18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, firearm possession, and that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Ibarra · filed 2012-11-30(g)(1)

To prove the felon-in-possession charge, the Government was required to prove that (1) Ibarra had a prior felony conviction, (2) he possessed a firearm, and (3) the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s firearm element is not established when the conviction record leaves inconclusive whether the defendant possessed or otherwise dealt with a firearm.

Tapia-Cruz v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-12-26(g)(1)

However, those same facts are inconclusive as to whether Tapia-Cruz was convicted of owning, possessing, purchasing, receiving, or having custody or control over a firearm, and therefore do not satisfy the second element of section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior felony conviction, knowing possession of a firearm, and a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Alexander · filed 2013-03-12(g)(1)

A conviction under § 922(g)(1) requires proof that “(1) that the defendant previously had been convicted of a felony; (2) that he knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.” United States v. Meza, 701 F.3d 411, 418 (5th Cir. 2012). The factual basis to which Alexander stipulated is sufficient to sustain each of these elements, and Alexander does not contend otherwise.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Johnny Winters, Jr. · filed 2013-05-13(g)(1)

The elements of a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) violation include finding “beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant previously had been convicted of a felony; (2) that he possessed a firearm; and (3) that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a qualifying prior conviction, possession of a firearm, and a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Saleem · filed 2013-09-18(g)(1)

To convict a defendant of the offense of felon in possession of a firearm, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant previously was convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that he possessed a firearm, and that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce. ... In both instances, Saleem had actual possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove a prior felony conviction to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2013-10-22(g)(1)

This was quite proper, as it is beyond dispute that a felony conviction is “an essential element of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)” that must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a conviction when the government proves that a felon knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition, even if the indictment alleged possession of both.

United States v. Saavedra · filed 2013-12-04(g)(1)

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) defines the crime of being a felon in possession of a handgun in the disjunctive—it forbids any person who has been convicted of a felony from possessing “any firearm or ammunition.” Id. (emphasis added). As Mr. Saavedra acknowledges, the evidence was sufficient to establish his possession of the Bryco .380 handgun. This is enough to satisfy the statutory element at issue and to convict him on Count 1.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior felony conviction, knowing possession of the firearm, and proof that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Dazzle Young · filed 2014-01-31(g)(1)

In order to convict Young of being a felon in possession, the jury had to find that Young had a previous felony conviction, that he knowingly possessed the firearm specified in the indictment, and that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) requires proof that the defendant is an illegal alien, knowingly possessed a firearm, and that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Luna-Santillanes · filed 2014-02-07(g)(5)(A)

To support a conviction under § 922(g)(5), the Government must show that: (1) the defendant is an illegal alien, (2) he knowingly possessed the firearm, and (3) the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior felony conviction and knowing possession of a firearm affecting interstate commerce after that conviction.

United States v. Williams · filed 2014-06-26(g)(1)

The jury convicted Williams of possessing a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under the former statute, the Government had to show that Williams committed a drug trafficking crime and knowingly possessed a firearm in furtherance of that crime. Under the latter statute, Williams had to be convicted of a prior felony and knowingly possess a firearm affecting interstate commerce after the prior conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from knowingly possessing a firearm that affected or was in interstate commerce.

United States v. Felix · filed 2014-11-19(g)(1)

Section § 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a felon knowingly to possess a firearm that affected or was in interstate commerce. ... We conclude that there was ample evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found Felix guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1) makes firearm possession criminal for people with a qualifying felony conviction; the prior conviction is a status separate from the act of possession.

United States v. Thomas Mills, Sr. · filed 2014-12-08(g)(1)

Section 922(g) does not, as Mills would have it, criminalize the act of possessing-a-firearm-while-being-a-felon. Rather, it renders the possessory act a criminal one, and then applies the statute only to a limited subset of people -- convicted felons.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and the firearm’s movement in interstate commerce.

United States v. Sewell · filed 2015-03-13(g)(1)

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) criminalizes a felon’s possession of any firearm affecting interstate commerce. Accordingly, the statute requires proof of three elements: (1) a prior felony conviction; (2) possession of the firearm; and (3) the firearm’s movement in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a person previously convicted of a felony punishable by more than one year in prison knowingly possessed a firearm that had traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Kelvin Brown · filed 2016-01-11(g)(1)

In order to secure a conviction on Count 12 under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the Government had to show that Brown had previously been convicted of a felony punishable by a term of imprisonment of over one year and had knowingly possessed a firearm that had traveled in interstate or foreign commerce. ... Accordingly, the Government satisfied its burden of proof on Count 12.

Section 922(g)(1) does not make a firearm’s capacity to accept a large magazine an element of the offense when that capacity does not change the statutory punishment.

United States v. Reid · filed 2016-07-05(g)(1)

That the assault rifle was capable of accepting a large capacity magazine, however, did not increase the statutory minimum or maximum punishment, and it was thus not an element of the violation under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a qualifying prior conviction, knowing possession of a firearm, and the firearm’s shipment or transportation in interstate commerce.

United States v. Bacote · filed 2016-08-12(g)(1)

To convict Bacote of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the jury must have found that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Bacote: (1) prior to June 23, 2015 — the date of the offense— had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and (2) knowingly and intentionally possessed a firearm that (3) had been shipped or transported in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was a felon, voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm, and that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Williams · filed 2016-12-15(g)(1)

To convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government must establish that: (1) the defendant was a felon; (2) he voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm; and (3) the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof of homicide to establish unlawful firearm possession by a felon.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2017-06-07(g)(1)

Homicide, obviously, is not an essential element 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a point that is underscored by the fact that when Defendants were initially charged with this crime there was no mention of Starks’ murder.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a convicted felon knowingly possessed a firearm that moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Henry · filed 2017-11-30(g)(1)

To convict Henry of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government had to prove that he is a convicted felon who knowingly possessed a firearm, and that the firearm moved in interstate commerce. United States v. Morales, 758 F.3d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 2014). Henry stipulated that he was a convicted felon and that the gun at issue had moved in interstate commerce. Additionally, a pawn shop owner testified that Henry sold him a firearm. This evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.

