18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved with circumstantial evidence; direct observation of the defendant with the firearm is unnecessary.

United States v. Williams · filed 2018-12-17(g)(1)

To prove possession, the government may introduce circumstantial evidence that requires the jury to infer that the defendant possessed a firearm; the government need not provide evidence of direct observation of the defendant with the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ammunition-possession element may be proved by circumstantial evidence linking the defendant to the ammunition.

United States v. Mathis · filed 2019-08-16(g)(1)

The evidence was thus sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that it was Mathis driving his own car and using his own cell phone, and to conclude that Mathis possessed the ammunition used to kill Wolfer and the ammunition found in his room bearing his DNA.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the defendant to own the firearm; another person’s ownership does not decide whether the defendant possessed it.

Ingram v. United States · filed 2019-08-28(g)(1)

In any event, Patterson’s ownership of the H&K firearm was not dispositive of whether Petitioner possessed it; this was a question for the jury.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Vallejo · filed 2020-06-05(g)(1)

Vallejo claims the evidence was insufficient to establish the possession element of his firearms offense because no witness observed him actually possessing or firing the firearm. Vallejo is correct that the Government did not prove its case by direct evidence. But circumstantial evidence alone can suffice. ... We hold there was more than enough evidence to sustain his conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm before police recovered it from someone else.

United States v. Fisher · filed 2020-08-19(g)(1)

Although Fisher did not have actual possession of the Bushmaster at the time the government seized it from Arthur and Arnold, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer that Fisher knowingly possessed the Bushmaster rifle at his residence earlier that evening.

A felon’s firearm possession under § 922(g) can be proved by circumstantial evidence even when video does not show the firearm.

United States v. Tillery · filed 2020-08-17(g)

Tillery contends that the video footage creates a reasonable doubt because it doesn’t show that Tillery possessed or fired a firearm during his interaction with Stephenson. We disagree. ... Second, the evidence presented at trial, though circumstantial, was sufficient for the jury to fill in the blanks left by the video footage and find that Tillery killed Stephenson.

Circumstantial evidence connecting a convicted felon to a truck containing a firearm can suffice to prove possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Donald D. Payton, II · filed 1989-08-10(g)(1)

Finally, Payton argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he possessed the handgun found in the truck after the collision. ... After the collision, one of the officers discovered a revolver lying on the floorboard. The police later discovered Payton hiding underneath an automobile in a private garage, after they had received reports of a person running through nearby yards. When the police later searched Payton’s residence, they found other guns and photographs of Pay-ton brandishing handguns and ammunition. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, United States v. Karunatileka, 820 F.2d 961, 965 (8th Cir.1987), we conclude that this evidence is sufficient to support Payton’s conviction.

A gun under the driver’s seat, with ammunition on the driver’s floorboard, can support a finding of possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Campbell · filed 2021-06-07(g)(1)

The gun was found underneath the driver’s seat with .38 rounds on the driver’s floorboard. For the reasons articulated above, that fact can support the jury’s finding of possession on both gun charges.

Section 922(g)’s possession element can be satisfied by evidence that a firearm was cradled in the defendant’s arm or lay beneath his shoulder.

United States v. Richard Starghill, II · filed 2021-07-26(g)

... this evidence, the jury could easily have concluded that Starghill possessed the firearms as alleged. His sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument therefore fails.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendant carried the firearm.

United States v. Bratton · filed 2021-09-24(g)(1)

When viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, a reasonable jury could infer that Bratton had a firearm in his waistband and that it fell to the ground during his struggle with the officer. ... Thus, there was sufficient evidence to establish Bratton’s possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element is satisfied when the evidence permits a rational jury to find that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.

United States v. Clyde Alston, Jr. · filed 2021-11-04(g)(1)

To sustain a conviction for Count 3, the Government needed to prove, as relevant here, that the defendant knowingly possessed, in or affecting interstate commerce, a firearm. ... From the record, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Alston knowingly possessed both the drugs and the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element may be satisfied by actual or constructive possession.

Hall v. Hudgins · filed 2022-02-02(g)(1)

Given that the Defendant admitted he had the shotgun in his home and was acting as a middleman in its sale, a factual basis exists to find that the Petitioner was in either actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)’s possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence that the defendant hid a firearm in a car trunk.

United States v. Watson · filed 2022-02-07(g)

The district court appropriately concluded that, if viewed in the prosecution’s favor, the circumstantial evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Watson placed the Sig Sauer in the Cadillac’s trunk.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence establishes constructive possession of firearms or ammunition.

United States v. Fischer · filed 2023-02-09(g)(1)

The evidence was sufficient to establish that Fischer possessed the drugs, the firearms, and the ammunition.

Section 922(g)(5)(A)’s firearm-possession element can be proved through circumstantial evidence that the defendant knew about the guns.

United States v. Perez · filed 2023-12-05(g)(5)(A)

From this evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that he knew about the guns all along and was only pretending to cooperate to hide his own culpability.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be supported by evidence that the defendant used a firearm during a robbery and placed it in his car afterward.

United States v. Maxwell · filed 2023-12-27(g)(1)

Maxwell argues that the government failed to prove that he possessed the Springfield XDs 45 ACP, .45 ACP caliber pistol. As just discussed, the evidence demonstrated that Maxwell entered J.B. and G.H.’s apartment and stole money and marijuana. G.H. testified that the Springfield pistol was the same as the gun used against him. The government presented evidence that the pistol was found in Maxwell’s Malibu, which, according to security-video footage of a nearby business, was parked by Harden moments before Maxwell ran from the Trailblazer. This timing supports a finding that Maxwell placed the pistol and the robbery proceeds in the Malibu before the two vehicles left J.B. and G.H.’s apartment. The evidence supported the jury’s finding that Maxwell possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence supports shared possession of a firearm.

United States v. Joseph · filed 2024-04-26(g)(1)

Given that Joseph and James were together at the time of Joseph’s arrest, the jury made reasonable inferences based on evidence of James’s DNA on the gun that James abandoned the gun at the construction site during the police chase and that Joseph at least shared possession of the gun. We affirm the district court’s judgment convicting Joseph of being a felon in possession of a firearm under Count Five.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by officers’ testimony that they found a firearm in the defendant’s pocket.

