28 U.S.C. § 1391

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction, making venue proper there under § 1391(b)(1).

Seeberger Enterprises, Inc. v. Mike Thompson Recreational Vehicles, Inc. · filed 2007-01-12(b)(1), (c)

Furthermore, the Court finds that venue in the Western District of Texas is permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, as Defendant is properly subject to personal jurisdiction in the Western District of Texas.

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in a district where it was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action commenced.

Seeberger Enterprises, Inc. v. Mike Thompson Recreational Vehicles, Inc. · filed 2007-02-27(c)

The residence of MTRV, a corporation, is determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c): “For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” ... The Court finds that the foregoing contacts would render MTRV subject to personal jurisdiction in the Central District of California at the time Plaintiffs’ suit was filed. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs could have brought suit against MTRV in the Central District of California.

A corporate defendant subject to personal jurisdiction in a district resides there for venue purposes, making venue proper in that district under § 1391(a)(1).

Mid-West Materials, Inc. v. Tougher Industries, Inc. · filed 2007-03-27(a)(1), (c)

Accordingly, as this Court has found Tougher subject to personal jurisdiction in this District, the Court holds that venue is proper under § 1391(a)(1) and § 1391(c).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the sole defendant corporation does business.

Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. BOC Group, Inc. · filed 1987-03-02(b)

This court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant Aireo as a corporation doing business in New Jersey, and since Aireo is the sole defendant venue is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(c) permits venue where a corporate defendant has a manufacturing plant.

Allen Industries, Inc. v. National Sponge Cushion, Inc. · filed 1967-07-12(c)

Venue is proper since one of defendant’s manufacturing plants is located in New Jersey. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391 permits suit against a corporation where it does business, using the same meaning of “doing business” as for personal jurisdiction.

Metropolitan Staple Corp. v. Samuel Moore & Co. · filed 1967-10-23(c)

The holding that the defendant is not amenable to jurisdiction also requires granting of defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue, since 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1964) permits such suits where a corporation is doing business and this term has the same meaning as for jurisdictional purposes.

Section 1391(c) permits a corporation to be sued in a district where it does business.

Chemical Specialties Sales Corp.—Industrial Division v. Basic Inc. · filed 1968-09-25(c)

The Act has no special venue provision and, therefore, venue is governed by the general venue statute which provides that a corporation may be sued in any district in which it does business. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). ... Further discussion is not necessary; those contacts are sufficient to meet the doing business test of the general venue statute as well as being within the reaches of the venue criterion of the Clayton Act.

Section 1391(c) permits venue for a parent corporation where it constructively does business through a subsidiary deemed identical to it for jurisdictional purposes.

ACS Industries, Inc. v. Keller Industries, Inc. · filed 1969-01-28(c)

If, for jurisdictional purposes, the parent and subsidiary are deemed identical, it necessarily follows that for venue purposes Keller constructively does business in Connecticut through its “subsidiary”. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue is likewise denied.

Section 1391(c) permits venue against a corporation in a district where it does business, including where its principal place of business is located.

Quandt v. Beech Aircraft Corp. · filed 1970-10-07(c)

This action could have been brought in the District Court of Kansas and tried by that court sitting in Wichita, venue being proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) since there is no dispute that the defendant’s principal place of business is located in Wichita, Kansas.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing for venue purposes in the district where it is incorporated or licensed.

Fuller & Dees Marketing Group, Inc. v. Outstanding American High School Students · filed 1972-01-07(c)

In a large state such as Texas, the hardships associated with a defendant’s coming from Texarkana to El Paso to defend a federal suit filed by an harassing plaintiff with a nuisance cause of action magnify the purpose of venue statutes and cause this Court to believe that, within the meaning and purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1391, a corporation is incorporated or licensed in the district where it is and that the statute should not be construed to mean that a corporation may be sued in any district in any state where it is incorporated, licensed, or doing business.

Section 1391 permits venue against corporations where they are incorporated, licensed, or doing business and against aliens in any district.

Standard Oil Company v. Montecatini Edison SpA · filed 1972-05-08(c), (d)

Of the five adverse parties to Interference No. 89,634, Du Pont, Hercules and Phillips are Delaware corporations and actions against them would be properly laid in this District for venue purposes under § 1391(c). Venue also would be proper in this District with respect to Montecatini under § 1391(d) as it is an alien corporation. While Standard, an Indiana corporation, might have had a proper challenge to venue under § 1391, it has expressly waived such an objection. Consequently, if the general venue provisions of § 1391, quoted above, are applicable to these actions, venue has been properly laid in this District. ... As previously indicated Montecatini and Hercules claim that the general venue provisions of § 1391, under the Fourco doctrine, have been superseded by the provisions of § 146 which they say are “special venue” provisions. The Court is unable to agree. In the Court’s opinion § 146 is not a special venue provision which replaces the general venue statute. Rather, it provides the District Court for the District of Columbia with a method for invoking personal jurisdiction over, and effecting personal service upon, foreign corporations and adverse parties residing in different states.

