11 U.S.C. § 362

When a debtor files a second bankruptcy case within one year and the stay is not extended, § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the stay after 30 days as to property of the estate as well as the debtor.

In re Wright · filed 2015-07-01(c)(3)(A)

Therefore, this Court adopts the Expansive View and concludes that in the ease at bar, if this Court denies the Debtor’s request to extend the stay, then there will be no stay in place on the 30th day as to any property of the Debt- or’s Chapter 11 estate.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) ends the automatic stay as to all interests of a debtor, including property in the bankruptcy estate, 30 days after a second petition filed within a year of dismissal of a prior petition.

St. Anne's Credit Union v. Ackell · filed 2013-03-21(c)(3)(A)

I adopt the view expressed in Reswick and the other minority-view courts and conclude that under § 362(c)(3)(A) when a second bankruptcy petition is filed within a year of the dismissal of a previous petition, the automatic stay terminates in its entirety thirty days after the petition is filed as to all interests of the debtor, including property in the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(c)(3) terminates the automatic stay as to both the debtor’s property and estate property thirty days after a repeat filing when the debtor does not seek an extension.

Lattin v. Midland Mortgage Co. (In re Lattin) · filed 2011-12-16(c)(3)

One consequence of this failure to seek relief under Section 362(c)(3) was that the automatic stay terminated as to both the debtors’ property and the property of debtors’ estate thirty days after debtors filed their current case.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) ends the automatic stay 30 days after an individual debtor files a new bankruptcy case when a prior case was pending within the preceding year and was dismissed, unless the debtor timely seeks an extension under § 362(c)(3)(B).

Provident Funding Associates, L.P. v. Faloye (In Re Faloye) · filed 2011-08-29(c)(3)(A)

The thirtieth day after the petition date of debtor’s current case fell on May 2, 2011, and debtor did not file a motion pursuant to § 362(c)(3)(B) prior to that date or at any time. Accordingly, the automatic stay terminated by law under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A). Because the automatic stay is no longer in effect in this case, Provident’s motion for relief from stay is moot.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay after 30 days as to the debtor in a repeat filing, but the stay remains in force as to property of the bankruptcy estate.

Rinard v. Positive Investments, Inc. (In Re Rinard) · filed 2011-05-09(c)(3)(A)

The plain text of § 362(c)(3)(A) is crystal clear that the automatic stay is terminated ... with respect to the Debtor. There is no mention of the Estate in the text.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay in its entirety, including protection of estate property, 30 days after a repeat filer files a second bankruptcy case within a year unless the stay is extended.

Reswick v. Reswick (In Re Reswick) · filed 2011-02-04(c)(3)(A)

For the reasons set forth above, section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay in its entirety on the 30th day after the petition date.

Section 362(c)(3)(A)'s 30-day termination applies only to debts or property of the debtor; the automatic stay continues to protect property of the estate while it remains estate property.

In Re Johnson · filed 2006-01-09(c)(3)(A)

When read in conjunction with subsection (1), the Court finds that the plain language of § 362(c)(3)(A) dictates that the 30-day time limit only applies to “debts” or “property of the debtor” and not to “property of the estate.” As a result, the automatic stay continues to protect “property of the estate” as long as it remains “property of the estate.”

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the stay after thirty days only with respect to formal actions or proceedings taken before the bankruptcy petition, so the stay remains effective if no such action was taken.

In Re Paschal · filed 2006-01-06(c)(3)(A)

Based on the usage of the term “action” in § 362(a)(1), §§ 362(b)(1), (2)(A), (4), (8), (14), (15), (16), (22), and (25)(A) and (B), and § 362(c)(3)(C)(ii), the court concludes that the term “action” means a formal action, such as a judicial, administrative, governmental, quasi-judicial, or other essentially formal activity or proceeding. ... Furthermore, the action with respect to which the stay terminates is an “action taken,” which means an action in the past, prior to the filing of the debtor’s bankruptcy petition.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay as to actions taken against the debtor and the debtor’s property, but leaves the stay protecting property of the estate in place.

In Re Jones · filed 2006-03-21(c)(3)(A)

To summarize, the court holds that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the stay with respect to actions taken against the debtor and against property of the debtor, but does not terminate the stay with respect to property of the estate.

Section 362(c)(3) terminates the automatic stay after thirty days as to debts and property of the debtor but preserves it as to property of the estate, and an extension requires notice and a hearing completed within that thirty-day period.

In Re Moon · filed 2006-03-28(c)(3)(A), (c)(3)(B)

As set forth in § 362(c)(3)(B), the Court may extend the automatic stay only after notice and a hearing completed before the expiration of the thirty day period after the filing of the later case. If the notice and hearing are not completed within this period, the automatic stay terminates by operation of § 362(c)(3)(A). ... Reading the plain language of these sections together, the automatic stay, which operates as to both the debtor and the property of the estate, is terminated by § 362(c)(3)(A) only as to the debtor thirty days after the petition date. ... For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the language of § 362(c)(3)(A) unambiguously terminates the automatic stay only as it applies to “debts” or “property of the debtor.”

When a debtor had one prior case pending and dismissed within the preceding year, section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the stay after thirty days as to the debtor's debts, property, and leases, but leaves the stay protecting property of or from the estate intact.

In Re Harris · filed 2006-05-01(c)(3)(A)

The Court further finds that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminated the automatic stay as to (1) any action taken with respect to a debt of the debtor; (2) any action taken with respect to property of the debtor; and (3) any action taken with respect to any lease of the debtor. No other portion of the automatic stay, including the stay relating to property of or from the estate, was effected.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay, including protection of estate property, thirty days after a repeat filing unless timely extended, and § 105(a) cannot reimpose the stay when the statutory requirements are unmet.

In Re Jumpp · filed 2006-06-23(c)(3)(A)

Although a mortgagee could seek relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on the estate’s interest in the mortgagee’s collateral, requiring a creditor to take such action is inconsistent with the intent of § 362(c)(3)(A). ... Although the Court is sympathetic to the plight of each of the above Debtors, having concluded that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay on the 30th days after each of the Debtors filed her second bankruptcy petition, the Court cannot use its general equitable powers under § 105(a) to impose a stay Congress has declared must terminate if the requirements of § 362(c)(3) are not met.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) does not terminate the automatic stay protecting property of the estate after the initial 30-day period expires.

Bankers Trust Co. of California, N.A. v. Gillcrese (In Re Gillcrese) · filed 2006-07-21(c)(3)(A)

The automatic stay as to the property of the estate is not terminated by § 362(c)(3)(A).

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay only with respect to the debtor, leaving property of the estate protected by the stay.

In Re Brandon · filed 2006-08-29(c)(3)(A)

Therefore, the court must conclude that, under § 362(c)(3), the Stay terminates only with respect to the debtor and that property of the estate is still protected by the Stay.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the stay only as to the debtor, leaving estate property protected; creditors must seek estate stay relief under section 362(d) and give the debtor, counsel, and trustee notice of hearing before obtaining confirmation under section 362(j).

In Re Rice · filed 2006-12-19(c)(3)(A), (d), (j)

Although 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) has effected a termination of the automatic stay “with respect to the debtor,” all other aspects of the automatic stay remain operative, including the stay of proceedings to obtain possession of estate property. ... Before considering any motion under 11 U.S.C. § 362(j) to confirm the termination of the automatic stay in a case, I will require that the moving creditor give notice of hearing to the debtors, their attorney, and the trustee. To the extent that a creditor desires a termination of the stay as against a trustee, it cannot rely upon confirmation of a termination under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3), but must also move for stay relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).

For a debtor with one prior case dismissed within the preceding year, section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay after thirty days as to the debtor and the debtor's property, but leaves estate property protected.

In Re Jumpp · filed 2006-12-28(c)(3)(A)

Section 362(c)(3)(A) provides for a partial termination of the stay, which, although a lesser penalty than complete termination, nonetheless discourages abusive filings and, therefore, is a result that is neither absurd nor demonstrably at odds with the intention of the drafters. With regard to the Debtor's residence, the automatic stay remains in effect to the extent that the residence is property of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay after thirty days only as to the debtor and the debtor's property, leaving the stay intact as to property of the bankruptcy estate.

Jumpp v. Chase Home Finance, LLC · filed 2006-12-28(c)(3)(A)

With regard to the Debtor’s residence, the automatic stay remains in effect to the extent that the residence is property of the bankruptcy estate. Because the automatic stay never lapsed with respect to property of the estate, it is unnecessary for the Panel to consider issues regarding extensions of the stay.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay with respect to the debtor after 30 days following a repeat filing within one year of a prior dismissal, regardless of whether creditors took action before the current filing.

