18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Thompson · filed 2010-02-23(g)(1)

Because knowledge of the interstate nexus was not required, counsel’s related insufficient-evidence argument likewise fails.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal interstate commerce nexus: the firearm must have been in interstate commerce at some time.

United States v. Silver Galindo · filed 2010-02-25(g)(1)

Convictions under § 922(g)(1) require only the “minimal nexus that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce.” ... The charge given clearly described the elements of the offense and the slight change in wording did not amount to Galindo being convicted of a substantially different crime.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed ammunition that traveled in interstate commerce; the government need not prove that every round alleged in the indictment did so.

United States v. Nazario · filed 2010-03-11(g)(1)

We conclude that there was no error by the district court because the indictment provided Nazario “notice of the ‘core of criminality’ to be proven at trial,” id. at 266, and “[t]he essential element of the offense charged was that [the defendant] possessed ammunition that had traveled in interstate commerce, not the precise nature of that ammunition,” United States v. Danielson, 199 F.3d 666, 670 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element can be satisfied by proof that the firearm or ammunition traveled across state lines.

United States v. Hunter · filed 2010-04-19(g)(1)

The jurisdictional element may be satisfied by proof that the firearm or ammunition traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce element is supported by evidence that the firearm was purchased in another state and was not manufactured in the state of possession.

United States v. Gatlin · filed 2010-06-15(g)(1)

Here, even without the testimony of the ATF Agent, there was substantial evidence from which the jury could have found that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce: the ATF database indicated that the gun had been purchased in Virginia, and no handguns have been manufactured in Delaware in nearly 100 years.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce; markings, purchase records, and manufacturing evidence can establish that element.

United States v. Gatlin · filed 2010-07-15(g)(1)

Here, even without the testimony of the ATF Agent, there was substantial evidence from which the jury could have found that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce: the gun was marked with a “Miami, Florida” engraving and the manufacturer’s name, the ATF database indicated that the gun had been purchased in Virginia, and no handguns have been manufactured in Delaware in nearly 100 years.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied by proof that a firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was recovered.

United States v. Roberts · filed 2011-03-22(g)(1)

Although the evidence that the gun was sold in Ohio does not appear elsewhere in the record aside from the Trace Summary, this is immaterial to the government‟s proof of the interstate commerce nexus where they showed that this Ruger, found in Pennsylvania, had to have traveled in interstate commerce because all Rugers are made outside the state.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a defendant knew the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Potts · filed 2011-06-15(g)(1)

He argues that the word “knowingly” in § 924(a)(2) requires the government to prove that every element in § 922(g)(1), including that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce, was known by the defendant. That argument, however, is foreclosed by United States v. Rose, 587 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 2009).

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm was manufactured in another state or country.

United States v. Roseby · filed 2011-11-17(g)

It is well established that this element is satisfied where, as here, there is proof that the firearm was manufactured in another state or country.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element can be established by expert testimony that no shotguns are manufactured in the state where the defendant possessed one, even when the shotgun was not recovered.

United States v. McNeal · filed 2012-01-04(g)(1)

We have found, however, that where the Government is unable to produce the subject firearm, expert testimony indicating that no type of shotgun is manufactured in the state in which the defendant is alleged to have possessed the weapon is sufficient to establish the interstate commerce element of a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) charge. Williams, 445 F.3d at 729, 740. Because just such testimony regarding the shotgun possessed by McNeal was offered at his trial, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to determine that the weapon traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by a firearm’s past interstate movement, even if federal agents later acquire and store it for a reverse sting.

United States v. Sarraj · filed 2012-01-06(g)(1)

Our cases have not endorsed, and we do not adopt here, any distinction that would allow passage of time, or acquisition by the government, to strip a firearm of its interstate nexus.

A defendant who stipulates that ammunition traveled in interstate commerce waives a challenge to the sufficiency of proof on that element of § 922(g).

United States v. Barlow · filed 2012-05-03(g)

We hold that Barlow waived this argument by entering into a stipulation that the ammunition traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)’s interstate-commerce element is satisfied when evidence shows that a firearm was manufactured in one state and possessed in another.

United States v. McDowell · filed 2012-10-19(g)

The expert’s testimony and manufacturer’s inscription on the gun, combined with the fact that Defendant possessed the gun in Tennessee, leads to the inexorable conclusion that Defendant’s gun traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by evidence that ammunition previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Hatcher · filed 2012-11-20(g)(1)

Because there was evidence that Hatcher’s ammunition had previously traveled in interstate commerce, and such evidence satisfies the jurisdictional element of § 922(g)(1), see Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 570 (1977); United States v. Davis, 242 F.3d 1162, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam), there was sufficient evidence to support Hatcher’s conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element can be satisfied by evidence that the firearm traveled across a state line.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2012-12-13(g)(1)

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the Government presented sufficient evidence that the firearm had traveled across a state line to permit the jury to find a required element of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Haron Tucker · filed 2013-01-24(g)(1)

Proof that the possessed firearm had previously traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the required nexus between possession and commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm possessed by a felon was manufactured outside the state and traveled there.

United States v. Corey · filed 2013-06-04(g)(1)

His as-applied challenge to § 922(g) is also unavailing. At the plea colloquy, he admitted that the firearm was manufactured outside of Florida and thus traveled in and affected interstate commerce. As such, this was sufficient to ... show a “minimal nexus” between the firearm and its connection to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm was manufactured in one state and sold in another.

United States v. Horton · filed 2013-06-11(g)(1)

Finally, as the guns were manufactured in Ohio and then sold in Georgia, they had the requisite “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured outside the state where the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Westmoreland · filed 2013-10-10(g)(1)

In Gallimore, which was decided after Lopez, Morrison, and Jones, we held that that the interstate nexus component of § 922(g) is established when the Government can demonstrate “that a firearm was manufactured outside the state where the defendant possessed it.” ... Thus, this claim lacks merit.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce for a felon-in-possession conviction.

United States v. James Looman, III · filed 2013-10-22(g)(1)

A defendant can be guilty of possessing a firearm as a felon only if, as relevant here, there is proof that the “firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce element can be proved by showing that the gun was manufactured outside the state where the defendant possessed it; the government need not identify where it was manufactured.

United States v. Brownlee · filed 2014-03-04(g)(1)

The government didn’t have to prove where the gun had been manufactured, only that it had not been manufactured in Indiana, a conclusion the expert had arrived at on the basis of her database searches before she talked to the manager.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element may be proved by showing that a firearm and ammunition were manufactured outside the state where they were possessed.

