18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(3) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a firearm that affected commerce.

United States v. Wolfe · filed 2011-08-02(g)(3)

To convict Wolfe, then, the Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, among other elements, that he possessed a firearm that affected commerce.

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that the defendant knowingly made a false statement material to the lawfulness of a firearm sale and intended or likely to deceive the dealer.

United States v. Harvey · filed 2011-08-04(a)(6)

To sustain a conviction in this case under § 922(a)(6), the Government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant knowingly made (2) a false or fictitious oral or written statement that was (3) material to the lawfulness of the sale or disposition of a firearm, and was (4) intended to deceive or likely to deceive a firearms dealer.

Section 922(g) requires that a felon possess a firearm or ammunition that has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce.

United States v. Moore · filed 2012-02-22(g)

The elements of such an offense are (1) that the defendant is a felon, (2) who possesses a firearm or ammunition, (3) which has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(a)(5) requires the government to prove that neither the transferor nor the nonresident transferee held a federal firearms license at the time of the transfer.

United States v. Fries · filed 2013-08-06(a)(5)

The plain language of § 922(a)(5) clearly requires the government to prove, as an essential element of the offense, that neither the defendant nor the nonresident to whom the defendant allegedly transferred the weapon possessed an FFL at the time of the transfer.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year, voluntary and intentional firearm possession, and a connection to interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Baize · filed 2015-03-31(g)(1)

To convict Baize of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), 1 the Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) he was previously convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) he voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affecting commerce, because the firearm had traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a qualifying prior conviction and firearm or ammunition possession or transport connected to interstate or foreign commerce.

Commonwealth v. Williams · filed 2016-12-02(g)(1)

The federal “unlawful acts” statute requires proof that the defendant (1) possessed or transported a firearm or ammunition; (2) possessed or transported the firearm or ammunition in a manner that affected interstate/foreign commerce; and (2) has been convicted of any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g) does not require proof that the defendant discharged the firearm.

United States v. Cormier · filed 2017-05-24(g)

Although Cormier maintains that he did not discharge the firearm, (see id. at 9:15-16; Doc. 64 at 21:15-19), discharging the firearm is not an element of the § 922(g) offense charged sub judice.

Section 922(g) does not require proof that a defendant carried a handgun in his waistband on a street corner or transported it in a vehicle.

United States v. Stuckey · filed 2018-06-28(g)

Finally, Stuckey attempts to factually distinguish Walker by pointing out that he carried his handgun in his waistband while standing on a street corner, unlike the defendant in Walker who carried or transported a handgun in his vehicle. Stuckey does not explain why this factual distinction is significant, and we find that it is not because a violation of § 922(g) does not require proof of either of these factual scenarios.

Section 922(e) requires proof that a defendant knowingly and willfully delivered a container with firearms or ammunition to a common or contract carrier for foreign shipment to an unlicensed recipient without giving the carrier written notice.

United States v. Zamor · filed 2018-08-09(e)

To prove that Defendant violated § 922(e), the Government had to establish four elements: (1) that Defendant knowingly and willfully delivered or caused to be delivered a package or container containing firearms or ammunition to a common or contract carrier, (2) that the package or container was intended for transportation in foreign commerce, (3) that the package or container was intended to be transported to someone other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector, and ... (4) that Defendant did not provide written notice to the carrier that firearms or ammunition were being transported or shipped.

Section 922(g)(1) permits conviction when the indictment charges multiple prohibited acts conjunctively and the government proves any one of them beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Quiroz-Carrasco · filed 1978-01-10(g)(1)

We do not agree with appellant that the challenged instruction results in inadequate procedural safeguards in a criminal case, where proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any one of the acts charged in the indictment is sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Section 922(a)(6) requires a false statement in connection with purchasing a firearm, but does not require proof that the buyer was subject to a protection order.

United States v. Meech · filed 2022-01-14(a)(6)

The elements of § 922(a)(6) do not require showing that a defendant was subject to a protection order, but they do require showing that the defendant made a false statement in connection with purchasing a firearm.

Section 922(o) prohibits transferring or possessing a machinegun with knowledge that the weapon has characteristics qualifying it as a machinegun.

United States v. Adamiak · filed 2025-10-14(o)

That statute makes it unlawful for any person to (1) transfer or possess (2) a machinegun with (3) knowledge that the relevant weapon possessed characteristics that qualified it as a machinegun.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed ammunition, had and knew of a prior felony conviction, and possessed ammunition that had previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Dias · filed 2026-05-06(g)(1)

To support a conviction for being a felon in possession of ammunition, the Government had to prove that Mr. Dias: (1) knowingly possessed ammunition; (2) had been convicted of a felony before he possessed the ammunition; (3) knew he had been convicted of a felony before he possessed the ammunition; and (4) possessed ammunition that had previously traveled in interstate commerce. ... Viewing this collective evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Dias possessed ammunition.

Section 922(h) does not require proof of compensation to establish that someone was “employed for” a person prohibited from possessing firearms.

United States v. Weaver · filed 2011-10-24(h)

We do, however, hold that compensation cannot be the sine qua non of the words "employed for" in § 922(h).

Section 922(h) covers people used as substitutes or agents to possess, receive, or transport firearms for prohibited persons, even if they receive no compensation.

United States v. Lahey · filed 2013-08-08(h)

In sum, the Court holds that, as evidenced by its text, context, and purpose, § 922(h) does not require the Government to allege or to prove that the Moving Defendants were hired for wages, salary, or another form of tangible compensation. Instead, the Government must prove that prohibited persons used the Moving Defendants as their substitutes or agents in possessing, receiving, or transporting a firearm.

Section 922(g)(9) can apply despite a state court order purporting to set aside the predicate misdemeanor domestic violence conviction.

Baker v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-25(g)(9)

Although Jennings v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 894, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2007), forecloses Baker’s statutory argument that his state court order purporting to “set aside” his misdemeanor domestic violence conviction renders § 922(g)(9) inapplicable, Jennings does not foreclose Baker’s Second Amendment argument.

Section 922(g)(1) measures felon status on the date of the firearm offense; later invalidation of the predicate felony does not undo the violation.