In Re James · filed 2007-01-17(c)(3)(A)

The Court finds that when “action taken” is read in context with the remaining provisions of § 362(c)(3) its application is not limited to creditors that have taken action prior to the pendency of the current case.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the stay only as to actions against the debtor and the debtor’s property, leaving the stay protecting property of the estate in effect.

In Re McFeeley · filed 2007-02-22(c)(3)(A)

the stay which terminated under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) is the stay of actions against the Debtor and the Debtor’s property and does not encompass the stay of actions against property of the estate.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay after 30 days for a debtor with one bankruptcy case dismissed within the preceding year only as to actions against the debtor and the debtor’s property, leaving the stay in effect as to property of the estate.

In Re Tubman · filed 2007-03-26(c)(3)(A)

Therefore, this Court agrees with the majority of courts that have considered this issue to date and accordingly holds that when Section 362(c)(3)(A) self-executes, the automatic stay is terminated as to actions against the debtor and property of the debtor but not as to any actions against property of the estate.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay after thirty days only as to the debtor and the debtor’s property, leaving the stay in effect as to property of the estate.

Holcomb v. Hardeman (In Re Holcomb) · filed 2008-01-07(c)(3)(A)

On this basis, we conclude that the language of § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the stay only as to the debtor and the debtor’s property.

When a Chapter 7 debtor fails to timely extend the stay after a prior case was dismissed within the preceding year, § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the stay as to postpetition commissions outside the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Smith · filed 2008-11-25(c)(3)(A)

Therefore, because no motion to extend the automatic stay was filed, this Court will confirm that the automatic stay is indeed terminated with respect to the debtor's postpetition commissions.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay after 30 days as to actions against the debtor, but leaves the stay in place for property of the estate.

In Re Dowden · filed 2010-03-26(c)(3)(A)

Therefore, the limiting language included in § 362(c)(3)(A) dictates that the automatic stay is terminated “with respect to actions taken against the debtor ..., but does not terminate the stay with respect to property of the estate.” Jones, 339 B.R. at 365 (citing In re Johnson, 335 B.R. 805, 806 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn.2006)).

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay after 30 days as to the debtor and the debtor’s property in a repeat filing, while the stay continues as to property of the estate.

In Re Robinson · filed 2010-04-16(c)(3)(A)

The court has interpreted 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) as drawing a distinction between actions against the debtor or property of the debtor, on the one hand, and actions against property of the estate, on the other.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay 30 days after an individual debtor files another bankruptcy case within a year of a prior dismissal, absent an extension.

Fryzel v. Miller · filed 2014-05-20(c)(3)(A)

Therefore, pursuant to section 362(c)(3), the stay in Miller Bankruptcy II and Miller Bankruptcy III expired 30 days after defendants filed the petitions in those respective cases.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay after 30 days as to a repeat-filing debtor and the debtor’s property, but the stay continues as to property of the bankruptcy estate.

Witkowski v. Knight (Witkowski) · filed 2014-11-13(c)(3)(A)

Finding no reason to deviate from the majority of courts or our own precedent, we adhere to the position which we articulated in Jumpp, and therefore continue to hold that under § 362(c)(3)(A), the automatic stay terminates as to the debtor and the debtor’s property, but remains in effect as to the property of the estate.

When a debtor had a bankruptcy case dismissed within the prior year and fails to request an extension within 30 days, § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay as to all creditors.

In re Williams · filed 2016-02-18(c)(3)(A)

By operation of law, the Automatic Stay expired as to all creditors on December 30, 2015, when the Debtor failed to file his request within the statutorily allotted timeframe.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay in its entirety after 30 days for a debtor who files again within one year of a prior dismissal, including as to property of the estate.

Vitalich v. Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2016-08-10(c)(3)(A)

Having considered the language of the statute itself, the statutory structure, the legislative intent, the cases articulating both the majority and minority views, and in particular the Ninth Circuit BAP’s lengthy and well-reasoned opinion discussing all of the above, this Court concludes that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay entirely and not only with respect to the debtor and the debtor’s property.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay after 30 days for a debtor with a case dismissed within the preceding year, as to the debtor personally and both estate and non-estate property.

In re Wade · filed 2018-06-06(c)(3)(A)

Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow, this court agrees with rulings from this district and others, holding that the stay termination applies to debtors personally as well as both their estate and non-estate property.

Section 362(c)(3) terminates the automatic stay after 30 days for a debtor with a case dismissed in the preceding year only as to the debtor and the debtor’s property; the stay continues as to property of the estate.

In re Wood · filed 2018-09-25(c)(3)

Accordingly, the automatic stay of section 362(a) terminated under section 362(c)(3) only as to the Debtor and property of the Debtor. The automatic stay remains in place in this case with respect to property of the estate pending resolution of the Lender's Stay Motion.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the entire automatic stay, including protection for estate property, thirty days after a second bankruptcy filing within a year of dismissal of an earlier case unless the stay is extended.

Smith v. ME Bureau of Revenue Services · filed 2018-12-12(c)(3)(A)

On this close question, we hold that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the entire stay thirty days after the filing of a second petition.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) ends the automatic stay after a repeat bankruptcy filing only as to the debtor and the debtor’s property, leaving property of the estate protected.

LSF9 Master Participation Trust v. Sanchez · filed 2018-12-28(c)(3)(A)

Accordingly, following the Tenth Circuit precedent in Holcomb, we conclude that § 362(c)(3) and § 108(c), each of which apply only to actions brought by or against the debtor, do not apply to this case in which Bank sought only in rem relief against the property of Homeowners’ bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(c)(3) terminates the stay after 30 days for a debtor with a case pending in the prior year who does not seek an extension, but the stay remains in effect for property of the estate.

In re Smith · filed 2019-02-01(c)(3)

Here, this Court finds that the property of the estate of a debtor, who had a case pending within the prior year but did not seek an extension of the stay under section 362(c)(3), is still protected by the stay imposed by subsection (a).

Section 362(c)(3)(A) ends the automatic stay after 30 days in a successive case only if the prior case was pending within the preceding year and was dismissed; a completed prior case does not trigger that expiration.

Tracey P. Weber · filed 2019-12-19(c)(3)(A)

Section 362(c)(3)(A) does not apply where a prior case was completed, rather than dismissed.

Section 362(c)(3) terminates the automatic stay thirty days after a second bankruptcy filing within a year of a prior case’s dismissal unless the debtor obtains an extension.

Marjorie Partch · filed 2020-01-07(c)(3)

In accordance with section 362(c)(3), the automatic stay terminated on the thirtieth day after filing the Debtor’s petition.

When a debtor files a second bankruptcy case within a year after dismissal of the first, § 362(c)(3) terminates the automatic stay after 30 days unless the debtor obtains an extension.

Marjorie Partch · filed 2020-01-07(c)(3)

Therefore, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3), the automatic stay terminated on the thirtieth day after the filing of the Debtor’s Second Chapter 13 case unless the Debtor had moved and obtained an extension of the automatic stay. Since the Debtor did not move and obtain an extension of the automatic stay, it terminated on September 12, 2019.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay as to the debtor 30 days after a new filing when the individual debtor had a prior case pending and dismissed within the preceding year.

Thomas J Kearns, II · filed 2020-05-08(c)(3)(A)

The Court holds that, by operation of § 362(c)(3)(A), the automatic stay statutorily terminated on April 3, 2020.

Section 362(c)(3) ends the automatic stay on the thirtieth day after a later bankruptcy filing when the debtor had a case dismissed within the preceding year and does not seek to continue the stay.

Carolina Llangari-Pico · filed 2020-05-14(c)(3)

Since the Debtor’s first Chapter 13 case was pending and was dismissed within the one-year period preceding the filing of the instant case, the automatic stay terminated on the thirtieth day after filing the instant case because the Debtor did not seek to continue the automatic stay under subsection 362(c)(3)(B).

Section 362(c)(3) ends the automatic stay as to the debtor 30 days into a later case when an individual debtor had a case dismissed within the preceding year and does not obtain an extension.

Alexander Timothy Nehring · filed 2020-06-19(c)(3)

Since the Debtor’s third Chapter 13 case was pending and was dismissed within the one-year period preceding the filing of this case, the automatic stay terminated on the thirtieth day after filing of this case because the Debtor did not seek to continue the automatic stay under section 362(c)(3)(B).

Section 362(c)(3)(A) ends the stay as to the debtor 30 days after a repeat bankruptcy filing within a year of dismissal, but leaves estate property protected.

Neria v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2022-11-28(c)(3)(A)

Therefore, the automatic stay was terminated with respect to the Debtor 30 days after her 2014 Bankruptcy was filed. However, the automatic stay was not terminated with respect to the property of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(c)(4)(A) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect after two or more cases were pending and dismissed within the preceding year, regardless of whether creditors or third parties know of those filings.