United States v. Crawford · filed 2014-06-05(g)(1)

And the jury reasonably could find based on the testimony of Robert Walker, a crime scene investigator, that Crawford’s handgun and ammunition were not manufactured in Florida, and by necessity, must have traveled through interstate commerce to reach Crawford.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by evidence that ammunition was manufactured outside the state where it was found.

United States v. Adams · filed 2014-06-26(g)(1)

The interstate commerce element was satisfied by Special Agent Amato’s expert testimony that the ammunition was discovered in North Carolina but manufactured outside of North Carolina.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm or ammunition previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Ponce-Cortes · filed 2014-07-31(g)(1)

Ponce-Cortes violated section 922(g)(1) because the two firearms and ammunition that he possessed had been manufactured in foreign countries, Connecticut, Illinois, and Mississippi and necessarily traveled in interstate commerce to reach him in Florida.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm traveled in interstate commerce at some time in the past.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2014-07-31(g)(1)

We are, accordingly, bound by this Court’s precedent to find that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce element here, and Jackson raises this argument only to preserve it for purposes of appeal.

A firearm’s travel across state lines satisfies § 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2014-09-02(g)(1)

Robinson concedes that the precedent of this Circuit forecloses his current argument that evidence that the firearm traveled across state lines was insufficient to prove an effect on interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element requires proof that the firearm crossed state lines at some point; the defendant need not have transported it personally.

Wilson v. United States of America · filed 2015-03-31(g)(1)

Plaintiff is under the mistaken impression that, in order to prove guilt for a violation of § 922(g)(1), the government must show that plaintiff personally shipped or transported the Ruger in interstate or foreign commerce, or possessed the Ruger in or affecting commerce. ... In other words, the prosecution need only prove that the Ruger crossed state lines at some point in time.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by evidence that the firearm was manufactured in a state other than the state where it was possessed.

United States v. Dollson · filed 2015-04-21(g)(1)

To show that a firearm has been transported across state lines, the Government need only offer evidence that “the firearm was manufactured in a state other than the state where the possession occurred.” United States v. Shambry, 392 F.3d 631, 634 (3d Cir. 2004). Here, the Government satisfied this burden by presenting a stipulation that the firearm was manufactured in Arizona.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the possessed firearm crossed state lines at any point before possession.

United States v. Dixon · filed 2015-05-22(g)(1)

Under Corey, Section 922(g) requires only that a defendant have possessed a firearm in a state other than the one in which it was manufactured, id. at 88 -- that is, that the defendant have possessed a firearm that has crossed state lines at some point.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of an interstate commerce nexus, but a defendant who stipulates to that element and accepts the jury instruction waives a later challenge to it.

United States v. Lockwood · filed 2015-06-16(g)(1)

The statute, though, also requires the government to prove that the pipe bomb-shaped object Lockwood allegedly possessed was “in or affecting interstate commerce.” ... On these bases, Lockwood is bound by his stipulation and waived any challenge to the interstate commerce element.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of an interstate commerce element; uncontested evidence that the firearm and ammunition traveled across state lines supported that element.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2016-02-12(g)(1)

Finally, as previously explained, Thomas did not contest the government’s evidence that the firearm and ammunition traveled in interstate commerce. Thus, the third and final element of § 922(g)(1) also was not a matter of serious debate.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a convicted felon knowingly possessed a firearm that was in or affected interstate commerce; evidence that the firearm traveled between states satisfies the commerce element.

United States v. McDonald · filed 2016-05-24(g)(1)

To obtain a conviction for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that (1) the defendant was a convicted felon; (2) he knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce. ... Finally, the government introduced evidence that the AR-15 rifle had been manufactured in Utah and had traveled to Maine before finally entering Georgia, which satisfies the interstate commerce element. Sufficient evidence was presented to support the jury’s conviction on Count Three.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by evidence that the firearm was manufactured outside the state, including in a foreign country.

United States v. James Holley, Jr. · filed 2016-07-27(g)(1)

Counts Two and Three both alleged that Holley possessed a firearm “affecting interstate commerce.” Holley contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that the H&K handgun “affect[ed] interstate commerce” because it demonstrated only that the handgun moved in foreign commerce—not interstate commerce. As Holley concedes, this argument is foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm manufactured outside a state is found in that state.

United States v. Simplice · filed 2017-05-03(g)(1)

In this case, it was undisputed that the firearm at issue ... was manufactured outside of Florida and that it was discovered in Florida. Under de novo review, these facts were sufficient to prove the interstate commerce element (or “jurisdictional element”) of § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) contains an interstate-commerce jurisdictional element that the government must prove; the defendant’s possession need not itself substantially affect interstate commerce.

United States v. Rodriguez · filed 2017-10-05(g)(1)

Rodriguez first argues that his possession of a firearm did not substantially affect interstate commerce. But we have rejected this argument because the statute contains a jurisdictional element that the government proved in this case.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element can be proved by testimony that no firearms are manufactured in the Virgin Islands.

United States v. Trant · filed 2019-05-15(g)(1)

But Sergeant Burke’s testimony was that there were no firearm manufacturers in the Virgin Islands. That alone would justify a rational trier of fact in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Trant’s firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element can be satisfied by showing that the firearm crossed state lines at some time in the past.

United States v. Aguirri · filed 2019-06-19(g)(1)

As grounds for her claim, Aguirri asserts that there is an insufficient factual basis for the interstate commerce element of § 922(g) because the statute requires more ... than a mere showing that the firearm passed from one state to another at some time in the past; ... Aguirri’s interstate commerce element argument is foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242–43 (5th Cir. 1996).

Section 922(g)(8)’s interstate commerce element withstands a plain-error challenge to a guilty plea’s factual basis when the firearm was manufactured outside the state of possession and the defendant stipulated that possession was in and affected commerce.

United States v. Mohr · filed 2019-07-17(g)(8)

Next, as to Mohr’s argument concerning § 922(g)(8)’s interstate commerce element, we discern no clear or obvious error regarding the sufficiency of the factual basis, given that a document in the sealed records shows that the firearm at issue was manufactured outside of Texas and he stipulated that his gun possession was in and affected commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm possessed in the state was manufactured outside it.

United States v. Swinton · filed 2019-12-23(g)(1)

Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) Special Agent William Farnham testified at Swinton’s trial that the rifle and revolver seized from Swinton’s residence were manufactured in New Hampshire and Brazil, respectively. That testimony was sufficient to establish the “minimal nexus with interstate commerce” that is required to invoke § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element may be established at a guilty plea through a government proffer; the defendant need not state in the allocution that the firearm traveled interstate.

