18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) constitutionally bars a person on probation from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Brown · filed 2025-12-11(g)(1)

But we need not address this argument, because our precedent is clear: “§ 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to convicts on parole or probation” 20 and “[a] convict completing his sentence on supervised release does not have a Second Amendment right to possess a firearm.” 21 Because Brown was on probation at the time of the offense, he does not have a Second Amendment right to possess a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to nonviolent felons.

United States v. Green · filed 2026-02-24(g)(1)

Green first contends that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, and was taken in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him as a purported nonviolent felon. This claim is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally bar firearm possession by a person on probation.

United States v. Brown · filed 2026-03-06(g)(1)

Because Brown was on probation at the time of the offense, he does not have a Second Amendment right to possess a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by felons withstands Perez’s as-applied constitutional challenge under binding circuit precedent.

United States v. Perez · filed 2026-04-08(g)(1)

Finally, Perez’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him is foreclosed by our decision United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743, 762 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc).

Section 922(g)(3) cannot be applied to a regular drug user found possessing a firearm when the government does not seek to prove the person was intoxicated at the time.

United States v. Hemani · filed 2025-01-31(g)(3)

Here, the Government concedes its evidence is deficient under Connelly’s binding precedent and that this deficiency is dispositive. Given the parties’ agreement on summary affirmance and the application of our precedent here, we AFFIRM.

Section 922(g)(4) treats a state court finding that a person requires mental health treatment as an adjudication that the person is a mental defective.

United States v. Four (4) Firearms and One Hundred Fifty Two Rounds of Assorted Ammunition · filed 2019-12-18(g)(4)

The Court finds that the finding in the subject Order that Claimant was a “person requiring treatment” is an adjudication that Claimant is a mental defective under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).

Section 922(g)(4) bars firearm possession after a formal involuntary commitment to a mental institution, even if the commitment hearing had defects.

United States v. McIlwain · filed 2014-11-25(g)(4)

Even if McIlwain could show some infirmity in his commitment hearing, we still hold that he was “committed to a mental institution” under the meaning of § 922(g)(4). ... We see no reason that § 922(g)(4) should be subject to a validity requirement that other subsections of § 922(g) are not.

A mental health adjudication does not disqualify a person under § 922(g)(4) after the person is fully released or discharged from all mandatory treatment, supervision, or monitoring.

Texas Department of Public Safety v. Randolph · filed 2014-01-09(g)(4)

But upon her discharge, federal law deems Randolph’s mental health adjudication to have never occurred, and she is therefore not disqualified from purchasing a handgun under federal law.

Section 922(g)(4) disqualifies a person adjudicated as a mental defective from receiving or possessing a firearm; discharge from all mandatory treatment can cause the adjudication to be deemed never to have occurred for that disqualification.

Texas Department of Public Safety v. Randolph · filed 2014-05-08(g)(4)

At the time that the mental health services order was entered, Randolph became disqualified under federal law from purchasing a firearm and thus ineligible for a concealed handgun license under Texas law. But upon her discharge, federal law deems Randolph’s mental health adjudication to have never occurred, and she is therefore not disqualified from purchasing a handgun under federal law.

A later vacatur and dismissal of an involuntary commitment order on technical grounds does not retroactively invalidate a § 922(g)(4) possession conviction.

United States v. Cantlon · filed 2017-05-30(g)(4)

Applying the law of analogous felon-in-possession cases United States v. Padilla, 387 F.3d 1087, 1090–92 (9th Cir. 2004) and Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60–65 (1980), the district court ruled that the dismissal of Cantlon’s commitment order did not operate retroactively to affect her conviction. As a result, her conviction was not invalid. ... We agree.

Section 922(g)(4) applies to all persons involuntarily committed to a mental institution.

Jefferies v. Sessions · filed 2017-10-03(g)(4)

Congress enacted § 922(g)(4) to apply to all persons involuntarily committed.

Whether an adjudication or commitment qualifies under Section 922(g)(4) is a question of law for the court.

United States v. McLinn · filed 2018-07-24(g)(4)

We therefore conclude that whether a defendant has been adjudicated a mental defective or committed to a mental institution for the purposes of § 922(g)(4) is a question of law to be determined by the court rather than a question of fact to be reserved for the jury.

Section 922(g)(4) does not support a firearms prohibition when the mental-impairment application is dismissed, and a substance-related disorder alone satisfies none of section 922(g)’s listed predicates.

In the Matter of J.S., Alleged to be Seriously Mentally Impaired · filed 2019-08-21(g)(4)

Having dismissed the application, the court could not rely on a serious mental impairment to support the firearms prohibition. ... But there must also be grounding in the federal statute, and none of the nine federal predicates for imposition of the firearms prohibition are premised on a substance-related disorder. See 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)-(9).

Section 922(g)(4)’s prohibition based on an adjudication as a mental defective requires judicial process; a physician emergency certificate does not suffice.

United States v. Tucker · filed 2022-08-24(g)(4)

Critically, however, no reasonable degree of deference could overcome the fact that Tucker never underwent an “adjudication” in the sense contemplated by § 922(g)(4). Black’s Law Dictionary explains that “adjudicate” commonly means “[t]o rule on judicially.”

Section 922(g)(4) prohibits firearm possession by a person who has been committed to a mental institution.

Collins v. United States · filed 2022-11-02(g)(4)

But he was prosecuted under federal law, and federal law does prohibit persons who have been committed to a mental institution from possessing firearms.

Section 922(g)(4)’s prohibition for people “adjudicated as a mental defective” includes those adjudicated mentally ill and a danger to themselves or others.

Randy Dale Sixta, Appellant, vs. Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office, Respondent · filed 2025-10-13(g)(4)

The phrase “adjudicated as a mental defective,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), includes individuals who have been adjudicated mentally ill and a danger to themselves or others.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) covers regular firearms dealing for profit without a license; repeated purchases and resales, experience, and knowledge of prices and sales laws can support a conviction.

