11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362's automatic stay may be enforced against a state for costs and attorneys' fees when the state waives its sovereign immunity by filing a proof of claim.

State of Georgia Department of Revenue v. Burke (In re Burke) · filed 1998-07-22

The Supreme Court's decision in Gardner establishes that, by filing a proof of claim in the debtors' respective bankruptcy proceedings, the State waived its sovereign immunity for purposes of the adjudication of those claims. We hold that this waiver includes the bankruptcy court's enforcement of the discharge injunction and the automatic stay in the instant cases.

Section 362(k) permits emotional distress damages against the United States for a willful violation of the automatic stay because Section 106(a) waives sovereign immunity for that relief.

Hunsaker v. United States · filed 2018-08-30(k)

In sum, sovereign immunity does not preclude an award of emotional distress damages against the United States for willful violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay.

A vehicle lienholder notified of bankruptcy must ensure its disabling device permits the debtor’s use of the vehicle, and shifting to the debtor the burden of obtaining operating codes constitutes a willful stay violation.

Hampton v. Yam's Choice Plus Autos, Inc. (In Re Hampton) · filed 2005-01-10(a)(3), (h)

Defendant then placed the duty on Debtor to obtain the appropriate code to start her vehicle. By placing that burden on the Debtor, rather than taking action itself, Defendant willfully violated the automatic stay. ... In sum, creditors who have installed PayTeck or similar devices on debtors’ vehicles bear the burden of ensuring that such devices do not deprive debtors the use of their vehicles; once a customer with such a device files bankruptcy, and notifies the lienholder of such bankruptcy, the lienholder must take action to ensure that a security device like the PayTeck does not deprive a debtor the use of his or her vehicle.

Section 362(a)(3) permits continued use of a vehicle-disabling system when the creditor supplies proper monthly and emergency codes to prevent disablement, leaving the debtor responsible for properly entering them.

Roey v. Auto Credit Center, Inc. (In Re Grisard-Van Roey) · filed 2007-06-15(a)(3)

Rather, Auto Credit was obligated under § 362(a)(3) to avoid exercising control over the vehicle. Thus, Auto Credit had to take appropriate measures to prevent the vehicle from being disabled if it wished to continue its use of the Passtime System. ... In both instances, Auto Credit had provided Debtor or Debtor’s attorney with the correct codes. It was Debtor’s responsibility to properly input the codes. Thus, Auto Credit was not in violation of automatic stay under § 362(a)(3) when the Passtime System disabled the Vehicle on July 4 and September 1, 2006.

Section 362(b)(2)(F) permits interception of a refundable tax credit to collect child support.

Jason Matthew Bronson · filed 2022-08-23(b)(2)(F)

The automatic stay did not prohibit DCS from collecting child support owed by Debtor from the stimulus payment because the stimulus payment was a refundable tax credit.

Section 362(b)(2)(F) excepts interception of a CARES Act stimulus payment for past-due child support from the automatic stay because the payment is a tax refund.

Lockhart v. Washington County Child Support Enforcement Agency · filed 2021-06-24(b)(2)(F)

As a refund, § 362(b)(2)(F) excepts the interception from the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(2)(F) excepts interception of a debtor’s tax refund to collect a prepetition domestic support obligation from the automatic stay.

In RE McGRAHAN · filed 2011-12-07(b)(2)(F)

DHHS's intercepting the debtor's tax refunds to satisfy his prepetition domestic support obligations falls squarely within the § 362(b)(2)(F) exception to the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(2)(F) permits a support creditor to intercept tax refunds before Chapter 13 plan confirmation, but the stay exception does not permit collection of prepetition support arrears contrary to a confirmed plan.

In Re McGrahan · filed 2011-04-22(b)(2)(F)

When a debtor files for chapter 13, a support creditor, as described in § 362(b)(2)(F), may intercept tax refunds before the plan is confirmed since such acts are exempt from the automatic stay. ... Consequently, DHHS may not intercept tax refunds to pay its prepetition claim according to the Proposed Modified Plan.

Retaining tax overpayments intercepted for past-due child support does not violate the automatic stay when mandatory statutory reductions leave no refund to become property of the estate.

Lyle v. Santa Clara County Department of Child Support Services (In Re Lyle) · filed 2005-03-04(a)

Here, the value of Lyle’s claim to a refund was statutorily determined to be zero, and the intercepted funds did not become part of Lyle’s estate. Because the intercepted funds are not property of the estate, SCCDCSS did not violate the automatic stay by retaining them.

Section 362(b)(26) permits a governmental unit to set off an income tax refund against an earlier income tax liability without violating the automatic stay.

Copley v. United States (In re Copley) · filed 2016-03-22(b)(26)

In light of § 362(b)(26), the United States did not, by setting off the Debtors’ tax overpayment against their prior years’ tax liabilities, violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar requiring debtor plaintiffs to choose whether to remain in a class action or opt out, or binding them to an approved settlement when they fail to opt out.

Santangelo v. Fairbanks Capital Corp. (In Re Santangelo) · filed 2005-03-22(a)(3)

Debtors with claims involved in a class action suit must decide whether to remain in a class or opt out. The court administering a class action suit does not violate the automatic stay or exercise any control over the claim by requiring debtors to make this election. Nor is the stay violated because the debtors are now bound by the approved settlement.

Section 362 bars a postpetition attorney’s lien for postpetition services when the lien does not relate back to a prepetition date under state law.

In Re Chewning & Frey Security, Inc. · filed 2005-08-09(a)(4), (b)(3)

Despite this prohibition, sections 362(b)(3) and 546(b) allow post-petition perfection of liens in property of the debtor or of the estate if state law provides that upon perfection the lien relates back to a pre-petition date. ... Accordingly, the automatic stay prevents Special Counsel from obtaining a post-petition lien for post-petition services.

Section 362(a)(4) bars postpetition perfection of an attorney’s lien by possession, and receiving client funds does not qualify for the ministerial-act exception when possession itself accomplishes perfection.

In Re Miglia · filed 2006-06-29(a)(4)

Further, although Mr. Mahaffey’s act of possession might be considered clerical in nature, his act of possession was certainly not trivial. This act of possession constituted the complete substance of his act of perfection. Thus, Mr. Mahaffey’s receipt and possession of the client funds cannot fit within the narrow ministerial act exception to the automatic stay. ... After establishment of the automatic stay, Mr. Mahaffey was barred from any act that might perfect his lien and give him a secured claim. Thus, he could not perfect his attorney’s lien through any means, including by possession, once the automatic stay was in effect.

Section 362(k) includes attorney’s fees in actual damages for a willful stay violation, so those fees may be proved as damages without a separate motion.

In Re Butts · filed 2006-09-18(k)

Section 362(k) expressly provides that attorney’s fees are included in the "actual damages” which are compensable for a willful violation of the automatic stay. Therefore, I conclude that attorneys’ fees are "an element of damages to be proved at trial” within the meaning of Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7054 when a party seeks to remedy a violation of the automatic stay. As such, there was no requirement that a separate motion be filed in this case.

Time sheets and bookkeeping records showing incurred legal fees can support an award of attorney’s fees under Section 362(k) for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jones · filed 2008-07-01(k)

In contrast, counsel for Jones and counsel for Wells Fargo submitted time sheets and bookkeeping records to assist the Bankruptcy Court in fashioning a reasonable award. ... Thus, evidence of the legal fees incurred by both parties were available for the Bankruptcy Court’s review and assisted the Bankruptcy Judge in finding that $67,202.45 was a reasonable award.

Section 362(k) permits a successful claimant to recover attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting a willful stay-violation claim without proving that the fees have already been paid.

Young v. Repine · filed 2008-07-22(k)

Accordingly, we reject Young’s claims that the statute does not provide for a successful claimant to collect the fees incurred in prosecuting their action. We likewise find no qualification in the statute or our precedents that requires a prevailing party to prove that fees actually have been paid before they can be awarded.

Attorney’s fees under former § 362(h) must be assessed first using the lodestar method and the § 330 factors, and may not be reduced solely because the damages award is small.

Lopez v. Consejo De Titulares Del Condominio Carolina Court Apartments (In Re Lopez) · filed 2009-05-07(h)

The bankruptcy court, nevertheless, reduced Debtor’s counsel’s fee by approximately two-thirds to $7,500.00 on the sole articulated ground that the amount requested was extremely high in view of the minimal damages which he had awarded to the Debtor for her emotional injuries. The bankruptcy court failed to determine the fee in accordance with the lodestar calculation applicable to fee-shifting statutes such as § 362(h), and he failed to consider the factors set forth in § 330(a)(3). ... The Panel concludes that the bankruptcy court erred in its determination that it was not bound to utilize the lodestar method as the critical first step in its analysis, and, as a result, abused its discretion in reducing Debtor’s counsel’s fees based upon a single factor.