Section 1391(d) allows an alien to be sued in any district, including in a patent infringement suit.

Honeywell Inc. v. Apparatewerke · filed 1972-09-06(d)

In that case, the Court unanimously held that section 1391(d), which provides that “an alien may be sued in any district”, applies to patent infringement suits where a defendant is an alien. Accordingly, Metz’s motion to dismiss for improper venue will be denied.

Section 1391 requires a showing that a corporate defendant does business in a proposed transfer district to establish venue there.

Follansbee M. Co., Inc. v. John T. Clark & Son of NH, Inc. · filed 1974-12-16

The Defendant here has failed to establish on the record any fact which would prove either that it is doing business in Massachusetts under the Federal Venue Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, or transacting business in Massachusetts under the Massachusetts “Long-Arm” Statute, M. G. L.A. Chapter 223A § 3.

Section 1391(c) makes venue proper in this district for a corporate defendant incorporated in Texas.

Minute Man of America, Inc. v. Coastal Restaurants, Inc. · filed 1975-02-18(c)

First, Coastal asserts that venue is improper; however, Coastal is incorporated in Texas and therefore venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1972).

Section 1391(c) permits venue for corporate defendants in districts where they maintain home offices or transact business.

Adler v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. · filed 1975-04-07(c)

In view of the fact that both defendants maintain home offices in the eastern district of New York and transact business in the southern district of New York, this action could have been commenced in either the eastern district or southern district of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) permits venue in a district where corporate defendants are incorporated.

Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co. · filed 1976-07-19(c)

Since plaintiff, BTL, is a New York corporation and both defendants are Delaware corporations venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) permits suit against a corporation in any judicial district of its state of incorporation, even if it does no business in that district.

Burbank International, Ltd. v. Gulf Consolidated International Inc. · filed 1977-12-07(c)

A corporation may be sued in either: (1) any judicial district in the state in which it is incorporated; (2) any judicial district in which the corporation is licensed to do business; or (3) any judicial district in which the corporation is doing business. ... Proper venue exists in the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Sections 1391(a) and (c) permit venue in a district where a corporate defendant maintains an office for the transaction of business.

Can-Base Productions, Ltd. v. Portrait Records · filed 1978-01-25(a), (c)

It is undisputed that venue would be proper in that district under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a) and (c) because an office for the transaction of business is maintained there by CBS Inc.

In a diversity case, § 1391(a) permits venue where all defendants reside, and § 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in a district where it does business.

Cruise v. Castleton, Inc. · filed 1978-05-03(a), (c)

In a diversity case, venue will lie in the district where “all defendants reside,” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), and for venue purposes a corporation resides in “any judicial district in which it ... is doing business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). The USTA clearly does business in the Southern District of Ohio because its principal place of business is in Columbus, and it appears from Castleton’s assertions regarding its business activities in Ohio that Castleton “does business” in that District as well.

Section 1391(c) permits venue in the district where a corporate defendant is incorporated.

Farmers Bank of the State of Delaware v. Bell Mortgage Corporation · filed 1978-08-09(c)

Of the numerous corporate defendants to this action, several are incorporated in Delaware, and there is venue over them in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) permits an action against a corporation to be brought in the district where its principal place of business is located.

Roc, Inc. v. Progress Drillers, Inc. · filed 1979-01-29(c)

As the record herein establishes without dispute that Defendant’s principal place of business is in the southern judicial district of Texas at Houston, Texas, this action could have been brought in said district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391 treats a corporation doing business in a judicial district as residing there for venue purposes.

Wooldridge v. Beech Aircraft Corp. · filed 1979-11-13(c)

Venue is proper in the District of Kansas, because it is undisputed that both Beech and Avco are doing business in Kansas and thus both are deemed to “reside” in that district.

A corporation may be sued in a judicial district where it does business because that district is its residence for venue purposes.

Lulling v. Barnaby's Family Inns, Inc. · filed 1980-01-11(c)

It is their position that since the Eastern District of Wisconsin meets none of these tests, venue is improper. This Court disagrees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) which provides: “A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation' for venue purposes.”

Section 1391(c) permits venue in a district where a corporate defendant does business.

National Acceptance Co. of America v. Wechsler · filed 1980-05-05(c)

Moreover, venue would be appropriate in the Eastern District of Michigan under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), as defendant Windsor is a corporation doing business within that district.

In a diversity action, venue is proper in a district where the corporate defendant does business.

Roby v. General Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1980-09-26(a), (c)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a) and (c), venue lies in this Court if the defendant does business in the State of Maryland. Defendant concedes, in a memorandum filed by it, that it does do business in Maryland. Accordingly, defendant’s venue motion must and does fail.

Section 1391 permits venue in the district where a corporate defendant has its principal place of business.