United States v. Garcia · filed 2023-01-05(a)(1)(A)

In an interview with law enforcement, Garcia admitted that he purchased and resold firearms “for profit.” In addition, the evidence showed that Garcia dealt in firearms regularly because he (1) purchased and resold a large quantity of firearms over a period of several months, (2) was experienced in buying and selling firearms, (3) was knowledgeable about current prices, and (4) was familiar with laws governing the sale of firearms.

Section 922(a)(1)(A)’s prohibition on unlicensed firearm dealing is constitutional under the Second and Fifth Amendments, both facially and as applied, and is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Hosford · filed 2016-12-06(a)(1)(A)

We hold that the prohibition against unlicensed firearm dealing comports with the Second and Fifth Amendments both facially and as applied. It is also a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) covers firearms dealing by a dealer who inadvertently lets a license lapse.

Mayorga v. Attorney General United States · filed 2014-06-27(a)(1)(A)

For example, a dealer who inadvertently let his or her license lapse would be in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A).

Section 922(a)(1)(A) includes an interstate or foreign commerce element that Puerto Rico’s unlicensed firearms offense lacks, making the local offense a lesser included offense in the court’s comparison.

Pueblo v. Sánchez Valle Y Otros · filed 2015-03-20(a)(1)(A)

La única diferencia es que el delito estatal no requiere que los hechos se hayan cometido en el curso del comercio interestatal o internacional. Pero lo cierto es que al probarse el delito federal se prueba cada uno de los elementos del delito estatal. En otras palabras, el delito estatal es uno menor incluido en el delito federal.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) permits an unlicensed firearms dealing conviction based on sales of complete parts kits that can readily be converted into functioning firearms.

United States v. Wick · filed 2017-09-07(a)(1)(A)

The evidence adduced by the Government was sufficient to convict Wick on the firearm charge. The evidence demonstrated that, in addition to demilled receivers, Wick was selling complete Uzi parts kits that could “readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,” thus meeting the statute’s definition of a firearm.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) requires proof that an unlicensed person dealing in firearms pursued an economic objective through repetitive purchases and resales.

United States v. Rosa-Hernandez · filed 2020-10-01(a)(1)(A)

To prosecute an unlicensed individual for unlawfully dealing in firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), the Government must prove, among other things, that the person who engaged in such activity had an economic objective and “pursue[d] this objective through the repetitive purchase and resale of firearms.” Id. The record before the District Court does not appear to satisfy these elements and thus the Court properly viewed the February event as possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, rather than as the offense of dealing in firearms.

Section 922(a)(1) prohibits unlicensed firearms dealing; participants in the sales can be dealers even when someone else negotiates the prices.

United States v. Curtis Charles Overshon and John Overshon · filed 1974-04-30(a)(1)

Appellants submit that the conspiracy conviction cannot be sustained because the government failed to prove that they engaged “in the business of * * * dealing in firearms” without a license as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1), and as charged in the indictment. ... Quite to the contrary, as shown above, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government provides adequate proof that appellants were not only partners in the conspiracy and thus bound by Sharp’s actions, but they actively participated in the sales of the firearms to the government agents and received a part of the proceeds from the sales.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) prohibits unlicensed firearms dealing; evidence that a defendant deliberately dealt in firearms knowing the conduct was unlawful can sustain a conviction.

United States v. O'COnner · filed 1990-10-16(a)(1)(A)

The evidence in the record convinces us that, taken in the light most favorable to the government, sufficient evidence supports the jury's conclusion that O'Conner deliberately engaged in firearms dealings in knowing violation of the law.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) prohibits dealing in firearms without the required license; Rehaif’s knowledge-of-prohibited-status rule does not apply to that offense.

Washington v. United States · filed 2022-01-07(a)(1)(A)

But Rehaif’s holding applies only to charges brought under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2); it has no bearing on Washington’s convictions for firearm possession under § 924(c), Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951, conspiracy to distribute narcotics under 21 U.S.C. § 846, or engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without being a licensed importer, manufacturer, or dealer of firearms in violation of 18. U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A).

Section 922(a)(1)(A) prohibits a person from knowingly engaging in the business of dealing firearms without a license.

United States v. Omar Shorter, Jr. · filed 2025-10-10(a)(1)(A)

18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) makes it unlawful for any person who is not a licensed dealer “to engage in the business of . . . dealing in firearms.” To convict Shorter, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) engaged in the business of dealing in firearms; (2) wasn’t a licensed firearms dealer; and (3) knew that his conduct was unlawful.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) categorically qualifies as illicit trafficking in firearms even when the proof of profit exception applies.

Ronquillo v. Bondi · filed 2025-08-25(a)(1)(A)

We therefore disagree that the “proof of profit” exception makes § 922(a)(1)(A) a broader offense than “unlawful trading or dealing in firearms.” We instead find that the two offenses are a categorical match.

Section 922(g)(1)'s ban on firearm possession by convicted felons remains valid under the Commerce Clause after United States v. Lopez.

United States v. Shuman · filed 2023-02-09(g)(1)

We have already held that Lopez did not invalidate section 922(g) under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands facial and as-applied Commerce Clause challenges based on National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.

United States v. Spann · filed 2014-04-14(g)(1)

Spann contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. ... This court rejected Spann’s arguments regarding National Federation in United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 2014 WL 682525 (Mar. 24, 2014) (No. 13-8792).

Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g)(1) based on noneconomic firearm possession are foreclosed by circuit precedent.

United States v. Banchs · filed 2014-05-07(g)(1)

Whether our review is de novo or for plain error, Banchs’s challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)'s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge in the Fifth Circuit.

United States v. Gomez-Perales · filed 2014-12-16(g)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Manuel Francisco Gomez- Perales raises an argument that he concedes is foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The unopposed motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g) withstands an as-applied Commerce Clause challenge when the firearm and ammunition affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Hudson · filed 2015-06-29(g)

And he concedes that the firearm and ammunition that he possessed both affected interstate commerce, which defeats his as-applied challenge.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands the Commerce Clause challenge rejected by binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Moore · filed 2015-12-15(g)(1)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Ronald Martin Moore raises an argument that he concedes is foreclosed by United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 241-43 (5th Cir. 1996), which rejected a Commerce Clause-based challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Government’s motion for summary ... affirmance is GRANTED, the alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Zamarripa-Aranda · filed 2015-12-15(g)(1)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Mauricio Zamarripa-Aranda raises an argument that he concedes is foreclosed by United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 241-43 (5th Cir. 1996), which rejected a Commerce Clause-based challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial Commerce Clause challenges and challenges based on intrastate possession of a gun manufactured out of state.