Lesane v. United States · filed 2020-01-20(g)(1)

Lesane’s argument concerning the interstate commerce element is also misplaced, because defendants pleading guilty to felon-in-possession are not required to state, in their allocution, that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce. The Court may rely on a proffer from the Government as to the interstate commerce element.

Section 922(g) requires proof that a firearm possessed by a convicted felon traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Antwan Bates · filed 2020-03-03(g)

To prove an offense under § 922(g), the government must prove that the defendant not only possessed a firearm but also that “the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed.

Kelley v. United States · filed 2020-04-15(g)(1)

The record shows conclusively that a factual basis was established for the proposition that the firearm was “in and affecting commerce” inasmuch as it was manufactured outside the state of Tennessee.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured outside the state where the defendant possessed it.

Lester v. United States · filed 2020-04-20(g)(1)

First, Petitioner admitted that the firearm he was convicted of possessing, a Taurus pistol, was manufactured in Brazil. (Crim. Doc. 33 at 18, 22; Crim. Doc. 59 at 24, 25). “The interstate nexus element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) can be established by showing that the firearm was manufactured [outside of the state] in which it was ultimately possessed by the defendant.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the firearm possessed by a convicted felon traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Burton · filed 2003-03-12(g)(1)

The Government concedes that it failed to prove that the firearm involved traveled in interstate commerce and agrees that Burton’s conviction should be set aside as to count two. ... Burton’s convictions for carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (count one), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (count two), and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (count three) are REVERSED and Burton’s corresponding sentences are VACATED.

Section 922(g)(1) has an interstate commerce element that is satisfied when the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Bookman · filed 2008-01-23(g)(1)

The Daugherty court also refused to reconsider the interstate commerce element of § 922(g)(1) in light of Morrison and Jones, reasoning that those cases are distinguishable because a plain jurisdictional element exists in § 922(g), and, as in the instant case, there was stipulated evidence showing that the gun traveled in interstate commerce. ... For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM Taylor’s sentence and conviction on all grounds.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm was manufactured in a different state from where the defendant possessed it.

Brown v. United States · filed 2021-01-04(g)

“The interstate nexus element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) can be established by showing that the firearm was manufactured in a different state from the one in which it was ultimately possessed by the defendant.” United States v. Folk, 754 F.3d 905, 917 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Thus, the interstate commerce element was satisfied.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied by evidence that the firearm was manufactured in another state.

United States v. Hawkins · filed 2021-08-06(g)(1)

The government satisfied its burden of proving the interstate commerce element of the felon-in-possession statute by adducing evidence that the firearm in question was manufactured in another state.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the firearm a felon possessed moved in interstate commerce; evidence identifying it as a firearm stipulated to have done so can satisfy that element.

United States v. Teachey · filed 2021-10-13(g)(1)

We conclude that a rational juror could have found that the gun seized on May 11, 2017, which the parties stipulated had moved in interstate commerce, was the same gun Teachey possessed on May 9, 2017, which he used to assault a friend of his estranged wife.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Howell · filed 2021-11-08(g)(1)

In a charge for felon in possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1), one element the government must prove is that “the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm or ammunition was shipped in interstate commerce; possession itself need not be a commercial act.

Taylor v. United States · filed 2022-06-08(g)

And there is no requirement that the firearms possession itself be a “commercial” act to satisfy the interstate commerce element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); it is enough that the firearm or ammunition was shipped in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) can constitutionally apply to ammunition the defendant found if it previously traveled across state lines.

United States v. Seekins · filed 2022-08-24(g)(1)

Seekins’ second argument—that § 922(g)(1) cannot constitutionally be applied to found ammunition—fails under our caselaw. We have long held that § 922(g) can be constitutionally applied where the “in or affecting commerce” element is proved by showing the firearm had previously traveled across state lines without regard to the defendant’s conduct.

A firearm’s prior travel across state lines satisfies the “in or affecting commerce” element of § 922(g)(1)’s possession offense.

United States v. Stevens · filed 2022-10-20(g)(1)

Because Stevens concedes the gun traveled across state lines, the government properly charged him with possessing a firearm “in or affecting commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that the firearm traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

Lurry v. United States · filed 2023-07-25(g)(1)

Petitioner also pleaded guilty to violating § 922(g)(1). His admission that the offense occurred in and affecting interstate commerce was sufficient to satisfy Rule 11; Petitioner’s knowledge that the firearm had traveled in interstate or foreign commerce is not required.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce element can be satisfied by ammunition’s past movement in interstate commerce.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2023-12-29(g)(1)

First, Johnson contends there was an insufficient factual basis for his plea because § 922(g)(1)’s “in or affecting commerce” element, “correctly interpreted,” requires more than the mere past movement of his ammunition in interstate commerce. But, as Johnson acknowledges, our precedent holds otherwise.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing a firearm that moved in interstate commerce.

R.D. Navarro v. PSP · filed 2024-01-10(g)(1)

The case is as straightforward as it appears: substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings that (1) Petitioner is subject to the prohibitions of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 and GCA Section 922(g)(1) by virtue of having been convicted of crimes punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment, and (2) the firearm in question moved in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Galvan · filed 2024-02-08(g)(1)

First, we have clearly held the “‘in or affecting commerce’ element [of § 922(g)(1)] can be satisfied if the firearm possessed by a convicted felon had previously traveled in interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm traveled across state lines, even if the defendant did not.

United States v. Burks · filed 2024-02-09(g)(1)

The factual basis alleged that the firearm “was manufactured in Massachusetts and therefore traveled in interstate commerce.” Burks contends that this interstate nexus is insufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce element of § 922(g). However, he concedes that this issue is foreclosed. ... Accordingly, Burks cannot demonstrate plain error.

Section 922(g)(1)’s “in or affecting commerce” element is satisfied by a firearm’s past movement in interstate commerce.

United States v. Rocco · filed 2024-02-12(g)(1)

First, Rocco contends there was an insufficient factual basis for his plea because § 922(g)(1)’s “in or affecting commerce” element, when “[c]orrectly interpreted,” requires more than the mere past movement of his firearms in interstate commerce. But, as he acknowledges, our precedent holds otherwise.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element does not require more than proof that the firearm moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Baez · filed 2024-02-15(g)(1)

Baez first argues that the factual basis for his plea failed to establish the requisite nexus to interstate commerce, as the statute requires more than the mere movement of a firearm in interstate commerce. He further argues that § 922(g)(1) unconstitutionally exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause. Baez correctly acknowledges that these arguments are foreclosed.