Section 922(g) does not require proof that a felon fired the firearm he possessed.

United States v. Cormier · filed 2018-12-28(g)

Moreover, as the District Court correctly explained, the fact that Cormier may not have fired a shot is irrelevant to his claim of factual innocence, as discharging the firearm is not an element of the charged offense, § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition, was a convicted felon, and that the firearm or ammunition was in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Kennon · filed 2019-02-15(g)(1)

To prove that a defendant violated § 922(g)(1), the government must show that he knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition, that he was a convicted felon, and that the firearm or ammunition was in or affecting interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm by a person with a prior felony conviction when the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Harper · filed 2019-03-22(g)(1)

Harper stipulated that he had a prior felony conviction and that the gun was transported in interstate com- merce. In order to find him guilty, the jury thus had only to find that he knowingly pos- sessed the gun.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require that a firearm be used to further another crime.

Rouson v. Kallis · filed 2019-04-29(g)(1)

However, § 922(g)(1) only requires possession of a firearm—not that it be used in the furtherance of another crime like a § 924(c) offense.

A felon-in-possession conviction under § 922(g)(1) requires proof of status, possession, a connection to interstate commerce, and a firearm.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2019-08-19(g)(1)

There are four elements to the charged offense: (1) status, (2) possession, (3) jurisdiction (“in or affecting commerce”), and (4) a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that the people pursuing him are law enforcement officers.

Adams v. United States · filed 2019-09-17(g)(1)

Knowledge that the persons in the van or who pursued him were law enforcement officers was not an element of the crime and had no bearing on the verdict.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a convicted felon, knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition, and that the firearm or ammunition was in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Katadrew Jamon Smith · filed 2020-01-08(g)(1)

To sustain a conviction for possession of a firearm or ammunition by a convicted felon, the government must prove that (1) the defendant knew that he was a convicted felon; (2) he was in knowing possession of a firearm or ammunition; and (3) the firearm or ammunition was in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a felon's possession of firearms to be separate from any ownership rights in them.

United States v. Rivers · filed 2020-01-09(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) contains no requirement that the possession of firearms by a convicted felon be divorced from any ownership rights in the firearms, and Henderson does not purport to add any such element.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was a felon, knew he was a felon, knowingly possessed a firearm, and that the firearm had traveled through interstate commerce.

United States v. Ward · filed 2020-04-30(g)(1)

To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant was a felon; (2) the defendant knew he was a felon (from Rehaif); (3) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; and (4) that the firearm had traveled through interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to prove that the exceptions in § 921(a)(20) are inapplicable.

United States v. Nicholson · filed 2020-04-30(g)(1)

Nicholson contends that the inapplicability of the exceptions outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) is an element of a section 922(g)(1) offense, and that the government failed to prove that those exceptions do not apply here. Our decisions are inconsistent with that theory.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was a convicted felon, knew he possessed a firearm, and the firearm affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Bell · filed 2020-06-18(g)(1)

Under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that (1) the defendant was a convicted felon; (2) that the defendant knew he was in possession of a firearm; and (3) that the firearm affected or was in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon, knowingly possessed a firearm, and that the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. De Aza · filed 2020-09-10(g)(1)

Lastly, to sustain a conviction for Count 3, the government must have proven three elements: (1) that De Aza was a convicted felon and knew he was a felon; (2) that De Aza was in knowing possession of a firearm; and (3) that the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) requires a knowing offense and possession of a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce; controlling circuit precedent foreclosed the challenges to those elements here.

United States v. Priestley · filed 2008-02-12(g)

Priestly further argues that the district court plainly erred in finding that the facts stipulated in connection with his plea established that he possessed the weapon “in or affecting interstate commerce” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) or that he knowingly committed the offense; however, he correctly concedes that his argument is foreclosed by this court’s precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of a prior felony conviction, knowingly possessed the firearm specified in the indictment, and that the possession was in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2020-12-09(g)(1)

To prove this charge, the government had to show that: (1) Johnson knew he had a prior felony conviction; (2) he knowingly possessed the firearm specified in the indictment; and (3) the possession was in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon, but not that he knew he was barred from possessing firearms.

Broome v. United States · filed 2021-06-01(g)(1)

Petitioner’s suggestion that Rehaif required the Petitioner to know that he was barred from possessing firearms is rejected; Rehaif requires knowledge only that he possessed a firearm and that he is a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a person who knows he is a felon to knowingly possess a firearm that affected commerce; it does not require a killing.

United States v. Ball · filed 2021-11-18(g)(1)

The Virginia murder statute under which he was convicted — Virginia Code § 18.2-31(6) — punishes the “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a law-enforcement officer,” while the federal statute — 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) — makes it unlawful for a convicted felon, knowing his status as such, to knowingly possess a firearm that affected commerce. Thus, the state murder violation requires proof of a killing, whereas the federal firearm violation does not. Conversely, the federal firearm violation requires proof that the defendant was a felon, while the state murder violation does not. Therefore, under the Blockburger test, they are not the same offense.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was a felon, voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm, and that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Dennis · filed 2021-12-03(g)(1)

The government had to prove that (1) Dennis was a felon, (2) he “voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm,” and (3) the firearm “traveled in interstate commerce.” ... But at day’s end, the jury was entitled to take Officer McAndrew at his word.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a gun, knew he was barred from possessing one, had a qualifying prior conviction, and that the gun had traveled in or affected interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Shaffers · filed 2022-01-05(g)(1)

To convict Shaffers, the government needed to prove that (1) he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison, (2) he knowingly possessed the gun, (3) he knew he was in a category of persons barred from possessing a gun, and (4) the gun had traveled in or affected interstate or foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of a qualifying conviction, knowingly possessed a firearm, and that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Romar Bartee, Jr. · filed 2022-08-11(g)(1)

To sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), the government must prove (1) that the defendant knew he had been convicted of an offense punishable by a term exceeding one year of imprisonment, (2) that he knowingly possessed a firearm, and (3) that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. ... Based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found that Bartee knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was a felon, knew of that status, and knowingly possessed a firearm.

