Crook Co.’s records — is accessible there; and 3) the parties would be more convenienced by a trial there.

Section 1391(b) did not permit venue for the RICO claims in a district where the substantial acts underlying those claims did not occur.

Clement v. Pehar · filed 1983-08-08(b)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that venue as to plaintiffs’ RICO claims also is not proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

In a federal question action, § 1391(b) permits venue where the claim arose; for false arrest and imprisonment claims, that is where the injuries occurred.

Williams v. Garcia · filed 1983-08-24(b)

Thus, the cause of action arose in the Southern District of Texas and, accordingly, venue is proper in that district. Conversely, venue in the Eastern District of Michigan is improper.

Under § 1391(b), a district where allegedly infringing offers reached potential buyers is not necessarily where the claim arose; the court considers witnesses, evidence, and the defendant’s convenience.

German Educational Television Network, Ltd. v. Oregon Public Broadcasting Co. · filed 1983-09-08(b)

In my judgment, Leroy is now the controlling authority in respect of § 1391(b) venue; and, for the reasons stated, venue in this District is improper under the principles therein articulated.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claims arose.

Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Savings & Loan · filed 1983-10-31(b)

Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, in that the claims alleged herein arose in this district.

Under § 1391(e)(2), a challenge to an agency proceeding arises where the proceeding begins, rather than where its future effects may be felt.

Honeywell, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission · filed 1983-05-16(e)(2)

However, it is the opinion of this court that the cause of action here arose with the commencement of an administrative proceeding in the District of Columbia against Honeywell by the CPSC. It was that event which gave rise to the instant suit and, therefore, the cause of action did not arise, under any theory, in the District of Minnesota. Therefore, venue in Minnesota is not proper under § 1391(e)(2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the cause of action arose.

E. Penn Nicholson, Trustee for the Estate of Carolee's Combine, Inc. v. First Investment Company and Bill Beltzer · filed 1983-05-16(b)

Venue was also correctly found to exist in the Northern District of Georgia. Venue is proper in the district where the cause of action arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The trustee’s cause of action is based upon the payment by cashier’s check to appellant in Atlanta. Consequently, First Investment’s challenges to jurisdiction and venue are without merit.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a cause of action arose; a RICO claim does not arise in a district where none of its predicate acts occurred.

DeMoss v. First Artists Production Co., Ltd. · filed 1983-09-19(b)

Where venue is improper under § 1965, it may still be proper under § 1391(b), which provides for venue wherever a cause of action arose. But since all the acts upon which DeMoss’ RICO counts are predicated occurred outside of this district, the RICO claims cannot possibly be said to have “arisen” here.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where many of the alleged unlawful employment practices occurred.

Coser v. Moore · filed 1983-08-03(b)

Venue is proper within this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because many of de: fendants’ allegedly unlawful employment practices occurred at Stony Brook within this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claims arose.

Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Savings & Loan · filed 1983-09-21(b)

Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, in that the claims alleged herein arose in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claims arose.

Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Sav. and Loan · filed 1983-10-07(b)

Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, in that the claims alleged herein arose in this district.

For a diversity action under § 1391(a), the court uses a substantial contacts test to determine where the claim arose for venue purposes.

United Coal Co. v. Land Use Corp. · filed 1983-12-08(a)

This court applies a substantial contacts test to determine whether venue is proper in this judicial district.

Under § 1391(b), the court determines where a claim arose by weighing the relevant contacts; the place where the alleged injury was felt does not alone establish venue.

Soper v. Simmons International, Ltd. · filed 1983-12-21(b)

The facts in the present case, as developed in the pleadings and affidavits at bar, make it manifest that the “weight of contacts” for venue purposes lies in the Southern District of New York. There are absolutely no contacts with the Northern District of New York except that plaintiffs allege that the impact of the conspiracy is felt in this district.

Under § 1391(b), a declaratory judgment claim may arise where enforcement of the challenged law has a substantial impact, even if enforcement occurs elsewhere.

Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin · filed 1983-12-28(b)

In such a case it is possible that the claim could arise not only where the enforcers of an allegedly unconstitutional law reside, but also where that enforcement impacts. ... Thus, in that impact upon this district is not insubstantial, and in that this district is convenient for all parties, there is no reason to upset plaintiffs’ choice of forum, and defendant’s motion to transfer venue is denied.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the claim arose; when the defendants’ operative acts occurred in only one district, the claim arose there.

ANDREW H. BY IRENE H. v. Ambach · filed 1984-01-23(b)

On these facts venue is proper under section 1391(b) in the Northern District of New York alone, for the claim “arose” only there.

Under § 1391(b), a patent invalidity and noninfringement declaratory claim arises where the alleged infringer is located, receives infringement charges, or suffers economic injury.

Pennwalt Corp. v. Horton Co. · filed 1984-01-30(b)

A declaratory judgment action seeking (1) to invalidate a patent; and (2) a declaration of non-infringement, arises where the alleged infringer is located, receives the damaging charges of infringement, or suffers economic injury as a result of the charges.

Section 1391(a) permits venue where a claim arose, but diffuse reputational injury does not make every district where injury occurred a proper venue.

Davis v. Costa-Gavras · filed 1984-02-07(a)

Multiple venue under the “claim arose” provision is proper at most in districts that with “approximately equal plausibility ... may be assigned as the locus of the claim.” ... This rule precludes venue in Virginia since, even under a plaintiff-centered, place-of-injury analysis, the District of Columbia would provide a more plausible forum.

Section 1391(b) does not place venue in a district when two other districts have substantially greater contacts with the claims.

Bernstein v. IDT Corp. · filed 1984-03-02(b)

Whatever may be the meaning of the phrase “the judicial district ... in which the claim arose,” as used in Section 1391(b), it cannot include Delaware when there are two other Districts having substantially greater contacts with the subject matter of plaintiff’s claims.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the claim arose.

Gallery House, Inc. v. Yi · filed 1984-03-21(b)

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 and 1400. The claims asserted herein arose within this district, and both defendants are found within this district. Additionally, defendant Joy’s maintains its principal place of business within this district.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought in the judicial district where the claim arose.

Leab v. Streit · filed 1984-04-14(a)

The proper venue of this action is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) which provides, in relevant part, that “[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may ... be brought ... in the judicial district ... in which the claim arose.” Since the claim in this action arose out of an alleged contract, negotiated and executed in this district, for sale of a building located at 121 East 78th Street, in this district, venue is clearly proper in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim arose, based on the case’s contacts with that district.

Wendell Terrace Apts. v. Scruggs-Leftwich · filed 1984-05-24(b)

We find that the claim arose in the Eastern District and that the Eastern District is therefore a proper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b).

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in a district where the claim arose, even when the claim also arose in another district.

Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. v. South-Coast Bank · filed 1984-05-29(a)

Thus, having considered all factors, the court is of the opinion that the claim arose, for purposes of § 1391(a), in Indiana.

Section 1391(a) permits venue where a claim arose; the court weighed the litigation’s contacts with each district and found venue improper in Maryland.

Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Miller · filed 1984-08-01(a)

Applying a “weight of contacts” test to the allegations before the Court, and looking at the factors specifically mentioned by the Supreme Court in Leroy, this Court determines that venue for the plaintiff’s claim does not lie in this district.

When determining where a claim arose under § 1391(b), courts consider witness availability, access to evidence, and the defendant’s convenience, but not the plaintiff’s convenience.

Southern Marine Research, Inc. v. Jetronic Industries, Inc · filed 1984-08-23(b)

In determining which district is “a place which may be more convenient to the litigants,” the factors to be considered are the availability of witnesses, equal accessibility of other relevant evidence, and the convenience of the defendant, but not that of the plaintiff.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in the district where the claim arose.

Washington Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. United States Department of the Navy · filed 1984-09-21(a)

Venue in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California is proper because this action is brought in the district where the claim arose, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. section 1391(a).