United States v. Jones · filed 2024-08-06(g)(1)

After considering this standard, we affirm Jones’s conviction. The record is replete with evidence that Jones physically possessed the firearm. This evidence includes Gregory’s and Heise’s testimony about finding a firearm in Jones’s back pocket.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of firearm possession through actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Stewart · filed 2024-08-02(g)(1)

The government may establish possession by actual or constructive possession of a firearm, United States v. Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 374 (6th Cir. 2008), and here, the evidence presented at trial supports either theory.

Section 922(g)(1) permits possession of a firearm to be proved through circumstantial evidence of physical possession.

United States v. Williams · filed 2025-07-07(g)(1)

Taken together, this evidence supports an inference that Williams physically possessed the gun and placed it in the backseat.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt through witness testimony and circumstantial evidence identifying the firearm charged in the indictment.

United States v. Wagner · filed 2025-12-09(g)(1)

This evidence is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Wagner had possession of the specific firearm described in the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved through circumstantial and forensic evidence.

United States v. Jones · filed 2026-05-04(g)(1)

A jury could reasonably have found that Jones possessed the firearm based on circumstantial and forensic evidence.

Section 922(g)(1) allows knowing firearm possession to be proved through actual or constructive possession, including circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Terrence Devol London, II · filed 2026-05-14(g)(1)

Although the evidence of London’s possession is entirely circumstantial, circumstantial evidence alone is enough to support a theory of possession under § 922(g). ... Rather, we find the evidence sufficient to show that London both actually and constructively possessed the firearm located in the Camry on June 6.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a felon to own the firearm he possesses.

United States v. Mickles · filed 2026-06-04(g)(1)

First, Gray’s ownership of the firearm is legally irrelevant.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence that the defendant carried and hid the firearm.

United States v. Gatkuoth · filed 2026-06-08(g)(1)

What clinched it was the child blurting out that Gatkuoth had “put some stuff in [the] room.” From there, the jury could—and most likely did—infer that the reason he held his waistband during the chase was to avoid losing the gun the officers later discovered.

Rehaif's knowledge-of-status rule does not affect a conviction under § 922(d).

United States v. Kelley · filed 2023-03-15(d)(1)

Rehaif, therefore, has no effect on Defendant’s conviction under § 922(d).

Section 922(d)(1) prohibits selling a firearm to someone the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe was convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison. The buyer need not explicitly disclose the conviction.

United States v. Gjergji · filed 2014-05-27(d)(1)

There was sufficient evidence here from which a jury could conclude that Gjergji knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the informant to whom he sold the firearm had been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” Although Gjergji emphasizes that the informant never explicitly told him that he was a convicted felon, there is ample evidence in the record indicating that the informant made multiple references to his having spent five years in federal prison for selling a large amount of cocaine.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a firearm possession conviction based on either actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Garcia · filed 2014-07-10(g)(1)

A defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) may be premised on either actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) allows firearm possession to be actual or constructive.

United States v. Morales · filed 2014-07-15(g)(1)

Possession of a firearm for purposes of § 922(g)(1) can be either actual or constructive.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm, which can be established by knowledge of the firearm and the power and intent to control it.

United States v. Bellamy · filed 2014-12-02(g)(1)

Bellamy’s admissions that he “saw the firearm when he [got] into the vehicle,” and “pushed the gun back when he was exiting the vehicle,” are sufficient to establish that Bellamy had knowledge of the firearm and the power and intent to control it.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a felon-in-possession conviction based on actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Castle · filed 2015-01-13(g)(1)

Actual or constructive possession is sufficient to give rise to criminal liability under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession element may be proved by actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Bauzo-Santiago · filed 2015-02-06(g)(1)

To satisfy the “knowing possession” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government may prove either actual or constructive possession of the charged firearm. ... In sum, the Court is satisfied that the government introduced sufficient evidence on the element of possession to ground Bauzo’s 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) allows proof of firearm possession through actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Castle · filed 2015-08-31(g)(1)

Actual or constructive possession is sufficient to give rise to criminal liability under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by evidence that a person carried a firearm and discarded it while fleeing.

United States v. Jones · filed 2017-06-02(g)(1)

We agree with the district court that, based on the trial evidence, a reasonable jury could find that Jones had actual possession of the firearm and discarded it during his flight.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element includes actual and constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Whiteside · filed 2018-08-29(g)(1)

Possession under 18 U.S.C §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(c)(1) includes actual possession and constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Ivory · filed 2019-08-28(g)(1)

The Government’s evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that Ivory had actual possession of the gun at multiple points and constructive possession while it was in the glove compartment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s firearm possession element can be satisfied by actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Figueroa · filed 2020-08-03(g)(1)

To establish that a defendant possessed a firearm, the government can show either actual possession or constructive possession.

An officer's testimony that he saw a gun in the defendant's pocket can support a finding of possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Allred · filed 1996-12-05(g)(1)

Because one of the officers testified that he saw the butt of a gun in Allred's back pants pocket, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Allred possessed the weapon found in the car.

Section 922(g)(1) requires possession of a firearm; merely touching it, without more, is insufficient.

United States v. Smith · filed 2021-05-05(g)(1)

The plain text of § 922(g), logic, and an analysis of our precedents all reveal that mere touching is insufficient to establish possession.

Section 922(g) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm; officer testimony, prompt recovery of the gun, and the defendant’s admissions can establish possession.

United States v. Ganter · filed 2021-07-01(g)

The officers’ testimony combined with the dash camera video and audio recordings and Ganter’s statements in the taped jail call provide overwhelming evidence that Ganter actually as well as constructively possessed the firearm in the flower pot.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is satisfied when the evidence shows the defendant knew of the firearm and had the ability to control it.

United States v. Tyler · filed 2021-08-23(g)(1)

Here, Tyler was the only occupant of the motel room when law enforcement arrived. He immediately alerted the officers to the presence of the firearm in the bathroom. He stated that he then passed the firearm to law enforcement, contradicting his current argument that he lacked the ability to control the firearm. Moreover, Tyler described the ... firearm in detail to law enforcement in his statement. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to establish Tyler’s possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by evidence linking a defendant to a firearm found in a backpack he discarded.