United States v. Carter · filed 2011-11-09(g)(1)

However, because “[t]he defendant’s status on the date of the offense controls whether the felon in possession ... laws have been violated,” United States v. Olender, 338 F.3d 629, 636 (6th Cir. 2003), the fact that the predicate felony was subsequently invalidated “is irrelevant,” United States v. Settle, 394 F.3d 422, 431 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 1102 (2005).

A prior felony conviction that was in effect when the defendant possessed the firearm supports a § 922(g)(1) prosecution even if its validity is later called into question.

United States v. Davis · filed 2012-11-14(g)(1)

This court squarely rejected this line of argument in United States v. Kahoe, 134 F.3d 1230 (4th Cir. 1998), holding that any subsequently-realized invalidity of a predicate felony conviction is immaterial to a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, as long as the prior conviction was in effect on the date that the defendant possessed the firearm. ... As a result, Davis’s current § 922(g)(1) conviction is proper, notwithstanding the possible effects of Simmons on his previous convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on a prior felony conviction that was in effect when the person possessed the firearm, even if the prior conviction is later found invalid.

United States v. Neal · filed 2011-12-16(g)(1)

This court squarely rejected this line of argument in United States v. Kahoe, 134 F.3d 1230 (4th Cir. 1998), holding that any subsequently-realized invalidity of a predicate felony conviction is immaterial to a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, as long as the prior conviction was in effect on the date that the defendant possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a person to clear a predicate felony conviction before possessing ammunition; vacating the conviction afterward does not undo the firearms offense.

United States v. Cerdes · filed 2025-08-14(g)(1)

He succeeded in 2024 in vacating his 2006 conspiracy conviction. But in 2015, when he possessed ammunition, that predicate felony conviction remained in place. To avoid the restrictions to his ability to possess ammunition that the felony conviction created, Cerdes was required to clear that conviction before possessing the ammunition. He did not do so.

Section 922(n)’s receipt element may be proved through circumstantial evidence of prior receipt, including constructive possession of the firearm.

United States v. Haynes · filed 2025-10-09(n)

Further, Haynes’s constructive possession of the firearm was circumstantial evidence of his prior receipt of the firearm.

Section 922(n) bars receiving, shipping, or transporting firearms while under indictment, but does not bar possession alone.

United States v. Avila · filed 2022-12-21(n)

After all, § 922(n) does not bar the possession of weapons while under indictment, only their shipment, transport, or receipt. ... While possession and receipt are not equivalent, a finding of possession can support a finding of receipt.

Section 922(n) does not prohibit a person under indictment from possessing firearms or ammunition received before the indictment.

United States v. Call · filed 2012-06-07(n)

18 U.S.C. § 922(n) does not make it unlawful for a person under indictment to possess firearms or ammunition that he received prior to the indictment.

Section 922(n) requires proof that a person shipped, transported, or received a firearm while under a felony indictment; mere possession does not suffice.

United States v. Laurent · filed 2011-12-02(n)

In order to prove the defendant guilty of violating § 922(n), the government must establish that he shipped, transported, or received the gun after and while still under an indictment for a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. To interpret the statute otherwise would criminalize mere possession and would be contrary to the law as written and interpreted.

Section 922(n) bars a person under indictment for a felony from receiving a firearm, so a background-check denial of an attempted purchase was proper.

Alexander v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 2020-03-02(n)

Because Plaintiff was prohibited from receiving a firearm from Grab-A-Gun.com, the FBI’s denial of Plaintiffs attempted purchase was appropriate and, as such, it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 922(n) covers receiving a firearm while under a felony indictment, regardless of whether the person is later convicted of that felony.

Hefner v. United States · filed 2022-09-13(n)

Whether Petitioner was subsequently convicted of the felony is not relevant to Petitioner’s conviction as an individual under indictment.

Section 922(n) does not allow a person under indictment to obtain a firearm for self-defense.

Dalal v. Molinelli · filed 2026-03-02(n)

But he was not entitled to possess a weapon for any purpose while under indictment.

Section 922(j) does not require an intent to permanently deprive the owner for a firearm to be stolen.

United States v. Tyerman · filed 2011-12-20(j)

The Court is aware of no indication that Congress intended the term “stolen,” as used in § 922(j), to include an intent to permanently deprive; the Court will not add such a requirement on its own initiative.

Section 922(g)(1) covers inoperable firearms.

United States v. Tyrone Dale · filed 2012-09-12(g)(1)

Dale next contends that the Government failed to prove that he possessed a “firearm” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006), because the firearm in question was inoperable. However, he concedes that this court has found that an inoperable firearm is nonetheless a “firearm” for purposes of the statute. ... Accordingly, this claim is without merit.

Section 922(j) treats a firearm as stolen after any wrongful taking, even without an intent to deprive its owner permanently.

United States v. Tyerman · filed 2012-12-12(j)

This court’s determination that all wrongful takings (regardless of com mon-law larceny) constitute “stolen” applies equally to § 922(g) and (j).

Section 922(j) does not require a stolen firearm to have been reported stolen.

Sparrow v. USA-2255 · filed 2022-03-31(j)

Property need not be reported as stolen in order for it to be deemed as stolen.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) prohibits firearm possession by an alien who entered the United States illegally and whose temporary protected status application had been denied before the possession.

United States v. Ramos-Cruz · filed 2012-01-18(g)(5)(A)

Section 922(g)(5)(A) prohibits possession of firearms by aliens who are "illegally or unlawfully in the United States." ... Neither party disputes, however, that a person who entered the country illegally and had been denied TPS status would be an illegal alien. ... For the reasons discussed below, we believe the evidence presented at trial would have easily allowed a rational jury to determine that Ramos-Cruz’s application for TPS had been denied on August 17, 2004—when he was found in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) applies to a DACA recipient who lacks lawful immigration status, despite work authorization and temporary protection from removal.

United States v. Arrieta · filed 2017-07-07(g)(5)(A)

What these defendants lacked, and what Arrieta lacks, is lawful status, and the absence of such status is controlling. Accordingly, we hold Section 922(g)(5)(A) applicable here.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year of imprisonment; a juvenile offense with a sentencing range of 0–30 days does not qualify.

