28 U.S.C. § 1391

Section 1391 permits venue in a federal-question action where the defendant resides; a corporation resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

DeVaughn v. Inphonic, Inc. · filed 2005-12-13(b), (c)

Because Maryland has personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the District of Maryland is a proper venue for the plaintiffs claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

In a diversity action, a corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Keating Fibre International Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser Co. · filed 2006-02-28(a), (c)

In addition, § 1391(c) provides that “under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” ... It is apparent that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Wey-erhaeuser and venue is proper here.

Section 1391(c) treats a defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for venue purposes.

AdvanceMe, Inc. v. RAPIDPAY LLC · filed 2006-02-16(c)

Under § 1391(c), Rapidpay resides in this district because it is subject to personal jurisdiction in this district. Thus, venue is proper.

Section 1391(c) permits a recently dissolved corporation’s principal place of business at dissolution to establish its residence for venue purposes.

Norsworthy v. Mystik Transport, Inc. · filed 2006-02-23(c)

Based upon the representations made in the above public documents, this Court determines that Mystik’s principal place of business at the time of dissolution was in Cleveland, Texas, and that it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Texas for venue purposes. ... Because Mystik in this case is a resident of the Eastern District of Texas for venue purposes, this Court holds that venue is proper for the present case in the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 1391 permits venue where a corporate defendant has its headquarters and principal place of business.

Rogal v. Skilstaf, Inc. · filed 2006-06-26(b), (c)

In applying the preceding principles to the matter at bar, we note at the outset that this matter could well have been brought in the Middle District of Alabama given that Skilstaf is an Alabama corporation with its headquarters and principal place of business in Alexander City, Alabama. See, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c).

Section 1391(c) permits venue in a district where a corporate defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction because it transacts business there.

Feldman v. Google, Inc. · filed 2007-03-29(c)

Whether venue is proper in this district is governed by the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. ... Without considering the forum selection clause, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Neither party disputes that Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in this district because Defendant transacts business here.

Section 1391(c) makes venue proper in a judicial district where a corporate defendant does business.

Graham v. United Parcel Service · filed 2007-10-01(c)

Since the Northern District has no divisional venue requirement, this case could have originally been filed in either division of the Northern District; venue is proper in the Northern District since it is undisputed that UPS does business within the district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Rockefeller University v. Ligand Pharmaceuticals Inc. · filed 2008-05-19(c)

Section 1391(c) provides that, “[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Personal jurisdiction over the sole corporate defendant provides a proper basis for venue.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in every judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Safarian v. Maserati North America, Inc. · filed 2008-06-11(c)

Maserati is a single defendant and a “resident” of the Southern Division for venue purposes. Therefore, (b) above is satisfied, and assignment to the Southern Division was proper.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for purposes of venue.

Daughtry v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc. · filed 2009-07-09(c)

However, under § 1391(c), venue would also be proper for Mr. Daughtry’s § 1981 claim in Delaware as plaintiffs allege in the amended complaint that defendant operates a store at 2082 New Castle Avenue, New Castle, Delaware.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Engineered Products & Services, Inc. v. Echo Engineering & Production Supplies, Inc. · filed 2009-10-20(c)

And under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), a corporate defendant is “deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” ... Thus, for the foregoing reasons, venue is proper in this district, and defendant’s Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss will be denied.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

In Re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litigation · filed 2010-03-12(c)

Because the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Anchen Pharmaceuticals, venue, too, is proper in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing, for venue purposes, in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Heidenbreicht v. Nevilog Inc. · filed 2010-03-30(c)

The Court has found that it has personal jurisdiction over Nevi-log. Venue in this district, therefore, is proper.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a)(1) permits venue in a district where the defendant resides; a corporation’s residence depends on whether its contacts support personal jurisdiction there.

Henning v. Suarez Corp. Industries, Inc. · filed 2010-05-04(a)(1)

Defendant’s contacts with the EDPA are not sufficiently continuous and systematic to give rise to general jurisdiction over Defendant in this district. Accordingly, Defendant does not “reside” in the EDPA, and the EDPA is not a proper venue under § 1391(a)(1).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any district where it was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action began.

Berklee College of Music, Inc. v. Music Industry Educators, Inc. · filed 2010-08-04(c)

The text of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) goes on to explain that, for the purposes of § 1391, “a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” Thus, because this court holds specific personal jurisdiction over MIE, venue is also proper as to MIE.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing, for venue purposes, in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Greenwich Life Settlements, Inc. v. Viasource Funding Group, LLC · filed 2010-10-04(c)

The Court holds that even if the Purchase Agreement, and the forum selection provision therein, is unenforceable, venue in this District is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). ... “For purposes of venue,” a corporate defendant “reside[s] in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” ... Because ViaSource conducts business in New York County, ... it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York, which encompasses New York County.

Section 1391(c) permits venue in a district where corporate defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction.

Chiste v. Hotels.com L.P. · filed 2010-11-15(c)

Venue does he in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), because Travelocity and its co-defendants are corporations and are subject to personal jurisdiction here.

Section 1391(c) permits an FLSA action to be brought in the district where the employer is headquartered and incorporated.

Johnson v. VCG Holding Corp. · filed 2011-03-01(c)

A lawsuit under the FLSA could have been brought in the district where the employer is headquartered and incorporated. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Here, VCG says that it is headquartered and incorporated in Colorado. Accordingly, VCG has met this essential jurisdictional prerequisite for transfer.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing, for venue purposes, in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Genocide Victims of Krajina v. L-3 Services, Inc. · filed 2011-08-17(c)

Section 1391(c) provides, in relevant part, that “[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. 1391(c). L-3'is subject to general personal jurisdiction in Illinois, and venue in the Court is thus proper.

Section 1391 permits venue for a claim against a corporation in a district where the corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Schoendorf v. RTH Mechanical Contractors · filed 2012-05-31(c)(2)

The Maine court is also a proper venue for Schoendorf's claims under Maine law by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which provides, so far as is relevant here, for venue over a corporation anywhere it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in this court for an action against a Virginia corporation.