Conner v. Mark I, Inc. · filed 1981-03-18(b), (c)

and, as defendant Mark I, Inc. is an Illinois corporation having its principal place of business in Chicago, venue in the Northern District of Illinois is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) & (c), see footnote 1, supra.

Section 1391(c) permits venue in Delaware for a corporation incorporated there.

Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Winchester Electronics Division of Litton Systems, Inc. · filed 1981-07-31(c)

Winchester is a Delaware corporation. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), and venue is properly laid in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) and 1400(d).

Section 1391(c) permits venue in a district where the defendant corporation is incorporated.

Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Mary Helen Coal Co., Inc. · filed 1981-10-13(c)

This claim could have been brought in the Eastern District of Kentucky. Jurisdiction and venue would be proper, as defendant is a Kentucky corporation. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing for venue purposes in a district where it regularly conducts business and is subject to personal jurisdiction.

ALEXANDER, ETC. v. Richardson-Merrell Inc. · filed 1982-02-25(c)

Clearly this Court has in personam jurisdiction in this district over the defendant corporation because it regularly conducts business in the district. In light of this fact and in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), this district is also the “residence” of the defendant corporation for venue purposes.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing, for venue purposes, in a district where it does business.

Supco Automotive Parts, Inc. v. Triangle Auto Spring Co. · filed 1982-05-18(c)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), a corporation’s residence for venue purposes may be the district in which it is either incorporated or licensed to do business or doing business. Since defendants have demonstrated by affidavits that all defendants presently party to the Pennsylvania action are at least doing business in the Northern District of Illinois, that district is one in which the present action “might have been brought.”

Section 1391(c) makes venue proper in a district where a corporate defendant does business.

Kyle v. Days Inn of America, Inc. · filed 1982-09-23(c)

Thus Franchising is doing business in the Middle District and venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Sections 1391(a) and (c) permit venue where a corporate defendant does business and the events giving rise to the suit occurred.

Neminski v. Truckstops Corp. of America · filed 1983-03-04(a), (c)

Truckstops is licensed to do business in Indiana and carries on business in the proposed transferee district. Furthermore, the event giving rise to this suit occurred at Truck-stops’ restaurant in Gary, Indiana. In light of those Indiana contacts, the venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a) and (c) would have permitted filing in the proposed transferee district.

A corporation does not do business in a district for venue purposes merely because one of its suppliers is located there.

DB Orban, Inc. v. Orbex International, Inc. · filed 1983-03-16(c)

Thus, the bare fact that one supplier is in New Jersey, whose goods go out to overseas customers, falls far short of showing that Orbex is “doing business” within New Jersey for venue purposes.

Section 1391(c) permits venue for corporate defendants in a district where they are found or transact business; their principal offices in the district establish proper venue there.

Sports Eye, Inc. v. Daily Racing Form, Inc. · filed 1983-05-26(c)

There is no question that the Central District of California is a proper forum for this action under the venue provisions governing this case. See 15 U.S.C. § 22 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). These two venue statutes provide that an action properly may be brought in any district in which the defendants are found or in which they transact business. All three defendants have their principal offices within the Central District of California, either in Los Angeles or in nearby Inglewood. Consequently, venue is proper in the Central District, and defendants are subject to service of process there.

Section 1391(c) permits venue over a corporation in a district where it does business.

Consolidated Metal Products, Inc. v. American Petroleum Institute · filed 1983-08-29(c)

The two corporations are “doing business” in the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) permits suit against a corporation in a district where it does business; small local sales through a representative can suffice.

Aluminum Housewares Co., Inc. v. Chip Clip Corp. · filed 1984-06-25(c)

As to defendant Chip Clip, the Court finds that venue properly lies within this Court's jurisdiction. Defendant Chip Clip transacted business in this district as is evidenced by the establishment of a marketing relationship with a manufacturer's representative whose place of business is within this district and the sales of defendant Chip Clip's closure clip within this district. Once again, these sales are small in quantity but are sufficient to maintain proper venue for this cause of action.

Section 1391(c) permits venue in a district where a corporate defendant does business.

Luca Oil Drilling Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp. · filed 1984-09-21(c)

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) since Gulf does business in the Western District of Texas.

Section 1391(c) supports venue in a district where a corporate defendant maintains its principal place of business.

Texas Energy Fuels Corp. v. Pemco Supply Co., Inc. · filed 1985-02-21(c)

Venue is proper in the Middle District of Pennsylvania by virtue of the fact that Defendant Pemco Supply Company maintains its principal place of business within the Middle District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

The court held that neither § 1391(b) nor § 1391(c) established venue in the district and therefore considered dismissal or transfer.

Tonka Corp. v. TMS Entertainment, Inc. · filed 1985-05-20

Because the Court has concluded that venue is not proper under either 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) or (c), the Court must either dismiss the action or transfer the case to a district where venue is proper.

Neither § 1391(b) nor § 1391(c) established venue in the district on the facts presented.