Randy D Plasterer · filed 2024-02-13(c)(4)(A)

The absence of the automatic stay under § 362(c)(4) is not contingent upon whether creditors and third parties are aware of how many bankruptcy cases a debtor has filed within the past year. Rather, it expressly provides that the automatic stay shall not go into effect if a debtor had two or more cases pending and dismissed within the previous one-year period.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires a hearing on a motion to extend the automatic stay before the initial 30-day stay expires; a court cannot extend the stay after that deadline.

Damian Morgan and Rae Morgan · filed 2025-06-23(c)(3)(B)

Based on the plain statutory language of §362(c)(3)(B), one prerequisite to extending the automatic stay is that a hearing on the motion to extend the stay must be held before the stay terminates at the end of the 30-day period.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay after 30 days as to a debtor who filed a case within the preceding year that was dismissed, but the stay remains in effect for property of the estate.

Sarah E. Sanders · filed 2026-01-23(c)(3)(A)

The Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED, because the Court finds that the Debtor’s residence is property of the estate, and the automatic stay remains in effect with respect to estate property, and there is no need for a separate injunction protecting the Debtor’s residence.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) ends the automatic stay as to actions against a repeat debtor after 30 days, but the stay continues to protect property of the estate.

Dugas · filed 2026-05-14(c)(3)(A)

Thus, in this instance the automatic stay in the underlying bankruptcy case—the Second Bankruptcy Case—terminated as to actions taken against the debtor on the 30th day but remained in place as to actions taken against property of the estate.

For the rule barring an automatic stay after two prior dismissed cases, a case stops being pending when it is dismissed, even if it is administratively closed later.

Khadene Walker · filed 2019-08-08(c)(4)(A)(i)

In light of plain meaning of “pending,” as well as relevant considerations involved in construing the meaning of “pending” in Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) derived from related sections of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor’s first prior case was no longer “pending” once it was dismissed, irrespective of the date that the case was administratively closed by the Clerk’s Office.

Section 362(c)(3) and (c)(4) limit the automatic stay for serial filings only when a prior case was dismissed, rather than closed.

In re Bremer · filed 2017-01-26(c)(3), (c)(4)

The provisions of § 362(c)(3) and (c)(4), limiting the automatic stay in instances of serial filings, apply only when the prior cases have been "dismissed,” not when they are "closed.” The Chapter 7 Case has not been dismissed.

Section 362(c)(4)(A) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect when two earlier bankruptcy cases were pending and dismissed within the preceding year, subject to its § 707(b) exception.

Jean v. Suntrust Bank (In Re Jean) · filed 2013-02-13(c)(4)(A)

Contrary to Jean’s argument, whether the automatic stay comes into effect upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not hinge on whether two cases have been filed within the year, but rather, whether two cases had been pending within one year.

For purposes of Section 362(c)(3)(A), a prior bankruptcy case ceases to be pending upon dismissal, regardless of when it is closed, so a case dismissed more than one year before the new filing does not trigger termination of the automatic stay on the thirtieth day.

In Re Moore · filed 2005-12-02(c)(3)(A)

Based on this analysis, Mr. Moore’s first case was no longer “pending” for purposes of § 362(c)(3) as of the date of dismissal, regardless of when the case was closed. Accordingly, the automatic stay in the present case will not terminate on the thirtieth day.

Section 362(c)(3) and (c)(4) do not restrict the automatic stay in a subsequent case when the earlier petition was dismissed because failure to satisfy the credit counseling requirement prevented the individual from becoming a debtor.

In Re Valdez · filed 2005-12-13(c)(3), (c)(4)

Because the petition failed to provide Mirielys Valdez status as a debtor, the Court will not consider this a dismissed case in which the individual was the debtor, for purposes of denying the imposition of the automatic stay in a subsequently filed case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(c)(3) and (4) apply separately to each debtor in a joint bankruptcy case, so one debtor’s prior filings do not eliminate the other debtor’s automatic stay unless the provisions independently apply to that debtor.

In Re Parker · filed 2006-01-04(c)(3), (c)(4)

Although this phrase is not repeated in Section 362(c)(4), both subsections focus on, and apply to, the acts of a specific debtor rather than joint debtors in the aggregate. This Court concludes that in a joint bankruptcy case, the application of Section 362(c)(3) and (4) to each debtor must be analyzed separately.

Section 362's repeat-filing presumptions apply to a prior bankruptcy case pending within the preceding year even if the debtor was ineligible under Section 109(h).

In Re Tomco · filed 2006-02-27(c)(3)

This Court concludes that the plain language of Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code is that if a prior case was commenced by a debtor, and if such prior case was pending in the 1 year period prior to the filing of the debtor’s most immediate bankruptcy case, the presumptions set forth in Section 362 become operational. Had Congress desired to include in Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code additional exceptions, Congress could have done so. Congress, however, did not do so and this Court will not re-write the statute.

Section 362(c)(4) applies separately to each joint debtor, withholding the automatic stay from a debtor with two cases dismissed in the preceding year while preserving it for a spouse with no cases in that year.

In Re Haisley · filed 2006-07-18(c)(4)

There is no stay in effect as to his interest in the current bankruptcy under Section 362(c)(4). Beatrice Haisley had no pending cases in the year preceding the filing of the bankruptcy and does not fall within the parameters of Section 362(c)(4).

A prior bankruptcy case ceases to be pending upon dismissal, so dismissal more than one year before a new filing prevents the 30-day termination of the automatic stay even if the prior case was closed within that year.

In Re Williams · filed 2006-11-22(c)(3)

Given the meaning and application of the word “pending” and given the policy considerations involved, it would appear that a case is no longer pending once it has been dismissed. As the Debtor’s previous case that was filed in 2004 was dismissed on September 23, 2005, it was not pending during the one-year period preceding the filing of the Debtor’s current case. Therefore, § 362(c)(3) does not apply to the Debtor’s case and the automatic stay does not terminate with respect to the Debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the present case.

For Section 362(c)'s repeat-filing limits, a bankruptcy case is pending until dismissal, and a motion to vacate the dismissal does not extend that period.

In Re Lundquist · filed 2007-07-11(c)(4)(A)(i)

A case is “pending” for purposes of section 362(c) until it is dismissed, and a motion to vacate the dismissal does not extend the time that the case is “pending.”

Section 362(c)(3) does not terminate the automatic stay after thirty days or require a motion to extend it when the debtor's prior chapter 7 case ended in discharge rather than dismissal.

In Re Williams · filed 2008-07-14(c)(3)

Clearly, the terms “dismissal” and “discharge” are treated differently within the Bankruptcy Code and are not referred to interchangeably. Based upon the language of this section, Congress clearly intended to limit the applicability of Code Section 362(c)(3) to chapter 7 debtors whose cases were dismissed within the preceding 1-year period. The Court finds Code Section 362(c)(3)(A) will not terminate the Automatic Stay in Debtor’s case because she received a discharge in her prior chapter 7 case.

Section 362(c)(3)'s thirty-day limit on the automatic stay does not apply when the debtor's prior Chapter 7 case ended in discharge and closure rather than dismissal.

In Re Forletta · filed 2008-10-10(c)(3)

In the Prior Case a discharge was granted and then the case was closed but not dismissed; therefore Section 362(c)(3) does not apply.

Section 362(c)(3) does not terminate the automatic stay when the debtor’s prior bankruptcy case was closed after full administration rather than dismissed.

In Re Chaudhry · filed 2009-07-06(c)(3)

Counsel is correct. The provisions of § 362(c)(3) do not apply. There is a difference between a case that is closed and one that is dismissed.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect on a later bankruptcy filing when two or more of the debtor’s cases were pending and dismissed within the previous year.

Klein v. Commissioner · filed 2010-07-27(c)(4)(A)(i)

This exception to the automatic stay applies when there have been ‘‘2 * * * cases * * * within the previous year * * * dis- missed’’. When that prerequisite is met, the statute provides simply and without condition that the automatic stay ‘‘shall not go into effect’’ upon the filing of any bankruptcy petition within a year of those dismissals.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect in a later case when two or more of the debtor’s cases were pending and dismissed within the previous year.

In Re Benefield · filed 2010-08-20(c)(4)(A)(i)

In this case, the stay never came into effect due to the two previous cases dismissed within a year of the filing of this case. Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) is unambiguous on this issue.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(ii) permits a party to request an order confirming that no automatic stay is in effect, but does not require that order before the party acts.

Washington v. US Bank Natl Assoc · filed 2026-03-27(c)(4)(A)(ii)

The plain language of the statute provides that a party may request the bankruptcy court to confirm what (i) already establishes—that no stay is in effect—but it does not require a party to do so.

Section 362(c)(4)(C) prevents a court from imposing the automatic stay retroactively to the petition date.

Jacqueline Elizabeth Ard and Terry Frank Nicola · filed 2025-05-23(c)(4)(C)

First, Debtors sought to impose a stay retroactive to the filing of this case. This is denied. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(C) clearly prevents the Court from ordering any retroactive relief of this nature.