Evans v. Larchmont Baptist Church Infant Care Center, Inc. · filed 2013-07-08(b)

The Court also has general personal jurisdiction over Larchmont because it is a Virginia, but now defunct, corporation, and venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391 permits venue against a corporation in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Aweida Arts, Inc. v. Pure Glass Distribution, Inc. · filed 2015-05-27(b), (c)

This District is not an improper venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c) (making corporation subject to venue in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction).

When no claims arise in the district, § 1391 permits venue based on a corporate defendant’s residence only if the corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction there.

Bojorquez v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Co. · filed 2016-06-16(b), (c)(2)

Because no claims remain which allege wrongful conduct occurring in the Central District of California, venue can only be proper here if Abercrombie is subject to this Court’s general jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c)(2); see also Daimler AG, 134 S.Ct. at 754. ... Because the Court finds Abercrombie is not “essentially at home” here, it does not have personal jurisdiction over Abercrombie with respect to Vallante’s and Allan’s claims; and therefore, venue is improper in this district.

Section 1391(c) deems a corporate defendant to reside where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Edizone, LLC v. Asia Focus International Group, Inc. · filed 2016-07-21(c)

Corporate defendants are deemed to “reside” anywhere they are subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action commenced. ... Accordingly, venue is proper in this district because AFIG is subject to personal jurisdiction here.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where corporate defendants reside, including a district where their contacts support personal jurisdiction under a conspiracy theory.

In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litigation · filed 2016-12-21(b)(1)

Accordingly, because all Moving Defendants are corporate defendants who are subject to personal jurisdiction in this district under the conspiracy theory, venue is proper in this district under Section 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where a corporate defendant resides, and subsection (d) determines residence from the corporation's contacts with the district.

Synoptek, LLC v. Synaptek Corp. · filed 2017-03-06(b)(1), (d)

Those contacts would suffice for personal jurisdiction in the absence of any other California contacts, and accordingly venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

In a single-district State, a corporate defendant that does not contest personal jurisdiction may be treated as a resident of that district for venue purposes.

Aguilar v. Michael & Son Services, Inc. · filed 2017-11-09(c)(2)

The provision further specifies that in a single-district State—like this judicial district—a defendant corporation resides where the corporation “is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. §1391(c)(2). M&S has not raised any affirmative objections to personal jurisdiction, and thus there is no basis for this Court to conclude that M&S does not reside in the District of Columbia for venue purposes.

In a single-district state, a corporate defendant that does not contest personal jurisdiction fails to show that it is a nonresident for venue purposes.

Aguilar v. Michael & Son Servs., Inc. · filed 2017-11-09(c)(2)

Given this change in the statute, it appears that defendant corporations in single-district States must contest personal jurisdiction in order to dispute residency under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing, for venue purposes, in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Data Scape Limited v. Barracuda Networks, Inc. · filed 2019-08-15(c)(2)

For purposes of venue, a corporation “resides” where it is subject to personal jurisdiction. VE Holdings Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1990). ... The Court agrees with Defendant that the Northern District of California would have personal jurisdiction over Defendant and, therefore, venue would be appropriate there as well. See VE Holdings Corp., 917 F.2d at 1583-84; 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).

Section 1391 permits a suit against a corporate defendant in a district where that defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Maryland Digital Copier v. Litigation Logistics, Inc. · filed 2019-08-22(b)(1), (c)(2)

But the applicable venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, provides that venue is appropriate for a suit against a corporate defendant in any district in which that defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, because the Court has already concluded that it may exercise jurisdiction over Defendant to hear Plaintiff’s claims stemming from the District of Columbia contract, venue is proper here for those claims as well.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a defendant entity as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Doyle v. Merz North America, Inc. · filed 2019-09-18(c)(2)

Because the Court has determined that it has personal jurisdiction over Merz, Merz is deemed to reside in Massachusetts for purposes of venue.

Section 1391 treats a defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action, supporting venue there.

Ward Kraft, Inc. v. UMB Bank, N.A. · filed 2019-10-25(b)(1), (c)(2)

The federal statute provides that a civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which any defendant resides, with residency defined as any judicial district “in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (c)(2). Because the court has found personal jurisdiction to be proper, it follows that venue in this district is also proper.

Section 1391(c)(2) permits venue for a corporate defendant in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

Riffel v. The Regents of The University of California · filed 2019-11-12(c)(2)

Therefore, venue is proper in the Northern District of California because a court in the Northern District could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over The Regents if the Northern District were a separate State.

In a state with multiple judicial districts, a corporation resides for venue purposes in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction.

Dubiel v. Correct Care Solutions · filed 2020-01-22(d)

CCS is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Kentucky and is thus deemed to reside there for purposes of venue.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where the defendants reside, and § 1391(c)(2) ties a corporate defendant’s residence to personal jurisdiction.

QUINN v. ETHICON, INC. · filed 2020-02-27(b)(1)

Furthermore, venue is proper in this district pursuant to § 1391(b)(1) because, as Judge New recently held in In re Pelvic Mesh Litigation, defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in this state.

Section 1391(d) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

A.C. v. Red Roof Inns Inc · filed 2020-06-16(d)

The Court finds venue is proper in the Eastern Divisionbecause Plaintiff’s allegations support a finding that Defendants had sufficient minimum contacts such that it would be subject to personal jurisdiction in this division under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d)(establishing residency of corporate defendants is “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction”).

Under § 1391(c)(2), a corporate defendant resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action, making that district a proper venue under § 1391(b)(1) when the statute’s other conditions are met.

Hill-Green v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. · filed 2020-09-15(c)(2)

Because Experian is subject to personal ... jurisdiction in the Central District of California it can be said to reside in that jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), meaning that district could be a proper venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

A corporate defendant that consents to a court’s personal jurisdiction is deemed to reside in that district for purposes of venue under § 1391(b)(1).