United States v. White · filed 2022-01-07(g)(1)

All this was sufficient to prove White possessed the gun found in the backpack.

Section 922(g) requires possession of a firearm, but does not require ownership of it.

Caffery v. United States · filed 2022-09-27(g)

Nothing in § 922(g) either before or after Rehaif or in the binding case law requires that Mr. Caffery own the firearms to possess them.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied when a felon knowingly keeps a gun immediately accessible without physically holding it.

United States v. Martin · filed 2022-12-06(g)(1)

Neither the text nor the purpose of § 922(g) require us to distinguish a felon who physically holds a gun from a felon who merely keeps a gun nearby.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by even brief physical possession of a firearm.

United States v. Lewis · filed 2023-03-21(g)(1)

Lewis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions under §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 922(g)(1) both as to his possession of the firearm (for both convictions) and as to the “in furtherance” of drug trafficking element of his § 924(c)(1)(A) conviction. We conclude that the evidence presented to the jury was more than sufficient to support a guilty verdict on both elements. ... This testimony plainly allowed the jury to conclude that Lewis possessed the gun, and even brief physical possession satisfies this element.

Section 922(g)(5) covers an unlawfully present alien’s firearm kept at his residence when he admitted recently buying it, even if he did not have it when arrested.

GALVAN-MARCELO v. United States · filed 2023-05-09(g)(5)

But the fact that Galvan-Marcelo did not have the firearm with him when he was arrested does not mean that he did not "possess" it. The firearm was found at his residence, and he admitted that he had recently purchased it. That is enough to establish that he "possessed" it.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be established by evidence that the defendant possessed the charged firearm before leaving it at another home.

United States v. Connor · filed 2025-06-27(g)(1)

Accepting, as it did, that Connor was the robber, the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the robber’s pistol and the pistol found in the home were one and the same and that Connor possessed it before leaving it with his grandparents.

Section 922(o) treats lawful possession as an affirmative defense, which a defendant waives by failing to raise it at trial.

United States v. Greenberg · filed 2015-01-09(o)

Finally, Greenberg argues that the district court omitted an essential part of the jury instructions for count 74, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), unlawful transfer or possession of a machine gun. ... We have already held that this instruction for lawful possession is an affirmative defense. ... Because the affirmative defense was not raised at trial, it was waived by Greenberg, and we need not consider whether the instruction should have been included in the jury instructions.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits material misrepresentations in ammunition sales, and § 922(d)(1) prohibits transferring ammunition to someone known to have a qualifying conviction.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2019-04-03(a)(6), (d)(1)

But whether Mrs. Jackson knew the consequences of Jackson’s felon status is immaterial. The Government highlights two criminal statutes that confirm that Mrs. Jackson’s knowledge that her husband was a convicted felon sufficed. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (criminalizing misrepresenting facts “material to the lawfulness of the sale” of ammunition); § 922(d)(1) (making it a crime to “dispose” of ammunition to anyone known to “ha[ve] been convicted in any court of . . . a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”). Both statutes establish that Mrs. Jackson’s knowledge of her husband’s criminal history justified admission of the testimony under the joint-participant exception.

Section 922(d) prohibits a firearm sale only when the actual buyer is a prohibited person and the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe that.

Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Boydston · filed 2015-10-26(d)

Eighteen U.S.C. § 922(d) and 27 C.F.R. § 478.99(c) prohibit the sale of “any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person” is a prohibited person. There is no allegation that Laura Brady is a prohibited person under federal law. As a result, § 922(d) can only be violated if the person who was sold the gun, by straw purchase or otherwise, is a prohibited person.

Section 922(d)(5) prohibits selling ammunition to someone known or reasonably believed to be unlawfully in the United States; the buyer’s deferred removal status did not change his unlawful status here.

United States v. Clements · filed 2017-04-03(d)(5)

There is no evidence that Licona was legally admitted or paroled into the United States. Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports the finding that Licona was, in fact, an illegal alien when Clements aided and abetted the sale of ammunition to him.

Section 922(d)(1)’s reasonable-cause requirement is satisfied when a firearm buyer tells the seller he is a felon.

United States v. Alexander · filed 2020-11-02(d)(1)

Hilt acknowledges that the informant told him that he was a felon. Such information gave Hilt “reasonable cause to believe” the informant had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in prison, as required by the statute.

Section 922(g) bars people with disqualifying convictions from possessing firearms, including through constructive possession.

Bentley v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives · filed 2011-01-31(g)

In light of Steve Bentley’s previous convictions and admissions, he has no legal right to possess these weapons and they are therefore contraband.

Section 922(d)(1) prohibits firearm sales to convicted felons, including sales made through a straw purchaser.

Williams v. Beemiller, Inc. · filed 2012-10-05(d)(1)

We conclude that, although the complaint does not specify the statutes allegedly violated, it sufficiently alleges facts supporting a finding that defendants knowingly violated federal gun laws. ... Specifically, plaintiffs allege that, on at least four different occasions, Brown sold guns to Bostic, a “convicted felon” who was prohibited from purchasing firearms (see 18 USC § 922 [d] [1]), via straw purchases to Upshaw.

Section 922(d)(3)-(4) prohibits a firearm sale when the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe the buyer has a covered drug use or mental health disqualification.

Rodriguez v. Academy, Ltd. D/B/A Academy Sports + Outdoors · filed 2024-03-05(d)(3)-(4)

Nor does Khachikian’s affidavit constitute evidence that Academy knew or had reasonable cause to believe that Kristina was an unlawful or addictive drug user or had been committed to a mental institution when she was 16 or older.

Section 922(d)(1)’s ban on selling firearms to felons does not violate the Second Amendment because felons lack a protected right to possess firearms.

United States v. Vlha · filed 2025-07-09(d)(1)

Section 922(d)(1)’s prohibition on selling firearms to felons cannot meaningfully constrain the possessory rights of felons because they do not have possessory rights.

Section 922(g) bars a person subject to its prohibition from possessing firearms or ammunition, which can prevent their return after seizure.

