18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) treats a felon’s firearm possession as a continuing offense, so a justification defense requires showing no reasonable legal alternative to continued possession.

United States v. Rice · filed 2007-12-19(g)(1)

Even assuming, arguendo, that a threat to a third person can satisfy Develeaux’s first prong, that Rice did not place himself in the circumstances of this case negligently or recklessly, and that Rice had no reasonable legal alternative to “snatching” the gun away from his fiancee when he first found her with it, because the offense continued as his possession continued, and because Rice has failed to prove that he had no reasonable legal alternative to continuing to possess the gun, see Bailey, 444 U.S. at 412, 100 S. Ct. at 635 (“in order to be entitled to an instruction on duress or necessity as a defense to the crime charged, an escapee must first offer evidence justifying his continued absence from custody as well as his initial departure”), we conclude that the district court did not err when it granted the government’s motion in limine and barred Rice from asserting a defense of justification.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a narrow justification defense, but a felon’s fear of a future assault does not justify possessing a firearm.

United States v. Alston · filed 2008-05-20(g)(1)

To hold otherwise would immunize a convicted felon from prosecution for carrying a firearm solely based on a legitimate fear for life or limb. Someone in Alston’s circumstances must show more than a legitimate fear of life and limb, as possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in the hope of deterring an assault is unlawful.

A justification defense to a § 922(g)(1) charge is available only in extraordinary circumstances, including a present, imminent threat and no reasonable legal alternative.

United States v. Webster · filed 2008-10-15(g)(1)

A justification defense is available to a felon-in-possession charge under § 922(g)(1) “in only extraordinary circumstances.” ... These circumstances do not constitute a “present, imminent, and impending threat of death or serious bodily injury” and also indicate that there was a reasonable legal alternative to violating the law. Thus, there was no basis for an instruction on the justification defense.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a justification defense only in extraordinary circumstances, and a defendant needs sufficient evidence of that defense to receive a jury instruction.

United States v. Moss · filed 2008-10-20(g)(1)

In the seminal case of Deleveaux discussing the applicability of an affirmative defense of justification for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), we held that the defense is available only in extraordinary circumstances. ... Because the record demonstrates that Moss did not produce sufficient evidence to support a justification defense, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give an instruction on Moss’s justification defense.

A felon charged under § 922(g)(1) cannot establish a justification defense merely because the firearm’s owner is intoxicated.

United States v. Kemp · filed 2008-11-14(g)(1)

A felon is not free to take possession of a firearm merely because its owner is drunk.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a justification defense only in extraordinary circumstances; the defense fails when the defendant has a reasonable legal alternative to possessing the firearm.

United States v. Harkness · filed 2008-12-30(g)(1)

Turning first to justification, this court has held that the affirmative defense of justification is available to felon-in-possession charges under § 922(g)(1), but only in “extraordinary circumstances.” ... Accordingly, the district court properly refused to instruct the jury on the defense of justification because Harkness had a reasonable alternative to keeping the gun in his possession.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) bears the burden of proving a justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

United States v. Woods · filed 2009-04-23(g)(1)

The district court further instructed the jury, on request of the defendant, that defendant asserted that his possession of the firearm was justified by the circumstances existing on June 23, 2005, and that they must find the defendant not guilty if he proved the elements of his justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The district court’s jury instructions were not in error and were consistent with the instructions approved by this Court in Brown.

A felon who briefly possesses a firearm under a justification defense need not turn it over to police if another way of dispossessing himself is reasonable.

United States v. Ricks · filed 2009-07-20(g)(1)

This conclusion, however, did not create a bright-line rule that the only reasonable way for a felon to dispossess himself of a gun he has justifiably come to possess is to turn that gun over to the police.

A defendant charged under § 922(g) must present sufficient evidence to warrant a justification instruction, including evidence that no reasonable, legal alternative was available.