Cardwell v. Investor's Analysis, Inc. · filed 1985-10-31

Accordingly, the Court determines that venue is not proper under either Section 1391(b) or Section 1391(c).

For venue purposes, a corporation resides in a district where it conducts substantial business operations when the cause of action accrues.

National Bank of Canada v. Artex Industries, Inc. · filed 1986-01-29(c)

For venue purposes a corporation resides in a district where it is “doing business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). ... Thus Artex was engaged in “substantial business operations” within this district on or about June 10, 1983 when NBC’s cause of action accrued, see Complaint, 117, and therefore venue is proper in this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(c) permits a corporation to be sued in a district where it does business.

Dai Nippon Printing Co. v. Melrose Publishing Co. · filed 1986-11-18(c)

Because Melrose has been found to be “doing business” in New York within the meaning of Civ. Prac.L. § 301, venue in New York is also proper.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation incorporated in a state as a resident of each judicial district in that state for venue purposes.

Wood v. Barnette, Inc. · filed 1986-11-26(c)

Under the general venue provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), a corporation may be sued, among other places, “in any judicial district in which it is incorporated ..., and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.” Thus, because Dominion Bank is incorporated in Virginia, it can be sued in any district in Virginia and such district be deemed its residence for venue. Therefore, the Court concludes that venue is proper in the Eastern District as to Dominion Bank.

Section 1391 treats a corporation licensed to do business in a judicial district as a resident of that district for venue purposes.

Eastern Refractories Co. v. Forty Eight Insulations, Inc. · filed 1987-08-05(c)

Aycock’s contention that venue in this district is improper is meritless. Both ERCO and Aycock are licensed to do business in New York.

Section 1391(c) permits an action against a New Jersey corporation to be brought in federal court in New Jersey.

Triffin v. Harris Camden Terminals Corp. · filed 1987-10-08(c)

Plaintiff, although now residing elsewhere, alleges that he is a citizen of Pennsylvania; defendant is a New Jersey corporation. This action might have been brought in federal court in New Jersey. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) governs where an ADEA claim against a corporate defendant may initially be filed.

Darchuk v. Kellwood Co. · filed 1988-07-08(c)

The Court finds that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) plaintiffs ADEA claim could have initially been brought in Missouri and that pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) plaintiffs ERISA claim could have been filed in Missouri.

Section 1391(c) permits suit against a corporation in a district where it does business.

Goodin v. Burlington Northern Railroad · filed 1988-07-12(c)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), “a corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business.” Defendant is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Texas. Plaintiff has alleged that defendant does business in the Southern District of Illinois and defendant has not denied that claim. The Court, therefore, finds that venue is proper in this district.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as a resident of a state where it has its principal place of business for venue purposes.

BV v. Apollo Computer Inc. · filed 1989-02-17(c)

Plaintiff does not dispute that on the day this suit was filed, defendant’s principal place of business was in Chelmsford, Massachusetts. Thus, defendant is considered a resident of Massachusetts for venue purposes. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(a) permits a corporation to be sued in a district where it is incorporated, licensed to do business, or doing business.

Morales v. Navieras De Puerto Rico · filed 1989-06-12(a)

With respect to the first part of the test, according to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) “a corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business.” Thus, plaintiffs action could have been brought in Puerto Rico in the first instance and the first part of the test under § 1404(a) has been satisfied.

Section 1391(c) permits venue in a district where a corporate defendant does business and is licensed to do business.

Public Service Enterprise Group, Inc. v. Philadelphia Electric Co. · filed 1989-08-24(c)

Venue is proper because PECO is doing business and is licensed to do business in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) makes venue proper for a corporate defendant in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Evans v. American Surplus Underwriters Corp. · filed 1989-10-12(c)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), this Court finds that since defendant is a corporation and subject to personal jurisdiction of this Court, venue is proper in the Northern District of Georgia.

Under the version of § 1391(c) preceding the 1988 amendment, a corporate defendant doing business in a district when sued could be sued there even if it did no business there when the claim arose.

Tenefrancia v. Robinson Export & Import Corporation · filed 1990-12-27(c)

Framed in present tense, as it is, the plain language of the statute authorizes venue as to a corporation that “is incorporated or licensed to do business” or “is doing business” in the district at the time it is sued (emphasis added).

Section 1391(c) can treat a trust as a corporation for venue purposes, making it a resident of a district where it was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action began.

Kingsepp v. Wesleyan University · filed 1991-05-02(c)

Because Dartmouth is a “corporation” for purposes of section 1391(c) and was subject to personal jurisdiction at the time this action was commenced, Dartmouth is deemed to “reside” in this district pursuant to section 1391(c). Accordingly, all of the moving defendants are deemed to reside in this district and venue is therefore appropriate under section 1391(b).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district within a state with multiple judicial districts when its contacts with that district would support personal jurisdiction if the district were a separate state.