Watford v. United States · filed 2021-03-25(g)

Watford’s request is DENIED as to the seized firearm and ammunition because he is not the registered owner of the firearm and, in any event, he □ fs prohibited from possessing firearms or ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) does not make a person liable for a felon’s firearm possession merely because the person knows about it and fails to stop it.

Harris News Agency, Inc. v. Bowers · filed 2015-12-22(g)(1)

Brian possessing guns, by itself, was not a violation by Lois or James Jr.; thus, Lois and James Jr. supposedly turning blind eyes to Brian’s illegal gun possession cannot alone justify denying the Harris News application.

Section 922(g) does not make the precise date of firearm possession a material element; a variance from the charged date does not defeat the charge when the indictment gives adequate notice.

United States v. Cestoni · filed 2016-05-11(g)

Our court of appeals, however, has subsequently rejected this argument, stating “because the statute does not make time a material element, the variance between proof and indictment is irrelevant so long as the defendants were afforded adequate notice of the charges against them.” United States v. Laykin, 886 F.2d 1534, 1543 (9th Cir.1989). Here, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the operative indictment failed to afford Cestoni adequate notice of the charges against him.

Section 922(o) cannot support a prosecution based on treating an AR-15 lower receiver as a machinegun receiver when the law gave the defendant inadequate notice that it was covered.

United States v. Jimenez · filed 2016-06-06(o)

The indictment is dismissed to the extent the Government’s prosecution of Jimenez under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) is based on the theory that he possessed a “receiver” as that term is: defined in 27 C.F.R. § 479.11.

Section 922(g)(1) includes qualifying state felony convictions as predicate convictions because “in any court” is not limited to federal courts.

Ward v. United States · filed 2023-03-22(g)(1)

Movant points to no authority that limits the scope of the definition of convictions for a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to offenses under federal law. In fact, the statute specifically states the conviction is from “in any court.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Movant’s four felony convictions in the State of Missouri, discussed above, were all felony crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) bars a person with a qualifying conviction from possessing firearms once the conviction becomes final, even if the person seeks post-conviction relief.

Scofield v. LeDoux · filed 2021-07-06(g)(1)

As such, he was subject to the firearm disabilities of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and thus he was ineligible to receive an FFL under 18 U.S.C. § 923(d)(1)(B).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a qualifying predicate felony for a felon-in-possession conviction.

Bland v. United States · filed 2019-12-02(g)(1)

Because Bland lacks a qualifying predicate offense under Valencia-Mendoza and McAdory, his conviction for violation of § 922(g)(1) is unlawful.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a North Carolina felony sentence that includes mandatory postrelease supervision as a predicate felony when the total term exceeds one year.

United States v. Deante Banks · filed 2016-06-16(g)(1)

Two prior North Carolina convictions served as predicate felonies for purposes of § 922(g)(1): possession of cocaine, for which the state court sentenced Banks to 6 to 17 months of imprisonment, and possession of a schedule II controlled substance, for which the state court sentenced him to 5 to 15 months of imprisonment. ... We held that “state law renders post-release supervision part of the term of imprisonment,” id., such that “all North Carolina felonies now qualify as federal predicate felonies,” id. at 137. Thus, as Banks acknowledges, our decision in Barlow forecloses his appeal.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a state felony conviction to serve as a predicate when the person's right to possess firearms was never restored.

United States v. Thorpe · filed 2017-03-01(g)(1)

Because Thorpe’s right to possess firearms was never restored, his state court convictions are proper predicates under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) treats a Texas jail felony as a predicate conviction even when the defendant was punished as for a misdemeanor under Texas Penal Code § 12.44(a).

United States v. Dixon · filed 2018-05-29(g)(1)

Therefore, a Texas jail felony is one “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”, regardless whether it was punished as a misdemeanor under § 12.44(a).

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession based on a sealed Washington juvenile adjudication that state law treats as never having occurred.

Barr v. Snohomish County Sheriff · filed 2018-06-12(g)(1)

Because Barr received orders sealing his class A felony juvenile adjudications under Washington law and because Washington law requires that his adjudications be treated as if they never occurred, Barr is not prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law.

Section 922(a)(6) applies to a false statement about a prior conviction when California expungement leaves firearm disabilities in place.

United States v. Andrino · filed 1974-06-20(a)(6)

Andrino’s expungement occurred after this legislative amendment. Thus, the California legislature, by specific enactment, has negated the very theory under California law by which Andrino seeks to demonstrate the absence of a requisite element for the Federal conviction in question.

Section 922(g) treats a prior conviction as a predicate felony when it remained classified as a felony at the time the person possessed a firearm.

United States v. Gilmore · filed 2021-10-13(g)

Because California still considered Gilmore a felon at the time of his arrest, his marijuana conviction still counted as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

A prior state felony can support a § 922(g) conviction when the defendant was not conditionally discharged and faced a possible prison term exceeding one year.

United States v. Sizemore · filed 2022-01-19(g)

We find that these cases are not applicable to Sizemore. ... He was not conditionally discharged, and he was sentenced to a term that could have exceeded a year in prison on each charge. Accordingly, this argument is without merit.

Section 922(g)(1)’s firearm prohibition applies to convictions punishable by more than one year even if the sentences were suspended; sealing the conviction records from public view does not remove the prohibition.

Rieff v. Illinois State Police · filed 2024-02-05(g)(1)

Although the sentences were suspended, nothing in the record contradicts they were both convictions and punishable for a term exceeding one year. ... Rieff’s expungement order, without more, had only showed that his Oklahoma convictions had been sealed from public view. The circuit court erred when finding Rieff’s expungement was not contrary to federal law.

Section 922(g)(1) treats an outstanding state felony conviction as a predicate even if the statute underlying that conviction was later declared unconstitutional, unless the conviction has been vacated.

United States v. Williams · filed 2025-03-18(g)(1)

This clarification in N.G. confirms that Williams’s prior convictions were not automatically vacated and therefore remained valid predicate felony convictions for his federal felon-in-possession charges.

Section 922(g)(1) permits only one conviction when a felon possesses a firearm and ammunition in a single incident of possession.