United States v. El-Alamin · filed 2009-08-04(g)

Even assuming such a defense is available in the context of § 922(g), El-Alamin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant a justification instruction. ... Assuming that El-Alamin made an adequate showing as to the other elements, he failed to demonstrate that he lacked a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a justification defense only when an immediate emergency requires the defendant to possess a firearm.

United States v. Singletary · filed 2009-09-10(g)(1)

His claim is very similar to the claim in Rice, in that he alleged repeated threats, but did not show an immediate, emergency situation that required possession of the gun at that moment. Therefore, we conclude that the district court was correct to grant the government’s motion.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm; a justification defense requires a sufficiently imminent threat to excuse continued possession.

United States v. Dutton · filed 2009-10-27(g)(1)

We hold that Mr. Dutton was not under a threat sufficiently imminent to justify his continued possession of the firearm.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) must establish four elements to claim justification: an imminent threat of death or serious injury, no reckless or negligent creation of the situation, no reasonable legal alternative, and a direct link between possessing the firearm and avoiding the harm.

United States v. Mays · filed 2009-10-27(g)(1)

A defendant must show four elements to establish the justification defense in the § 922(g)(1) context, which Mays sought to interpose: “(1) that the defendant was under unlawful and present, imminent, and impending threat of death or serious bodily injury; (2) that the defendant did not negligently or recklessly place himself in a situation where he would be forced to engage in criminal conduct; (3) that the defendant had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law; and (4) that there was a direct causal relationship between the criminal action and the avoidance of the threatened harm.”

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to a justification instruction without evidence that there was no reasonable, legal alternative to possessing a firearm.

United States v. Burnes · filed 2009-10-30(g)(1)

No reasonable jury could conclude that defendant had no reasonable, legal alternative to possessing a firearm. Therefore, the Court denies defendant’s Motion in Limine requesting that the court allow him the defense of justification as it relates to his possession of the firearm (Docket No. 89), and grants the government’s Motion in Limine to Preclude a Justification Defense (Docket No. 110). Defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of justification and is not permitted to present evidence of the justification defense to the jury.

A necessity defense to a felon-in-possession charge is unavailable when legal alternatives to possessing the firearm exist.

United States v. Kilgore · filed 2010-01-08(g)(1)

The district court was correct in finding that Kilgore could not avail himself of a justification defense, given the uncontested facts that he had possession of a loaded weapon for over an hour, failed to exhaust all legal avenues open to him and carried the gun outside the apartment.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) must present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the elements of a justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence to receive a jury instruction on that defense.

United States v. Mercer · filed 2010-01-26(g)(1)

To warrant instructing the jury on a justification defense, Defendant’s burden was not so light as he suggests. Defendant had to present evidence whereby a reasonable jury could find four elements by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a justification defense in extraordinary circumstances, but the defendant must introduce some evidence supporting every element to receive a jury instruction.

United States v. Clarence Noble Jackson · filed 2010-02-23(g)(1)

Because Jackson did not meet his burden of introducing some evidence to support all of the elements of a justification defense, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury with respect to that defense.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a justification defense in rare cases, but the shooting victim’s character is not an essential element of that defense.

United States v. Clark · filed 2010-05-12(g)(1)

While a justification defense is available against gun-possession charges “in rare situations,” United States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d 471, 472 (6th Cir. 1990), the character of a shooting victim is not an essential element of such a defense.

A felon charged under § 922(g) is not entitled to a justification instruction when the threat was not imminent and the felon kept firearms longer than absolutely necessary.

United States v. Sloan · filed 2010-11-04(g)

Here, where there was no “imminent” or “impending” threat, Sloan’s ten-day maintenance of firearms at Myrick’s residence—where Sloan had no obligation to be—cannot be described as “absolutely necessary.”

Section 922(g)(1) allows a narrow justification defense only when a felon possesses a firearm no longer than absolutely necessary.