Prior circuit precedent forecloses an argument that § 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce element requires more than past interstate travel.

United States v. Campos-Esqueda · filed 2024-06-25(g)(1)

Next, he asserts that the jurisdictional element of § 922(g)(1) requires more than past interstate travel at an indeterminate time; but if it does not, he maintains that the statute exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. ... Campos-Esqueda correctly concedes that his arguments are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s jurisdictional element does not require more than a firearm’s past interstate travel at an indeterminate time.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2024-10-04(g)(1)

Next, he asserts that the jurisdictional element of § 922(g)(1) requires more than past interstate travel at an indeterminate time; but if it does not, he maintains that the statute exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. ... Johnson correctly concedes that his arguments are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on a firearm’s past interstate travel, and that application survives a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Meeks · filed 2024-10-30(g)(1)

Next, he asserts that the jurisdictional element of § 922(g)(1) requires more than past interstate travel at an indeterminate time; but if it does not, he maintains that the statute exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. ... Meeks correctly concedes that his arguments are foreclosed.

A firearm manufactured in another state has the past interstate connection needed to satisfy § 922(g)(1)’s commerce element.

United States v. Barber · filed 2024-12-23(g)(1)

And we have repeatedly held that possession of a firearm manufactured in a different state or country is sufficient. ... Barber possessed a firearm that was manufactured and purchased in two other states. So we hold that the government met its burden on the third element as well as the second.

Section 922(g)(1)’s “affecting commerce” element is satisfied if the ammunition moved across state lines at any time.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2025-03-17(g)(1)

Thus, we adhere to Scarborough and our precedent holding that the “affecting commerce” element is satisfied so long as the ammunition at some time moved across state lines.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm traveled across state lines.

United States v. Riddick · filed 2025-03-31(g)(1)

Riddick further concedes that his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the interstate commerce element of the offense is likewise foreclosed by our precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 271-72 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that showing a firearm traveled across state lines is sufficient to establish that a defendant’s possession of a firearm was in or affected interstate commerce). We agree with Riddick’s concessions. We therefore affirm the criminal judgment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce element does not require more than a firearm’s past interstate travel.

United States v. Ford · filed 2025-04-01(g)(1)

He now raises three challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). First, for the first time on appeal, he asserts that the district court erred by accepting his guilty plea because the jurisdictional element of § 922(g)(1) requires more than past ... interstate travel at an indeterminate time. ... Ford correctly concedes that his arguments are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) has an interstate commerce element that must be explained to a defendant pleading guilty and supported by a sufficient factual basis.

United States v. Anderson · filed 2025-07-29(g)(1)

In short, he was correctly advised on the interstate commerce element of § 922(g)(1), and there is a sufficient factual basis supporting that element.

Section 922(g)(1) has an interstate commerce element that must be supported by a sufficient factual basis for a guilty plea.

United States v. Pearson · filed 2026-03-05(g)(1)

In short, he was correctly advised on the interstate commerce element of § 922(g)(1), and there is a sufficient factual basis supporting that element.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when testimony establishes that ammunition possessed in a state was manufactured outside that state.

United States v. Hallmon · filed 2026-04-24(g)(1)

This testimony is legally sufficient for the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, the ammunition was manufactured outside of Minnesota and, thus, traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. White · filed 2026-05-05(g)(1)

We have held that the interstate commerce element of § 922(g)(1) is satisfied where the firearm had previously traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status, but not that he knew the status prohibited him from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Stallings · filed 2021-07-22(g)(1)

Stallings’ argument is without merit. ... The Court did not hold that the government must also prove that the defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm based on his status.

Section 922(g) does not require proof that the defendant knew firearm possession was prohibited.

Corthion v. United States · filed 2021-07-23(g)

Petitioner also maintains that the Government was required to prove he knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. The argument is without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew the law prohibited him from possessing a firearm.

Mosz v. United States · filed 2021-04-29(g)(1)

Contrary to Mosz’s reading, missing in Rehaif is “any notion that, in felon-in-possession cases, the government is also required to prove that ... the defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm, which goes to the heart of the ‘ignorance of the law’ maxim.”

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that possessing a firearm is unlawful.

Phillips v. United States · filed 2021-03-10(g)(1)

Even if Petitioner had alleged “actual innocence”, Petitioner's knowledge of the ramifications of his felony convictions are irrelevant to his subsequent guilty plea and § 922(g) conviction. The law simply does not require that Petitioner knew his possession of a firearm was unlawful.

Section 922(g) does not require proof that a defendant knew federal law prohibited felons from possessing firearms.

United States v. Trevino · filed 2021-03-03(g)

But a mistake concerning a defendant’s knowledge that the law prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms does not negate any element of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that possessing a firearm was unlawful.

Owens v. United States · filed 2020-10-15(g)(1)

The law simply does not require that Petitioner knew his possession of a firearm was unlawful.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that possessing a firearm is unlawful.

Davidson v. United States · filed 2020-09-16(g)(1)

Even if true, Petitioner’s knowledge of the ramifications of his felony conviction are irrelevant to his subsequent guilty plea and § 922(g) conviction. The law simply does not require that Petitioner knew his possession of a firearm was unlawful.

A § 922(g)(1) prosecution does not require proof that the defendant knew possessing a firearm was unlawful.

Woodard v. United States · filed 2020-09-09(g)(1)

However, knowledge-of-the-law is not an element of the crime charged, even after Rehaif.

Section 922(g) requires knowledge of the facts constituting the offense, but not knowledge that possession is illegal.

United States v. Walker · filed 2016-10-18(g)

Similarly, in this case, the government was required to prove that Walker “knew of the facts that constituted the offense under § 922(g),” not that he knew his possession of the shotgun and ammunition were illegal.

Section 922(g)(9) does not require proof that a defendant knew firearm possession was unlawful after a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction.

United States v. Murray · filed 2009-09-29(g)(9)

It is not necessary for the government to prove that defendant knew that he was violating the law when he possessed a firearm after he had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a felon knew possessing a firearm was unlawful.

United States v. Hernandez · filed 2011-01-11(g)(1)

As stated, the government did not need to prove Hernandez’s knowledge of the law, but only her possession of a weapon. See § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(5)(A) does not require proof that a defendant knew possessing a firearm was illegal.