United States v. James · filed 2022-10-31(g)(1)

Moreover, based on James’s post-Miranda statements, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that James was a felon, that he knew of his status of a felon, and that he knowingly possessed a firearm, which is all that is required for the offense of felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year knowingly possessed ammunition, knew of the prior felony conviction, and that the ammunition had crossed state lines.

United States v. Michael Mills · filed 2023-11-17(g)(1)

To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that Mills has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (2) that Mills, following his conviction, knowingly possessed the ammunition; (3) that at the time Mills possessed the ammunition, he knew that he was previously convicted of a felony; and (4) that the ammunition crossed state lines prior to the possession.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was a felon, knowingly possessed a firearm, and that the firearm affected or was in interstate commerce.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2024-01-05(g)(1)

To sustain a conviction under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that: (1) the defendant was a felon; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) the firearm affected or was in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Ron Garland · filed 2024-06-25(g)(1)

And to sustain a conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, the Government must prove, as relevant here, that the defendant knowingly possessed, in or affecting interstate commerce, a firearm. ... Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports Garland’s convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to own a firearm to possess it.

Bible v. United States · filed 2025-01-13(g)(1)

Moreover, Defendant’s claims are premised upon his misunderstanding of what is required to demonstrate possession for purposes of § 922(g)(1). To be convicted under that statute, a defendant need not own the firearm in order to possess the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, knowledge of that conviction, knowing firearm possession, and the firearm’s interstate travel; a stipulation to all four elements relieves the government of proving them.

United States v. Watson · filed 2025-07-09(g)(1)

To prove guilt under § 922(g)(1), the government was otherwise required prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (i) the defendant had a prior felony conviction, (ii) the defendant knew that he had a prior felony conviction, (iii) the defendant thereafter knowingly possessed the firearm specified in the indictment, and (iv) the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. ... The district court did not err in accepting Watson’s stipulation to all four elements for felony possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce and knew he was a convicted felon.

Moore v. United States · filed 2025-09-22(g)(1)

To prove a violation of § 922(g)(1), the United States must prove that a defendant knowingly possessed a firearm in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce and that the defendant knew he was a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof of a specific predicate felony; a stipulation that tracks the statute establishes the prior conviction element.

United States v. Ducksworth · filed 2025-11-26(g)(1)

The Supreme Court has specifically held that allegation of a specific predicate felony is not required. ... Diaz did not, and could not, add this requirement to § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he had a prior conviction punishable by more than one year.

Davis · filed 2026-01-28(g)(1)

Rehaif teaches that the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm, such as a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a qualifying prior conviction, knowing possession of a firearm affecting interstate commerce, and knowledge of the person’s prohibited status.

United States v. Tyus · filed 2026-02-18(g)(1)

To convict Tyus of being a felon in possession of a firearm under § 922(g), the Government had to prove four elements: (1) “previous conviction of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year,” (2) “knowing possession of a firearm,” (3) “the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce,” and (4) that Tyus “knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was a convicted felon, knowingly possessed a firearm, and that the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Deion Larry Jamar Mangum · filed 2026-02-19(g)(1)

To convict a defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm, the government must prove that: (1) the defendant was a convicted felon; (2) the defendant was in knowing possession of a firearm; and (3) the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon.

United States v. Jddarrian Irons · filed 2026-05-26(g)(1)

Irons’s felon-in-possession conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and his concealed-carry violation, FLA. STAT. § 790.01(3), are distinct offenses. To establish the former, the government must prove that Irons knowingly possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on coconspirator liability or aiding and abetting when the defendant joins a criminal plan knowing confederates have guns.

United States v. Conley · filed 2017-11-14(g)(1)

Under both the theory of shared culpability of conspirators under Pinkerton and that for aiding and abetting under Rosemond, Conley is liable for being a felon in posses- sion of a weapon.

An indictment for aiding and abetting a § 922(g)(1) offense must allege the felon’s knowing possession of a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce, and the aider’s knowledge of the prohibition and actual assistance.

United States v. Huet · filed 2012-01-05(g)(1)

Thus, a valid indictment under § 922(g)(1) based on an aiding and abetting theory must allege that: (1) the principal, who had been convicted of a crime carrying a term of imprisonment in excess of one year, knowingly possessed a firearm that had traveled in interstate commerce, Higdon, 638 F.3d at 239-40, and (2) the defendant knew or had reason to know that the principal was prohibited from possessing a firearm, Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286-87, and rendered actual aid or assistance to the principal in possessing the firearm, United States v. Nolan, 718 F.2d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 1983).

Aiding and abetting unlicensed firearms dealing does not require knowledge of multiple transactions if the defendants know the dealer holds himself out as a source of firearms and is ready to procure them for customers.

United States v. Nadirashvili · filed 2011-08-23(a)(1)(A)

Thus, the government did not need to prove that Nadirashvili and Chvelidze were aware that Solomonyan was actually engaged in multiple transactions, but rather that they knew Solomonyan had held himself “out as a source of firearms” and was ready to procure them for his customers.

Aiding and abetting a § 922(g)(1) violation requires proof that the defendant knew or had cause to know the person possessing the firearm was a convicted felon.