United States v. Haynes · filed 2023-03-13(g)(1)

But here, we agree with government that the two counts as proved at trial are multiplicitous -- Haynes obtained, possessed, and used the firearm and ammunition in a single “incident of possession.”

Section 922(g)(1) does not permit separate punishments for possessing a firearm and ammunition without a jury finding that they were acquired or possessed separately.

United States v. Perez · filed 2016-06-22(g)(1)

Perez’s convictions and sentences on count two (for felon in possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1)) and count three (for felon in possession of ammunition under § 922(g)(1)) are cumulative punishments that violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate counts for a felon’s possession of ammunition and a firearm acquired separately.

United States v. Perry · filed 2017-07-06(g)(1)

Perry violated § 922(g)(1) when he purchased ammunition from Wal-Mart on May 22, 2013. The store’s surveillance footage shows that he possessed the ammunition but not a firearm, and his receipt confirms that he did not purchase a firearm along with the ammunition. Accordingly, the firearm and shotgun must have been “acquired separately,” which supports the two separate charges.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of possession of a firearm or ammunition, even when the indictment charges possession of both.

United States v. Silva · filed 2018-05-08(g)(1)

To obtain a conviction under § 922(g)(1), the Government was required to prove only that Mr. Silva possessed the firearm or ammunition, not both.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when the government proves possession of either a firearm or ammunition, even if the indictment alleges both.

United States v. Ochoa · filed 2019-10-25(g)(1)

However, it was necessary for the government to sufficiently establish that he possessed only either one to sustain his § 922(g)(1) conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate firearm and ammunition convictions when the jury necessarily finds possession of another firearm apart from the one associated with the ammunition.

United States v. Stanard · filed 2021-03-10(g)(1)

Therefore, Stanard’s convictions for possession of a firearm and possession of ammunition involve two different and separately chargeable violations of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) generally permits only one conviction for a felon’s simultaneous possession of firearms and ammunition unless they were acquired on different occasions or stored at different sites.

United States v. Leiser · filed 2024-12-26(g)(1)

“[A] convicted felon who simultaneously possesses various firearms and rounds of ammunition can generally only be charged with a single violation of § 922(g).” United States v. Olmeda, 461 F.3d 271, 280 (2d Cir. 2006). Although the government may bring charges for both offenses “if the evidence shows that the felon acquired possession of the firearms or ammunition on different occasions, or that he stored them at different sites,” id., the government made no such showing here. ... We remand to the district court to vacate one of Leiser’s § 922(g)(1) convictions and to adjust his sentence accordingly.

Section 922(g)(1) is violated when a convicted felon knowingly possesses either a firearm or ammunition that traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Smith · filed 2025-04-25(g)(1)

Smith could not possibly have fired a gun in James’s driveway, discharging a shell casing, unless he simultaneously possessed both a firearm and ammunition, either of which would independently violate § 922(g)(1) if it traveled in interstate commerce.

Whether a court-martial conviction qualifies as a crime under § 922(g)(1) is a question of law.

United States v. Vermilyea · filed 2016-06-28(g)(1)

We conclude that under United States v. MacDonald, 992 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1993), the issue of whether a court-martial conviction is a crime under § 922(g)(1) is a matter of law.

Section 922(g) does not impose a firearm or ammunition ban based on a special court-martial conviction and a bad-conduct discharge when no other disqualifying offense applies.

United States v. MacIas · filed 2022-10-14(g)

Because Appellant was convicted by a special-court martial, received a bad conduct discharge (vice a dishonorable discharge), and was not convicted of one of the aforementioned triggering offenses under the GCA, we agree that the Statement of Trial Results is inaccurate.

An expunged juvenile offense does not count as a qualifying conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Siperek v. United States · filed 2017-08-29(g)(1)

Regardless of whether a qualifying conviction never actually occurred or whether it was expunged, set aside, or pardoned, in such cases the Court ultimately concludes that there is no “conviction” for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

A prior felony remains a predicate for § 922(g)(1) when the convicting state restores civil rights but continues to restrict firearm possession.

United States v. Kenneth Clegg, Jr. · filed 2016-06-29(g)(1)

Looking to the whole of state law, as Cassidy instructs, the district court properly concluded that Ohio law restricts Clegg’s firearm rights.

Section 922(g)(9)’s firearm prohibition applies even when a state does not offer every conviction-relief mechanism listed in section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii).

Fisher v. Kealoha · filed 2017-05-05(g)(9)

The plain language of these statutory provisions makes clear that section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) creates exceptions to section 922(g)(9)’s general prohibition, rather than preconditions to its application.

A set-aside conviction can support a charge under § 922(g)(1) when the statute authorizing the set-aside expressly preserves a restriction on possessing firearms, even if the certificate does not mention firearms.

United States v. AKA · filed 2018-10-22(g)(1)

The Court concludes that because the source of Aka’s set-aside—§ 24-906 of the YRA—“expressly provide[d]” that he cannot possess firearms, his District of Columbia conviction may serve as a predicate offense for a charge under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) permits a set-aside conviction to serve as a predicate when the law authorizing the set-aside expressly retains a firearm possession restriction.

United States v. Samuel · filed 2018-10-22(g)(1)

Though the Certificate itself does not mention firearms, § 24-906(f) expressly subjects him to the District of Columbia's prohibition on felons possessing firearms. Because the source by which Aka's 2011 conviction was set aside- D.C. Code § 24-906 -expressly provided that he nonetheless may not possess firearms within the District of Columbia, that conviction qualifies under § 922(g)(1) as a prior conviction of a crime punishable by more than one year's imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(1) cannot use a set-aside conviction as a predicate when the certificate setting it aside does not expressly prohibit firearm possession.

United States v. Payne · filed 2019-06-19(g)(1)

Based on this discussion, the Court reads Bost as requiring that, when a Section 922(g) defendant is issued a certificate unconditionally setting aside his conviction or restoring his civil rights, the certificate should expressly forbid the defendant from possessing firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) continues to bar a person with a felony conviction from possessing firearms when the convicting state restores firearm rights only in part, including by limiting where firearms may be possessed.

