11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(b)(2)(B) permits collection of domestic support obligations from property outside the bankruptcy estate, including property revested in the debtor after plan confirmation.

Florida Department of Revenue v. Rodriguez · filed 2010-02-22(b)(2)(B)

Therefore, subsequent to confirmation, the property was “not property of the estate” and subject to the § 362(b)(2)(B) child support exception.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) exempts collection of a domestic support obligation from the automatic stay only when collection is from property outside the bankruptcy estate.

In Re the Marriage of Weis · filed 2010-06-07(b)(2)(B)

We find that, while the trial court properly determined that the credit card debts Bergeron was obligated to pay under the divorce decree were in the nature of a “domestic support obligation,” there is no evidence that such an obligation could be collected from “property that is not property of the [bankruptcy] estate” as required by title 11, section 362(b)(2)(B). The exception to the automatic stay for the collection of domestic support obligations against non-estate property therefore does not apply.

Section 362(b)(2) does not allow a domestic support creditor to bring the trustee into state court to determine the extent of a priority claim against the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Dreier · filed 2010-10-04(b)(2)(A)(ii)

Section 362(b)(2) does not, however, allow her to haul the Trustee into state court to litigate the acceleration question, and ultimately, the extent of her priority claim against the estate.

Section 362(b)(2)(A) excepts from the automatic stay the establishment of domestic support obligations, including divorce-related attorney fees and monthly payments for household bills when they are in the nature of support.

In Re Lee · filed 2012-02-08(b)(2)(A)

Because both the debts in question, the attorney fee award and the monthly maintenance payment, are domestic support obligations, they fall within § 362(b)(2)(A)’s exception to the automatic stay established by § 362(a).

Section 362(b)(2)(B) permits collection of a domestic support obligation from property outside the estate through contempt proceedings, notwithstanding the automatic stay.

In re Angelo · filed 2012-09-27(b)(2)(B)

For these reasons, I hold that Congress understood “collection” to include enforcement of a judgment by contempt and that, in § 362(b)(2)(B), Congress created an exception from the entirety of the stay to permit that to occur.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) excepts proceedings to establish or modify child-support orders from the automatic stay.

Landry v. Landry · filed 2013-01-18(b)(2)(A)(ii)

The exception to the automatic stay found in § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) applies to the commencement or continuation of a civil action or proceeding for the establishment or modification of an order for domestic-support obligations, including child-support orders. That portion of the mother’s complaint seeking an adjustment of the father’s child-support obligation falls within the plain language of § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) and clearly does not come within the scope of the automatic stay.

The automatic stay may be terminated to permit enforcement of a domestic support obligation in family court.

In re Ashby · filed 2013-01-23(b)(2)(B), (C)

It is further ORDERED that the automatic stay is terminated for the purpose of enforcing the domestic support obligation in the Henderson Family Court pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B) and (C).

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) excepts proceedings to establish or modify a spousal support obligation from the automatic stay.

Ward v. Hoobler · filed 2013-04-12(b)(2)(A)(ii)

Moreover, to the extent that appellant sought to create a spousal support obligation, the bankruptcy stay did not prevent the district court from addressing ... that issue.

Section 362(a) bars coercive civil contempt to collect prepetition divorce-related debt despite a stay-relief order limited to state-court proceedings connected to the divorce appeal.

Young v. Young (In re Young) · filed 2013-06-10(a)

While the confusing language suggests a mitigation of willfulness, the Stay Order does not alter the Code’s integrated treatment of domestic support obligations and the inappropriateness of pursuing, through coercive contempt, the collection of prepetition debt.

Section 362(b)(2)(C) does not except domestic support collection from the automatic stay unless income is withheld under a judicial or administrative order or a statute.

DeSouza · filed 2013-06-14(b)(2)(C)

Likewise, because there was no withholding under a judicial or administrative order or a statute, the exception under § 362(b)(2)(C) does not apply.

Section 362(b)(2)(C) excepts withholding income for domestic support from the automatic stay, but does not except garnishment of a bank account into which the debtor’s income has been deposited.

In re Ojiegbe · filed 2014-06-20(b)(2)(C)

Thus, the court concludes that the plain meaning of the phrase “withholding of income” does not encompass the garnishment of a bank account into which a debtor’s income has been deposited.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) excludes collection of a domestic support obligation from property outside the bankruptcy estate from the automatic stay.

Matter of Gorsky v. Kessler · filed 2015-11-25(b)(2)(B)

While a bankruptcy petition does create an automatic stay as to certain types of proceedings (see 11 USC § 362 [a]), 11 USC § 362 specifically excludes from the automatic stay proceedings for “the collection of a domestic support obligation from property that is not property of the [bankruptcy] estate” (11 USC § 362 [b] [2] [B]; see Bloch v Bloch, 2010 WL 3824125, *2, 2010 US Dist LEXIS 99891, *5 [ED NY, Sept. 23, 2010, No. 09-CV-3963(RRM)]; In re Johnston, 321 BR 262, 274 [Bankr D Ariz 2005]; In re Bezoza, 271 BR 46, 51 [Bankr SD NY 2002]; see also In re Moon, 211 BR 483, 485 [Bankr SD NY 1997]).

Section 362(b)(2)(C) excepts domestic support collection from the automatic stay only when it involves withholding income through wage garnishment or an income deduction order.

Jordahl v. Dyal (In re Jordahl) · filed 2016-08-08(b)(2)(C)

Accordingly, I hold that the plain language of § 362(b)(2)(C) limits the stay exception to the withholding of income, whether through wage garnishment or an income deduction order. Here, Jordahl’s ex-wife was not seeking withholding of income; she was seeking immediate payment. Thus, the stay exception under § 362(b)(2)(C) does not apply.

Section 362(b)(2)(C) permits court-ordered withholding of Chapter 11 estate income to pay a domestic support obligation, while § 362(b)(2)(B) excepts collection from property outside a Chapter 7 estate from the automatic stay.

In re Cascone · filed 2017-05-18(b)(2)(B), (b)(2)(C)

Section 362(b)(2)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the court-ordered withholding of a Chapter 11 debtor’s income for the payment of a domestic support obligation. Additionally, the order that established the Debtor’s child support arrearage in this case is not void as a violation of the automatic stay, because the collection action was excepted from the stay under § 362(b)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) does not except collection of a custody-related attorney fee award from the automatic stay when the award is primarily a sanction rather than a domestic support obligation.

O'Brien v. Skubic · filed 2017-07-21(b)(2)(B)

Based on this Court’s own simple inquiry into what the Superior Court considered in making the Fee Award, it appears that the Superior Court must have given great weight to the other factors it mentioned, which would include the numerous instances of wrongful conduct by the Debtor asserted by Skubic, and therefore this Court finds that the Fee Award is primarily a sanction for the Debtor’s conduct, was not in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, and is thus not a DSO. Consequently, 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B) did not apply to the service of the Contempt Motion to th,e extent it sought payment of the Fee Award by the Debtor.

Section 362(b)(2) excepts collection of a domestic support obligation from the automatic stay only when collection is from property outside the bankruptcy estate.

Zhuk v. Zhuk (In re Zhuk) · filed 2017-10-27(b)(2)

The statute excepts from the automatic stay "the collection of a domestic support obligation from property that is not property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2) (emphasis added).

Section 362(b)(2)(B) does not except contempt proceedings to enforce a domestic support obligation from the automatic stay as collection of that obligation.

Grinspan v. Grinspan (In re Grinspan) · filed 2019-02-08(b)(2)(B)

Accordingly, the Court finds that even if the Money Judgment constitutes a domestic support obligation, defendants violated the automatic stay because litigating the Contempt Motion was the "enforcement" of a domestic support obligation, which is not excepted pursuant to § 362(b)(2)(B) as "collection."

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) permits a family court to fix the amount of prepetition domestic support arrearages after the debtor files for bankruptcy.

In re Dougherty-Kelsay · filed 2019-04-23(b)(2)(A)(ii)

The plain language of § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) allows family courts to review pre-petition domestic support obligation arrearages and establish the amount due post-petition, just as the Family Court did in this case in the Judgment.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) permits collection of a domestic support obligation from nonestate property, but collection of support-related legal fees from estate property remains stayed.