United States v. Jones · filed 2010-11-22(g)(1)

Jones argues that the District Court should have limited its instruction on the defense of justification to the language in the model instructions and should not have included additional language that a convicted felon cannot possess a firearm any longer than “absolutely necessary.” ... Here, the District Court accurately explained the law when charging the jury and correctly emphasized the narrowness of the necessity defense.

A general desire for safety does not justify a felon’s ongoing possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Smith · filed 2011-06-01(g)(1)

A general desire for self- protection or a wish to live in a safer neighborhood does not justify ongoing possession of a forbidden firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge when the evidence warrants a jury instruction.

United States v. Inman · filed 2011-11-02(g)(1)

Our de novo review of the record convinces us that the district court correctly concluded the evidence did not warrant an instruction on the justification defense.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a justification instruction only when the evidence supports its requirements, including a present threat of serious harm and no reasonable legal alternative.

United States v. Taylor · filed 2011-12-07(g)(1)

The court did not err in declining to give the justification instruction. To be entitled to the instruction, Taylor was required to “produce evidence which would allow the factfinder to conclude” that, among other things, he was under an “unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily injury,” that he did not “recklessly place himself in a situation where he would be forced to engage in” the conduct, and that he “had no reasonable legal alternative.”

For these § 922 firearm charges, duress is an affirmative defense the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence; the government need not rebut it.

United States v. Barnes · filed 2012-03-14(g)(3), (n)

Even if the defendant proves duress by a preponderance of the evidence, the government is not under an obligation to rebut that defense. Rather, the defendant is then entitled to a jury instruction on duress.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to a justification instruction when lawful alternatives were available and possessing the firearm did not directly avert the threatened harm.

United States v. Langhorn · filed 2012-03-30(g)(1)

Because lawful alternatives were available and no direct causal relationship existed between the criminal conduct and the harm to be avoided, the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on a justification defense.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to a justification instruction without sufficient evidence of imminent harm and no reasonable legal alternative to possessing the firearm.

United States v. Parker · filed 2012-05-25(g)(1)

We have yet to recognize in a given case a justification defense to a violation of § 922(g). Id. ... Parker’s proffer concerning these elements was inadequate because he failed to show imminency of threatened harm or that he was without reasonable, legal alternatives to possessing the gun.

A defendant charged under § 922(g) is entitled to a justification instruction upon presenting some evidence supporting each element of the defense.

United States v. Jerry Clark, Jr. · filed 2012-06-26(g)

Because Clark has presented some evidence to support each element necessary to a conclusion that he was justified in possessing the gun, he was entitled to the accurate jury instruction on justification.

A necessity defense to § 922(g)(1) requires the defendant to give up the firearm as soon as possible after the threat ends.

United States v. Moore · filed 2013-10-23(g)(1)

As to that element, a defendant must show that he gave up possession as soon after the harm ended as possible. ... Even if we accept Moore’s version of events, these precedents close the door on his necessity defense.

A defendant charged with being a felon in possession must proffer sufficient evidence of justification to receive a jury instruction on that defense.

United States v. Ibrahim Bare · filed 2014-07-21(g)(1)

Bare was not entitled to an instruction on justification unless he proffered sufficient evidence “to establish a justification defense.”

For a § 922(g)(1) charge, a justification defense is unavailable when the defendant had a reasonable, legal alternative to using the firearm, even assuming the defense exists.

United States v. Cooney · filed 2014-07-22(g)(1)

Because no reasonable person could conclude that the evidence supports Cooney’s claim that he lacked a reasonable, legal alternative to using the gun to break up the fight, the district court did not err in precluding Cooney from presenting a justification defense.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a justification defense to a charge of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon.

United States v. Enoch · filed 2015-10-01(g)(1)

Turning to the merits, Enoch contends that this circuit recognizes a justification defense to a § 922(g)(1) firearm-possession offense, and that the district court therefore was permitted to depart downward under § 5K2.12, even if the facts show only an imperfect defense. We agree.

A justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge requires evidence that the defendant had no reasonable legal alternative to possessing a firearm.