United States v. Courtney Garner · filed 2016-02-18(g)(1)

Garner contends that 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional because regulation of the mere possession of a gun exceeds Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause. Garner also argues that section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him because his intrastate possession of a gun manufactured out-of-state had no substantial effect on interstate commerce. As Garner concedes, however, his arguments are foreclosed squarely by this Court’s binding precedent. See, e.g., United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1996). Thus, we affirm Garner’s conviction.

Section 922(g) is facially valid under the Commerce Clause, and a firearm manufactured outside the state where it was possessed satisfies the required minimal interstate commerce nexus.

United States v. Dixon · filed 2018-07-06(g)

We have held that § 922(g) is facially constitutional as an exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power. ... Regarding as-applied challenges to the statute, we have held that the Commerce Clause requires only a “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce; the government must prove only that a firearm was manufactured in a state other than the one in which the defendant possessed it. ... Because Dixon stipulated at trial that “[t]he firearm and ammunition were manufactured outside the State of Florida and therefore traveled in or affected interstate commerce,” this argument also fails.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a convicted felon is not unconstitutional under Lopez.

United States v. Gardner · filed 2018-08-15(g)(1)

In United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996), we rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) on the basis that neither the holding nor the reasoning in Lopez constitutionally invalidates § 922(g)(1). ... In view of the foregoing, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by convicted felons survives a Commerce Clause challenge based on Lopez.

United States v. Mora · filed 2018-09-14(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.” ... The motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED. The alternative motion for an extension is DENIED. The judgment is AFFIRMED.

An Eleventh Circuit Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1) fails under circuit precedent.

United States v. Reed · filed 2018-10-19(g)(1)

The district court also committed no error, much less plain error, in convicting Reed because, as he concedes, his constitutional challenge to section 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)'s felon-in-possession prohibition remains enforceable against a Commerce Clause challenge based on Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius.

United States v. Simmons · filed 2018-11-21(g)(1)

Appealing his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, Christopher David Simmons raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2010). ... In Alcantar, we rejected the argument that Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), affected our prior jurisprudence rejecting Commerce Clause challenges to the felon-in-possession statute (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Combs · filed 2019-06-11(g)(1)

Finally, regarding Combs’ constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under the Commerce Clause, we have rejected that argument as well. ... Considered altogether, we hold that the issues Combs raises on appeal are all foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate-commerce requirement defeats a facial Commerce Clause challenge, and the section is constitutional as applied when the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Alfred Wayne Lee, Jr. · filed 2019-10-25(g)(1)

We have held that “the jurisdictional element of the statute, i.e., the requirement that the felon ‘possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition,’ immunizes § 922(g)(1) from [a] facial constitutional attack,” ... and that section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a defendant who possesses a firearm that “traveled in interstate commerce,” United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1996).

Section 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Edward Curran, III · filed 2020-08-14(g)(1)

Curran’s argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a person convicted of a felony survives a challenge based on Congress’s interstate commerce power under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Frelix · filed 2021-07-22(g)(1)

He contends that § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s power to legislate on issues affecting interstate commerce, and he cites National Federation of Independent ... Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). ... The parties are correct that Frelix’s argument is foreclosed.

Section 922(n)’s interstate-commerce nexus requirement defeats a Commerce Clause challenge to its prohibition on receiving a firearm while under felony indictment under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Waldman · filed 2021-12-21(n)

The motion is unopposed: Waldman concedes that the constitutional issue he raises is foreclosed by precedent rejecting similar arguments with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which includes a jurisdictional nexus requirement like that in § 922(n). See, e.g., United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013). Because the Government’s position “is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case,” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969), summary affirmance is proper.

A Commerce Clause challenge to Section 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by Eighth Circuit precedent.

United States v. McNeese · filed 2022-10-27(g)(1)

McNeese argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds the power granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause, but his argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands Baker's Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Baker · filed 2023-01-10(g)(1)

Baker correctly concedes that his arguments challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Mack · filed 2023-02-09(g)(1)

Mack correctly concedes that his arguments challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on the argument that a firearm’s travel through interstate commerce is insufficient.

United States v. Reyna · filed 2023-02-27(g)(1)

Reyna argues for the first time on appeal that § 922(g)(1) exceeds the scope ... of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and is thus unconstitutional. ... The parties are correct that Reyna’s claim is foreclosed.

Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Hickcox · filed 2023-04-25(g)(1)

Hickcox also seeks to preserve the argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. As he concedes, this argument is foreclosed.

A Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Ramirez-Moreno · filed 2023-08-02(g)(1)

Ramirez-Moreno correctly concedes that his arguments challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed.

A Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Washington · filed 2023-08-16(g)(1)

First, Washington urges that in enacting § 922(g)(1), Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause. However, he concedes—and we agree—that this argument is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

A Commerce Clause challenge to Section 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Saenz-Nolan · filed 2024-01-12(g)(1)

Saenz-Nolan argues Section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds the scope of Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause. This argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

A Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Pastrana · filed 2024-02-15(g)(1)

Additionally, Pastrana’s assertion that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’ Commerce Clause authority is, as he concedes, also foreclosed by our precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Paniagua · filed 2024-03-13(g)(1)

Next, Paniagua asserts that § 922(g)(1) exceeds the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. ... He correctly concedes that this argument is foreclosed.

Section 922(g) is facially constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2025-03-19(g)

We have upheld § 922(g) as facially constitutional under the Commerce Clause, and thus Johnson’s challenge to the facial constitutionality of § 922(g) is foreclosed under the prior panel precedent rule.

A Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Bacon · filed 2025-05-28(g)(1)

Bacon further argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him because the statute violates the Commerce Clause. He acknowledges our precedent forecloses that argument too.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause when the firearm and ammunition possessed in the state were manufactured elsewhere and therefore traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Edwards · filed 2025-06-27(g)(1)

Because neither has occurred here, we affirm the judgment of the district court that § 922(g) doesn’t violate the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(n)’s ban on receiving a firearm while under felony indictment survives a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Batiste · filed 2025-10-09(n)

He also argues that § 922(n) exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. ... We conclude that his claim is not viable in light of United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013).

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial and as-applied Commerce Clause challenges under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.

United States v. Antunez-Galarza · filed 2026-03-03(g)(1)

We have repeatedly upheld § 922(g)(1) against facial and as-applied challenges based on the Commerce Clause. ... We are bound by those decisions. ... Accordingly, Antunez-Galarza cannot show plain error, and we affirm.

Section 922(g) bars a felon from possessing firearms, including through a transfer that leaves the firearms under the felon’s control.

United States v. Casteel · filed 2018-07-05(g)

As to Devan’s request for eight firearms seized during the search, we agree that, as a felon, he could not possess the firearms, and we note that he did not provide the district court any assurance that transferring the firearms to his mother would prevent him from exercising control over them. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); Henderson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1780, 1786 (2015).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits transferring a felon's firearms to someone who would allow the felon to control their use.

STILLWELL v. UNITED STATES · filed 2022-03-21(g)(1)

Mr. Stillwell, as a convicted felon, is prohibited from possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... This court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show Defendants wrongfully declined to deliver possession of the suppressors to Plaintiff. Whether through a marital interest as wife of Mr. Stillwell and pursuant to the power of attorney, as successor trustee for the living trust, or as a member/manager of Grandfather Oak Custom Carry, L.L.C., delivery of the suppressors to Plaintiff would contravene the continuing prohibition on felon-directed transfers recognized by Henderson.

Under § 922(a)(6), a firearm purchaser’s place of residence is material to the lawfulness of the sale, and the court decides materiality as a question of law.

United States v. Garrity · filed 2016-11-30(a)(6)

It is well-settled in this Circuit that for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), the materiality of a false statement is a question of law for the court and that a firearm purchaser’s identity, which includes his place of residence, is always material to the lawfulness of a firearm sale.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the firearm previously traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

Reid v. United States · filed 2019-12-03(g)(1)

Upon consideration of the foregoing the Court finds that with this testimony, the Government successfully established § 922(g)(1)’s element that Movant did knowingly possess one or more firearms which had previously traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied by proof that the firearm previously traveled across state lines.

United States v. Irizarry · filed 2014-05-06(g)(1)

To prove the requisite interstate nexus, the government introduced expert testimony demonstrating that the firearm in question had traveled in interstate commerce from Maryland, where it was manufactured, to Florida. Both the Supreme Court and this Court have held that such testimony is sufficient to meet the jurisdictional requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element can be established by showing that the firearm was manufactured in a different state from where the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Folk · filed 2014-06-12(g)(1)

The interstate nexus element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) can be established by showing that the firearm was manufactured in a different state from the one in which it was ultimately possessed by the defendant.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) does not require proof of a nexus between unlicensed firearms dealing and interstate commerce.

United States v. Burke · filed 2014-08-11(a)(1)(A)

However, such a nexus is not a required element of § 922(a)(1)(A) under King.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm and ammunition possessed in one state were manufactured outside that state.

United States v. Kirk · filed 2014-09-16(g)(1)

Here, the government produced evidence that the firearm and ammunition Kirk possessed in Florida were manufactured outside the state and therefore had necessarily traveled in interstate commerce. Given our undisturbed precedent, such evidence was sufficient to demonstrate the minimal nexus between the firearm and ammunition Kirk possessed and interstate commerce. Therefore, the jurisdictional element of § 922(g) was satisfied, and the statute is not unconstitutional as applied to Kirk’s conduct.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Gibson · filed 2015-07-07(g)(1)

Thus, Scarborough remains binding precedent; and the “minimal nexus” test is the applicable standard for establishing a connection with interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) applies when a convicted felon possesses a firearm that previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Solomon · filed 2015-07-28(g)(1)

Solomon also argues that his firearm did not “substantially affect” interstate commerce because he possessed it briefly in a residential parking lot, but a convicted felon violates section 922(g)(1) if the firearm that he possesses traveled previously in interstate commerce, see United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715–16 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1273–74 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1996).

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce nexus is satisfied when the firearm travelled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Raymond · filed 2015-08-28(g)

Moreover, at trial, Raymond stipulated that his gun travelled in interstate commerce. Therefore, the “minimal nexus requirement” was fully satisfied here.

Section 922(g)(4)’s interstate nexus can be established by stipulation because the nexus is a jurisdictional hook, not an active element of the offense.

United States v. Bonelli · filed 2016-11-08(g)(4)

The interstate nexus of a firearm is only a jurisdictional hook, not an active element of the crimes charged. A stipulation could easily have replaced the entirety of MacMaster’s testimony without any prejudice to the prosecution.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce element is satisfied when a firearm possessed in one state was manufactured abroad and imported through another state.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2017-04-06(g)(1)

The Government presented testimony from Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Agent Daniel Kaase, who testified that the firearm had been manufactured in Germany. Further, the importer and distributor of the firearm was in Los Angeles, California. Thus, the firearm’s presence in Texas, where Johnson possessed it, meant that it had traveled in or affected interstate commerce. This evidence sufficiently established the interstate nexus of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g) is constitutional as applied when the government proves a minimal nexus to interstate commerce, including that the firearm was manufactured in another state.

United States v. Sadonnie Marquis Kitchen · filed 2017-08-14(g)

Furthermore, the statute is constitutional as applied here, because the government met its burden of showing a minimal nexus to interstate commerce through Kitchen’s admission in the plea colloquy that the firearm was manufactured outside the state of Florida.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm traveled between states, even if the felon possessed it only within one state.