In re Golan · filed 2019-05-03(b)(2)(B)

Following the commencement of Debtor's Bankruptcy Case, the automatic stay prevented Attorney Gisondo from seeking to enforce payment of the legal fees from Debtor's post-petition earnings or from property of the estate. The Court finds that the filing of the Motion to Compel constituted a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(2) allows proceedings to establish or modify domestic support obligations and collection of those obligations from nonestate property despite the automatic stay.

Joanne Doughty v. Douglas · filed 2019-12-17(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)

As the bankruptcy court properly recognized, the stay did not apply to the matters raised in the 2019 Request because they concern DSOs and there was no attempt to collect from estate property.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) permits collection of a domestic support obligation only from non-estate property, which the state court must specifically identify.

Valentine v. Valentine · filed 2020-01-17(b)(2)(B)

The Court FINDS that the actions taken at the February 4, 2019 Hearing and under the Order & Confinement violated the automatic stay, because the exception under § 362(b)(2)(B) cannot apply when the State Court fails to specifically identify non-Estate property available for payment of the Pre-Petition Debt.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) exempts collection of domestic support obligations from the automatic stay only when payment comes from property outside the bankruptcy estate.

Valentine v. Valentine · filed 2020-01-27(b)(2)(B)

The Court FINDS that the collection efforts taken at the February 4, 2019 Hearing and under the Order & Confinement violated the automatic stay, because the exception under § 362(b)(2)(B) cannot apply when the State Court fails to specifically identify non-Estate property available for payment of the Pre-Petition Debt.

Section 362(b)(2) does not exempt an order enforcing payment of a domestic support obligation from the automatic stay when payment is not sought from nonestate property or through wage garnishment.

RASMUSSEN VS. ROBERT W. RASMUSSEN (FM-02-1134-05, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) · filed 2021-07-13(b)(2)

Further, plaintiff did not contend she sought payment from property that was not part of the bankruptcy estate, nor did the court indicate whether the payments were to come from a source other than the bankruptcy estate. The court simply ordered defendant to pay plaintiff within thirty days from entry of the March 16, 2020 order. Finally, plaintiff did not seek, nor did the court enter an order imposing a wage garnishment to recover these funds. On such a record, we conclude the March 16, 2020 order was entered in violation of the automatic stay and is, therefore, void.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) excludes proceedings to establish or modify domestic support obligations from the automatic bankruptcy stay.

O'Leary, S. v. O'Leary, A. · filed 2021-11-22(b)(2)(A)(ii)

Upon further review, we determine that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, filing for bankruptcy “does not operate as a stay” for “the establishment or modification of an order for domestic support obligations[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii).

Section 362(b)(2)(B) excepts collection of a domestic support obligation from the stay only when collection is limited to property outside the bankruptcy estate.

In re Michelle Dougherty-Kelsay · filed 2022-03-21(b)(2)(B)

To except collection of the payment from the stay, it would need to be paid from property that is not property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B). Because the judgment did not limit collection of the $50 Payment from funds that were not property of the estate, that portion of the judgment violated the stay and is void.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) permits collection of a domestic support obligation from property outside the bankruptcy estate, but collection from estate property remains stayed.

Foufas v. Foufas · filed 2022-06-17(b)(2)(B)

So long as the holder of such a claim does not seek to collect from assets that are subject to administration in the bankruptcy case, the claimant is free to act even prior to discharge. It is a violation of the automatic stay only if the claimant seeks to collect from property of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) permits a court to fix past-due child support in a judgment and adjust wage withholding because those actions establish or modify a domestic support obligation.

Dougherty-Kelsay v. Kelsay · filed 2022-10-17(b)(2)(A)(ii)

That order either established a new domestic support obligation of $50 per month or amended the existing one. It fell within the exception either way. Because an exception to the automatic stay applies, the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) does not except the commencement of civil contempt proceedings to enforce a domestic support obligation from the automatic stay.

Evans v. Evans · filed 2023-03-20(b)(2)(B)

This court is obligated to accept that Congress was purposeful in its word choice and thus that there is no exception to the automatic stay for the commencement of civil contempt enforcement litigation with respect to a domestic support obligation.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) permits a court to modify domestic support obligations despite the automatic bankruptcy stay, including by prospectively crediting car payments that benefit the supported parent and children against support payments.

Marriage of Ruiz CA5 · filed 2023-04-27(b)(2)(A)(ii)

One notable and pertinent exception to the automatic stay is for orders relating to “domestic support obligations ….” (11 U.S.C. § 362, subd. (b)(2)(A)(ii).) ... We have no doubt the court’s order crediting Jacob for car payments is a domestic support obligation.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) excepts collection of a domestic support obligation from property outside the bankruptcy estate from the automatic stay.

Foufas v. Foufas · filed 2023-05-04(b)(2)(B)

Section 362(b)(2)(B) provides an exception to the automatic stay for collection of a domestic support obligation from property that is not property of the estate.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) excepts from the automatic stay a state-court proceeding to modify a support obligation owed to the debtor or the debtor’s children.

Ruiz v. Ruiz · filed 2023-11-30(b)(2)(A)(ii)

Therefore, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the state-court proceeding to modify Mr. Ruiz’s support obligation met the terms of § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii), and Ms. Ruiz failed to plead a plausible claim that Mr. Ruiz and Mr. Hardcastle violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) permits collection of a domestic support obligation from non-estate property, but contempt proceedings to collect it violate the stay if they reach or fail to exclude estate property.

William Curtis Wood · filed 2025-05-13(b)(2)(B)

Notwithstanding the slightly hedged language in Moore, the Court concludes that contempt applications aimed at collecting a domestic support obligation in a way that reaches (or fails to carve out) estate property violates the stay.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) excepts proceedings to establish or quantify a domestic support obligation from the automatic stay.

Timothy Bagley · filed 2025-10-29(b)(2)(A)(ii)

The filing of her fee request was to establish the amount of such fees, and that action as well as the resulting DSO Order are excepted from the automatic stay by § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii).

Section 362(b)(2) does not permit a spouse to seek a second state court determination of a prepetition domestic support claim already fixed by a final bankruptcy court order.

Andrew Michael Demos · filed 2026-04-01(b)(2)

Those exceptions, however, do not permit a dissatisfied spouse to seek an alternative adjudication of a claim for prepetition DSOs filed in a bankruptcy case once the amount in dispute is fixed by this Court, as it was through entry of the Claim Order.

Section 362(b)(2)(C) permits withholding a debtor’s income for domestic support obligations even when the support order is sought after bankruptcy begins.

Peterson v. Peterson (In Re Peterson) · filed 2009-04-08(b)(2)(C)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the automatic stay does not apply to the mov-ant seeking an order from the state court for the withholding of the debtor’s income for the payment of domestic support obligations.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) permits collection of a domestic support obligation from property outside the bankruptcy estate despite the automatic stay.

In Re Anderson · filed 2011-10-17(b)(2)(B)

Therefore, the Child Representative is free to collect on the obligation due her without restriction of the automatic stay so long as such collection is from property that is not part of the estate available to creditors generally.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) excepts proceedings concerning qualifying domestic support obligations from the automatic stay, including proceedings over attorney’s fees awarded in a custody dispute.

Rugiero v. Dinardo · filed 2012-10-10(b)(2)(A)(ii)

The question is whether an exception to the automatic stay—for domestic support obligations—applies, and whether the debts are non-dischargeable. We think so in both respects and therefore affirm.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) exempts collection of domestic support obligations from the automatic stay, including an annual child support administrative fee.

Khurana v. State of Idaho, Child Support Services · filed 2020-01-16(b)(2)(B)

Accordingly, Child Support Services’ annual $25 ... administrative fee falls within the definition of a “domestic support obligation” and ... its collection did not and does not violate either the automatic stay or the discharge ... injunction.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) permits collection of a domestic support obligation from property outside the bankruptcy estate despite the automatic stay.

Garry Wright · filed 2025-10-29(b)(2)(B)

A proceeding to collect a domestic support obligation from property that is not property of the estate is also not stayed. ... Thus, the Court holds that Ms. Wright, the State Court, and the Probation Department can enforce the State Court’s Orders and levy on the Debtor’s Fidelity IRA in the amount of $55,000.

Section 362(b)(2) excepts domestic support matters from the automatic stay; bankruptcy does not require a court to halt the entire child support case.

