11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362 relief from the automatic stay is denied when the movant has neither title to nor a security interest in the property at issue.

Barick Furniture Corp. v. Monzack · filed 1984-02-09

Because Barick has neither title to nor a security interest in the household goods in question, its motion for relief from the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362 is denied, and because the relief sought by the movant is denied, its request for attorneys’ fees is also denied.

Section 362(d) provides a motion procedure for seeking relief from the automatic stay to levy on and sell property.

Union Planters National Bank v. Bell (In Re Bell) · filed 1985-11-22(d)

The latter issue is more appropriately raised as a motion for relief from the stay pursuant to § 362(d) and is inappropriate for decision at this time.

The automatic stay may be terminated to allow a lessor to pursue state-law eviction remedies after a lease is deemed rejected.

In Re Re-Trac Corp. · filed 1986-04-07(a)

Consequently, I will modify the stay under § 362(a) to allow Wickes to pursue its state law remedies for evicting the debtor.

Section 362(a)(7) requires a creditor to obtain relief from the automatic stay before making a setoff under § 553 after a bankruptcy case begins.

American Central Airlines, Inc. v. Department of Transportation (In Re American Central Airlines, Inc.) · filed 1986-04-28(a)(7)

However, setoff under § 553 after the bankruptcy case has begun requires obtaining relief from the automatic stay under § 362(a)(7) of the Code.

A creditor with no valid claim against the debtor is not entitled to relief from the automatic stay.

Philadelphia Consumer Discount Co. v. Gurst (In Re Gurst) · filed 1987-11-20

The elimination of any valid claim of the Creditor against the Debtor requires us to deny the stay-relief motion.

Section 362’s automatic stay requires relief from the bankruptcy court before a bankrupt party may appear in another action for the court to determine its interest in the dispute.

PLM Financial Services, Inc. v. Coast to Coast Trucking, Inc. · filed 1988-08-23

We shall stay this action until January 2, 1989, to permit the parties to move the Bankruptcy Court for relief from the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 so that Lone Star may appear in this court for the purpose of making the necessary factual determination whether Lone Star, by virtue of its status in bankruptcy has, in fact, an “apparent interest” in the stipulation and agreement which were assigned to PLM on October 7, 1986, and whether the defendant runs a “substantial” risk of double liability.

Section 362(a)’s automatic stay may be modified to permit a secured creditor to take proceeds of its collateral and apply them to its claim.

In Re Simpson Motor Co. · filed 1989-06-14(a)

ORDERED that the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is hereby modified to permit Habersham to draw down the Disputed Proceeds (including all earned interest) and apply those proceeds against its claim in this case.

Section 362(d) does not provide relief from the automatic stay to pursue a setoff when the creditor has no right of setoff under applicable law.

Integra Bank/Pittsburgh v. Petraglia (In Re Petraglia) · filed 1993-07-20(d)

Since Integra is without the right of set-off and since § 553 of the Code permits setoff only to the extent allowed by state law, Integra’s motion under § 362(d) will be denied.

Section 362 does not support relief from the automatic stay to garnish wages when the creditor has no surviving lien and is merely unsecured.

In re Ducommun · filed 1993-09-09

Relief from stay is inappropriate, since in the absence of a lien Inland is merely an unsecured creditor.

The bankruptcy court decides whether to lift the automatic stay under § 362(a) for creditors seeking to proceed against a debtor.

Lust v. Burke · filed 1994-02-16(a)

As noted hereinabove, the question whether in a particular bankruptcy case the automatic stay provisions of § 362(a) should be lifted as to the creditors is one for the Bankruptcy Court to make.

Section 362 does not require a party to obtain relief from the stay before requesting relief from the bankruptcy court.

In Re Dow Corning Corp. · filed 1996-02-15(d)

However, Wilfarm does not need relief from the stay to request relief from the bankruptcy court.

Retroactive relief from the automatic stay defeats a challenge based on the stay when the relief order has not been appealed.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Cockrell · filed 1997-10-24

Because the bankruptcy court in Grace Cockrell's bankruptcy case granted Guardian retroactive relief from the automatic stay, and no appeal has been taken from the bankruptcy court, we dismiss this appeal as moot.

Relief from the automatic stay permitting a suit to proceed without exception includes the contract claim already in that suit.

Int'l v. Barnett Bank · filed 1998-12-15

The bankruptcy court’s order granting relief from stay concluded, without exception, that Bel-Bel’s suit in district court should proceed. This suit included Bel-Bel’s contractual claim against the Torcises for repayment of the note. We therefore hold that the district court did not err in entertaining this claim.

A secured creditor that files an untimely proof of claim may not seek relief from the automatic stay concerning the debtor.

Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Rebuelta (In Re Rebuelta) · filed 1983-02-10

While a secured creditor who has filed an untimely proof of claim may not seek relief from the automatic stay concerning a debtor before this Court, it is a settled question of law that relief from the codebtor stay is mandated to the extent that a Chapter 13 plan does not propose to pay a claim in full, as in the instant case.

Section 362(d) permits the bankruptcy court to grant relief from the automatic stay that allows a previously issued state court property division order to take effect.

In Re the Marriage of Ebel · filed 1993-09-09(d)

Here, on July 20, 1990, on wife’s application, the bankruptcy court granted relief from the stay and specifically allowed the June 14, 1990, property division order to enter effective July 20, 1990. In these circumstances, the issuing court chose specifically to “grant relief from the stay ... solely for the purpose of permitting the state court’s order and decree dated June 14,1990, ... to enter.” Under such circumstances, we perceive no reason based on the stay to reverse the judgment.

Section 362 permits a bankruptcy court to retroactively ratify an action that the automatic stay would otherwise have voided.

Davies v. Commissioner · filed 1995-10-12

A bankruptcy court may retroactively ratify an action that would have been voided by the stay.

A bankruptcy court may retroactively ratify an action that would otherwise be void under the automatic stay.

Davies v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue · filed 1995-10-12(a)(8)

A bankruptcy court may retroactively ratify an action that would have been voided by the stay.

Section 362(d) permits a state tax agency to petition the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay.

St. Jude Hospital of Kenner, La., Inc. v. Kennedy · filed 1997-07-29(d)

Our review of this record and applicable statutes and jurisprudence indicates that the Department’s tax-collecting attempts were not absolutely stymied by the bankruptcy filing and the automatic stay. Like any other creditor or debtor, the Department could have petitioned the bankruptcy court to lift its automatic stay and determine the hospital’s exact tax liability. See 11 United States Code Sec. 362(d) and Rogers v. Corrosion Products, Inc., 42 F.3d 292 (5th Cir.1995).

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a debtor fails to make post-petition mortgage payments.

Jones v. Money Store, Inc. (In Re Jones) · filed 2002-09-27(d)(1)

Failure to make post-petition payments to a mortgagee has been found to be sufficient “cause” for relief from the stay under Section 362(d)(1). ... Therefore, the relief requested by The Money Store will be granted for “cause” under § 362(d)(1).

Section 362(d)(4) requires evidence of fraudulent intent for in rem stay relief; a conclusory allegation is insufficient.

In Re Poissant · filed 2009-05-20(d)(4)

Herein, the Bank makes only a conclusory allegation that the Debtor has acted with fraudulent intent without specifying concrete facts or other evidentiary proof to prove its claim by a preponderance of the evidence standard. Thus, the Bank is not entitled to in rem relief under Section 362(d)(4).

Section 362(d)(1) relief from the automatic stay can prevent future damages but does not compensate for past injuries.

Sutton 58 Associates LLC v. Pilevsky · filed 2020-11-24(d)(1)

Dismissal of the bankruptcy petition (see generally 11 USC § 1112 [b]) or lifting of the automatic stay (see 11 USC § 362 [d] [1])—the remedies relied on by defendants and the dissent to support preemption—merely operate to prevent future damages from accumulating; such remedies do not compensate for past injuries.

