11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(b)(3) does not except postpetition mechanic’s lien acts from the automatic stay when the lien was filed too late under state law to relate back to the work performed.

Klein v. Lionel Leisure, Inc. (In Re Lionel Leisure, Inc.) · filed 1993-09-14(b)(3)

Because CTI did not file the lien within the four-month period of section 13(5), Judge Lifland found that the lien did not relate back to the date of the work’s performance and thus did not fall within the exceptions to the automatic stay pursuant to Code sections 362(b)(3) and 546(b). This Court agrees. Because CTI failed to file its lien within the four-month period, it cannot reap the benefit of avoiding the automatic stay provision.

Section 362(b)(3) does not except postpetition perfection of a statutory lien from the automatic stay when § 546(b) does not apply; that perfection violates § 362(a)(5).

Dairy Fresh Foods, Inc. v. Ramette (In re Country Club Market, Inc.) · filed 1993-12-29(b)(3)

As § 546(b) does not apply in this case, the § 362(b)(3) exception to the automatic stay is inapplicable. Therefore, the plaintiff's post-petition perfection of its statutory lien claim is a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) which operates as a stay against "any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of this case under this title.”

Section 362(b)(3) excepts postpetition perfection of a prepetition interest from the automatic stay only if applicable law makes that perfection effective against earlier acquired rights.

Matter of Faita · filed 1994-02-15(b)(3)

Because the no-fault lien statute does not provide that perfection of the lien “is effective against an entity that acquires rights in such property before the date of such perfection,” the lien does not come within the exception of § 362(b)(3) to the automatic stay provision of § 362(a)(4).

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition acts to perfect a lien when applicable law gives the lien priority over interests acquired before perfection.

In Re Lionel Corporation · filed 1994-07-12(b)(3)

We therefore conclude that CTI's post-petition conduct fits within the exception created by Secs. 362(b)(3) and 546(b) and should not have been declared invalid by the bankruptcy court as a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition steps to perfect a mechanic’s lien when applicable law gives the lien priority over interests acquired before those steps.

Klein v. Civale & Trovato, Inc. · filed 1994-07-12(b)(3)

We therefore conclude that CTI’s post-petition conduct fits within the exception created by §§ 362(b)(3) and 546(b) and should not have been declared invalid by the bankruptcy court as a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(3) allows a taxing authority to perfect a prepetition property tax lien during bankruptcy when the lien relates back under applicable law.

In Re Western States Distributors, Inc. · filed 1995-03-15(b)(3)

But under §§ 362(b)(3) and 546(b), the City was allowed to complete those tasks and thus perfect its hen, which hen related back to 12 noon on January 1,1990.

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition perfection of a state environmental cleanup lien when the state had an interest in the property before bankruptcy and the lien relates back under § 546(b).

Matter of Perona Bros., Inc. · filed 1995-03-31(b)(3)

The State’s “interest in property” required by section 546(b) of the Code did in this case relate back to a time prior to the debtor’s filing for bankruptcy protection and, as a result, the lien asserted by the State has retroactive effect. The State’s assertion of its superpriority lien against the debtor’s property did not violate the “automatic stay” provision of the Bankruptcy Code, and constituted a valid superpriority hen against the debtor’s property.

Section 362(a)(2)–(5) bars a creditor from recording a certified judgment after the bankruptcy petition to perfect a lien on the debtor’s real property.

Kapila v. Farragut Mortgage Co. (In Re Halabi) · filed 1995-09-22(a)(2), (3), (4), and (5)

Such filing was a violation of the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2), (3), (4), and (5).

Section 362(a)(4) bars postpetition perfection of a lien against estate property, and a lien recorded in violation of the stay is void.

Field v. Fifth Third Bank (In Re Nasr) · filed 1996-02-06(a)(4)

The basis for this is that the Bank’s lien is void as a violation of the automatic stay under § 362(a)(4). This section stays “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4). Acts which violate the automatic stay are void.

Section 362(a)(5) bars filing a postpetition notice to perfect an attorney’s charging lien securing a prepetition claim against the debtor’s property.