Section 362(k) requires proof of compensable damages, and attorneys’ fees must be reasonably incurred; a debtor seeking damages must mitigate them.

Brittner v. Beach Anesthesia LLC · filed 2021-06-10(k)

The Court is not seeking to establish a bright line rule requiring contact prior to initiating suit under § 362(k), or to impose a duty to warn or educate as to the stay first. However, Plaintiff does have a duty to mitigate damages, which may be satisfied by these methods. ... No damages have been proven and the attorneys’ fees were not reasonably incurred.

Section 362(k) requires a debtor to mitigate damages from a stay violation, including damages beyond the costs of stopping the violation and attorney’s fees.

Steed v. GSRAN-Z LLC · filed 2021-03-26(k)

The Court adopts the implicit reasoning of Esposito: the duty to mitigate damages for a stay violation is not limited to stopping the stay violation and attorney’s fees.

Section 362(h) requires debtors to mitigate damages from stay violations and does not permit recovery when the only damages are litigation costs that could have been avoided through adequate communication.

In Re Preston · filed 2005-10-04(h)

A debtor, however, has a duty to mitigate any damages that may occur as a result of a stay violation. ... Because the only damages the Debtor sustained are those manufactured by the Debtor’s counsel, which could have easily been mitigated, the Court will deny any damage award to the Debtor.

A debtor has a duty to mitigate damages resulting from a violation of the automatic stay.

Emmons v. Emmons (In re Emmons) · filed 2006-06-23(h)

Where the automatic stay has been violated, the debtor has a duty to mitigate the damages. ... Based on Debtor’s failure to mitigate his damages, Webb’s immediate attempt to rectify her initial violation of the automatic stay and Webb’s reasonable belief that she was abiding by the Partial Relief Order by proceeding on the Fall 2005 and the Spring 2006 college tuition, the Court finds that Webb did not willfully violate the automatic stay and that sanctions are not warranted.

For a willful stay violation under § 362(k), the creditor’s attempt to shift responsibility for damages to the debtor on mitigation grounds is outweighed by the creditor’s own violation.

Garza v. CMM Enterprises, LLC d/b/a Car Mart Motors 2 · filed 2020-02-12(k)(1)

Any attempt by Defendant to deflect blame onto Plaintiff for failing to mitigate damages is completely overshadowed by Defendant’s willful violation of the automatic stay.

A debtor seeking damages for an automatic stay violation must mitigate those damages.

McGregor v. McGregor · filed 2019-09-30(k)

Courts around the country, including bankruptcy courts in this district, have recognized that debtors have a duty to mitigate damages resulting from a stay violation.

Section 362(e)(2)(B)(ii) allows a court to prevent automatic termination of the stay by extending it for a specified period for good cause stated in its findings.

In re: Murray Altman · filed 2018-06-26(e)(2)(B)(ii)

In sum, we conclude that there was no automatic termination of the stay because the condition in § 362(e)(2)(B)(ii) was met; i.e., the bankruptcy court extended the stay for a specific period of time for good cause.

Section 362(c)(3) permits continuation of the automatic stay after a prior case was dismissed within a year only upon a showing of good faith; a lack of substantial change in financial or personal affairs creates a presumption against good faith.

Susan Ellen Jetmore · filed 2025-02-19(c)(3)(C)(i)(III)

The Court simply cannot credit the Commitment Letter as clear and convincing proof of a change in financial or personal affairs. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(C). The Debtor has otherwise failed to overcome the presumption that this bankruptcy filing lacks good faith.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) does not require a court to extend the automatic stay merely because no one objects to the motion; the movant must still establish good faith.

Steven Carrigan, Sr. v. · filed 2025-02-18(c)(3)(B)

Although some courts hold that, in the absence of any objections to a motion to extend the stay under § 362(c)(3)(B), the bankruptcy court may grant the motion without holding a hearing, see, e.g., In re McMinn, 452 B.R. 247, 248 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2011), this does not mean that the bankruptcy court must grant the motion if no objection has been filed or that the bankruptcy court is precluded from holding a hearing to determine whether there is an absence of good faith.

A debtor cannot establish good faith for continuation of the automatic stay under § 362(c) when the record lacks evidence that the bankruptcy petition was filed in good faith, even under a preponderance standard.

Powell v. PS Bank aka Peoples State Bank aka Peoples State Bank of Wyalusing · filed 2023-11-06(c)

Based on the reasoning and evidence cited by Bankruptcy Judge Conway in his decision,10 there is a dearth of evidence to suggest that Powell’s bankruptcy petition was filed in good faith, and he failed to sustain his burden of proof—even under a more lenient standard.

A lack of creditor opposition alone is not clear and convincing evidence of good faith needed to extend the automatic stay under § 362(c)(3).

Marcelle E. West · filed 2023-07-06(c)(3)(B)

Although creditor opposition can factor into the Court’s determination of good faith, a lack of creditor opposition alone does not amount to clear and convincing evidence of good faith.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) applies only when an individual debtor had a chapter 7, 11, or 13 case pending within the preceding year that was dismissed, subject to the stated exception for certain refilings after dismissal under section 707(b).

Marilynn Lynn Thomason · filed 2021-12-21(c)(3)(B)

However, that statute is inapplicable here as it applies only when a case is filed by a debtor “who is an individual in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13, and if a single or joint case of the debtor was pending within the preceding 1-year period but was dismissed, other than a case refiled under a chapter other than chapter 7 after dismissal under section 707(b).” § 362(c)(3).

Section 362(c)(3)(B) permits an extension of the automatic stay when the debtor sufficiently demonstrates that the new case was filed in good faith as to all creditors.

Mark A Binkley and Andrea M Binkley · filed 2021-09-23(c)(3)(B)

The Court found that the Debtors had sufficiently demonstrated that the filing of this case was in good faith as to all creditors and granted the Debtors’ motion to continue the stay.

Section 362(c)(3)(C) requires a debtor seeking to extend the automatic stay to rebut an applicable presumption of bad faith with clear and convincing evidence of good faith, assessed under the totality of the circumstances.

Cedric Wooten · filed 2021-08-25(c)(3)(C)

The Court simply cannot ignore this in any bad faith analysis and, by considering the totality of the circumstances through the lens of these facts, this Court finds Wooten has failed to rebut the presumption of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 362(c)(3)(C) presumes bad faith when a repeat debtor failed to perform a prior plan, and the debtor must rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence to extend the automatic stay.

Thomas A McLachlan · filed 2021-02-25(c)(3)(C)

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Debtor’s history of nonperformance in each of his prior bankruptcies gives rise to the presumption of bad faith. ... This presumption of bad faith may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. ... The Court finds that Debtor has failed to make the necessary showing to rebut the presumption of bad faith.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) permits extension of the automatic stay after a prior case was dismissed when the debtor shows the later case was filed in good faith.

Stewart v. ARCHIE'S AUTO SALES, INC. · filed 2019-09-13(c)(3)(B)

The Court finds that the Debtor has satisfied the good faith requirement of § 362(c)(3)(B).

Section 362(c)(3)(B) permits extension of the automatic stay on a party in interest’s motion, but does not require an extension for confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan.

In re: Thomas Dyer v. · filed 2013-03-14(c)(3)(B)

Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or any other statute, however, requires that the stay be extended. For example, § 362(c)(3)(B) merely states that a court “may extend the stay” on the motion of a party in interest.

A debtor seeking to continue the automatic stay after a prior case was dismissed must rebut a presumption of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence when the debtor cannot show that the later Chapter 13 case will end in a confirmed plan that will be fully performed.

In re Rodriguez · filed 2013-02-11(c)(3)(C)(i)(III)

For purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3), the Debtor has not established that his Chapter 13 case was filed in good faith because the Debtor has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that this case will be concluded with a confirmed Chapter 13 plan that he will fully perform.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires a motion to continue the automatic stay in a second bankruptcy case to be noticed and heard within the first thirty days of that case.

In re Radson · filed 2011-12-06(c)(3)(B)

Subsection (c)(3)(B) requires that such motions be noticed and heard within the first thirty days of the second case.

Section 362(c)(3) presumes a repeat chapter 11 case was filed without good faith if the debtor’s finances have not substantially changed or a confirmed plan is unlikely to be fully performed; the debtor must rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence to extend the stay.

In Re Washington · filed 2011-03-04(c)(3)(C)(i)(III)

A presumption that Debtors’ chapter 11 case was not filed in good faith arises under section 362(c)(3)(C)(i)(III) and 362(c)(3)(C)(i)(III)(bb), because there has been no substantial change in Debtors’ financial affairs and because it appears that Debtors will be unable to fully perform a confirmed chapter 11 plan. Debtors have failed to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence showing that their case was filed in good faith. Debtors’ Motion to Extend Stay is denied.