Section 362(d) allows a complaint seeking relief from the automatic stay to serve as the request for relief; no separate request for a hearing is required.

Zechman v. Skaneateles Bowling Center, Inc. (In Re Skaneateles Bowling Center, Inc.) · filed 1980-05-22(d)

This Court does not agree with the Bankruptcy Court’s interpretation of Bankruptcy Code § 362(d), 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), as requiring a complaint and a separate “request for relief” before an automatic stay can be removed. A reading of § 362(d) demonstrates clearly that a separate request is not necessary.

Section 362(d) permits relief from the automatic stay when its standards are met; adequate protection of the creditor’s interest supports denying relief.

First Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Bennett (In Re Bennett) · filed 1981-12-16(d)

The standards for modification are clear, and it is obvious that those standards were not met by First Savings. ... Their interest is adequately protected. Therefore, the decision of the bankruptcy court denying relief from stay is affirmed.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a bankruptcy court to modify the automatic stay for cause to allow an action involving the debtor to proceed in another forum.

Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc. v. Hunter (In Re Hunter) · filed 1983-07-25(d)(1)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) the Court may terminate, annul, modify or condition the automatic stay for a cause. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). ... Whether to modify the stay and permit actions involving a debtor to proceed in another forum is a matter of discretion exercised by the Bankruptcy Court. ... In considering the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court exercises its discretion to permit Thomson McKinnon to implead Hunter as a third party defendant in the District Lawsuit.

Section 362 permits the court to modify the automatic stay so a creditor may pursue cancellation of its contracts under state law after a specified period.

In Re Winckler · filed 1984-02-14

That ten (10) days following entry of this Order, the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 is modified to permit the movant, Cen-Dak Leasing, Inc., to proceed under state law with cancellation of its contracts with the Debtors.

Section 362(d) allows a bankruptcy court to grant a party in interest relief from the automatic stay by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning it for cause.

Browning v. Navarro · filed 1984-10-01(d)

Section 362(d) expressly authorizes a bankruptcy court to modify or condition the automatic stay to provide relief to a party in interest who has requested it.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay when a creditor’s interest is not adequately protected.

In Re Missimer · filed 1984-11-19(d)(1)

We conclude that the debtors’ proposal does provide adequate protection of the mortgagee’s interest in the property pursuant to § 362(d)(1).

Section 362(d) permits the bankruptcy court to grant relief from the automatic stay for cause, including to allow an action to proceed to completion in another tribunal.

In Re Meehan · filed 1985-01-30(d)

Similarly, “cause” under 11 U.S.C. § 362 may include “the desire to permit an action to proceed to completion in another tribunal.” ... The court shall determine from the particular facts of each request to vacate the stay whether relief is appropriate.

Section 362(d) allows a bankruptcy court to terminate, annul, modify, or condition the automatic stay for cause shown, determined case by case.

In Re Donald · filed 1985-03-12(d)

Section 362(d) and Bank.R.Proc. 401(d) 1 explicitly authorize the bankruptcy court to lift the stay "for cause shown." Because there is no clear definition of what constitutes "cause," discretionary relief from the stay must be determined on a case by case basis.

Section 362(d) allows the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay so a party can pursue appropriate procedures to regain possession of property.

Dean v. Postle Enterprises, Inc. (In Re Postle Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 1985-05-06(d)

The automatic stay is now lifted to allow movant to resort to appropriate procedures to regain possession of its property as property of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).

Section 362(d)(1) requires a creditor seeking relief from the automatic stay for cause to first establish a prima facie case, after which the debtor bears the burden of showing adequate protection.

In Re Wolsky · filed 1985-10-04(d)(1)

Thus, only after a credit has proven a prima facie case under section 362(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code does a debtor have the burden of proving that the creditor’s interest is adequately protected.

Section 362 permits a creditor to obtain relief from the automatic stay to enforce rights that a Chapter 13 plan could not lawfully modify.

In Re Charlene Wise HARLAN, Debtor. WESTERN EQUITIES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charlene Wise HARLAN, Defendant-Appe · filed 1986-02-19

Appellant is entitled to relief from the automatic stay of section 362 in order to assert rights under the promissory noté secured by the second deed of trust to appellee’s residence.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause, including lack of adequate protection, and § 362(d)(2) permits relief when the debtor lacks equity and the property is not necessary for an effective reorganization.

In Re Sea Island Motor Sales, Inc. · filed 1986-04-08(d)(1), (d)(2)

Because SCN, a perfected secured creditor, has not been offered adequate protection and because there is no equity in the property, the stay should be modified in order to allow it to exercise its state law rights. ... Accordingly, SCN’s motion for relief from the automatic stay should be granted.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause, including inadequate protection, and failure to make required periodic payments may constitute cause.

In Re Wright, Egan & Associates · filed 1986-05-28(d)(1)

We have held numerous times that the continued failure to tender periodic payments to a secured creditor pursuant to the terms of an underlying loan may constitute “cause” for relief under § 362(d)(1).

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause.

In Re Compass Van & Storage Corp. · filed 1986-05-29(d)(1)

Congress intended a hearing under Section 362(d) to be conducted in an expedited manner. The only matters to be determined by the bankruptcy court in these proceedings are issues of adequate protection, debtor’s equity in property, the necessity of property for an effective reorganization, or the existence of any other cause for relief.

Section 362(d)(1) permits the court to grant relief from the automatic stay for cause, including by conditioning modification on a future default.

In Re Marter · filed 1986-06-06(d)(1)

However, relief from the automatic stay may be granted for cause under § 362(d)(1). ... Culling from the best of our Solomonic rulings of recent vintage, we hold that there is no cause for absolutely modifying the stay at this time, but there is sufficient cause for a conditional modification of the stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits termination of the automatic stay for cause, including a debtor’s lack of good faith.

Matter of Grieshop · filed 1986-08-13(d)(1)

The Land Bank’s central legal issue concerns the concept of good faith and the degree of bad faith necessary to constitute “cause” for either terminating the automatic stay or dismissing the petition altogether. ... In neither of these sections is the concept of good faith explicitly mentioned. Good faith has long been a prerequisite to a debtor’s use of the bankruptcy laws, however, and the lack thereof has consistently been recognized as adequate cause for both terminating the stay afforded by the filing of a petition as well as dismissing the petition outright.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a court to grant relief from the automatic stay for cause.

In Re Hoffert Marine, Inc. · filed 1986-08-29(d)(1)

The Court finds that cause exists for granting Hickory relief from the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(d) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause or, in specified property cases, when the debtor lacks equity and the property is unnecessary to an effective reorganization.

In re Stephen Smith Home for the Aged, Inc. · filed 1986-09-10(d)

Relief from the automatic stay may be granted under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) which states as follows: ... We agree with the debtor that the issue is primarily one of contractual interpretation. We will accordingly retain the dispute in this court for adjudication and enter an order denying the motion for relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d) permits relief from the automatic stay when statutory grounds for lifting the stay are established.

Matter of Braen · filed 1987-03-11(d)

For the foregoing reasons pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 362(d), movants Nicholas Laganella and P.T.L. Construction Co. are granted relief from the stay and the Court finds that the Debtor has no equity in the following property: ... Movants are free to move before the New Jersey State Court in respect to said matters.

Section 362(d) generally requires notice and a hearing before a court grants relief from the automatic stay for cause.

Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. · filed 1987-04-01(d)

Section 362(d) provides that a court shall grant relief from the automatic stay for cause only after notice and a hearing, 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), and Soler correctly points out that the district court did not follow the letter of this prescribed procedure in the instant case. ... Accordingly, we do not believe the district court abused its discretion in the context of this particular case by summarily granting relief from the stay and directing that the arbitration proceed as directed by the Supreme Court.