Holder v. The Winnebago County State Attorney's Office · filed 2021-10-01(g)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court was incorrect in concluding that the Department’s defense—that Holder remains federally prohibited from possessing firearms—fails as a matter of law.

A restoration of firearm rights by one state does not remove the § 922(g)(1) bar arising from a qualifying conviction in another state.

Rossing v. United States Attorney General · filed 2025-07-25(g)(1)

In short, Plaintiff was convicted of a crime in Illinois that disqualifies him from possessing a firearm under § 922(g)(1). The only jurisdiction with the authority to change that status is the jurisdiction where those conviction proceedings were held: Illinois.

Section 922(o)’s machinegun possession ban applies to a trustee who holds a machinegun through a Texas trust.

Hollis v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-30(o)

Thus, Hollis, a person, would in fact possess the machinegun even if he is a trustee. A trust cannot possess anything as it is not an entity under Texas law. Hollis is subject to Section 922(o)’s ban on possessing a machinegun.

Section 922(g)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to someone who frequently uses marijuana and knows he is a marijuana user when possessing a gun.

United States v. Madden · filed 2025-04-25(g)(3)

Through the diversion agreement’s stipulations, Madden “admitted that he frequently used marijuana and knew that he was a marijuana user when he possessed the gun[,]” and therefore “he has failed to show that § 922(g)(3) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him[.]” Deng, 104 F.4th at 1055.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) is not void for vagueness as applied to a person who knew his unlicensed firearms sales were unlawful; California law does not make the federal prohibition vague.

United States v. Arao · filed 2023-02-17(a)(1)(A)

Nor can California’s state law, or its interplay with federal law, render the federal § 922(a)(1)(A) void for vagueness.

Section 922(g)(3) cannot be struck down as facially vague unless the defendant shows that it is vague as applied to his own conduct.

United States v. Bramer · filed 2016-08-11(g)(3)

Though Bramer need not prove that § 922(g)(3) is vague in all its applications, our case law still requires him to show that the statute is vague as applied to his particular conduct.

Section 922(g)(3) is not facially void for vagueness because its prohibition on firearm possession by an unlawful user of a controlled substance can be applied to the defendant's conduct.

United States v. Kimbrough · filed 2018-06-26(g)(3)

Having fully considered the applicable law and the arguments of the parties, the Court finds that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) is not facially void for vagueness and, accordingly, Kimbrough's Motion to Dismiss will be denied.

Section 922(g)(1) gives fair warning that a convicted felon may not possess a firearm or ammunition that has moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Smith · filed 2019-04-30(g)(1)

As applied to Smith, the plain language of § 922(g)(1) makes it clear that it is unlawful for (a) a person who has been convicted of a felony (b) to possess any firearm or ammunition that has moved in interstate commerce. These requirements are straightforward and sufficient to provide fair warning of the proscribed conduct.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to a person whose DACA status expired before possessing a firearm.

United States v. Sunny Singh · filed 2019-09-19(g)(5)(A)

So even assuming DACA introduces uncertainty into section 922(g)(5)(A) for some potential defendants, the same cannot be said for someone like Singh who was no longer enrolled in the program.

Section 922(g)(3) cannot be challenged as unconstitutionally vague by a defendant who does not dispute that it clearly prohibits his conduct.

United States v. Hasson · filed 2022-02-22(g)(3)

Because Hasson does not contest that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) clearly prohibited his conduct, he cannot challenge the statute as unconstitutionally vague.

Section 922(g)(3)’s prohibition is clear as applied when a person’s drug use is regular and ongoing during firearm possession.

United States v. Moss · filed 2024-10-22(g)(3)

Section 922(g)(3)’s phrase “unlawful user of . . . any controlled substance” is clear in its application to Defendant’s conduct. The facts presented at trial, coupled with the reasonable inferences the jury was entitled to draw from those facts, support the conclusion that Defendant was an “unlawful user” of illegal drugs, one whose use was “regular and ongoing” while in possession of a firearm.

A defendant challenging § 922(g)(3) as vague must show that it is vague as applied to his own conduct.

United States v. Baxter · filed 2025-02-05(g)(3)

Here, Baxter’s vagueness challenge fails. Though Baxter has presented broad arguments about the vagueness of the term “unlawful user” in § 922(g)(3), he has not carried his burden of presenting any argument for why the phrase is unconstitutionally “vague as applied to his particular conduct.” See Bramer, 832 F.3d at 909.

Section 922(g)(1) gives a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison fair notice that possessing a firearm is unlawful.

United States v. Branson · filed 2025-06-04(g)(1)

The statute, § 922 (g)(1), clearly defines the prohibited conduct—possessing a firearm as a felon.

Section 922(g)(3) gives fair notice that possessing a firearm while intoxicated from marijuana use is prohibited when the person’s drug use is regular and sufficiently close in time to the possession.

United States v. Sanchez · filed 2025-06-13(g)(3)

An ordinary person would understand that Sanchez’s actions fall squarely within § 922(g)(3)’s proscriptions. Because § 922(g)(3) provides fair notice that possessing a gun while intoxicated from using marijuana was prohibited conduct, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Sanchez.

Section 922(g)(3) gives fair notice to someone who regularly uses marijuana while possessing firearms.

United States v. Harris · filed 2025-07-14(g)(3)

Though there will be border- line cases, Harris’s habitual marijuana smoking falls squarely within § 922(g)(3)’s plain text. So the statute put him on notice that his conduct was a crime.

Section 922(g)(1) is not vague as applied to a person previously convicted of motor vehicle theft, a valid predicate for its firearm prohibition.

United States v. Doster · filed 2025-12-03(g)(1)

Even if we were open to the suggestion that Diaz could potentially render § 922(g)(1) unconstitutionally vague, it was not vague in this case: Doster has previously been convicted of motor vehicle theft, and that is the same predicate crime affirmed in Diaz as valid for a § 922(g)(1) conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to a felon convicted of possessing a firearm.

United States v. Scott · filed 2025-12-12(g)(1)

Finally, we conclude that § 922(g)(1) is not vague in Scott’s case.

Section 922(o)(2)(A)’s public authority exception is unconstitutionally vague as applied to a police chief possessing a machine gun registered to his department at a shooting event.