Smith v. United States · filed 2021-03-25(g)(1)

This offense did not expose Mr. Smith to a sentence range in excess of a year and was therefore not “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” for purposes of § 922(g)(1). Accordingly, Mr. Smith could not, as a legal matter, have violated § 922(g)(1).

A defendant’s stipulation that a prior conviction qualifies as a felony for § 922(g)(1) forecloses a later challenge based on the business practices exception.

United States v. Coppin · filed 2014-06-02(g)(1)

Bennett stipulated not only that she had committed a one-year felony but also that she had committed a felony for purposes of Section 992(g) as a matter of law.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who sustained the qualifying prior conviction.

United States v. Riley · filed 2014-05-22(g)(1)

However, Exhibit 33b, even when considered together with Special Agent Fitzpatrick’s testimony, is insufficient to permit an inference beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant Riley and the “Charles Riley” convicted in 1994 in Wicomico County are one and the same.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a conviction for a crime punishable by more than one year in prison even when state law no longer labels the defendant a felon after a deferred sentence.

United States v. Reese · filed 2012-12-11(g)(1)

The difficulty is that to sustain a federal charge for unlawful possession it does not matter whether state authorities continue to label him a “felon,” only (and again) whether he stands “convicted ... of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). And in this case the answer to that question is clear: everyone agrees Mr. Reese’s 1992 charge carried with it a potential penalty of up to eighteen months in prison.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a defendant whose prior felony was punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment.

United States v. Artis · filed 2012-12-13(g)(1)

A review of Artis’ criminal history reveals he was convicted of receiving stolen property of a value greater than $1000 in Delaware, in violation of Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 851.3, a Class G felony punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 4205(b)(7). In view of this conviction, Artis is not entitled to relief under Simmons, and we find that the district court did not err in denying his pro se motion to dismiss the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) covers common-law offenses with no statutory maximum term of imprisonment because they can be punished by more than one year, and the two-year state-misdemeanor exception does not apply.

Schrader v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-01-11(g)(1)

Because common-law offenses carry no statutory maximum term of imprisonment, they are capable of being punished by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year and thus fall within section 922(g)(1)’s purview. And because such offenses are also capable of being punished by more than two years’ imprisonment, they are ineligible for section 921(a)(20)(B)’s misdemeanor exception.

A North Carolina conviction qualifies as a predicate for § 922(g)(1) only if the defendant faced more than one year of imprisonment for it.

Graham v. United States · filed 2013-04-23(g)(1)

Applying the holding in Simmons to Mr. Graham’s case causes his two felon in possession convictions to be infirm — that is, under Simmons, Mr. Graham no longer has the requisite predicate convictions to sustain a conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison; convictions carrying a maximum sentence of eight months do not qualify.

United States v. McCaskey · filed 2013-04-05(g)

Because the prior convictions fail to qualify as a prior felony for purposes of being a felon in possession of a firearm, we vacate McCaskey’s conviction and sentence on Count Fourteen.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a prior conviction as a predicate felony when the defendant could have been sentenced to more than one year in prison, regardless of the sentence actually imposed.

United States v. Swann · filed 2013-05-10(g)(1)

However, a qualifying predicate felony is one for which Swann himself could have been sentenced to a prison term exceeding one year.

A conviction punishable by only one year in prison does not satisfy § 922(g)(1)’s prior-conviction element.

United States v. Marquez-Perez · filed 2014-09-12(g)(1)

The evidence presented at trial establishes that Marquez was convicted of an offense punishable by a one-year term of imprisonment; his prior conviction was thus insufficient to support the predicate conviction element of section 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) treats a prior conviction as qualifying when the maximum prison term authorized at the time of conviction exceeds one year, including time that could be served after revocation of post-release supervision.

United States v. Bunn · filed 2015-06-24(g)(1)

Rather, it requires consideration of the maximum term of imprisonment that is actually authorized for the defendant at the time of conviction. It is this authorized maximum term of imprisonment that corresponds to whether an offense is “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (emphasis added).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction for a crime punishable by more than one year in prison; the amount involved in a felony shoplifting charge does not matter.

United States v. Jenkins · filed 2015-07-06(g)(1)

Federal law does not require that a felony shoplifting charge exceed a specified amount. See id. If a crime is punishable by more than one year, it meets the statutory requirement.

Section 922(g)(1) does not treat a Puerto Rico drug guilty plea as a prior felony conviction when the court stays the proceedings and places the person on probation without entering a conviction.

United States v. Valle-Fuentes · filed 2015-11-09(g)(1)

In conclusion, the Court holds as a matter of law that defendant Del Valle did not become a convicted felon when he pled guilty to an Article 404(b) violation and the Puerto Rico court stayed the proceedings against him and placed him on probation pursuant to Article 404(b)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) looks to the possible sentence for a prior offense, not the sentence imposed, when determining whether the offense qualifies as a predicate conviction.

United States v. Pelissier · filed 2015-12-04(g)(1)

The fact that Pelissier was punished by less than one year is immaterial so long as he was “punishable” by more than one year.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a North Carolina felony with a maximum term exceeding one year as a qualifying prior conviction, even when that term includes post-release supervision.

United States v. Barlow · filed 2015-12-21(g)(1)

Therefore, each of Barlow’s convictions, for which he faced a nineteen-month term of imprisonment, qualifies as a prior felony conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person from possessing firearms while a predicate state felony conviction is pending on direct appeal if state law treats the person as convicted.

United States v. Rocky Houston · filed 2016-02-08(g)(1)

Even though Houston’s state felony conviction was pending on direct appeal at the time of his alleged possessions of firearms, Houston was nonetheless a prohibited person under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession by a person whose prior convictions do not qualify as predicate felonies.

United States v. Adams · filed 2016-02-19(g)(1)

Under our holding in Simmons, Adams was not a convicted felon at the time of the offense, and it was therefore not a violation of § 922(g)(1) for Adams to be in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) does not count a Florida guilty plea with adjudication withheld as a prior felony conviction when Florida law does not treat it as a conviction.

