18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g) permits credible witness testimony to establish possession of a firearm and ammunition when the predicate convictions and interstate-commerce connection are undisputed.

United States v. Glenn · filed 2010-11-26(g)(1), (g)(9)

As to the sufficiency of the evidence, we conclude that the witness testimony that the court found credible supported a finding that Glenn possessed a firearm and ammunition; and Glenn does not dispute that he suffered the predicate convictions or that the firearm and ammunition traveled in interstate commerce.

A § 922(d)(1) conviction can rest on corroborated testimony that the defendant sold a firearm to someone he knew was a felon, even when the witness cannot recall the sale’s exact date.

United States v. Porter · filed 2010-12-03(d)(1)

Here, conviction on both counts turns on the single issue of whether Defendant sold the Hi-Point. ... The date of sale was a point of conflict in the government’s central theory that Defendant sold Ballard the gun, which the jury was entitled to resolve in the government’s favor by concluding that Ballard bought the Hi-Point from Defendant at some point after Defendant already had possession of it.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing ammunition that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Stewart · filed 2011-01-21(g)(1)

We conclude there was ample evidence showing that Stewart was an active participant in the robbery, that he aided and abetted the use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and that he was a felon in unlawful possession of ammunition.

Section 922(g)'s possession element can be proved by evidence sufficient for a jury to find that the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. Richardson · filed 2011-02-01(g)

Reviewing the record on appeal with those principles in mind, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to establish that Richardson possessed the gun at issue.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element is supported by evidence that the defendant knew of and exercised dominion and control over firearms in a vehicle.

United States v. Kennedy · filed 2011-03-16(g)(1)

We therefore conclude, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, that a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Kennedy had both knowledge as well as dominion and control over the drugs and firearms found in the vehicle.

An officer’s eyewitness testimony that a convicted felon possessed a firearm can suffice to prove knowing possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Barham · filed 2011-03-21(g)(1)

The testimony of Officer Forbes alone is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Barham knowingly possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits felons from possessing firearms, and a defendant’s admission of possession can support a conviction.

United States v. Brown · filed 2011-04-14(g)(1)

After a trial, Alonzo Neil Brown was convicted of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), (e)(1) (2006). ... We conclude there was more than sufficient evidence to support Brown’s conviction. In fact, at trial, Brown admitted possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)'s possession element can be supported by evidence that a gun was concealed in a car the defendant used for drug dealing.

United States v. Goncalves · filed 2011-04-29(g)

Nor was there any difficulty in the jury's inference that the gun under the hood belonged to Goncalves and was kept in aid of his drug dealing.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession element can be proved by an officer’s testimony that the defendant held a gun.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2011-05-03(g)(1)

Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we hold that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson possessed a gun.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon’s possession of a firearm to be proved by circumstantial evidence that he hid the gun.

United States v. Phillips · filed 2011-05-17(g)(1)

This is a sufficient basis upon which the jury could have reasonably concluded that Phillips, a convicted felon, had secreted the gun in the wall.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from knowingly possessing a firearm, and testimony that the defendant moved and arranged storage of firearms can support a conviction.

United States v. Williams · filed 2011-06-22(g)(1)

In short, there was ample evidence upon which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly possessed the two firearms, in violation of § 922(g).

An officer's observations of a defendant carrying a firearm, together with the defendant's admission that he possessed it, can support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Brooks · filed 2011-07-14(g)(1)

In this case, Officer Schwerb saw Brooks carrying what he suspected was a firearm. Officer Schwerb later confirmed this suspicion when he saw the firearm in the crawl space. Additionally, Brooks admitted he possessed the firearm when he told the officers that he found the gun in his basement and was on his way to the dumpster to dispose of it. Affording all reasonable inferences to the verdict, there is more than sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence linking the defendant to a firearm.

United States v. May · filed 2011-08-29(g)(1)

In any event, viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Svec saw May drop the firearm.

Section 922(g) permits a finding of firearm possession when the defendant’s fingerprints are on a gun magazine and the gun is found in the car he was driving.

United States v. Williams · filed 2011-09-13(g)

The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that: Williams possessed the firearm (his fingerprints were on the gun magazine;2 it was in the car he was driving); Williams possessed the crack cocaine with an intent to distribute (the car had a narcotics odor; the drugs were in the same compartment as the firearm; there were 180 small bags containing over 150 grams of cocaine; he had $1,100 and six cellular phones in the car); and that the gun was used in connection with the firearms offense (the gun and the drugs were found in the same hidden compartment).

Circumstantial evidence can support a felon-in-possession conviction, including evidence of possession and that the firearm traveled across state lines.

United States v. Toler · filed 2011-09-20(g)(1)

We find that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict on every count. Although much of the evidence was circumstantial—e.g., the proximity of the drugs and gun to Toler‘s personal documents, suggesting they all belonged to him; ... such evidence is enough to overcome a sufficiency challenge. See id. at 156. Moreover, the circumstantial evidence offered by the Government‘s experts was both admissible and adequate to support the intended inferences—i.e., that the evidence found in Toler‘s possession was consistent with what one would expect to find in the apartment of a drug distributor, and that the gun was a real Smith & Wesson that traveled across state lines.

A properly admitted gun found in a defendant’s car can support a felon-in-possession conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Hagins · filed 2011-11-18(g)(1)

Hagins also asserts the evidence was insufficient to sustain the felon-in-possession conviction stemming from his December 2004 arrest. Given that the gun found in Hagins’ car was properly admitted and not subject to suppression, see supra, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Hagins’ conviction on Count Seven.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction can rest on testimony supporting firearm possession and stipulations establishing felony status and an interstate-commerce connection.

United States v. Stanback · filed 2011-12-07(g)(1)

The testimony of these witnesses also supports the conviction for felony possession, when combined with the parties’ stipulations ... that Stanback was a convicted felon at the time of the robbery and that the pertinent firearms were involved in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by evidence that the defendant had bodily contact with the firearm.

United States v. Antwain Devon Council · filed 2012-01-24(g)(1)

From this evidence, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have concluded that Council possessed the firearm the officers seized, thereby satisfying the possession element of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be supported by an admission that the defendant discarded a gun near where officers later found him and a gun.

United States v. Smoot · filed 2012-02-22(g)(1)

Here the jury could reasonably infer that Smoot possessed the Ruger based on his admission to tossing away a gun near the senior citizen center—the very place where the officers found him hiding and where shortly afterward they found a gun.