Section 362(a)(3) stays acts to obtain possession of property of the estate or property from the estate.

In Re WL Bradley Co., Inc. · filed 1987-06-17(a)(3)

Nevertheless, Sunkist concedes that it must obtain relief from the automatic stay in order to take action to obtain payment from the debtor of the trust proceeds. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (stays act to obtain property o/the estate or property from the estate); 2 Collier 11362.04[3], at 362-34. (automatic stay protects property “in the possession of the estate”). ... I conclude that Sunkist is entitled to relief from stay and immediate payment from the debtor.

Section 362 permits relief from the automatic stay when a creditor's interests are not adequately protected or the debtor lacks a reasonable possibility of reorganization.

United States Small Business Administration v. Klarich (In re Klarich) · filed 1987-07-06(d)(1), (d)(2)

That the interests of the SBA are not adequately protected, and that there is not a reasonable possibility that this Chapter 13 plan will be confirmed; and that the SBA is entitled to relief from the automatic stay; and That denial of the SBA request to terminate the automatic stay retroactive to a time prior to foreclosure would be patently inequitable to the SBA and would frustrate the effect of these findings and conclusions and orders; and That denial of the SBA requests would result in unnecessary additional costs to the SBA which would not be recovered due to the absence of sufficient value in the Debtor’s property; and That, therefore, the SBA will suffer irreparable damage if its request is denied. Therefore, By a separate order, the Small Business Administration is granted relief from the automatic stay retroactive to 11:55 a.m. on June 18, 1987.

Section 362(d) permits a bankruptcy court to grant relief from the automatic stay by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning it.

In Re McLean Industries, Inc. · filed 1987-07-29(d)

In determining whether to vacate or modify the automatic stay in connection with entering an order for relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d), the bankruptcy court has discretion.

Section 362(d) permits relief from the automatic stay when secured creditors lack adequate protection and the debtor has no equity in collateral that is unnecessary to the estate.

Ables v. Major Funding Corp. (In Re Major Funding Corp.) · filed 1987-11-06(d)

As to these investors, the Court must apply the standards set out in 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) to determine whether the automatic stay should lift. ... Hence, the Court finds adequate protection is lacking. ... Because of the reduced value of the notes due to the low collection rate, it is also clear that the Debtor has no equity in the notes. ... The Court therefore holds that the stay should lift as to those investors in possession of their original notes.

The automatic stay may be modified to permit an indenture trustee to serve a notice of acceleration without demanding payment.

In Re Texaco, Inc. · filed 1988-01-13(a)

Chase is entitled to a modification of the automatic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) for the limited purpose of serving upon the debtors a Notice of Acceleration without a demand for payment.

Section 362 permits the automatic stay to be lifted so the government can terminate a contract that the debtor in possession cannot assume under the federal nonassignment statute.

United States, Department of Air Force v. Carolina Parachute Corp. (In Re Carolina Parachute Corp.) · filed 1989-12-08(d)

... the Court determines that the automatic stay should have been modified to allow the government to terminate the contract with debtor, pursuant to the provisions of 41 U.S.C. § 15.

Section 362(d) permits the court to deny a judgment creditor relief from the automatic stay while the trustee may challenge the creditor’s lien on the funds as a preference.

In Re Grigoli · filed 1993-03-09(d)

In light of the foregoing, this Court finds ample reason not to dismiss this case nor to direct that the stay be lifted to permit Citibank to enforce its lien against the funds held in escrow, without prejudice to the rights of the Trustee and Citibank arising out of such adversary proceedings which may be commenced by the Trustee with respect to such funds.

Section 362 requires a court to construe relief from the automatic stay strictly; permission to foreclose on property does not by itself authorize pursuit of a deficiency judgment against the debtor.

Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Mehta, No. Cv 92 50832 S (Sep. 9, 1994) · filed 1994-09-09(a)

The court therefore finds that the relief from stay order issued by the bankruptcy court in this case did not clearly and unambiguously authorize the plaintiff to proceed to obtain an in personam judgment against the defendant for a deficiency under § 49-14 of the General Statutes, and that if the plaintiff had elected to pursue the deficiency judgment procedure under the statute and Practice Book rules the defendant could have interposed and pursued a colorable claim that the automatic stay had thereby been violated.

Section 362(d) permits a bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay retroactively so a state lawsuit may proceed against the debtor to the extent of insurance proceeds.

Hammes v. Brumley · filed 1995-12-29(d)

Under section 362(d) of the Bank-ruptey Code, the bankruptey court may grant relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(2) permits relief from the automatic stay when debtors have no equity in property and cannot reorganize without it.

In Re Mosello · filed 1996-05-09(d)(2)

With regard to subsection (2), there is no dispute (A) that the debtors have no equity in the Thomwood Property and (B) that there is no possibility of reorganization in this case without post-petition financing to develop the Thomwood Property. ... Accordingly, Acquvest’s motion for relief from the stay is granted.

Section 362 permits relief from the automatic stay so pending litigation and its appeal can proceed.

In Re A.Z. Services, Inc. · filed 1997-04-22(d)(1)

ORDERED, for the reasons set forth above, that stay of relief is granted in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B) and § 362(d)(1) to proceed with the Federal District Court litigation pending in the Southern District of Florida, and the appeal thereof to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals; and it is further ORDERED that this Court shall conduct a hearing on Monday, May 19, 1997 at 1:30 P.M. at the Paul G. Rogers Federal Building, 701 Clematis Street, Courtroom 6, West Palm Beach, Florida, to consider the propriety of awarding sanctions against the Debtor and its counsel pursuant to F.R.C.P. 11 and *582 Bankruptcy Rule 9011, and to determine the amount of such sanctions.

Section 362(d)(1) requires relief from the automatic stay for cause, assessed from the totality of the circumstances.

In Re Robert Frank-Leonard Wilson, Debtor. Lisa Baldino v. Robert Frank-Leonard Wilson Bunce D. Atkinson, Trustee · filed 1997-06-16(d)(1)

The Bankruptcy Code provides that the bankruptcy court shall grant relief from the automatic stay “for cause.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). Section 362(d)(1) does not define “cause,” leaving courts to consider what constitutes cause based on the totality of the circumstances in each particular case. ... We believe “cause” exists under the circumstances of this case.

Section 362 permits relief from the automatic stay when a prepetition foreclosure sale is perfected under state law before the debtor files, leaving the debtor with no interest in the property.

Bebensee-Wong v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n (In Re Bebensee-Wong) · filed 2000-04-25

In the case before us, fourteen days following the trustee’s sale, Fannie Mae recorded the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale. Therefore, pursuant to Civil Code § 2924h(c), the trustee’s sale became perfected at 8 a.m. on the day of the sale. Because this day was twelve days before the debtor’s petition, perfection occurred before the filing, even though Fannie Mae recorded postpetition. Thus, the debtor had no interest in the property at the time of her petition. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in granting Fannie Mae relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d) permits a bankruptcy court to annul the automatic stay retroactively in appropriately limited circumstances.

Govola v. Murphy (In Re Govola) · filed 2004-02-23(d)

“Nonetheless, § 362(d) expressly grants bankruptcy courts the option, in fashioning appropriate relief, of ‘annulling’ the automatic stay .... The word ‘annulling’ in this provision evidently contemplates the power of bankruptcy courts to grant relief from the stay which has retroactive effect .... [Section] 362(d) permits bankruptcy courts, in appropriately limited circumstances, to grant retroactive relief from the automatic stay.”

Section 362(d)(1) requires relief from the automatic stay for cause, including lack of adequate protection of an interest in property.

In Re Michaelesco · filed 2004-07-29(d)(1)

It is therefore concluded that EMC is entitled to relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d)(1).