United States v. Alcaraz · filed 2016-11-02(g)(1)

The district court did not abuse its discretion because Defendant did not establish he had no reasonable legal alternative to possessing a firearm.

A defendant charged with possessing a firearm under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to a justification defense based on a generalized fear without an immediate threat of serious bodily injury.

United States v. Richardson · filed 2017-01-03(g)(1)

Curtis Richardson appeals his conviction and sentence of 57 months of imprisonment following his plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012). ... Although Richardson may have had a generalized fear, the record does not show that he was under any immediate threat of serious bodily injury, and thus, Richardson has not shown that he was entitled to the justification defense.

If a justification defense is available under § 922(g)(1), a generalized fear of future harm does not establish the imminent threat it would require.

United States v. Dinkins · filed 2017-05-26(g)(1)

Thus, as a matter of law, Dinkins failed to show a real and specific threat existed at the time of his unlawful possession.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a justification defense only if the defendant makes a prima facie showing that there was no reasonable legal alternative to possessing a firearm.

United States v. Rezene · filed 2019-02-21(g)(1)

we agree with the district court that, construing the facts in Rezene’s favor, Rezene did not make a prima facie showing that he had no reasonable legal alternative to possessing a firearm.

A defendant charged with possessing a firearm as a felon bears the burden of proving justification by a preponderance of the evidence; that burden does not shift to the government.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2019-06-03(g)(1)

Although he correctly states that he bore the burden of establishing each element of the justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence, see United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 350 (3d Cir. 2000) (adopting “a rule that places the burden of persuasion on the defendant with regard to a justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge”), the law does not provide for a burden shift that would require the government to disprove the elements of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt once the defense had established them by a preponderance of the evidence.

A felon charged under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to a justification instruction when he possessed the gun before an imminent threat and kept it after the threat ended.

United States v. Joey Wiseman, Jr. · filed 2019-07-26(g)(1)

Wiseman possessed the gun and had it accessible long before he observed the would-be-robber’s entry; he did not begin to possess it only when he learned of the imminent robbery. ... After defending himself against Whitaker, he stashed the gun he had used in a safe to which he possessed the combination and in which he maintained other contraband, rather than immediately relinquishing it. A justification defense could not be supported by the facts here, and accordingly we affirm the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury on it.

A justification defense to a § 922(g)(1) charge does not excuse ammunition possession that began before an imminent threat arose.

United States v. Gilcrest · filed 2019-11-25(g)(1)

But even if Calhoun started the gunfight, that does not justify Gilcrest’s possession of ammunition before he ran into Calhoun.

A justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge requires the defendant to give up the firearm promptly once the danger ends.

United States v. Penn · filed 2020-08-05(g)(1)

A defendant must act promptly to rid himself of the firearm once the circumstances giving rise to the justification subside.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge.

United States v. Mercer · filed 2009-02-10(g)(1)

Mercer was allowed to present a justification defense, and the jury was properly instructed on the defense.

For a § 922(g) charge, continued firearm possession after a safe opportunity to dispose of it defeats a proposed justification defense, assuming that defense is available.

United States v. Still · filed 2021-07-27(g)

Assuming without deciding that a justification defense to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is available, we agree with the district court that Still failed to present evidence sufficient to warrant denying the government’s motion to exclude the justification defense.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a justification defense to felon possession only when the defendant has no reasonable alternative to possessing the firearm.

United States v. Lewis · filed 2022-01-04(g)(1)

However, because he could have chosen to return or remain inside the Waffle House, as others in his group did, or to remain hidden behind the first vehicle, Lewis failed to make a threshold showing of all the elements necessary to establish a justification defense.

A defendant claiming justification under § 922(g)(1) must give up possession of the firearm as promptly as reasonably possible.

United States v. Billy J. Pellett, Jr. · filed 2022-07-15(g)(1)

So, for a defendant to avail himself of the defense, he must “rid himself of possession of the firearm as promptly as reasonably possible.”