Section 922(g)(1) supports a felon-in-possession conviction when a person with a qualifying prior conviction possesses a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Harriman · filed 2012-11-09(g)(1)

Although Harriman had made arrangements with his brother to pick up the rifle and store it until Harriman’s son was old enough to receive it as a gift, Harriman’s brother had at some point brought it to Harriman’s residence and left it there at Harriman’s request. The following month, after asking a friend to help him acquire a handgun, Harriman purchased a Glock .40-caliber pistol from an undercover law enforcement officer on October 25, 2009. The parties stipulated that, during the relevant time, Harriman had been convicted of felony crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year, and that both firearms had been transported in interstate commerce. This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to convict Harriman of both felon-in-possession counts.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing a firearm in or affecting commerce; possession may be actual or constructive.

United States v. McKoy · filed 2012-11-20(g)(1)

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a rational finder of fact to conclude that McKoy possessed the firearm.

A felon-in-possession conviction under § 922(g) can be supported by proof of felony status, handgun possession, and the firearm’s interstate movement.

United States v. Gerard · filed 2012-12-19(g)

Gerard stipulated that he was a convicted felon, that there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a pending information charging him with felony robbery, and that there were no firearm manufacturers in the Virgin Islands, so the weapon necessarily travelled in interstate commerce. Considering these stipulations and the testimony indicating that Gerard murdered the victim with a handgun, there was sufficient evidence to convict him of the three firearms charges.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is satisfied when the evidence permits a rational jury to find possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Faulkner · filed 2013-02-06(g)(1)

Viewing the controverted testimony about Faulkner’s confession, in combination with the other circumstantial evidence described above, in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that the possession element was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm with an interstate nexus; testimony and the defendant’s stipulation can establish those facts.

United States v. Harris · filed 2013-03-28(g)(1)

We conclude that the Government produced sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Defendant stipulated that he had been convicted of a felony. Uncontradicted testimony of ATF Special Agent Todd Willard established an interstate nexus. Lastly, two witnesses testified that the Defendant possessed a firearm at the time he shot Bush.

Circumstantial evidence linking a defendant to ammunition can support a § 922(g)(1) conviction.

United States v. Kenneth H. Burke, Jr. · filed 2013-06-04(g)(1)

Burke also challenges his § 924(c)(1)(A) firearm conviction and § 922(g)(1) ammunition conviction on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to link him to the discharged firearm and ammunition. ... Our review leads us to conclude there was ample evidence to support a finding that Burke participated in an attempted robbery and to link Burke to the discharged firearm and ammunition.

A conviction under Section 922(g)(1) survives a sufficiency challenge when the evidence permits a rational jury to find every element beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Johnny Winters, Jr. · filed 2013-06-20(g)(1)

The elements of a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) violation include finding “beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant previously had been convicted of a felony; (2) that he possessed a firearm; and (3) that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.” United States v. Guidry, 406 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2005). ... Because we already decided that the evidence, apart from the disputed photographs, was overwhelming, we incorporate that analysis and conclude that “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); accord United States v. Vargas-Ocampo, 711 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved by eyewitness and circumstantial evidence sufficient for a rational jury to find possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Stafford · filed 2013-06-11(g)(1)

To convict a defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a jury must find that the defendant “had a previous felony conviction, that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm specified in the indictment, and that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.” ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a rational trier of fact could find Stafford guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Stafford’s conviction is affirmed.

A jury may find possession under § 922(g)(1) from evidence identifying the defendant as the person carrying the firearm.

United States v. Jones · filed 2013-07-18(g)(1)

Since the evidence was sufficient to allow a conviction of the defendants on the robbery and conspiracy counts, the jury reasonably could have determined that, as between Cole and Jones, Cole had to be the gunman as he was stockier and generally fit the description of the bank robber who was using the gun.

Section 922(g)(1)’s firearm possession element can be proved by evidence that the defendant held the gun and moved it within a vehicle.

United States v. King · filed 2013-08-05(g)(1)

Anthony Demps King, Jr., appeals his conviction for knowingly possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... The totality of the evidence the government produced at trial (which we have summarized above), viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was more than sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

Evidence that each defendant possessed the firearm was sufficient to sustain their § 922(g) convictions.

United States v. Bowdery · filed 2013-09-27(g)

The issue, then, is whether the government proved that Harper and Bowdery each possessed the firearm. The jury had sufficient basis to conclude that each of them did.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a convicted felon possessed a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce; a confession can support the possession element.

United States v. Edmond · filed 2014-03-19(g)(1)

On the § 922(g)(1) count, the parties stipulated that Edmond already was a convicted felon before the apartment search and that the guns had traveled in interstate commerce. Only the element of possession was at issue, see United States v. Morris, 349 F.3d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir.2003), and the jurors chose to believe the police officer’s testimony that Edmond had confessed to possessing the guns. We would not second-guess the jury’s assessment.

A felon-in-possession-of-ammunition conviction under § 922(g)(1) can be supported by testimony and spent shell casings even when the firearm is not recovered.

United States v. Weaver · filed 2014-03-21(g)(1)

Given the parties’ stipulations that Weaver had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and that the ammunition or shell casings found at the scene had been transported across a state line, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Weaver guilty of being a felon in possession of ammunition.

Evidence of voluntary firearm possession, a felony conviction, and the firearm’s interstate movement can support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Johnson · filed 2014-03-26(g)(1)

We further hold that the evidence was sufficient to convict him on Count Seven, because the evidence established that Johnson voluntarily possessed a firearm. Further, a stipulation was entered at trial stating that Johnson was a convicted felon and that all the firearms and ammunition involved in the case had been shipped or transported in interstate commerce.

Possession under § 922(g)(5)(A) can be supported by a firearm found in the defendant’s bedroom with his identifying documents and by his confession.

United States v. Fuentes-Enamorado · filed 2014-05-19(g)(5)(A)

The record does not indicate that any error occurred, much less plain error or a miscarriage of justice. Rather, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the record amply supports the jury’s verdict. ... The detectives found the firearm under a pillow on the bed in Fuentes-Enamorado’s bedroom, where the detective also uncovered identifying documents, including Fuentes-Enamorado’s driver’s license and immigration documents. According to a detective, Fuentes-Enamorado also gave a detailed confession to possession of the firearm when he returned to find government authorities at his home.