Section 362(d) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause, including allowing litigation in another forum to proceed.

In Re Carroll's Wine Co. · filed 2005-07-20(d)

Regardless, the Court believes cause exists to modify the automatic stay to allow the proceedings in Iowa District Court to come to a final conclusion.

Section 362(d) permits the court to lift the automatic stay for cause.

In Re Swizzlestick, L.L.C. · filed 2000-09-19(d)

That is incorrect; the stay may be lifted for “cause,” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), and Paragraph 18 of the Debtor’s Motion specifically states: “Entry of an order granting the relief requested in this Motion is appropriate under relevant law, including but not limited to ... § 362 ..., and for cause, including but not limited to ... ” That section continues, listing five “causes” why the stay should be lifted. We have reviewed those causes and find them to be sufficient, especially in the absence of any specific objection to them.

Section 362(d) allows relief from the automatic stay for cause, including inadequate protection, or when the debtor lacks equity in property that is unnecessary to an effective reorganization.

Barrister's Land Co. v. Merchants & Farmers Bank of Columbus (In re Barrister's Land Co.) · filed 1985-12-02(d)

Consequently, this Court finds that NBC and M & F Bank have not met the requirements mandated by 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). Therefore, the motions seeking relief from the automatic stay are not well taken and are hereby overruled.

Section 362(d) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause or when the debtor lacks equity in property that is unnecessary to an effective reorganization.

Rice-Etherly v. Bank One (In Re Rice-Etherly) · filed 2006-01-24(d)

Relief from the automatic stay is controlled by section § 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. ... Stay litigation is limited to the issues of adequate protection, equity in the property, and necessity of the property to the reorganization. ... To the extent that the issue of the $800 attorney fee affects the amount of equity in Plaintiffs property, the issue can be directly addressed at the hearing on the Motion for Lift of Stay. An independent claim under the FDCPA arising from the inclusion of the attorney fees is unnecessary and appears to be a deliberate attempt to bypass the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(d)(1) requires relief from the automatic stay for cause, including a lack of adequate protection of an interest in property.

Drake v. Franklin Equipment Co. (In Re Franklin Equipment Co.) · filed 2009-09-14(d)(1)

The Court finds that the Trustee has not carried her burden in the instant matter. An insufficient equity cushion exists based upon the evidence presented to the Court and a lack of evidence presented by the Trustee to show that adequate protection exists. Therefore, the Court finds that relief pursuant to § 362(d)(1) should be granted.

Section 362(d)(2) permits relief from the stay against property when the debtor lacks equity in it and the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.

In Re Carlson · filed 2009-10-09(d)(2)

Since other portions of the record made out a prima facie showing for a minimum amount of encumbering debt at $50,000.00, and the basis for a reduction by counterclaim and offset was still conjectural, the Bank satisfied its one burden under 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(1). The Trustee did not counter the Bank’s evidence with a significantly higher valuation-by-appraisal; and the satisfaction of 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) was a non-issue in a Chapter 7 case.

Section 362(d) requires the court to grant relief from the automatic stay on request of a party in interest after notice and a hearing.

In Re Mims · filed 2010-10-27(d)

The Court concludes that Wells Fargo lacks standing to request relief from the automatic stay. ... Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code imposes an automatic stay on all litigation against the Debtor, as well as “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “[o]n request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay....” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (emphasis added). ... It follows from the Second Circuit’s analysis that unless Wells Fargo qualifies as a “creditor,” it does not have standing to request relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) does not require a separate motion for relief from the automatic stay when a creditor requests setoff in litigation before the bankruptcy court.

Holber v. Suffolk Construction Co. (In re Red Rock Services Co.) · filed 2012-08-30(d)(1)

I find therefore that Suffolk’s right to request a setoff is not prejudiced by its failure to file a separate section 362(d) motion.

Section 362(d)(1) permits retroactive annulment of the automatic stay for cause when the equities favor relief.

In re Chispito, Inc. · filed 2013-02-27(d)(1)

Although such stay should not be easily disturbed, section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code empowers the bankruptcy court to annul the stay under extremely limiting circumstances. ... Summarily, given the weight of the additional factors in the initial balancing test, the legal inquiry leads to a support of retroactive relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d) allows a bankruptcy court to grant relief from the automatic stay, permitting later adjudication of a suit filed during the stay.

Kimbrell v. Brown · filed 2011-07-11(d)

Even assuming that Kimbrell’s suit as to Brown was “void ab initio” in the sense that other courts have used this term to describe actions filed in violation of the automatic stay, the Bankruptcy Code allows for later adjudication of such suits, which pre- cludes finality under the circumstances presented here.

Section 362 allows a bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay for the limited purpose of letting another court adjudicate a case.

Kartchner v. Harper (In re Harper) · filed 2016-09-07

The Court lifts the Stay for the limited purpose of permitting adjudication of the merits of the Oregon Case by the Oregon Court.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay so a former spouse can enforce a vested property interest awarded in a divorce.

Martin v. Awve · filed 2016-09-28(d)(1)

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in granting Awve’s motion for relief from the automatic stay to allow her to pursue her rights in the divorce court.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause, assessed under the totality of the circumstances.

Siewe v. Locci · filed 2018-05-08(d)(1)

“Cause” is not defined in the bankruptcy code, so courts consider a variety of case-specific factors under the totality of the circumstances. ... Because the bankruptcy court’s actions were consistent with the purpose of the automatic stay and were not unfair to him, we conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion to deny Siewe relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay for cause, assessed case by case by balancing potential harm to the estate against hardship to the party seeking relief.

Stewart · filed 2018-09-27(d)(1)

For these reasons, it is this Court’s opinion that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion by lifting the automatic stay in this case.

Section 362(d)(1) permits modification of the automatic stay for cause to let litigation proceed in state court through final judgment.

Ramco Inc. v. Charles Guy Evans & Sons Inc. (In re Charles Evans Trucking Inc.) · filed 2018-12-10(d)(1)

The court may modify the automatic stay "for cause." ... FURTHER ORDERED that the automatic stay is MODIFIED to allow the proceedings against Evans Trucking and against the Individuals to recover Ramco's claim against Evans Trucking to proceed in the Circuit Court of Lamar County through entry of a final judgment. This Court retains jurisdiction over enforcement of any judgment obtained.

Section 362(d) permits a court to modify the automatic stay so a creditor can exercise its rights against the debtor's property when grounds for relief are established.

Green Parts International, Inc. · filed 2019-08-06(d)

Further, the Movant has established its entitlement to relief from stay under Section 362(d).

Section 362(d)(1) permits retroactive relief from the automatic stay for cause after the court balances the equities.

Toromanova v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB · filed 2020-07-27(d)(1)

A bankruptcy judge may grant relief for “cause,” but must balance the equites to determine whether retroactive relief is justified. ... Judge Landis’s decision to grant U.S. Bank retroactive relief from the automatic stay was not an abuse of discretion under these circumstances. I therefore affirm his order.

Section 362(d) permits a court to deny further relief from the automatic stay when the creditor is adequately protected under the circumstances.

In Re: James Kurt Bird · filed 2021-03-17(d)

Upon careful review of the totality of the circumstances of this case, the Court detects no reversible error in the bankruptcy court’s decision to deny VAGA further relief from the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(d) permits retroactive relief from the automatic stay to ratify an earlier offset.

In re: Larry Edward Wood · filed 2021-06-25(d)

WHEREFORE, after thorough review and careful consideration, the Court ORDERS that the Motion of Defendant/Appellant U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for Retroactive Relief from the Automatic Stay (Document 25) be GRANTED.

Section 362(d)(1)–(2) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause or when the debtor lacks equity in property that is not necessary to an effective reorganization.