Section 1391 permits venue in the district where the plaintiffs’ claims arose.

Pitts v. Black · filed 1984-10-09

3. Venue is properly laid in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the district in which plaintiffs’ claims arose, as specified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 and 1392.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the defendants centered the activities giving rise to the claim.

Look Magazine Enterprises S.A. v. Look, Inc. · filed 1984-10-16(b)

Applying the Supreme Court’s guidance to the facts of this case yields the conclusion that venue is proper in this district. This is the judicial district which Kunitz selected as the center for the activities allegedly infringing the plaintiff’s trademark.

Section 1391(a) permits venue where a claim arose, determined by whether the district has significant contacts with the dispute.

Precision Rubber Products Corp. v. George McCarthy, Inc. · filed 1984-10-29(a)

Under the weight of contacts test, the Court must determine if the contacts with this district are significant enough to justify venue. ... Based on the weight of contacts, the Court concludes that the claim arose in the Middle District of Tennessee for the purposes of Section 1391(a).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the claim arose.

National Coal Ass'n v. Clark · filed 1984-11-28(b)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper in the district in which the claim arose, and as noted in note 13, supra, Montana can reasonably be characterized as the district in which these claims arose.

Under § 1391(b), when all defendants do not reside in a district, venue there depends on whether the claim arose there.

Sunray Enterprises, Inc. v. David C. Bouza & Associates, Inc. · filed 1984-12-14(b)

There is no allegation that Bouza, the individual defendant, resides in New York. Thus, “all” defendants, as requested under Section 1391(b), obviously do not reside in New York and venue can only be properly laid in New York if the “claim” arose here.

Section 1391(b)'s claim-arose provision does not provide venue in another district when all defendants reside in the same district.

Canaday v. Koch · filed 1984-12-17(b)

That is, because the “claim arose” language was inserted into § 1391(b) to fill a venue gap created by the residence of defendants in different districts, venue under the “claim arose” language should not be considered when, as here, all defendants do reside in the same district, i.e., the Southern District of New York.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where a claim arose; the location of the underlying orders, solicitation, and nonpayment can establish that district.

IDEAL STENCIL MACH. AND TAPE CO. v. Merchiori · filed 1985-01-09(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides that venue is proper where the claim arose. Although there is no precise test to determine where the claim arose, the Court is of the opinion that this claim arose in this district.

Section 1391(b) requires courts to respect judicial district boundaries when deciding where a claim arose, even if another district’s courthouse is closer to the parties and evidence.

Reuber v. United States of America (Two Cases.) Melvin D. Reuber v. Food Chemical News (Two Cases.) · filed 1985-01-23(b)

Despite the pragmatic concerns of section 1391(b), we believe that its language — allowing suit to be brought “in the judicial district where ... the claim arose” — mandates that we take account of the boundaries between such districts.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where a claim arose.

Ross v. Colorado Outward Bound School, Inc. · filed 1985-02-21(b)

The District of Colorado, wherein plaintiff’s causes of action assertedly arose, would have been a proper district for the original institution of this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and the fact that venue was also proper in this forum poses no bar to a transfer under section 1406(a).

Under § 1391(b), the place of injury alone does not establish where a claim arose; the court also considers the relevant events, witnesses, evidence, and convenience of the defendants.

Payne v. Marketing Showcase, Inc. · filed 1985-02-25(b)

Thus, because no defendant except MSI has a significant connection with this district, the fact that plaintiff may have suffered her losses here does not make venue proper here. The convenience of both the litigants and the witnesses, access to the relevant proof, and the nature of the case convince the court that the locus of the claim is New York.

Under § 1391(b), a claim for violation of a judgment arises in the district where the judgment was entered.

In Re Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp. · filed 1985-04-03(b)

This disposes of Jonnet's contention that venue was improperly laid in the Eastern District of New York. As the 1981 Judgment was entered in that district, the claim for violation of the Judgment may be deemed to have arisen in that district.