Bicicletas Windsor, S.A. v. Bicycle Corp. of America · filed 1992-01-27(c)

According to § 1391(c), then, BCA is a resident of the Southern District only if its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if the Southern District were a separate state. ... Although it is a close call, the Court views BCA’s contacts in the Southern District as sufficient for the purposes of 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) applies to Jones Act venue, so a corporate defendant resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Bass v. Energy Transportation Corp. · filed 1992-03-24(c)

For the reasons which are discussed supra, section 1391(c), as amended in 1988 prior to that 1989 accident alleged by Bass in this case, is deemed applicable herein. In sum, if personal jurisdiction exists in this case, venue exists.

Section 1391(b) and (c) permit venue over a corporate defendant where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Whitaker v. Lanceco, Inc. (In re Olympia Holding Corp.) · filed 1992-04-29(b), (c)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c), venue over a defendant corporation is only proper in districts in which it has contacts which would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state or in districts where a substantial part of the events that led to the subject claim occurred. ... The Court only has before it the uncontroverted Affidavit, which contains sworn testimony that shows that venue does not lie against the Defendant anywhere in this' district.

Section 1391(c) deems a corporation to reside in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Kinetic Instruments, Inc. v. Lares · filed 1992-08-25(c)

For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. ... There appears to be no dispute that Lares Research is subject to jurisdiction here, and so it “resides” in the Southern District of New York for venue purposes.

Section 1391(c) permits venue against a corporate defendant in any district where the corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Max Planck Gesellschaft Zur Foederung Der Wissenschaften, E v. v. General Electric Co. · filed 1994-07-22(c)

The 1988 amendments expanded venue for cases against corporate defendants to embrace any district in which personal jurisdiction over the corporation could be obtained. ... However, in light of GE’s significant activities in the Southern District of New York, its motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and for improper venue notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) is denied.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing, for Jones Act venue, in any judicial district where it does business.

Rich v. Southern Gulf Operators · filed 1995-02-02(c)

For suits brought under the Jones Act, venue is proper wherever the defendant "resides.” That is, in any judicial district in which the corporation is doing business.

Section 1391(c) permits venue for a corporate defendant in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Charlesworth v. Marco Manufacturing Co. · filed 1995-02-14(c)

The ADEA does not contain its own venue provision and, thus, venue is governed by the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Pursuant to § 1391, venue is proper for a defendant corporation only in a “judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” Marco has admitted that it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Central District of California.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc. · filed 1995-05-18(c)

As the earlier discussion on personal jurisdiction implied, Pass is subject to personal jurisdiction in this District and thus venue as to the claims asserted against Pass is properly asserted in this District at this time. The same holds true for Legrand.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where its business contacts subject it to personal jurisdiction.

Jumara v. State Farm · filed 1995-06-02(c)

Venue is also proper, however, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where the defendant transacts business and is therefore subject to personal jurisdiction.

Section 1391(a)(1) permits venue in a district where all corporate defendants are deemed to reside because each is subject to personal jurisdiction there.

Hexacomb Corp. v. Damage Prevention Products Corp. · filed 1995-08-24(a)(1)

Although neither DPP nor AHI are Indiana corporations, for the purposes of venue, “a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Since both AHI and DPP are subject to personal jurisdiction in the district, both are deemed to reside in this district, and therefore venue in this district is proper under § 1391(a)(1).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing for venue purposes in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Icon Industrial Controls Corp. v. Cimetrix, Inc. · filed 1996-04-05(c)

Having already determined that the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in Louisiana, and that the venue provisions of Section 12 of the Clayton Act are not exclusive, the court agrees that § 1391(c) provides a basis for venue. It was clearly the intention of Congress, when it amended § 1391 in 1988, to provide that if all corporate defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum, and there are no individual defendants who reside elsewhere, venue is automatically established.

Section 1391(c) makes venue proper for a corporate defendant in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Regent Lighting Corp. v. Galaxy Electrical Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 1996-04-29(c)

Venue for a corporate defendant is proper in any judicial district in which the corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1993). Since the Court has concluded that Galaxy is subject to personal jurisdiction in this district, venue is proper.

Section 1391(c), with the patent venue statute, supports venue for a corporate officer personally accused of infringement based on the corporation’s acts when the complaint supports venue as to that officer.

Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., and Dwayne Holden · filed 1996-05-24(c)

In comparison, venue for personal liability of a corporate officer/owner for acts of infringement by the corporation, whether or not the facts support piercing the corporate veil, may reasonably be based on the venue provisions for the corporation, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1400(b) and 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction.

Air-Flo MG Co., Inc. v. Louis Berkman Co. · filed 1996-07-18(c)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), “a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” ... Construing the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it also appears that there could be a set of facts which would support personal jurisdiction, and therefore venue, within this district. Since that is so, the motion to dismiss must be denied.