Proof that a repeat bankruptcy filing was made in good faith permits, but does not require, the court to extend the automatic stay in its discretion.

In Re Charles · filed 2005-11-04(c)(3)(B)

Although proof of good faith is the only articulated requirement in the statute, the statute does not mandate the Court grant relief merely because the case was filed in good faith. Satisfying the good faith requirement only allows a court to exercise its discretion to grant the relief.

To extend the automatic stay under § 362(c)(3), a debtor subject to the bad-faith presumption must present clear and convincing evidence of good faith toward the creditors to be stayed, assessed from the creditors’ perspective.

In Re Montoya · filed 2005-11-23(c)(3)

In some matters, where no presumption arises, an unrebutted allegation in a motion may be deemed admitted if it is not specifically opposed; but here, where a presumption such as § 362(c)(3)(C) arises, the burden shifts back to the movant to present clear and convincing evidence in support of the motion. ... In concluding which factors may be most critical in this analysis, it is important to note that § 362(c)(3)(B) requires this Court to view this issue from the creditors’ perspective. Section 362(c)(3)(B) specifically states that the Debtor must demonstrate that the filing of the petition is in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed.

For a stay extension under § 362(c)(3), absent exceptional circumstances, good faith requires a reasonable likelihood of success followed by a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry into subjective good faith, unless the creditor stipulates to good faith.

In Re Charles · filed 2005-11-30(c)(3)

Absent exceptional circumstances, a debtor fails to sustain her burden of demonstrating good faith as to the creditors to be stayed if the case lacks a reasonable likelihood of success. ... However, upon a showing that the new ease has a reasonable probability of success, the Court continues the analysis and considers the totality of the circumstances in determining whether subjective good faith exists under § 362(c)(3). ... Nonetheless, because the focus of § 362(c)(3) is on a debtor’s good faith “as to the creditors to be stayed,” the Court holds that a new case is conclusively filed in good faith as to a creditor that so stipulates. If a creditor to be stayed stipulates that the case is filed in good faith as to that creditor, the Court’s inquiry necessarily concludes without consideration of objective or subjective good faith and the automatic stay is extended.

Good faith for extending the automatic stay under § 362(c)(3)(B) is determined under the totality of the circumstances, using relevant factors developed under § 1307(c).

In Re Galanis · filed 2005-12-07(c)(3)(B)

The Court determined that a debtor’s good faith under § 362(c)(3) is governed by a totality of the circumstances test, and looked to factors historically used to determine a debtor’s good faith under § 1307(c).

When a repeat filing is presumed not to be in good faith, extending or imposing the automatic stay requires clear and convincing evidence rebutting the presumption and a supporting affidavit filed with the motion.

In Re Wilson · filed 2005-12-05(c)(3), (c)(4)

Accordingly, for the court to extend the automatic stay beyond the initial thirty-day period set forth in subsection (c)(3)(A), each Debtor must rebut the presumption that his or her case was “filed not in good faith” by clear and convincing evidence. ... Additionally, the court will require that the supporting affidavit be filed and served with the motion seeking to extend the stay. ... Any motion to impose the stay must be accompanied by an affidavit and, if appropriate, any supporting documentation, filed contemporaneously therewith.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) permits extension of the automatic stay upon a showing of good faith under the totality of the circumstances, proved by clear and convincing evidence when the statutory presumption of bad faith arises.

In Re Ball · filed 2006-01-25(c)(3)(B)

Accordingly, the Debtors must carry their burden under Section 362(c)(3)(B) by clear and convincing evidence. ... In light of the above analysis, the Court determines that under a totality of the circumstances analysis the Debtors have carried their burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that they filed the Present Case in good faith.

Section 362(c)(3) requires a debtor facing a presumption of bad faith to establish plan feasibility by clear and convincing evidence to obtain an extension of the stay, and subjective good faith cannot cure failure of that objective showing.

In Re Collins · filed 2005-12-27(c)(3)

Section 362(c)(3)(C)(i)(III)(bb) asks the Court to determine whether the Debtor is likely to confirm a plan and perform under that plan. ... This Debtor is further faced with a presumption that his case was not filed in good faith — raising his burden to a clear and convincing standard. There is little question that the Debtor fails to establish feasibility by clear and convincing evidence. Consequently, the case fails to meet an objective good faith requirement. Failure to meet the objective good faith requirement ends the analysis. Subjective good faith is consequently irrelevant.

When the presumption of bad faith arises, a debtor seeking to extend the automatic stay must establish good faith by clear and convincing evidence under the totality of the circumstances.

In Re Havner · filed 2006-01-04(c)(3)(B), (c)(3)(C)

Accordingly, the Debtor must carry his burden under Section 362(c)(3)(B) by clear and convincing evidence. ... In light of the above analysis, the Court determines that under a totality of the circumstances analysis the Debtor has failed to carry his burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that he filed the Present Case in good faith.

A movant seeking to extend the automatic stay must prove good faith even without creditor opposition and must rebut a statutory presumption of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re Mark · filed 2006-01-23(c)(3)(B), (C)

At the January 11, 2006 hearing, no creditors appeared to contest the Debtor's Motion, but nevertheless Debtor is required to prove that the present case was filed in good faith as to the rights of all creditors who would be stayed under such an extended automatic stay. ... If the court finds (as here) that grounds exist to presume a lack of good faith as to the intent in filing the current case, it is incumbent upon the party seeking the extension of the automatic stay to ... rebut that presumption by a demonstration of “clear and convincing” evidence of good faith.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requests to extend the automatic stay should be liberally granted when no presumption of bad faith arises and no party objects.

In Re Warneck · filed 2006-01-04(c)(3)(B)

Where no presumption of bad faith arises, and where no party objects, a request to extend the automatic stay should be liberally granted.

Under § 362(c)(3)(C), a Chapter 13 debtor seeking to extend the stay after a prior plan default must rebut the presumption of bad faith with clear and convincing evidence that the new plan can be fully performed.

In Re Kurtzahn · filed 2006-01-31(c)(3)(C)

To proceed in this case after the 2004 case failed, the Debtor had to show with “clear, direct, ... weighty and convincing” evidence that her household now would have enough sustained income to support her proposal to restructure this debt, via timely monthly payments over a full five-year period. ... The Debtor failed to rebut the presumption of § 362(c)(3)(C)(i)(II)(cc), because she did not prove that her modified plan for this case was feasible as is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6).

A debtor whose repeat filing is presumptively not in good faith must rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence before the court may exercise its discretion to extend the automatic stay.

In Re Ellis · filed 2006-02-24(c)(3)

In order to rebut the presumption applied here that the case was filed not in good faith, Debtor must provide “clear and convincing evidence” to the contrary. ... Nor does a finding of good faith mandate that the court order that the stay be extended. Rather the court may then exercise its discretion to extend the stay. Id. On the contrary, the absence of proof of good faith requires that no extension of the stay be ordered.

Under § 362(c)(3), a debtor must rebut any presumption of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence and then show by a preponderance of the evidence why the court should exercise its discretion to extend the stay.

In Re Baldassaro · filed 2006-02-24(c)(3)

Once the rebuttable presumption arises, an extension of any stay under § 362(c)(3)(B) may only be considered by the Court if the Debtor is able to rebut the presumption with clear and convincing evidence. ... Once good faith is established, the movant must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, why the Court should exercise discretion to extend the stay.

Denial of a stay extension under § 362(c)(3)(B) does not bar chapter 13 plan confirmation because its good-faith inquiry focuses on creditors and differs from the inquiry under § 1325(a)(7).

In Re Tomasini · filed 2006-03-08(c)(3)(B)

The Court concludes that the standards are similar but not identical. Thus, a debtor may obtain confirmation of his or her chapter 13 plan even though the Court previously denied a motion to extend the automatic stay under § 362(c)(3). ... In light of this statutory analysis, the Court determines that it may approach its finding of good faith under § 1325(a)(7) by focusing primarily on the debtor. This contrasts with the Court’s analysis under § 362(c)(3), which requires a focus on creditors.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) permits a good-faith debtor whose prior case was dismissed for failure to satisfy the credit counseling requirement to seek an extension of the automatic stay within thirty days after filing a second case.

In Re Seaman · filed 2006-03-30(c)(3)(B)

And conversely, the dismissal of a case filed by an ineligible petitioner does not leave a good-faith debtor without recourse. Such debtors may still access the “full panoply of protections” by seeking an extension of the automatic stay from the court within the first thirty days after the second case is filed.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires an independent finding of good faith even on an unopposed motion to extend the stay, with proof by a preponderance of the evidence when no presumption of bad faith arises.