United States v. Timothy Dale Washington, II · filed 2017-08-31(g)(1)

The required nexus to interstate commerce is met when “the firearm possessed traveled in interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Basilio Amaury Bron, Jr. · filed 2017-09-18(g)(1)

That the firearm traveled in interstate commerce was sufficient to satisfy the required “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element can be established by proof that the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Jerrell Sims · filed 2017-10-06(g)(1)

In his seventh claim, Sims complains that he was denied a fair trial when the district court permitted the jury to establish the interstate commerce nexus merely by finding that the firearm Sims possessed had at some point been ... transported in interstate commerce. Circuit precedent also forecloses this argument.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between a firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Baez · filed 2017-12-28(g)(1)

Further, because “§ 922(g) only requires that the government prove some ‘minimal nexus’ to interstate commerce,” Wright, 607 F.3d at 715, there is no merit to Baez’s claim that the district court improperly advised him of the elements of a § 922(g) offense during his plea colloquy. Accordingly, § 922(g) is constitutional both facially and as applied to Baez’s conduct, and Baez’s guilty plea is valid.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between firearm possession and interstate commerce.

United States v. Bell · filed 2018-03-27(g)(1)

However, both the Supreme Court10 and this court11 have previously determined that the “minimal nexus”12 required by ... § 922(g)(1) suffices.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when firearms and ammunition possessed in one state were manufactured elsewhere and traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Bishop · filed 2018-04-24(g)(1)

The “minimal nexus to interstate commerce’” is satisfied against Bishop since the parties stipulated to the fact that the firearms and ammunition Bishop possessed in Florida were not manufactured in Florida and traveled in interstate and foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(3)’s interstate-commerce element is satisfied by evidence that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Tramain Price · filed 2018-06-22(g)(3)

We have held, however, that evidence that “the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce” suffices to establish the interstate-commerce “nexus” of the statute.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce element is satisfied by evidence that the ammunition traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Brewer · filed 2018-09-06(g)(1)

We have held, however, that evidence that “the [ammunition] traveled in or affected interstate commerce” suffices to establish the interstate-commerce “nexus” of the statute.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a minimal interstate commerce nexus, which proof that the firearm or ammunition was manufactured outside the state where the offense occurred satisfies.

United States v. Yosnel Boney · filed 2018-09-19(g)(1)

Under binding circuit precedent, however, “§ 922(g) only requires that the government prove some ‘minimal nexus’ to interstate commerce, which it may accomplish by ‘demonstrat[ing] that the firearm possessed traveled in interstate commerce.’” Wright, 607 F.3d at 715 (quoting Scott, 263 F.3d at 1274). Proof that the firearm or ammunition was manufactured outside of the state where the offense took place satisfies this burden.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon’s possession of a firearm with a past connection to interstate commerce.

United States v. Nixon · filed 2019-01-16(g)(1)

In Fitzhugh, 984 F.2d at 146, this court rejected an indistinguishable challenge to the sufficiency of a factual basis, concluding that “a convicted felon’s possession of a firearm having a past connection to interstate commerce violates § 922(g)(1).” The Supreme Court’s decision in Bond did not address § 922(g)(1) or abrogate this holding.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon’s possession of a firearm with a past connection to interstate commerce; Bond did not change that rule.

United States v. Carraway · filed 2019-08-08(g)(1)

In United States v. Fitzhugh, 984 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1993), we rejected a similar challenge to the sufficiency of a factual basis, concluding that “a convicted felon’s possession of a firearm having a past connection to interstate commerce violates § 922(g)(1).” The Supreme Court’s decision in Bond did not address § 922(g)(1) or abrogate this holding.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied by a minimal nexus, including a firearm made abroad and recovered in Florida.

United States v. Porter · filed 2019-12-03(g)(1)

And the district court did not err in finding a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce because the parties stipulated that the firearm was made in Austria and was recovered in Florida.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce; it does not require the defendant to have directly caused the firearm to cross state lines.

United States v. Evans · filed 2019-12-11(g)(1)

Evans next argues that the district court erred by refusing his requested jury instruction, which would have required the district court to ignore or “overturn” controlling precedent, namely Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), and United States v. Murphy, 107 F.3d 1199, at 1210-11 (6th Cir. 1997), which prescribe only a “minimal nexus” between the handgun and interstate commerce, rather than Evans’s asserted “direct causation” requirement. Neither we nor the district court are at liberty to ignore or overturn our published precedent, much less that of the ... Supreme Court. See United States v. Burris, 912 F.3d 386, 406 (6th Cir. 2019). Therefore, the district court did not err by refusing the requested instruction.

Section 922(g)(1) reaches a felon's possession of a firearm that crossed a state line before the possession.

United States v. Cooper · filed 2001-07-25(g)(1)

In fact, “[t]his court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question,” based on “the mere fact that the ammunition [or firearm] traveled through interstate commerce in the past.” United States v. De Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 863 (1999). The court iterated its ruling that United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), does not constitutionally invalidate § 922(g)(1). Id. Accordingly, Cooper’s argument based on Lopez lacks merit.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element does not require proof that continued possession affected commerce; the firearm’s earlier travel across state lines is sufficient.

United States v. Smoot · filed 2012-08-13(g)(1)

The instruction given by the district court on the interstate commerce nexus element fairly and accurately reflected Supreme ... Court and circuit precedent. By contrast, Smoot’s proposed instruction, requiring the government to show that his continuing possession of the firearm had an impact on interstate commerce, was clearly contrary to Scarborough and Gallimore, and thus an incorrect statement of law.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm and ammunition were manufactured outside the state where the offense occurred.

United States v. Williams · filed 2021-05-17(g)(1)

The factual basis included in Williams’s plea agreement established that both the firearm and the ammunition were manufactured outside of Florida, the state in which the offense took place. Thus, the minimal-nexus requirement was satisfied in this case.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm traveled in interstate commerce before the defendant possessed it.

Gilbert v. United States · filed 2021-07-12(g)(1)

Accordingly, based on this binding case law, it is apparent that the Government need not prove that Petitioner himself possessed the firearm in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm crosses state lines, even if it is manufactured and later possessed in the same state.