Hamm v. Wyndham Resort Development Corp. · filed 2020-10-09(c)(2)

As applied here, Section 1391(c)(2) means that WVR, by failing to object to personal jurisdiction and thus consenting to this court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, is deemed to “reside” in this district for purposes of § 1391(b)(1). As a result, venue in this district is proper under the statute.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Caturano v. Armchem International Corp. · filed 2020-10-14(c)

Since Armchem is a citizen and resident of Broward County, Florida, this case could have been brought in the Southern District of Florida. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (a corporation defendant is a resident in any judicial district in which it is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction). Having determined that venue is proper in the Southern District of Florida, this Court will now consider the eleven factors listed above.

Section 1391(b) and (c) permit venue in the district where a corporate defendant has its headquarters and principal place of business.

Cowley v. Prudential Security, Inc. · filed 2020-12-11(b), (c)

Therefore, Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in Michigan and venue in the Eastern District of Michigan is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c).

Section 1391 treats a corporate defendant as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company v. MCMC, LLC · filed 2022-08-02(d)

Having already concluded that MCMC is subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction, MCMC resides in Massachusetts, and therefore Massachusetts is a proper venue.

Section 1391 permits venue based on a defendant’s residence and treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Dickerson v. Arcadian Infracom Inc · filed 2022-10-12(b)(1), (c)

The defendants do not contend they are not subject to the Court's personal jurisdiction. See Dkt. 7, Defendants’ Answer and Counterclaims, at 2, 7 (objecting to venue based only on the forum-selection clause of the contract, but not otherwise objecting to jurisdiction). Accordingly, the defendants have sufficient contacts with the State of Washington for venue purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing, for venue purposes, in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action is brought.

Busbice, Jr. v. Industrial Motor Power Corporation DO NOT DOCKET. CASE HAS BEEN REMANDED. · filed 2023-03-17(c)

But most importantly, § 1391(c) provides that for all venue purposes, an entity with the capacity to be sued in its common name, such as a corporation, is deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is brought. ... Having ruled that IMPC is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Texas, the Court finds venue is proper and § 1406(a) does not apply.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing, for venue purposes, wherever it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

N. v. Gillette Childrens Specialty Healthcare Medical Benefit Plan · filed 2023-08-08(c)

For purposes of venue, a corporation “resides” wherever there is personal jurisdiction over it.

A corporate defendant resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action, making venue proper there when the requirements of § 1391(b)(1) are met.

SIMON v. FIRST SAVINGS BANK OF INDIANA · filed 2023-09-14(c)

Under § 1391(c), a corporation is “deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” The court has found that it has personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendants. Consequently, venue is proper.

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in its state of incorporation because it is subject to personal jurisdiction there.

Singh v. Stellantis N.V. · filed 2023-10-26(c)(2)

Third, venue would be proper, given that Defendant can be said to “be at home” in its state of incorporation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2); see Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction, including its state of incorporation.

Singh v. FCA U.S. LLC · filed 2023-10-26(c)(2)

Third, venue would be proper, given that Defendant can be said to “be at home” in its state of incorporation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2); see Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

R.J. v. Mead Johnson & Company, LLC · filed 2023-12-08(c)(2)

But a corporate defendant is deemed to reside anywhere it is subject to personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (defining corporate residency for venue purposes as “any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question”). Thus, if Missouri could exercise personal jurisdiction over Mead, venue may be proper there.

Section 1391 permits venue where the defendant resides, subject to the rule for multiple defendants, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred; a corporation’s residence in a state with multiple districts depends on its contacts with the district.

Wickham v. Schenker, Inc. · filed 2024-01-10(b)(1), (b)(2), (d)

Venue would have been proper in the Eastern District of Virginia both because Schenker resides in the Eastern District of Virginia (which covers Chesapeake, Virginia) and because a “substantial part of events or omissions giving rise to the claim” occurred there.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats an entity defendant in a single-district state as residing in that district for venue purposes when it waives an objection to personal jurisdiction.

Twardy v. Ocwen Financial Corporation · filed 2025-03-19(c)(2)

By waiving personal jurisdiction, the Defendants made venue proper in the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a corporate defendant resides, as determined by personal jurisdiction.

Green Building Initiative, Inc. v. Green Globe International, Inc. · filed 2025-03-20(b)

GCI’s State of incorporation of is California and its principal place of business is Santa Monica. Thus, the Central District has general personal jurisdiction over GCI, which in turn satisfies both the first and third pathways to establishing venue as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where a defendant resides, and § 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Fountain Equipment Finance, LLC v. Elk Grove Truck Sales, Inc. · filed 2025-03-20(b)(1), (c)(2)

Given defendant resides in and is incorporated in Illinois, the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, would have personal jurisdiction over defendant, and the district would be a proper venue.

Section 1391(b)’s venue requirements do not affect federal subject-matter jurisdiction.

Kohler v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 2011-07-21(b)

Whether venue was proper below does not affect the exercise of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.

Section 1391(b) and (c) govern venue and do not establish personal jurisdiction.

Dynetech Corp. v. Leonard Fitness, Inc. · filed 2007-11-26(b) and (c)

The Complaint contains no allegations whatsoever supporting personal jurisdiction, merely stating vaguely that “[t]he Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties and venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and (c)” (Doc. 1 ¶ 6); these statutory provisions pertain to venue only.

Section 1391 governs venue and does not confer subject matter jurisdiction.

Li v. Chertoff · filed 2007-04-02

Plaintiff also cited 28 U.S.C. § 1391 as providing jurisdiction, but § 1391 deals only with venue.

The court held § 1391(e) inapplicable to its personal-jurisdiction determination over these defendants.

Stephens v. Coleman · filed 1989-04-04(e)

Plaintiff cites 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) either in an effort to show that this court has personal jurisdiction over defendants or to establish venue. However, this section is ... inapplicable to a determination of personal jurisdiction.