In Re Montoya · filed 2006-04-12(c)(3)(B)

Notwithstanding, the lack of opposition does not require the Court to continue the stay. ... This necessarily means a court must make its own determination of good faith under the applicable eviden-tiary standard before it may continue the stay. ... Because the presumption of bad faith does not arise, the Court need only determine whether Debtor has established the four minimum requirements of § 362(c)(3)(B) by a preponderance of the evidence.

Extending the automatic stay requires an independent finding of good faith even on an unopposed motion, and dismissal of a prior case within the preceding year for failure to perform a confirmed plan creates a presumption of bad faith that the debtor must rebut by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re Castaneda · filed 2006-04-28(c)(3)(B), (c)(3)(C)(i)(II)(cc)

Notwithstanding, the lack of opposition does not require the Court to continue the stay. ... This necessarily means a court must make its own determination of good faith under the applicable eviden-tiary standard before it may continue the stay. ... With respect to this fourth requirement, Debtor presumptively filed the case in bad faith as to her creditors because she had a prior pending case which was dismissed within the year preceding the filing of this case after Debtor failed to perform the terms of her confirmed plan. § 362(c)(3)(C)(i)(II)(cc). However, Debtor rebutted the presumption by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay after thirty days as to both the debtor and property of the debtor’s estate when a prior case was pending within the preceding year and dismissed and the stay is not extended.

In Re Jupiter · filed 2006-06-21(c)(3)(A)

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay as to Debtor and property of Debtor’s estate.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the stay after thirty days only as to the debtor and the debtor’s property, leaving estate property protected even without a timely motion to extend the stay.

In Re Williams · filed 2006-06-21(c)(3)(A)

However, since section 362(c)(3)(A) does not purport to terminate the stay as to estate property — a concept defined by section 541(a), and which property is distinct from the debtor or the debtor’s property— the stay provisions imposed by sections 362(a)(3), (a)(4), and part of (a)(2), expressly protecting property of the estate, do not expire after thirty days.

Extending the stay for a repeat filer requires good faith assessed under the totality of the circumstances, with any presumption of bad faith rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, and remains discretionary when sufficient equitable factors justify relief.

In Re Thomas · filed 2006-06-27(c)(3)(B), (c)(3)(C)

The burden is on the Debtor to demonstrate that his current case was filed in good faith by clear and convincing evidence. ... An examination of the totality of the circumstances is not an act of counting factors for and against a proposition, but requires a careful weighing of the evidence. ... Where the Debtor establishes good faith in the present filing, the Court has discretion to extend the stay if sufficient equitable factors exist to justify the exercise discretion in favor of the Debtor.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires good faith for extension of the automatic stay to be assessed under the totality of the circumstances.

In Re Carr · filed 2006-06-09(c)(3)(B)

This court agrees that the totality of the circumstances test applies to section 362(c)(3)(B) cases.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires a motion to extend the automatic stay to allow adequate notice and completion of a hearing within 30 days after the petition date.

In Re Norman · filed 2006-06-13(c)(3)(B)

In sum, filing a motion to extend the automatic stay on the 28th day after the petition date provides an insufficient amount of time for notice and a hearing that is to be completed by the 30th day after the petition date; therefore, the Debtors’ motion will be denied.

To overcome the presumption of bad faith under § 362(c)(4)(B), a debtor must show by clear and convincing evidence legitimate bankruptcy purposes, eligibility for relief, sufficient resources to pursue relief meaningfully, and honest pursuit of relief.

In Re Sarafoglou · filed 2006-06-29(c)(4)(B)

Given that analytical background, I construe good faith in the § 362(c)(4) setting to require that the Debtor demonstrate that she filed the Current Case to obtain legitimate bankruptcy law protection and relief, that she is eligible for such protection and relief, that she has sufficient resources to render her pursuit thereof meaningful, and that she is pursuing such protection and relief honestly. Further, in that section, I construe clear and convincing evidence in a more aphoristic manner: situated somewhere on the evidentiary spectrum between the preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt standards, clear and convincing means highly probable or reasonably certain or both.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires repeat filers seeking to continue the automatic stay beyond 30 days to demonstrate good faith.

In Re Weinraub · filed 2006-09-18(c)(3)(B)

Under § 362(c)(3) a Debtor who files a petition for a second or third time receives an automatic stay that ceases 30 days after the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B). This shortened stay would force the Debtors to file an emergency motion, under § 362(c)(3)(B) demonstrating their “good faith.”

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay only with respect to the debtor and the debtor’s property, leaving the stay in place as to property of the estate.

In Re Pope · filed 2006-10-03(c)(3)(A)

For the reasons discussed below, I conclude that Section 362(c)(3)(A) only gives the creditor relief from the automatic stay with respect to the Debtors and the Debtors’ property, but not as to property of the estate.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay after thirty days, absent an extension, for a debtor with a prior case dismissed within the preceding year, including as to estate property already in foreclosure.

In Re Curry · filed 2007-02-22(c)(3)(A)

For the foregoing reasons, it is concluded that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay as to property of Debtor’s estate that is in foreclosure as well as ending stay protection to the Debtor and any property of Debtor not included in the estate. Therefore, separate order will enter holding that the automatic stay fully terminated as to the Property involved here on November 11, 2006.

To rebut the presumption of bad faith and obtain an extension of the stay, a Chapter 13 debtor must show by clear and convincing evidence, under the totality of the circumstances, that the new plan will succeed and the repetitive filing represents a sincere effort to fulfill Chapter 13’s purposes.

In Re Chaney · filed 2007-01-17(c)(3)(C)

In assessing these factors in the context of a chapter 13 case under the elevated evidentiary burden under § 362(c)(3)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court must be satisfied that the plan in the new case will succeed where the plan in the prior case did not. Usually this will require a finding that some change in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor has occurred that will allow the debtor to perform under the terms of the plan in the new case. But the inquiry does not end there. The court needs to determine that the repetitive filing does not violate the spirit of the Bankruptcy Code. The new case must not be a ploy to frustrate creditors. It must represent a sincere effort on the part of the debtor to advance the goals and purposes of chapter 13.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) prevents only the automatic stay under section 362(a) from arising and does not limit the codebtor stay under section 1301.

King v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In Re King) · filed 2007-03-20(c)(4)(A)(i)

Neither Section 1301 nor Section 362(c)(4)(A) contains any language that limits the applicability of the codebtor stay in cases where Section 362(c)(4) is applicable.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay, including protection of estate property, after 30 days when a prior case was pending and dismissed within the preceding year and the debtor fails to seek a timely extension.

In Re Cannon · filed 2007-04-10(c)(3)(A)

Debtor argues that Section 362(c)(3)(A) did not terminate the automatic stay as to property of the bankruptcy estate. Debt- or failed to comply -with the safe harbor provision of the Bankruptcy Code by filing a motion to extend the automatic stay, so Debtor’s argument fails since the automatic stay terminated over 120 days ago.

Section 362(c)(3) requires a hearing within 30 days to extend the stay but does not terminate the stay as to estate property, and section 362(c)(4) is unavailable when only one prior case was pending during the preceding year.

In Re Ajaka · filed 2007-06-04(c)(3), (c)(4)

The failure to comply with the time limitations set forth in § 362(c)(3) deprives debtors of the right to seek an uninterrupted extension of the automatic stay under that portion of the statute. Section 362(c)(4) is not applicable to a debtor who has had only one prior case pending during the twelve months preceding the filing of the current case. ... As § 362(c)(3) does not apply to terminate the stay as to property of the estate, relief under that Bankruptcy Code section is unnecessary.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) requires formal creditor action before the current bankruptcy filing and terminates the stay after thirty days only as to the debtor and the debtor’s property, leaving estate property protected.

In Re Stanford · filed 2007-08-03(c)(3)(A)

For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that “with respect to any action taken” requires a formal legal action to have been taken, and in this case, Schneider took formal action by filing a Complaint for Replevin in state court to gain possession of the Peterbilt truck. The Court further finds that the phrase “with respect to the debtor” refers to the debtor and property of the debtor and not property of the estate, and because the Peterbilt is property of the estate, it is protected by the automatic stay which did not automatically terminate on the thirtieth day following debtor’s bankruptcy filing.

Section 362(c)(3) requires an individual filing chapter 11 within a year of dismissal of a chapter 12 case to obtain a stay extension, but requires proof of good faith only by a preponderance of the evidence as to creditors who did not seek stay relief in the prior case.