Leslie A. Artache Delgado v. Alexander D. Salcedo San Inocencio · filed 2025-12-17(b)(2)

La señora Artache Delgado acude ante nos y plantea que el TPI erró al determinar que la paralización automática (“automatic stay”) bajo el Código de Quiebras impedía la continuación de los procedimientos sobre pensión alimentaria adeudada a dicha paralización y no reconocer que la obligación alimentaria está exceptuada de la mencionada paralización automática. Tras examinar la legislación federal aplicable y el expediente ante nuestra consideración, determinamos que le asiste la razón, y en efecto, se cometió el error señalado.

Section 362(a)(1) stays the continuation of proceedings against a debtor prospectively but does not toll the time for a judgment entered before the bankruptcy petition to become final.

Lunde v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 2009-09-29(a)(1)

Although § 362 halts judicial proceedings, it does not make time stand still nor toll the time in which a judgment already entered becomes final.

Section 362 does not void a final child-support contempt order entered before the bankruptcy petition.

Rucker v. Johnson (In Re Rucker) · filed 2011-05-12(a)(1)

The Contempt Order in this case was entered prepetition and is final and therefore not void under § 362.

Section 362(a) does not affect the validity of a foreclosure sale conducted before the bankruptcy petition was filed.

In re Schweiger · filed 2017-12-11(a)

In the case now before this court, the automatic stay went into effect on the petition date, but had no effect on the validity of the foreclosure sale conducted before the petition was filed.

Section 362 does not stay an FTC motion to recover frozen funds previously released to a debtor’s law firm because it targets the firm rather than the debtor or estate, and the police and regulatory power exception also applies.

Federal Trade Commission v. QT, Inc. · filed 2007-03-12(a), (b)(4)

While the FTC argues that the section 362(b)(4) exception applies, the automatic stay under section 362(a) does not apply in the first place. The automatic stay provisions under section 362(a) address actions taken against the debtor or the property of the debtor’s estate. Here, the FTC seeks to have the funds previously released to the Ungaretti firm under the December 22 order either returned to the accounts frozen under the Final Judgment Order or paid into the Court. Therefore, the FTC is not taking action against the debtor or the debtor’s estate, but rather against the Ungaretti firm. ... Further, even if this were an action subject to section 362(a), the section 362(b)(4) exemption applies. ... The circumstances in this case are sufficiently similar to counsel in favor of applying the exception. Therefore, this Court will decide the FTC’s motion on the merits.

A Bankruptcy Rule 2004 examination in a corporate bankruptcy is not a proceeding covered by the automatic stay arising from an individual's personal bankruptcy.

Metcalf v. Wernerdal (In re Adbox, Inc.) · filed 2007-03-14(a)

However, the automatic stay in Wernerdal’s personal bankruptcy does not apply to this appeal, because an examination under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004 pursuant to the Adbox bankruptcy is not a “proceeding” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362 prohibits increasing postpetition mortgage escrow payments to collect a prepetition escrow shortage, and an intentional increase made with knowledge of the stay is a willful violation requiring actual damages.

Campbell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In Re Campbell) · filed 2007-03-16(a)(6), (k)(1)

To the extent that Countrywide increased the Debtors’ mortgage payment post-petition to provide for the pre-petition Contractual Escrow Shortage, Countrywide attempted to collect and enforce a pre-petition debt against the Debtors and property of the estate post-petition in violation of the automatic stay. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Countrywide willfully violated the automatic stay and that damages must be awarded pursuant to § 362(k).

Section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit a mortgage lender from misallocating voluntary payments made under a confirmed chapter 13 plan after those payments have ceased to be property of the estate.

Padilla v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. (In Re Padilla) · filed 2007-08-03(a)(3)

Nor would Wells Fargo’s or Novastar’s alleged allocation of payments contrary to the plan violate § 362(a)(3). That section only prohibits “acts” with respect to “property of the estate”. The conduct in question involves two separate acts: an initial deposit within a general account, and a latter allocation from the general account to individual accounts. The first act involved “property of the estate”, the second did not. Only the second act, involving non-estate property, was allegedly wrongful.

Section 362(a) does not bar a mortgage lender from notifying a debtor of escrow deficiencies or sending notices required by RESPA.

Pultz v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc. (In Re Pultz) · filed 2008-06-13(a)

The automatic stay does not bar a lender from notifying a debtor of an escrow deficiency or from making other notification that are required by RE SPA.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit calculating and collecting a postpetition mortgage escrow shortage contribution authorized by RESPA for future disbursements because it does not collect a prepetition obligation.

In Re Rodriguez · filed 2008-07-22(a)

Countrywide’s calculation and assessment of a shortage contribution is not an attempt to collect a pre-petition obligation or “double collection” of Debtors’ pre-petition escrow deficits. Rather, the shortage contribution is authorized under RESPA to minimize the risks to lenders where there are disbursements of funds to protect the underling property before the escrow account contains sufficient funds to pay such amounts.

Allegations that a mortgage creditor billed for and collected amounts not owed because it misapplied payments under confirmed chapter 13 plans state a claim for violation of the automatic stay under section 362(k).

Myles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In Re Myles) · filed 2008-10-15(k)

It alleges that Wells Fargo actually billed for and collected from the debtors amounts that it was not owed as a result of its misapplication of the debtors’ plan payments. The allegations state a claim for violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k).

Section 362(a) does not bar a mortgage lender from misapplying voluntary payments after receiving them because the funds are no longer estate property.

Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In Re Rodriguez) · filed 2009-12-09(a)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the plain language of § 362 does not apply to Countrywide’s conduct.

Section 362(a)(6) protects a debtor from efforts to collect prepetition escrow arrears outside the Chapter 13 process, even when a lender has rights under RESPA to recalculate escrow payments.

In Re Rodriguez · filed 2010-12-23(a)(6)

Following the Fifth Circuit‟s lead in Campbell, we also reject Countrywide‟s argument that forcing it to recoup the missed escrow cushion payments through the Chapter 13 plan improperly modifies Countrywide‟s rights under RESPA and “Regulation X,” 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17. As the Campbell court held, at least implicitly, the principle of protecting the debtor from all efforts to collect pre-petition claims outside of the Chapter 13 structure takes precedence over Countrywide‟s other rights under RESPA to recalculate the escrow payments.

Section 362(a)(3) does not require an insurer to obtain relief from the automatic stay before determining its contractual obligations and refusing to perform acts the policy does not require.

Benz v. DTRIC Insurance (In Re Benz) · filed 2007-03-28(a)(3)

Under section 362 as written, an insurer does not violate the automatic stay when it determines its obligations under a policy and acts accordingly.

Diverting estate funds to undisclosed mortgage fees without court approval violates the automatic stay, and the violation is willful if the creditor knows of the stay and intentionally collects the fees.

Jones v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (In Re Jones) · filed 2007-04-13(a)(3), (h)

While Wells Fargo argues that the accrual of fees is not a violation of the automatic stay, the application of estate funds to their payment without Court authority is clearly a violation. ... A willful violation does not require a specific intent to violate the stay, as the statute provides for damages if Wells Fargo knew of the automatic stay and its actions were intentional.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a mortgage creditor from using Chapter 13 estate funds to pay undisclosed post-petition fees and costs without court approval.

Sanchez v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. (In Re Sanchez) · filed 2007-07-24(a)(3)

In the instant case, the Defendant has violated § 362(a)(3) by taking property of the estate without this Court’s approval. The Defendant assessed the Plaintiffs post-petition charges comprising attorney’s fees, costs, and property inspection fees. The Defendant then satisfied these charges with the mortgage payment it received from the Chapter 13 Trustee' — monies which came from the Plaintiffs’ post-petition earnings.

Merely assessing mortgage fees and including them in a proof of claim does not support a claim under § 362(a)(3) without allegations that the fees were paid from estate property after the petition was filed.

Price v. America's Servicing Co. (In Re Price) · filed 2009-03-20(a)(3)

In this case, there is no allegation that ASC has in fact paid itself or been paid the charges it lists on the transaction history and its proof of claim out of estate property. The Prices have simply not alleged that these fees have in fact been paid, and accordingly, they have not pled sufficient allegations to support a claim for violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 does not stay state client-security fund reimbursement proceedings that do not determine the debtor’s liability and, alternatively, exempts them as exercises of police or regulatory power serving public policy rather than the fund’s pecuniary interest.