Section 362(c)(4)(B) permits a court to impose the automatic stay after two or more prior cases were dismissed within a year only if a party in interest requests it within 30 days of the new filing.

Richard Ramon Mills, Sr. · filed 2025-02-06(c)(4)(B)

Accordingly, the Court may impose the automatic stay when there were two or more prior cases that were dismissed within a year of the petition date only if a motion to impose the stay is filed within 30 days of the petition date.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect when two bankruptcy cases of the debtor were dismissed within the preceding year.

Rossi v. US Bank National Association · filed 2022-08-01(c)(4)(A)(i)

Here, however, the automatic stay did not go into effect because Rossi had filed two bankruptcy cases that were dismissed within one year prior to the involuntary petition.

Section 362(c)(4) prevents an automatic stay from arising in a new case when two or more of the debtor’s prior cases were pending and dismissed within the preceding year.

Kimberly Richmond Hardy · filed 2022-04-21(c)(4)

As a result, section 362(c)(4) applies in this case. No automatic stay arose on the petition date in this case and, by denying the Motion, the Court declines to impose the stay.

Section 362(c)(4)(A) prevents a new bankruptcy filing from triggering an automatic stay when the debtor had two bankruptcy cases dismissed within the preceding year.

Isidro Rosas and Maria Martinez v. Chih Ting Wang · filed 2019-08-23(c)(4)(A)

Under federal law, the dismissal of Martinez’s first two bankruptcies within the preceding year precluded her January 2 bankruptcy from triggering a stay.

Section 362(c)(4) prevents an automatic stay from arising in a new case when the debtor had two or more bankruptcy cases pending and dismissed in the preceding year.

Real Estate Short Sales Inc · filed 2019-09-03(c)(4)

Because Cueva had two or more cases pending and then dismissed within the previous year, there was no stay due to this most recent case.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect, including as to estate property, when a debtor had two or more cases pending and dismissed within the previous year, subject to the statutory exception for certain cases dismissed under section 707(b).

Bates v. BAC Home Loans (In Re Bates) · filed 2011-03-23(c)(4)(A)(i)

It is clear to us that where a debtor has had two or more cases pending within the previous year that were dismissed, and neither was a case refiled under a chapter other than chapter 7 after dismissal under section 707(b), the automatic stay under § 362(a) never goes into effect. No exception is made for property of the estate.

Section 362(c)(4)(B) permits reimposition of the stay for a debtor with one prior dismissed case pending within the preceding year if relief is requested within 30 days of the new petition, even when the hearing and order occur later.

In Re Toro-Arcila · filed 2005-12-12(c)(4)(B)

Under § 362(c)(4)(B), only the motion to impose the stay must be filed within 30 days of the petition; no order must be entered within that time. ... Read together with subsections (B) and (C), the Court concludes that Congress intended for subsection (B) to apply to cases in which there is a timely request that the stay be imposed, whether the case is the first repeat filing or a subsequent repeat filing.

Section 362(c)(4)(B) permits imposition of a stay after the automatic stay expires under section 362(c)(3)(A), provided the motion is filed within 30 days after filing the later case.

In Re Beasley · filed 2006-03-16(c)(4)(B)

... the Court ruled that it would adopt Judge Marvin Isgur’s ruling in ... holding that section 362(c)(4)(B) applies to cases in which the automatic stay has expired under section 362(c)(3)(A). The Court notes that a stay may be imposed under section 362(c)(4)(B) only if a motion is filed within 30 days after the filing of the later case.

Section 362(c)(4)(B) permits imposition of a stay after expiration under section 362(c)(3)(A) only if the motion is filed within 30 days after the later bankruptcy case is filed.

In Re Wright · filed 2006-03-16(c)(4)(B)

... a stay may be imposed under section 362(c)(4)(B) only if a motion is filed within 30 days after the filing of the later case.

Section 362(c)(4)(B) permits imposition of the automatic stay on short notice when an imminent foreclosure makes an expedited hearing necessary and the notice is appropriate under the circumstances.

In Re Frazier · filed 2006-03-17(c)(4)(B)

While § 362(c)(4)(B) requires notice and hearing before the Court can impose the stay, the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “notice and hearing” as contained in § 102(1) leaves it to the Court to determine what is appropriate in the particular circumstance. ... Given the exigencies of this situation, I find that the notice given to Centex was appropriate under the circumstances.

Section 362(c)(4) applies only to debtors with two or more cases pending within the previous year but dismissed, and its stay-imposition procedure is unavailable to debtors with only one such prior case.

Whitaker v. Baxter (In Re Whitaker) · filed 2006-04-20(c)(4)

By its plain and unambiguous language, section 362(c)(4) applies only to multiple repeat filers.

The stay may be reimposed by injunction despite a motion filed after the thirty-day deadline where the debtors establish good faith, conditioned on their remaining current on Chapter 13 plan payments.

In Re Schroeder · filed 2006-10-18(c)(4)(B)

The Debtor’s did not file the Motion within the requisite thirty day period. ... The Debtors have established the filing of Case III was in good faith as to all creditors and reinstatement of the automatic stay is appropriate conditioned the Debtors remain current on their Chapter 13 plan. ... An injunction shall issue enjoining all creditors from taking any action inconsistent with the stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The injunction shall terminate in the event the Debtors default on their plan payment obligations.

When two prior bankruptcy cases were pending within the previous year and dismissed, no automatic stay arises, and imposing a stay requires a request within 30 days of filing and clear and convincing evidence rebutting the presumption of bad faith.

In Re Morales · filed 2007-03-28(c)(4)

Clearly, two cases of this Debtor were pending within the previous year and were dismissed. Therefore, the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) did not go into effect on the filing of the present case. Further, there is a presumption that the present case was not filed in good faith due to those prior filings. That presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. ... As discussed, above, 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4) is clear. The automatic stay did not arise upon the filing of this proceeding. If Debtor wanted this Court to impose the automatic stay, Debtor was required to make that request within 30 days of the filing.

Section 362(c)(4) permits imposition of the stay when the movant rebuts the presumption of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence under the totality of the circumstances, showing the absence of objective futility and subjective bad faith.

In Re Hurt · filed 2007-05-11(c)(4)

The presumption that the Debtor did not file the present case in good faith may only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D). ... Unlike Carolin Corp., the burden under Section 362(c)(4) does not rest on the party seeking dismissal as it does in Section 1112(b), but on the party seeking imposition of the stay. Therefore, the movant must prove that objective futility and subjective bad faith were not present at the filing of the current case. ... In considering the totality of the circumstances in the case at bar, this court finds that the evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption of bad faith in § 362(c)(4) and that grounds for imposition of the automatic stay as to all creditors exist.

To impose a stay after repeat filings, a debtor must rebut the bad-faith presumption by clear and convincing evidence of a substantial financial change, feasibility, and confirmability, including good faith under the totality of circumstances.

In Re Thornes · filed 2007-09-26(c)(4)(D)(i)(III)

Since a debtor is presumed, because of the previous filings, not to have filed in good faith, the stay cannot be imposed if the debtor fails to separately establish all three elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the new BAPCPA “substantial change” element; (2) the feasibility element; and (3) the “confirmability” element which follows pre-BAPCPA precedent. In other words, proof of “substantial change” is not merely another factor in the “totality of circumstances” analysis but a new, independent objective threshold test for imposition of the stay.

Section 362(c)(4)(B) requires good faith to be assessed under the totality of the circumstances rather than solely by changed circumstances or expected full performance of a confirmed plan.

In Re Ferguson · filed 2007-10-25(c)(4)(B)

Therefore, I conclude that the proper analysis under § 362(c)(4)(B) is to determine by the requisite standard of proof whether the debtor has established that the case was filed in “good faith,” not simply whether “circumstances have changed” since the last case was dismissed or whether the present case will “conclude with a confirmed plan that will be fully performed.” ... Therefore, I join those courts that hold that the court may consider the “totality of the circumstances” in determining the debtor’s good faith.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) prevents any automatic stay, including protection of estate property, from arising when an individual debtor files a later case after two or more cases were pending and dismissed within the preceding year, subject to the statutory section 707(b) exception.

Nelson v. George Wong Pension Trust (In Re Nelson) · filed 2008-06-26(c)(4)(A)(i)

In sum, the Nelsons do not dispute that § 362(c)(4)(A)(i) was applicable in their third bankruptcy case because the Nelsons had two bankruptcy cases pending within the same year in which their third case was filed, and the two prior cases were dismissed for reasons other than under § 707(b). Section 362(c)(4)(A)® unambiguously specifies that “the stay under [§ 362(a)] shall not go into effect upon the filing of the [third] case.” There is neither authority nor logical reason to infer that Congress intended that only the stay protecting property of the debtor did not arise when the Nelsons filed their third case.