United States v. Wendt · filed 2026-03-03(o)(2)(A)

Because the public authority exception as applied to Wendt in his capacity as Chief of Police is unconstitutionally vague, his conviction for possession of a machine gun under § 922(o) is vacated.

Section 922(g)(1) clearly prohibits felons from possessing firearms and is not void for vagueness.

United States v. Landrum · filed 2026-03-05(g)(1)

Because we do not find that § 922(g)(1) is void for vagueness, and because all Landrum’s other arguments are foreclosed by our precedent, we AFFIRM.

Treating a § 922(q) violation as a felony for supervised release and special assessments is not plain error when the defendant did not preserve a contrary objection.

United States v. Levelle Grant · filed 2016-12-16(q)

As the government argues, though it “is not immediately obvious” on the face of § 922(q), Appellee Br. at 8, it is perhaps possible to read that provision in conjunction with § 3559’s classification scheme in a way that would make § 922(q) a felony offense. ... Like the First Circuit, we cannot conclude that this interpretation is so plainly erroneous as to warrant reversal absent a properly preserved objection.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to misdemeanor convictions carrying maximum sentences of more than two years.

Marshall v. US Attorney General · filed 2025-06-03(g)(1)

Although § 922(g)(1) is commonly referred to as the felon-in-possession law, it also applies to persons with misdemeanor convictions that carry maximum sentences of more than two years.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits felons from possessing firearms or ammunition; the duration of possession is not an element of the offense.

United States v. Jones · filed 2016-12-21(g)(1)

Section § 922(g)(1) simply prohibits felons from possessing firearms and ammunition, period; duration is not an element of the of- fense.

A firearm need not be recovered to support a conviction under § 922(g) when circumstantial evidence establishes that it was real.

United States v. Payne-Owens · filed 2017-01-04(g)(1), (g)(3)

But we have previously found evidence of gun possession sufficient when the gun was not recovered, provided there was circumstantial evidence the gun was real.

Section 922(j) requires proof that the defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe the firearm was stolen.

United States v. Ronald White, Jr. · filed 2017-07-11(j)

In addition to affirming the unregistered firearm conviction, the panel (1) reversed White’s conviction for possession of a stolen firearm due to insufficient evidence proving White knew or had reasonable cause to believe the Romarm Draco was stolen, and (2) upheld the submission of evidence at trial that White was a subject of law enforcement’s investigation of a series of violent crimes. White, 824 F.3d at 789, 792. We agree with the panel’s sound reasoning supporting its reversal of the stolen firearm conviction, and we therefore reinstate Part II of the panel opinion.

Section 922(j) requires proof that the defendant knew or had reason to know the firearm was stolen; an admission of that knowledge during a plea colloquy can support a guilty plea.

United States v. Amalfitano · filed 2020-12-21(j)

To convict a defendant of possession of a stolen firearm, “the government must prove that (1) the defendant possessed a stolen firearm, (2) the firearm was part of interstate commerce, and (3) the defendant knew or had reason to know that the firearms were stolen.” ... Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the district court plainly erred in finding that there was a sufficient factual basis for Amalfitano’s guilty plea at the time it accepted it.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the possessed weapon meets the federal definition of a firearm; the pistol and expert testimony can establish that element.

United States v. McCoy · filed 2023-06-13(g)(1)

The evidence sufficiently proved that McCoy’s .45-caliber pistol was a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(3) and 922(g).

Section 922(l) applies extraterritorially to conduct involving the illegal importation of firearms into the United States.

United States v. Ubaldo · filed 2017-06-09(l)

For similar reasons, § 922(l) and § 2778(b)(2) overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.

Section 922(g)(1) covers firearm possession by a felon, so a firearms trafficking enhancement does not double count that offense.

United States v. Turner · filed 2017-06-21(g)(1)

The upshot is that § 922(g) covers possession, not sale. It does not require unlawful recipients or “trafficking” in multiple weapons. It just bars possession and thus does not double count.

Section 922(g)(4) prohibits firearm possession after an involuntary commitment to a mental institution by lawful authority, even without judicial involvement.

Escamilla v. United States · filed 2023-03-09(g)(4)

In sum, because Escamilla was involuntarily “committed to a mental institution” by lawful authority, § 922(g)(4) pro- hibited him from possessing a firearm.

Under § 922(g)(4), a mental health hospitalization alleged to lack robust judicial involvement does not qualify as a commitment to a mental institution at the pleading stage.

Clifton v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2022-07-15(g)(4)

The court finds plaintiff’s arguments at this pleading stage to be persuasive and concludes plaintiff has adequately alleged that his 2001 hospitalization does not constitute an involuntary commitment involving robust judicial involvement under § 922(g)(4).

Section 922(g)(4) does not treat a California fourteen-day psychiatric certification without judicial involvement as a commitment that bars firearm possession.

Stokes v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2021-07-30(g)(4)

In summary, under Mai, plaintiff’s Section 5250 “certification” was not a “commitment” within the meaning of Section 922(g)(4) and defendants may not withhold his firearm permit on that ground.

Section 922(g)(4) treats an involuntary commitment under New York’s Mental Hygiene Law as a disqualifying commitment to a mental institution.

Montgomery v. Cuomo · filed 2018-03-05(g)(4)

Significantly, any involuntary commitment under MHL Article 9, including under MHL § 9.27, constitutes a disqualifying "commitment to a mental institution" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).

Section 922(d)(4) prohibits transfers to persons committed to a mental institution, while § 922(g)(4) prohibits those persons from possessing firearms.

Hill v. D.D. (In Re Interest of D.D.) · filed 2018-08-28(d)(4), (g)(4)

Subsection 922(d)(4) prohibits selling or disposing of firearms or ammunition to a person who has been committed to a mental institution. Thus, D.D. would not violate this subsection by keeping firearms or ammunition in his home. Subsection 922(g)(4) prohibits the possession of firearms by those who have been committed to a mental institution. A person of ordinary intelligence would readily understand that § 922(g)(4) is violated by continued possession of a firearm after one has been involuntarily committed.