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) must prove a justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

United States v. Sapp · filed 2023-02-22(g)(1)

Thus, it was permissible for the government to say that once it had proven Sapp possessed the firearm, Sapp had the burden of proving his affirmative defense of justification because the law requires the ... defendant to prove a justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 922(g) permits a justification defense only if the defendant gives up possession of the firearm as soon as possible after the threat ends.

United States v. Mardy Mollett, Jr. · filed 2023-03-08(g)(1), (g)(3)

Because Mollett did not meet his burden on the fifth factor, he was not entitled to a justification defense; we need not review the remaining factors.

Section 922(g)(1)'s justification defense covers firearm possession only during the time of danger.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2023-05-05(g)(1)

Furthermore, the justification defense would insulate Wilson only for possession during the time of the alleged endangerment.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) may assert a justification defense, but the jury may reject it when the defendant escalated the situation that led to his possession of the firearm.

United States v. Moore · filed 2023-08-11(g)(1)

The evidence was sufficient for the jury to reject his justification defense and find him guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, which precluded a judgment of acquittal.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a justification instruction only in rare circumstances; choosing to acquire a firearm and ammunition for an avoidable meeting does not warrant one.

United States v. Brendon Garner · filed 2023-08-30(g)(1)

He also decided to acquire a firearm and ammunition to take with him to the meeting. This is not the “extraordinarily uncommon” scenario in which the justification defense is applicable.

A defendant charged with felon possession must offer evidence of an unlawful and present threat when he first possessed the firearm to present a justification defense at trial.

United States of America v. Garrito Fort · filed 2023-09-25(g)(1)

To be able to present the justification defense to the jury, Fort must adduce some evidence — indeed, any evidence — that he was under an unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily injury at the moment he first possessed the gun.

Section 922(g)(1)’s federal justification defense requires a sufficiently imminent threat of death.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2024-04-10(g)(1)

Neither did the district court err in determining that Robin- son’s actions were not covered by Florida’s self-defense law or fed- eral law’s justification defense. Robinson was not under a suffi- ciently imminent threat of death, rendering his belief in such a threat unreasonable.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a justification defense to unlawful possession of ammunition only in extraordinary circumstances, including an imminent threat and no reasonable legal alternative.

United States v. Little · filed 2024-07-10(g)(1)

To establish a justification defense to a § 922(g)(1) charge, a defendant must show that (1) he was under unlawful and imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; (2) he did not negligently or recklessly place himself in a situation where he would be forced to engage in criminal conduct; (3) he had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law; and (4) there was a direct causal relationship between the criminal action and the avoidance of the threatened harm.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) cannot present a justification defense without evidence of an imminent threat when the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. Aaron Green, Jr. · filed 2024-11-25(g)(1)

We agree with the district court that the hours-long delay between the shooting and Green’s encounter with the deputies foreclosed his use of the justification defense.

A defendant cannot present a justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge when no threat of death or serious bodily injury existed when he first possessed the firearm.

United States v. Fort · filed 2026-05-12(g)(1)

When Fort first possessed the pistol -- when he took it in his hand and placed it in his sweatshirt pocket, and later left the house knowing it was there -- he was under no threat of death or serious bodily injury. Coletti was outside, and Fort was inside. Moreover, Richard Sr. had already told Fort he was sure Coletti would pay for any damage to the car. Those facts alone defeat Fort's effort to assert a justification defense and require affirmance of the district court's order.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Glock GMBH 43, 9mm Firearm, Serial Number AEYD780, and Five Rounds of Ammunition · filed 2025-09-18(g)(1)

It was thus unlawful for Jackson to possess the Defendant ... Properties under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires possession of a firearm, but does not require ownership.

United States v. Dwayne Robinson, Jr. · filed 2025-04-07(g)(1)

The felon-in-possession statute requires a defendant to “possess” (not own) a weapon.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof of an unlawful motive for firearm possession.