McKinnon v. Prime South Bank (In Re McKinnon) · filed 2007-09-24(c)(3)

Based on a plain reading of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3), because Debtor’s prior chapter 12 case was dismissed within one year of filing of his current chapter 11 case, Debt- or must comply with the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B) in order to obtain an extension of the automatic stay. ... Therefore, because Debtor’s previous case was filed under chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, I conclude that as to all ... creditors who did not commence an action under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) in Debtor’s prior Chapter 12 case, the Presumption of § 362(c)(3)(C) does not arise; and that in order to satisfy the requirement of § 362(c)(3)(B), Debtor is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his current chapter 11 case was filed in good faith.

Section 362(c)'s presumption of lack of good faith for extending the stay is not binding in other Bankruptcy Code good-faith inquiries, although failure to seek an extension is a relevant factor.

In Re McFadden · filed 2008-02-27(c)(3)(C)

Section 362 is silent on whether this presumption of a lack of good faith applies in other situations presented by the Bankruptcy Code. This Court is not convinced that the presumption of a lack of good faith for extension of stay purposes is binding beyond the confines of § 362(c) when a debtor fails to sufficiently rebut the presumption. The Court believes that a debtor’s failure to seek an extension of stay is only one factor relevant in considering whether a case has been filed in good faith.

Under § 362(c)(4), no automatic stay arises when two or more cases were pending and dismissed in the preceding year, and a pending motion to impose a stay does not bar an order confirming that no stay arose.

In Re Atari · filed 2008-12-18(c)(4)

The other provision, § 362(c)(4)(A)(i), addresses the situation where two or more cases were pending and dismissed in the one-year period preceding the filing of the third or subsequent case. In this instance, the automatic stay does not come into effect on the filing of a third or subsequent case. ... That the debtor is seeking to have the automatic stay imposed does not change this fact. ... An order finding that the § 362(a) stay did not arise does not prevent that status from changing as may be permitted by the Bankruptcy Code and is without prejudice to the debtor’s pending motion.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) does not permit reconsideration to grant a previously denied stay extension after the 30-day period expires.

In Re Williams · filed 2009-02-11(c)(3)(B)

The court concludes that relief cannot be granted on reconsideration, under Section 362(c)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, after the 30-day period of Section 362(c)(3)(B) expires.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) allows a court to decide a timely motion to extend a repeat filer’s stay after the stay expires on day 30, but a stay imposed afterward operates only prospectively.

In Re Furlong · filed 2010-03-19(c)(3)(B)

In this Court’s view, the better interpretation of Section 362(c)(3)(A) and (B) is that, where the debtor files a motion within 30 days of the petition, but the issue is not adjudicated within that time period, the stay terminates on the 30th day, but the court retains the ordinary judicial power to thereafter conduct and complete a hearing, to permit discovery, to request briefing, to render a decision on the merits, and even, as in this case, to reconsider and reverse an earlier ruling. ... However, the court may only grant the motion to the extent that the stay is imposed prospectively without retroactive effect.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay after 30 days as to a repeat-filing debtor, but the stay continues to protect property of the estate unless extended or otherwise terminated.

In Re Alvarez · filed 2010-05-11(c)(3)(A)

Accordingly, the Court finds and concludes that failure of a debtor to timely obtain an extension of the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(c)(3)(B) results in the termination of the stay under § 362(c)(3)(A) as to the debtor only, and not also as to property of the estate.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) ends the stay after 30 days as to the debtor individually, exempt property securing the debtor’s debt, and certain leases, but leaves the stay in place for property of the estate.

In re Scott-Hood · filed 2012-06-18(c)(3)(A)

After reviewing both the plain language of the statute itself, as well its narrow context within section 362 and its broader context within the Bankruptcy Code, the court concludes that section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the stay only with respect to the debtor individually, with respect to the debtor’s exempt property that stands as collateral for a debt of the debtor, and with respect to certain leases. It does not terminate with respect to property of the estate.

Section 362(c)(3) permits extension of the automatic stay when a debtor rebuts the presumption of bad faith through a sufficient change in circumstances.

1200 Buena Vista Condominiums v. Young (In Re Young) · filed 2012-03-30(c)(3)

In the instant matter, the Debtor has successfully rebutted the presumption of bad faith that arises in the instant case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(C). ... Thus, the Debtor has highlighted a sufficient change of circumstances to grant the Debtor’s request to extend the automatic stay.

Section 362(c)(3) permits an extension of the automatic stay after a repeat filing when the debtor shows good faith; absent a statutory presumption of bad faith, the debtor must prove good faith by a preponderance of the evidence.

In Re Pence · filed 2012-04-19(c)(3)

Because none of the criteria in 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(C)® are present, the presumption of bad faith does not arise and the Debtor’s good faith in filing should be judged under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B) by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 362(c)(3) requires a hearing completed within 30 days to extend the automatic stay in a repeat filing, and a court cannot use § 105(a) to extend or reimpose the stay after that deadline.

In re Martinez · filed 2014-09-11(c)(3)

As a result this Court could not hold a hearing within 30 days after the petition date as required by § 362(c)(3)(B). Therefore, under § 362(c)(3)(A), the stay terminated on the 30th day from the filing date, on June 21, 2014. Using § 105(a) to extend the clear statutory deadline or to impose a different yet identical stay, would provide relief directly contrary to the clear text of § 362(c)(3)(A) and § 362(c)(3)(B). It simply cannot be done.

Under § 362(c)(3), a debtor may obtain an extension of the automatic stay in a repeat case by proving good faith by clear and convincing evidence under the totality of the circumstances.

In re Riedy · filed 2014-09-24(c)(3)

Based on the totality of the circumstances, this court finds, solely for purposes of section 362(c)(3), that the Debtor has established by clear and convincing evidence that the second bankruptcy case was filed in “good faith.”

Section 362(c)(3)(A) limits the automatic stay to 30 days if a debtor seeks bankruptcy protection again within a year after dismissal; it does not keep the dismissed case pending.

In re Walker · filed 2014-12-12(c)(3)(A)

But § 362(c)(3)(A) merely states that if Walker seeks bankruptcy protection again within a year of his dismissal, then the automatic stay protecting his assets is limited to 30 days. It does not keep his case pending during the year following dismissal.

Section 362(c)(3)(C)(i)(II)(bb) presumes a later bankruptcy petition was not filed in good faith when the debtor failed to make court-ordered adequate-protection payments in the prior case.

In re Muhammad · filed 2015-06-03(c)(3)(C)(i)(II)(bb)

Where, as here, a debtor failed to make payments on time, she failed to provide adequate protection. This failure gave rise to a presumption that the petition in this case was not filed in good faith.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) ends the automatic stay after 30 days as to a repeat-filing debtor and the debtor’s property, but the stay continues to protect property of the estate.

In re Hale · filed 2015-08-03(c)(3)(A)

Accordingly, this Court joins the majority of courts in holding that termination of the automatic stay under section 362(c)(3) does not extend to actions against property of the bankruptcy estate—rather, the stay remains in effect with respect to estate property.

Section 362(c)(3) causes the automatic stay to expire thirty days into a second bankruptcy case filed within a year after dismissal of the first, without a creditor moving to limit it.

In re Taal · filed 2015-10-22(c)(3)

The work relating to the motion to limit the stay was unnecessary because the automatic stay expired by operation of law, without the Bank’s intervention, and Mr. Taal did not seek to reinstate it.

A debtor seeking to extend the automatic stay after a prior case was dismissed must prove the new case was filed in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed; absent a statutory presumption of bad faith, the burden is a preponderance of the evidence.

In re Bowman · filed 2016-09-01(c)(3)(B)

Because the presumption of § 362(c)(3)(C) does not arise, the Debtor is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his current chapter 13 case was filed in good faith.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay after 30 days for a debtor whose prior case was dismissed within a year, including protection for the debtor and all of the debtor’s property, even estate property.

In re Smith · filed 2017-08-18(c)(3)(A)

When the stay terminates under section 362(c)(3)(A), section 362(a) ceases to protect the repeat-filing debtor and all of that debtor’s property, including property of the debtor’s estate.

When a debtor had two bankruptcy cases pending within the preceding year and both were dismissed, the automatic stay does not take effect upon the later filing.

In re O'Farrill · filed 2017-07-25(c)(4)(A)(i)

Pursuant to section 362(c)(4)(A)(i), there is no automatic stay in effect because the Debtor had two cases pending within the year preceding the filing of Petition 3, both of which were dismissed.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay in its entirety after thirty days for a debtor whose prior case was dismissed within the preceding year, including the stay protecting property of the estate.

Smith v. Maine Bureau of Revenue Servs. · filed 2018-05-16(c)(3)(A)

The Court concludes that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay in its entirety, meaning the protection of the automatic stay for property of the estate does not endure beyond thirty days as a result of the phrase "with respect to the debtor."

A repeat filer seeking to extend the thirty-day automatic stay must show that the later case was filed in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed.