United States v. Gardner · filed 2007-05-25(g)(1)

However, we sustain Gardner’s challenge to his aiding-and-abetting conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 2 because the government presented insufficient evidence that Gardner knew or had cause to know of the principal’s status as a convicted felon.

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that an aider and abettor knew false statements would be made when firearms were purchased from a federally licensed dealer.

United States v. Alexander · filed 2008-03-20(a)(6)

Significantly, there was no evidence at trial from which a jury could infer that Alexander knew that false statements would be made in the purchase of firearms or that the firearms would be purchased from a federally-licensed firearms dealer. Under these facts, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could have convicted Alexander beyond a reasonable doubt for aiding and abetting a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6).

For a conspiracy to supply a firearm to a felon under § 922(g)(1), the government need not prove the supplier knew the felon was prohibited from obtaining a firearm; it must prove she knowingly supplied the firearm.

United States v. Hyles · filed 2008-04-08(g)(1)

The Government was not required to prove that Hyles knew Carter was prohibited from obtaining a firearm; it had to prove only that Hyles knowingly provided Carter with a firearm.

A person who knows or has reason to know someone is a felon and assists that person in possessing a firearm may be convicted of aiding and abetting the felon’s firearm possession.

United States v. Samuels · filed 2008-04-10(g)(1)

Therefore, to aid and abet a felon in possession of a firearm, the defendant must know or have reason to know that the individual is a felon at the time of the aiding and abetting, and, in turn, must assist the felon in possessing a firearm.

Aiding and abetting a felon’s possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1) requires proof that the aider knew or had cause to know the possessor was a convicted felon.

United States v. Ecklin · filed 2011-12-22(g)(1)

Since the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Winstead requires a defendant to be aware of the principal’s criminal intent and the unlawful nature of his acts, this Court finds the reasoning the Third and Sixth’s Circuits to be persuasive and adopts it here because a defendant can only be aware of the unlawful nature of the principal’s being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition if he knows that the principal was a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a felon’s firearm possession as a continuing violation that another person can aid without helping the felon acquire the gun.

United States v. Manso-Cepeda · filed 2016-01-20(g)(1)

It follows that a defendant may aid and abet a convicted felon's possession of a gun under § 922(g)(1) without contributing to his acquisition of the firearm.

Aiding and abetting a felon's firearm possession under § 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of the disqualifying conviction or knowledge that the possession is unlawful; reason to know alone is insufficient.

United States v. Ford · filed 2016-04-13(g)(1)

Similarly, but for James's criminal history, there would have been no gun possession crime under section 922(g)(1). Hence, if Darlene was not aware of that history, she could not have acted with the requisite criminal purpose.

Section 922(j) permits an aiding and abetting instruction when the evidence supports a finding that the defendant knowingly helped another possess stolen firearms.

United States v. Seabrooks · filed 2016-10-19(j)

Here, the trial evidence showed that Seabrooks aided Butler in committing a § 922(j) violation, thus authorizing the aiding and abetting instruction.

Aiding and abetting a felon-in-possession offense requires knowledge that the principal possessed a firearm.

United States v. Lopez-Soto · filed 2020-05-21(g)(1)

The evidence supported a finding that López-Soto knew García possessed and would brandish the revolver.

Section 922(g)(1) does not allow an innocent possession defense on the facts of a felon carrying a gun to a cash-for-guns program.

United States v. Miles · filed 2014-04-10(g)(1)

Miles next contends that the district court erred in not entertaining an “innocent possession” defense in his prosecution under § 922(g)(1). ... Although we do not here announce a new rule, we believe that the district court correctly held that on the facts averred by Miles he would be unable to assert such a defense.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a fleeting-possession instruction to bolster a coercion-or-duress defense under well-settled law, so refusing one is not plain error.

United States v. Gonzales · filed 2012-08-14(g)(1)

Based upon the foregoing alone, the district court’s denial of Ms. Gonzales’s request for a fleeting-possession instruction could not be deemed contrary to well-settled law (i.e., an instance of clear or obvious error).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require an innocent-possession jury instruction when the evidence does not show transitory, innocent possession or an intent to turn the firearm over to police.

United States v. Langforddavis · filed 2011-12-08(g)(1)

Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Langforddavis, nothing indicates that Langforddavis’s possession was transitory and innocent: Upon realizing he possessed a firearm, Langforddavis chose to pick his girlfriend up from work. Furthermore, in concealing the firearm and leaving the weapon loaded, Langforddavis’s actions belie any intent to turn the weapon over to police. Thus, we find the District Court did not err in denying Langforddavis’s request for jury instructions on an affirmative defense to a § 922(g)(1) crime of innocent possession.

A fleeting possession defense to a § 922(g) charge, if available, requires innocent possession.

United States v. Kelly · filed 2010-11-18(g)

But no matter how short that period, it would have no bearing on a fleeting possession defense, as that defense depended on Holloway’s possession being innocent and there is no basis in the record to support a finding that the possession was innocent.

Section 922(g)(1) does not recognize a separate innocent possession defense to a felon-in-possession charge.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2010-03-12(g)(1)

Defendant’s innocent possession argument fails for two reasons. First, we have not recognized such a defense and decline to do so in this case.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing firearm possession, so evidence that possession was unintentional bears on that element; an innocent-possession instruction was unwarranted on these facts and without circuit precedent recognizing the defense.

United States v. Lindsey · filed 2009-11-19(g)(1)

The Court allowed Defendant to present the evidence to the jury because the Court concluded that this evidence was relevant to whether Defendant’s possession was knowing. However, the Court declined to give an instruction regarding the affirmative defense of innocent possession, because that defense has not been recognized by the Third Circuit.

Even assuming § 922(g)(1) permits an innocent possession defense, a defendant who kept a gun longer than necessary to surrender it is not entitled to an instruction on that defense.