Canales, Victor v. United States · filed 2025-04-08(g)(1)

But Canales’s “motive or purpose behind his possession” is neither here nor there, since § 922(g) “is a general intent crime[.]” United States v. Moore, 76 F.4th 1355, 1362 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Vereen, 920 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir. 2019)).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require an indictment to identify a particular type of firearm.

United States v. Smith · filed 2021-07-06(g)(1)

It does not distinguish between any particular type of firearm, nor does it require possession of a certain type to establish a violation.

Section 922(g) requires the government to prove a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison, and a court may describe the charge as “felon in possession.”

United States v. Ray · filed 2015-09-23(g)

In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by using, or allowing the use of the word “felon” or the phrase “felon in possession” to describe Ray’s charge under § 922(g). As Ray points out, § 922(g) does not use the word “felon,” either in the title or text of the statute: it refers only to a person who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, which is an element the Government must prove during its case-in-chief.

A felon-in-possession offense ends when the defendant no longer actually or constructively possesses the firearm.

United States v. Collins · filed 2014-06-11(g)(1)

He no longer actually or constructively possessed the firearm, and therefore the felon-in-possession offense had ended.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a felon possessed a firearm or ammunition; proof of both is unnecessary.

Coleman v. United States · filed 2014-04-25(g)(1)

As the district court noted, the indictment charged Coleman with possession of firearms and ammunition; however, "the government in this case was required to prove only that [Coleman] possessed a firearm or ammunition to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), not that he possessed both." ... This evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that Coleman violated § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, but a defendant who stipulates to felon status waives the right to require the government to prove that element.

United States v. Brunson · filed 2012-07-27(g)(1)

By stipulating to felon status, a defendant waives the right to require the Government prove his felon status.

Sections 922(g)(1) and 922(k) each require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a firearm.

United States v. Nelson · filed 2012-05-16(g)(1), (k)

Counts One, Two, and Three each require the government to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Nelson possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a qualifying prior conviction, firearm possession, and that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Hageon · filed 2011-03-14(g)(1)

To convict a defendant of the offense of felon in possession of a firearm, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant previously was convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that he possessed a firearm, and that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing firearm possession by a felon and an interstate-commerce connection; § 922(k) requires knowing possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number that traveled through interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Ali Reno Harden · filed 2009-10-30(g)(1), (k)

To convict a defendant of possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant was a convicted felon (2) in knowing possession of a firearm (3) that was in or affecting interstate commerce. ... A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) requires proof of (1) knowing possession (2) of a firearm with an obliterated serial number (3) that traveled through interstate or foreign commerce. ... Given the abundance of the evidence linking Harden to the gun and the crack cocaine and the bedroom where those items were found, affirming his convictions on Counts One through Four would not amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a qualifying prior conviction, knowing possession of a firearm, and a connection to interstate commerce; motive for possessing the firearm is not an element.

United States v. Seward · filed 2009-10-15(g)(1)

To establish a § 922(g)(1) violation, the government must prove that (1) the defendant had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment over one year, (2) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm, and (3) the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce. ... Motive for possessing the firearm is not an element of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to prove a motive for possessing the firearm.

United States v. Hilano · filed 2008-11-12(g)(1)

Although Hiciano correctly notes that the government was not required to prove motive as an element of the felon-in-possession charge, the record reflects that the District Court carefully weighed the prejudicial impact of the evidence against its probative value as proof that Hiciano knowingly possessed the firearm in light of the large amount of cash that he carried.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm in interstate commerce and had a prior felony conviction.

United States v. Hope · filed 2007-05-15(g)(1)

At trial, the government was required to prove (1) that Hope possessed a firearm in interstate commerce and (2) that he had a prior felony conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) does not make the § 921(a)(20)(A) business practices exclusion an element of the offense.