Rice-Harris · filed 2018-04-12(c)(3)(B)

Rather, because § 362(c)(3)(B) makes filing in good faith a requirement for obtaining a stay extension, the bankruptcy court rightly concluded that Rice-Harris was entitled to no more than the thirty-day stay for which the statute provides.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires a good-faith filing to extend the automatic stay in a subsequent bankruptcy case.

In Re: Nath · filed 2018-07-24(c)(3)(B)

Given that Nath was actively challenging the foreclosure judgment against him on multiple fronts, the bankruptcy court’s finding that his third bankruptcy was not filed in good faith, as required for extension of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B), was not clearly erroneous, and the bankruptcy court properly denied the extension motion.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) allows a court to condition an extension of the automatic stay on the debtor continuing to make plan payments and payments protecting a creditor’s collateral.

In re Goodrich · filed 2018-09-24(c)(3)(B)

Therefore, this Court conditions the extension of the automatic stay, as to the Creditor, on the Debtor's continued and consistent payment of the sums due under the confirmed plan and all post-petition obligations which affect the Creditor's collateral interest.

Section 362(c)(4) cannot be used by a debtor with one prior bankruptcy case to impose a stay after the stay expires under § 362(c)(3).

Lisa Keeton Clark · filed 2019-05-09(c)(4)

The Court holds that Debtors cannot use § 362(c)(4) as a backdoor to extend the stay when the deadline to do so has passed.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires a debtor seeking to extend the automatic stay after a prior case was dismissed within a year to prove that the new case was filed in good faith; when the presumption against good faith applies, the debtor must rebut it by clear and convincing evidence.

Anita R Edwards · filed 2019-10-03(c)(3)(B)

For the reasons outlined above, and based upon the Debtor’s testimony, arguments and statements of counsel, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, the Court finds that the Debtor has not met her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that this bankruptcy case has been filed in good faith. Accordingly, the Debtor’s Motion to Continue the Automatic Stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B) is denied.

Section 362(c)(3) ends the automatic stay thirty days after a new bankruptcy petition when the debtor had another case dismissed within the preceding year and does not obtain a continuation of the stay.

George Morton Bolling, Jr. · filed 2019-12-18(c)(3)

In accordance with section 362(c)(3), the automatic stay terminated on the thirtieth day after filing the Debtor’s petition.

Section 362(c)(3) permits an extension of the automatic stay after a prior case was dismissed only if the debtor establishes good faith, and a statutory presumption of bad faith must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.

Sheretta White-Folks · filed 2019-12-16(c)(3)

The court has considered the totality of circumstances surrounding the Debtor and finds that she did not rebut the presumption that her case was not filed in good faith by clear and convincing evidence.

Feasibility of the new Chapter 13 case is central to deciding whether to continue or impose the automatic stay after prior filings.

Hector Manuel Mendoza · filed 2020-01-09(c)(3), (c)(4)

As a result, feasibility is a central issue in considering a motion under section 362(c)(3) to continue the automatic stay or a motion under section 362(c)(4) to impose the stay.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) allows a court to condition extension of the automatic stay on Chapter 13 plan confirmation and timely plan payments.

Karie Ann Baker · filed 2020-01-14(c)(3)(B)

The Court finds that the extension of the stay as to U.S. Bank should be conditioned upon Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan being confirmed and being current on her Chapter 13 payments to the Chapter 13 Trustee.

Section 362(c)(3) requires a debtor seeking to extend the automatic stay to carry the burden of rebutting an applicable presumption that the new case was not filed in good faith.

Darlene Denise Davis · filed 2020-02-05(c)(3)

The Court found that the Debtor had not carried her burden of proving that she was entitled to an extension of the automatic stay. ... Thus, the Debtor’s argument is unavailing, as she has failed to rebut the presumption that her case was not filed in good faith.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) provides that no automatic stay arises when a debtor files a third bankruptcy case after two cases filed in the preceding twelve months were dismissed.

Lee E. Chapman · filed 2020-03-11(c)(4)(A)(i)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i), this meant that a stay was not automatically in place when the third case was filed.

Section 362(e)(2)(B)(ii) permits a court to extend the automatic stay for cause through a scheduled status conference when judicial efficiency warrants it.

Ulish Booker, Jr. · filed 2020-02-26(e)(2)(B)(ii)

For judicial efficiency, I find cause exists pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(e)(2)(B)(ii) to extend the automatic stay through the date of the status conference.

Section 362(e)(2)(B)(ii) permits a court to extend the 60-day automatic-stay period for good cause to a specified date through an order that identifies the cause and date, even if the order does not cite the provision.

Joan Marie Winder and Paul Edwin Winder · filed 2020-04-06(e)(2)(B)(ii)

But the absence of a citation to § 362(e)(2)(B)(ii) does not change the fact that (1) the Court identified the cause necessitating an extension of time for deciding the Nicol motion; and (2) the Court set a specific date and time on which the motion would be heard.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) ends the automatic stay as to the debtor 30 days after a qualifying repeat filing, but does not end the stay protecting property of the estate.

Thu Thi Dao · filed 2020-05-11(c)(3)(A)

The phrase “shall terminate with respect to the debtor” in § 362(c)(3) cannot be construed by inference to extend to “with respect to the estate and property of the estate” because the consequences in chapter 7, to which § 362(c)(3) also applies, are so far at odds with basic chapter 7 administration that Congress would not have intended such dramatic consequences without unambiguous explanation.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) permits an extension of the automatic stay for a repeat filer only when the debtor establishes that the later bankruptcy case was filed in good faith as to the creditor.

In Re: Maximo Morillo · filed 2020-05-19(c)(3)(B)

Applying these factors to this case, it is clear that Appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was acting in good faith in filing his second Chapter 13 petition.

In a repeat filing, failure to show that a Chapter 11 case is likely to end in a confirmed plan that can be fully performed gives rise to a presumption of bad faith as to all creditors when the debtor seeks to continue the automatic stay.

Samuel Lee Crilly and Kimberly Deane Crilly · filed 2020-06-30(c)(3)(C)(i)(III)(bb)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Section 362(c)(3)(C)(i)(III)(bb) remains unsatisfied and a presumption of bad faith arises as to all creditors.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay as to the debtor after 30 days in a second bankruptcy case filed within a year of a prior dismissal, but does not terminate the stay protecting property of the bankruptcy estate.

Nelson A Madsen and Sharon L Burns · filed 2022-04-27(c)(3)(A)

No termination of the automatic stay, other than with respect to the debtor, is provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A).

Section 362(c)(3) does not terminate the automatic stay after 30 days when the debtor’s earlier case remains pending rather than having been dismissed.

Wasiline Jean Gilles · filed 2022-07-15(c)(3)

Section 362(c)(3) only causes the automatic stay to terminate if the Debtor had a prior case pending within the preceding year that was dismissed.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires a debtor seeking to extend the automatic stay after a prior case was dismissed to rebut an applicable presumption of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence.

Patricia Diane Mason · filed 2022-10-11(c)(3)(B)

Based on the totality of circumstances and analysis of the factors cited above, the Court concludes that Mason has not met her burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence, and has failed to provide sufficient evidence to justify this Court granting an extension of the automatic stay.

Section 362(c)(3) limits the automatic stay to the first thirty days when a debtor had a prior case dismissed within the preceding year, unless the court grants a motion to extend the stay filed within those thirty days.

In Re. Harvey · filed 2022-12-01(c)(3)

In addition, because the underlying case was filed less than one year after the dismissal of his previous case, the automatic stay could exist only for the first thirty days of the case unless a motion for extension filed within the first thirty days was granted by the court.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) allows a court to extend the automatic stay in a repeat bankruptcy case only if it completes a hearing within 30 days after the later case is filed.

Shannon Scott · filed 2023-01-10(c)(3)(B)

Given the language of § 362(c)(3), quoted above, the Court had no authority to extend the automatic stay beyond January 4, 2023, unless the Court first held and “completed” a hearing on the Motion within the 30 day period, i.e., no later than January 4, 2023.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) ends the automatic stay after 30 days as to a repeat-filing debtor and the debtor’s property, but the stay remains in effect as to property of the bankruptcy estate.

Yarbra v. US BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE OF T · filed 2023-01-11(c)(3)(A)

Accordingly, given the plain meaning of Section 362(c)(3)(A), it is clear that the stay automatically expired as to the Plaintiff after thirty (30) days from the Petition Date, but not as to property of the bankruptcy estate. Specifically the stay under Section 362(a) remains in effect as to the Property.

Section 362(c)(3) terminates the automatic stay as to a debtor 30 days into a new case filed within a year after dismissal of the debtor’s earlier case.