United States v. Mirza · filed 2011-10-25(g)(5)(A)

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) provides that the required mens rea under Section 922(g) is knowledge. Contrary to what Mirza suggests, the term “knowingly” as used in the Section 924(a)(2) does not require knowledge that his possession of weapons was illegal.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that possessing ammunition is illegal.

United States v. Anderson · filed 2012-03-16(g)(1)

To the extent Anderson asserts he was unaware that the possession of ammunition was illegal, his assertions are immaterial to proof of the elements of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of firearm possession; a belief that state law permits possession does not negate that knowledge.

United States v. McCormick · filed 2013-03-14(g)(1)

Thus, McCormick’s belief that he could possess the guns at issue under Kentucky law has no bearing on whether he “knowingly” possessed them.

Section 922(g)(9) requires knowledge of the facts constituting the firearm offense, but not knowledge that possessing the firearm is illegal.

United States v. Stein · filed 2013-03-19(g)(9)

We have held repeatedly that ... the word “knowingly” made applicable to § 922(g) by § 924(a)(2) requires knowledge of the factual elements of the offense and nothing more.

Section 922(g)(3) does not require proof that a defendant knew federal law barred unlawful drug users from possessing firearms.

United States v. Hope · filed 2019-09-12(g)(3)

That is, in a prosecution under § 922(g)(3), the Government arguably must prove that defendants knew they were unlawful users of a controlled substance, but not, as defendants ... appear to argue, that they knew unlawful users of controlled substances were prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felony status, but does not require knowledge that possessing a firearm is prohibited.

Clark v. Gilley · filed 2020-04-02(g)(1)

Finally, contrary to Clark’s argument, Rehaif does not hold that the Government was required to prove that he knew that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm to sustain a conviction under Section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a defendant knew possessing a firearm violated the law.

United States v. Lawson · filed 2021-06-28(g)(1)

Knowledge that one is “violating the law” is not an element of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a defendant knew the law prohibited him from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Merrett · filed 2021-08-16(g)(1)

Third, Merrett disputes the jury instruction regarding his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He argues for the first time on appeal that the jury was required to find not only that he knew that he belonged to the category of persons barred from possessing a firearm, see Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), but that he knew that he was forbidden by law to posses a firearm. There was no plain error in failing to require the government to prove that Merrett knew the law.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a felon knew possessing a firearm was illegal.

United States v. MacK · filed 2021-10-19(g)(1)

The district court correctly declined to give Mack’s proposed jury instruction, which misstates the law. Following Rehaif, we expressly held that “a felon need not specifically know that it is illegal for him to possess a firearm under federal law” in order to be liable under sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).

Section 922(g)(9) does not require proof that the defendant knew federal law prohibited him from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Adams · filed 2021-11-04(g)(9)

Accordingly, we find that the district court neither abused its discretion nor incorrectly stated the law by instructing the jury that “[t]he government does not have to prove that the defendant knew that his possession of a firearm or ammunition was against federal law.”

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew his felon status prohibited him from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Ice Hudson · filed 2021-12-20(g)(1)

To the extent that Hudson makes the argument, we note that the government was not required to prove his knowledge that his felon status prohibited his firearm possession.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew federal law prohibited him from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Crite · filed 2021-12-22(g)(1)

Insofar as Crite claims that his guilty plea should be vacated because the record does not contain evidence establishing that he also knew that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm under federal law, we have held that Rehaif does not require any such showing.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that possessing a firearm is a federal offense.

Richman v. United States · filed 2022-01-24(g)(1)

Nothing in the statute requires that a § 922(g) defendant know he has committed a federal offense.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that possessing a firearm is unlawful.

Rice v. United States · filed 2022-05-04(g)(1)

Even if Petitioner had alleged “actual innocence”, Petitioner's knowledge of the ramifications of his felony convictions are irrelevant to his subsequent guilty plea and § 922(g) conviction. The law simply does not require that Petitioner knew his possession of a firearm was unlawful.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Andrews · filed 2022-05-12(g)(1)

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court adequately informed Andrews of the nature and elements of the charge against him and did not plainly err in accepting his plea. See United States v. Moody, 2 F.4th 180, 197-98 (4th Cir. 2021) (explaining government is not required to prove defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing firearm to convict under § 922(g)).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a felon to know that possessing a firearm violates federal law.

Robinson v. United States · filed 2022-09-27(g)(1)

In Rehaif, the Supreme Court did not hold that a violation of Section 922(g)—whether knowing or unknowing—requires that the defendant be aware that his possession was in violation of federal law.

Section 922(g) does not require a defendant to know that the law prohibits firearm possession.

Harvell v. USA - 2255 · filed 2023-09-18(g)

Lastly, Harvell argues that his conviction should be vacated because he was “unaware of § 922(g),” and that certain categories of people could violate § 922(g) by possessing a firearm. ... But it is well-established that “ignorance of the law . . . is no defense to criminal prosecution.” ... Harvell’s motion is denied on this ground as well.

Section 922(n), prosecuted under § 924(a)(1)(D), requires proof that a person under felony indictment received ammunition knowing that doing so was unlawful.

United States v. Trevino · filed 2026-05-21(n)

Separately, to prove the violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n), the government needed to prove that while under felony indictment, Trevino “willfully” received ammunition on or about July 22, 2022, and on or about August 12, 2022. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D). Each ammunition count required proof that when Trevino purchased the ammunition, he knew it was unlawful to do so.

Section 922(a)(5) requires proof that the transferor knew the firearm transfer was unlawful, but does not require knowledge of the federal licensing scheme.

United States v. Tyson · filed 2011-08-03(a)(5)

In the context of § 922(a)(5), it was therefore incumbent upon the government to show, not that Tyson knew that he was subject to a particular federal licensing scheme, but that he knew it was unlawful for him to transfer firearms to a resident of the Virgin Islands.

Section 922(e) requires a willful violation for criminal liability.

United States v. Brummer · filed 2010-03-08(e)

Willfulness is therefore an element of the offense under § 922(e).

A willful violation of Section 922(n) requires knowledge that receiving the firearm is unlawful, but not knowledge that the prohibition arises from a felony indictment.

United States v. Lipp · filed 2013-04-16(n)

The instruction was offered by Lipp, and we conclude it properly focused on the need for evidence that indicated Lipp knew his receipt of the firearm was unlawful – regardless of the exact elements of the offense. In other words, the Government need not prove that Lipp knew the specific reason his receipt was unlawful was because he was under indictment for a felony.

Section 922(a)(3) requires proof that the defendant knew transporting firearms into his state of residence was unlawful, but does not require knowledge of the specific law.