Andresi Rosett Tate · filed 2021-09-29(d)(1)–(2)

For these reasons, W7’s Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay Against Real Property will be granted under § 362(d)(1) for cause and under § 362(d)(2) for lack of equity.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause, and a movant’s prima facie showing shifts the burden to the debtor to oppose relief.

James v. SWH 2017-1 Borrower, LP · filed 2022-05-05(d)(1)

If the movant establishes a prima facie case of cause for relief, the burden shifts to the debtor to prove cause or adequate protection does not exist. ... Based on these undisputed facts, the Court discerns no abuse of discretion in the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to lift the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits limited relief from the automatic stay for cause when the circumstances justify allowing litigation to proceed in another court.

MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners II L · filed 2022-12-16(d)(1)

For reasons detailed below, the Court declines to lift the stay in a way that sets no topical limitations, but does lift the stay to allow resumed litigation of two specific, already-pending aspects of the Brazilian proceedings.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay upon a showing of cause.

AmeriFirst Financial, Inc. · filed 2024-06-12(d)(1)

AIF has not shown cause for relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) did not permit termination of the stay where the creditor failed to show cause.

Teal Properties, Inc. · filed 2023-09-20(d)(1)

Under § 362(d)(1), stay relief may be granted “for cause”. ... For the forgoing reasons, the court finds that no cause exists to terminate the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §362(d).

Section 362 permits relief from the automatic stay so a secured creditor can take possession of collateral and enforce its security interest.

In Re Guil-Park Farms, Inc. · filed 1988-08-31

Further, NCNB is entitled to relief from the automatic stay to take possession of the notes and pursue whatever other rights it has against the debtor.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when factors such as judicial economy and the balance of harms favor allowing state court litigation to proceed.

In Re: Christopher Mongiello · filed 2025-01-17(d)(1)

Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in granting Eastman’s motion to lift the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(d)(1).

Relief from the automatic stay in a Chapter 11 case does not carry over to a later Chapter 7 case; a fee award entered without relief from the Chapter 7 stay violates § 362.

Wilcox v. McGann · filed 2025-05-23

Without citing legal authority, Wilcox argues that the bankruptcy court's May 4, 2020 order granting relief from the automatic stay in the Chapter 11 case applied to the Chapter 7 ... case. It did not. Wilcox didn't seek relief from the automatic stay in the Chapter 7 case on Scheibel's behalf. The circuit court's Fee Order awarding Scheibel attorneys fees thus violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) allows relief from the automatic stay for cause when the property has no connection to the debtor’s reorganization.

McZeal · filed 2025-10-17(d)(1)

Here, Judge Conway had sufficient grounds to grant the motion for relief under §362(d)(1).

Section 362(a) does not bar an eviction or a finding of unpaid rent when the bankruptcy court has granted relief from the automatic stay to pursue eviction.

Cedar One Properties, Ltd. v. Rudolph · filed 2026-04-07(a)

The county court did find that Appellant violated the lease by failing to pay rent. This finding is not prohibited since Appellee was granted relief from the automatic stay to pursue the eviction action.

Section 362 does not prohibit perfecting a lien against property owned by a third party rather than the debtor or the bankruptcy estate.

Gwinnett-Club Associates, L.P. v. Southern Electric Supply Co. · filed 2000-07-14

There is nothing in Section 362 which prohibits the perfecting of a lien against property that does not belong to the debtor or to the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(a)(1) and (a)(3) do not stay a supplier’s use of Texas construction claim remedies against a property owner for a bankrupt subcontractor’s debt when the supplier seeks payment from the owner rather than estate property.

In Re Medina · filed 2009-08-20

For the reasons stated, the court concludes that a supplier’s assertion of the remedies available under sections 53.056, 53.081, 53.082, and 53.083 of the Texas Property Code, to recover a debt owed by a subcontractor or supplier does not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(h) does not provide damages for filing an inaccurate proof of claim in the bankruptcy court because filing the claim does not itself violate the automatic stay.

In Re Sammon · filed 2000-09-06(h)

The filing of a Proof of Claim before a bankruptcy court, which is in control over the process of administering the property of the bankruptcy estate, is the logical equivalent of a request for relief from the automatic stay, which cannot in itself constitute a violation of the stay pursuant to § 362(h).

Filing a proof of claim, even when incorrect, does not violate the automatic stay under Section 362.

In Re Hurst · filed 2006-12-15

The Debtor does not and cannot make a valid argument that the filing of a proof of claim, even when incorrect, violates the automatic stay set out in 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(6) does not prohibit a creditor from asserting in a proof of claim a right to increased post-petition mortgage payments to recover unpaid pre-petition escrow obligations.

Campbell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2008-08-26(a)(6)

In this case, Countrywide filed a claim asserting a right to increased mortgage payments under the loan documents. The Campbells objected, and the bankruptcy court sustained the objection. These actions were permitted by the Bankruptcy Code and did not violate the automatic stay.

Asserting a right to payment in a proof of claim, without taking collection action outside the bankruptcy proceeding, does not violate the automatic stay.

Campbell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2008-10-13(a)

None of these sections bars a creditor’s filing a Proof of Claim pursuant to Section 501 of the Bankruptcy Code. ... In this case, Countrywide filed a claim asserting a right to increased mortgage payments under the loan documents. The Campbells objected, and the bankruptcy court sustained the objection. These actions were permitted by the Bankruptcy Code and did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit a creditor from filing a proof of claim barred by the statute of limitations.

McGregor v. B-Real, LLC (In Re McGregor) · filed 2008-12-12(a)

Simply because B-Real’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations does not mean that it can never be Filed. ... Therefore, the court is of the opinion that the Filing of the original and amended proofs of claim by B-Real was not a violation of the automatic stay.

Filing a proof of claim does not violate the automatic stay.

Moore v. Comenity Capital Bank (In re Moore) · filed 2014-09-29(a)

The court agrees that filing a claim would not violate Section 362.

Section 362(a) does not bar a creditor from filing a proof of claim in the bankruptcy court under § 501.

In re Mazyck · filed 2014-11-19(a)

Furthermore, it would be unreasonable to conclude that Congress, in its drafting of the Bankruptcy Code, established in § 501 a process for filing proofs of claims within the bankruptcy court that directly violated its provision in § 362(a) of a post-petition stay of the commencement or continuation of judicial or administrative actions.

Section 362(a) does not bar filing a proof of claim within the bankruptcy proceeding.

Reed v. LVNV Funding, LLC · filed 2015-03-27(a)

Treating a claim filed in bankruptcy as an attempt to collect a debt does not, as Defendants contend, violate the statutory injunction against debt collection attempts during a bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 362(a) does not bar a creditor from filing a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding.

HOWARD v. LVNV FUNDING, LLC · filed 2020-02-28(a)

The automatic stay does not prohibit filing a proof of claim before the bankruptcy court.

Section 362(a) does not stay a creditor’s complaint to local officials about the legality of a postpetition occupancy certificate issued to the debtor.

Kauffman v. Neal (In re Kauffman) · filed 2000-10-25(a)

The defendants are not prevented by the automatic stay from complaining to the Town that the Town’s actions in permitting the change of use of the property requested by the debtors was arbitrary and capricious.

Section 362(d)(1) does not permit a party to obtain prospective relief from the automatic stay based on inadequate protection of another party’s property interest.

In re Williams · filed 2015-07-06(d)(1)

However, were the Court to deny AH4R retrospective relief from the automatic stay, the Court cannot grant it prospective relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d)(1) due to lack of adequate protection of another party’s interest in the property. In short, AH4R lacks standing to seek such relief prospectively as it has no interest in the Property under this circumstance and no relationship to the Debtors.

Section 362(d)(1) requires a party seeking relief from the automatic stay to have an interest in the property.

In Re Isenbart · filed 2000-11-14(d)(1)

Stockgrowers must have an interest in the property before relief may be granted under § 362(d)(1).