Section 1391 governs venue and does not independently confer subject-matter jurisdiction.

Woods v. Lake Drive Nursing Home, Inc. · filed 1980-12-10

Neither 28 U.S.C. § 1391 nor 42 U.S.C. § 1302 provides an independent jurisdictional basis in that § 1391 is the general venue provision and § 1302 authorizes the promulgation of federal regulations regarding nursing home facilities.

Section 1391(e) governs venue and does not itself confer subject-matter jurisdiction.

Heffelman v. Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Department of Interior of the United States · filed 1967-05-24(e)

We thus conclude that the trial court properly held that jurisdiction did not exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (mandamus, see Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians v. Udall, 10 Cir., 355 F.2d 364, 367); 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (venue); or 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (declaratory judgment).

Section 1391 governs venue and does not confer subject matter jurisdiction.

Mathis v. Laird · filed 1971-04-01

28 U.S. C. § 1391 relates to venue, not jurisdiction.

Section 1391(e) does not alter the conclusion that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the writ could not be directed to the petitioner's custodians.

Dillon v. Colonel v. L. Chandler · filed 1971-12-29(e)

We also observe that 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e) does not alter this conclusion.

Section 1391 governs venue and does not provide a basis for jurisdiction.

Roberts v. Morton · filed 1975-01-23

Nor may jurisdiction be based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1391 which deals only with venue.

Section 1391(e) does not remove sovereign immunity from damages claims against federal officials in their official capacities.

Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission · filed 1976-11-04(e)

Nor does 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) change the situation. ... To the extent that the plaintiffs base their action against the defendants in their official capacity, the doctrine of sovereign immunity remains available.

Section 1391 governs venue and does not confer subject matter jurisdiction.

Hunt v. Democratic Party of Oklahoma · filed 1977-11-06

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391 is the venue statute. Therefore, §§ 2201, 2202 and 1391 do not vest this court with jurisdiction.

Section 1391(e) governs venue and cannot itself confer subject-matter jurisdiction.

Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co. · filed 1978-05-31(e)

Title 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (e) is a venue statute and cannot itself confer jurisdiction.

Section 1391 governs venue, not subject matter jurisdiction.

O & F Tennessee Land, Inc. v. Ramsey · filed 1978-03-07

The complaint averred erroneously that this Court’s jurisdiction was invoked under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which statute pertains to venue and not to jurisdiction; however, the plaintiffs additional allegations were sufficient to invoke this Court’s diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1), (c).

Section 1391 governs venue and does not confer jurisdiction.

Johnson v. Frederick · filed 1979-03-20

The court also notes that 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the venue statute, does not confer jurisdiction.

Section 1391 governs venue but does not confer subject matter jurisdiction.

John Doe Corp. v. Miller · filed 1980-10-10

Plaintiff also claims jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 2201 and 2202, and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. These sections of the United States Code, relating to . venue and declaratory judgments, respectively, do not confer jurisdiction, and, in appropriate cases, it is 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), not the Fifth Amendment, that provides a basis for jurisdiction over constitutional claims.

Section 1391 governs federal venue and does not grant federal jurisdiction.

Powell v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., Etc. · filed 1981-05-11

28 U.S.C. § 1391 is of course the federal venue statute and does not grant any form of federal jurisdiction.

Section 1391(c) governs venue and does not establish subject matter jurisdiction.

Berberian v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. · filed 1982-11-08(c)

Plaintiff also mistakenly claimed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), but this statute relates to venue rather than to subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1391 governs venue and does not confer personal jurisdiction.

Guthrie v. Ciba-Geigy, Ltd. · filed 1984-05-10

By its terms, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 is a venue statute, not a personal jurisdiction statute and, therefore, it cannot confer in personam jurisdiction over Corporation.

Section 1391(f) provides venue for suits against foreign states, but satisfying its venue rules does not alone establish personal jurisdiction.

Unidyne Corp. v. Argentinas · filed 1985-09-20(f)

The venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) cannot be, as plaintiff claims, the only restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court.

Section 1391 governs venue for civil actions properly brought in federal district court and does not confer subject matter jurisdiction.

LaChance v. Drug Enforcement Administration · filed 1987-08-24

Plaintiff’s attempted reliance on 28 U.S.C. § 1391 for jurisdictional purposes is also misplaced, as this statute concerns only the separate and distinct issue of venue for civil actions that are properly brought in Federal District Court and has no bearing on the threshold question of whether the court has jurisdiction.

Section 1391 governs venue, not personal jurisdiction.

Dickson v. United States · filed 1993-09-08

Further confusing the issue, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, titled “Venue Generally,” deals with venue rather than jurisdiction, and 5 U.S.C. § 1508 authorizes judicial review of Civil Service Commission determinations involving State officials in elections and political campaigns.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a)(3) permits venue in a district where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

National Ass'n of Credit Management v. Hubbard Lumber, Inc. · filed 1993-09-16(a)(3)

In a diversity action, venue is appropriate in “a judicial district in which the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3). The determination that this Court has jurisdiction over defendant thus establishes this district as an appropriate venue.

Section 1391(a)(3) permits venue in a diversity action where defendants have made themselves subject to personal jurisdiction through a forum selection clause.

Falconwood Financial Corp. v. Griffin · filed 1993-12-01(a)(3)

The defendants have made themselves subject to the personal jurisdiction of this court. By operation of § 1391, venue is proper here.

Section 1391(b) governs venue and does not provide diversity jurisdiction.

Marietta Realty, Inc. v. Springfield Redevelopment Authority · filed 1995-10-24(b)

First, plaintiffs cite only 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which relates to venue rather than jurisdiction, in support of their claim for diversity jurisdiction.

Section 1391(a)(3) does not establish venue as to a defendant who is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the district.

Sutherland v. Cybergenics Corp. · filed 1995-12-08(a)(3)

The court notes, however, that since defendant Chamlin is not subject to the jurisdiction of this court, venue here is improper as to Chamlin. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3).