United States v. Hernandez · filed 2017-06-15(a)(3)

In this case, the government was required to show that Hernandez knew his transportation of firearms into California was somehow unlawful, even if he did not know of the specific legal duty, or the particular law, that made it unlawful.

Section 922(o) requires proof that a defendant knew the firearm had the characteristics of a machinegun.

United States v. Pina-Nieves · filed 2023-01-30(o)

To convict Pina-Nieves of the § 922(o) charge, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) he knowingly possessed a machinegun on or about April 1, 2020; and (2) he had knowledge that the firearm had the characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition of a machinegun under § 922(o) (though not that he knew that those characteristics made the weapon a machinegun).

Section 922(o) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a machine gun and knew the firearm's essential characteristics that made it a machine gun.

United States v. De La Paz-Rentas · filed 2010-07-20(o)

In fact, the jury was instructed as to the statutory definition and told that to convict under section 922(o), it had to find that the government proved that Torres "knowingly possessed a machine gun" and "knew or was aware of the essential characteristics of the firearm which made it a machine gun," which is an accurate rendition of the elements.

Knowledge of possessing a machine gun under § 922(o) may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Anderson · filed 2010-03-12(o)

From the totality of the evidence presented by the government, the jury could reasonably infer that Anderson knew he possessed a machine gun.

Section 922(o) prohibits machine gun possession unless it falls within an exception for government authority or lawful possession predating the subsection.

State v. Carter · filed 2011-04-27(o)

18 U.S.C. § 922( o )(1) makes it unlawful for "any person" to possess a machine gun, and Carter failed to produce any evidence suggesting that he was exempt from that prohibition under 18 U.S.C. 922( o )(2).

Section 922(o) prohibits an individual from possessing a machine gun through a trust, and its machine gun ban survives a facial Second Amendment challenge.

United States v. One (1) Palmetto State Armory PA-15 MacHinegun Receiver/Frame · filed 2016-05-18(o)

Because we agree that the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of machine guns, and because trustees, and by extension trusts, are not exempt from § 922(o), we affirm.

Section 922(o) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew the firearm was fully automatic.

United States v. Wolf · filed 2017-05-24(o)

The government had the burden to demonstrate that Wolf knew the firearm was fully automatic and had a shortened barrel.

Section 922(o) requires proof that the defendant possessed or transferred a machinegun and knew it was a machinegun.

United States v. Williams · filed 2019-08-08(o)

Here, then, for the counts of unlawful possession or transfer of a machinegun, the government needed to prove that Williams (1) possessed or transferred an auto sear and (2) was aware that the auto sears constituted machineguns.

Section 922(o) requires proof that the defendant possessed a machinegun and knew of its automatic shooting capacity.

Munoz-Rivera v. United States · filed 2019-09-30(o)

To obtain a conviction for possession of a machinegun in violation of Section 922(o), the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) possessed a machinegun;3 and (2) had knowledge of the automatic shooting capacity.

Section 922(o) requires proof that the defendant possessed a machinegun and knew the weapon had the characteristics of a machinegun.

United States v. Torres-Perez · filed 2021-12-30(o)

“To establish a violation of § 922(o), ‘the government must prove that 1) the defendant possessed or transferred a machinegun 2) with knowledge that the weapon had the characteristics to bring it within the statutory definition of a machinegun.’”

Section 922(o) prohibits private possession or transfer of machineguns unless lawfully possessed before its effective date and does not permit an amnesty period for an unregistered drop-in auto sear.

Roe v. Lombardo · filed 2022-01-12(o)

However, courts have held that there is no authority to provide amnesty for machineguns because the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o),6 where Congress intended to make it illegal for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun, was to limit transactions in post-1986 machineguns. ... Considering the extensive judicial authority and clear Congressional intent saying so, the Court agrees Defendants do not have the authority to provide an amnesty period for Plaintiff’s DIAS.

Knowledge that a firearm can become a fully automatic machine gun is material to a § 922(o)(1) possession charge.

United States v. Marques Armstrong, Jr. · filed 2024-05-02(o)(1)

Two material issues were Armstrong’s knowledge that he possessed a firearm and that it could become a fully automatic machine gun. ... His rap that his Glock was upgraded with a switch, accompanied by the sounds of automatic gunfire, and him showing a firearm with an extended magazine were relevant and directly probative of this knowledge.

Section 922(o) requires proof that the defendant knew the weapon had the characteristics of a machinegun; circumstantial evidence can establish that knowledge.

United States v. Matta-Quinones · filed 2025-06-09(o)

We acknowledge this may be a close call, but viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.

Section 922(o) requires proof that the defendant knew the weapon’s characteristics made it a machinegun; an indictment alleging knowing possession of a machinegun sufficiently charges that knowledge.

United States v. Opdahl · filed 2026-03-27(o)

But here, the indictment as a whole sufficiently alleged that Opdahl knew of the prohibited characteristics of the firearms—a machinegun and a silencer—as required by Staples.

Section 922(o) requires proof that a defendant knowingly possessed a machinegun or machinegun conversion device and knew what it was.

Jones · filed 2026-05-11(o)

Count Three charged Mr. Jones with possessing the same three machineguns and the same machinegun conversion device, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). (Jones doc. 7 at 3). The elements of that offense are (1) knowing possession (2) of a machinegun or machinegun conversion device (3) that the defendant knew was a machinegun or machinegun conversion device.

Section 922(g)(1)'s regulation of firearm possession by felons does not violate the Tenth Amendment because it falls within Congress’s commerce power.

United States v. Parker · filed 2010-03-17(g)(1)

We also reject Parker’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Tenth Amendment. We previously have held that Congress’s regulation of firearm possession by felons is allowed under the commerce clause, and therefore, does not violate the Tenth Amendment.

Section 922(g)(1) permissibly regulates felons’ possession of firearms under the Commerce Clause without violating the Tenth Amendment.

United States v. Duckett · filed 2010-12-16(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) permissibly regulates felons' possession of firearms by virtue of the commerce clause without violating the Tenth Amendment.

Section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Tenth Amendment because Congress enacted it under its commerce power.

United States v. Ernst · filed 2012-03-09(g)(1)

Therefore, because Congress acted under one of its enumerated powers in enacting § 922(g)(1), the statute does not unconstitutionally usurp the States’ police powers.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons is not facially unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment.