Section 362(c)(4)(B) gives the bankruptcy court discretion to limit the scope of a stay it imposes.

In Re DiGiovanni · filed 2009-07-16(c)(4)(B)

Section 362(c)(4)(B) provides the court with discretion in fashioning the scope of a stay imposed under § 362(c)(4).

Section 362(c)(4)(D) limits its presumption that a repeat filing lacks good faith to requests to put the automatic stay into effect under § 362(c)(4)(B).

In Re Underhill · filed 2010-03-01(c)(4)(D)

The Court therefore concludes that the express language of § 362(c)(4)(D) limits its application to § 362(c)(4)(B).

Section 362(c)(4)(B) permits a court to impose the automatic stay after two prior dismissals within a year when the debtor proves good faith by clear and convincing evidence, and the stay may be imposed as to some creditors but not others.

In Re Jenkins · filed 2010-04-19(c)(4)(B)

The bankruptcy court may grant such relief if the debtor demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that her new case was filed in good faith. ... The Court concludes that the automatic stay shall be imposed as to all creditors except Wells.

Section 362(c)(4)(D) requires a debtor seeking to impose a stay after repeat filings to rebut each applicable presumption of bad faith with clear and convincing evidence explaining the prior failures and why the new case can succeed.

In Re Benefield · filed 2010-09-14(c)(4)(D)

What seems clear from the statute is that Congress expected a debtor to address directly any of the applicable circumstances arising from § 362(c)(4)(D) which apply to the debtor. And by “address”, the Court means that a debtor, by clear and convincing evidence, must “explain away” or justify the debtor’s role in those circumstances, and further explain why the Court should be confident that the current case will be successful when the previous cases were not.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) can leave foreclosure and sale unstayed despite the debtor’s third bankruptcy petition.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Dixon · filed 2012-03-06(c)(4)(A)(i)

Further, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the foreclosure and sale were not stayed by virtue of the filing of his third bankruptcy petition (see 11 USC § 362 [c] [4] [A] [i]).

A stay imposed under § 362(c)(4)(C) takes effect when the court’s order is entered on the docket.

Eastern Savings Bank, FSB v. Toor (In re Toor) · filed 2012-06-22(c)(4)(C)

Therefore, this court finds that the Bankruptcy Court imposed the stay on the date of the entry of the Order on the docket— October 17, 2011 — as authorized by 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(C) and Fed. R. Bankr.P. 5003(a) and 9021.

Section 362(c)(4)(D) presumes certain repeat bankruptcy filings lack good faith, and a debtor seeking to impose the stay must rebut that presumption with clear and convincing evidence.

In re Acosta · filed 2015-11-02(c)(4)(D)

Section 362(c)(4)(D) creates a presumption that such a case is not filed in good faith under certain conditions. A court, when considering a debtor’s request for the imposition of the Automatic Stay, must evaluate the debtor’s attempt to rebut this presumption under the clear and convincing evidentiary standard.

Section 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(I) presumes a repeat debtor’s new case was filed in bad faith as to all creditors when two earlier cases were pending and dismissed within the preceding year.

In re Gibas · filed 2016-01-19(c)(4)(D)(i)(I)

Before filing this case, Kimberly Gibas had two cases that were pending and dismissed within the prior year, so the presumption of bad faith arises as to all of her creditors under section 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(I).

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) prevents an automatic stay from taking effect when a debtor files a third bankruptcy case after two prior cases were dismissed within the year.

HSBC BANK USA NATIONAL ASSOCIATION VS. ADESINA OGUNLANA (F-012098-13, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-09-20(c)(4)(A)(i)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i), an automatic stay does not take effect when a debtor has had two or more prior cases dismissed within the year.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect when a debtor files another case after two or more cases were pending and dismissed within the previous year.

Martha Cecilia Rojas · filed 2019-11-14(c)(4)(A)(i)

Furthermore, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §362(c)(4)(A)(i), because two or more cases of the Debtor were pending within the previous year but were dismissed when the Debtor filed this Chapter 13 case, the automatic stay provided in 11 U.S.C. §362(a) did not go into effect upon the filing of this Chapter 13 case.

Section 362(c)(4) can prevent a new bankruptcy petition from triggering the automatic stay under § 362(a) upon filing.

Kathryn Toggas · filed 2019-12-23(c)(4)

The provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4) would for some time prevent a new case filed by the debtor from giving rise to an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) upon the filing of the petition.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect when a debtor files a case after two or more cases were pending and dismissed within the previous year.

Jeffrey Perkins · filed 2020-01-07(c)(4)(A)(i)

Furthermore, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i), because two or more cases of the Debtor were pending within the previous year but were dismissed when the Debtor filed his third Chapter 13 case, the automatic stay provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) did not go into effect upon the filing of this case.

When two or more of a debtor’s cases were pending within the preceding year and dismissed, the automatic stay does not take effect upon filing another case.

Andrew Consiglio · filed 2020-01-07(c)(4)(A)(i)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i), because two or more cases of the Debtor were pending within the previous year but were dismissed when the Debtor filed this Chapter 7 case, the automatic stay provided in 11 U.S.C. §362(a) did not go into effect upon the filing of this Chapter 7 case.

When a debtor had two or more cases pending and dismissed within the previous year, the automatic stay does not take effect upon filing a new case.

Myriam Othello · filed 2020-01-14(c)(4)(A)(i)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i), because two or more cases of the Debtor were pending within the previous year but were dismissed when the Debtor filed this Chapter 13 case, the automatic stay provided in 11 U.S.C. §362(a) did not go into effect upon the filing of this Chapter 13 case.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect when two earlier dismissed cases were pending within the preceding year, even if one was filed more than a year before the new case.

James Franklin Cook, Jr. · filed 2020-05-11(c)(4)(A)(i)

As the statute makes clear, however, the question is not whether the prior cases were filed within the previous year, but whether the cases were pending within the previous year.

Section 362(c)(4)(D) requires a debtor with two recently dismissed cases to rebut the presumption of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence before the automatic stay may be imposed.

Robert Earl Dear · filed 2020-08-10(c)(4)(D)

Weighing all these considerations, the Court concludes that Debtor has carried his burden to rebut the presumption that his case was not filed in good faith by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 362(c)(4)(A) prevents an automatic stay from arising when an individual debtor files a new case after two bankruptcy cases were pending and dismissed within the preceding year.

Charles Gary Blankenship, II · filed 2025-07-01(c)(4)(A)

It is undisputed that the debtor had two bankruptcy cases that were pending but dismissed within a year of the filing of the present bankruptcy case. Accordingly, no automatic stay arose with the filing of this case.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect when two of the debtor’s bankruptcy cases were dismissed within the preceding year.

Sharonda Harris · filed 2025-09-08(c)(4)(A)(i)

More importantly, as discussed above, because the Debtor had two cases dismissed within one year prior to the Petition Date, the automatic stay did not go into effect.

Section 362(c)(4) prevents the automatic stay from arising after two bankruptcy cases were dismissed within the previous year, and a debtor seeking to impose the stay must rebut the presumption of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence.

Laneka Deoneida Lombrano · filed 2025-11-06(c)(4)

Two bankruptcy cases, filed by the Debtor, were dismissed within the past twelve months. Therefore, the automatic stay did not arise upon the filing of this case, and this case presumptively was filed in bad faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i), (c)(4)(D)(i)(I). Debtor failed to appear at the Hearing and did not present evidence to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, the Court will not impose the stay and the motion will be denied.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) precludes an automatic stay when a debtor has had two prior bankruptcy cases pending within the year before the current filing.

Vornholt · filed 2025-11-26(c)(4)(A)(i)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i), Appellant's prior bankruptcy filings in the same year as his current petition precluded an automatic stay.

Section 362(c)(4) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect when a debtor files a third bankruptcy petition within a year.

Hardwick · filed 2025-12-08(c)(4)

Because this was Hardwick’s third bankruptcy within a year, the automatic stay did not go into effect.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) may prevent a third bankruptcy filing from triggering an automatic stay when two earlier cases were pending and dismissed within the preceding year.

Pachis, Zander v. Quayle · filed 2026-04-30(c)(4)(A)(i)

As to the ancillary matters, the appellant has not demonstrated that his third bankruptcy filing triggered an automatic stay,2 and the Family Court’s property-division order accounted for the possibility of various outcomes in the litigation pending in the Court of Chancery.

Section 362(a) bars a debtor’s state bar complaint against a bankruptcy trustee when it is an outside effort to control the estate or its property.