Section 1391(b) permits a nondiversity civil action where the claim arose, and a claim for violating a judgment may arise in the district where the judgment was entered.

Wards Co. v. Jonnet Development Corp. · filed 1985-04-03(b)

As the 1981 Judgment was entered in that district, the claim for violation of the Judgment may be deemed to have arisen in that district. ... Hence, venue was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1982) (civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity may be brought in district in which the claim arose).

Section 1391(b) identifies where a claim arose by considering the accessibility of relevant evidence and the defendant's convenience when more than one district is plausible.

Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant · filed 1985-04-16(b)

In determining districts in which a claim may be regarded as having arisen for purposes of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(b) where there is arguably more than one such district, the controlling factors are the accessibility of relevant evidence and the convenience of the defendant (but not of the plaintiff).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a claim arose, determined by the district’s contacts with the underlying claim.

So-Comm, Inc. v. Reynolds · filed 1985-04-29(b)

Therefore, since Reynolds made several trips to Illinois which, in part, gave rise to this suit, this Court finds that So-Comm’s RICO claim “arose” in Illinois for purposes, of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the claim arose, even when events giving rise to the claim also occurred in another district.

Pikofsky v. Jem Oil · filed 1985-05-02(b)

Recognizing that the transactional basis for this action does not derive solely from the State of Wisconsin but springs, at least in part, from southern Illinois as well, where the subject oil wells are presumably located, the Court nonetheless finds no fundamental unfairness in determining, in the language of § 1391(b), that the Eastern District of Wisconsin is the forum “in which the claim arose.”

Section 1391(b) does not establish venue where an arbitration award was issued and served if the claim challenges the award’s merits rather than those administrative acts.

Central Valley Typographical Union, No. 46 v. McClatchy Newspapers · filed 1985-05-23(b)

We conclude that the administrative acts of issuing the award alone cannot form "a substantial part of the acts" to which the Publisher objects as a matter of law. It objects to the merits underlying the arbitrator's award, and seeks vacation of the award as a remedy. The Publisher is not challenging the technical aspects of the award's issuance. Thus, we conclude that these aspects of the award, including service, do not constitute part of the claim and do not confer venue on the Northern District.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action where the claim arose; for a tort claim, that is typically where the injury was suffered.

Cook v. International Harvester Co. · filed 1985-06-12(a)

Although there is no dispute that this action is properly venued for § 1391(a) purposes in this forum, it is equally clear that the action might have been initiated in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, where the truck accident occurred and the consequent injuries were apparently suffered. The Court’s finding as to the propriety of venue in that forum thus removes the final hurdle to the transfer of this case to the Southern District of Indiana for all further proceedings.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claims arose.

Best Resume Service, Inc. v. Care · filed 1985-01-30(b)

Venue in this court is proper with respect to the claims asserted in the complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because such claims arose in the Western District of Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim arose.

Monetary Management Group v. Kidder, Peabody & Co. · filed 1985-08-16(b)

Venue in this District is proper pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because the sales of the securities at issue herein took place in this District and both defendants are found, reside and/or transact business in this District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a claim arose, including a district where a substantial number of the acts underlying the claim occurred.

Miller Brewing Co. v. Landau · filed 1985-08-19(b)

Despite whatever arguments can be made with respect to the convenience of one forum as opposed to another, however, it is an undeniable fact that a substantial number of the actions which form the basis of the plaintiff’s claims occurred within this district. Accordingly, the Court hereby finds that the plaintiff’s claims did arise in this district, and the venue is proper here under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

When a claim has substantial contacts with multiple districts, § 1391(b) determines where it arose by considering witness availability, access to evidence, and defendants’ convenience, without considering plaintiffs’ convenience.

Jaffe v. Boyles · filed 1985-08-27(b)

However, the Supreme Court emphasized that the convenience of the plaintiffs is not to be considered when determining the propriety of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Since the other factors noted by the Court are roughly equal, the convenience of defendants is dispositive. The locus of the claim is the Middle District of Florida.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where the defendants’ contacts are too slight for the claim to have arisen there.