United States v. Kenny Thrower · filed 2013-07-31(g)(1)

As Thrower concedes on appeal, his argument that § 922(g) is facially unconstitutional because it violates the Tenth Amendment is foreclosed by our precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands an as-applied Tenth Amendment challenge when the firearm and ammunition were manufactured outside the state, establishing a sufficient connection to interstate commerce.

United States v. Flores · filed 2014-04-02(g)(1)

Nor is the statute unconstitutional as applied in these exact circumstances. Flores’s factual proffer establishes that the firearm and ammunition in this case were manufactured outside the state of Florida, and that creates a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to overcome Flores’s Tenth Amendment challenge under our precedent.

Section 922(g) does not bar a court from ordering the transfer of a felon’s lawfully owned firearms for the felon’s benefit to someone who may legally possess them.

United States v. Brown · filed 2010-04-09(g)

Senior Judge Longstaff’s pragmatic solution to this problem is the appropriate one: the court, exercising equitable powers, may order the transfer of title to firearms lawfully owned by a person later convicted of a felony (which are not subject to forfeiture or confiscation as contraband) for the felon-owner’s benefit.

Section 922(g) bars a court from giving a convicted felon actual or constructive possession of firearms, even when the felon voluntarily surrendered them to the government.

United States v. Henderson · filed 2014-01-28(g)

The fact that the government acquired Mr. Henderson’s firearms because of a voluntary surrender pursuant to a judge’s concern for his safety does not alleviate the concern that by granting Mr. Henderson actual or constructive possession of a firearm, a court would violate § 922(g).

Section 922(g) permits a court to transfer a felon’s firearms from government custody to a third party if the felon will not retain control over them.

Henderson v. United States · filed 2015-05-18(g)

We hold that §922(g) does not bar such a transfer unless it would allow the felon to later control the guns, so that he could either use them or direct their use.

Section 922(g) permits a felon’s firearms to be transferred only if the felon cannot later possess or control them.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2020-04-10(g)

We hold that the district court did not err in (1) allowing the government to retain property that could be used as evidence, if a new trial were required after appeal; (2) finding that the government returned a Rolex watch and twenty-one firearms to Johnson when the government transferred those items to Johnson’s then-retained attorney; (3) finding that Johnson’s mother-in-law was not an appropriate transferee to receive Johnson’s remaining fifteen firearms, in light of the evidence suggesting that Johnson would attempt to exert influence over her to obtain possession or control of the firearms; (4) and ordering the government to transfer those firearms to a licensed dealer to be sold if Johnson’s convictions were not reversed on appeal.

Section 922(g) permits a felon to transfer firearms to a suitable third party only if the felon will not retain control over them.

State v. Cultrona · filed 2023-10-11(g)

However, this disability does not divest him of the right to seek transfer of the guns to a suitable third party. ... Based on the foregoing, we find that Appellant’s motion, seeking to transfer ownership of the firearm property to his son, fails the test set forth in Henderson and the ... trial court’s decision denying the motion was appropriate.

Section 922(g)(4) treats an admission under New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 as a disqualifying commitment to a mental institution.

Susman v. Sullivan, M.D. · filed 2025-02-21(g)(4)

So under the plain language of section 922(g)(4) and its implementing regulations, a section 9.39 admission is disqualifying under federal law.

Section 922 treats an emergency admission under New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 as an involuntary commitment that triggers federal firearm restrictions.

Matter of Colihan v. State of New York · filed 2022-12-29(d)(4), (g)(4)

Under federal law, individuals who have been committed to a mental institution are prohibited from purchasing or possessing any firearm (see 18 USC § 922 [d] [4]; [g] [4]; see also 18 USC § 921 [a] [3]). ... We reject any claim that petitioner's Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 admission was not an involuntary commitment within the meaning of federal law.

Section 922(g)(4) bars firearm possession by a person admitted to a mental institution under New York’s emergency admission procedure, which constitutes an involuntary commitment.

Escamilla v. United States · filed 2022-07-08(g)(4)

In light of these authorities, the Court concludes that an admission under § 9.39 constitutes a “commitment” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) and 27 C.F.R. § 478.11.

Section 922(g)(4) does not bar firearm possession based on a brief emergency mental health examination conducted without an adversarial proceeding or a judicial or quasi-judicial decision-maker.

Franklin v. Sessions · filed 2017-12-21(g)(4)

However, the Court is persuaded that, by its own terms, Section 922(g)(4) does not restrict Mr. Franklin's ability to possess firearms based on a brief emergency mental health examination pursuant to Section 302 of the MPHA that was justified by only the ex parte decisions of a police officer, an unspecified official in the county administrator's office, and a single physician.

Section 922(a)(6) does not support a false-statement conviction for denying a prior commitment when a retroactively applicable ruling establishes that the prior emergency psychiatric admission was not a commitment.

United States v. Spring · filed 2012-08-09(a)(6)

The same principle should apply to Mr. Spring and he should not stand convicted of saying he was not committed when, under Rehlander, he has not. Based on Schriro and Rehlander, the Court applies Rehlander’s change to the definition of “commitment” to Mr. Spring’s case and grants the Defendant’s third motion for acquittal.

Section 922(g)(4) does not treat temporary emergency hospitalization under Maine's ex parte procedures as a commitment that bars firearm possession.

United States v. Rehlander · filed 2012-01-13(g)(4)

The constitutional doubts raised by such a regime are sufficient that we now conclude that section 922 should not be read to encompass a temporary hospitalization attended only by the ex parte procedures of section 3863.

Section 922(g)(4) treats an involuntary hospital stay for mental health evaluation and treatment in a criminal case as a disqualifying commitment, even when it occurs outside civil commitment procedures.

Little v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2011-08-10(g)(4)

For all these reasons, the facts here establish Little was “committed to a mental health institution” as that term is used in Section 922(g)(4) of the Federal Act.

Section 922(g)(4) does not bar firearm possession based on Furda’s emergency mental health evaluation, which the court concluded was not a commitment.

Furda v. State · filed 2010-07-06(g)(4)

Appellant argues that, under federal law, a commitment may only occur after "a hearing or 'formal' proceeding by some 'lawful authority,' ” and does not include emergency evaluations. We need not belabor these contentions, as they are the subject of the companion appeal. It is sufficient to say here that we agree with Furda that the court erred in concluding that he had been committed.

Section 922(g)(4) does not treat a brief emergency mental health evaluation as a commitment when the patient lacks an evidentiary hearing, the right to appear and to counsel, and findings based on medical evidence.