United States v. Jenkins · filed 2016-05-11(g)(1)

Now that the Florida Supreme Court has made clear that Jenkins’s guilty plea with adjudication withheld is not a “conviction” for purposes of § 790.23(1)(a), his § 922(g)(1) conviction cannot stand.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a North Carolina felony carrying a 4- to 14-month sentence as a qualifying prior conviction even when nine months must be served on postrelease supervision.

United States v. Justus · filed 2016-05-20(g)(1)

Justus has a prior North Carolina felony conviction for attempted breaking or entering for which he received a 4- to 14-month sentence. ... As counsel for Justus concedes, this argument is foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Barlow, 811 F.3d 133, 140 (4th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-8925 (U.S. Apr. 8, 2016).

Section 922(g)(1) does not treat a Florida guilty plea with adjudication withheld as a qualifying prior conviction.

United States v. Clarke · filed 2016-05-11(g)(1)

As described above, we have vacated Jenkins’s § 922(g)(1) conviction because the Florida Supreme Court has told us that his guilty plea with adjudication withheld is not a “conviction” for purposes of Florida’s felon-in-possession statute.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a prior conviction as a qualifying felony when the possible prison term exceeds one year, including a term of post-release supervision.

United States v. Randy Shoffner, Jr. · filed 2016-06-15(g)(1)

Under Barlow, the district court properly treated this conviction as a felony.

Under § 922(g)(1), Barlow forecloses Bame’s claim that his prior North Carolina convictions were not punishable by more than one year.

United States v. Vernon Bame, Jr. · filed 2016-07-06(g)(1)

Vernon Wade Bame, Jr., pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012). ... Bame’s assertion that his prior convictions were not punishable for a term exceeding one year is foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Barlow, 811 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2016 WL 1465057 (U.S. May 16, 2016) (No. 15-4114).

Section 922(g)(1) does not treat a Florida felony guilty plea with adjudication withheld as a qualifying conviction.

United States v. Williams · filed 2016-08-26(g)(1)

Williams’s § 922(g)(1) conviction was also based on a guilty plea in Florida state court where adjudication was withheld. The government therefore concedes that Williams’s “§ 922(g) conviction for being a felon in possession must be vacated.” [R. Br. 8] We agree.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison; the sentence actually imposed does not control.

Jones v. Warden FCI Allenwood · filed 2018-09-28(g)(1)

To be convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924, the government needed only to prove that Jones had been convicted by any court of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1) turns on whether the prior crime was punishable by more than one year in prison, regardless of a later reduction in the sentence.

United States v. Elbert Walker, Jr. · filed 2019-02-01(g)(1)

Contrary to Defendant’s suggestion, § 922(g) does not require a prior felony conviction, but only a prior conviction for a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). That Defendant’s prior conviction was for a crime punishable by a term exceeding one year was demonstrated by evidence that he was sentenced to a two-to-three year prison term. The fact that Defendant was later resentenced to 364 days’ imprisonment obviously does not speak to the length of time for which his crime was “punishable.” Id.

Sealed juvenile felony adjudications remain disqualifying convictions under § 922(g)(1) when state law treats them as convictions and sealing has not expunged or set them aside.

Barr v. Snohomish County Sheriff · filed 2019-05-09(g)(1)

The Sheriff was not required to issue Barr a GPL because, the sealing order notwithstanding, Barr's class A felony adjudications are predicate, disqualifying convictions for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) treats a Washington conviction as a predicate felony only if the state's mandatory sentencing scheme actually exposed the defendant to more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. McAdory · filed 2019-08-28(g)(1)

Accordingly, we consider McAdory’s prior convictions to have been “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” such that they would serve as predicates under § 922(g)(1), only if McAdory’s convictions actually exposed him to sentences of that length. None of McAdory’s prior convictions had standard sentencing ranges exceeding one year, nor were any accompanied by written findings of any of the statutory factors that would justify an upward departure. Thus, the district court ... convicted McAdory under § 922(g)(1) even though he had no predicate offenses within the meaning of the statute.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession based on a North Carolina guilty plea followed by a conditional discharge, because that disposition is not a qualifying conviction.

United States v. Tyrius Smith · filed 2019-09-27(g)(1)

So Smith could not have violated § 922(g)’s prohibition on possessing a firearm after being “convicted” of a felony.

Section 922(g)(1) looks to whether a prior offense is punishable by more than one year in prison, regardless of the sentence actually served.

United States v. Freeman · filed 2019-10-29(g)(1)

In short, the length of time Freeman actually served does not matter under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) applies when the prior crime was punishable by more than one year in prison, regardless of whether it was labeled a felony.

Gray v. United States · filed 2020-01-10(g)(1)

Whether a crime is deemed a felony or not does not change the application of § 922(g)(1), since the statute uses a term of maximum years as the baseline instead of the felony/misdemeanor distinction.

Section 922(g)(1) looks to whether a prior crime was punishable by more than one year, regardless of the sentence imposed or served.

Snowden v. United States · filed 2020-03-02(g)(1)

A felony is a crime that is punishable by greater than one year regardless of whether a court actually imposes such a sentence. Id. Whether Defendant served a prison sentence greater than one year has no bearing on his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), so this claim is meritless.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

Binder v. United States · filed 2020-03-23(g)(1)

Mr. Earnst was correct that Mr. Binder had convictions that qualified under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession based on a prior conviction for which the defendant could not have received more than one year in prison.

Miller v. United States · filed 2013-08-21(g)(1)

Simmons, then, narrowed the scope of § 922(g)(1) by establishing that it does not reach defendants whose prior convictions could not have resulted in a sentence of more than one year in prison.

Section 922(g)(1) does not cover firearm possession when the defendant lacks a qualifying prior felony conviction.

Whitaker v. Dunbar · filed 2014-09-02(g)(1)

Moreover, subsequent to Whitaker’s first section 2255 motion, the substantive law changed due to Simmons such that the conduct of which Whitaker was convicted in count five is deemed not to be criminal due to the absence of a qualifying underlying felony conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by imprisonment for more than one year to support a felon-in-possession conviction.