United States v. Brantley · filed 2009-08-27(g)(1)

Thus, even assuming arguendo that innocent possession is a viable defense to a section 922(g)(1) charge and accepting Brantley’s testimony, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to give the requested charge on this record.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require an innocent possession instruction when the defendant could have promptly turned over a found firearm to police but kept it.

United States v. Daniels · filed 2007-09-20(g)(1)

The District Court properly denied Daniels’ request for a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of innocent possession. That affirmative defense has not been recognized by this court. Moreover, even if it had been available, Daniels cannot establish that it applies here.

Section 922(g) does not permit an innocent and transitory possession jury instruction.

United States v. Boyd · filed 2007-06-15(g)

We find no error in the district court’s decision to deny Boyd’s request as we have previously rejected this instruction in § 922(g) cases.

Section 922(g)(1) does not provide an innocent possession defense when a felon knowingly possesses ammunition.

United States v. Baker · filed 2007-12-06(g)(1)

Because we conclude that "innocent possession" is not a defense to being a felon in possession of ammunition, we conclude that the District Court did not err in refusing to tender such an instruction.

Under § 922(g)(1), buying and carrying ammunition without trying to give it up does not support a temporary innocent possession instruction, even assuming that defense exists.

United States v. Palma · filed 2008-01-04(g)(1)

Indeed, Appellant presented no affirmative evidence whatsoever that he attempted to rid himself of the ammunition. These facts simply do not support an “innocent transitory possession” instruction.

Section 922(g)(1) does not allow an innocent possession defense to a charge that a felon possessed ammunition.

United States v. Baker · filed 2008-04-29(g)(1)

Because we conclude that “innocent possession” is not a defense to being a felon in possession of ammunition, we conclude that the District Court did not err in refusing to tender such an instruction.

A defendant charged under § 922(g) is not entitled to an innocent possession instruction without evidence that he intended to turn the firearm over to police promptly, even assuming the defense is available.

United States v. Broadus · filed 2008-09-09(g)

Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has adopted the innocent possession defense to a felon-in-possession charge, see United States v. Mason, 233 F.3d 619 (D.C. Cir. 2001), this court has not done so. In any event, even if we followed Mason, Broadus cannot establish that he fits within that holding.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a fleeting possession instruction when the defendant carried a firearm out of an apartment building and across parking lots before discarding it.

United States v. Williamson · filed 2009-03-05(g)(1)

We need not reach that issue in the present case, since, in our view, even if this Circuit recognized the defense of “fleeting possession,” the facts of the present case would not necessitate giving the “fleeting possession instruction.” Defendant’s “possession” was not “fleeting.”

Even if innocent transitory possession is a defense to § 922(g)(1), a defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on it without sufficient supporting evidence.

United States v. Giles · filed 2009-08-28(g)(1)

We find it unnecessary to determine the availability of an innocent-transitory-possession defense to a § 922(g) charge. Assuming that such a defense is available, we find that Giles did not provide a sufficient evidentiary basis in the record to support the instruction.

A court does not plainly err by omitting an innocent possession instruction for a § 922(g)(1) charge while the defense’s availability remains unsettled.

United States v. Starr · filed 2010-01-13(g)(1)

Second, the district court did not plainly err in failing to instruct the jury as to the “innocent possession” defense to § 922(g)(1). Because this Court has not recognized the availability of the innocent intent defense to § 922(g)(1), there is a circuit split, and there is no precedent from the Supreme Court resolving the issue, there cannot have been plain error, which is the applicable standard to be applied.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a fleeting possession instruction based solely on momentary handling of a firearm.

United States v. Washington · filed 2010-02-23(g)(1)

Although this circuit has discussed a fleeting possession defense, we have never recognized one. ... Mr. Washington has never contended that he did not know he was handling the guns or that he had a legally justifiable reason to do so. His defense at trial was that he handled them momentarily or not at all. Because the evidence, at best, would support a favorable finding as to only the first element of a fleeting possession defense, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to so instruct the jury.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) cannot obtain an innocent transitory possession instruction without evidence supporting the defense, even if the defense is assumed to exist.

United States v. Warwick · filed 2013-01-08(g)(1)

Here, as in Palma, even if we presume the existence of an innocent transitory possession defense, Warwick never proffered any facts nor presented evidence that would support a foundation for an innocent transitory possession defense. Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying the proposed jury instruction.

Section 922(j) permits an innocent possession defense when a person acquires a firearm without knowing it is stolen and promptly relinquishes it after learning the truth.

United States v. Baird · filed 2013-04-05(j)

Here, we hold only that defendants prosecuted under § 922(j) must receive, at minimum, the innocent possession defense afforded by Teemer.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to an innocent possession instruction when possession is more than fleeting and lacks significant justification.

United States v. Williams · filed 2013-06-04(g)(1)

While we have not decided “whether to recognize an innocent possession defense in the section 922(g)(1) context,” United States v. White, 552 F.3d 240, 249 (2d Cir. 2009), we have repeatedly rejected efforts to assert such a defense where the possession was not “momentar[y],” United States v. Paul, 110 F.3d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1997), or “only for as long as necessary” to deal with a justifying necessity of some kind, White, 552 F.3d at 249. Here, Williams stated his intent to take the gun home with him in the middle of the night and proceeded to walk down the street while carrying it. As Williams’s possession was much longer than fleeting, and Williams has presented no significant justification for possessing the firearm, such as a protection of a child, the district court correctly declined to instruct the jury on the innocent possession defense.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) does not support an innocent possession jury instruction for an illegal alien charged with possessing a firearm.

United States v. Sanchez-Equihua · filed 2013-09-30(g)(5)(A)

As acknowledged by Sanchez, this issue is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Johnson, 459 F.3d 990, 994-96 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s decision not to give the requested innocent possession jury instruction.

Section 922(g)(1) does not recognize innocent or transitory possession as a defense.