Section 922(g) requires proof that a felon knowingly possessed a firearm; admissions linking the defendant to a gun can support the jury’s finding of possession.

United States v. Pate · filed 2014-06-06(g)

Having charged Pate with being a felon in possession of a firearm, the government had to prove, among other elements, “that he knowingly possessed a firearm.” ... But these recordings support the imminently reasonable inference that the gun he owned and wanted out of the residence was the same gun found by police shortly after his arrest, and we accept any reasonable inference that supports the jury’s verdict. See, e.g., Causevic, 636 F.3d at 1005. Pate fails to clear the high bar required for us to reverse the conviction.

An officer’s testimony that a defendant discarded a firearm and admitted possessing it can provide substantial evidence of possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Morris · filed 2014-06-11(g)(1)

Officer Spada testified that he saw Morris discard the firearm, and that Morris admitted to possessing the firearm. These facts constituted substantial evidence that Morris possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) supports a felon-in-possession conviction when evidence shows prior felony convictions and that the firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was seized.

United States v. Speed · filed 2014-12-22(g)(1)

We first conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, and resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the government, was sufficient to support the guilty verdict. ... The government adduced evidence that Speed had prior felony convictions, and that a firearm seized during a search of his residence on July 11, 2013, was manufactured outside Missouri.

Section 922(g)(1) supports a felon-in-possession conviction when evidence establishes a prior felony and possession of a firearm.

United States v. Smith · filed 2015-08-21(g)(1)

These facts provide a basis for convicting Smith of being a felon in possession and of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction is supported by evidence identifying a convicted felon as possessing a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Mabine · filed 2015-10-26(g)(1)

Considering all of the evidence admitted at trial, we conclude that the Government presented sufficient evidence to support Mabine’s convictions. The witness identified Mabine—both during the show-up and in court—as the man who entered the store, pointed a firearm at her, demanded the money in her register, and took $429. Mabine, who stipulated that he was a convicted felon and that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce, was discovered within 30 minutes of the crime in a dumpster behind the store, with discarded clothing and a firearm that matched the witness’ description, as well as four $100 bills.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when evidence sufficiently connects the defendant to firearms kept in a storage unit.

United States v. Smith · filed 2015-11-03(g)(1)

Surveillance video at the facility showed Smith filling out rental paperwork, paying for the unit, and placing items inside it. The unit itself contained a box with a shipping label containing Smith’s name and address, in addition to the guns and ammunition. This evidence was more than sufficient to support Smith’s conviction on the weapons charge.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a convicted felon knowingly possessed a firearm that was in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Mariano · filed 2016-01-25(g)(1)

To obtain a conviction for felon in possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1), “the government must prove . . . three elements: (1) that the defendant was a convicted felon, (2) that the defendant was in knowing possession of a firearm, and (3) that the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce.” ... Taking such evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Mariano knowingly possessed a firearm. Therefore, we uphold Mariano’s conviction.

An admission to loading a gun, corroborated by DNA on the ammunition inside it, is sufficient to sustain a § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession conviction.

United States v. Seals · filed 2016-02-23(g)(1)

Seals himself had admitted to loading the gun for his brother, and his DNA was discovered on the ammunition inside the gun recovered from the crime scene. That alone is sufficient to sustain his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(q)(2)(A)’s firearm-possession element can be proved through witness testimony and circumstantial evidence even when no weapon is recovered.

United States v. Flanders · filed 2016-03-28(q)(2)(A)

Harper further argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for possessing a firearm because no weapon was ever recovered and no test for gunpowder residue was performed. ... The same witness who placed Harper at the crime scene further testified that she saw a firearm in Harper’s ... pocket as he exited her car. Taken together, this evidence is a sufficient basis from which a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Surveillance video showing the defendant with a firearm can establish possession under § 922(g)(1) beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Spight · filed 2016-04-04(g)(1)

Moreover, the video footage leaves no reasonable doubt that Spight possessed the firearm and is thus sufficient to establish Spight's guilt.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction can be upheld when eyewitness testimony and factual stipulations provide substantial evidence of guilt.

United States v. Garrett · filed 2016-04-15(g)(1)

We have reviewed the trial transcript and conclude that the Government’s evidence, which included the testimony of multiple eyewitnesses, coupled with the parties’ factual stipulations, more than supported the jury’s guilty verdicts. See United States v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 271 (4th Cir.) (stating elements of § 922(g) offense), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 167 (2015); see also United States v. Jamison, 635 F.3d 962, 967-68 (7th Cir. 2011) (reciting elements of § 5861(d) offense).

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when sufficient evidence shows that a convicted felon knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Harris · filed 2016-06-17(g)(1)

As with count 1, there was more than sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction on count 3.

A felon-in-possession conviction under § 922(g)(1) stands when the evidence permits a rational jury to find the offense’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Mays · filed 2017-02-10(g)(1)

Under this standard, Mays challenges his conviction for aiding and abetting bank robbery, while Williams challenges his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The evidence supports both convictions, and therefore, these claims fail.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when evidence supports the defendant’s constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. McDuffie · filed 2017-05-19(g)(1)

The second argument fails because there was sufficient evidence supporting Mr. McDuffie’s convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

A felon’s admission to possessing a firearm, corroborated by circumstantial evidence, can support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Davis · filed 2017-10-27(g)(1)

Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient extrinsic evidence to substantiate Mr. Davis’ admission, and we affirm his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a person with a qualifying prior conviction knowingly possessed ammunition that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Moore · filed 2017-11-03(g)(1)

We conclude that when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to support Moore’s conviction. It was for the jury to determine which version of Walker’s description of the relevant events represented the truth.

A firearm and ammunition found in a felon’s residence, where he lives alone, can provide sufficient evidence of possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Mirabal · filed 2017-11-29(g)(1)

The third count involved possession of a firearm and ammunition. Here the Government presented evidence that officers had found a firearm and ammunition in Mr. Mirabal’s residence, where he lived alone. This evidence sufficed for guilt on the third count.

A felon-in-possession conviction may rest on an admission that the defendant owned the gun when other evidence sufficiently corroborates the admission.