Section 1391 limits where an action may be brought; it does not confer or deny subject matter jurisdiction.

United States ex. rel. Thistlethwaite v. Dowty Woodville Polymer, Ltd. · filed 1997-01-16

In contrast, the general federal venue provisions set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 specify, for the principal types of cases over which the district courts have subject matter jurisdiction, the “judicial distriet[s]” in which an “action ... may ... be brought.” ... The venue provisions do not confer or deny jurisdiction; they assume that the court in question has subject matter jurisdiction, and they simply limit the locations in which the action may be brought.

Section 1391 governs venue and does not confer subject matter jurisdiction.

Brooks-McCollum v. Emerald Ridge Service Corp. · filed 2006-02-10

As the District Court properly noted, the statutes that Brooks-McCollum cites are largely irrelevant–they are either non-jurisdictional, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1401 (regarding venue), or unrelated to the allegations of her complaint, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1357 (jurisdiction over revenue and voting rights cases); id. at § 1344 (jurisdiction over election disputes); id. at § 1350 (jurisdiction over alien tort claims).

Section 1391 sets the rules for proper venue in federal actions but does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction.

Davis v. Ryan Oaks Apartment · filed 2009-12-17

Davis’s amended complaint mentions 28 U.S.C. § 1391, but that provision establishes the rules for proper venue in federal actions; it does not confer jurisdiction.

Section 1391(e) governs venue; it does not provide a basis for jurisdiction over federal agencies in a Bivens action.

Driggers v. Clark · filed 2011-05-05(e)

However, § 1391 is a venue statue; it does not alter the fact that Bivens actions cannot be asserted against federal agencies, Smith, 561 F.3d at 1093. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying the motion.

Section 1391(d) permits an alien to be sued in any district but does not provide an independent basis for personal jurisdiction.

Day v. Cornér Bank (Overseas) Ltd. · filed 2011-08-01(d)

Plaintiff’s reliance on § 1391(d) thus provides no independent basis for the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants.

Section 1391 governs venue and does not confer subject matter jurisdiction.

Campbell v. American International Group, Inc. (Aig) · filed 2013-03-01

And the venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, is not a source of jurisdiction.

Section 1391 governs venue and does not confer subject matter jurisdiction.

Chey v. YHB Hospitality Group, Inc. · filed 2022-05-04

Section 1391, however, is a venue provision−it has nothing to do with subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1391 governs venue and does not establish subject-matter jurisdiction.

Aaebo v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte · filed 2022-10-07

Section 1391, however, concerns venue, not jurisdiction.

Section 1391(e)(1) governs venue in actions against federal officers or employees; it does not establish federal question jurisdiction.

Manganello v. Haynes · filed 2023-01-04(e)(1)

Here, Plaintiff cites 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1), which governs the proper venue for actions where a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States, as the basis for federal question jurisdiction. Venue is a procedural mechanism, not a basis for federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1391 governs venue and does not confer federal subject matter jurisdiction.

Thompson v. Reed · filed 2023-07-21

Nor does Plaintiffs’ reference to the venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, suffice to confer jurisdiction.

Section 1391 governs venue and does not confer subject matter jurisdiction.

Lang v. Schmitt · filed 2023-09-18

28 U.S.C. § 1391 pertains to venue generally as opposed to jurisdiction.

Section 1391(b)(2) governs venue and does not confer personal jurisdiction.

Aych v. University of Arizona · filed 2025-06-10(b)(2)

However, unlike the RICO provision—which deals with both venue and service of process, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1965(a), (b)—§ 1391(b)(2) deals solely with venue. The Supreme Court has distinguished between venue and service of process, tying personal jurisdiction only to the latter.

Section 1391(e) does not create general personal jurisdiction over a federal agency in a damages action.

EWINGS · filed 2026-01-31(e)

Neither 39 U.S.C. § 409 nor 28 U.S.C, § 1391 creates universal general personal jurisdiction over USPS for damages actions.

Section 1391(b) governs venue and does not confer federal jurisdiction.

Oliver · filed 2026-03-05(b)

Contrary to Oliver’s assertion, this Court does not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). That statute addresses venue whereas 28 U.S.C. § 1331 confers jurisdiction in this Court for controversies arising under federal law.

Former § 1391(f) permitted, but did not require, an automobile tort action to be brought where the alleged act or omission occurred.

Debbis v. Hertz Corporation · filed 1967-06-01(f)

In any event, Section 1391(f) was permissive, not compulsory.

Section 1391(a) and (b) can make venue proper in more than one district.

Northeast Theatre Corp. v. Edie and Ely Landau, Inc. · filed 1983-06-02(a) and (b)

In this action, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and (b), venue is appropriate in either California or Massachusetts.

Section 1391(a) and (c) permits venue in the Eastern District of Virginia for this diversity action against a corporate defendant.

Morganstern v. Marriott-Hot Shoppes, Inc. · filed 1967-06-29(a), (c)

...and venue exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and (c), in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

Section 1391 determines venue by judicial district; filing in Richmond is proper when venue lies in the Eastern District of Virginia, which has no divisions.

Joseph v. Blair · filed 1973-07-26

Venue was properly in the Eastern District of Virginia, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Since the Eastern District of Virginia is not subdivided into divisions, there was nothing improper in plaintiffs’ filing suit in Richmond.

Section 1391 makes venue proper where all defendants reside and where a corporate defendant is licensed and transacts business.

Letter-Rite, Inc. v. Computer Talk, Inc. · filed 1985-02-15

Venue there is proper both because all defendants reside in Colorado (28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)) and because Computer Talk is licensed to do business in Colorado and plainly transacts business there (28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)).

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the claim arose and a corporation is licensed to do business.