Strickland v. Padgett Wares, P.A. (In re Florida Allstate Trucking, Inc.) · filed 1997-01-31(a)(5)

It is without dispute that PW filed its Notices of Lien in this Court on January 15, 1996 which was after the imposition of the automatic stay on March 15, 1995, when the Debtor filed a Voluntary Petition under Chapter 11. Therefore, PW’s filing of Notices of Liens was in violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code which prohibits “any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case....” As a result, PW did not meet all of the requirements to impose a valid charging lien because the charging lien was not perfected through timely notice.

Section 362(a)(4) bars postpetition recordation of a deed of trust against estate property, and a recordation in violation of the stay is a nullity.

Glanz v. RJF International Corp. (In Re Glanz) · filed 1997-02-26(a)(4)

The post-petition recordation of the Deed of Trust violated the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) and is a nullity.

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition issuance of a deed after a prepetition California foreclosure sale if the deed is recorded within fifteen days of the sale.

In Re Garner · filed 1997-06-05(b)(3)

Provided the deed is recorded within fifteen days of the sale, issuance of the deed would not violate the stay.

Section 362(a)(5) prohibits perfecting a prepetition lien against a debtor’s property during the automatic stay, and an act that violates the stay is void.

In Re Prine · filed 1997-09-04(a)(5)

Under § 362(a)(5), the Bank violated the automatic stay by this attempt to perfect its lien on Debtors’ mobile home. ... Acts taken in violation of the automatic stay are void. The Bank’s perfection of its lien on Debtors’ mobile home in violation of the automatic stay in Debtors’ previous Chapter 13 case is void.

Section 362(b)(3) permits a foreclosure purchaser to record a deed during California’s fifteen-day relation-back period without violating the automatic stay.

In Re Stork · filed 1997-09-22(b)(3)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3), an act to perfect an interest in property does not violate the automatic stay to the extent that the trustee’s rights and powers are subject to such perfection under 11 U.S.C. § 546(b). ... Therefore, recordation of a foreclosure sale deed within fifteen days of the sale does not violate the automatic stay and is not avoidable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 or 549.

Section 362(b)(3) permits a vehicle repairman to retain possession to continue perfecting a statutory lien when the trustee’s rights are subject to that perfection under § 546(b).

Eaton v. River City Body Shop (In Re Eaton) · filed 1998-04-01(b)(3)

Because the trustee’s rights are subject to River City’s hen under section 546(b), section 362(b) provides that the automatic stay does not prohibit the continuation of such perfection through possession of the vehicle by River City.

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition perfection of a mechanics’ lien by either method allowed under state law, including filing and serving a complaint, when § 546(b) protects that perfection.

In Re McCord · filed 1998-04-06(b)(3)

Section 362(b)(3) applies to permit perfection by either method permitted by Arkansas law.

Section 362(b)(3) excepts perfection of a prepetition statutory lien from the automatic stay when the lien is protected under § 546(b).

Tri-River Chemical Co. v. TNT Farms (In Re TNT Farms) · filed 1998-10-27(b)(3)

Section 362(b)(3) provides an exception to the automatic stay for parties holding statutory liens that can not be avoided under Section 546. For this reason, Kunz has a valid, priority seed lien only as to the shipments occurring before TNT filed for bankruptcy.

Section 362(a)(4) prevents Michigan personal property tax liens from arising after a bankruptcy petition in cases commenced before the § 362(b)(18) exception took effect.

In Re Merry-Go-Round Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1998-12-03(a)(4)

Michigan does not possess some pre-existing interest in personal property such that a tax lien is created despite 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4).

Section 362(a)(4) stays acts to perfect a lien against estate property unless the creditor obtains relief from the stay.

In Re Reaster · filed 1999-11-24(a)(4)

Accordingly, Green-Point could not take any actions to perfect its lien against the mobile home without obtaining relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(3) allows a creditor to retain estate property after a bankruptcy filing to maintain perfection of a possessory statutory lien when applicable law satisfies § 546(b)(1)(B).

Boggan v. Hoff Ford, Inc. (In Re Boggan) · filed 2000-07-07(b)(3)

In sum, applying § 362(b)(3) and § 546(b)(1)(B) to Hoff's postpetition retention of Debtor's car to maintain perfection of its possessory statutory lien, we hold that no stay arose and therefore Hoff did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(3) excepts postpetition perfection of an environmental lien from the automatic stay when the creditor had a prepetition interest in the property and state law gives the lien priority over earlier encumbrances.