Section 362(h) does not permit a debtor to maintain a claim for a willful stay violation involving property in which the debtor had no legal or equitable interest at the time of the alleged violation.

Bostanian v. American Hilton Corp. · filed 2002-07-01(h)

Therefore, he did not have a legal interest in Parcel A at the time of Liberty’s and Cal Fed’s alleged violation of the automatic stay as to Parcel A. Because Stefan did not have an intérest in Parcel A at the time of the events he alleges willfully violated the automatic stay, he may not maintain his claim.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem stay relief only on request of a creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in the affected real property.

Ellis v. Junying Yu (In Re Ellis) · filed 2014-11-19(d)(4)

Applying its plain meaning, this provision of the Code authorizes a bankruptcy court to grant the extraordinary remedy of in rem stay relief only upon the request of a creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in the subject property.

Section 362(d)(4) permits in rem stay relief only at the request of a creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in the affected real property.

In re: Gigi Ellis · filed 2014-11-19(d)(4)

Applying its plain meaning, this provision of the Code authorizes a bankruptcy court to grant the extraordinary remedy of in rem stay relief only upon the request of a creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in the subject property.

Section 362(d) allows a note holder who can seek foreclosure in state court to seek relief from the automatic stay as a party in interest.

In Re Sterling · filed 2018-09-12(d)

The creditor is a proper party to the action to lift the automatic stay because, as holder of the note and allonge, it could seek foreclosure in state court, and is therefore a “party in interest.”

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay the automatic cancellation of an FCC license when the governing regulations cancel it without any act by the FCC.

United States v. Kansas Personal Communications Services (In Re Kansas Personal Communications Services, Ltd.) · filed 2000-12-18(a)(3)

Because the regulations mandate that a license automatically cancels and the FCC permissibly interprets the regulations to mean that no “act” by the FCC is required, this court concludes that the filing of the bankruptcy petition does not preserve a licensee’s limited property interest in a license under the automatic stay of section 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a) does not toll the passage of time or prevent a contractual payment option from expiring automatically upon a postpetition default when expiration requires no affirmative act by the creditor.

In Re Margulis · filed 2005-04-12(a)

The effectiveness of the termination does not depend on the timing of the default but on whether termination requires an act prohibited by the automatic stay. In other words, if a post-petition default triggers an automatic termination, the lease or contract will terminate in accordance with its terms. ... The option terminated with the passage of time, and hence, the automatic stay was not implicated.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay the automatic expiration of a regulatory award when expiration occurs by operation of law without agency action.

Moncada NJ Solar 201, LLC v. ISE Am., Inc. (In re Moncada NJ Solar 201, LLC) · filed 2018-09-07(a)(1)

Here, contrary to Moncada's arguments, I find that the automatic stay does not protect Moncada against the termination of the SubQ Award. In that regard, as the Court has already found, the plain and unambiguous language of the Solar Act provides that any solar project approved pursuant to subsection (q) must commence commercial operations no later than May 31, 2018. In the event that a project is not operational by that date, the award thereunder expires as a matter of law.

Section 362 stays a creditor’s suit against a debtor to establish the debtor’s insurer’s secondary liability until the creditor obtains relief from the stay or the stay ends.

Becker v. Becker · filed 2001-02-23(a)(1)

Here, the § 362(a) automatic stay was still in effect when the default judgment was entered against Ralph on May 13, 1988, as the discharge was not filed until May 16, 1988. In order to proceed with their suit before the bankruptcy case was closed, dismissed, or the debtor discharged, Alvin and Debi were required to request relief from the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) lists those situations when the automatic stay does not apply, and none of those exceptions allows a creditor to proceed against a debtor for the purpose of establishing secondary liability against a debtor’s insurer. Alvin and Debi’s claim does not fall under any of these exceptions.

Section 362(d)(1) permits stay relief for personal injury litigation and collection of insurance benefits when the balance of hardships, comity, and judicial economy favor state court, while preserving the stay against the debtor’s other assets.

In Re Glunk · filed 2006-06-12(d)(1)

In evaluating whether “cause” exists for modification of the automatic stay, courts consider circumstances other than the balancing of the respective harms to the parties. Considerations of both comity and judicial economy may support the granting of relief from the automatic stay to permit litigation to proceed in the non-bankruptcy forum. ... My review of these considerations convinces me that the initial, comprehensive airing of the issues should take place in state court, leaving this court ready to resolve any remaining issues. ... b. The Movants may proceed against any available insurance benefits in order to obtain satisfaction or partial satisfaction of any judgment which may be entered in their favor in the CP Action. ... c. In all other respects, the automatic stay remains in full force and effect.

Section 362(a)(3) protects pawned property from sale when the debtor holds a redemption interest at filing and a confirmed Chapter 13 plan binds the pawnbroker to secured claim treatment.

In Re Young · filed 2001-03-08(a)(3)

This Court holds that Cash America has a secured claim of $ 420; that its contract with the Debtor has been modified by the order of confirmation; that Cash America is bound by 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) and the doctrine of res judicata; and that the automatic stay extends to the collateral held by Cash America.

Section 362(a) does not toll statutory redemption periods, but bars a Texas pawnbroker from completing forfeiture of pledged goods when the debtor retained redemption rights at filing.

Prado v. Cash America Advance, Inc. (In Re Prado) · filed 2006-03-31(a)

Accordingly, this Court adopts the view that § 362(a) does not toll the running of statutory redemption periods, and that statutory redemption periods are only extended to the extent allowed by § 108(b). ... If the Debtor’s right to recover the pledged goods existed under Texas law when he filed his bankruptcy petition, then § 362(a) precludes Cash America from terminating the Debtor’s interest in the Property.

Section 362(a) stays a pawnbroker’s discretionary forfeiture of pledged goods when state law preserves the debtor’s right of redemption until that act, even after the statutory grace period expires.

CASH AMERICA ADVANCE, INC. v. Prado · filed 2008-09-29(a)

Pursuant to Texas law, the end of Prado’s redemption period occurred when Cash America made the discretionary decision to document the date of forfeiture, not when the grace period expired. Prado therefore had a legal or equitable interest in the merchandise at issue when Cash America changed the status of the goods in its store computer and placed them for sale. Accordingly, section 362(a) proscribed the affirmative act taken by Cash America to terminate Prado’s interest, i.e., his right of redemption. By placing the items for sale, Cash America violated the automatic stay.

Section 362 bars the sale of a debtor’s pawned property while the redemption period remains open.

Harrison, Jr. v. Konfino · filed 2020-04-29

Both New York State law, and the automatic stay set forth in section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, barred any sale of items belonging to AN Frieda before the expiration of the redemption period.

Section 362(a) freezes a pawnbroker’s secured interest in a vehicle when the debtor files for bankruptcy before the pawn contract matures and the vehicle enters the estate.

Titlemax of Alabama, Inc. v. Womack · filed 2021-08-30(a)(3)–(5)

But the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (3)–(5), froze the interest of TitleMax as a lienholder with a secured interest in Womack’s vehicle, see Ala. Code § 5-19A-10(a), for “the amount of its interest in the automobile,” Thompson, 791 So. 2d at 978.

Section 362(a) prevents a judgment creditor from registering a foreign judgment in any forum once the bankruptcy case begins.

Moss v. Burton & Norris (In Re Moss) · filed 2001-10-02(a)

In any event, once the bankruptcy case is commenced, the automatic stay precludes a judgment creditor form registering the foreign judgment in any forum.

Section 362(a) prevents a judgment creditor from registering a foreign judgment in any forum once the bankruptcy case begins.

Moss v. Burton & Norris · filed 2001-10-02(a)

In any event, once the bankruptcy case is commenced, the automatic stay precludes a judgment creditor from registering the foreign judgment in any forum. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(6) does not require withdrawal of a prepetition debarment merely because it remains in effect after the bankruptcy petition.