General Accident Insurance v. Travelers Corp. · filed 1987-08-13(a), (c)

Venue is also proper in the Western District of Texas (the transferee district) because General Accident is licensed to do business there and the claim arose there. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), (c) (1982).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside or the claim arose; under subsection (c), a corporation resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Daramola v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 1990-10-25(b), (c)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue in a civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose. Westinghouse, a corporation, is deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). ... Daramola fails to meet the threshold requirement for a transfer under section 1404(a) of Title 28, that the action “might have been brought” in the District Court in the District of Maryland. First, the claim arose in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, within the Western District of Pennsylvania. Secondly, there has been no showing by Daramola that Westinghouse was subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.

Section 1391 permits venue in a diversity action where the underlying events occurred and the corporate defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Dahl v. HEM Pharmaceuticals Corp. · filed 1994-10-26(a), (c)

This action initially could have been brought in Nevada. The clinical trial of Ampligen (the “AMP-502 clinical trial”), which HEM sponsored and in which plaintiff, Dr. Kristina A. Dahl (“Dahl”), participated, was conducted in Incline Village, Nevada. Consequently, HEM is amenable to personal jurisdiction in Nevada and venue is also appropriate in Nevada.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) permits venue in a district where the defendants reside or a substantial part of the events occurred.

C.I.S. of Pine Bluff, Inc. v. Alltel Cellular Associates of Arkansas Ltd. Partnership · filed 1994-11-10(b)(1) and (2)

Personal jurisdiction existed over Alltel in the Eastern District of Arkansas at the time this suit was initiated as their principal places of business is in that district. And, for the same reason venue in that district is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) and (2).

Section 1391 permits venue in the district where the defendant is headquartered and the parties signed the agreement at issue.

Flake v. Medline Industries, Inc. · filed 1995-01-12

Venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois, where Medline is headquartered and the parties signed their employment agreement. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391 states federal venue in terms of judicial districts, not counties.

Excell, Inc. v. Sterling Boiler & Mechanical, Inc. · filed 1997-02-04

For federal court purposes, venue is not stated in terms of "counties." Rather, it is stated in terms of "judicial districts." See 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Because the language of the clause refers only to a specific county and not to a specific judicial district, we conclude venue is intended to lie only in state district court.

In a civil action not based solely on diversity, venue is proper where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the suit occurred.

Vasconcellos v. Cybex International, Inc. · filed 1997-04-03(b)

The federal venue statute provides that in a civil action where jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity, venue is proper in a judicial district where any defendant resides, a judicial district where a substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to the lawsuit occurred, or, if neither of the first two are possible, then in a judicial district in which any of the defendants may be found. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). In the instant case, all of the Defendants reside in the State of New York, so venue is proper in any district in New York where any of the Defendants reside. Cybex and LMPI “reside” in Bayshore which is located in the Eastern District of New York because that is where them headquarters are located. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Moreover, a substantial part of the events giving rise to the lawsuit occurred at these headquarters, giving further support for the Eastern District of New York being a proper venue for this action.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the defendants reside and the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Cerussi v. Union College · filed 2001-06-06(b)

It is undisputed that this action could have been brought in the Northern District. All the defendants presently reside there, all of the events giving rise to plaintiffs claims occurred there, and UC, the site where the events took place, is located there (in Schenectady, New York).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Montgomery v. STG International, Inc. · filed 2008-01-30(b)

STG is headquartered in the Eastern District of Virginia and many of the alleged events complained of occurred in or involved employees in the transferee district. Therefore, this action could have been brought in the transferee district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where defendants reside or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Sweetgreen, Inc. v. Sweet Leaf, Inc. · filed 2012-03-23(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The events giving rise to plaintiff’s claims occurred in the Eastern District of Virginia, where defendants live and operate their business; it is there that the court may exercise personal jurisdiction and where venue is proper.

Section 1391(b) permits an action to be filed in a district where a defendant is headquartered and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the action occurred.

LeBlanc v. C.R. England, Inc. · filed 2013-08-13(b)(1), (b)(2)

This Court likewise concludes this action could have been filed in federal district court in Utah, and thus transfer is possible. England is headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah, and a “substantial part of the events or omissions” that gave rise to the action occurred in the District of Utah.

Section 1391(b) supplies the venue rules used to determine whether an action could have been brought in a proposed transferee district.

Estate of Matthews v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. · filed 2014-11-26(b)

Venue is proper in a “judicial district where any defendant resides . . . [or] in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. . . [or] any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... In regards to the threshold inquiry under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the Court concludes—and the parties do not dispute—that this action could have properly been brought in either the Southern District of Georgia or the Middle District of Florida.

Section 1391 permits a corporate defendant to be sued in a district where it has its principal place of business.

Bennett v. Moran Towing Towing Corp. · filed 2016-02-01(b)-(d)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, the preliminary question for the district court is whether the suit could have been filed originally in the destination venue of Connecticut. ... Here, Moran Towing’s principal place of business is in Connecticut and Moran Towing’s barge division, the division which operates the MW.MARY ANN MORAN, is also located in Connecticut. Accordingly the Court finds that, as originally filed, this action could have been brought in the District of Connecticut. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)-(d), 1400(b).

Section 1391(b) identifies the districts where a civil action may be brought, including a district where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if no district qualifies under its other venue rules.

Byler v. Deluxe Corp. · filed 2016-08-19(b)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in any of the following: ... This action could have been brought, and indeed was previously litigated, in the Eastern District of Missouri. As Defendant notes in support of transfer, it has sufficient minimum contacts with the transferee district to establish personal jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 5-1 at 13.) Accordingly, this action could have properly been filed in the Eastern District of Missouri.

Section 1391(b)(2)–(3) supplies grounds for proper venue; when venue is proper, § 1406 does not authorize transfer.

Florence Mussat, M.D., S.C v. IQVIA Holdings, Inc. · filed 2018-10-26(b)(2)–(3)

But venue ... is appropriate in the Northern District of Illinois, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2)–(3), so that statute cannot support transferring this case.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a defendant resides, and the court treated personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant as sufficient to establish venue.