Ryan Lashon Ford · filed 2025-09-29(a)

As this Court explained there, such action violated the “automatic 18 Debtor’s assertion otherwise is all the more illogical given that the Debtor, as a landlord, is herself a potential creditor who, if ever needing to recover from a debtor-tenant, would be dependent on a trustee acting for her interests to receive fair treatment in bankruptcy, even if adverse to that debtor. stay. . . . [W]hich bars outside efforts to control either the estate or its property,” as well as “the Barton Doctrine, [whereby] a bankruptcy trustee may not be sued in another tribunal without leave of the appointing court.” Seertech at 15-16 (first citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) then citing Gordon v. Nick, 162 F.3d 1155 (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 1998), Schafler v. Field, 2001 WL 34553964 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 2001), and In re Byrd, 2007 WL 1485441 (Bankr. D. Md. May 18, 2007) (all citing Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 26 L. Ed. 672 (1881))). The Bar Complaint here is no different.

Section 362(h)(1) does not terminate the automatic stay when a represented debtor timely enters into a reaffirmation agreement that is unenforceable because counsel declined to certify it.

Julio Cesar Fernandez · filed 2025-11-03(h)(1)

For this reason, the Court holds as follows: Just as an unrepresented debtor who enters into a reaffirmation agreement is considered to have complied with section 362(h)(1) regardless of whether the Court then approves the agreement and thus renders it enforceable, so too, a represented debtor who enters into such an agreement has complied with the statute even if his or her attorney fails to certify it.

Section 362(h) terminates the automatic stay when a debtor fails to timely redeem or reaffirm collateral, and a good-faith attempt alone does not satisfy the requirement.

Anderson · filed 2025-12-11(h)

Section 362(h) demands compliance with the specified action, not a good-faith attempt.

A stay relief order under § 362(d)(4) can bind later bankruptcy proceedings concerning the same property for two years, so a later filing does not create a stay as to that property.

Montgomery v. U.S. Bank · filed 2025-12-01(d)(4)

But judicially noticeable documents show that the stay was lifted, and that the court’s order applied to any bankruptcy proceeding concerning the property for the following two years. Dkt. No. 8, Ex. 15. The record indisputably shows that there was no stay in effect when Ms. Montgomery filed for bankruptcy, related to the same property, less than two months later.

Section 362(l) requires a debtor who rents a residence to make the prescribed payment to maintain the automatic stay after an eviction judgment; a debtor who is not a renter cannot use that provision to remain in the property.

Cheryl Yeboah · filed 2025-12-03(l)

That form (Form 101A) applies to debtors who rent their residence and provides strict guidelines under 11 U.S.C. § 362(l) that require payment in order to maintain the automatic stay. The Debtor, however, is not a renter and, based upon the eviction judgment, has no right to stay at the Property.

When a residential tenant complies with § 362(l) by filing the eviction certification and paying one month’s rent, the automatic stay applies for 30 days if the landlord does not timely object to the certification.

Talona Riviere · filed 2025-12-10(l)(3)

As a result, the Court finds that the Debtor’s compliance with the requirements of Section 362(l), coupled with the Landlord’s failure to timely object, results in the imposition of the automatic stay for thirty days post-petition (the “30-Day Stay”).

Section 362(b)(22)’s eviction exception likely does not apply when a debtor’s possession arises from a contract for deed rather than a lease or rental agreement.

David R. Christenson · filed 2026-01-08(b)(22)

Thus, in reviewing the record, at least on a preliminary basis, this Court finds that the exception to the automatic stay under Section 362(b)(22) does not likely apply because AGI’s claim to possession to the Premises does not appear to arise by “lease or rental agreement.”

Section 362(a) does not prohibit a creditor from assigning its mortgage during the debtor’s bankruptcy case without court permission.

Mark Duhaney · filed 2025-12-04(a)

The conduct of which Mr. Duhaney complains – “a mortgage assignment from Goshen Mortgage LLC, Trustee for GDBT I Trust 2011-1, to Lycan Capital Fund I LLC, . . . made during my active bankruptcy case, without Court permission,” simply does not amount to a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(21)(A) excludes acts enforcing a lien or security interest in real property from the automatic stay when the debtor is ineligible under § 109(g); a creditor need not first obtain stay relief.

Frederica West · filed 2026-01-07(b)(21)(A)

The Court also finds and concludes that, while Ms. West’s filing of this bankruptcy case triggered the protections of the automatic stay under Bankruptcy Code Section 362(a), that protection was limited by the terms of another Section, Bankruptcy Code Section 362(b)(21). Specifically, the automatic stay in this bankruptcy case did “not operate as a stay . . . of any act to enforce any lien against or security interest in real property . . . if the debtor is ineligible under section 109(g) to be a debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(21).

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits collection calls and bills demanding immediate payment after a debtor files for bankruptcy.

Kirk Freeland · filed 2020-08-12(a)(6)

Verizon violated § 362(a)(6) in at least two ways. First, Verizon violated the stay by repeatedly calling the Freelands after they filed their bankruptcy petition. ... Second, Verizon violated the automatic stay when, approximately three months after the petition date, it sent the Freelands the September Bill asking for “immediate payment.”

Section 362(a)(6) bars calls and text messages intended to coerce a debtor to pay a prepetition obligation after the creditor learns of the bankruptcy.

Sharon Annette Reid · filed 2026-01-15(a)(6)

Thus, the messages and their context in this case establish by unrebutted evidence that Modern Rent to Own was not simply threatening mere repossession of its collateral if the lease payments were not made but further was attempting to coerce Debtor to pay a pre-petition obligation. As such, these actions also were in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) does not extend the stay for a debt owed by one spouse to the other spouse merely because they filed a joint bankruptcy petition.

Jaden Terrance and Jesse Terrance · filed 2026-02-20(a)(6)

Filing a joint bankruptcy petition, however, does not create an automatic stay applied to both parties.

Section 362 does not require a creditor to withdraw a prepetition pleading that produced no operative court order; leaving it pending does not violate the automatic stay.

Raley · filed 2026-04-20(a)

The automatic stay does not impose a duty on creditors to withdraw prepetition pleadings that have not resulted in any operative court order.

Section 362(b) excepts Kansas protection-from-abuse proceedings that restrain abuse without affecting estate property under the criminal and police-power exceptions, with an additional domestic-relations exception when ancillary to paternity or support proceedings.

In Re Nelson · filed 2005-11-04(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(4)

The Court concludes that a PFA case more closely resembles a criminal proceeding or a proceeding to enforce a government’s police power to provide for the safety of its citizens. Accordingly, it falls under the exceptions to the stay found in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) or (4). ... PFA proceedings conducted in conjunction with divorce cases can also be deemed ancillary to paternity or alimony and support proceedings which are plainly excepted from the stay by § 362(b)(2).

Section 362(h) terminates the stay as to collateral when a debtor fails to timely perform a stated intent to redeem it, but leaves the debtor’s redemption right intact.

In Re Herrera · filed 2011-07-08(h)(1)(B)

Therefore, as a result of the Debtor’s failure to timely perform his intention pursuant to § 521(a)(2)(B), the automatic stay in connection with the Debtor’s Vehicle terminated in accordance with § 362(h), allowing Capital One to pursue all rights and remedies available to it under applicable law in connection with the Yukon Denali. ... The phrase, “except as provided in section 362(h),” added to § 521(a)(2)(C) by BAPCPA, limits the effect of failure to redeem within the § 521(a)(2)(B) time limit, to the termination of the automatic stay under § 362(h), leaving all other rights of the debtor under the Code intact.

Section 362(h)(1) ends the stay for all personal property securing a scheduled debt when the debtor fails the statement of intention requirements, even if the collateral itself was not scheduled.

Samson v. Western Capital Partners, LLC (In Re Blixseth) · filed 2011-05-25(h)(1)

Under the unambiguous language of § 362(h), all personal property secured by a scheduled debt is released from the automatic stay if a debtor fails to timely file and comply with her statement of intention.

Section 362(h)(1)(B) preserves the stay despite a debtor’s failure to take timely action only if the statement of intention specifies reaffirmation on the original contract terms and the creditor refuses those terms.

Heflin v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. (In re Heflin) · filed 2011-05-02(h)(1)(B)

Both the Specificity Requirement and the Refusal Requirement must be satisfied for the Unless Clause to be satisfied.

Section 362(h)(1) terminates the stay as to personal property when an individual debtor fails to timely state and carry out an intention to surrender, redeem, reaffirm, or assume a lease.

In Re Miller · filed 2011-01-05(h)(1)

Now, section 362(h) requires that a failure to redeem or to reaffirm within the applicable time period terminates the automatic stay with respect to personal property of the estate or the debtor.

Section 362(h)'s early termination of the automatic stay does not apply in Chapter 13 cases.

In Re Schlitzer · filed 2005-11-17(h)

Section 362(h) is not applicable in a Chapter 13 case.

Section 362(h)(2) permits continuation of the stay for secured personal property whose equity provides consequential value to the estate, without an additional adequate-protection order where the equity protects creditors.