Pennsylvania Lawyers Fund for Client Security v. Baillie (In Re Baillie) · filed 2007-04-24(a)(1), (b)(4)

Applying the above law to the facts of this case, we conclude that any proceedings which took place concerning the claims submitted by Florio and Bogar were not “against the debtor” for purposes of § 362(a)(1). The purpose of such proceedings was to determine whether PLFCS would reimburse them for their losses, not whether debtor was liable for those losses. ... Our conclusion would be the same if the proceedings before PLFCS were “against the debtor” for purposes of § 362(a)(1). The proceedings would fall squarely within the exception to § 362(a)(1) found at § 362(b)(4). ... Actions PLFCS took after the petition date were not in furtherance of any pecuniary interest it had in debtor’s property. ... In taking the actions that it did, PLFCS also sought to further the public policy of reimbursing persons who suffered economic losses caused by an attorney’s misconduct.

Section 362(a)(3) stays foreclosure of property titled solely in a nondebtor spouse’s name when the debtor’s marital and possessory interests bring the property within the automatic stay’s protection.

In Re Levenstein · filed 2007-06-04(a)(3)

The issue in this contested matter is whether the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), applies to a state court foreclosure action where the property in question is titled solely in the name of the non-debtor spouse. On the facts presented here, I conclude that the automatic stay does apply. ... Based on the foregoing, it is unquestionable that under the New York Domestic Relations Law, as of the petition date, the debtor had a marital interest in the Oriole property as defined by Section 236. This interest became property of his bankruptcy estate, and, along with the debtor’s possessory interest in the Oriole property, was sufficient to invoke the protection of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay foreclosure of property held solely by a nonfiling spouse when the debtor has no legal or equitable interest in it.

In Re Balzano · filed 2008-06-13(a)(3)

Accordingly, because the Property was neither property of the estate nor of the debtor, this Court holds that the automatic stay does not apply in this case to the Property.

Section 362 bars docketing a judgment against a nonfiling spouse when it creates a lien on marital property in the bankruptcy estate, makes the lien void, and supports recovery of costs and attorneys’ fees for a willful violation.

In Re Thongta · filed 2009-03-24(a)(4), (k)(1)

Since both the Debtor’s and the non-filing spouse’s interest in the real property are property, of the bankruptcy estate, the docketing of the judgment, which created a lien on the property under Wis. Stat. § 806.15(a), violated the automatic stay of Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)(4). Acts in violation of the automatic stay are void. ... Accordingly, the Court will enter a separate Order determining that American Family’s judgment lien is void, and awarding the Debtor his costs and attorneys’ fees incurred as a result of American Family’s conduct.

Section 362 does not require a utility to obtain relief from the automatic stay before terminating a Chapter 13 debtor’s service for failure to pay post-petition utility bills.

Jones v. Boston Gas Co. (In Re Jones) · filed 2007-06-08(a)(3)

We conclude that a utility may terminate service, without obtaining relief from stay, based upon a Chapter 13 debtor’s failure to pay for post-petition service.

Section 362 does not require stay relief before a utility terminates a Chapter 13 debtor's service for unpaid postpetition bills when timely adequate assurance was not furnished and the postpetition account is not governed by the confirmed plan.

Weisel v. Dominion Peoples Gas Co. (In Re Weisel) · filed 2009-02-09(a)(3)

Therefore there is no basis for their claim that Dominion violated any duty allegedly owed them by failing to seek relief from stay or a modification of adequate assurance of payment in this Court prior to doing so.

Section 362(a)(3) does not require a utility to obtain stay relief before terminating service for unpaid postpetition charges when it follows state law termination procedures.

Weisel v. Dominion Peoples Gas Co. · filed 2010-02-01(a)(3)

The result below does not change, however, as this Court finds that Dominion had the right to terminate the Weisels’ natural gas service for failure to pay post-petition utility service delinquencies. It is well-established that § 366 permits a utility to terminate service to a debtor or trustee who has posted adequate assurance but fails to make post-petition payments on the utility service, and may do so without seeking relief from the automatic stay as long as the utility follows its state law termination procedures.

Section 362(a) does not bar a utility from terminating service after the debtor loses § 366 protection by failing to furnish adequate assurance of payment within 20 days.

In re Gordon-Garigan · filed 2017-08-03(a)

Because DTE Energy had the statutory right to terminate the Debtor’s utility service when it did, such action by DTE Energy was not a violation of the automatic stay.

Terminating utility service under a nondebtor’s account does not violate the automatic stay when it neither collects a debt from the debtor nor interferes with estate property.

Johnnie Marene Thomas · filed 2025-02-25(a)(3), (a)(6)

OREMC’s actions were not actions to collect a debt against Debtor or to exercise control or obtain possession of property of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(b)(22) permits a lessor to continue a residential eviction only if it obtained a judgment for possession on a date before the bankruptcy petition was filed; a judgment entered on the petition date does not qualify.

Norman J. Resnicow · filed 2024-04-24(b)(22)

The judgment in favor of 71 Washington thus fails to meet the explicit requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(22)’s exception to the automatic stay that the lessor obtain the judgment for possession “before the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(22).

Section 362(l)(1)(A) requires a debtor facing a prepetition eviction judgment to have a right under applicable law to cure the entire monetary default before the automatic stay can protect possession.

Barbara Simone · filed 2021-12-03(l)(1)(A)

Regardless of whether the Debtor initially checked one box or two boxes when she filed Official Form 101A, the Debtor’s certification fails because under applicable non- bankruptcy law she cannot certify there are circumstances under which she would be permitted to cure the entire monetary default giving rise to the Judgment as required by § 362(l)(1)(A).

Section 362(b)(22) requires residence under a lease or rental agreement; a deed of trust creating only a tenancy at sufferance does not satisfy that requirement.

Connor v. Russell · filed 2021-09-09(b)(22)

Because the debtor did not reside at the property “under a lease or rental agreement,” the exception to the automatic stay in section 362(b)(22) does not apply.

Section 362(b)(22) permits a residential landlord with a prepetition possession judgment to evict without stay relief when the debtor fails the certification and rent-deposit requirements of § 362(l), despite subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2), while enforcement of the monetary judgment remains stayed.

In Re Williams · filed 2007-07-05(b)(22), (l), (a)(1)-(3)

However, Congress also clearly intended the Lessor Exceptions, where applicable to the facts, to allow landlords to proceed with eviction without having to seek relief from other stay provisions. From this I conclude that Congress construed subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) as inapplicable to the very specific actions allowed by the Lessor Exceptions. ... In limiting the automatic stay exception to that under subsection (a)(3), Congress has allowed repossession of the landlord’s property but still protects the debtor from enforcement of the portion of the judgment seeking to collect the debt, including execution against the debtor’s personal property. ... As Debtors have failed to fulfill the requirements of § 362(0, the stay was inoperative by reason of the Judgment Exception. Accordingly, no stay relief is required, and AGLF is free to pursue its state law remedies with respect to the Residence.

Section 362(b)(22)'s eviction exception does not apply when a timely perfected prepetition appeal for de novo review under Pennsylvania law nullifies the landlord's judgment for possession.

Housing Authority of Beaver County v. Alberts (In Re Alberts) · filed 2008-01-24(b)(22)

In the case now before the Court, it appears that Ms. Alberts timely lodged her appeal of the District Magistrate Court’s order for possession, giving rise to de novo review by the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County. Under such circumstances, this Court concludes that there was no recognizable “judgment” for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(22) in place as of the petition date. As a result, the exception to the automatic stay cited by the Housing Authority has no application in this case and the Motion for Relief From Stay will be denied by the Court on this basis.

Section 362(l) does not permit reinstatement of the automatic stay when a prepetition judgment of possession rests in whole or in part on a material default that cannot be cured by payment of money.

In Re Griggsby · filed 2009-04-17(l)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that § 362(m) does not apply if the lessor obtained a prepetition judgment based upon “property endangerment”; and § 362(i) does not apply if the prepetition judgment of possession is based in whole or in part on a material default that cannot be cured by the payment of money.

Section 362(l)(5)(A) requires a debtor to disclose in the bankruptcy petition a landlord’s prepetition judgment for possession of the debtor’s residence.

In Re Green · filed 2010-02-02(l)(5)(A)

Section 362(Z)(5)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code clearly requires the debtor to state in his petition when “a judgment for possession of residential property in which the debtor resides as a tenant under a lease or rental agreement has been obtained by the lessor.”

Section 362(b)(22) allows a landlord with a prepetition judgment for possession to continue a residential eviction when the debtor does not file the required certifications and rent deposit with the petition.