United States v. Davis · filed 2018-03-14(g)(1)

We acknowledge that Mr. Davis’ confession that he owned the handgun, standing alone, is insufficient to convict him. ... Here, under this standard of review, we conclude there was sufficient corroborating extrinsic evidence.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Sims · filed 2018-06-05(g)(1)

We conclude that the witness testimony, the recorded phone calls, the evidence that the firearms had traveled in interstate commerce, and the stipulation that Sims had been convicted of a felony were sufficient to support the jury verdict.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved by evidence that officers saw the defendant holding a firearm before he dropped it.

United States v. Bob Jones · filed 2018-07-18(g)(1)

The only disputed element was whether Jones possessed the firearm. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the conviction.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction stands when the evidence permits a reasonable jury to find firearm possession by a convicted felon beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Eckel · filed 2018-07-30(g)(1)

Given all this evidence amassed against Eckel, a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm, was a felon, and that the firearm traveled through interstate commerce.

United States v. Comar Wheeler · filed 2018-12-21(g)(1)

But counsel aptly determines that this argument would be frivolous because the government presented evidence supporting each part of the charged crime: Wheeler testified that he possessed a firearm, and the parties stipulated both that Wheeler was a felon and that the firearm travelled through interstate commerce.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction can be sustained when the evidence permits a rational juror to find that the defendant possessed the firearm named in the indictment.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2019-02-14(g)(1)

Based on this evidence, a rational juror could have found that the weapon entered into evidence was the one named in the indictment and that Johnson was guilty of possessing that weapon.

Section 922(g)’s possession element can be proved by witness testimony and recovery of a gun where the defendant was seen dropping an object.

United States v. Nickelous · filed 2019-02-26(g)

Nickelous also challenges the conviction because there was no physical evidence. But “there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for felon in possession where a gun was immediately recovered from the location where the defendant was observed dropping something.” ... The district court did not err in finding the evidence sufficient to convict.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved through witness testimony and physical evidence showing that the defendant handled the firearm.

United States v. Harrell · filed 2019-03-08(g)(1)

Testimony from Detectives Thomas Wever and Alexis Marrero, statements recorded by Wever’s body camera, and the detectives’ discovery of the Glock handgun and accessories unique to that firearm provided sufficient evidence that Harrell possessed the firearm.

Witness testimony placing a firearm in a convicted felon’s hands can provide sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. McLaughlin · filed 2019-03-28(g)(1)

Given that three different witnesses placed a gun in McLaughlin’s hands on the night of the shooting, we conclude that the Government produced sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction can stand despite a mistaken serial number in an officer’s report when the evidence permits a reasonable jury to find that the gun tested was the gun the defendant possessed.

United States v. Hogan · filed 2019-06-18(g)(1)

A reasonable jury could have relied on this evidence to conclude that Special Agent Latham tested the gun that Hogan possessed, and therefore could have found Hogan guilty.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a firearm conviction based on photographs and witness testimony without scientific proof that the object was a firearm.

United States v. Brinson · filed 2019-10-21(g)(1)

The evidence was sufficient to support Brinson’s § 922(g)(1) conviction. ... Although Brinson argues Hunt and Woodruff are distinguishable because they involved violent crimes, our holding in both cases, that the government need not show to a scientific certainty a defendant is carrying a firearm, did not depend on the violent nature of the robberies in those cases.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when circumstantial evidence rationally supports finding that the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. Bradley · filed 2019-12-23(g)(1)

Although the police may have briefly lost sight of the suspect, the jury was presented with strong circumstantial evidence that Bradley was the man who dropped the gun and was therefore guilty of the charged offense.

Consistent officer testimony that they saw and recovered a firearm, together with the physical evidence, can sufficiently prove possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Lea · filed 2020-01-15(g)(1)

That consistent firsthand testimony from both officers—in conjunction with the physical evidence of the gun, ammunition, digital scale, and currency recovered from Mr. Lea—was sufficient to convince any rational juror that he possessed a firearm on March 5, 2019.

Section 922(g) supports a felon-in-possession conviction when sufficient evidence shows the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Dunnican · filed 2020-06-09(g)

Here, the government clearly has presented sufficient evidence of all of the elements of Dunnican’s three charges. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D); § 924(c). First, Dunnican conceded that he was a convicted felon, and there was a firearm in the trunk of his car, which traveled in interstate commerce. Second, the government advanced sufficient evidence to show that Dunnican (1) knew the firearm was in his vehicle’s trunk; (2) knew the marijuana also was in his car; (3) intended to distribute that marijuana; and (4) carried the firearm in order to protect his illegal drug-trafficking business. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found Dunnican guilty.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by officers’ testimony that they saw the defendant carry and discard a firearm.

United States v. James · filed 2020-10-14(g)(1)

Here, the government’s evidence that James possessed the firearm was more than sufficient. Two officers testified that they saw James pull a firearm from his waistband and throw it over a fence as he was running.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on circumstantial evidence of constructive possession and a nexus with interstate commerce.

United States v. Alexander · filed 1990-04-05(g)(1)

On appeal, Alexander contends that there was insufficient evidence to establish that she constructively possessed the weapons or that there was a nexus with interstate commerce as required by the statutes. In our view, there is no merit to these contentions, Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), nor to her contention that the district court's instructions to the jury were improper.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person previously convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Virgil · filed 1992-08-17(g)(1)

On June 29, 1991, a Grand Jury returned an indictment charging defendant with ... (c) having been previously convicted of a felony, possessing a firearm which had traveled in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). ... Defendant's contention that the evidence fails to support his conviction of each of the offenses is without merit.

A conviction under § 922(g)(1) cannot stand when the government admits that it failed to prove the firearms charge.

United States v. Aikens · filed 2005-11-09(g)(1)

On the basis of the Government’s admission of a failure of its proof on the firearms charge, we vacate that conviction and remand for dismissal of the underlying charge.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) prohibits an illegal alien from possessing a firearm; a key giving access to a locked room containing firearms can support a finding of possession.

United States v. v. Cuevas-Arredondo · filed 2006-12-04(g)(5)(A)

Cuevas-Arrendondo possessed a key that unlocked the front door of the trailer. ... The officers opened the locked bedroom using Cuevas-Arrendondo’s key. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to prove the elements of the charged offenses.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence supports firearm possession and the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Albin · filed 2008-11-06(g)(1)

Regardless whether we review for plain error, or apply the standard used in cases where the challenge was preserved, United States v. Shepherd, 284 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 2002) (evidence is viewed in light most favorable to verdict, and is sufficient if any rational trier of fact could have found essential elements of crime beyond reasonable doubt), the evidence amply supports Albin’s felon-in-possession conviction, see United States v. Echols, 144 F.3d 584, 585 (8th Cir. 1998) (government has burden of proving defendant was convicted of felony and thereafter possessed firearm, and firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce; credibility of officers’ testimony was matter to be resolved by jury).