Section 1391(c) makes venue proper in a district where a corporate defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc. · filed 1996-08-19(c)

Defendant's argument that venue is improper must also be denied. Because the Court has concluded it has personal jurisdiction over defendant, venue is proper in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

KLLM, Inc. Employee Health Protection Plan v. Ontario Community Hospital · filed 1996-10-28(c)

The foregoing clearly indicates that if Ontario as a defendant corporation was subject to this court’s personal jurisdiction at the time the suit was commenced, then for purposes of § 1391, Ontario is deemed to have resided in the Southern District of Mississippi. Having established that personal jurisdiction exists, the court likewise concludes that venue in this district is also proper.

Under § 1391(c), a corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

P.M. Enterprises v. Color Works, Inc. · filed 1996-11-13(c)

Under § 1391(c), for purposes of establishing proper venue, a corporate defendant “reside[s] in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced_” Therefore, our venue inquiry must focus on whether Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in this district. ... Because these contacts suffice to establish personal jurisdiction over Defendants in this district, ... this action meets the statutory requirements for venue here.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as a resident for venue purposes where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Micro-Assist, Inc. v. Cherry Communications, Inc. · filed 1997-04-16(c)

Since Mercury is subject to personal jurisdiction here, under § 1391 Mercury is a New York State resident for venue purposes.

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Cook v. Pride Petroleum Services, Inc. · filed 1998-04-27(c)

Furthermore, for venue purposes, “a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(C). ... Therefore, both Defendants are subject to general personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of Texas, ... and both Defendants reside in the Southern District of Texas.

For venue purposes, a corporation resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction, and venue is proper where all defendants reside.

GIULIANI, S.P.A. v. Vickers, Inc. · filed 1998-03-17(a)(1), (c)

And, because both defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in Nebraska, venue is proper in Nebraska. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1), (c).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it was subject to personal jurisdiction when the lawsuit began.

Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc. v. Brunton Co. · filed 1998-05-08(c)

A corporate defendant is deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the lawsuit commenced. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Because Brunton and Silva Production both “reside” in this district under section 1391(c), venue here is proper, ... so the motion must be denied.

Sections 1391(b)(1) and (c) permit venue when the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the district.

Park Inns International, Inc. v. Pacific Plaza Hotels, Inc. · filed 1998-03-30(b)(1), (c)

In its prior order, the court deferred ruling on this motion because, if Defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction here, then venue would be proper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) & (c). Since the court has found that Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction here, the court will deny their motion to dismiss for improper venue.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Frontline Test Equipment, Inc. v. Greenleaf Software, Inc. · filed 1998-06-03(c)

Thus, venue is proper generally where personal jurisdiction can be asserted over the corporate defendant. ... Under this analysis of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 and 1400, venue is proper in the instant case because personal jurisdiction was proper.

Section 1391(c) makes venue proper for a corporate defendant wherever it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp. · filed 1998-09-28(c)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), venue is proper over a corporate defendant wherever it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the. time the action is commenced. ... Accordingly, the District of Columbia is a proper venue.

Section 1391(b) does not provide venue in this district when the court finds no personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Patriot Systems, Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp. · filed 1998-09-25(b)

However, because the court has determined it has no personal jurisdiction over defendant, venue is likewise not proper in this district under the relevant provisions of this statute.

In a federal question case, § 1391 permits venue where a corporate defendant resides, including a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if the district were a separate state.

Worldcom Technologies, Inc. v. ICC Inteleca Communications, Inc. · filed 1999-03-04(b), (c)

Because we find that personal jurisdiction exists over Defendant, Plaintiff's motion to dismiss for improper venue also must be denied. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides that a federal question case may be brought in a judicial district where any defendant resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) provides that a corporate defendant resides, for the purposes of § 1391(b), in any judicial district “within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State ....” All of Defendant's contacts with the State of New York discussed herein occurred in the Southern District of New York.

In a diversity action, venue is proper where the defendant corporation resides, and a corporation resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Cable-La, Inc. v. Williams Communications, Inc. · filed 1999-03-23(a)(1), (c)

Moreover, this fact indicates that venue is proper in the Northern District of Oklahoma as well. ... The statute goes on to provide that for venue purposes a corporate defendant is deemed to reside in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

In a diversity action, venue is proper where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state; a corporation’s residence depends on its contacts with the district.

Promuto v. Waste Management, Inc. · filed 1999-04-23(a)(1), (c)

Venue would be proper in the Northern District of Illinois pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which provides: (a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State.... (c) For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced ... [and] in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State, and, if there is no such district, the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within which it has the most significant contacts.

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Bousis v. Marriott International, Inc. · filed 1999-05-07(c)

For purposes of venue, “a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” Id. § 1391(c). Marriott, the only remaining defendant, does not dispute that this court has jurisdiction over it, thus, venue is proper.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the corporate defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Brandon Apparel Group, Inc. v. Quitman Manufacturing Co. · filed 1999-03-18

Further, the court denies Quitman’s motion to dismiss for improper venue because, as Quitman conceded, if this court can exercise personal jurisdiction over Quitman, venue is proper in this district.