In Re Harris · filed 2010-02-19(b)(22)

As a result, by operation of Section 362(b)(22), the filing of the Debtor’s bankruptcy petition did not trigger the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) with respect to Napco’s proceeding against the Debtor based on its prepetition judgment for possession of the Premises, and Napco’s eviction of the Debtor from the Premises on the day after this bankruptcy case was commenced did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(22) permits a landlord to continue an eviction based on a prepetition judgment of possession immediately when the debtor fails to disclose that judgment in the bankruptcy petition.

In Re Plumeri · filed 2010-08-02(b)(22)

As made plain in the statutory analysis at the beginning of this Opinion, because Lamborn failed to indicate in the Initial Petition that the Debtor was subject to a pre-petition judgment of possession at the time of filing for bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(22) automatically took effect. The filing of the Initial Petition, in other words, did not trigger any automatic stay as to the Debtor’s eviction proceedings.

Section 362(b)(22) excludes a residential eviction from the automatic stay when the lessor obtained a prepetition judgment for possession.

In re Paul · filed 2012-06-08(b)(22)

In the current case, it is undisputed that Stonemark obtained a pre-petition judgment, therefore 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(22) excludes the eviction proceeding from the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(22) permits continuation of a residential eviction after a prepetition judgment for possession when the debtor fails to satisfy the certification requirements of section 362(l).

Knight, Anthony v. Minter, LaTonya · filed 2013-05-14(b)(22)

Because Knight failed to comply with section 362(l) of the bankruptcy code, we conclude the automatic stay did not apply to Minter’s action for possession of the property.

Section 362(l)(1)(A) does not preserve the automatic stay against residential eviction when the prepetition judgment for possession arose from a nonmonetary default.

In re Soto · filed 2013-10-29(l)(1)(A)

Section 362(i) of the Code does not prevent the operation of Section 362(b)(22) where the judgment of possession is based on a non-monetary default.

Section 362(b)(22) requires a final, non-appealable judgment for possession entered before the bankruptcy filing for its residential eviction exception to apply.

In re Nitzsky · filed 2014-09-18(b)(22)

In accord with the common meaning of “judgment,” the court holds that a court order must be final and non-appealable to meet the definition of judgment for possession under § 362(b)(22).

Section 362(b)(22) applies to eviction proceedings involving a debtor who is a tenant under a lease or rental agreement; it does not cover an informal, rent-free tenancy at will.

Dennen v. Dennen (In re Dennen) · filed 2015-09-29(b)(22)

Because the language used in § 362(b)(22) is specific to the type of landlord-tenant relationship that is formed under a “lease or rental agreement,” the Court finds that it is not applicable to the current dispute and will deny the Declaratory Motion.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay eviction from California real property when a prepetition unlawful detainer judgment and writ of possession have extinguished the debtor’s legal and equitable possessory interests.

Eden Place v. Perl · filed 2016-01-08(a)(3)

Consequently, the Sheriff’s lockout did not violate the automatic stay because no legal or equitable interests in the property remained to become part of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(b)(22), the exception for continuing an eviction after a prepetition judgment for possession, does not apply when the landlord took possession before the automatic stay began and took no further eviction action.

In re: Lucienne Moolenaar v. · filed 2021-03-30(b)(22)

However, § 362(b)(22) is inapplicable here because JVA took possession of the property before the automatic stay was in place; moreover, JVA had taken no further “actions of eviction” when the Bankruptcy Court denied the motion.

When a debtor with a prepetition residential eviction judgment fails to file the required certification and rent deposit with the petition, the eviction exception applies immediately, and a later amendment does not retroactively impose the stay.

Pablo Torres and Kelly Ann Torres · filed 2021-05-28(l)(4)

Section 362(l)(4) makes clear that, absent the requisite certifications made at the time of filing, Section 362(b)(22) takes effect immediately. Put another way, the Debtors’ filing of an Amended Form ten days later did not somehow operate to retroactively trigger the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) prohibits serving a new eviction notice after learning of the bankruptcy when the notice advances a prepetition eviction and seeks possession of an estate interest.

Evans v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation · filed 2022-09-30(a)(1), (a)(3)

By marking up or purporting to “amend” the form of 48-hour notice to establish a new date for the eviction and serving that on the debtor while the automatic stay was in place, Freddie Mac violated the automatic stay because it took an act to issue new process that furthered the eviction action, enforce a prepetition judgment against the debtor or property of the estate, and to obtain possession of the Property which at that time was subject to a possessory interest that constituted property of the estate.

Section 362(b)(22) excludes a residential eviction from the automatic stay when the lessor obtained a prepetition judgment for possession, unless the debtor meets the conditions for a temporary stay under section 362(l).

Charles Alexander Williams, Jr. · filed 2022-12-05(b)(22)

The Debtor here has met none of the conditions, and thus under section 362(b)(22) the stay is not applicable to the eviction proceedings.

Section 362(b)(22) permits an eviction to continue after a judgment of possession when the debtor fails to comply with § 362(l)(1) certification requirements.

Robert Earl McClees, Sr. · filed 2023-06-20(b)(22)

In both cases, Debtor filed statements reflecting the existence of a judgment of possession, and in both cases, Debtor failed to comply with the certification requirement(s) of 11 U.S.C. § 362(l)(1) (ECF Nos. 5 & 7, Case No. 22-18444; ECF Nos. 7 & 9, Case No. 22-12187). Thus, the exception to the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(22) applies in this case and the eviction process can continue.

Section 362(b)(22) leaves a residential eviction outside the automatic stay when the landlord obtained a judgment for possession before the bankruptcy petition and the debtor does not satisfy section 362(l)’s certification and rent-deposit requirements.

Kristen M Alsterklint · filed 2023-11-29(b)(22)

The automatic stay does not apply to the Summary Proceeding because the Landlord obtained a judgment of possession on May 31, 2023, prior to the Petition Date.

Section 362(b)(22) permits a landlord to enforce a prepetition possession judgment without stay relief after the debtor’s 30-day temporary eviction stay expires without a timely cure certification.

Michael DeVon Bowers · filed 2025-01-13(b)(22)

As a result, on July 10, 2024, the exception to the automatic stay arising under section 362(b)(22) took effect. Consequently, in August and September 2024, OZH was not required to obtain relief from the automatic stay in order to effectuate Debtor’s eviction.

Section 362(b)(22) leaves the automatic stay inapplicable to enforcement of a final eviction judgment when the debtor has not made the rent deposit or otherwise met the requirements of § 362(l).

Melanie Lynn Powell · filed 2025-07-23(b)(22)

Moreover, as noted above, the Landlord holds a final judgment and warrant of eviction in a sum certain, and Debtor has not made a required deposit of rent or otherwise satisfied the requirements for reinstatement of the automatic stay pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 362(l). Accordingly, the stay is inapplicable by operation of Code Section 362(b)(22).

Section 362(b)(22) does not stay an eviction after a prepetition judgment for possession when the debtor has not made the required one-month rent deposit, even if the debtor certifies that she has.

Eden Ashlee Powell · filed 2025-09-18(b)(22)

The Court scheduled and then conducted a hearing on September 10, 2025, at which the Court issued an oral ruling granting the Motion and determining that the automatic stay is inapplicable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(22) because although the Debtor filed a certification that she deposited one month’s rent to the Clerk of Court , at the time of the hearing, Ms. Powell had not made such a payment.

If a debtor facing a prepetition judgment for possession fails to make the required certification and rent deposit, the eviction exception applies immediately and the automatic stay does not prevent the eviction from continuing.

Robert Joseph Chester and Belinda Dawn Chester · filed 2025-10-02(l)(4)(A)

The Debtors’ failure to make the certification in addition to not making a deposit constituted a failure to make a certification of the type required under 11 U.S.C. § 362(l)(1). This failure immediately triggered the applicability of Section 362(b)(22) which specifically provides that the Debtors’ bankruptcy filing did not operate as a stay against the Debtors because the filing of the Debtors’ petition did not trigger the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(22) leaves a prepetition residential possession judgment outside the automatic stay when the debtor fails to meet Section 362(l)’s conditions for temporary stay protection.

Mark Anthony Comrie · filed 2026-05-08(b)(22), (l)

On that basis, Section 362(l) affords no protection here and thus the stay is inapplicable by operation of statute, such that the Movant is entitled to proceed with and complete the eviction process.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay does not prevent a landlord from executing a prebankruptcy judgment for possession against a residential tenant whose interest in the property was extinguished by that judgment.