United States v. Santiago · filed 2013-12-20(g)(1)

Moreover, innocent or transitory possession is not a valid defense under section 922(g).

A defendant charged under § 922(j) is not entitled to a transitory-possession instruction when the evidence establishes knowing possession of the stolen gun for at least fifty days.

United States v. Habibi · filed 2015-03-20(j)

Thus, the evidence admits of only the conclusion that Habibi was in knowing possession of the gun for at least fifty days. ... And such a time period is hardly fleeting.

In the Sixth Circuit, a defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to a jury instruction on fleeting or innocent possession.

United States v. Tommy Slaughter · filed 2018-09-27(g)(1)

Slaughter asked the court to provide the jury with an instruction on the “fleeting or momentary possession” and “innocent possession” defenses. ... Slaughter cannot show that his requested instruction is a correct statement of applicable federal law because, as he admits, it is a defense adopted only by the D.C. Circuit. The district court did not abuse its discretion.

Section 922(g)(1) provides no innocent transitory possession defense to a felon-in-possession charge.

United States v. Ernest Vereen, Jr. · filed 2019-04-05(g)(1)

In any event, we’re bound by the unambiguous language contained in § 922(g)(1), and this leaves no room for an innocent or transitory exception, however narrowly the D.C. Circuit may have drawn it.

A felon charged under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to an innocent possession instruction without a justification such as necessity or duress.

United States v. Cherry · filed 2019-04-17(g)(1)

First, as the district court noted, we have never recognized the innocent possession defense outside situations in which the defendant can establish a justification ... like necessity or duress.

Section 922(g)(1) does not allow an innocent transitory possession defense to a felon-in-possession charge.

United States v. Faircloth · filed 2019-05-06(g)(1)

His requested jury instruction did not “correctly state the law” in this Circuit because it included a defense which we had not adopted at the time, and which we have subsequently rejected.

Section 922(g)(1) has no innocent-possessor defense; a felon’s knowing possession of a firearm or ammunition is prohibited regardless of motive.

United States v. Becerra · filed 2020-05-07(g)(1)

Neither statute requires Becerra to have possessed either for a nefarious purpose. Knowing possession, regardless of motive, is all that matters.

Section 922(g)(1) does not support an innocent possession instruction when possession was more than momentary and no justifying necessity existed.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2020-06-17(g)(1)

While this Court has yet to rule definitively on the existence of an innocent possession defense to § 922(g), our prior cases have made clear that the defense is not available “where the possession was not momentary or only for as long as necessary to deal with a justifying necessity of some kind.” ... Thus, even taking into consideration the facts set forth in Johnson’s affidavit, there would have been no evidentiary basis in this case for an innocent possession defense, and the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury as to the defense was not error.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm and does not recognize an innocent or transitory possession defense.

United States v. Allen · filed 2022-08-09(g)(1)

This Court has held there is no innocent or transitory possession defense to a felon in possession of a firearm charge. ... Mr. Allen’s proffered jury instruction is an incorrect statement of the law. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Mr. Allen’s “innocent or transitory” possession instruction.

Section 922(g)(1) affords no innocent possession defense on facts where a felon leaves a loaded firearm in a crowded store, hides from police, and reveals its location only after arrest.

United States v. Sorensen · filed 2023-07-11(g)(1)

We decline to recognize an innocent possession defense to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in this case.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a special verdict identifying which firearm a felon possessed when the jury agrees that the felon possessed at least one of them.

United States v. Metts · filed 2014-09-11(g)(1)

A special verdict was unnecessary when the jury had to agree that Metts possessed any one of the six firearms.

Section 922(g) does not require jurors to agree on which firearm a felon possessed because the particular firearm is not an element of the offense.

United States v. Charles Pollock, Jr. · filed 2014-07-01(g)

Accordingly, “the particu- lar firearm possessed is not an element of the crime under section 922(g), but instead the means used to satisfy the ele- ment of ‘any firearm.’” Id. at 542. We thus see no error, let alone plain error, in the instruction the district court gave to the jury.

Section 922(g)(1) does not make the date of firearm possession a material element, so a general unanimity instruction can suffice when the evidence concerns possession on different dates.

United States v. Alcorn · filed 2011-05-13(g)(1)

Noting that the date of possession is "not a material element of the felon in possession of a firearm charge," we rejected the notion that evidence and arguments about a date other than that listed in the indictment "contributed to the existence of a variance or a constructive amendment" of the indictment. Howe, 538 F.3d at 851 n.4. For the same reasons, we conclude that the district court committed no plain error in its decision to give the jury only a general unanimity instruction.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require jurors to agree on which particular firearm the defendant possessed.

United States v. Talbert · filed 2007-09-25(g)(1)

Talbert challenges this instruction on appeal, arguing that it improperly allowed conviction even if the jurors were not unanimous as to which gun he actually possessed. ... The Sixth Circuit, the only other of our sister courts to have addressed this issue, expressly adopted the “careful analysis” of Verrecchia. United States v. DeJohn, 368 F.3d 533, 542 (6th Cir. 2004). We do the same.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm, but jurors need not agree on which firearm.

United States v. Carey · filed 2009-02-19(g)(1)

To convict Mr. Carey of unlawful possession, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed “any firearm” on October 11, 2007. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Jury unanimity on the specific firearm is not required.

For a § 922(g)(3) count involving firearms found in the same transaction, jurors need not agree on which firearm the defendant possessed.

United States v. Case · filed 2009-07-28(g)(3)

In the present case, Counts 5 and 7 were not so complex that there existed a chance of jury confusion or of differing outcomes with regard to the firearms located in and around the defendant’s residence. The proof at trial established that each of the firearms listed in these specific counts of the indictment were all seized in and around the residence of the defendant and were discovered “as part of the same transaction.” This is particularly true where the particular firearms described in the indictment are not elements of the offenses charged but rather are the means used to satisfy the element of “a firearm” having been possessed.