Section 1391 treats a corporation as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction and permits a diversity action against it there.

Topliff v. Atlas Air, Inc. · filed 1999-07-08(a), (c)

Because Atlas is subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of Kansas for this case, it is deemed to reside in the District of Kansas for the purposes of venue. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Venue is, therefore, proper in the District of Kansas because the action can be brought in any district where Atlas resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

In a diversity action against a corporation, venue is proper in the district of its principal place of business even if a subsidiary manufactured the product elsewhere.

Addie M. Willis, Special Administratrix of the Estate of Bobby Willis, Deceased v. Caterpillar Incorporated · filed 1999-12-08(a), (c)

Caterpillar is the sole defendant in this action. Its principal place of business is Peoria, Illinois. Venue was clearly proper in the Central District of Illinois. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a), (c). The new evidence that the forklift was actually manufactured by a subsidiary in another state — namely, Caterpillar Industrial in Ohio — -whatever other questions it may raise, does not change the conclusion as to venue with respect to the suit as filed.

Section 1391(c) makes venue proper in a judicial district where a corporate defendant does business.

Hillard v. Guidant Corp. · filed 1999-12-09(c)

The law provides that venue is proper in a judicial district in which a corporation is doing business. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). It is apparently uncontested that the defendants conduct substantial business activities in California; hence venue is proper in California.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing, for venue purposes, in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

R & J Tool v. Manchester Tool · filed 2000-04-21(c)

In other words, because the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Manchester, section 1391(c) provides, at least for venue purposes, that Manchester “resides” in this district.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as a resident of any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Kressen v. Federal Insurance · filed 2000-05-08(c)

Therefore, because Federal and Chubb are both subject to personal jurisdiction in the Virgin Islands and they are both corporations, they are deemed residents of the Virgin Islands for purposes of venue.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Miller v. Asensio · filed 2000-06-16(c)

A corporate defendant is “deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1994). This court has already found that the corporate Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in this forum based upon the nationwide service of process provisions of the SEA of 1934. The corporate Defendants are thus deemed to reside in this forum.

Section 1391(c) permits venue where a corporate defendant has sufficient contacts, even when a forum-selection clause names another place.

Smith v. Commodore Cruise Line Ltd. · filed 2000-09-29(c)

Similarly, here, defendants do not dispute that, as a corporation, they have sufficient contacts with Louisiana to render venue proper under the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), and, accordingly, this Court finds that venue was properly brought in Louisiana.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

GMAC Commercial Credit, LLC v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc. · filed 2001-01-17(c)

Personal jurisdiction over defendant having been established, this court finds that venue in New York is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where its contacts support personal jurisdiction for venue purposes.

LG Electronics Inc. v. First International Computer, Inc. · filed 2001-04-11(c)

FIC’s contacts are directed primarily to the Northern District of California, where its United States subsidiary, FICA, has its principal place of business. Thus, venue is proper in the Northern District of California.

Section 1391 permits venue against a corporation in a judicial district where it does business.

Reed v. Weeks Marine, Inc. · filed 2001-08-20(b) and (c)

As plaintiff alleges in his complaint that Weeks Marine was doing business in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania at or around the time of the subject accident and given the defendant’s admission that it does work in the navigable waters of the Delaware River, venue in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is proper.

In a diversity suit, a corporation resides for venue purposes in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Morgan v. Coushatta Tribe of Indians of Louisiana · filed 2001-09-21(a), (c)

Venue in a diversity suit lies against a corporate defendant in any district where the corporation resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). A corporation is deemed to reside in any district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Since the court has ... determined that it has personal jurisdiction over INC., it resides in this district for purposes of venue. Therefore venue is proper, and transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) is not authorized.

Section 1391(c) determines a corporation’s residence for venue from its amenability to personal jurisdiction when the action commenced, regardless of a later waiver of a jurisdiction objection.

DSMC, INC. v. Convera Corp. · filed 2002-08-29(c)

This language requires an independent inquiry into whether personal jurisdiction was appropriate at the time the plaintiff filed the lawsuit, not as of the time defendant failed to object to jurisdiction.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

International Truck & Engine Corp. v. Dow-Hammond Trucks Co. · filed 2002-09-04(c)

For the purposes of venue, a “defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Because defendant Dow-Hammond, a California corporation, is the only defendant in the instant case, and this court has found that it may assert personal jurisdiction over defendant, venue is proper in this district.