Williams v. United States · filed 2021-10-25(g)(1)

Williams is actually innocent of his felon-in-possession conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because Williams’ prior convictions for residential burglary and possessing stolen property were not punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) looks to the possible prison term for a prior offense, not the sentence actually imposed, to determine whether the offense qualifies.

Jordan v. Hemingway · filed 2021-12-14(g)(1)

It is the possible term of imprisonment, not the actual sentence received, that matters under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison to support a felon in possession conviction.

Williams v. United States · filed 2022-01-21(g)(1)

Unlike Goodall, Williams argued that he is actually innocent of the felon in possession of a firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). As the Court discussed in its original order, Williams is actually innocent of this conviction because his prior convictions for residential burglary and possessing stolen property were not punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year and therefore were not qualifying predicate convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) looks to the maximum prison sentence the defendant faced for a prior offense, regardless of the sentence actually imposed.

United States v. Rezell Alston, IV · filed 2022-02-02(g)(1)

Accordingly, regardless of the sentence the court ultimately imposed, Alston faced the possibility of a 44-month sentence. ... There is thus no question that the offense was punishable by more than one year.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prior-conviction element is satisfied when a person had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison before possessing a firearm or ammunition.

Stanard v. Hendrix · filed 2022-02-16(g)(1)

Mr. Stanard had been previously convicted at least three times of crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year at the time in 2014-16 when he possessed the firearms and ammunition of which he was convicted before this Court.

Section 922(g)(1) bars firearm possession after a conviction for a crime punishable by more than one year in prison, even if the person served less than a year.

United States v. Moon · filed 2022-04-11(g)(1)

And because the maximum term of imprisonment for each offense exceeded one year, they are properly considered felony convictions for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

For § 922(g)(1), a Washington conviction qualifies as a predicate felony if the mandatory sentencing range or the actual sentence imposed exceeded one year.

Marin-Torres v. United States · filed 2022-05-10(g)(1)

Here, there is no question that petitioner received a 24-month sentence for the 1996 delivery offense, making it a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. ... Under controlling authority, it was therefore a felony for the purposes of the felon-in-possession statute.

A prior conviction qualifies under § 922(g)(1) if the crime was punishable by more than one year in prison, even when the defendant received a shorter sentence.

NELSON v. BERGAMI · filed 2022-05-24(g)(1)

That Petitioner’s drug crimes were felonies is therefore beyond doubt. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (prohibiting possession of a firearm by anyone who “has been convicted . . . of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” emphasis added).

Section 922(g)(1) covers a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison even when the person served less than one year.

United States v. Davis · filed 2022-09-13(g)(1)

Even though Davis only served four months of his sentence, he was still convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s phrase “in any court” includes state and federal courts.

Gebregziabher v. United States · filed 2022-09-23(g)(1)

Under a plain reading of the statute, the phrase “in any court” includes all domestic courts, both state and federal.

Section 922(g)(1) covers ammunition possession by a person previously convicted of a drug offense for which he received a 14-month sentence.

United States v. Batchelor · filed 2022-10-17(g)(1)

Specifically, although Batchelor argues that he was not previously convicted of a felony offense and is thus innocent of the § 922(g) offenses, the record reflects that he previously received a 14-month sentence for a drug offense and therefore was a convicted felon when he possessed the ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction for a crime punishable by more than one year in prison; it does not require a sentence of ten years or more.

Jones v. USA - 2255 · filed 2022-11-02(g)(1)

... there is no requirement that Jones have been sentenced to 10 or more years in order for a prior conviction to qualify as a felony.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a person whose prior conviction carried a sentence of more than one year, even if most of the sentence was suspended and the person served less than a year.

Robinson v. USA - 2255 · filed 2022-11-08(g)(1)

Although most of the sentence was suspended, Robinson falls squarely within the prohibited persons category in § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) applies when the defendant could have received more than one year in prison for a prior conviction, even if the sentence imposed or served was shorter.

Charleston v. Lothrop · filed 2022-12-01(g)(1)

But this only requires that, considering the statutory sentence range together with mandatory sentencing guidelines, a court could have imposed upon a particular defendant a sentence exceeding one year—not that the defendant need actually serve (or even receive) a sentence of more than one year.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession when restoration of civil rights means the person has no qualifying prior conviction.

United States v. Lujan · filed 2022-12-13(g)(1)

It was therefore not illegal for Mr. Lujan to possess a firearm because he did not have a qualifying felony conviction within the meaning of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g) applies when the defendant’s prior felony sentence had not ended, so his civil rights had not been restored when he possessed firearms.

United States v. Grady Sullivan, Jr. · filed 2023-02-17(g)

Regardless of how long Sullivan spent imprisoned, his sentence was for a 10-year term and that term had not terminated before he was discovered in possession of firearms and ammunition in October 2020. Thus, his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) was proper.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a prior violent felony conviction; a qualifying crime punishable by more than one year suffices.

Prince v. United States · filed 2023-05-01(g)(1)

Thus, one can violate this statute without having been convicted of a violent felony.

A prior state felony conviction qualifies as a predicate conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Santana v. United States · filed 2023-06-29(g)(1)

In any event, as mentioned supra at n.4, prior state convictions are valid predicate offenses for a charge pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) turns on whether the prior crime was punishable by more than one year in prison, regardless of the conduct underlying the conviction.

Silverio v. United States · filed 2024-10-18(g)(1)

While Silverio’s prior felony conviction did not involve the use of a firearm, as Silverio and his counsel both explained at sentencing, it was still an act of physical harm to another person, and in any event, section 922(g)(1) does not inquire as to the subject matter or events underlying the felony conviction—only whether it was a conviction for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Burglary convictions punishable by more than one year in prison qualify as prior convictions under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Brown · filed 2025-05-14(g)(1)

Brown has several burglary convictions that qualify under § 922(g)(1) because they are “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1) counts a prior crime only if the defendant could have received more than a year of confinement in a prison or jail; a noncarceral community corrections sentence does not count.