Roslyn Napier-Lopez · filed 2023-05-04(c)(3)

And, because Ms. Napier-Lopez filed her 2023 Case within a year of the dismissal of her 2022 case, the automatic stay terminated with respect to her on the 30th day after she filed her current case.

Section 362(c)(4)(A) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect in a later bankruptcy case when the debtor had two prior cases pending and dismissed within the preceding year.

Barbara Giordano-Leonaggeo · filed 2023-05-24(c)(4)(A)

The statute is clear: because the Debtor in this case will have had two previous bankruptcies pending and dismissed within the year, the stay will not go into effect automatically upon the filing of a chapter 11 subchapter V case.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay in its entirety 30 days after a later bankruptcy filing when a prior case was pending within the preceding year, unless the stay is timely extended under subsection (c)(3)(B).

Brian John Emery · filed 2023-08-25(c)(3)(A)

In such circumstances, the automatic stay terminates in its entirety “on the 30th day after the filing of the later case,” unless a request to extend the automatic stay is granted before the stay terminates. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3); see also In re Smith, 910 F.3d 576, 578 (1st Cir. 2018). Here, no party in interest sought to extend the automatic stay within the permitted timeframe under section 362(c)(3)(B). Thus, the automatic stay terminated in its entirety on June 15, 2023, under 362(c)(3)(A).

When two prior cases were pending within the year before a debtor’s new filing and both were dismissed, § 362(c)(4) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect, leaving no stay to extend.

Ralph Leon Hayes · filed 2024-03-07(c)(4)

Given that two dismissed cases were pending in the year prior to the filing of this case, the automatic stay did not go into effect. Because the stay does not exist, there is no stay to extend. This Court is without authority to grant an extension for a nonexistent stay.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect when two or more bankruptcy cases of the debtor were pending and dismissed within the preceding year.

Antonio Pitts · filed 2025-02-19(c)(4)(A)(i)

When § 362(c)(4)(A)(i) applies to a case, no automatic stay is in effect upon the filing of the petition.

Section 362(c)(3) permits extension of the 30-day automatic stay for a repeat filer only upon a showing of good faith, and a presumption of bad faith must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.

Nayla Chanto · filed 2025-03-20(c)(3)

Therefore, the Court finds Debtor has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the Current Case was filed in good faith.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay with respect to the debtor 30 days after a new petition when the debtor had another case pending within the preceding year and no extension is obtained.

Tiffany Monique Lewis · filed 2025-06-13(c)(3)(A)

However, because the Debtor had a prior case pending within a year of the petition date and no motion to extend the stay was filed, the automatic stay terminated with respect to the Debtor 30 days after the filing of the instant case.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) gives a court no authority to extend the automatic stay when the motion to extend it is filed after the 30-day period has ended.

Jean Michel Letennier · filed 2025-09-29(c)(3)(B)

As the Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay was filed after the 30-day period ended, this Court has no statutory authority to extend the automatic stay and Debtor’s motion is therefore denied.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) provides that no automatic stay takes effect when a debtor files a case after two prior bankruptcy cases were pending within the preceding year.

Rosa Mack Lee · filed 2025-11-03(c)(4)(A)(i)

Second, due to the two prior filings pending within the past year, at the time the case was filed there was no automatic stay in place pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i).

Section 362(c)(3)(B) does not authorize a court to extend the automatic stay when the motion is filed after the 30-day stay period expires.

Anna Theresa Balash · filed 2025-12-11(c)(3)(B)

However, the Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay was filed after the 30-day period ended so this Court has no statutory authority to extend the automatic stay.

Section 362(c)(3) permits extension of the automatic stay for a repeat filer who rebuts the bad-faith presumption with clear and convincing evidence of changed circumstances and a reasonable prospect of a confirmed, fully performed plan.

Sheena Cameau · filed 2026-05-14(c)(3)

On this record, the Court finds that the Debtor has shown a substantial change in circumstances and a reasonable likelihood that this case may result in a confirmed and fully performed Chapter 13 plan. The Debtor has therefore rebutted the presumption of bad faith under § 362(c)(3) by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) allows the automatic stay to be extended after a prior case was dismissed only if the debtor demonstrates that the new case was filed in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed.

In re Ochoa · filed 2015-11-04(c)(3)(B)

As such, pursuant to § 362(c)(3)(B), Debtors have failed to carry the burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, that they have filed the pending case in good faith as to all creditors.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay after 30 days for previously initiated actions, including actions against estate property, when a debtor files within a year of a dismissed case.

In re Dev · filed 2018-10-26(c)(3)(A)

The automatic stay imposed by § 362(a) with respect to Mr. Dev's equitable distribution action against the Debtor and with respect to CFCU's foreclosure of the Property terminated under § 362(c)(3)(A) on March 15, 2018, which is 30 days after the Debtor's petition.

Section 362(c)(4) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect when an individual had two bankruptcy cases pending and dismissed in the preceding year; a request made more than 30 days after filing cannot impose the stay retroactively.

Ryan Robert Brassell · filed 2026-04-14(c)(4)

Two cases filed by the Debtor were pending within the previous year but were dismissed prior to filing the instant case. The Debtor did not file a motion under Section 362(c)(4)(B) to impose the stay within the statutory deadline. Therefore, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4), the automatic stay under Section 362(a) never went into effect. And, as Judge Brown explained in Murphy, the stay cannot be imposed retroactively after expiration of the 30-day period set forth in Section 362(c)(4)(B).

Section 362(c)(4)(B) gives a party 30 days to request a stay after a repeat filing, but that request period does not itself prevent creditors from acting.

Miley v. Thornburg Mortgage Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2015-08-21(c)(4)(B)

Specifically, § 362(c)(4)(B) gives a party 30 days to request a stay and allows the court to grant that request, but it does not prohibit her creditors from taking action during that time period.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires service of a motion to extend the automatic stay on each creditor to be bound by the extension, with an opportunity to oppose it at a hearing.

In Re Collins · filed 2005-11-29(c)(3)(B)

As such, individual creditors that would be affected by an extension of that stay are entitled to notice that a debtor is requesting such an extension, and an opportunity to oppose the request at a hearing.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires notice sufficiently in advance of the hearing to give creditors a meaningful opportunity to oppose continuation of the automatic stay.

In Re Taylor · filed 2005-12-09(c)(3)(B)

The reason is that the movants did not give their creditors “such notice as is appropriate in the particular circumstances” of a request for relief under § 362(c)(3)(B), as implicated by that statute’s prescription of “notice and a hearing” and as the latter is fleshed out by the definition in 11 U.S.C. § 102(1). ... Rather, it lay in the length of time in advance of the hearing, for which the debtors put creditors on actual notice of their request for relief. This factor goes directly to the whether all creditors had an adequate opportunity to review the motion, to evaluate their options, and to oppose the debtor via formal participation in the case if they so chose.

An unopposed motion to extend the automatic stay may be granted without a hearing if all creditors receive proper notice and an opportunity to object and the motion properly pleads all statutory elements, including rebutting the presumption of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re Phillips · filed 2006-01-06(c)(3)

Attorneys who practice before this Court are advised that if their Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay is unopposed, the Court may grant the Motion under certain circumstances without the necessity of a hearing. In order to do so, there must be proper notice and opportunity to object provided to all creditors. In addition, in order to grant the Motion without a hearing, the Court must find that counsel in their Motion have properly pled all the elements under § 362(c)(3) including rebutting by clear and convincing evidence the presumption that the case was not filed in good faith. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(C).

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires the hearing on a motion to extend the automatic stay to conclude before the thirty-day stay expires.

In Re Reed · filed 2006-02-28(c)(3)(B)

Further, Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires that the hearing on a motion for such extension be concluded prior to the expiration of said thirty day period.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires notice and a completed hearing within thirty days after the petition is filed and does not permit revival of the automatic stay after that period expires.

In Re Berry · filed 2006-04-14(c)(3)(B)

The language of § 362(c)(3)(B) permits the Court to extend the automatic stay provided that notice is given and a hearing completed within the thirty-day period. ... There is nothing in the language of § 362(c) which suggests that the Court may impose a stay once the thirty-day period has expired.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) permits extension of the automatic stay only if notice and a hearing are completed within 30 days after a second bankruptcy filing within one year of dismissal of a prior case; otherwise the stay terminates by operation of law.

In Re Garrett · filed 2006-12-07(c)(3)(B)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B), the Bankruptcy Court may extend the automatic stay only after notice and a hearing completed before the expiration of the 30 day period after the filing of a second bankruptcy case within one year of the dismissal of a previously filed case. If the notice and hearing are not completed within this period, the automatic stay terminates by operation of law pursuant to § 362(c)(3)(A).

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires a hearing within thirty days of the later petition to extend the stay for a debtor with one prior case dismissed within the preceding year, while section 362(c)(4)'s allowance for a later hearing applies only to debtors with multiple prior cases dismissed within that year.