Phillips v. Henry Schein Inc. · filed 2019-10-07(b)

Venue is proper in any judicial district where (1) a defendant resides, as long as all defendants are residents of the state in which the district is located; (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions leading to the claim or claims occurred, or where a substantial portion of the property subject to the action is located; or (3) if no other district exists, a district where the defendant or defendants are subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... Because the Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Washington, this action could have been brought in that district.

Section 1391 permits a civil action to be filed in any division of a judicial district where venue is proper.

Hammers v. Mayea-Chang · filed 2019-12-11

Conversely, § 1391 permits a civil action to be filed in any division, so long as the division is within a proper judicial district.

Section 1391(b) determines whether venue is proper in a district receiving a transferred action.

Branstetter v. Holland America Line N.V. LLC · filed 2019-12-20(b)

Here, HAL would be subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Venue in that district would be proper under § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b)(3) can make venue proper in a district even when personal jurisdiction over some defendants is disputed.

Diece-Lisa Industries, Inc. v. Disney Store USA · filed 2020-03-23(b)(3)

While the premise is not accepted, venue would still be proper there under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3).

A party seeking to transfer a case must show why venue would be proper in the proposed district under § 1391.

(PC) Evans v. Milam · filed 2020-09-09

Plaintiff makes no argument for why venue would be proper in the Northern District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and makes no plausible argument for why convenience or justice require such a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in that state, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Winsor v. TBD Pizza · filed 2021-03-30(b)

A civil action may be brought in “(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; [or] (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). This action could have been filed in the District of Massachusetts; as discussed, TBD is headquartered and incorporated in the State.

Section 1391 permits venue where the defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

RHH LLC v. INNISFREE HOTELS, INC. · filed 2021-03-25(b)(1), (b)(2), (c)

Here, the Northern District of Florida constitutes a proper venue under Section 1391 because (i) Defendant resides in that district (with its principal place of business in Gulf Breeze, Florida (Docket Entry 8-1, ¶ 18)), (ii) Plaintiff remains subject to personal jurisdiction in that district, and (iii) “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,” id. § 1391(b)(2), in that district.

Section 1391(b) identifies where a civil action may be brought based on defendant residence, substantial events giving rise to the claim, or personal jurisdiction.

Dumanian v. Schwartz · filed 2021-03-31(b)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. ... Because venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois and the first-to-file rule warrants deference to the Northern District of Illinois, the Court will transfer this case to the Northern District of Illinois.

Section 1391(b) allowed the insurance coverage suit to have been brought in the Eastern District of Texas for purposes of a transfer motion.

LiquidAgents Healthcare LLC v. Evanston Insurance Company · filed 2021-04-05(b)

Venue is proper in any judicial district where (1) a defendant resides, as long as all defendants are residents of the state in which the district is located; (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions leading to the claim or claims occurred, or where a substantial portion of the property subject to the action is located; or (3) if no other district exists, a district where the defendant or defendants are subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Here, the insurance contract was entered into in the geographic region encompassing the Eastern District of Texas. None of the events or omissions leading to the claim or claims occurred there. The defendant does not “reside” in Texas but is probably subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction for issuing the insurance policy to the Plaintiff there. On balance, the Court finds that this case could have been brought in the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

OJEDA V. LOUIS BERGER GROUP (DOMESTIC), INC. · filed 2021-04-12(b)

Venue is also proper in either location: LMD “resides” in South Carolina, justifying venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Puerto Rico, justifying venue under § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b) identifies the districts where a civil action may be brought.

Masciotra v. Vertafore, Inc. · filed 2021-04-30(b)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in: (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. ... Because venue is proper in the Southern District of Texas, and the first-to-file rule warrants deference to that court, the Court will transfer this case to the Southern District of Texas.

In considering a transfer from the Court of Federal Claims, the court used § 1391(b)(1) to find that the action could have been filed in the plaintiff’s home district.

Ross v. United States · filed 2021-07-23(b)(1)

With regard to the second requirement, the court finds that because plaintiff resides within the boundaries of the Western District of Louisiana, he could have filed this case in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b) determines venue by judicial district, not by division within a district.

LaCompte v. Chicago Capital Holdings, Inc. · filed 2021-09-17(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) is littered with references to analyzing proper venue in relation to the proper judicial district, with no mention to intra-district divisions.

Section 1391 provides grounds for venue based on where defendants reside or where events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Klayman v. Rao · filed 2021-10-25(b), (e)(1)

None of the events alleged in the complaint occurred anywhere besides the District of Columbia. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (e)(1). Accordingly, venue would not be proper in the districts Klayman proposes, and this Court cannot transfer the case to an improper venue.

Section 1391 permits venue in the Central District of California for this action.

Llevat v. True North Brands, LLC · filed 2021-11-22

On balance, the Court finds that this action might have been brought in the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, and consideration of the above-referenced factors weigh in favor of transferring this matter to the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

Section 1391(b)(1) can establish whether a proposed transferee district is a venue where an action could have been filed.

Willis v. United States · filed 2022-01-06(b)(1)

Lincoln, Illinois is located within the boundaries of the Central District of Illinois; as such, plaintiff could have filed this case in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) can establish that a proposed transfer destination is a district where the action could have been brought.

Parker Powersports Inc. v. Textron Specialized Vehicles Inc. · filed 2022-03-16(b)(1)

The Court finds that even if plaintiffs have not consented to venue in Georgia, the action could have been brought in the Southern District of Georgia for § 1404 analysis because venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1)–(2) permits venue where the sole defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Sellman v. Aviation Training Consultants LLC · filed 2022-05-03(b)(1)–(2)

Because this action “might have been brought” in Oklahoma under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)–(2), the Court may transfer the case to the Western District of Oklahoma if doing so would serve “the convenience of parties and witnesses,” or “the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

Section 1391(b)(1) supplies a venue rule for deciding whether an action could have been filed in a proposed transferee district.