Ervin v. United States · filed 2021-10-29(g)(1)

As such, regardless of its origin in North Carolina, the firearm was shipped and/or transported in interstate commerce, at least to Louisiana and back, and, thus, Petitioner was prohibited from possessing it under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm has moved from one state to another after manufacture.

United States of America v. Jackson · filed 2022-01-04(g)(1)

To affect interstate commerce, the firearms must, at any time after they were manufactured, have moved from one state to another or from a foreign country into the United States.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the firearm was at some time in interstate commerce; evidence that its frame was made abroad satisfies that requirement.

United States v. Mattox · filed 2022-03-04(g)(1)

To show a violation of § 922(g), the Government needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mattox’s firearm had been “in or affecting interstate commerce,” United States v. Burning Breast, 8 F.4th 808, 812 (8th Cir. 2021), which requires “prov[ing] that there exists the minimal nexus that the firearm has been, at some time, in interstate commerce,” United States v. Horsman, 114 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). ... The definition of a “firearm” includes “the frame or receiver of any such weapon,” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(B), so even if the barrel was manufactured in Minnesota, testimony that the frame and other parts were manufactured in Israel and that the gun was assembled in Minnesota is sufficient to show that the gun had been in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires an interstate commerce nexus for possession of a firearm or ammunition by a felon.

Smith v. United States · filed 2022-04-08(g)(1)

The jury was similarly instructed on an interstate nexus requirement. Both the stipulation and the instruction were correct.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm possessed by a convicted felon previously crossed a state line.

Sanders v. United States · filed 2022-08-22(g)(1)

The record in Sanders’s criminal case clearly shows that the United States met the minimal nexus requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and that therefore the Court had jurisdiction over Count 1.

Section 922(g)(9) requires an interstate commerce nexus between the firearm and the prohibited possession.

PSP v. R. Madden, Jr. (OAG) · filed 2022-10-21(g)(9)

Therefore, the ALJ was required to dispose of all the necessary requirements of the statutory plain language under both statutes, including rendering a finding as to whether a nexus existed between the requested firearm and interstate commerce pursuant to Section 922(g)(9) of the FGCA.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause, and proof that a firearm or ammunition traveled across state lines satisfies its minimal interstate-commerce requirement.

United States v. Sims · filed 2022-11-21(g)(1)

In light of McAllister and Wright, Sims’s constitutionality arguments regarding § 922(g) lack merit and thus do not establish error, much less plain error. Here, the government presented evidence, by way of Special Agent Mace, showing that the firearm and ammunition that Sims possessed had traveled in interstate commerce, and therefore, satisfied the minimal nexus requirement.

Section 922(g)’s interstate-commerce nexus is satisfied when a firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed.

United States v. Salinas · filed 2024-02-08(g)

To the contrary, the Supreme Court has held that § 922(g)’s interstate-commerce nexus requires no more than “the minimal nexus that the firearm[s] have been, at some time, in interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce element is satisfied when a firearm possessed by a convicted felon previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Carrasco · filed 2024-02-14(g)(1)

However, he correctly concedes that we have held that § 922(g)(1)’s “‘in or affecting commerce’ element can be satisfied if the ... firearm possessed by a convicted felon had previously traveled in interstate commerce.” ... Accordingly, Carrasco’s factual basis and Commerce Clause arguments lack merit.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce element is satisfied when a firearm crossed state lines before possession, even if it later returned to its state of manufacture.

United States v. James Ervin, Jr. · filed 2025-03-14(g)(1)

We therefore conclude that § 921(a)(2)’s definition of “interstate or foreign commerce” does not apply to the term “commerce.” Rather, as we held earlier, the phrase “in or affecting commerce” in § 922(g) maintains the broad meaning consistently recognized by courts since Scarborough. As long as the weapon has previously traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, as delimited by Congress’s constitutional ability to regulate commerce, the jurisdictional nexus is satisfied.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce nexus can be proved by markings showing that the firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was found.

United States v. Alvarez · filed 2025-06-13(g)(1)

As already discussed above, the firearm in the instant case— stamped with the markings “Made in Austria” and “Glock, Inc., Smyrna, Ga.”—was sufficient evidence to prove the nexus element of the § 922(g)(1) charge under our precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally prohibit firearm possession by a person convicted of a nonviolent felony, and a firearm’s travel across state lines satisfies the interstate commerce nexus.

United States v. Jones · filed 2025-10-22(g)(1)

As for Defendant’s second and third issues, they were both resolved by United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 2009), which upheld the constitutionality of the federal ban for any convicted felon’s possession of a firearm, see id. at 1047, and held that “if a firearm has traveled across state lines, the minimal nexus with interstate commerce is met and [§ 922(g)(1)] can be constitutionally applied.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We reaffirmed the Second Amendment holding in Vincent v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1197 (10th Cir. 2023). This court’s precedents foreclose all three issues raised on appeal.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce nexus is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured out of state.

United States v. Townsel · filed 2026-01-12(g)(1)

Townsel objects to this line of ... precedent, but he does not dispute that the firearm in this case was manufactured out of state and thus satisfied the minimal interstate nexus our precedent requires.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a firearm manufactured outside the state where the felon possessed it because that establishes the required minimal nexus to interstate commerce.

United States v. Jones · filed 2026-04-09(g)(1)

We have repeatedly held that § 922(g) is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. ... Jones objects to this line of precedent, but he does not dispute that the firearm in this case was manufactured out of state and thus satisfied the minimal interstate nexus our precedent requires.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of possession only; transferring the firearm is a separate act.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2014-02-03(g)(1)

But section 922(g)(1) requires proof of possession only; the transfer of the firearm was a separate act neither necessary to nor subsumed within his conviction for possession.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by DNA evidence supporting an inference that the defendant possessed the gun.

United States v. Brown · filed 2025-05-15(g)(1)

If the jury knew he had contact with it, it could reasonably draw the inference that he “possessed” it too.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a jury to find possession from circumstantial evidence, even when no witness saw the defendant holding the gun.