Section 922(g) possession is presumed continuous absent specific evidence that the defendant lost possession, so a single continuous possession charge does not require a specific unanimity instruction.

United States v. Raymond Ruiz, Jr. · filed 2013-03-26(g)

Indeed, possession is presumed continuous absent specific evidence that the defendant lost possession at some point.

For a single § 922(g)(1) offense on one date, jurors need not agree whether the defendant possessed the firearm or the ammunition.

United States v. Jemison · filed 2016-08-10(g)(1)

Jemison was charged with a single offense – being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) – on a single date. The district court did not err by failing to provide a specific unanimity instruction as to which specific object constituted the item possessed.

For a § 922(g)(1) conviction, jurors must agree that the defendant possessed a firearm or ammunition, but need not agree on the particular item when the possession rests on the same act.

United States v. Workman · filed 2018-11-09(g)(1)

All that was required to satisfy the second element of § 922(g)(1), then, was that Workman’s constructive possession—the act—extended to any firearm or ammunition listed in the indictment. As such, ... there was no risk a conviction would result from different jurors concluding that Workman committed different acts when the “act” necessary for conviction was possession of “any” firearm or ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) does not plainly require a special instruction that jurors agree on the particular firearm or ammunition possessed when the indictment charges possession on a specific date.

United States v. Davis · filed 2019-06-12(g)(1)

Here, Davis has not established plain error. Davis has identified no “on-point precedent in this Court or the Supreme Court” holding that a special unanimity instruction is required in the circumstances presented by this case.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a felon's continuous possession of the same firearm as one offense, so jurors need not agree on the precise time of possession within the charged period.

United States v. Estevez · filed 2020-06-05(g)(1)

We conclude that the indictment properly charged, and the government proved, the single offense of Estevez's possession of the Firearm during the period alleged. The instruction requested by Estevez would have incorrectly charged the jury that the Indictment charged him with two offenses rather than one. As possession is a continuing offense, the jury was not required unanimously to pinpoint a precise time at which Estevez possessed the Firearm within the period alleged.

Section 922(g)(1) treats actual and constructive possession as different ways to prove possession; jurors need not agree on which theory applies.

United States v. Crump · filed 2023-04-11(g)(1)

Here, we are dealing with one element under one crime—possession under § 922(g)—with some different means to get there. ... Actual and constructive possession aren’t alternative elements for Crump’s conviction. Rather, they are different ways for the government to prove an element—possession. ... And here a unanimous jury found the element, so it doesn’t matter which tool they used to get there. As a ... result, nothing required Crump’s proposed instruction.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require jurors to agree on which firearm a felon possessed when the firearms were possessed simultaneously as one course of conduct.

United States v. Day · filed 2024-07-01(g)(1)

Jurors were free to consider either the silver Smith & Wesson or the American Tactical for purposes of the § 922(g)(1) charge.

Section 922(g) requires jurors to agree that the defendant possessed a firearm or ammunition, but not which particular firearm or piece of ammunition the defendant possessed.

United States v. Morris · filed 2025-03-19(g)

We conclude that § 922(g) does not require jury unanimity as to which of multiple firearms or pieces of ammunition a defendant possessed.

Repeal of Section 922(v) does not invalidate a conviction under Section 922(g)(1).

United States v. Roberson · filed 2007-10-18(g)(1)

Fourth, the repeal of 18 U.S.C. § 922(v) does not invalidate his conviction under section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(9) is nonpunitive, so a qualifying domestic-violence misdemeanor may be established by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil firearms-license proceeding.

D'ALESSANDRO v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2007-11-21(g)(9)

Because Section 922(g)(9) of the Federal Gun Control Act is nonpunitive, see Lehman v. Pa. State Police, 839 A.2d at 273, and this case involves a civil proceeding, the AALJ's finding needed only to rest on proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

In a § 922(g)(1) indictment, a repeated allegation of a qualifying prior conviction and details of the prior offense and sentence may be stricken as prejudicial surplusage.

United States v. Torres-Gonzalez · filed 2007-11-30(g)(1)

To prove a charge of being a felon-in-possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government must show that (1) the defendant was previously convicted of an offense requiring imprisonment exceeding one year and (2) he knowingly possessed a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce. ... Thus, the second paragraph of each of the counts shall be stricken because said paragraphs constitute prejudicial surplusage.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) prohibits an alien who entered unlawfully from possessing firearms while an application for adjustment of status is pending, even if the alien has an employment authorization document.

United States v. Ochoa-Colchado · filed 2008-04-11(g)(5)(A)

We conclude that Defendant, despite his filing of an application for adjustment of status and receipt of an EAD, was still “illegally or unlawfully in the United States” for purposes of § 922(g)(5)(A).

A pending application for adjustment of status does not by itself make an alien legally present under § 922(g)(5)(A).

United States v. Mendiola-Martinez · filed 2010-03-02(g)(5)(A)

This contention fails because Mendiola-Martinez’s pending I-485 application for adjustment of status does not affect his removability, and Mendiola-Martinez points to no statute that renders his presence lawful based upon his application for adjustment of status.

Section 922(n) treats taking possession of firearms retrieved from another person as receipt.

United States v. Fierro · filed 2008-04-18(n)

At rearraignment, Fierro admitted that he possessed two of the weapons charged in the indictment, and admitted to meeting his friend, Beto, at his grandparents’ house for the specific purpose of retrieving two weapons, which constitutes “receipt” under the statute.

Section 922(g)(1) allows an entrapment-by-estoppel defense only when the defendant relied on a federal official’s misstatement of the law; permission from a state probation officer does not suffice.