Section 922(g)(4) requires an adjudicative decision in favor of hospitalization before a person is considered committed to a mental institution.

United States v. McMichael · filed 2018-10-05(g)(4)

In other words, under the statute, a commitment does not occur until the completion of an adversary process that results in an adjudicative decision in favor of hospitalization.

Section 922(g)(4) covers a court-ordered commitment to a mental institution to restore competency.

United States v. Collins · filed 2020-12-03(g)(4)

Collins’s commitment to restore him to competency under W. Va. Code § 27-6A-3(f) similarly falls squarely within the definition of committed as used in § 922(g)(4).

Section 922(g)(4) bars firearm possession after a formal commitment to a mental institution; a temporary emergency detention without formal commitment does not qualify.

United States v. Dhingra · filed 2021-09-22(g)(4)

Finally, although “[t]emporary, emergency detentions for treatment of men- tal disorders or difficulties, which do not lead to formal commitments under state law, do not constitute the commitment envisioned by 18 U.S.C. § 922,” ... the record demonstrates that Dhingra was formally committed to a mental institution by a Texas probate court in accordance with Texas Health & Safety Code § 574.034.

A probable cause order followed by a short stay for observation does not constitute commitment to a mental institution under § 922(g)(4).

Shepherd v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2022-03-31(g)(4)

But the Court finds that under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (4), Plaintiff was not “committed to a mental institution.”

A hospitalization under New York MHL § 9.39 counts as an involuntary commitment that triggers the firearm restrictions in § 922(d)(4) and (g)(4).

Giannavola v. Lee, M.D. · filed 2025-07-14(d)(4), (g)(4)

It is well-established in the Second Circuit and New York state courts that a hospitalization pursuant to MHL § 9.89 is an “involuntary commitment” by an “other lawful authority” and, thus, properly triggers the firearms restrictions set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(4) and (g)(4).

Section 922(g)(4) bars a person involuntarily admitted under New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 from possessing a firearm, regardless of whether the state reports the admission to NICS.

K.I. · filed 2026-03-02(g)(4)

But, regardless of whether the State reported Plaintiff's MHL § 9.39 commitment to NICS, Plaintiff is prohibited from possessing a firearm under § 922(g)(4).

Section 922(g)(4) treats an involuntary admission under New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 as a disqualifying commitment to a mental institution.

Susman · filed 2026-03-31(g)(4)

In fact, an involuntary commitment—including a commitment under section 9.39, see supra—is expressly classified as a disqualifying event under section 922(g)(4).

Section 922(d)(1) requires proof that the firearm transferee actually had a felony conviction at the time of transfer.

United States v. Francis · filed 2018-06-05(d)(1)

We agree with the district court that this statute contains an element that the firearms transferee actually have a felony conviction at the time of transfer.

Section 922(t)(6) shields the United States from an FTCA negligence claim arising from a NICS background check that failed to prevent a prohibited person from buying a firearm.

Individually v. United States · filed 2018-06-18(t)(6)

Plaintiffs fully briefed this issue and addressed it at the evidentiary hearing, and it is obvious to the Court that a claim of negligence in the operation of the NICS system resulting in a prohibited person obtaining a firearm falls plainly within the scope of the Government's immunity.

Section 922(t)(6) does not immunize the United States from an FTCA suit, even though it immunizes certain federal employees involved in providing information to the background-check system.

Holcombe v. United States · filed 2019-05-23(t)(6)

The statute includes tailored grants of immunity-none of which fit the United States-and the doctrine cited by the Government focuses on state-law defenses. Thus, the Court holds that the unavailability of suit against federal employees directly does not confer immunity on the United States in this FTCA action.

Section 922(t)(6) grants immunity to qualifying federal employees, but not to the Federal Government itself.

Felicia Sanders v. United States · filed 2019-08-30(t)(6)

In sum, the statutory text is clear: federal employees, but not the Federal Government, enjoy immunity from suit under § 922(t)(6).

Section 922(t)(6) grants immunity for specified background check reporting conduct to local governments and government employees, but not to state governments or their agencies.

Von Lossberg v. State · filed 2022-03-17(t)(6)

Therefore, the Brady Act’s immunity provision plainly does not extend to federal or state governments.

In an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1), the court may consider a defendant’s felony convictions beyond the conviction identified as the predicate for the charge.

United States v. Alaniz · filed 2025-10-03(g)(1)

Contreras’s other convictions were irrelevant not because they were not explicit predicates, but because they were misdemeanors irrelevant to § 922(g)(1). ... This court may consider Alaniz’s burglary conviction. His as-applied challenge is therefore foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges by a person on supervised release.

United States v. Steave · filed 2025-09-18(g)(1)

Steave’s arguments are foreclosed by binding precedent. In United States v. Moore, 111 F.4th 266 (3d Cir. 2024), this Court rejected facial and as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) for persons on supervised release. See id. at 273 & n.5. Thus, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to non-violent felons despite an as-applied Second Amendment challenge.

United States v. Hunt · filed 2025-08-27(g)(1)

Hunt finally argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l), which generally criminalizes firearm possession by felons, is unconstitutional as applied to a non-violent offender like Hunt. An en banc panel recently rejected the argument that the Second Amendment precludes application of § 922(g)(l) to non-violent felons.

Sections 922(g)(3) and (d)(3) may violate the Second Amendment as applied to medical marijuana users whose allegations do not show they are comparable to felons or dangerous people.

Florida Commissioner of Agriculture v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2025-08-20(g)(3), (d)(3)

Because both of the Federal Government’s historical analogues fail at the motion to dismiss stage, we conclude it has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the challenged laws and regulations as applied to medical marijuana users are consistent with this Nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation. Thus, the Appellants have plausibly alleged that the challenged statutes and regulations violate the Second Amendment as applied to them.

Section 922(g)(1)’s firearm prohibition does not violate the Second Amendment as applied to an unpardoned felon convicted of fraud, even after years of rehabilitation.

Medina v. Whitaker · filed 2019-01-18(g)(1)

To prevail on an as-applied challenge, Medina would have to show facts about his conviction that distinguishes him from other convicted felons encompassed by the § 922(g)(1) prohibition. Medina has not done so.