In re Squires · filed 2006-03-23(h)(2)

The schedules show that there is equity in the certificate of deposit and two vehicles. Therefore, the certificate of deposit and two vehicles are of consequential value or benefit to the estate. The Court finds that there is no need to order adequate protection of the creditors’ interest because of the equity. ... Based upon the foregoing, the Court will not terminate the automatic stay with respect to the personal property of the bankruptcy estate listed on Schedules B and D securing in whole or in part a claim.

Section 362(h)(1)(A) terminates the automatic stay as to a vehicle thirty days after the petition date when the debtor's timely statement of intention provides for retaining the vehicle without indicating redemption or reaffirmation.

In Re Craker · filed 2006-02-14(h)(1)(A)

Nevertheless, pursuant to § 362(h)(1) the Debtor was also required to indicate on her timely filed Statement of Intention that she was either surrendering or retaining the Vehicle, and if retaining the Vehicle, that she was either redeeming the Vehicle or reaffirming the underlying debt. The Debtor failed to do so. Because the Debtor failed to indicate one of the options set forth in § 362(h)(1), the automatic stay terminated with regard to the Vehicle thirty days after the Petition Date.

Section 362(h)(1) automatically terminates the stay and removes personal-property collateral from the estate when a Chapter 7 debtor elects to retain it and continue payments without timely redeeming or reaffirming, but gives the creditor no immediate right to possession independent of state law.

In Re Rowe · filed 2006-05-10(h)(1)

The Debtor’s failure to file a Statement of Intent to either redeem the Vehicle or reaffirm the debt to the Bank within the time periods provided, has resulted in the automatic lifting of the stay and the removal of the Vehicle from the estate. The Bank’s right to repossess the Vehicle are determined by state law; there is nothing in the Code as amended giving the Bank an immediate right of possession of the Vehicle.

Section 362(h)(1) terminates the automatic stay as to collateral thirty days after the petition date when a debtor timely states an intention to retain and pay but fails to specify reaffirmation, redemption, or surrender.

In Re Boring · filed 2006-05-30(h)(1)

While the Debtor most certainly filed a timely statement of intention as required by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2), the Debtor’s statement of intention was inadequate under the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)(1). The Debtor’s failure to affirmatively indicate whether she intended to reaffirm the underlying obligation, redeem the collateral, or surrender the collateral caused the automatic stay to terminate thirty days after the petition date.

Section 362(h)(1)(A) terminates the stay over retained personal-property collateral and removes it from the estate if the debtor fails to timely state an intention to redeem the property or reaffirm the debt.

In Re Donald · filed 2006-06-12(h)(1)(A)

The problem with that argument, however, is that it would be contrary to the plain meaning of § 362(h), which provides that the automatic stay shall terminate if the debtor is retaining property unless the debtor states the intention to either redeem the property or to reaffirm the debt. ... The consequences of not complying with § 362(h)(1)(A) are that the stay will terminate with respect to personal property of the estate or the debtor and that the personal property shall no longer be property of the estate.

A trustee's motion under Section 362(h)(2) is timely if filed before the Section 521(a)(2)(B) performance deadline and prevents termination of the automatic stay pending resolution of the motion.

In Re Norton · filed 2006-08-02(h)(2)

Section 362(h) does not expressly state which of the two § 521(a)(2) deadlines applies; however, because subsections (A) and (B) of § 362(h)(1) are in the conjunctive, thus requiring that both subsections (A) and (B) of § 521(a)(2) be met prior to termination of the automatic stay, the court finds the § 521(a)(2)(B) deadline to be determinative, since § 362(h)(1) cannot be triggered until the expiration of that particular deadline. As such, the Trustee’s Motion was timely and precluded termination of the automatic stay on July 7, 2006, until after the court’s resolution of the Motion.

Section 362(h)(1)(B) terminates the automatic stay over personal-property collateral when a debtor fails to perform a stated intention to reaffirm within thirty days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors.

In Re Anderson · filed 2006-08-31(h)(1)(B)

In this case, the Debtors did file their statement of intention as required. They did not, however, perform their stated intention (i.e., reaffirm the debt). Therefore, the Court concludes that under the plain language of section 362(h), the stay was terminated on June 8, 2006, thirty days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors (and almost a month prior to the Debtors’ discharge).

Section 362(h)(1) terminates the stay when a debtor retains secured personal property without timely redeeming it or reaffirming the debt, leaving the creditor’s remedies subject to applicable state law.

In Re Ruona · filed 2006-10-26(h)(1)

Because the Debtor retained the Collateral but failed to redeem or reaffirm the debt, the stay terminated by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(h); however, FMC’s remedies upon termination of the automatic stay remain subject to applicable state law.

Section 362(h)(1)(A) terminates the stay as to personal-property collateral 30 days after the petition when the debtor states an intention to retain it without specifying redemption or reaffirmation.

In Re McFall · filed 2006-11-22(h)(1)(A)

Section 362(h)(1)(A) clearly provides that the stay will terminate if a debtor fails to 1) timely file a statement of intention; 2) indicate in the statement whether debtor intends to retain or surrender collateral; and 3) if debtor intends to retain such collateral, whether debtor will redeem the collateral or reaffirm the debt.

Section 362(h)(1) does not terminate the stay on secured personal property when a debtor timely states an intention to reaffirm and enters into a reaffirmation agreement, even if the court refuses to approve the agreement.

In Re Blakeley · filed 2007-01-17(h)(1)

Section 362(h) provides that if a debtor fails to timely comply with the requirement found under § 521(a)(2) and take timely action specified in such statement before the expiration of the period for taking action, then the automatic stay with respect to the secured personal property is terminated. Here, the Debtor timely complied with the requirements found under § 521(a)(2). She took timely action by entering into the reaffirmation agreement, and she appeared before the court at the scheduled hearing to consider the reaffirmation agreement where she honestly and openly testified in support of the reaffirmation agreement. The Debtor has met all of the requirements under § 362(h). ... It is not necessary for the Court to approve the reaffirmation agreement in order for the Debtor to comply with § 521 or § 362(h).

Section 362(h)(1) terminates the stay when a debtor fails to timely perform a stated intention to redeem personal property, and seeking financing without contacting the creditor or filing a redemption motion does not preserve the stay.

In Re Parker · filed 2007-03-01(h)(1)

In any event, a debtor, such as the debtors in this case, who stops his regular monthly payments, does nothing to keep the creditor informed, and fails to file a motion to redeem, clearly has not demonstrated the minimal effort needed to perform his stated intentions. ... As such, the Court concludes that the debtors have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that they performed their duties under Section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code and, pursuant to Sections 362(h) and 521(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, the stay automatically terminated on January 23, 2007, prior to the date Nuvell repossessed the van. Because no stay existed, sanctions are not appropriate.

Section 362(h)'s termination of the automatic stay applies only to personal property and does not eliminate the ride-through option for real property.

In Re Wilson · filed 2007-05-30(h)

Section 362(h) was added by BAPCPA and provides that the automatic stay terminates with respect to personal property when the debtor does not state an intention to reaffirm or redeem, or does not perform such intention within a specified period of time. ... However, the language in § 521(d) refers to such provisions in agreements covered by § 521(a)(6) and § 362(h), which address only personal property liens.

Section 362(h)(1) does not terminate the automatic stay when a debtor timely files a statement of intention and enters into a reaffirmation agreement that the court later disapproves.

In Re Moustafi · filed 2007-06-04(h)(1)

The consequences of § 362(h)(1) and § 521(d) — lifting the automatic stay and making ipso facto default clauses enforceable — are only caused by a debtor’s failure to timely file a statement of intention and/or to timely enter into a reaffirmation agreement, “not by the court’s disapproval of the agreement or by its determination that the agreement is unenforceable.”

Section 362(h)(1)(B) does not warrant relief from the automatic stay when a debtor timely states an intention to reaffirm and remains ready and willing to sign, but the secured creditor fails to provide the reaffirmation agreement.

Pacific Capital Bancorp v. Schwass (In Re Schwass) · filed 2007-11-06(h)(1)(B)

The Court also holds that where, as in the case at hand, a debtor has timely filed a statement of intention to reaffirm, she complies with the requirement to “perform” such intention under subsection 521(a)(2)(B) by standing ready and willing to execute the reaffirmation agreement prepared by the secured creditor. Accordingly, the Court holds that in the case at hand relief from the automatic stay under § 362(h) is not warranted because Debtor has not failed to reaffirm. The same result may be reached by finding that Movant, by failing to provide a reaffirmation agreement for Debtor’s signature, has refused to agree to reaffirmation on the original terms and thus relief is not warranted under § 362(h)(B).

Section 362(h)(1)'s exception for a creditor's refusal to reaffirm requires the debtor both to timely state an intention to reaffirm and to timely attempt reaffirmation.