United States v. Stanko · filed 2007-06-20(g)(1)

We agree and hold that the indictment was not defective because the § 921(a)(20)(A) exclusion is not an element of a § 922(g)(1) offense.

Section 922(k) requires proof that the defendant actually or constructively possessed the firearm and knew it was defaced.

United States v. Mitchell · filed 2007-07-02(k)

Under § 922(k), the government had to establish either actual or constructive possession of the Ruger. ... In addition to finding that Mitchell knowingly possessed the Ruger, the jury also had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mitchell knew the Ruger was defaced.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a firearm, the firearm traveled in interstate commerce, and the defendant had a prior felony conviction.

United States v. Pratt · filed 2007-08-08(g)(1)

To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant possessed a firearm; (2) the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce; and (3) the defendant had been convicted of a felony prior to his possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior felony conviction, firearm possession, and possession in or affecting interstate commerce; shooting someone with the firearm is not an element.

United States v. Crow · filed 2007-11-14(g)(1)

In this case, the elements of the offense of conviction, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon are: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony; (2) the defendant possessed a firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affected interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Use of the firearm to shoot the victim, as occurred in this case, is not an element, nor is it conduct underlying an element of the offense of conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Bailey · filed 2007-12-13(g)(1)

To convict a defendant under this statute, the prosecution must prove three elements: (1) the defendant had a previous felony conviction, (2) the defendant possessed a firearm, and (3) the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant possessed a firearm, had a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison, and possessed the firearm in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Sanders, DeAngelo · filed 2008-03-21(g)(1)

That evidence similarly can establish possession of a firearm for the felon-in-possession charge, which addi- tionally requires proof that the defendant previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprison- ment for a term exceeding one year, and that the posses- sion of the firearm was in or affecting interstate com- merce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a convicted felon possessed a firearm or ammunition in or affecting commerce.

United States v. Cox · filed 2008-06-17(g)(1)

Thus, to support a conviction under this section, the government must prove that the defendant: (1) is a convicted felon; (2) in possession of; (3) any firearm or ammunition; (4) in or affecting commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior felony conviction and possession of a firearm.

United States v. Lewis · filed 2008-07-08(g)(1)

The two essential elements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) are prior conviction of a felony and possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was a felon, possessed a gun, and that the gun previously traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Jenkins · filed 2008-08-14(g)(1)

To convict under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government had to prove that (1) Jenkins was a felon, (2) he possessed a gun, and (3) the gun previously had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant had a prior felony conviction when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Williams · filed 2008-08-26(g)(1)

Although we agree that, under the circumstances here, it would have been better for the prosecutor to limit her proofs of the defendant’s prior convictions, a prior felony conviction was nevertheless an element of the offense Williams was charged with. Thus, the government had to establish that he was a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm charged in this indictment.

Section 922(g) does not make discharge of the firearm an element of the felon-in-possession offense; discharge is a sentencing factor.

United States v. Bonds · filed 2008-10-10(g)

Although he states his argument as contesting the factual basis for his conviction, the determination of whether he discharged the firearm is not an element of the felon-in-possession offense, but rather a sentencing factor.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing firearm possession by a person convicted of an offense punishable by more than one year in prison and a firearm connection to interstate commerce.

United States v. Jones · filed 2009-02-10(g)(1)

To convict Jones of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the government had to show that (1) Jones knowingly possessed a firearm; (2) Jones was previously convicted of an offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; and (3) the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a firearm, the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce, and the defendant had a prior felony conviction.

United States v. Pratt · filed 2009-06-03(g)(1)

To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant possessed a firearm; (2) the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce; and (3) the defendant had been convicted of a felony prior to his possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) bars a convicted felon from possessing a firearm without requiring a purpose to use it unlawfully.