Capital One Auto Finance v. Cowley · filed 2006-12-28(c)(3)(B), (c)(4)

In sum, the Court finds that § 362(c)(3)(B) requires a hearing to be held within thirty days of the filing of the later petition by a single-repeat filer in order for a bankruptcy court to extend the automatic stay past the thirty-day period. The Court further concludes that the provisions of § 362(c)(4), which allow a hearing on a stay to be held outside of the thirty-day window, apply only to multiple-repeat filers.

In a second bankruptcy case filed within one year, continuation of the automatic stay requires a motion demonstrating good faith and heard within 30 days of filing, and the court cannot impose the stay on a request made after that period expires.

In re Birchall · filed 2008-01-22(c)(3)(A) and (B)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(c)(3)(A) and (B), the automatic stay terminates 30 days after the filing unless a party moves to continue the stay via a motion that demonstrates that the filing was in good faith and the motion is heard within the 30 days. The only pleading which the Debtor filed in the 30 day period was the motion requesting that the Court order the Creditor to take steps to have the Debtor released. The Debtor did not request a continuance of the stay within 30 days after filing the petition. The statute is quite explicit in its requirements and I cannot entertain the Debtor’s request for the imposition of the stay after expiration of the 30 days.

Section 362(c)(3) ends the stay against a debtor 30 days after a successive filing unless an interested party timely moves to extend it; good faith matters only when such a motion is filed.

Sciortino v. Gwinnett County Department of Water Resources (In re Sciortino) · filed 2016-09-06(c)(3)

The stay expires after 30 days unless a motion to extend is filed. If a motion is filed, then the question of good faith is relevant to the decision to extend the stay. However, the issue of good faith only arises if an interested party timely files a motion to extend the stay.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) requires a hearing on a motion to extend the automatic stay before the 30-day period expires; the court lacks authority to extend the stay after that deadline.

In re Davon and Tina Weatherholt · filed 2026-05-28(c)(3)(B)

The plain text of the Bankruptcy Code requires that a hearing on a motion for relief under section 362(c)(3)(B) must be held before the stay terminates.

Section 362(c)(4) provides that no automatic stay takes effect when a debtor files a case after two or more prior cases were pending and dismissed within the preceding year, subject to rebuttal by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re Nealen · filed 2009-07-09(c)(4)

Under these circumstances, Mr. Nealen has not met his burden of proof under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(i), and the Court’s May 22, 2009 Orders correctly note that no automatic stay came into effect as a result of the Debtor’s fourth bankruptcy filing.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) does not terminate the automatic stay against property of the estate when a debtor files a successive case.

In re Shue · filed 2026-06-29(c)(3)(A)

The statute does not terminate or otherwise affect the stay of acts against property of the estate.

Section 362(c)(4)(A)(ii) does not require a party to obtain an order confirming the absence of a stay before acting when the repeat-filer rule prevents the stay from taking effect.

In Re: Tony Frederick Washington · filed 2025-05-15(c)(4)(A)(ii)

The Court does not read this language to somehow revive the stay dispensed with under Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) for frequent filers or even to require any further action from third parties who wish to proceed with matters concerning the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(c)(3) ends the automatic stay 30 days after a repeat bankruptcy filing when the prior case was dismissed and the court declines to extend the stay.

ARMIN DIRK VAN DAMME · filed 2025-03-13(c)(3)

Because the debtor dismissed his third bankruptcy on November 8, 2024, the automatic stay in this case expired on February 20, 2025, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) after the court declined to extend the automatic stay.

Section 362(c)(4)(A) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect when an individual debtor had two or more bankruptcy cases pending and dismissed in the preceding year.

Edwin Pabon · filed 2025-03-04(c)(4)(A)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A), the automatic stay does not go into effect in a bankruptcy case of an individual who had two or more prior cases pending in the previous year that were dismissed.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) ends the stay as to the debtor 30 days after a second bankruptcy filed within a year of dismissal, while the stay remains in effect for estate property.

Neria v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2022-04-05(c)(3)(A)

Therefore, the automatic stay was terminated with respect to the Debtor 30 days after her 2014 Bankruptcy was filed. However, the automatic stay was not terminated with respect to the property of the bankruptcy estate.

For a repeat filer covered by § 362(c)(3)(A), the stay terminates after 30 days as to the debtor and the debtor’s property, but continues as to property of the bankruptcy estate.

Moore · filed 2021-07-08(c)(3)(A)

But courts since Reswick have tended toward the alternative approach, whereby the stay only terminates under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) as to the debtor and property of the debtor, not as to property of the estate. See, e.g., In re Rinard, 451 B.R. 12 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011). This Court adopts the approach taken in Rinard.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay after 30 days for a repeat filer only as to the debtor and the debtor’s property, leaving estate property protected.

First Financial Bank v. Clark · filed 2021-03-19(c)(3)(A)

The bankruptcy judge properly concluded that 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) unambiguously says its termination of the automatic stay for repeat filers applies only to the debtor and his property, not to the property of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(c)(3) terminates the automatic stay on the thirtieth day after a bankruptcy petition when the debtor had a prior bankruptcy case dismissed within the preceding year.

Hegedus v. U.S. Bank National Association · filed 2021-02-24(c)(3)

Because the appellants’ prior bankruptcy case had been dismissed within the previous year, the automatic stay terminated on the thirtieth day after their petition was filed, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3).

Section 362(c)(3)’s thirty-day limit on the automatic stay after a prior dismissed case does not apply in Chapter 12 cases.

Rodney Ray Bradshaw · filed 2020-12-09(c)(3)

But this section is applicable only in cases under Chapters 7, 11, and 13. It does not apply in Chapter 12 cases.

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay in its entirety, including as to property of the bankruptcy estate.

Linda S Coughlin · filed 2019-09-19(c)(3)(A)

Even assuming, arguendo, that the state court did not have jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the automatic stay, this Court adopts the reasoning articulated in Jn re Anderson, wherein the Court (Hon. A. Nevins) concluded that when the automatic stay was terminated pursuant to 362(c)(3)(A), it was done so in “in its entirety.”

Section 362(c)(3) terminates the automatic stay 30 days into a new case when the debtor had a case dismissed within the preceding year and did not move within 30 days to extend the stay.

Joyce Y Bender · filed 2019-09-13(c)(3)

The automatic stay has already terminated in this case under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (3). The debtor’s prior case, Case No. 19- 00012, was dismissed on January 9, 2019, within one year of the commencement of this case. The debtor did not file a motion within 30 days after the commencement of this case seeking to extend the automatic stay beyond 30 days after the commencement of the case. Therefore, under § 362(c) (3), the automatic stay terminated.

In a successive bankruptcy case, the automatic stay expires after thirty days if no party in interest seeks an extension.

Paul David Buhl · filed 2019-07-22(c)(3)(A)

In the 2016 Case, a limited stay arose upon the filing of the case, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a) and 362(c)(3)(A), but it expired after thirty (30) days when no party in interest sought an extension of the stay.

Section 362 limits the automatic stay to thirty days for a debtor’s second bankruptcy filing within one year and imposes no automatic stay for a third filing within one year.

COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC. VS. LYNN SAMUEL (F-013775-08, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-06-13(c)(3)(A), (c)(4)(A)(i)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A), the automatic stay is only for thirty days if a debtor files a second bankruptcy case in the same year. The automatic stay is not implemented if a debtor files a third bankruptcy case within a one-year period. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i).

Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the stay after 30 days for a repeat filer as to prepetition judicial, administrative, or other formal proceedings concerning a debt, its collateral, or a lease, even when the collateral or lease is estate property.

In re Bender · filed 2016-12-06(c)(3)(A)

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court grants NY Liens’ motion to confirm that the automatic stay terminated in this case 30 days post-filing by operation of § 362(c)(3)(A), and further finds that the § 362(a) stay terminated with respect to any judicial, administrative or other formal proceeding commenced prepetition which relates to a debt or property securing such debt or a lease, regardless of whether the property or lease was property of the estate or property of the Debtor.

Section 362(c)(3) terminates the stay after 30 days in a repeat Chapter 13 filing without an extension, allowing a landlord to recover possession of leased property of the estate and liquidate its claim.

In re Keeler · filed 2016-11-22(c)(3)

Because a Chapter 13 trustee does not have the same rights and obligations as a Chapter 7 trustee and, in particular, does not have an interest in the debtor’s property, the termination of the stay under § 362(c)(3) as to the debtor in a Chapter 13 case sufficiently terminates the stay with respect to a debt or property securing a debt or a lease to, at the very least, allow the creditor or landlord to proceed to liquidate its claim, recover its collateral or possession of its property.