In Re Moss · filed 2001-12-11(a)(6)

Therefore, I find that the mere post-petition existence of the Debarment and the Government’s failure to remove it for the term of the confirmed Plan is not a violation of the Stay provided for by Section 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit a creditor’s internal bookkeeping entries absent communication, an overt act, or an effect on the debtor.

Kerney v. Capital One Financial Corp. (In Re Sims) · filed 2002-05-08(a)(3)

However, other than possibly in a setoff context, mere internal bookkeeping entries by a creditor, in and of themselves, do not generally produce any effect on a debtor, much less a change or an attempted change in possession of property of the estate. Capital One or any creditor could produce all kinds of paperwork which if communicated to the debtor or a third party would violate the stay, but absent that communication, some overt act, or resulting effect on the debtor, no violation has occurred.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit a creditor from recording postpetition fees in its internal books without communicating the charges or taking an overt act to collect them.

Mann v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. · filed 2003-01-17(a)(3)

Viewed in this light, these postpetition bookkeeping entries by Chase did not implicate Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)(3), since such unilateral accruals of amounts assertedly due, but in no manner communicated to the debtor, the debtor's other creditors, the bankruptcy court, nor any third party, plainly are not the sort of “act” Congress sought to proscribe.

An automatic-stay claim under Section 362(a) is insufficiently pleaded when internal record changes are not sufficiently alleged to have been communicated to the debtors or to have affected their bankruptcy proceedings.

Guetling v. Household Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2004-07-20(a)

Household correctly points out that the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that any internal record-keeping or changes on its part were either communicated to the Plaintiffs or had any effect on their bankruptcy proceedings, in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 bars a mortgagee from seeking to fix a deficiency claim against a residence while the automatic stay remains in effect as to that property.

CIT Small Business Lending Corp. v. Zinchiak (In Re Zinchiak) · filed 2002-07-03

This is for the reason that the automatic stay which remained in place as to the residence until January 9, 2001 prevented the mortgagor from any act to recover its claim against the residence, and that a proceeding to fix the amount of the mortgage claim against the residence would have been such an act.

Sections 362(a)(5) and (6) stay garnishment of a debtor’s wages to collect a nondischargeable judgment from an earlier bankruptcy case, even when the wages are not estate property, so the creditor must obtain stay relief.

Arneson v. Farmers Insurance Exchange (In Re Arneson) · filed 2002-08-30(a)(5)-(6)

Thus, §§ 362(a)(5) and (6) applied to stay Farmers from garnishing Arneson’s wages, which are not property of the estate, and Farmers’ motion for relief from stay was necessary.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not prevent a district court from remanding an improperly removed action after a debtor defendant files for bankruptcy.

Diebel v. S.B. Trucking Co. · filed 2003-04-09(a)

Because S.B. Trucking and Jackson filed for bankruptcy on December 11, 2002, this Court must address whether the automatic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362 prevents this Court from remanding this improperly removed action. The Plaintiffs Motion to Remand (Doc. No. 17) calls into question this Court’s jurisdiction. As such, this Court “finds the automatic stay does not leave this court helpless to remand an improperly removed action.”

An allegation that a creditor violated the automatic stay is equitable in nature and carries no right to a jury trial.

Quarles v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. (In Re Quarles) · filed 2003-05-28

Plaintiff’s allegation regarding the automatic stay invokes an equitable provision of the Bankruptcy Code, and is therefore equitable in nature such that no right to a jury trial exists with respect to that allegation.

Section 362(k)(1) stay violation actions assert a public right, so a defendant has no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial even if it has not filed a proof of claim.

Calderon v. Bank of America Corp. (In re Calderon) · filed 2013-07-01(k)(1)

Here, the fact that the Defendant has not filed a proof of claim is irrelevant because the Court has determined that a § 362(k)(l) action asserts a public right and the Defendant is therefore, not entitled to a jury trial.

A claim for violation of the automatic stay under § 362(k) is decided by a bankruptcy judge without a jury, but a jury must first decide any factual issues common to private rights claims that the trustee also brings.

Loveridge v. Hall (In re Renewable Energy Development Corp.) · filed 2013-09-23(k)

While Congress has properly assigned the resolution of the Trustee’s claim for violation of the automatic stay to the bankruptcy judge to be decided without a jury, the bankruptcy court should first allow the jury to determine any issues that are common to the Trustee’s private rights of action and this public right.

An action to enforce the automatic stay under § 362(a) does not give rise to a right to a jury trial.

Windstream Holdings, Inc. v. Charter Communications, Inc. · filed 2020-03-17(a)

Although the question is not quite as easily answered, it is well established that an action to enforce the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) also does not give rise to a jury trial right.

A claim under § 362(k) for violation of the automatic stay carries no right to a jury trial, even when damages and attorneys’ fees are sought.

Lysyy v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company · filed 2025-05-27(k)

Plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial on their § 362(k) claim.

The automatic stay, while in effect, prevents the IRS from entering into an offer in compromise of a debtor’s tax obligations.

In Re Barnette · filed 2004-04-14(a)

To start with, the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), while in effect, will prevent the IRS from entering into any such agreement.

Section 362(h) treats a willful stay violation as an injury and permits nominal damages when the debtor cannot quantify actual damages.

Jackson v. Dan Holiday Furniture, LLC (In Re Jackson) · filed 2004-04-28(h)

Thus, the mere violation of the automatic stay constitutes an injury to the debtor inasmuch as the creditor’s violation restricts the debtor’s breathing spell and subjects the debtor to continued collection efforts, possibly including harassment and intimidation. There is no requirement that a debtor must prove a quantum of actual damages to successfully sue a creditor for violating the automatic stay. ... Actual damages are a matter of proof, and in the absence of such proof, a nominal award for actual damages serves as a vindication of a debtor’s rights.

Section 362(k) does not make enforcement of the automatic stay the exclusive remedy for collection activity that also violates the FDCPA.

Atwood v. GE Money Bank (In Re Atwood) · filed 2011-04-07(k)

Enforcement of the automatic stay provisions under the Bankruptcy Code is not Plaintiffs exclusive remedy for collection activity that could also constitute a violation of the FDCPA.

Section 362(h)'s remedy for willful stay violations does not displace remedies under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act for negligent false collection demands.

Randolph, Jeanette v. IMBS Incorporated · filed 2004-05-12(h)

Just so with §1692e(2)(A) and §362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code. To say that only the Code applies is to eliminate all control of negligent falsehoods. Permitting remedies for negligent falsehoods would not contradict any portion of the Bankruptcy Code, which therefore cannot be deemed to have repealed or curtailed §1692e(2)(A) by im- plication.

Section 362(h)'s remedy for willful stay violations does not displace FDCPA remedies for debt-collection conduct, including negligent false demands for payment.

Randolph v. Imbs, Inc., Cheryl Alexander v. Unlimited Progress Corp., Cross-Appellee. Jennifer J. Cross v. Risk · filed 2004-05-12(h)

These do not, however, add up to irreconcilable conflict; instead the two statutes overlap, and if the plaintiff shows a more serious transgression- — the willful violation to which § 362(h) refers — then more substantial sanctions (such as punitive damages) are available. It is easy to enforce both statutes, and any debt collector can comply with both simultaneously.

Section 362(a) remedies do not displace FDCPA claims based on collection letters that violate the automatic stay.

Bacelli v. MFP, INC. · filed 2010-07-28(a)

In Randolph, the Seventh Circuit discussed the matter at length found no irreconcilable conflict between the remedies available under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) and 1692e(2)(A) based on collection letters violating the automatic stay. The Court agrees.

Section 362(b)(6) permits a forward contract merchant to offset or net payments when the forward contract provides for that remedy.