Weiss v. Rizzoli International Publications, Inc. · filed 1985-09-03(b)

In sum, the Court finds that defendants’ contacts with this district are insufficient to support the proposition that plaintiff’s claim “arose” in this district for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Accordingly, venue is not proper in the Northern District of Illinois.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in the district where the claim arose.

United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Cregor · filed 1985-09-30(a)

Therefore, since the cause of action arose in this district, venue is proper here under § 1391(a).

Under § 1391(a), the place of performance is the usual place where a contract claim arises for venue purposes.

J.L. Clark Manufacturing Co. v. Gold Bond Corp. · filed 1985-10-16(a)

In contract actions the simplest and most logical answer to the question of where the claim arose is place of performance.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the acts underlying the claims arose.

Corbesco, Inc. v. Local No. 542, International Union of Operating Engineers · filed 1985-10-22(b)

Jurisdiction exists by virtue of 29 U.S.C. §§ 185, 187 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, and venue is properly laid under 29 U.S.C. § 185(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... and the acts which are the basis of the claims arose in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred; neither the place of contracting nor the place of performance alone controls.

United States v. Douglas · filed 1985-11-05(b)

This Court agrees that a substantial contacts test should be used to determine whether venue is proper. Under this test, the plaintiff must show that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in the district. Thus, neither the place of performance nor the place of contracting are dispositive as to the propriety of venue.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in the district where the claim arose.

Mantua Oil, Inc. v. C.J. Marketing Co. · filed 1985-11-21(a)

Venue in this diversity case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), which provides that a civil action may be brought “in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” I conclude that venue is proper as to all defendants on the ground that plaintiffs claim arose in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claims arose.

Minstar, Inc. v. Laborde · filed 1985-12-24(b)

Under either the specific venue provision for the alleged securities law violations, § 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, or the general venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), an action may be brought in any district in which the claims arose. Since the events surrounding plaintiffs’ allegations all took place primarily in New Orleans, the Court finds that the claims arose in the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Section 1391 permits venue where the claim arose, but the plaintiff must allege or prove facts connecting the claim to that district.

Monument Builders of Greater Kansas City, Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass'n · filed 1986-02-26(b)

Section 1391 provides that venue is properly brought in the judicial district where all defendants reside or where the claim arose. This argument does little to convince the court that venue is proper against these defendants. The court finds that plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged or proven facts which even infer that the violation of the antitrust laws by these two defendants occurred in Kansas.

When no defendant resides in the district, § 1391(b) permits venue there only if the claim arose there, as determined by the location of the operative events.

Lyons Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, Inc. · filed 1986-03-26(b)

Because none of the defendants reside in Illinois, venue is proper here only if the plaintiff’s claim arose here. Deciding where the claim arose for venue purposes is determined by where the “events having operative significance in the case” occurred.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where substantial events underlying a claim occurred and the forum is convenient, even if important events also occurred elsewhere.

Cross-Appellant v. Vivian L. Jenson, Cross-Appellee, Clarence Ehli, Cross-Appellee · filed 1986-04-21(b)

Although events that occurred in Washington were obviously critical to the father's ability to state a cause of action under section 1738A and the Declaratory Judgment Act, that fact alone surely cannot defeat venue in Florida under the liberal construction we have given section 1391(b). We thus find that the district court did not err in denying the mother's motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue.

In a diversity action to enforce a state court judgment, the claim arises where the judgment was entered, not where the underlying conduct occurred.

Water West, Inc., a Nevada Corporation v. Entek Corporation, a Texas Corporation, and James Edward Turner · filed 1986-04-29(a)

Venue in a diversity action is governed by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(a), which states: ... The claim upon which this action is founded is the Nevada judgment; it is not the underlying claim for the breach of the distributorship agreement. That underlying claim was merged into the Nevada judgment and is extinguished. ... The present claim, based on the Nevada judgment, arose in Nevada.