A felon’s statements that he had a gun can support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a firearm under § 922(g).

United States v. Simon · filed 2016-11-09(g)

Simon challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction on Count 6, which alleged illegal possession of a firearm by a felon. ... There was no error because a reasonable jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Simon committed the offense. For instance, Simon was recorded the day before the robbery, stating that he had a gun and planned to clean it that night so that it "doesn’t matter if it gets lost," and Simon told "confidential human source" Corona on the morning of the robbery that he had a gun.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm; sufficient evidence of that possession supports a conviction.

United States v. Cottrell · filed 2021-03-04(g)(1)

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the Government adduced sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that Cottrell unlawfully possessed at least one firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a prohibited person knowingly possessed a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce; evidence linking the person to the gun can support a finding of possession.

United States v. Cedric Wright · filed 2021-04-16(g)(1)

Therefore, the government only had to prove the second element, and we have already found sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Wright knowingly possessed a firearm and carried it during or in relation to the robbery of the Sprint store.

Sections 922(g)(1) and 922(q)(2)(A) require proof of firearm possession, which eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant as the shooter can establish.

United States v. Miller · filed 2021-05-24(g)(1), (q)(2)(A)

The evidence here was sufficient for a jury to find Miller guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have found that Miller possessed a firearm on the date in question. ... There was thus sufficient evidence to convict Miller on both counts.

Section 922(g)(1)’s firearm possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence even when the gun is never recovered.

United States v. Warfield · filed 2021-06-28(g)(1)

Warfield’s Facebook messages describing the gun and Collinsworth’s testimony that he saw the firearm in Warfield’s truck are substantial and circumstantial evidence that the gun existed, and that Warfield possessed it.

Section 922(g)(1) convictions may be sustained when the evidence permits a rational fact finder to conclude that the defendant possessed a firearm and ammunition.

United States v. Ashford · filed 2021-08-18(g)(1)

The evidence was sufficient for a rational fact finder to conclude that Ashford possessed a firearm and ammunition, and the district court properly denied the motion for acquittal or new trial.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition; eyewitness testimony can support that finding.

United States v. Nichols · filed 2021-12-14(g)

To secure a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the United States bore the burden to prove, inter alia, that Nichols “knowingly possessed the firearm as charged in the Indictment or knowingly possessed ammunition as charged in the Indictment.” R. Vol. 1 at 130; see also United States v. Taylor, 113 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 1997). ... The evidence was therefore also sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt Nichols knowingly possessed ammunition as charged.

Sections 922(u) and (j) prohibit taking a firearm from a licensed dealer and possessing a stolen firearm, respectively; surveillance video and corroborating testimony can support convictions for both offenses.

United States v. Igoe · filed 2022-03-15

Jeffrey Igoe appeals his conviction for the unlawful taking of a firearm from a licensed firearm dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(u), and possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). ... The government introduced (1) surveillance video of Igoe surreptitiously removing a gun from its display case and putting it in his pocket; (2) store employee testimony corroborating that account; and (3) police testimony identifying the pistol found on Igoe’s person later that day as the stolen pistol. ... The jury could reasonably have concluded that Igoe was guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction requires sufficient evidence that the defendant possessed the firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Harvest Sloan · filed 2022-05-12(g)(1)

Our review reveals that the district court did not err when it denied Sloan’s motion for a judgment of acquittal because sufficient evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that Sloan possessed the firearm and ammunition.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the charged firearm or ammunition; eyewitness testimony and evidence linking the defendant to ammunition can satisfy that requirement.

United States v. Nichols · filed 2022-05-18(g)

To secure a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the United States bore the burden to prove, inter alia, that Nichols “knowingly possessed the firearm as charged in the Indictment or knowingly possessed ammunition as charged in the Indictment.” R. Vol. 1 at 130; see also United States v. Taylor, 113 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 1997). ... The evidence was therefore also sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt Nichols knowingly possessed ammunition as charged.

Section 922(g)(1) bars convicted felons from possessing firearms; testimony that a convicted felon discharged a rifle can support a possession conviction.

United States v. Narcisse · filed 2022-07-20(g)(1)

Given the witnesses’ testimony, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Narcisse had committed Hobbs Act robbery, discharged a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and possessed a firearm as a convicted felon.

Eyewitness testimony that a felon fired a gun can support a conviction for possessing ammunition under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Leonel Miller Hinojosa, Jr. · filed 2023-05-05(g)(1)

It convicted him of robbing Stapler in violation of the Hobbs Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); of discharging a firearm during a “crime of violence,” see id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii); and of being a felon in possession of ammunition, see id. § 922(g)(1). ... As a general matter, Hinojosa suggests that the government presented insufficient evidence of the basic conduct underlying all of the offenses: that he shot Bradford and stole drugs and drug proceeds from Stapler. Yet the government’s evidence proving this conduct “is more accurately described as ‘overwhelming’ than ‘insufficient.’”

A conviction under § 922(g)(1) may rest on circumstantial evidence linking the defendant to a firearm found in a home.

United States v. Hamilton · filed 2023-07-24(g)(1)

Thus, a rational juror could have reasonably concluded that Hamilton possessed the weapon recovered from his grandmother’s home.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a possession conviction when the evidence supports finding that a felon knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition, even if an identifying witness recants at trial.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2023-12-04(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was sufficient evidence that Robinson was the shooter, permitting the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Robinson knowingly possessed the firearm and ammunition. His § 922(g)(1) sufficiency challenge fails.

Witness testimony that a felon held a firearm can provide sufficient evidence of possession under § 922(g)(1), even when the defendant disputes the witnesses’ credibility.

United States v. Swington · filed 2024-01-09(g)(1)

For the conviction to stand, there must have been evidence that Swington “possess[ed] . . . [the] firearm.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... The jury considered this possibility and rejected it, no doubt because multiple witnesses saw him with the gun earlier that night. ... And here, there is.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction is supported when the evidence permits a reasonable jury to find that the defendant possessed a firearm.