Clear Peak Energy, Inc. v. Southern California Edison Co. (In re Clear Peak, Inc.) · filed 2013-02-26(b)(6)

Under Section 362(b)(6), a forward contract merchant may proceed with offsetting or netting out certain payments, if provided for under the forward contract.

Section 362(b)(6) permits a forward contract merchant to offset amounts owed for pre-termination gas deliveries against rejection damages under a forward contract, but does not authorize offsets for post-termination deliveries or invasion of the debtor’s bank account.

Mirant Americas Energy Marketing, L.P. v. Kern Oil & Refining Co. (In Re Mirant Corp.) · filed 2004-05-17(b)(6)

While section 362(b)(6) of the Code is not sufficient basis for Kern to offset amounts due for post-termination delivery of gas or to invade MAEM’s bank account, section 362(b)(6) does permit offset of sums due for gas delivered pre-termination against Kern’s rejection claim if Kern was acting as a forward contract merchant and was bound to MAEM in a forward contract.

Section 362(b)(6) does not protect every transaction by a forward contract merchant; the setoff must involve a forward contract and qualify as a settlement payment.

In Re Gpr Holdings, LLC · filed 2004-09-30(b)(6)

Section 362(b)(6) excludes from the automatic stay a setoff by a forward contract merchant of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with a forward contract that constitutes a settlement payment arising out of a forward contract. ... Even if Duke had been acting as a forward contract merchant, not every transaction by a forward contract merchant is eligible for the protections of §§ 362(b)(6) and 546(e).

Section 362(a)(5) bars the IRS from reinstating a voluntarily released prepetition tax lien against the debtor’s property without court approval.

In Re Green · filed 2004-06-08(a)(5)

The automatic stay bars any post-petition attempt by the IRS to reinstate its lien against the debtors’ home.

Section 362(a)(1) prohibits an insurer from demanding a post-petition examination under oath of the debtor to investigate an allegedly fraudulent insurance claim, although merely denying or refusing to pay the claim does not violate the stay.

Grochocinski v. Allstate Insurance (In Re Lyckberg) · filed 2004-06-21(a)(1)

The Court finds that Allstate violated the automatic stay when it issued the demand to the Debtor to submit to a post-petition examination under oath. ... This act was more than merely denying the claim and not paying as requested by the Debtor and the Trustee, which, standing alone, is not a violation of the stay. The examination under oath is clearly a proceeding against the Debtor to assess Allstate’s allegation that he had “staged” the loss as a phoney claim to recover under the Policy and that he had thus defrauded Allstate.

Section 362 bars enforcement of a contractual clause that would prevent the bankruptcy court from enjoining violations of the automatic stay.

Lucas v. Nickens (In Re Lucas) · filed 2004-07-12

Likewise, a clause prohibiting this court from enjoining a party from violating the stay is contrary to the provisions and purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) stays similar alter ego actions brought by individual creditors when the underlying cause of action belongs to the bankruptcy estate under section 541(a).

Baillie Lumber Co. v. Thompson · filed 2004-12-02(a)(3)

If such causes of action, including alter ego actions, are property of the estate under section 541(a), any similar extraneous lawsuits brought by individual creditors will be subject to the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

The automatic stay bars a creditor from pursuing estate claims against the debtor’s principals, but permits personal claims under Missouri law that neither require piercing the corporate veil nor belong to the debtor.

In re Kuecker Equipment Co. · filed 2006-02-06(a)(1), (a)(3)

Accordingly, I find that the filing of the Petition asserting the original Counts I through III violated the automatic stay in the Debtor’s bankruptcy case. ... Accordingly, because Missouri law provides a mechanism whereby Garvey can seek personal liability against the individual defendants as principals of the Debtor ... without piercing the corporate veil, and he is no longer pursuing a cause of action belonging to the Debtor, I find that Counts I through III of the First Amended Petition do not violate the automatic stay in the Debtor’s bankruptcy case.

Section 362’s automatic stay prevents a creditor from pursuing an alter ego claim against a debtor’s owner when the claim belongs to the bankruptcy estate.

Rayonier Wood Products, LLC v. ScanWare, Inc. · filed 2009-11-30(a)

Rayonier, therefore, will be unable to proceed against FinScan upon remand because the automatic stay created by ScanWare’s bankruptcy applies to claims not just against ScanWare, but also against its alter ego.

A damages claim for violation of the automatic stay is ancillary to bankruptcy jurisdiction over the debtor’s property, so state sovereign immunity does not bar the claim.

POTTER v. NEWKIRK · filed 2020-10-20(k)(1)

Thus, while claims for damages based on violation of the automatic stay resemble traditional money damage lawsuits in form, their function is to facilitate the in rem proceedings which form the foundation of bankruptcy. As such, the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply with respect to the claim for violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)'s use of “entities” triggers § 106(c)'s waiver of sovereign immunity for a § 362(h) damages claim against the IRS.

In Re Lile · filed 1989-02-02(a)

Section 362 contains the triggering term “entities”, therefore, 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) applies to waive the sovereign immunity bar asserted by the IRS in this case.

Section 362(h) does not authorize an attorney fee award against the United States under § 106(c) because it contains none of that provision’s terms for waiving sovereign immunity.

United States v. Woloschak Farms (In Re Woloschak Farms) · filed 1989-11-07(h)

This Court finds that section 106(c) does not waive the government’s sovereign immunity from claims under section 362(h). Section 106(c) waiver is inapplicable in this case because section 362(h) does not contain any of the triggering terms set forth in section 106(c)(1).

Section 362 does not waive federal sovereign immunity for damages and attorneys’ fees under subsection (h).

United States v. Cheryl L. McPeck A/K/A Cheri Bell D/B/A Gold Studio · filed 1990-08-06(h)

Nothing in § 362 serves as a waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity from the damages and attorneys’ fees authorized by § 362(h).

Section 362(h) monetary sanctions for a willful stay violation cannot be awarded against a federal agency without a waiver of sovereign immunity.

Cowart v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Cowart) · filed 1990-12-04(h)

Without specifically adopting the Rine-hart holding or entirely rejecting the Nordic Village analysis, I am persuaded by the Pearson holding that, in the context of sanctions under Section 362(h) for willful violations of the automatic stay provisions of Section 362(a), there is no waiver of sovereign immunity under Section 106(c) such as to allow an award of monetary damages against an agency or instrumentality of the United States.

Section 362(h) does not permit monetary damages against the United States for an alleged violation of the automatic stay.

Pinkstaff v. United States (In re Pinkstaff) · filed 1990-11-16(h)

Thus, although the court does not lack jurisdiction as the USA asserts, summary judgment in favor of the defendant as to plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages under Section 362(h) is appropriate.

Section 362 bars collection efforts against a bankruptcy debtor after filing and permits damages for violations.

Georgia Higher Education Assistance Corp. v. Crow · filed 2004-12-23

Count two sought a declaration that the defendant state agencies had violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) by trying to collect on Crow’s debts, and monetary damages pursuant to § 362(h) for that violation. ... It follows that the federal courts, including the bankruptcy courts, have no authority to entertain a § 362 claim against two agencies of the State of Georgia ... absent that sovereign’s consent, see Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S. Ct. 347, 351 (1945), overruled on other grounds, 535 U.S. 613, 623, 122 S. Ct. 1640, 1646 (2002), and it has not consented.

A state that files a proof of claim waives Eleventh Amendment immunity from enforcement of the automatic stay to the extent of the debtor’s attorneys’ fees and costs.

State of Georgia v. Burke · filed 1998-07-22

Therefore, addressing ... only the live issues in this case, we hold that the State of Georgia has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to the extent of the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by the debtors in enforcing the bankruptcy court’s automatic stay and discharge injunction.