Section 1391 permits a diversity action to be brought in the district where the claim arose; an interpleader claim to oil production proceeds arises where the wells are located.

National Cooperative Refinery Ass'n v. Rouse · filed 1986-05-07(a)

These requirements of venue in a diversity action are provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982), which allows the action to be brought “only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” The oil wells are in Colorado, and it is entitlement to the proceeds from the production of these wells which constitutes the “claim” giving rise to the interpleader. Venue in this court is therefore appropriate for the interpleader.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a nondiversity case when the defendants do not all reside in the district and the claim did not arise there.

Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. United States District Court for District of Wyoming · filed 1986-05-07(b)

Since it appears from the limited record that at no time during the pendency of this lawsuit have all defendants or all plaintiffs resided in a single judicial district, venue was proper in Wyoming only if that is “where the claim arose.” Wherever the claim did arise in this case, it certainly was not in Wyoming. ... Thus, Wyoming is not only an inconvenient forum for petitioners, but it is also an improper one under section 1391(b).

Under the version of § 1391(b) applied here, when the defendants did not all reside in one district, venue was proper only in a district where the claim arose.

Greene v. Sha-Na-Na · filed 1986-05-23(b)

Venue in the instant action is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because the complaint ¿lieges claims under federal trademark law in addition to state law claims. ... Accordingly, because none of the defendants reside in Connecticut and because all defendants do not reside in any one district, venue is proper only where the claim arose. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that venue in the instant case does not properly lie in this District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a federal-question action where all defendants reside or where the claim arose; minimal contacts with a district do not establish that the claim arose there.

Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Hillblom (In Re Continental Air Lines, Inc.) · filed 1986-05-29(b)

Continental’s claims cannot reasonably be found to have arisen in this district for purposes of 1391(b). Accordingly, in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, Continental’s turnover complaint is transferred to the United States District Court (N.M.I.) where it could have been initially filed.

Section 1391(b) permits an action not founded solely on diversity to be brought where all defendants reside or where the claim arose; the claim arose where virtually all conduct underlying it occurred.

Ronald M. Costlow and Bonnie F. Costlow v. Larry Weeks, Individually, and as Assistant Attorney General for the State of · filed 1986-06-09(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides that where jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity, a civil action “may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose....” The Costlows concede that all of the defendants reside in Alaska. Although they argue that their claim arose in the state of Washington, virtually all of the activity providing the basis of the complaint took place in Alaska. The district court properly concluded, therefore, that it lacked venue over the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits a civil action not founded solely on diversity to be brought in the judicial district where the claim arose.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Kerr · filed 1986-06-13(b)

With respect to the proper venue of this action, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides that a civil action not founded solely on diversity may be brought “in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” As discussed previously, the Court believes that the FDIC’s claims arose out of the January 30, 1985 transaction in Charlotte, North Carolina. Thus, under § 1391(b), venue is proper in the Western District of North Carolina.

Section 1391(a) permits venue for a diversity action in the district where the cause of action arose.

Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc. · filed 1986-06-19(a)

3. This cause of action arose as a result of a crash near McLeod, Texas, which is in the Marshall Division of the Eastern District of Texas. Venue is therefore proper in this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (proper venue for tort claims actions against the United States); 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (proper venue in diversity cases).

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where all defendants reside or where the claim arose; a contract claim may arise where substantial events occurred even if negotiations took place elsewhere.

Champion International Corp. v. Bennett Forest Industries, Inc. · filed 1986-06-24(a)

Taking the factual assertions of both parties as true, the Court is of the opinion that the claim, if any, against defendants arose in Montana. Assuming that a final agreement was never executed and that all negotiations took place outside Montana, Montana is nonetheless the district having the most “substantial contacts” with this litigation.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a non-diversity claim where all defendants reside or where the claim arose; when the defendants live in different districts, the claim’s locus depends on witnesses, evidence, and defendants’ convenience.