Lee v. Baca · filed 1999-07-29(a)

As provided by section 715.050, the automatic stay that results from a tenant’s postjudgment bankruptcy filing does not affect the landlord’s right to execute on his judgment of possession of real property.

The automatic stay does not apply to sales or transfers of estate property initiated by the debtor and therefore does not render those transfers void.

Burkart v. Coleman (In Re Tippett) · filed 2008-09-04(a)(3)

In addition, we adhere to the established proposition that the automatic stay triggered by a debtor’s bankruptcy petition does not void transfers of estate property initiated by the debtor.

The automatic stay does not void transfers of estate property initiated by the debtor.

Burkhart v. Coleman · filed 2008-09-04(a)(3)

In addition, we adhere to the established proposition that the automatic stay triggered by a debtor’s bankruptcy petition does not void transfers of estate property initiated by the debtor.

Enforcing the automatic stay against an Illinois tax purchaser preserves the debtor’s Chapter 13 rights rather than extending the state-law redemption period.

Salta Group, Inc. v. McKinney · filed 2008-01-04(a)

Under this view, by enforcing the automatic stay, a bankruptcy court is not extending the period of redemption but simply enforcing bankruptcy rights that are allowed under Chapter 13.

Purchasing a tax lien at a tax sale is an act to obtain possession barred by the automatic stay even without immediate possession, rendering the sale and all proceedings flowing from it void.

ATFH Real Property, LLC v. Stewart · filed 2008-01-31(a)(3)

As a necessary step in obtaining 1841 North Bolton, the purchase of the tax lien, even though not resulting in immediate possession, clearly qualifies as an act to obtain possession of that property. ... As such, the tax sale and all proceedings flowing therefrom are void as violative of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not stay postpetition completion of a tax sale when a prepetition judgment extinguished the debtor’s redemption right and payment, deed transfer, and recordation do not affect the debtor’s remaining property interest.

In Re Foskey · filed 2009-10-19(a)

Because Mr. Foskey’s interest in the property was subject to Plus Properties’ right of payment and because the subsequent transfer and recordation of the tax deed had no effect on the interest Mr. Foskey retained after the foreclosure of his right of redemption, the postpetition acts of the District and Plus Properties were not in violation of the stay.

Section 362(a)(3), (4), and (6) stay a postpetition tax sale when the debtor retains property interests, the sale enforces a tax lien and collects a prepetition debt, and the county has discretion to stop it.

In re RW Meridian LLC · filed 2016-07-05(a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(6)

Accordingly, each of §§ 362(a)(3), (4) and (6) was violated by the conduct of the Sale post-petition, and the conduct of the Sale itself was not a ministerial act but one exercised with ample discretion by the County.

Section 362(b)(3) does not except proceedings to obtain a tax deed that enforce a lien against property of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Giddens · filed 2003-06-10(b)(3)

These acts were clearly not excepted from the automatic stay, because they went beyond mere preservation of S.I. Boo’s in rem interest in the property; they were acts enforcing a lien against and controlling property of the estate while Giddens’ first chapter 13 was pending.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit Florida tax collectors from selling tax certificates relating to a debtor’s property or a bankruptcy estate’s property.

In re Admin. Order Regarding Sale of Tax Certificates by Fla. Tax Collectors · filed 2018-03-26(a)

In order to foster the salutary effects of tax certificate sales, this administrative order provides blanket confirmation that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) does not prohibit Florida Tax Collectors from selling tax certificates relating to property of a debtor in bankruptcy or a bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(h) permits the same bankruptcy court in a debtor’s later bankruptcy case to award damages for an automatic-stay violation in the earlier case.

Brawders v. County of Ventura (In Re Brawders) · filed 2007-09-11(h)

Moreover, these Debtors returned to the very same bankruptcy court (although a different bankruptcy judge). We have no difficulty in concluding that the bankruptcy court in the Second Case had jurisdiction to determine the res judicata issues and decide whether to award damages under Section 362(h).

A bankruptcy court may award damages under Section 362(h) in a debtor’s later bankruptcy case for a stay violation in the debtor’s earlier case before the same bankruptcy court.

Brawders v. County of Ventura · filed 2007-09-11(h)

Ventura argued before the bankruptcy court that there is no jurisdiction under Section 362(h) to award damages in this Second Case for a stay vio- lation in the First Case. Ventura has not raised that argument on this appeal, and although we have an independent obligation to determine if we lack jurisdiction we are satisfied that the bankruptcy court did have jurisdiction to award such damages and therefore we have jurisdiction to review that award on appeal.

Section 362(k) creates an independent cause of action for automatic stay violations that may be brought or continued after the underlying bankruptcy case is dismissed.

Healthcare Real Estate Partner v. · filed 2019-10-22(k)

Put another way, while the institution of a bankruptcy proceeding at some point is necessary for the institution of a § 362(k) action, the institution of a new or the continuation of an existing § 362(k) action does not depend on the continued existence of that proceeding.

Section 362 bars a postpetition action against a debtor to enforce a prepetition indemnity agreement, and filing that action is sanctionable under subsection (k).

In Re Mobley · filed 2007-10-12(k)

Having considered all of the authorities cited by the parties, this Court is satisfied that the cases which held that the term “claim,” as defined by Section 101(5) of the Code covers the indemnity claim in question, govern. Therefore, the filing of the third-party claim against the Debtor was a violation of Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code and, thus, is sanctionable pursuant to Section 362(k) of the Code.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar filing an avoidance action for the benefit of the estate that names the bankruptcy trustee as a defendant eligible for realignment as a plaintiff.

Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (In Re Hashim) · filed 2007-12-06(a)(3)

The act of filing an avoiding action that seeks to recover for the benefit of the estate and that names the bankruptcy trustee as defendant, who is eligible for realignment as a plaintiff, does not offend 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) as an "act ... to exercise control over property of the estate.”

Section 362(a)(3) bars creditors from pursuing causes of action belonging to the bankruptcy estate.

Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (In Re Madoff) · filed 2010-05-03(a)(3)

The Florida Plaintiffs violated the stay by usurping causes of action belonging to the estate under sections 362(a)(3) and 541 of the Code.

The automatic stay applies to an unlisted creditor’s prepetition claim against the debtor; omission from the bankruptcy petition does not automatically relieve the creditor from the stay.

O'Dell v. Mahoney · filed 2013-10-28(a)(1)

Accordingly, to the extent that Schafer holds that a creditor who was omitted from a bankruptcy petition need not petition to the Bankruptcy Court for relief from the automatic stay, but instead receives such relief automatically, it is overruled.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a creditor with knowledge of the bankruptcy from demanding payment for prepetition services even if the debtor has not scheduled its claim.

Weidner v. Alaska Communications Systems Group, Inc. (In Re Weidner) · filed 2008-02-01(a)(6)

Once ACS learned of Weid-ner’s bankruptcy, it was subject to the automatic stay regardless of whether its claim was scheduled or not.

Section 362(a)(6) does not require a secured creditor to foreclose on or repossess surrendered property; its inaction alone does not violate the automatic stay.

Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In Re Arsenault) · filed 2011-09-19(a)(6)

Chase has not taken any action in violation of the stay. As previously discussed, after the Property is surrendered, Chase’s decision whether to foreclose and/or repossess the Property is purely a voluntary and discretionary decision.

The automatic stay no longer covers property effectively surrendered pursuant to a confirmed Chapter 13 plan because that property is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate.

Stranko v. Behanna (In re Behanna) · filed 2008-02-04(c)(1)

Moreover, this surrender was accomplished with the permission of the Court, as set forth in the Plan Confirmation Order. Once the property had been surrendered, it was no longer property of the estate or subject to the automatic stay and the Strankos are not now required to seek stay relief from this Court.

Section 362’s automatic stay is not violated merely because a secured creditor does not foreclose on property surrendered under a Chapter 13 plan.

Brown v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. (In re Brown) · filed 2012-09-04

For these reasons, I conclude BB & T has not violated the confirmation order or the automatic stay and I decline to exercise equitable powers pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105.

Section 362’s automatic stay is not violated when a secured creditor declines to foreclose on property surrendered under a Chapter 13 plan.