Kinney v. United States · filed 2022-08-22(b)(1)

Oakland, California is located within the boundaries of the Northern District of California; as such, plaintiff could have filed this case in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b) governs whether venue is proper in a proposed transferee district based on the alleged conduct and the defendant’s ties to that district.

Ghebreyesus v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia · filed 2022-09-28(b)(2), (3)

The Court will transfer this case to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. That is where Bekele is alleged to have operated his scheme and where he concedes personal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), (3); Reply at 10 n.3.

Section 1391(b) requires a proposed transferee district to be a proper venue, based here on defendants’ residence or where a substantial part of the events occurred.

Wereko v. Rosen · filed 2022-11-01(b)

Wereko’s motion fails at the first step as venue is not proper in the Southern District of Illinois. Wereko has not shown that any of the Defendants reside in the Southern District of Illinois or that all Defendants reside in Illinois.

Section 1391 determines whether a district is a proper place to bring a civil action before the action is transferred there.

Jian v. MIH CP Solutions, LLC · filed 2022-12-05

Plaintiffs could have brought this action in the Middle District of Florida. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b) determines whether venue is proper in a proposed transferee district.

Boyce v. Harper · filed 2023-01-24(b)

This case could have been brought in the Northern District of Florida under § 1391(b), and Plaintiff concedes this.

Section 1391(b) governs whether an action could have been brought in a proposed transferee district.

Anderson Trucking Service, Inc. v. Hadland · filed 2023-02-02(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The Court finds that this case could have been brought in the Northern District of Iowa because Hirschbach’s principle place of business is in Iowa, ATS does not deny it does business in Iowa, and Hadland is currently employed in Iowa and either is or will be living in Iowa a minimum of 50-60% while he works onsite in Dubuque.

Section 1391 permits venue where relevant events occurred and an entity defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Jones v. Emirates Airlines · filed 2023-07-15(b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(2)

As a threshold issue, the Court has determined that venue in this case would be proper in the Eastern District of Virginia. Plaintiff’s flight landed in that district, meaning not only that at least some facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint occurred there, but also that Defendant conducts business in that district, thereby making Defendant amenable to personal jurisdiction there. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(2).

Section 1391(b)(1) allowed venue in the proposed transferee district because the defendant entities were subject to personal jurisdiction there.

Bhatia v. Silvergate Bank · filed 2023-08-01(b)(1)

Finally, venue would be proper in the Southern District of California because Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction there. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391 permits venue where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events occurred, and treats a corporation as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

PURCELL v. CHUBB LTD · filed 2023-08-23(b)(1)-(2), (c)(2)

Because Defendant is a corporation, it is deemed to reside, and thus venue is proper, “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.” ... Therefore, the Court finds that this action may have been brought in the Northern District of California pursuant to § 1391(b)(1)-(2).

Section 1391(b) requires a proposed transferee district to satisfy its venue criteria before a case may be transferred there.

Harpo-Brown v. Intermark Management Corporation · filed 2023-12-04(b)

The first step is to decide a motion to transfer is to determine whether the case may have been brought in the proposed forum. ... 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... Plaintiff fails to show this case may have been brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiff fails to connect any of the Defendants or events giving rise to his claim with Washington, D.C. Accordingly, I DENY Plaintiff’s request to transfer venue to the District Court for the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(b) did not permit transfer to a district with no shown connection to the defendants or the events giving rise to the claims.

Harpo-Brown v. Craig · filed 2023-12-04(b)

Plaintiff fails to show this case may have been brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiff fails to connect any of the Defendants or events giving rise to his claims with Washington, D.C. Accordingly, I DENY Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer Venue to the District Court for the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(b) permits an action in the district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred; a proposed transfer requires a showing that the action could have been brought in the other district.

Wilson v. Robinson · filed 2023-12-27(b)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in: (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) a judicial district in which the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at the time that the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. ... Also, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that this action, in which he challenges actions that occurred in MCCX, which is located within this District, “might have been brought” anywhere else.

Section 1391(b)(3)’s residual venue provision can establish venue in a proposed transferee district when the complaint’s allegations support it.

Interparfums Luxury Brands, Inc. v. Gabet · filed 2024-03-13(b)(3)

The allegations in Interparfums’ complaint in this District would also support personal jurisdiction and venue over an action against Annie Oakley Enterprises and Renee Gabet in the Southern District of Indiana under the residual venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3).

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

LASSOFF v. MGM RESORTS INTERNATIONAL · filed 2024-05-23(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1391. Venue would be proper in the District of Nevada, as the Defendant ... transacts business there, has its headquarters there, and at least part of the events giving rise to this cause of action occurred there.

Section 1391(b) governs whether an action could have been brought in a proposed transferee district, even after removal from state court.

Health Freedom Defense Fund, Inc v. US Freedom Flyers, Inc. · filed 2024-07-02(b)

Lynch does not stand for the proposition, as Defendants assert, that § 1391 does not govern in a motion for change of venue to a different district after removal occurs.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Panaro v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2024-09-25(b)

Here, Defendant asserts, and Plaintiff does not dispute, this action could have been properly brought in the Northern District of Illinois. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Defendant resides in the Northern District of Illinois. (Doc. 9 at 15.) Further, a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in the Northern District of Illinois, as Defendant developed and implemented its COVID-19 vaccination policy at Defendant’s principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. (Id. at 16.)

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a defendant resides, if all defendants reside in that state, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Bryant v. Bruce Packing Company, Inc. · filed 2025-02-12(b)

Here, venue would be proper in Oregon or Oklahoma. Thus, this case could have been brought against BrucePac in either Oregon or Oklahoma.

Section 1391(b) was applied to find venue proper in a proposed transferee district where defendants from different states were both subject to personal jurisdiction.

Morales · filed 2026-03-18(b)

Venue is also proper in that district because the defendants are not from the same state and both are subject to personal jurisdiction there.