Kramer v. Pittstown Point Landings, Ltd. · filed 1986-07-03(b)

Thus, having considered the factors in Leroy, this Court is of the opinion that it is not equally plausible to place the situs of the claim in Illinois, and therefore plaintiff's choice of forum was improper. Venue is proper for Count I of the complaint, for breach of contract, only in Wisconsin.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim arose.

Angrisani v. City of New York · filed 1986-07-18(b)

Venue in the Eastern District of New York is proper because the claim arose within its borders. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1982).

Section 1391(b) supplements the Clayton Act’s venue rule, but its claim-arose provision does not establish venue where the defendant’s alleged acts, witnesses, and evidence are located in another district.

Grosser v. Commodity Exchange, Inc. · filed 1986-09-11(b)

Venue in this district may be authorized under either Section 12 itself or under the general federal venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), since the weight of authority now holds that the provisions of the general venue statute are supplemental to — not superseded by — the special antitrust venue statute. ... We therefore conclude that venue as to MACE does not lie in this district.

Section 1391(b)’s “where the claim arose” provision ordinarily points to one district and permits more than one only in unusual circumstances.

Leidholdt v. L.F.P., Inc. · filed 1986-11-18(b)

Therefore, although the language “where the claim arose,” taken by itself, may implicate numerous locales, in the context of venue it points to only one district, and to more than one in only unusual situations.

Under § 1391(b), a claim ordinarily arises in the district where the operative events and weight of contacts occurred; receiving notice in another district does not establish venue there.

Kupcho v. Steele · filed 1986-12-17(b)

Thus, except in “unusual” cases, a claim arises for the purposes of § 1391(b) in only one judicial district. ... In determining the district in which the claim arose, courts generally look to the district where the “weight of the contacts” or the “events having operative significance” for plaintiffs’ claim occurred. ... The mere fact that the plaintiff was informed in this district of the defendants actions in Utah is insufficient to support venue in this district.

Section 1391(a) permits venue for a diversity action in a district where the claim arose, including one of multiple districts with approximately equal substantial contacts with the claim.

Catsimatidis v. Innovative Travel Group, Inc. · filed 1986-12-29(a)

It is clear that the contacts between the claim and this district are not insignificant but go to the heart of plaintiffs’ claims, the negotiation and performance of the agreement. Nor has it been established that the weight of contacts with the Eastern District of Pennsylvania so far exceeds that of events occurring here that plaintiff’s choice of venue should be overridden.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a substantial part of the claim arose, even if another district is more convenient or has more contacts.

Business Trends Analysts v. Freedonia Group, Inc. · filed 1987-01-05(b)

Since venue may be proper in a district where the defendant engages in a significant amount of tortious activity, even if it is not the most convenient district or the one with the most contacts, venue over plaintiff’s unfair competition claims is proper in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where significant events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if the effects will be felt primarily in another district.

Brown v. Artery Organization, Inc. · filed 1987-02-24(b)

Thus, venue is proper in the District only if it is determined, after a “common sense appraisal” of the operative events in this case, that the cause of action arose here. ... The Court concludes on the basis of these facts that the activities in the District of Columbia constitute events having high operative significance for venue purposes, and that venue is therefore proper here.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a claim arose, determined by the weight of the defendant’s contacts with the district and the claim.

Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc. v. Charles Schmitt & Co. · filed 1987-04-03(b)

Since Schmitt Co. does not “reside”, for the purposes of § 1391, in this district, venue may be found here under the general statute only if the “claim arose” in this district. ... Accordingly, for all the aforementioned reasons the Court finds venue with respect to claims against Schmitt Co. to be proper in this district pursuant to § 1391(b).

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Edmonton World Hockey Enterprises, Ltd. v. Abrahams · filed 1987-04-08(a)

Here, a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in this district. The causes of action thus arose in Minnesota and venue is therefore proper.