United States v. Hampton · filed 2025-04-30(g)(1)

The jury was entitled to find the officers' testimony credible, and so the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Hampton guilty of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of unlawful possession, not proof that the defendant was present at a related shooting.

United States v. Watkins · filed 2023-05-09(g)(1)

He was charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm and ammunition, not shooting or assaulting someone. The jury was not required to decide whether Watkins shot someone or was even present at the shooting. It could have convicted him for possession whether it believed he was present at the shooting or not.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Sears · filed 2023-01-25(g)(1)

Both actual and constructive possession satisfy the possession element of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Freeman · filed 2023-01-06(g)(1)

Although the Government presented no direct evidence of possession, a reasonable jury could conclude that Freeman possessed the firearm.

Testimony credited by the trial court can provide sufficient evidence of firearm possession for a § 922(g)(1) conviction.

United States v. Talley · filed 2020-09-10(g)(1)

Reviewing the trial record “in the light most favorable to the . . . verdict” and presuming that the District Court “properly evaluated” King’s credibility, we conclude that Talley cannot establish that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the verdict.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by testimony establishing actual or constructive joint possession of a firearm and ammunition.

United States v. Jefferson · filed 2020-09-17(g)(1)

Stark’s testimony established, at a minimum, that Jefferson had actual and constructive joint possession of the .22-caliber firearm and the ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by evidence connecting a convicted felon to the place where firearms were found and testimony that he had those firearms.

United States v. Cleophus Reed, Jr. · filed 2020-08-25(g)(1)

We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. As discussed above, numerous pieces of evidence connected Reed to the Emerson apartment where the guns were found. Gentle and Dulaney testified that they saw Reed with the two guns in question. They identified the guns by their distinctive features: the Ruger had a scratched-off serial number and the Taurus had a tip-up barrel, which a firearms technician explained was made by only a couple of gun manufacturers. Based on this evidence, a jury reasonably could find Reed possessed the guns as the government alleged.

Section 922(g)(1) requires possession of a firearm, but ownership of the firearm is unnecessary.

United States v. Milton · filed 2016-11-14(g)(1)

The statute at issue criminalizes possession, and ownership is not necessary.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction can rest on circumstantial evidence of possession without fingerprint, DNA, or gunshot-residue evidence.

United States v. Donte Griffin · filed 2016-10-21(g)(1)

Although Griffin accurately observes that there was no fingerprint, DNA, or gunshot- residue evidence directly linking him to the pistol, such evidence is not necessary to support a conviction.

A § 922(g) conviction can stand when sufficient evidence shows the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.

United States v. Taylor · filed 2016-09-23(g)

The district court did not err in denying Taylor’s motion for acquittal because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine Taylor knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of possession through dominion over a firearm without fingerprint evidence.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2015-09-30(g)(1)

No precedent requires a defendant’s fingerprints to be on a firearm in order to support a conviction that the defendant possessed the weapon.

An admission of firearm ownership can support a § 922(g)(1) conviction despite the defendant’s contrary trial testimony.

United States v. Jones · filed 2015-03-03(g)(1)

Jones conceded at trial that he told police the gun was his, which was supported by the officer’s testimony. 1 Additionally, the officer testified that Jones later endorsed his admission at the sheriff’s office. In reaching its verdict, the jury made a credibility determination as to the inconsistency between Jones’s statement to police and his trial testimony, a determination that is not subject to our review. Therefore, Jones has not established that the evidence was insufficient.

Possession under § 922(g) can be proved by an officer’s observation of a firearm in the defendant’s waistband and identification of that firearm after it is recovered.

United States v. Ray · filed 2015-01-15(g)

A rational trier of fact could find that Ray possessed the handgun and magazine found on the empty lot following the foot chase.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element is satisfied when the evidence permits a rational juror to find that the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. Williams · filed 2015-01-26(g)(1)

In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court finds that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the defendant presented an alternate theory of the case, the Court finds that a rational juror could have determined that the defendant possessed the a firearm based on the evidence presented.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Six · filed 2015-01-13(g)(1)

The “possession” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is satisfied by either actual or constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence that the defendant physically controlled a firearm and ammunition.

United States v. Lavar Ford · filed 2014-11-26(g)(1)

Because the Government introduced ample circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ford had exercised physical control over a loaded handgun, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Ford possessed a firearm and ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of actual or constructive, sole or joint possession of a firearm; mere presence where a firearm is found is insufficient.

United States v. Mockabee · filed 2014-08-18(g)(1)

With respect to both the drugs and the firearms, the pos- session proved could be actual or constructive, and sole or joint. Proof of the mere presence of Jones at the Eagledale residence would not be enough; proof of his possessory in- terest in the contraband would be necessary.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be established by testimony that the defendant held a gun and tossed it into a yard.

United States v. Common · filed 2014-04-21(g)(1)

From the testimony produced at trial, the jury could have rationally concluded that Common was in possession of the gun that the officers found in the yard.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon's possession of a firearm when the evidence sufficiently links the person to the gun.

United States v. Conn · filed 2014-06-05(g)(1)

Moreover, there was sufficient evidence to link Conn to the gun and support Conn’s plea.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction can rest on direct and circumstantial evidence that the defendant possessed the charged firearm.

United States v. Russ · filed 2015-02-05(g)(1)

Boldin’s testimony provided direct evidence that Russ had actual possession of a firearm when he fled. Circumstantial evidence of possession included testimony that Russ fled from the officers, was not seen dropping anything before he went between the houses, and was found in nearby bushes a few minutes later without a firearm or any other shiny object. The still-dry firearm was found less than ten minutes later in the wet brush along the path Russ had taken after officers lost sight of him. Because there was evidence that Russ possessed the loaded firearm in question, the record is not devoid of evidence pointing to his guilt.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by evidence that a person carried a firearm, that it was later found under his bed, and that he admitted possessing it.

United States v. Richter · filed 2015-04-02(g)(1)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence presented at trial showed that Richter took possession of the firearm from his father’s house on August 15, 2012 and left the house with the firearm in his hand. The probation officer found the firearm on Monday, October 22, 2012 under Richter’s bed in Richter’s locked bedroom. Richter subsequently admitted to the probation officer that he possessed the firearm. That evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict.