United States v. Fogle · filed 2009-06-11(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) is violated if a person who is a convicted felon merely possesses a firearm. In contrast, the New Jersey Statute is violated if any person possesses a firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully. Accordingly, the statutes are distinct and pass the first part of the Navarro test.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Mosley · filed 2009-07-30(g)(1)

The elements of being a felon in possession of a firearm pursuant to § 922(g)(1) are: (1) the defendant had a previous felony conviction; (2) the defendant possessed a firearm; and (3) the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was a convicted felon, voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm, and that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Williams · filed 2009-09-24(g)(1)

To convict a defendant of a § 922(g)(1) violation, the Government must prove: (1) that the “defendant was a convicted felon at the time of the offense,” (2) that he “voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm,” and (3) that “the firearm traveled in interstate commerce at some point.”

Section 922(g) requires proof that a convicted felon possessed ammunition that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Beasley · filed 2009-10-08(g)

To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government had to establish that (1) he was a convicted felon; (2) he possessed ammunition; and (3) the ammunition had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from knowingly possessing a firearm or ammunition that has affected or was in interstate commerce.

United States v. Sailor · filed 2009-12-08(g)(1)

To establish a § 922(g)(1) violation, the government must prove that a convicted felon knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition that has affected or was in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not make a firearm’s particular serial number an element of felon-in-possession.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2010-02-03(g)(1)

Although we have never addressed this question directly, precedent from this circuit and others suggests that the particular attributes of a firearm are not actual elements of the offense. ... These cases support a conclusion that the change was one of form, not substance, and thus permissible.

Section 922(g)(3) requires an unlawful user of or person addicted to a controlled substance to knowingly possess a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Cheeseman · filed 2010-03-02(g)(3)

While the statute is silent as to its requisite mens rea, the elements of a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) violation are: (1) that the defendant is an unlawful user or addicted to any controlled substance; (2) who thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affecting interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Urcino · filed 2010-04-01(g)(1)

For a conviction under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove (1) the defendant had a previous felony conviction, (2) the defendant possessed a firearm, and (3) the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) requires knowing possession of ammunition, a prior felony conviction, and possession in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Barlow · filed 2010-08-05(g)

The crime of which Barlow was convicted — being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) — has three elements: (1) the knowing possession of ammunition; (2) a prior felony conviction; and (3) the possession “being in or affecting” interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was a convicted felon, voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm, and that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Colbert · filed 2010-09-16(g)(1)

To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government was required to prove that: (i) Colbert was a convicted felon at the time of the offense; (ii) he voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm; and (iii) the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm.

United States v. Halk · filed 2011-03-11(g)(1)

Knowing possession of a firearm is an element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and Halk "placed his knowledge of the firearm's presence at the scene on his person at issue by pleading not guilty to the crime and requiring the government to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a felon possessed a firearm with a nexus to interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Rogers · filed 2011-06-01(g)(1)

To convict under § 922(g)(1), the government need only prove that the defendant was a felon who possessed a firearm with a nexus to interstate or foreign commerce. ... We agree with counsel that the evidence was more than sufficient for a rational jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Rogers possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was a convicted felon, knew he possessed a firearm, and that the firearm affected or was in interstate commerce.

United States v. Pendleton · filed 2011-12-02(g)(1)

To support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that: (1) the defendant was a convicted felon; (2) the defendant knew he was in possession of a firearm; and (3) the firearm affected or was in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Urcino · filed 2011-12-22(g)(1)

For a conviction under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove (1) the defendant had a previous felony conviction, (2) the defendant possessed a firearm, and (3) the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce. ... We agree with counsel that this evidence would be more than sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Urcino guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm, but does not require proof that its make, model, or serial number matched the indictment.

United States v. Whitley · filed 2012-02-06(g)(1)

Whitley’s firearms convictions require nothing more than that he be in possession of a firearm. See id.; 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(c)(1)(A).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to prove that a defendant’s firearm rights have not been restored.

United States v. Wulf · filed 2012-10-16(g)(1)

Lack of restoration of rights is not an element of a § 922(g) charge.