FURDA v. State · filed 2010-07-02(g)(4)

In the absence of such minimal safeguards, the term does not extend to a brief hospitalization for purposes of an emergency mental health evaluation. Therefore, in this case, Furda’s hospitalization was not a commitment under federal law.

Section 922(g)(4) covers an emergency involuntary hospitalization under Maine law even when continued hospitalization is later found unnecessary.

United States v. Rehlander · filed 2010-04-28(g)(4)

For the same reasons set forth in Murphy, the Court finds that section 922(g)(4) adequately put Mr. Rehlander on notice that “commitment to a mental institution” would include his emergency hospitalization under Maine law and the law violates neither the Fifth nor Second Amendments.

Section 922(g)(4) prohibits firearm possession by a person adjudicated mentally defective or committed to a mental institution; a voluntary hospital admission does not count as a commitment.

In re the License to Carry a Pistol Issued to McKay · filed 2016-06-07(g)(4)

The court concludes that based upon the proof presented McKay’s time in the hospital was not a commitment within the meaning of 18 USC § 922 (g) (4). Further, she had not been adjudicated a mental incompetent. Therefore, she does not fall under the prohibition of 18 USC § 922 (g) (4) from obtaining or possessing firearms or ammunition.

Section 922(g)(4) prohibits a person who was involuntarily committed to a mental institution from receiving a firearm, even if the person initially consented to treatment.

Gorry v. PA State Police · filed 2016-07-15(g)(4)

As such, we conclude that these documents represent substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that Applicant is prohibited from purchasing a firearm pursuant to Section 6105(c)(4) of UFA and Section 922(g)(4) of GCA.

Sections 922(d)(4) and (g)(4) treat an involuntary hospitalization under New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 as a commitment to a mental institution.

Phelps v. Bosco · filed 2018-02-14(d)(4), (g)(4)

And, as in Waters, Phelps’s 2005 admission was based on the recommendation of at least two physicians, at least one of whom was a psychiatrist, and included treatment during the course of his stay. See Waters, 23 F.3d at 32; Phelps, 2017 WL 437407 at *27-28. That is exactly the sort of determination that a federal statute should include in its definition of “commitment” insofar as it is concerned with preventing firearms from getting into the hands of those whose mental illness might lead them to commit acts of violence.

Section 922(g)(4) does not treat an emergency psychiatric admission as a commitment when there was no adjudicatory finding that the person posed a danger to himself or others.

Hardy v. Chester Arms, LLC · filed 2024-01-30(g)(4)

Absent a finding that MacPherson posed a danger to himself or others following a contested, adjudicatory hearing — such as a probable cause hearing under RSA 135-C:31 — we cannot conclude that the 2007 events qualify as a commitment to a mental institution under 27 C.F.R. § 478.11.

An observation stay or voluntary admission does not itself establish a mental-institution commitment under § 922(g)(4); an alleged lack of formal commitment can support a claim against a firearm denial.

Mach v. Garland · filed 2025-01-10(g)(4)

Taken together, this suggests that one could be informally committed, in a mental institution for observation, and voluntarily admitted to a mental institution and still not be “committed to a mental institution” as contemplated by § 922(g)(4).

Section 922(g)(1) treats a conspiracy conviction as a predicate felony when the conspiracy and its target offenses fall outside the business practices exception.

United States v. Coleman · filed 2010-06-16(g)(1)

We hold that in evaluating whether a § 371 conspiracy conviction falls within the business practices exception, courts must evaluate the elements of § 371 and the target offenses of the conspiracy. Here, the conspiracy conviction for the target offenses of § 605(e)(4) and § 506(A) does not fall within the business practices exception. Coleman’s prior conspiracy conviction is therefore a predicate offense for purposes of § 922(g)(1), and we affirm the conviction.

Section 922(d)(1) and (g)(1) do not apply when the predicate convictions fall within the business practices exception to the definition of a qualifying crime.

Reyes v. Sessions · filed 2018-09-28(d)(1), (g)(1)

Because the Court concludes that § 922(d)(1) and (g)(1) are not applicable to Reyes, the Court will not consider the constitutional challenges he raises in the alternative.

Section 922(g)(1)'s firearm prohibition covers bookmaking and pool selling convictions because those offenses fall outside the business practice exemption in § 921(a)(20)(A).

Pitsilides v. Barr · filed 2021-11-19(g)(1)

If a defendant’s conviction falls within this exemption, he is not subject to §922(g)(1)’s firearm prohibition as a matter of law. ... Thus, it does not appear to this court that Pitsilides’s bookmaking and pool selling convictions fall within §921(a)(20)(A)’s exemption.

Section 922(g)(1) and (d)(1) do not apply when the predicate convictions fall within the business practices exception to the definition of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

Cuti v. Barr · filed 2022-09-29(g)(1), (d)(1)

They are therefore excluded from the definition of “crime[s] punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” under the business practices exception, id., and do not trigger the application of the § 922(g)(1) and (d)(1) prohibitions.

Section 922(g) does not treat an airgun silencer as a firearm merely because it could be adapted to muffle a firearm and the defendant knows that; a device not designed for firearm use requires a firearm silencing purpose.

United States v. Crooker · filed 2010-06-18(g)

We conclude, however, that the statute by its terms requires something more than a potential for adaptation and knowledge of it. The statute does not refer either to capability or adaptation; it speaks of a device "for" silencing or muffling. The ordinary connotation of the word is one of purpose.

Section 922(m) covers falsification of required records concerning firearm silencers.

United States v. Goff · filed 1987-12-31(m)

Consequently, the court’s conclusions related to probable cause and particularity apply to the silencers, because the silencers could be included in the description of “700 firearms,” and falsification of records concerning them would be a violation of § 922(m).

Section 922(g)(1)'s ban on firearm possession by convicted felons is a generally applicable, nonpunitive rule and is not a bill of attainder.

Freeze v. Obama · filed 2011-06-15(g)(1)

The challenged provision does not constitute a bill of attainder because it "set[ s] forth a rule generally applicable to all persons possessing a certain characteristic, i. e., having been [convicted] [of] a felony. [It] [is] reasonably calculated to achieve a nonpunitive public purpose, i.e., to keep firearms out of the hands of persons who ... may 'have a somewhat greater likelihood than other citizens to misuse firearms.'"

Section 922(j) does not require a prior felony conviction for possession of a stolen firearm.

Burkes v. Dobbs · filed 2022-06-22(j)

Furthermore, Carachuri would not have changed the law in the Eleventh Circuit regarding § 922(j) offenses as the elements of a possession of a stolen firearm pursuant to § 922(j) do not include a predicate prior felony offense.