229 Main Street Ltd. Partnership v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2000-07-26(b)(3)

However, under c. 21E, § 13, the lien trumps any “encumbrance theretofore recorded.” Section 546(b) is applicable. The Commonwealth did not violate the automatic stay provision; its post-petition actions fell within the exception of §§ 362(b)(3) and 546(b).

Section 362(b)(3) excepts postpetition perfection of a prepetition Wisconsin wage lien from the automatic stay.

Peltz v. Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development (In Re AR Accessories Group, Inc.) · filed 2001-07-18(b)(3)

The Department’s lien is not void under § 362(a). The post-petition actions taken by the Department fit within the exception created by § 362(b)(3).

Section 362(b)(3) may permit a creditor with a valid prepetition property interest to create and perfect a lien in a single postpetition act, if § 546(b) also applies.

229 Main Street Ltd. Partnership v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (In Re 229 Main Street Ltd. Par · filed 2001-08-22(b)(3)

Since section 362(b)(3) says that the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not automatically stay an act to perfect, the simultaneous postpetition creation and perfection of a lien may come within the pertinent exception to the automatic stay so long as the creditor holds a valid prepetition interest in the property.

Section 362(b)(3) allows postpetition perfection of a lien only when applicable nonbankruptcy law makes the perfected interest effective against an interest acquired before perfection.

Nazar v. Allstate Insurance (In Re Veazey) · filed 2002-01-28(b)(3)

Sections 362(b)(3) and 546(b) allow post-petition perfection of liens or other interests in property of the debtor or of the estate only if applicable non-bankruptcy law provides for the perfected lien to be effective against a previously acquired interest in the property.

Section 362(b)(3) permits a condominium association to perfect its lien after a bankruptcy filing when state law gives the perfected lien priority over interests acquired before perfection.

Genesee Court Householders Ass'n v. Cohen (In re Cohen) · filed 2002-05-10(b)(3)

Thus, the perfection is effective against the trustee standing in the shoes of a bona fide purchaser even if filed after the date of the petition, the date by which the trustee’s status and avoidance powers is measured. The general rule that normally governs the priority of liens, “first in time, first in right” does not apply by virtue of NYRPL § 339-z. ... Thus, the Association can perfect its lien without violating the automatic stay pursuant to Code § 362(b)(3).

Section 362(b)(3) excepts postpetition perfection of a prepetition property interest from the automatic stay when a generally applicable law gives the perfected interest priority over interests acquired before perfection, even if that law lacks express retroactive-perfection language.

In Re Ar Accessories Group, Incorporated, Debtor. Appeal Of: Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development · filed 2003-10-28(b)(3)

Accordingly, we hold that a priming statute need not contain language expressly providing for retroactive perfection in order to trigger the exception provided in 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)(1)(A) to the automatic stay of postpetition efforts to perfect a property interest. The Wisconsin statute therefore fits within the automatic stay exception, and the Department’s lien does not violate the automatic stay provision.

Section 362(b)(3) exempts continued possession of an impounded vehicle from the automatic stay when it maintains perfection of a Washington statutory towing lien protected by section 546(b)(1)(B).

Hayden v. Wells (In Re Hayden) · filed 2004-03-24(b)(3)

The bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that Defendant’s retention of the vehicle constituted the maintenance or continuation of the perfection of his statutory lien, and that the statutory lien fell within the ambit of section 546(b)(1)(B). Therefore, the automatic stay did not apply to Defendant’s actions under section 362(b)(3).

Section 362(a)(4) invalidates postpetition perfection of a lien on estate property, but refusal to release the lien does not constitute a willful stay violation under section 362(h) when notation was triggered by the debtor’s payment of transfer taxes and the creditor had reasonable defenses.

Masterton v. Huntington National Bank (In Re Ulinski) · filed 2004-07-06(a)(4), (h)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4), “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate[]” is a violation of the automatic stay and is therefore invalid. ... The court does not agree that the Defendant’s refusal to release the lien constituted a willful violation of the stay. The lien’s notation on the Certificate of Title was triggered by the Debtor’s payment of transfer taxes, not by an affirmative act of the Defendant. Further, the Defendant had reasonable defenses to the Plaintiffs claims against it, and it had the right to assert those defenses in this proceeding.

Section 362(b)(3) excepts lien perfection from the automatic stay when perfection defeats even one of the trustee’s avoiding powers, without requiring that it defeat every avoiding power.