United States v. Gaines · filed 2025-09-10(g)(1)

For these reasons, we hold that, as used in § 922(g)(1), the term “imprisonment” means confinement in a prison or jail, not participation in some non-carceral community-corrections program or the like. ... Because Gaines couldn’t receive any real-deal jail time for his Class D felony, that offense doesn’t qualify as a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” within the meaning of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the underlying felony to be violent.

Crook · filed 2026-01-21(g)(1)

Thus, the underlying offense needn’t be a violent felony for § 922(g)(1) to apply.

Section 922(z)(3) provides immunity from qualifying civil liability when a secure gun storage or safety device makes a handgun inoperable by reasonably foreseeable means.

Estate of Arrington v. Michael · filed 2012-12-19(z)(3)

In the absence of express guidance on the scope of immunity provided in § 922(z)(3), and taking into the account the legislative history’s reference to “common law rules,” id., the Court concludes that it is appropriate to read into the statutory term “made inoperable” a requirement that, for the immunity provision to apply, the secure gun storage or safety device must make the firearm inoperable by reasonably foreseeable means.

Section 922(z)(3) grants immunity from suit to a lawful handgun possessor who uses a secure storage or safety device when an unauthorized third party gains access to the handgun and misuses it.

Estate of Arrington Ex Rel. Arrington v. Michael · filed 2013-12-24(z)(3)

By its terms, the CSLA provides that, as long as an individual with lawful control of a gun has utilized a secure gun storage or safety device and has not authorized or permitted access to the gun, he or she is immune from suit in any “qualified civil liability action.”

A challenge to § 922(o)(2)(A)’s governmental authority exception is premature when the record does not substantiate the claimed authority to possess machine guns.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2013-02-04(o)(2)(A)

Defendants have indeed not made a complete production of evidence to support their defenses at this time, and they have thus not identified in any substantial respect why the governmental authority exception should be applied to their possession of the machine guns. ... Based on the foregoing, the court finds that resolution of the motion to dismiss counts eight and nine is premature. Accordingly, the court denies the motion to dismiss without prejudice.

Section 922(o)(2)(A)'s government exception does not exempt a target of an undercover operation from liability for possessing a machine gun.

United States v. Neuner · filed 2013-07-10(o)(2)(A)

The statute and legislative history do not except unwary targets of undercover operations, like Neuner, from criminal liability for possessing machine guns.

Section 922(o)(2)(A) permits machine gun possession under government authority, but an officer’s continued possession after termination and a deadline to return department property can fall outside that exception.

United States v. Spicer · filed 2016-08-11(o)(2)(A)

Regardless whether Spicer was authorized to have a machine gun while employed by Greene County, a rational jury could conclude based on the undisputed evidence of his continued possession after the deadline to return department property that Spicer did not possess the HK416 “under the authority” of Greene County on March 28, 2014, when ATF executed the warrant.

Section 922(o)(2)(A) does not authorize private possession of a machinegun merely because it is registered or was possessed by a police officer.

Doe v. Biden · filed 2022-10-31(o)(2)(A)

The implication is that when a police officer returns to being a private citizen, he is no longer “authorized” to possess the machinegun, even if it is registered.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed the firearm, but not that he knew of its interstate nexus.

United States v. Beasley · filed 2017-12-27(g)(1)

A conviction under § 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed the firearm but does not require knowledge of the interstate nexus.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that the firearm has an interstate nexus.

United States v. Thipprachack · filed 2016-12-28(g)(1)

He contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298 (2015), calls into question our holding in United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1988), that the offense does not require knowledge of a firearm’s ... interstate nexus. ... Because McFadden does not unequivocally direct this court to overrule Dancy, “we are not at liberty to overrule our settled precedent.”

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew the ammunition had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Stone · filed 2013-02-07(g)(1)

As this circuit and our sister circuits have recognized, the context in which §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) were enacted does not suggest Congress intended to extend the mens rea requirement to the interstate commerce element.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to prove that the defendant knew the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Ross · filed 2013-12-19(g)(1)

But we have repeatedly rejected the argument that, in a prosecution under § 922(g), the government must prove that the defendant knew that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the firearm or ammunition was in or affecting interstate commerce, but does not require proof that the defendant knew of that connection.

United States v. Garcia-Hernandez · filed 2015-10-16(g)(1)

In Garcia-Hernandez’s case, the government had to prove Garcia-Hernandez’s firearm or ammunition had been in or affecting interstate commerce, not that he knew it had been in or affecting interstate commerce. The mens rea requirement in § 924(a)(2) does not apply to the interstate-commerce element of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a defendant knew the firearm had been in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Michael Heath Thetford · filed 2015-11-18(g)(1)

We conclude that the jury instruction given by the district court in Thetford's case was correct because, as we explained in Garcia-Hernandez, "the government had to prove [Thetford's] firearm . . . had been in or affecting interstate commerce, not that he knew it had been in or affecting interstate commerce." Id. at *2 (emphasis in original).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Isom · filed 2016-01-25(g)(1)

This court has repeatedly held that there is no mens rea requirement as to the jurisdictional element of § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew of the firearm’s interstate nexus.

United States v. Ivory Thompson · filed 2016-02-24(g)(1)

Our rule of orderliness prevents us from overruling prior decisions rejecting Thompson’s contention that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) require proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the firearm’s interstate nexus.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that a firearm has an interstate nexus.

United States v. Tevin Wright · filed 2016-04-07(g)(1)

He contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298 (2015), calls into question our holding in United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1988), that the offense does not require knowledge of a firearm’s interstate nexus. Because ... McFadden does not unequivocally direct this court to overrule Dancy, “we are not at liberty to overrule our settled precedent.”

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew the firearm traveled in interstate commerce, and Commerce Clause challenges to the provision are foreclosed in the Fifth Circuit.

United States v. Steinberg · filed 2016-09-22(g)(1)

He also correctly concedes that his arguments that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and because it does not require proof of knowledge that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce are also foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require an indictment to allege that the defendant knew the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Sealy · filed 2016-09-28(g)(1)

Under plain error review, Sealy also challenges his conviction arguing that his conviction is unconstitutional because it falls outside the government’s power to regulate commerce; he also argues that the indictment failed to allege his knowledge that the firearm travelled in interstate commerce. As Sealy acknowledges, these arguments have been foreclosed by our precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a defendant knew the firearm had an interstate nexus.