In Re Hoisington · filed 2008-01-31(h)(1)

For the exception to apply a debtor must (1) timely file a statement of intention indicating that he or she intends to reaffirm the debt (§ 362(h)(1)(A)), and (2) he or she must timely take that action and attempt to reaffirm the debt (§ 362(h)(1)(B)). If a debtor meets both of the above conditions but the reaffirmation agreement is refused by the creditor, then the exception applies.

Section 362(h)(1) does not terminate the automatic stay when a debtor timely states an intention to reaffirm a secured debt and timely enters into and files a reaffirmation agreement, even if the court disapproves the agreement.

In Re Chim · filed 2008-01-25(h)(1)

Thus, a debtor who has timely filed a statement of intent to reaffirm a secured debt and timely entered into a reaffirmation agreement and filed it with the court has fully performed the obligations under Section 362(h) whether or not the Court approves the reaffirmation agreement.

Section 362(h)(1) terminates the stay on a retained vehicle if an individual debtor fails timely to state an intent to reaffirm or redeem and perform that intent, even when payments are current.

Dumont v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In Re Dumont) · filed 2008-02-06(h)(1)

Section 362(h) requires a debtor who retains a vehicle to indicate his intent either to reaffirm or redeem, and if the debtor fails to specify his or her intention or timely take the action specified (both must be done within the time period set by section 521(a)(2)), then the stay lifts. Therefore, when Dumont stated her intent to retain and pay in her statement of intention she did not comply with debtor’s obligations under section 362(h) and the stay lifted.

Section 362(h) eliminates the ride-through option for personal property but leaves intact the option to retain real property without reaffirming the debt while maintaining current payments.

In Re Caraballo · filed 2008-04-29(h)

Code § § 521(a)(6) and 362(h) abrogated the ride through option as it pertains to personal property. ... Accordingly, this court must conclude that when Congress eliminated the ride through option for personal property in BAPCPA, Congress was aware that there was a ride through option for real property and intended to leave it intact post-BAPCPA.

Section 362(h)(1) does not terminate the stay when a debtor timely enters into a reaffirmation agreement and remains current on payments, even if the court refuses to approve the agreement as an undue hardship.

In Re Baker · filed 2008-06-10(h)(1)

This Court rejects the argument that section 362(h), which provides for relief from the automatic stay under limited circumstances, trumps the Third Circuit’s holding, based, in part, on its interpretation of the overarching purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, that in certain circumstances debtors have the option to retain property while staying current on loan payments. A case such as this where a debtor has timely entered into a reaffirmation agreement (regardless of whether the agreement is approved by the court) and the debtor remains current on its debt is just such a circumstance.

Compliance with section 362(h) through a reaffirmation agreement requires the debtor to prove good faith, which is lacking when the debtor merely seeks to preserve protection against repossession without attempting to rebut an admitted presumption of undue hardship.

In Re Milby · filed 2008-06-16(h)

It is incumbent upon the debtor to prove good faith in complying with the statutory provisions which would prohibit a secured creditor from exercising its contractual rights post-discharge. To hold otherwise would permit all debtors to go through the procedural exercise of compliance when they know they have no basis for persuading the court to overrule a presumption of undue hardship.

Section 362(h) terminates the stay and removes personal property securing even an unperfected lien from the estate when the debtor fails timely to perform the statement of intention and the trustee fails to file a timely motion under subsection (h)(2).

Noland v. HSBC Auto Finance, Inc. (In Re Baine) · filed 2008-09-09(h)

This section clarifies that if a debtor does not file his or her statement of intention or follow through on it within the time periods codified in § 521(a)(2), and no motion of the type described in § 362(h)(2) (“ § 362(h)(2) motion”) is filed by a trustee, the automatic stay terminates with respect to the subject property and the property is no longer property of the estate. ... While it is clear, then, that HSBC did not perfect its lien, it nevertheless has a security interest in the Vehicle which “secures” the debt. Consequently, the requirements of § 521(a)(2) and § 362(h) do apply.

Section 362(h) limits termination of the automatic stay to personal property, preserving the option for debtors current on real-property debts to retain the property without reaffirming the debt.

In Re Waller · filed 2008-09-25(h)

Section 362(h) employs limiting language that terminates the automatic stay as to personal property when the debtor fails to state an intention to surrender, reaffirm, redeem, or does not perform the stated intention within a prescribed period.

Section 362(h)(1) terminates the stay and removes secured personal property from the estate when a debtor fails timely to choose surrender, redemption, or reaffirmation, precluding ride-through based solely on continued payments.

Daimler Chrysler Financial Services Americas LLC v. Jones (In Re Jones) · filed 2008-09-29(h)(1)

I therefore conclude that, in the absence of the “ride-through” option, when the debtor failed to timely choose one of the three available statutory options, the automatic stay was terminated and the vehicle was no longer part of the bankruptcy estate. I FIND that the debtor was not entitled to retain the vehicle pursuant to bankruptcy law, and that DaimlerChrysler was free to take whatever action was permitted under nonbankruptcy law.

Section 362(h)(1)(A) does not require court approval of a reaffirmation agreement to preserve the automatic stay when uncounseled debtors timely enter into and submit the agreement for approval.

Coastal Federal Credit Union v. Hardiman · filed 2008-10-28(h)(1)(A)

Even if the court equates the phrases “enter into an agreement pursuant to section 524(c)” and “enter into an agreement of the kind specified in section 524(c),” the court’s analyses of the phrase “enter into an agreement” in section 521(a)(6), the phrase “enter into an agreement” in section 362(h)(1)(A), and the term “agreement” in section 524(c) demonstrate that with respect to debtors proceeding without counsel the phrase “enter into an agreement” does not equal “enter into an enforceable agreement.” ... Therefore, the automatic stay remains in place with respect to the Hardimans’ loan concerning the Chevrolet, the Chevrolet remains part of the bankruptcy estate, and the Hardimans are not in default.

Section 362(h)(1) limits automatic stay termination for failure to comply with the statement-of-intention requirements to personal property and does not apply to real property.

In Re Hart · filed 2009-03-10(h)(1)

Thus, like section 521(a)(6), section 362(h) is specifically limited to personal property.

Section 362(h)(1) applies to all debts secured by personal property, including debts that are not purchase money debts; it does not govern debts secured by real property.

In Re Lopez · filed 2010-06-24(h)(1)

Section 521(a)(2) in conjunction with § 362(h) applies to all debts secured by personal property, not just purchase money debts.

Section 362(h)(1) terminates the stay and removes personal property from the estate 30 days after the first scheduled creditors’ meeting if the debtor fails to properly state or carry out an intention for that property.

Ostrander v. Source One Financial Corp. (In re Mollison) · filed 2012-01-06(h)(1)

Accordingly, this Court holds that, where a debtor fails to file (or file properly) a Statement of Intent or fails to perform according to his or her stated intent, the Automatic Stay will not terminate and personal property will not be removed from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 362(h)(1) until the expiration of 30 days after the first date set for the 341 Meeting.

Section 362(h)(1) terminates the automatic stay as to all personal property securing a scheduled debt, even if the property itself is unscheduled, when the debtor fails to timely file and comply with a statement of intention.

Edra Blixseth V. · filed 2012-06-21(h)(1)

Under the unambiguous language of § 362(h), all personal property secured by a scheduled debt is released from the automatic stay if a debtor fails to timely file and comply with her statement of intention.

Section 362(h) terminates the automatic stay as to all personal property securing a scheduled debt, including property omitted from the schedules, when the debtor fails to timely file and comply with a statement of intention.

Samson v. Western Capital Partners, LLC (In re Blixseth) · filed 2012-06-21(h)

Under the unambiguous language of § 362(h), all personal property secured by a scheduled debt is released from the automatic stay if a debtor fails to timely file and comply with her statement of intention.

Section 362(h) terminates the automatic stay as to personal property when a debtor fails to file a statement of intention or timely take the stated action; it does not eliminate the need to seek stay relief as to real property.

In re Covel · filed 2012-07-08(h)

Section 362(h) provides for the termination of the automatic stay with respect to personal property if the debtor fails to either file a statement of intentions or timely take the action specified in the statement.

Section 362(h) terminates the automatic stay only as to personal property securing a claim; it does not terminate the stay when that property no longer secures the claim.

Samson v. Western Capital Partners LLC (In re Blixseth) · filed 2013-03-18(h)

The Court rejects WCP’s argument that Samson’s failure to act under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) precludes this Court from setting aside WCP’s lien against Debtor’s personal property. Section 362(h) only terminates the automatic stay with respect to personal property of the estate or of the debtor securing in whole or in part a claim. By setting aside Debtor’s guarantee, Debt- or’s personal property no longer secures WCP’s claim, and as a result, WCP can no longer claim the stay terminated automatically under § 362(h).