Gouveia v. Wisconsin (In Re Globe Building Materials, Inc.) · filed 2004-09-13(b)(3)

In order to fall within the exception of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3), it is not necessary that every power of a trustee under §§ 544, 545 and 549 be subject to defeat by the interest sought to be made subject to § 362(b)(3). The issue under this statute is whether “any act to perfect, or to maintain or continue the perfection of, an interest in property” violates the automatic stay. If the act of perfection will “trump” even one of a trustee’s avoiding powers, it does not violate the automatic stay to undertake the actions necessary for perfection.

Section 362(b)(3) does not except postpetition filing of a mechanic’s lien claim from the automatic stay when perfection cannot relate back to a prepetition time and the lien cannot defeat the debtor’s avoidance power under section 545(2).

T.P. Electric, Inc. v. GGC, LLC (In re GGC, LLC) · filed 2005-08-22(b)(3)

As an aside, because the perfection of T.P.’s Lien could never have related back to a point in time pre-petition, and since, consequently, such lien could never have primed the Debtor’s avoidance power under § 545(2), the very act by T.P. of filing its mechanic’s lien claim approximately five hours after the commencement of the instant bankruptcy case and without the obtaining of stay relief (a) does not fall within the exception to the automatic stay set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3), and (b) constitutes a substantive violation of the automatic stay in the instant case under, at least, § 362(a)(4) and (5).

Section 362 bars a creditor from amending a defective recorded judgment to create a valid lien while the property remains in the bankruptcy estate, absent relief from or annulment of the stay.

Alcove Investment, Inc. v. Conceicao (In Re Conceicao) · filed 2005-08-23(a)(4), (c)(1)

After the filing, Creditor could no longer amend the First Judgment without obtaining an order granting relief from stay or annulling the stay. ... From the filing of Debtors’ Chapter 7 case until the Property ceases being property of the estate, section 362(a)(4) prohibits Creditor from performing “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.”

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition perfection of qualifying prepetition property interests, but does not except postpetition creation of a lien from the automatic stay.

Kara Homes, Inc. v. Century Kitchens, Inc. (In Re Kara Homes, Inc.) · filed 2007-08-29(b)(3)

Section 362(b)(3) does not except the creation of a hen, but does permit the lienholder to perfect, maintain, and continue the perfection of its lien. The failure of section 362(b)(3) to refer to the creation of hens is a significant one. In order to be excepted from the automatic stay, a creditor’s underlying interest must be created prior to the filing of petition, and the interest need only be perfected after the petition date.

Section 362(b)(3) permits qualifying acts to maintain or continue perfection of a judgment lien despite the automatic stay but does not require a creditor to take those acts.

Toranto Ex Rel. Rhonda Rubin Toranto Irrevocable Trust v. Dzikowski · filed 2007-12-17(b)(3)

But on its own terms, § 362(b)(3) does not require a creditor to do anything. It merely provides that certain actions to maintain or continue a judgment lien are exempted from the automatic stay.

Section 362 does not except postpetition recording of a mortgage acknowledgment correction from the automatic stay when no generally applicable law permits the correction to relate back.

Davis v. World Savings Bank (In Re Androes) · filed 2008-02-11(b)(3)

Finally, if there is no Kansas or other generally applicable law that would allow the Addendum to relate back, its filing was stayed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and not within an applicable exception to the stay found in § 362(b).

Postpetition recording of a mortgage to perfect a lien against estate property violates the automatic stay and is void to the extent of the estate’s ownership interest.

Peterson v. Berg (In Re Berg) · filed 2008-04-10(a)(4)

EHome did not make a Motion to modify stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) before recording the Mortgage, nor did it fall within any of the exceptions to the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b). Therefore, to the extent that the act of recording sought to perfect the Mortgage against the one-half ownership interest therein that is property of the Estate it violated the automatic stay. An action that violates the automatic stay is void.

Postpetition perfection of a mortgage lien on the debtors’ real estate violates § 362(a)(5) and renders the lien void.

Schnittjer v. Linn Area Credit Union (In Re Sickels) · filed 2008-07-11(a)(5)

Trustee and the Credit Union agree that the Credit Union’s lien, purportedly perfected postpetition, is void as a violation of the automatic stay under § 362(a)(5) and voidable under § 544(a)(3) because it was improperly perfected. ... FURTHER, Linn Area Credit Union’s mortgage lien is void under §§ 362 and 544.