United States v. Barefield · filed 2024-02-14(g)(1)

We conclude that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict was sufficient for a reasonable jury to determine that Barefield was in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession and interstate-commerce elements may be proved by surveillance footage and expert testimony even when the firearm is not recovered.

United States v. Busch · filed 2024-07-30(g)(1)

Because the surveillance footage and expert testimony provided sufficient evidence that Mr. Busch carried a firearm and that the firearm or ammunition had traveled in interstate commerce, we affirm his convictions under §§ 924(c) and 922(g).

Eyewitness testimony that a defendant threw a gun, corroborated by its recovery, can sufficiently prove possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Robinson · filed 2024-10-09(g)(1)

Robinson also briefly suggests that the evidence to support his conviction was insufficient, as "he was never found in possession of the firearm" that led to his conviction. But a police officer named Bradley Overton testified that he saw someone open the driver's door to a pickup truck and throw a gun near an interstate ramp. He identified the driver as Robinson. Overton pursued the truck and told another officer where to find the gun. That officer testified that he found the gun where Overton said it would be. Overton also testified that he pursued Robinson until Robinson parked at a mall, and there was no one other than Robinson in the truck. This evidence is manifestly sufficient to support the conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm; evidence linking the defendant to the charged firearm can support a conviction without an in-court identification.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2024-12-02(g)(1)

There is more than sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to find that Wilson was the person on trial and that he possessed the firearm referenced in the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved through video, witness testimony, and admissions connecting a defendant to the charged firearm.

United States v. Smith · filed 2025-01-17(g)(1)

There was sufficient evidence to support Smith’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction can stand when video and officer testimony support the jury’s finding that the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. Edwards · filed 2025-12-19(g)(1)

The jurors watched the video of the encounter and heard testimony from several agents and officers who participated in the stop and frisk, all of which gave them an ample basis to reject the “plant” defense, credit the government’s case, and return a guilty verdict. The verdict has abundant evidentiary support.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person with a prior felony conviction from knowingly possessing a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Madison · filed 2026-01-15(g)(1)

Sufficient evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the government, Charley, 189 F.3d at 1272, existed to support Mr. Madison’s conviction for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He stipulated to his prior felony conviction and to the firearm being in or affecting interstate commerce, and police found the firearm (a Glock pistol) in his jacket pocket, so a reasonable juror could conclude he knew he possessed it.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction supported by testimony that the defendant possessed a firearm and his stipulation that he was a felon.

United States v. Colbert · filed 2026-05-12(g)(1)

Evidence supporting Mr. Colbert’s conviction included the testimony of the officers who searched his vehicle and found the Glock pistol, testimony of the eyewitness who saw Mr. Colbert pull the pistol out of his shorts and shoot it at CR, and Mr. Colbert’s stipulation that he was a felon prohibited from possessing a firearm. “[V]iew[ing] the facts in evidence in the light most favorable to the government,” id. at 1293, as we must, we easily conclude a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on each count, so any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence would be frivolous.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved by testimony that a defendant discarded an object near a recovered firearm, together with DNA evidence linking him to the gun.

United States v. Grayson · filed 2026-06-18(g)(1)

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we readily conclude that a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Grayson possessed a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm; officers’ eyewitness testimony that a defendant carried and hid a firearm can support a conviction.

United States v. Brunson · filed 2012-01-17(g)(1)

The record of the Brunson’s trial indicates that the jury had a considerable amount of evidence before it on which to convict. This evidence included direct eyewitness testimony from police officers who observed Brunson carrying a firearm and retrieved it from a sofa where he had hid it. Accordingly, it is clear that Brunson is not entitled to an acquittal.

Section 922(g)’s possession element can be proved by credited testimony that the defendant held and sold the firearm.

United States v. Dwayne Bates · filed 2010-11-24(g)

Bates contends that Day‟s testimony is insufficient to establish that he possessed the sawed-off shotgun – a required element of both his offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). We disagree. ... Day testified that he saw Bates holding the shotgun on two occasions, that Bates was willing to sell it to him, and that Bates did sell him the shotgun the following day. This testimony, if credited, provided substantial evidence that Bates possessed the shotgun.

The possession element of § 922(g)(1) is satisfied when the evidence permits a jury to find that the defendant knew the firearm was present.

United States v. James Kelly, Jr. · filed 2010-12-07(g)(1)

Here, there was substantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Kelly had knowledge of the gun’s presence.

Possession under § 922(g)(1) may be proved by an officer’s testimony that the defendant discarded an object during a chase and that the officer immediately found a firearm at that location.

United States v. James Tyson, Jr. · filed 2010-10-21(g)(1)

An officer observed Tyson discard a shiny object during a foot chase. The officer returned to retrieve the item immediately after apprehending Tyson and found a firearm in the specific location where he observed Tyson discard the shiny object. ... Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, there was sufficient evidence to support Tyson’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm; evidence from which a reasonable jury could find possession is sufficient to sustain a conviction.

United States v. Sheets · filed 2010-10-26(g)(1)

According to the testimony and evidence presented at trial, a reasonable jury could have found that Sheets possessed a firearm. Substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict, and the district court did not err in denying the motions for judgment of acquittal.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence that the defendant threw a gun from a car.

United States v. Georges · filed 2010-07-02(g)(1)

In short, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices made in the government’s favor, the district court did not err in concluding that a reasonable juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Georges actually possessed a firearm, as required for a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Sections 922(g)(1) and 922(j) require proof of firearm possession, which eyewitness testimony that the defendant fired the gun can establish.

United States v. Nelson · filed 2010-05-27(g)(1), (j)

Nelson’s sufficiency challenge lacks merit. A reasonable juror could have found that he was in actual possession of the firearm based on Officer Rodriguez’s testimony that, while conducting an unrelated traffic stop, he observed Nelson shooting the firearm from the back of a Dodge pickup truck.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof of intent as a separate element when the charge rests on actual possession of a firearm.

United States v. Jones · filed 2007-04-13(g)(1)

Intent is not an element of actual possession under § 922.