United States v. Frederick Robinson, Jr. · filed 2018-03-06(g)(1)

He concedes that this court has also rejected that argument in United States v. Rose, 587 F.3d 695, 705 (5th Cir. 2009), in which the court determined that it is not necessary to prove that a defendant in possession of a firearm knew that the weapon has an interstate nexus. Because the issues raised by Robinson on appeal are all foreclosed by this court’s precedent, Robinson’s unopposed motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. McGee · filed 2018-05-29(g)(1)

Finally, McGee argues that the Government failed to establish that he knew the firearm traveled in interstate commerce, citing McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298 (2015). This argument is also foreclosed. See United States v. Schmidt, 487 F.3d 253, 254–55 (5th Cir. 2007).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Gilstrap · filed 2018-08-15(g)(1)

We have also rejected the argument, like Gilstrap’s, that a conviction under § 922(g) requires proof that a defendant knew that the firearm he possessed had traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew the firearm had an interstate nexus.

United States v. Denson · filed 2019-06-19(g)(1)

He further contends the statute requires the Government to prove he knew: he possessed a firearm; he was a felon; and the firearm was in, or affecting, interstate commerce. As Denson concedes, these contentions are foreclosed by our court’s precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew a firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Lynden Brown · filed 2019-08-06(g)(1)

Brown also asserts both that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional and that, even if it is not, ... knowledge of a firearm’s interstate travel is a required element. Whatever the merits of the constitutional issue, these arguments—as Brown acknowledges—are foreclosed by binding precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a defendant knew the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Guerrero · filed 2019-10-04(g)(1)

We have concluded that a § 922(g)(1) conviction does not require proof that a defendant knew that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that the firearm affected interstate commerce.

Robertson v. United States · filed 2020-11-20(g)(1)

Thus, if Petitioner asserts that he had no knowledge that the weapon affected interstate commerce or crossed state lines, he is not entitled to relief based on Rehaif.

Section 922(g) does not require a defendant to know that the firearm he possessed traveled in interstate commerce.

Rodriguez v. United States · filed 2021-02-02(g)

But, a conviction under § 922(g) does not require that a defendant have knowledge that the gun he possessed travelled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that the firearm affected interstate commerce.

Smith v. United States · filed 2021-04-29(g)(1)

However, the penalty provision’s “knowingly” requirement does not apply to the jurisdictional element of the statute.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a defendant knew the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Higgins · filed 2021-11-22(g)(1)

We have concluded that a § 922(g)(1) conviction does not require proof that a defendant knew that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a defendant knew the firearm possession was in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Carter · filed 2022-07-20(g)(1)

He also argues that the factual basis was insufficient to ... support his conviction because it did not include, as the mens rea element for the offense, that he knew that his possession of the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce. ... As Carter concedes, his arguments are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

Davis v. United States · filed 2023-01-09(g)(1)

The argument that Movant had to have known that the gun traveled in interstate commerce is likewise without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a defendant knew the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Tommy Walker · filed 2023-05-30(g)(1)

This argument fails because Stone admits of no such limitation—its holding is clear and categorical: the “knowingly” requirement applicable to § 922(g) does not apply to the jurisdictional interstate commerce element.

Section 922(g) does not require proof that the defendant knew the firearm had traveled interstate.

Odrick v. United States · filed 2023-06-07(g)

Knowledge of a firearm’s interstate travel is not an element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that the firearm affected interstate commerce.

Lewis v. United States · filed 2024-02-13(g)(1)

A defendant does not have to know that the gun affected interstate commerce. That aspect of Movant’s Rehaif claim is without merit.

Section 922(g) does not require a defendant to know that the firearm had an interstate-commerce connection.

United States v. Terrance Rush · filed 2020-11-20(g)

We conclude that there was a sufficient factual basis for Rush’s guilty plea to the felon-in-possession charge. See United States v. Christenson, 653 F.3d 697, 700 (8th Cir. 2011) (reviewing challenge to unobjected-to factual basis for guilty plea for plain error); United States v. Garcia-Hernandez, 803 F.3d 994, 997 (8th Cir. 2015) (mens rea requirement does not apply to interstate-commerce element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)); see also Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2196 (2019) (presumption in favor of scienter requirement does not apply to jurisdictional elements).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a defendant knew his firearm possession was in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Bomar · filed 2022-03-30(g)(1)

He also contends that the factual basis was insufficient to support his conviction because it did not include, as the mens rea element for the offense, that he knew that his possession of the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce. However, Bomar acknowledges that these challenges are foreclosed.

A state misdemeanor punishable by more than two years initially qualifies as a disqualifying conviction under § 922(g)(1), subject to later restoration of firearm rights.

D.A. Titus v. PSP · filed 2015-08-05(g)(1)

Therefore, under Maryland law, as it existed then and exists now, Petitioner would be disqualified under Section 922(g)(1) of the Federal Gun Act.

For § 922(g)(1), whether a crime is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year depends on its maximum authorized sentence, rather than the sentence imposed or advisory sentencing guidelines.

Ray v. Office of Attorney General · filed 2013-02-08(g)(1)

What Applicant’s argument ignores is that Section 922(g)(1) of the Act’s use of the term “punishable by imprisonment” goes to the maximum allowable term of imprisonment, not the term to which the person was sentenced or actually served.

Section 922(g)(1) looks to the maximum possible sentence for a predicate conviction, regardless of the sentence imposed.

Baginski v. Lynch · filed 2017-01-23(g)(1)

Thus, for purposes of section 922(g)(1), courts look solely to the maximum possible punishment in determining whether a defendant’s predicate conviction was for “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a person convicted of fraud punishable by more than one year in prison, even if the person received a lesser sentence.

Hatfield v. Barr · filed 2019-06-06(g)(1)

We now hold that §922(g)(1) may be applied to a felon convicted of fraud, whose maxi‐ mum sentence exceeded a year, even if the actual punish‐ ment was less.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a predicate conviction for which the defendant could have received more than one year in prison.