Section 922(g)(1) supports a felon-in-possession conviction when evidence connecting the defendant to a firearm permits a reasonable jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Britton · filed 2015-04-08(g)(1)

As for the verdict, an expert testified that the assault rifle, found in the house registered as Britton’s address, had Britton’s fingerprint on it. With all of the evidence discussed above, we have no difficulty concluding that, examined in a light favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the felon in possession count relating to the assault rifle.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by evidence from which a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. Thibeaux · filed 2015-05-04(g)(1)

Particularly in light of Geraldine Scott’s positive identification, this was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Thibeaux had been in possession of the gun found in the snow.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on actual or constructive possession of a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Keylon Weaver · filed 2015-05-07(g)(1)

“Actual or constructive possession is sufficient to give rise to criminal liability under § 922(g).”

A jury may infer possession under § 922(g)(1) from a defendant’s movements near the place where officers later find a firearm, even if no officer saw him holding it.

United States v. Muhammad · filed 2016-04-26(g)(1)

Irrespective of Special Agent McCarthy’s testimony that he did not see Muhammad’s waistband, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Muhammad possessed the firearm before it was found on the floor of the Buick Rendezvous.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a felon possessed the firearm on or reasonably near the charged date.

United States v. Musgraves · filed 2016-07-27(g)(1)

Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, possession no later than March 2013 cannot support a conviction for a charge of possession on or about November 17, 2013.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element may be proved by circumstantial evidence that a convicted felon carried and dropped a firearm while fleeing.

United States v. Bailey · filed 2016-08-05(g)(1)

From this evidence, a jury reasonably could have inferred that Bailey, a convicted felon, fled to avoid detection of the handgun, that he was holding the firearm in his waistband as he ran initially, and that he dropped the firearm and the cell phone when he fell.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. Samuel Curry, Jr. · filed 2017-02-09(g)(1)

Here, the district court did not err in determining that the trial evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Curry constructively possessed the firearm found in Officer Kelley’s patrol car.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of knowing possession of a firearm, which a jury may find from admissions about ownership of the gun and the car containing it.

United States v. Strickland · filed 2017-03-13(g)(1)

A reasonable jury could have found Strickland guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on his and his companion’s admissions with respect to ownership of the cars and the gun itself.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element may be proved with circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Sanders · filed 2017-06-16(g)(1)

But White testified that she heard Sanders threaten to shoot ATL, and Callahan testified that he found a gun in the very garbage can to which Wallace directed him; this evidence offers circumstantial support of Sanders’s possession of a gun. A jury may rationally convict based on only circumstantial evidence.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually or constructively possessed a firearm.

United States v. Parker · filed 2017-09-12(g)(1)

To establish firearm possession, the government had to prove actual or constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt. ... Therefore, we vacate Black’s firearm possession conviction due to insufficient evidence and remand for resentencing.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm.

United States v. Frazier · filed 2018-01-22(g)(1)

To convict Frazier under § 922(g)(1), the government needed to prove only that Frazier had possessed a firearm (Frazier stipulated to the other elements).

Possession under § 922(g)(1) can be established by evidence that the defendant shot himself with a firearm.

United States v. Felix · filed 2018-03-13(g)(1)

The combination of the 911 call, which was properly admitted into evidence, see supra Part 3, as well as testimony from Sergeant Pennucci about the entrance and exit points of the bullet into Felix’s leg, the bullet’s trajectory, and the angle of the gun when it was deployed, amounted to sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that Felix shot himself—and therefore possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of possession or receipt of a firearm, but does not require proof of ownership.

United States v. Mendez · filed 2018-03-23(g)(1)

Mendez’s admission that he bought the pistol was sufficient to establish possession or receipt of the firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Government is not required to prove ownership to sustain a conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is satisfied when the evidence permits a reasonable jury to find that the defendant possessed the firearm named in the indictment.

United States v. Craft · filed 2018-04-03(g)(1)

Here, Craft contests only one element: possession of the specific gun named in the indictment—i.e., the Tanfoglio revolver. ... Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Craft possessed the revolver named in the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant owned the firearm; proof of possession or receipt is sufficient.

United States v. Mendez · filed 2018-04-16(g)(1)

Mendez’s admission that he bought the pistol was sufficient to establish possession or receipt of the firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Government is not required to prove ownership to sustain a conviction.

Section 922(g)’s possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence of actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Brown · filed 2018-04-25(g)

A conviction under § 922(g) may be based on actual or constructive possession, id., and circumstantial evidence is alone sufficient for this Court to sustain a conviction, United States v. Garcia, 758 F.3d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 2014).

For a § 922(g)(1) possession charge, who took a photograph does not matter if a rational juror could find that it shows the defendant holding a real gun.

United States v. Farrad · filed 2018-07-17(g)(1)

With regard to sufficiency, meanwhile, this question is subsumed by the Photoshop theory; aside from potential alteration (which itself goes more to admissibility), we are aware of no reason why it would matter who took the photo, so long as a rational juror could conclude that Farrad was actually in the photo holding a real gun.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved through testimonial and forensic evidence linking the defendant to the firearm.

United States v. Horton · filed 2018-07-30(g)(1)

Here, the government’s testimonial and forensic evidence is enough to support the jury’s finding that Horton possessed the firearm recovered from underneath the red pickup truck.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved by circumstantial evidence that the defendant brought a gun into a patrol car where it was later found at his feet.

United States v. Tyrone Miller · filed 2018-08-16(g)(1)

It was reasonable to conclude that Mil- ler, who was not fully patted down, brought the gun into the car because the officer testified that Miller’s accident was his first call that shift after he found the back of his car empty, and the gun was found where Miller’s feet had been, imme- diately after he was pulled from the car.

The evidence was sufficient to prove knowing firearm possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Marquies Brown · filed 2018-11-07(g)(1)

Brown’s last contention is that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of knowingly possessing the firearm. Viewing the evidence, as we must, in the light most favorable to the verdict winner (here, the Government), we find the evidence sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.