Eyewitness testimony that a person grabbed, loaded, cocked, and pointed a firearm can establish possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Tison · filed 2007-06-07(g)(1)

The jury heard testimony from Tison’s ex-wife and his stepson that Tison grabbed the firearm, loaded and cocked it, and pointed it at them. ... Accordingly, sufficient evidence existed to sustain the verdict.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is satisfied when the evidence permits a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. Crowell · filed 2007-06-26(g)(1)

Because a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Crowell possessed the firearm in question, we find that sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support Crowell’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm.

The evidence was sufficient to establish possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Prado-Medina · filed 2008-05-05(g)(1)

There was enough evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to find possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm; eyewitness testimony can provide direct evidence of that element.

United States v. Gobert · filed 2008-05-23(g)(1)

Gobert contends only that the Government failed to prove that he was in possession of a firearm. See United States v. Guidry, 406 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2005) (listing elements of offense); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Gobert was observed by an acquaintance in possession of a firearm. Accordingly, there was direct evidence that Gobert possessed a firearm and the record was not “devoid of evidence” as to that element of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of actual possession even when no witness saw the firearm in the defendant’s possession.

United States v. Bedford · filed 2008-12-16(g)(1)

Even when the government claims actual possession, it is not necessary for a witness to have seen the gun in the defendant’s possession.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require exclusive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Rippee · filed 2009-01-28(g)(1)

Moreover, even though a defense witness testified that Rippee’s sister had shown her a gun that looked like the Rossi revolver, possession of a firearm under section 922(g)(1) need not be exclusive.

An officer’s credited testimony that a convicted felon placed a gun in a vehicle’s wheel well can support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Vas · filed 2009-01-29(g)(1)

A jury convicted Norval Vas, a convicted felon, of possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Taking all of these facts in the light most favorable to the Government, it is clear that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict.

Section 922(g)(1) possession can be proved by actual possession, sole control of the premises, or joint occupancy combined with evidence of access to and knowledge of the firearm.

United States v. Anderson · filed 2009-02-11(g)(1)

Taken together, Anderson’s authorities establish that possession can be established by (1) actual, physical possession of the firearm, (2) sole control and occupancy of a place where a firearm is found, or (3) joint occupancy of a place where a firearm is found, combined with some evidence of the defendant’s access to and knowledge of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is satisfied when a person knows a firearm is present and has immediate control over it.

United States v. Morrison · filed 2010-02-12(g)(1)

Taken together, these facts support an inference that Morrison knew the gun was there and that it was within his immediate control.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element is satisfied when a defendant knowingly has direct physical control over a firearm.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2010-08-04(g)(1)

This testimony establishes that Jackson had knowing, physical control over a firearm on the night of April 19th, 2009.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits convicted felons from possessing a firearm; evidence that a defendant handed a gun to another person can support a conviction.

United States v. Taylor · filed 2011-10-24(g)(1)

This evi- dence would plainly allow a reasonable jury to find Taylor guilty of unlawful possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by dominion over a firearm; ownership is unnecessary.

United States v. McIntyre · filed 2011-10-31(g)(1)

Having dominion over a firearm is sufficient to establish possession, and McIntyre never demonstrated confusion regarding this concept.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon’s brief actual possession of a firearm.

United States v. Burroughs · filed 2012-03-09(g)(1)

But Burroughs’s brief acknowledges that he had actual possession of the firearms at least briefly; after all, a person cannot divest himself of something he does not first have in his possession. This concession alone defeats Burroughs’s claim.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element includes actual possession, which a jury may infer from pawn receipts and testimony that the defendant brought firearms to a pawnshop.

United States v. Stoltz · filed 2012-07-10(g)(1)

"Possess[ion]" of a firearm, as contemplated in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), can be actual or constructive. ... We find that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Stoltz actually possessed the firearms at issue.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied when the evidence permits a jury to find that the defendant possessed a firearm before a vehicle crash.

United States v. Kevin Mills · filed 2013-10-21(g)(1)

Reviewing this record as a whole and drawing all inferences in favor of the government, we hold that a jury could reasonably conclude that prior to the accident Mills had possession of the shotgun. ... The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Mills’s conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element is supported by evidence that a convicted felon handled a firearm during a robbery.

United States v. Le · filed 2013-10-23(g)(1)

We agree the evidence is sufficient for a rational trier of fact conclude that Le possessed a weapon during the Bartonsville robbery, and that any argument to the contrary would be frivolous.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. Funzie · filed 2013-11-05(g)(1)

Here, the government introduced sufficient, circumstantial proof of actual possession through Tolbert’s testimony and the fact that the police recovered the firearm in the bedroom where Tolbert suspected Funzie had placed it.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt when a firearm is in plain view beside the sole occupant of a car.

United States v. Coleman · filed 2013-11-20(g)(1)

It is undisputed that the firearm was discovered in plain view beside Coleman in the center console of the car in which he was the sole occupant. This was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the element of possession.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by a defendant’s admission that he was holding a firearm for someone else, without proof that he lived where it was found.

United States v. Tucker · filed 2013-12-11(g)(1)

Here, we have direct evidence that Tucker possessed the rifle: Officer Caruso’s testimony that Tucker admitted he was holding the gun for a friend. This is enough to support Tucker’s conviction, regardless of his nexus to the apartment where the gun was found.

Section 922(g)(1) sets no minimum duration for actual possession of a firearm; briefly holding and handling one can suffice.

United States v. Pratt · filed 2017-07-26(g)(1)

Viewing Patrick’s testimony in the light most favorable to the government, however, Pratt did more than touch the gun—he held it and showed Dyer’s son how to operate it. Pratt cites no case law to support his theory that holding a gun for a “very brief” time means he did not actually possess it. Nor are we aware of any minimum temporal prerequisite for showing direct physical control of a gun.

When a § 922(g)(1) charge is tried on actual possession, the jury can decide whether the defendant possessed the firearm without deciding whether he possessed the vehicle where it was found.

United States v. Joyner · filed 2018-02-22(g)(1)

Even assuming arguendo, as Joyner argues, that the jury was confused about possession of the gun through possession of the car, the district court’s response to the jury’s question adequately addressed that confusion by making clear that possession of the car was not an issue but that possession of the gun was the issue—in other words, the jury should not consider possession of the car, but should decide whether Joyner possessed the gun.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a felon to control a firearm for any minimum length of time.

United States v. Demetrius Brooks · filed 2021-02-09(g)(1)

And nothing in the word “possess” requires a defendant to retain control of the gun for any lengthy period of time.