Hope v. United States · filed 2020-08-13(g)(1)

Thus, for purposes of a qualifying predicate conviction under § 922(g)(1), a predicate conviction is not “punishable for a term exceeding one year,” unless the defendant could have received a sentence of more than one year in prison under the North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.17.

Section 922’s background-check, recordkeeping, and prohibited-person transfer rules do not impose criminal liability on a dealer when a firearm is stolen because the violations require knowledge.

Estate of Kim Ex Rel. Alexander v. Coxe · filed 2013-02-22(d), (m), (t)

Because each statutory violation requires a knowing state of mind, we do not agree that a dealer faces criminal liability under these statutes when a firearm is stolen.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a person who remained a convicted felon when he possessed a firearm, even if he challenges the validity of the prior conviction.

United States v. Washington · filed 2013-05-09(g)(1)

At the time of his arrest for the instant offense, however, Washington remained a convicted felon. Accordingly, his argument is foreclosed by Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 64-67 (1980).

Section 922(g)(1) permits reliance on a state felony conviction that had not been set aside when the firearm was possessed.

United States v. Houston · filed 2013-07-30(g)(1)

For purposes of the § 922(g)(1) charges he now faces, reliance on his state felony conviction is proper.

Section 922(g)(1) treats an unvacated felony conviction as disqualifying even if the defendant claims it is void, and the defendant cannot collaterally attack that conviction in the federal firearms prosecution.

United States v. Fillingim · filed 2017-05-11(g)(1)

Here, Mr. Fillingim’s prior convictions had not been vacated and his firearm restrictions had not been removed at the time of his possession of the firearms and attempted purchase of the pistol. Accordingly, he had a prior conviction for purposes of § 922 and could not collaterally attack his state court convictions in his federal criminal proceedings.

Section 922(g) does not authorize a defendant to collaterally challenge prior convictions used to enhance a sentence during sentencing.

United States v. Sadler · filed 2023-08-15(g)

Custis also makes clear that nothing in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) authorizes a collateral attack, at sentencing, on prior convictions that are used as sentencing enhancements.

Section 922(g)(1) treats firearm possession by a felon as a continuing offense; the government need only prove possession at some point and a continuing possessory interest.

United States v. Hampton · filed 2013-10-21(g)(1)

The government is therefore not required to prove that Hampton possessed the firearm during both “time periods” (Appellee’s Br. at 16), as Hampton claims, but only that he possessed the firearm at some point, and that he had a continuing possessory interest in it: that is the essence of an offense being continuing.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a felon’s firearm possession as a continuing offense that ends when the felon relinquishes possession.

United States v. Goodwin · filed 2014-01-21(g)(1)

Possession of a firearm is a continuing offense that ceases only when the felon relinquishes possession.

Section 922(g)(1) treats felon firearm possession as a continuing offense that ends only when possession ends.

United States v. Kashif Dukes · filed 2025-08-05(g)(1)

felony firearm possession is a continuing offense that ceases only when possession ends.

Section 922(g)(4)’s firearm ban may violate the Second Amendment as applied to a person with a distant mental commitment who alleges he is no longer dangerous and has no available path to relief.

Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff's Dep't · filed 2014-12-18(g)(4)

Thus, § 922(g)(4) lacks narrow tailoring as the law is applied to Tyler.

Section 922(g)(1)’s firearm ban can constitutionally be applied to a person convicted of a violent felony such as attempted murder.

United States v. Gonzalez · filed 2022-09-22(g)(1)

Gonzalez’s offense—attempted murder—was violent, and we are aware of no authority supporting an argument that someone in his position historically had the right to possess a gun. Thus, it would be frivolous to argue that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him.

Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally prohibit felons on parole or probation from possessing firearms while they complete their sentences.

United States v. Quailes · filed 2025-01-17(g)(1)

We thus join our sister circuits in holding that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to convicts on parole or probation.

Section 922(g)(3) is unconstitutional as applied where the Government does not seek to show drug use or intoxication at the time of firearm possession, or drug use extensive enough to make the person dangerous.

United States v. Sam · filed 2025-03-10(g)(3)

Likewise, in this case the Government did not seek to show that Sam was intoxicated or unlawfully using a controlled substance at the time he was found in possession of a firearm. See Connelly, 117 F.4th at 282. Nor did it seek to prove that Sam’s marijuana use was so extensive as to render him analogous to the dangerously mentally ill or a danger to others. See United States v. Daniels, 124 F.4th 967, 976 (5th Cir. 2025). Accordingly, the district court properly determined that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutional as applied to Sam.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a felon whose violent and drug trafficking convictions show that he is dangerous.

Grayer v. United States · filed 2025-04-28(g)(1)

The Court finds that Movant’s convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, kidnapping and for drug trafficking show that Movant is indeed dangerous. And so, as applied to Movant, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is constitutional.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a felon who possessed a firearm while on supervised release and had prior robbery and burglary convictions.

United States v. Roberts · filed 2025-08-04(g)(1)

Giglio, Diaz, and Schnur therefore foreclose his § 922(g)(1) challenges, and the statute is constitutional as applied to him.

Section 922(g)(1) can constitutionally disarm a felon whose predicate offense was violent or who possessed a firearm while on probation.

United States v. Clark · filed 2025-08-21(g)(1)

As our recent precedents confirm, Clark’s as-applied challenge is doomed because his predicate felony—aggravated assault with a firearm—was violent, and because he possessed a firearm while on probation.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a person who possesses a firearm while on probation.

United States v. Edmond · filed 2025-09-10(g)(1)

Lastly, the District Court did not err in concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Edmond.

Section 922(n) may constitutionally bar a person indicted for possessing an unlawful weapon from transporting a firearm across state lines while the indictment is pending.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2025-09-12(n)

On the facts here, 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) presents no constitutional problem.

Section 922(g)(1) may be applied to a person convicted of burglary because that conviction establishes dangerousness under binding Sixth Circuit precedent.

Ramey v. United States · filed 2025-09-24(g)(1)

Accordingly, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to Section 922(g)(1) as applied to him is foreclosed under Sixth Circuit precent.