Moore v. BAC Home Loan Servicing LP (In re Moore) · filed 2012-09-04

The issue in this case is whether, under the undisputed facts above, a creditor can be compelled to take affirmative steps to foreclose upon surrendered property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C), and whether its failure to do so violates the automatic stay or confirmation order. ... For these reasons, I conclude Bank of America has not violated the confirmation order or the automatic stay and I decline to exercise equitable powers pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not bar a foreclosure sale when the debtor has surrendered all interest in the property under a confirmed Chapter 13 plan.

Booker v. New Penn Financial, LLC · filed 2017-08-08(a)

Shellpoint has the better of the argument, for in considering the extent (if any) to which a bankruptcy stay applies to a foreclosure proceeding, the key issue is whether the debtor has retained any interest in the property. ... Accordingly, Shellpoint’s sending Booker the Notice of Sale and otherwise proceeding to the judicial sale did not violate the bankruptcy stay.

Section 362(a)(5) prevents a judgment liquidated after the bankruptcy filing from becoming a lien on the debtor’s real property when stay relief permits adjudication of damages but leaves collection stayed.

In Re Cranston · filed 2008-03-03(a)(5)

Here, the Circuit Court Judgment was not liquidated until after the filing of the Debtor’s bankruptcy petition and the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) precluded the Circuit Court Judgment from becoming a lien on the Debtor’s real property.

Section 362(a)(4) and (5) prohibit a creditor from recording prepetition judgments to create liens on a debtor’s real property while the automatic stay remains in effect.

In re Passa · filed 2017-12-20(a)(4), (a)(5)

Section 362(a)(4) and (5) prohibit “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate; [or] any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title.” Recording the Judgments with the Salt Lake County Recorder created liens against real property owned by the Debtors. As such, it was a collection action that violated the automatic stay and this Court’s order.

Section 362(b)(19) excludes automatic payroll deductions for repayment of qualified retirement plan loans from the automatic stay, allowing those deductions to continue after the bankruptcy filing.

Coop v. Lasowski (In Re Lasowski) · filed 2008-03-31(b)(19)

Indeed, automatic deductions from the Debtor’s paychecks for repayment of these loans continue post-petition uninterrupted by the bankruptcy filing and unaffected by the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not stay the release of a supersedeas deposit held by the court when the deposit is not property of the bankruptcy estate.

Carter Baron Drilling v. Excel Energy Corp. · filed 1987-07-10(a)

Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code stays any action to take possession of any assets in the bankrupt’s estate. Therefore, the dispositive issue in this matter is whether the cash deposited with the Clerk of the Court as a supersedeas bond is property of the bankruptcy estate. The court holds that it is not, and will accordingly grant Badger’s motion.

Termination of the automatic stay after thirty days under Section 362(c)(3)(A) does not terminate the co-debtor stay under Section 1301.

In Re Lemma · filed 2008-09-09(c)(3)(A)

Just as the termination of the stay in section 362(a) will not terminate the co-debtor stay imposed by section 1301, so too does the Court find that the new thirty-day automatic termination of the stay applicable to Debtors pursuant to section 362(c)(3)(A) does not terminate the co-debtor stay imposed by section 1301.

Section 362(a)(1) prevents a court from entering judgment against a debtor after a bankruptcy petition is filed unless relief from the stay is granted; the stay itself does not extinguish the debtor’s liability.

Merry v. Robinson · filed 2011-11-29(a)(1)

Put another way, the filing of a bankruptcy petition deprives a court, absent relief from the stay, of the power to enter a judgment against the debtor, but the mere filing of a bankruptcy petition does nothing to extinguish his liabilities, which are extinguished, if at all, only upon his discharge from bankruptcy.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against a debtor after a bankruptcy petition, but the stay generally does not extend to the debtor’s co-defendants.

Meier v. Chesapeake Operating · filed 2019-06-21(a)(1)

A bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of “the continuation . . . of a judicial . . . proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of [the bankruptcy proceeding], or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). On the other hand, an automatic stay generally does not stay “litigation as to co-defendants of the bankrupt.” Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1329 (10th Cir. 1984). Accordingly, this case is stayed as to White Star Petroleum, but not as to the other defendants.

Section 362 stays appellate proceedings as to a debtor while allowing the appeal to proceed against other defendants.

Wallin v. Brill · filed 2008-03-14

Pursuant to the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362, proceedings in this appeal have been abated in Case No. 07-1144 as to appellee Monique Martel only, pending further order of this court. Accordingly, we decide the issues presented by Mr. Wallin’s appeal in Case No. 07-1144 with respect to the all the defendants except Ms. Martel, and stay further proceedings in the appeal with respect to her.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits stay relief when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property evolve into a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud a creditor, even if an earlier filing was legitimate.

Evan Ray Yellowman · filed 2023-08-31(d)(4)(B)

Because of that, the Court finds that the repeated chapter 13 filings, which started with a legitimate attempt to catch up on the delinquent mortgage, evolved over time into a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud the bank.

Section 362(d)(4) requires affirmative findings of a qualifying scheme before a stay relief order binds future debtors for two years.

In re: Garegin Papazov · filed 2013-05-30(d)(4)

Contrary to Deutsche Bank's position, however, the Stay Relief Order was not effective for two years as to any future debtor claiming an interest in the Grand View Property simply because the bankruptcy court granted relief under § 362(d)(4).

Section 362(d)(4) requires a movant seeking relief for a real-property scheme to make at least a prima facie showing that a purpose of the scheme was to defraud creditors.

In Re Gonzalez · filed 2011-08-01(d)(4)

The fifth element of the analysis under both section 362(d)(4)(A) and section 362(d)(4)(B) requires the movant to make out at least a prima facie case that a purpose of the scheme was to defraud creditors.

A later bankruptcy petition does not stay foreclosure when a recorded order granting relief from the automatic stay permits foreclosure of the property.

Rosal v. First Federal Bank of California · filed 2009-07-15(d)(4)

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Voluntary Bankruptcy Petition filed by plaintiff on February 27, 2009, did not stay defendants’ right to enforce foreclosure remedies.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief against real property that affects all interests in the property, including those of nondebtors who did not seek bankruptcy protection.

In Re Montalvo · filed 2009-10-05(d)(4)

Section 362(d)(4) specifically provides that a court may grant in rem relief as to “a stay of an act against real property” under Section 362(a), if the court finds that the filing of the petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors. This provision is not limited to a stay of an act against the debtor’s interest in the subject real property.

Section 362(b)(20)’s two-year limit applies only to orders entered under § 362(d)(4), not to earlier orders lifting the stay.

Barner v. Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc. · filed 2010-02-15(b)(20)

Because the 2004 order was not entered under subsection (d)(4), the limitation of subsection (b)(20), which provides that (d)(4) orders may suspend the automatic stay for no longer than two years after their entry, is also inapplicable. The provision applies exclusively to an “order under subsection (d)(4) as to such real property in any prior case under this title.” Not being a (d)(4) order, the 2004 order is unaffected by subsection (b)(20).

Section 362(b)(20) limits only orders entered under § 362(d)(4), so its two-year limit does not apply to earlier stay-relief orders.

Barner v. Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc. (In Re Barner) · filed 2010-03-02(b)(20)

Because the 2004 order was not entered under subsection (d)(4), the limitation of subsection (b)(20), which provides that (d)(4) orders may suspend the automatic stay for no longer than two years after their entry, is also inapplicable.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits in rem stay relief for two years when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud a secured creditor and the order is properly recorded.

In re Gel, LLC · filed 2012-07-30(d)(4)(B)

Therefore, this Court finds that relief under § 362(d)(4)(B) is appropriate and will accordingly enter an order that, if recorded in compliance with the applicable law governing notices of interest of liens in real property, will prevent any future bankruptcy filing affecting the Properties from operating as a stay of any action against the Properties for a period of two years after the date of the entry of such Order.

Section 362(d)(4) allows in rem relief for a scheme that uses the automatic stay to hinder creditors even when the scheme is implemented after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

In re 4th Street East Investors, Inc. · filed 2012-06-29(d)(4)

In other words, I interpret the term “was” as descriptive of the type of scheme (a scheme that involves the fact that filing the petition created an automatic stay), rather than as a temporal limitation intended by Congress to exclude schemes that are implemented post-petition.

Section 362(d)(4) does not automatically require relief from the automatic stay when a debtor consolidates properties into one bankruptcy before filing; the court must find a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors.

Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Bruckner · filed 2012-12-19(d)(4)

However, although Fannie would prefer to be dealing with three separate bankruptcies involving only its properties rather than a global bankruptcy involving the properties of many creditors, I can find nothing in bankruptcy law indicating that the kind of pre-bankruptcy consolidation effected by Bruckner in this case necessarily constitutes a scheme to delay, hinder or defraud creditors.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits relief from the automatic stay when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property were part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors generally; the moving creditor need not have been hindered itself.

In re Gray · filed 2013-09-18(d)(4)(B)

Contrary to Gray’s suggestion, this statutory provision, by its terms, does not require the Bankruptcy Court to find that the creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in real property has itself been stymied in its efforts to enforce its claim. Rather, it requires only that the Bankruptcy Court find that the debtor’s “multiple bankruptcy filings affecting [the] real property” at issue “was part of a scheme to delay, hinder or defraud creditors” in general.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits stay relief when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud a secured creditor.

In re Richmond · filed 2014-07-17(d)(4)(B)

Therefore, because the Debtor’s and Lyceum’s bankruptcy filings occurred on the eve of significant events affecting the Property, because the Debtor is once again trying to collaterally attack the Foreclosure Judgment, and because, in this case, the Debtor cannot modify the mortgage held by P.B. on the Property given that the Property is not property of the Debt- or’s estate, it is appropriate to grant stay relief to P.B. pursuant to § 362(d)(4), as the filing of this case is part of a scheme to hinder, delay or defraud P.B.

Section 362(d)(4) does not require a finding that the debtor is a serial filer; the number of bankruptcy filings is one factor in deciding whether to grant relief from the stay for a scheme affecting real property.

In re Richmond · filed 2014-09-29(d)(4)

The number of filings is only one factor that the court must weigh in determining whether relief under § 362(d)(4) is warranted.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) does not permit relief from the automatic stay based only on multiple bankruptcy filings that delay a creditor; the filings must be part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors.

In re Ford · filed 2014-10-29(d)(4)(B)

Undoubtedly, Debtor’s bankruptcies have delayed Midwest’s recovery of the Property as collateral, but without evidence that Debtor engaged in a “scheme” and thereby abused the bankruptcy process, relief under § 362(d)(4)(B) is improper.

Section 362(d)(4) authorizes in rem stay relief when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to delay creditors; a properly recorded order binds cases filed within two years.

In re Spencer · filed 2015-05-15(d)(4)

Spencer has engaged in a scheme to delay creditors involving multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property. Thus, PNC is entitled to in rem relief from stay as to the real property located at 1222 W. Jefferson Street, Marshfield, Wisconsin 54449. If recorded in compliance with applicable state laws governing notices of interests or liens in real property as provided in section 362(d)(4), the order granting relief from stay shall be binding in any other case under this title purporting to affect such real property filed not later than two years after the date of the entry of such order by the Court.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) denies an automatic stay when a debtor has had multiple bankruptcy cases dismissed within the preceding year.

In re Ball · filed 2015-07-30(c)(4)(A)(i)

As the district court properly pointed out, Ball submitted no evidence to disturb the bankruptcy judges’ determinations that (1) he did not qualify for the automatic stay against Credit Union West because he had filed three bankruptcy cases that were dismissed in 2013, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i); In re Curry, 362 B.R. 394, 399 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2007); and (2) he filed these cases as part of a scheme to delay Franklin Williamson’s foreclosure proceedings, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4); In re Barner, 597 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir.2010); In re Spencer, 531 B.R. 208, 217 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.2015).

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits in rem stay relief when multiple bankruptcy filings form a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud a creditor, assessed under the totality of the circumstances.

In re Danley · filed 2015-11-02(d)(4)(B)

Whether a series of bankruptcy filings is, or is not, a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud a creditor, must be determined based on the totality of the facts and circumstances of the cases, including the amount of the debt and arrearage and the length of the delinquency.

Section 362(d)(4) permits relief from the automatic stay as to real property when a bankruptcy filing is part of a scheme to hinder, delay or defraud a secured creditor through multiple bankruptcy filings.

In re Marques · filed 2016-04-06(d)(4)

Based upon the foregoing, the Court determines that (1) Movant has met its burden of going forward and establishing a prima facie case that the filing of Debtor’s petition was part of a scheme to hinder, delay or defraud Movant that involved the filing of multiple bankruptcy petitions, and (2) Debtor has failed to carry his burden of proof or persuasion that the filing of his petition was not part of such a scheme. Therefore, the Court grants Movant relief from stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4) with respect to the Property.

Section 362(d)(4) permits prospective in rem stay relief when a debtor uses multiple bankruptcy filings in a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud a secured creditor.

In re: Roberto Lara Ramirez · filed 2016-12-02(d)(4)

Under § 362(d)(4), the bankruptcy court may grant a secured creditor prospective, “in rem” relief from the automatic stay if the debtor has engaged in a scheme to delay, hinder or defraud creditors through multiple bankruptcy filings.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) allows in rem stay relief when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of an intentional plan to delay a secured creditor.

In re Anderson · filed 2018-11-20(d)(4)(B)

In the context raised here and based upon a review of the case law, the structure of the Code, the plain language of § 362(d), and the general usage of the word "scheme", this Court understands the word to mean an intentional plan to accomplish a particular result.

Section 362(d)(4) permits relief from the automatic stay for a scheme to hinder or delay a secured creditor through multiple bankruptcy filings affecting the same property, even when different people filed the cases.

In re Giambrone · filed 2019-05-01(d)(4)

A scheme to hinder, delay or defraud warranting relief under § 362(d)(4) need not involve filings by the same person or entity; repeat filings by different persons or entities may be found to constitute the requisite scheme to hinder, delay or defraud justifying relief under § 362(d)(4).

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief when multiple bankruptcy filings show a scheme to delay or hinder a creditor’s efforts to collect against real property.

Ronald Joseph Smith · filed 2019-09-30(d)(4)

US Bank met its burden of proof that Debtor’s filing was an intent to delay or hinder its efforts to collect the amount it is owed and is entitled to relief from stay and the imposition of in rem relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief from the automatic stay when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property show a scheme to hinder or delay a secured creditor.

Michael Porzio · filed 2019-12-06(d)(4)

The timing of the multiple bankruptcy filings and the fact that two of the Debtor’s son’s bankruptcy cases were dismissed for failure to prosecute or for insufficient filings, demonstrate that the Debtor and his son have engaged in a scheme to hinder or delay JPMorgan by continuously obtaining an automatic stay to prevent JP Morgan from completing the State Court Foreclosure Action.

Section 362(d)(4) permits relief from the automatic stay when repeated bankruptcy filings affecting real property show a scheme to delay or hinder creditors.

KAJLA v. US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION · filed 2019-12-30(d)(4)

These repeated actions demonstrate an intent to delay or hinder creditors with valid claims. On this record, the Court finds the Bankruptcy Court did not err when it granted Appellees’ Motion for Relief from the Stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4).

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits a court to order that the automatic stay will not apply to later bankruptcy petitions affecting property used in a scheme to delay foreclosure.

Jeremy Andrew Meltzer · filed 2020-01-10(d)(4)(B)

Second, the Court finds that the filing of multiple bankruptcy petitions by Mr. Meltzer was part of a scheme to delay and hinder PHH from foreclosing its mortgage against the Chadwick Drive property. Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4)(B), it is ORDERED that the automatic stay under § 362(a) will not be in effect as to any other bankruptcy petition filed within 18 months of this Order, purporting to affect the property located at 75 Chadwick Drive, Town of Brighton, New York.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem relief from the automatic stay when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to delay foreclosure.

Richard Caires · filed 2020-01-29(d)(4)

In sum, because JP Morgan has demonstrated the Debtor has engaged in multiple bankruptcy filings affecting the Property and has “used the bankruptcy filings as a scheme to delay foreclosure proceedings against the Property,” relief under section 362(d)(4) is warranted.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits in rem relief from the automatic stay for real property affected by repeated bankruptcy filings used to obstruct foreclosure.

F.M. Butt Hotels, Corp. · filed 2020-01-17(d)(4)(B)

Further, it is ORDERED that any bankruptcy case filed during the pendency of this one-year filing injunction, purporting in any manner to affect the 911 Brooks Avenue property, will not receive the benefit of the automatic stay as to 911 Brooks Avenue, Town of Gates, New York, under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and § 362(d)(4)(B).