Section 922(g)(1) forbids a previously convicted felon from possessing a firearm regardless of who owns it.

United States v. Greenwood · filed 2021-02-05(g)(1)

He suggests that someone else owned the firearms that he sold to the pawn shop, but the offense of conviction forbids possession, not ownership, so more information about the provenance of the guns would not establish innocence. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by holding a firearm briefly during the period charged in the indictment.

United States v. Xiong · filed 2021-06-15(g)(1)

This is enough to establish Defendant’s direct physical control over or actual possession of the handguns. To convict for actual possession, Defendant need only “have held [an identified] firearm for a mere second or two during the time specified in the indictment.”

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element is satisfied when a person knowingly sits on a firearm and thereby physically controls it.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2022-08-30(g)(1)

Because Johnson had been exerting physical control over the firearm by sitting on it, we find he actually possessed it.

Section 922(g)(1) requires direct physical control for actual possession of a firearm; exclusive control is not required.

United States v. Thompson · filed 2025-04-15(g)(1)

But Johnson in no way suggests that we should graft language regarding exclusivity from the constructive possession context onto the requirements for actual possession. ... The district court’s decision to focus the jury on whether Mr. Thompson achieved direct physical control of the firearm — the “sine qua non” of actual possession — was appropriate.

Section 922(g)(1) requires direct physical control to establish actual possession of a firearm, but does not require direct physical contact with it.

United States v. Eddings · filed 2025-10-31(g)(1)

This court has never held that this kind of direct physical contact is required to support a finding of actual possession. Instead, we have identified direct physical control as the defining feature of actual possession.

Section 922(d)(4) prohibits firearm sales or transfers to a person committed to a mental institution without requiring an involuntary admission.

D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt Health Sys. · filed 2019-08-13(d)(4)

The federal restrictions on an individual’s ability to transfer firearms is broader than those at the State level and does not require an individual be involuntarily admitted. Instead, the provision excludes those from transferring firearms if he or she “has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4).

Section 922(d)(4) requires a seller to know or have reasonable cause to believe a buyer was previously adjudicated mentally defective or committed to a mental institution; concern about future harm alone does not satisfy that standard.

Knight Ex Rel. Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1995-05-11(d)(4)

The plain language of § 922(d)(4) relates specifically and exclusively to the latter group of people. It does not simulate the common law duty of due care. It is a statute providing that a dealer has committed a crime if he sells a firearm to a customer when he has “reasonable cause to believe that [the customer] ... has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution.”

Section 922(d)(4) prohibits selling a firearm when the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe the buyer has been adjudicated mentally defective or committed to a mental institution; disruptive behavior alone did not show the seller had that knowledge or reason to believe it.

Bracy v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2007-04-26(d)(4)

In an attempt to raise a fact issue, Bracy cited to a federal statute that makes it unlawful to sell a firearm to a person when the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the person “has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution.” ... But even assuming for the sake of argument that the Wal-Mart store where Stewart became violent should have notified the other nearby Wal-Mart store of Stewart’s behavior, Bracy neither cites to any authority, nor provides any evidence, that suggests that based on this episode of disruptive behavior, Wal-Mart knew or should have known that Stewart had been adjudicated as a mental defective or actually committed to a mental institution.

A justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge does not negate knowing possession, so the defendant bears the burden of proving the defense.

United States v. Deberry · filed 2025-05-15(g)(1)

Because Deberry’s claim of self-defense does not negate an element of the offense, the district court did not err by instructing the jury that Deberry had the burden to prove his justification defense.

In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, the defendant must prove a justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

United States v. Reginald Wardell Howard, Jr. · filed 2016-11-10(g)(1)

Dixon is wholly consistent with Deleveaux’s holding that due process does not require the government to rebut a justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt in a § 922(g)(1) prosecution. ... Because Deleveaux forecloses Howard’s argument, ... the district court did not err in placing the burden on Howard to prove his justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a justification defense only while an imminent threat persists; continued firearm possession after the danger ends does not qualify.

United States v. Butler · filed 2007-05-07(g)(1)

The district court did not err in denying a justification instruction because Butler’s evidence was insufficient to permit the jury to reasonably find the continuing urgent danger required by our cases.

Section 922(g)(1)’s justification defense does not permit a jury instruction based on the defendant’s subjective reasonable belief that he faced an imminent threat.

United States v. Pollock · filed 2007-05-10(g)(1)

We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Pollock’s request for a modified jury instruction to provide for a reasonable belief element in the justification defense. First, the pattern jury instruction does not allow for the consideration of the defendant’s subjective reasonable belief that he was under an unlawful and present, imminent, and impending threat of death or serious bodily injury.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge only if the defendant had no reasonable legal alternative to possessing the firearm.

United States v. Izac · filed 2007-07-11(g)(1)

Accordingly, retreating into, and remaining in, his house was a reasonable alternative available to Izac. Because Izac failed to avail himself of that alternative, to show that he had no time to do so, or to show that it would have been futile to do so, he was not entitled to a justification defense.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a narrow justification defense when a felon takes a firearm to escape an imminent threat and promptly pursues a reasonable course to surrender it.

United States v. Mooney · filed 2007-08-06(g)(1)

But if the facts were presented at trial that have been established in his § 2255 proceeding, they would satisfy the demanding criteria set forth in Perrin and Crittendon, as well as the unanimous views of the other circuits, and Mooney would have been entitled to have the justification defense presented to the jury.

Section 922(g)(1)'s justification defense requires an imminent threat and no lawful way to avoid possessing the firearm.

United States v. Mahalick · filed 2007-08-13(g)(1)

The requirements of an imminent threat and a lack of recourse to lawful action mean that the defense does not apply if there is a way to avoid committing the felony of possession by a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) does not allow a felon to possess a gun for protection based only on a general fear of neighborhood crime; a justification defense requires an imminent threat and no lawful alternative.

United States v. Mahalick, Jeffrey · filed 2007-08-13(g)(1)

Mahalick, who harbored only a general fear of living in a dangerous neighborhood, faced neither an imminent threat nor a lack of lawful options. Convicted felons are not allowed to keep a gun under the bed in the event something bad happens.

A conviction under § 922(g) can stand when the evidence permits the jury to reject a justification defense.

United States v. Sands · filed 2007-09-04(g)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt and a rejection of the theory of justification.