Section 1391(c) makes venue proper where a corporate defendant has its principal place of business and is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Intranexus, Inc. v. Siemens Medical Solutions Health Services Corp. · filed 2002-10-29(c)

In the present action, it is indisputable that venue would be proper in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania because Defendant has its principal place of business in Pennsylvania and is therefore subject to personal jurisdiction therein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391 treats a corporation as residing in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

Horizon Marketing v. Kingdom International Ltd. · filed 2003-02-14(c)

Thus, were the Eastern District of New York a separate state, containing Queens County, Dong would be a domestic corporation subject to general jurisdiction. Accordingly, venue in the Eastern District is proper as to Dong. ... Accordingly, venue, for Kingdom, is likewise proper in the Eastern District.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Koh v. Microtek International, Inc. · filed 2003-03-05(c)

The definition of “residence” is found in § 1391, which provides, in relevant part, “[f]or purposes of venue ... a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2003). ... These contacts with California are sufficient to confer both venue and jurisdiction in the Central District of California over MEI and all of the Microtek defendants.

Section 1391(c) makes venue proper where a corporate defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Edwards v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. · filed 2003-05-01(c)

Although the fatal crash occurred in Georgia, venue was proper in the Northern District of West Virginia because Bell is sub- ject to personal jurisdiction there.

Section 1391(c) permits venue in a diversity action against a corporate defendant in a district where the defendant resides.

Touchstone Research Laboratory, Ltd. v. Anchor Equipment Sales, Inc. · filed 2003-06-04(c)

In actions founded on diversity of citizenship, venue is proper as to a corporate defendant “in a judicial district where any defendant resides.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). ... Given these circumstances, this Court is satisfied that defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with this forum so that it could expect to be haled into court here. ... Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer this case is DENIED.

Section 1391(a)(1) permits venue in a diversity case where corporate defendants are deemed residents because they are subject to personal jurisdiction in the district.

Financial Trust Co., Inc. v. NA · filed 2003-06-19(a)(1)

Because I have found that both Citibank and Citigroup are subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction and are thus deemed residents of the Territory for venue purposes, venue is proper in the Virgin Islands under section 1391(a)(1).

A corporation resides for venue purposes in a judicial district where it was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action began.

Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Micromuse, Inc. · filed 2004-04-15(c)

“For purposes of venue ... a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). Accordingly, to determine whether Defendant “resides” in the Southern District of New York, the Court must determine whether New York had personal jurisdiction over Micromuse when Plaintiff filed its Complaint. ... Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff could have brought this case in the Southern District of New York and the Court now turns to whether the interest of justice and convenience of the parties and witnesses justify transfer to that forum.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Schmidt v. American Institute of Physics · filed 2004-06-28(c)

In turn, because AIP is subject to personal jurisdiction in Maryland, it is deemed to “reside” in Maryland for purposes of the venue.

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in any judicial district where it was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action began.

PDK Labs, Inc. v. Proactive Labs, Inc. · filed 2004-07-15(c)

Section 1391(c) provides that “[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” ... Proactive’s claim under § 1391(c) must therefore fail.

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

DakColl, Inc. v. Grand Central Graphics, Inc. · filed 2005-01-20(c)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) provides that a corporation resides in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction. Grand Central Graphics is subject to personal jurisdiction in North Dakota based on its contacts with the State. As a result, venue in North Dakota is proper.

Section 1391 permits venue where the sole corporate defendant resides and treats a corporation as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

U.S. Ship Management, Inc. v. Maersk Line, Ltd. · filed 2005-02-11(b)(1), (c)

Under the general venue statute, venue is proper in a judicial district “where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State.” ... Because it has already been established that personal jurisdiction over MLL is proper in the District of Columbia, it follows that venue is also proper there.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Salinas v. O'Reilly Automotive, Inc. · filed 2005-02-16(c)

O’Reilly’s headquarters are in Springfield and it would be subject to personal jurisdiction in the Western District of Missouri; hence, it “resides” there within the meaning of the venue statute.

A corporate defendant with its principal place of business in a district resides there for venue purposes.

Original Creatine Patent Co. v. Met-Rx USA, Inc. · filed 2005-05-03(c)

Because the defendant has its principal place of business within the Eastern District of New York, it resides there for purposes of establishing both personal jurisdiction and venue.

Section 1391(a)(1) permits venue where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state; under § 1391(c), a corporation resides in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Hope v. Otis Elevator Co. · filed 2005-06-29(a)(1), (c)

Venue is proper in this District if both Defendants “reside” in California, and at least one Defendant “resides” in this District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1). For purposes of venue, a corporation is a resident of any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). ... Consequently, Otis is a resident of California for purposes of venue and venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1).

Section 1391 treats a corporation as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction and permits venue where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

A Slice of Pie Productions, LLC v. Wayans Bros. Entertainment · filed 2005-09-21(b), (c)

Since all defendants in this case are corporations, venue is proper under both § 1400(a) and § 1391(b) if the Court has personal jurisdiction over all defendants. Because the Court has found that personal jurisdiction exists over Gold, and because personal jurisdiction is not contested by Revolution, Sony, or Wayans, at this stage venue is proper under both § 1400(a) and § 1391(a) and defendants’ § 1406(a) motions to transfer are denied.