Section 1391(b) places a claim where the most significant events occurred, while § 1391(c) requires sufficiently localized corporate business to establish venue.

Dody v. Brown · filed 1987-04-10(b), (c)

Therefore, it appears that under the weight of the contacts test, the Northern District of Florida clearly has more significant contacts than this district and, thus, the cause of action arises in the Northern District of Florida under § 1391(b). ... Thus, the Court concludes that Ramm is not “doing business” within the meaning of § 1391(c).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a federal question case in a district where the claim arose, even when the claim could equally plausibly have arisen in another district.

Arandia v. Marriott Corp. · filed 1987-04-29(b)

Although it is true that the plaintiff’s place of employment was in the Eastern District of Virginia, the nub of this lawsuit is that he was fired as the result of an allegedly discriminatory polygraph test administered by defendants Polygraph and Moore in the District of Maryland. Thus, this claim can be said “with approximately equal plausibility” to have arisen in the Eastern District of Virginia and in the District of Maryland, and venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) in this District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the claim arose when a federal-question case has defendants who do not all reside in one judicial district; when more than one district is plausible, access to evidence and the defendants' convenience guide that determination.

John Walker And Sons, Ltd. v. Demert & Dougherty, Inc. · filed 1987-06-04(b)

Since jurisdiction in this case is based on the Lanham Act and not diversity of citizenship and since all of the defendants to this action do not reside within any single judicial district, under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(b), venue is only proper in this case in the judicial district "in which the claim arose." ... Thus, since the majority of the relevant documentary evidence that might be used at trial is located in the Northern District of Illinois and because a trial location in the Northern District of Illinois would be readily accessible to both parties and witnesses, the case should be tried in the Northern District of Illinois. ... We hold that venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a federal question claim arose when the defendants do not all reside in one district; access to evidence and convenience to defendants help identify that district.

John Walker & Sons, Ltd. v. DeMert & Dougherty, Inc. · filed 1987-06-04(b)

Since jurisdiction in this case is based on the Lanham Act and not diversity of citizenship and since all of the defendants to this action do not reside within any single judicial district, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is only proper in this case in the judicial district “in which the claim arose.” ... We hold that venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois.

Under § 1391(b), an infringement claim does not arise in a district where no substantial part of the alleged infringing activity occurred.

Artemide SpA v. Grandlite Design & Manufacturing Co. · filed 1987-06-18(b)

The threshold inquiry in this respect is whether any substantial part of the infringing activity occurred in New York. If it did not, venue is improper.

In a diversity action, venue is proper where the claim arose; a contract claim for failure to pay can arise where payment was due.

Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc. v. Cellular Communications Corp. · filed 1987-06-29(a)

Venue in diversity actions is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), which permits a plaintiff to bring an action in the district where all the plaintiffs reside, all the defendants reside, or where the claim arose. ... The fact that some evidence of this claim is located in Michigan does not alter this court’s conclusion that the basic allegations in Ameritech’s complaint relate to claims which arose here as a result of Cellcom’s failure to abide by its agreement with Ameritech. Accordingly, the court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the claim arose, determined by the claim’s contacts with the districts concerned.

Skelton v. Lowen · filed 1987-07-29(b)

However, the Court finds that plaintiff’s claim has more substantial contacts with this District. Plaintiff’s decedent resided here, he became disabled and incurred medical expenses giving rise to a claim for benefits in this District, and the effect of the denial of benefits is felt here. Accordingly, the claim arose in this District and venue is proper pursuant to the terms of Section 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim arose, including where acts central to the claim occurred.

Ahrendt v. Palmetto Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1987-08-10(b)

Since from the face of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (Doc. #90) it is evident that none of the Defendants reside in this district, venue is proper with this Court only if the claims of the Plaintiffs arose within the district. ... These acts of distribution and collection of the guarantee forms are sufficiently central to Plaintiffs’ claims for the Court to find that Plaintiffs’ causes of action arose in this district. Accordingly, the venue branches of Defendants’ motions are overruled.