United States v. Mayico Alphonso Golden · filed 2008-06-30(g)(1)

First, unlike in Thompson, even if Golden’s testimony were all true, because his probation officer was a state rather than a federal agent, his testimony was irrelevant to an entrapment-by-estoppel defense.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) cannot establish entrapment by estoppel by relying on state officials’ assurances that firearm possession is lawful.

United States v. Viola · filed 2019-04-17(g)(1)

Viola cannot avail himself of the entrapment-by-estoppel defense. ... Thus, the defense does not apply when, as here, a defendant relies on a state official’s assurances to his detriment under federal law.

Section 922(g)(3) and (n) have applications consistent with the Second Amendment, and § 922(g)(3) gives sufficient notice to a person using methamphetamine daily when possessing a firearm.

United States v. Stennerson · filed 2025-09-09(g)(3), (n)

Thus, we hold that § 922(g)(3) is facially constitutional because in at least these circumstances, the restriction that it imposes “is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” ... Stennerson’s “drug use was sufficiently consistent, ‘prolonged,’ and close in time to his gun possession to put him on notice that he qualified as an unlawful user of drugs under § 922(g)(3).” ... Given our decision in Perez-Garcia that the historical record supports complete pretrial disarmament, § 922(n)’s lesser burden on Second Amendment rights is at least constitutional as applied to those indicted for offenses that triggered pretrial detention at the founding.

Section 922(d)(1)’s ban on transferring firearms to known felons survives a facial Second Amendment challenge because lawful limits on possession also limit the right to acquire firearms.

United States v. Freddie Knipp, Jr. · filed 2025-05-19(d)(1)

Because this circuit has upheld the federal felon-in-possession law against facial attack, Knipp’s facial challenge to § 922(d)(1) likewise fails.

Section 922(g)(5)(A)’s prohibition on firearm possession by an illegal alien is facially constitutional under the Second Amendment in the Fifth Circuit.

United States v. Pineda-Guevara · filed 2025-04-30(g)(5)(A)

The Government has moved for summary affirmance, citing ... both of which upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(5)(A) and foreclose Pineda-Guevara’s constitutional challenge, as the Government correctly contends.

A facial Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Elliott · filed 2025-05-06(g)(1)

Elliott’s constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed.

A challenge to § 922(n) under Bruen does not establish plain error when the provision’s constitutionality remains reasonably disputed.

United States v. Morrison · filed 2023-03-06(n)

This court has rejected the notion that § 922(n) is clearly or obviously unconstitutional under Bruen. See United States v. Avila, No. 22-50088, 2022 WL 17832287, at *2 (5th Cir. Dec. 21, 2022) (unpublished). The issue is therefore subject to reasonable dispute, so Morrison cannot demonstrate clear or obvious error.

Section 922(g)(9)’s firearm ban for people convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence is subject to an as-applied Second Amendment challenge.

United States v. Glisson · filed 2012-01-05(g)(9)

In light of Chester, we believe that remand of this issue is appropriate in order for the district court to determine in the first instance whether § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional as applied to Derrick’s conviction on Count Five. Therefore, we vacate Derrick’s judgment and sentence as it relates to Count Five and remand this issue to the district court.

Section 922(k)’s prohibition on possessing firearms with obliterated serial numbers survives a Second Amendment challenge because it serves the interest in tracing firearms.

United States v. Marzzarella · filed 2010-07-29(k)

Accordingly, § 922(k) passes muster under intermediate scrutiny.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons is constitutional under binding circuit precedent.

United States v. Lee · filed 2010-07-14(g)(1)

Finally, Lee argues that the felon-in-possession statute is unconstitutional. He recognizes, however, that we are bound by our decision in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 198-205 (3d Cir.2001), in which we confirmed the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute, and he acknowledges that he presents this issue only “to preserve a challenge to the constitutionality of [the felon-in-possession statute] for Supreme Court review.” (Appellant’s Op. Br. at 80.) We therefore reject that argument without further discussion.

Section 922(g)(9)’s firearm ban for people convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence is substantially related to the important goal of preventing armed violence.

United States v. Skoien · filed 2010-07-13(g)(9)

The concession is prudent, and we need not get more deeply into the “levels of scrutiny” quagmire, for no one doubts that the goal of §922(g)(9), preventing armed mayhem, is an important governmental objective. Both logic and data establish a substantial relation between §922(g)(9) and this objective.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons remains constitutional after Heller.

United States v. Jones · filed 2009-11-24(g)(1)

Defendant also filed a Motion to Dismiss Indictment [18] challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). After reviewing the Report and Recommendation [34], it is received with approval and adopted as the Opinion and Order of this Court. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment [18] is hereby DENIED.

Section 922(g)(9)’s prohibition on firearm possession by people convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence survives Second Amendment scrutiny.

United States v. Booker · filed 2008-08-11(g)(9)

After the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court concludes that the law prohibiting persons who have been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence survives Second Amendment scrutiny.

Section 922(o)’s machinegun possession ban survives a Second Amendment challenge because machineguns fall outside the protected class of weapons in common lawful use.

United States v. Fincher · filed 2008-08-13(o)

Machine guns are not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use.

Section 922(g)(8) bars firearm possession while a qualifying domestic violence protection order is in effect, and that prohibition remains valid after Heller.

United States v. Knight · filed 2008-09-04(g)(8)

I conclude that Heller does not make unconstitutional the § 922(g)(8) crime.

Section 922(g)(8)’s ban on firearm and ammunition possession by people subject to qualifying domestic violence orders survives a Second Amendment challenge.

United States v. Luedtke · filed 2008-11-18(g)(8)

I therefore reject defendant’s argument that § 922(g)(8) is inconsistent with the historical practices discussed in Heller.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons does not violate the Second Amendment.

United States v. Frazier · filed 2008-11-19(g)(1)

The district court thus did not commit error in entering judgment against Frazier pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§§ 922 and 924 because his conviction is not in violation of the Second Amendment.