Section 362(b)(3) does not except an action seeking final judgment to enforce an already perfected attachment lien from the automatic stay.

Ivester v. Miller · filed 2008-12-04(b)(3)

The Ivesters have already perfected their attachment lien in the real property through the docketing and indexing of the levy. An act to enforce that interest by seeking final judgment in their state court action is not permitted under this exception.

Section 362 does not support relief for postpetition re-recording of a corrected mortgage when the original mortgage already encumbered the same value and was enforceable against the bankruptcy estate.

Ries v. Ibach (In Re Ibach) · filed 2008-12-12(a)(4)

However, that value was already encumbered by NetBank’s lien in a fashion enforceable against the estate, and it was not available for administration in bankruptcy. The Trustee thus lacks the predicate for his counts under §§ 549, 362, and 105 — the repose in the bankruptcy estate of substantial unencumbered value in the Hayfield real estate, as of the date when the second mortgage instrument was filed for record. So, the Trustee is not entitled to judgment on those counts either.

The automatic stay does not bar postpetition perfection of a prepetition contractors’ lien by recording a judgment issued before bankruptcy.

Naylor v. Cusson · filed 2009-04-03

The effect of an intervening bankruptcy on a contractors’ lien differs with respect to the action taken on the lien: perfection or enforcement. If a bankruptcy intervenes after judgment has been issued on the lien, then the automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy code do not bar the post-petition perfection of the lien by recording the existing judgment.

Section 362(b)(3) excepts from the automatic stay recording a mortgage extension or affidavit that maintains or continues perfection of the mortgage.

Shamus Holdings, LLC v. LBM Financial, LLC (In Re Shamus Holdings, LLC) · filed 2009-08-05(b)(3)

The Court finds, based upon the undisputed facts, that section 362(b)(3) would have excepted the filing of an extension or affidavit with the Suffolk Registry of Deeds from the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition perfection of an interest in property protected by § 546(b), even when the same act also creates the lien.

In Re Aznoe Agribiz, Inc. · filed 2009-09-24(b)(3)

“[A]ny act to perfect” means any act, whether it both creates and perfects a lien or simply perfects the lien.

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition recordation of a mortgage deed presented before bankruptcy when the creditor had a prepetition property interest and applicable law makes recordation effective from the date of presentation.

In Re Rios · filed 2009-11-30(b)(3)

For the reasons stated above, this court finds that the Mortgage Law of Puerto Rico satisfies the requirements of Sections 362(b)(3) and 546(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, thus falling within the exception to the automatic stay and the exception to the trustee's avoiding powers under Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(b)(3) excepts postpetition perfection of a lien from the automatic stay when applicable law makes the perfection effective against interests acquired before perfection under § 546(b).

Sovereign Bank v. Hepner · filed 2010-07-20(b)(3)

And the automatic stay did not prohibit the Bank from its postpetition perfection of its lien under the CCTA because such perfection is excepted from the stay by 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3).

Section 362(b)(3) can permit a creditor to perfect a prepetition property interest after bankruptcy, subject to a determination that the exception applies.

RG Premier Bank v. Alvarado (In Re Alvarado) · filed 2011-09-30(b)(3)

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that RGP has a potential secured claim which depends only on the provisions of section 362(b)(3), and on the bankruptcy court’s discretion to allow the perfection of the security interest, pursuant to section 362(b)(3).

Section 362(b)(3) excepts a creditor’s postpetition perfection of a prepetition property interest from the automatic stay when applicable law makes that perfection effective against intervening rights under § 546(b)(1).

Hiraldo v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico (In re Hiraldo) · filed 2012-05-29(b)(3)

For the reasons stated above, this court finds that the actions by BPPR satisfy the requirements of Sections 362(b)(3) and 546(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, thus falling within the exception to the automatic stay and the exception to the trustee’s avoiding powers under Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(b)(3) permits post-petition perfection of a lien when applicable state law gives timely perfection priority over an intervening lien creditor under § 546(b).

Mouton v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (In re Mouton) · filed 2012-09-07(b)(3)

The Bankruptcy Code would have allowed the Bank to perfect its lien after the petition was filed pursuant to Sections 362(b)(3) and 546(b) in accordance with this exception to the stay.

Section 362(b)(3) does not except a creditor’s act from the automatic stay when the creditor fails to show a secured claim or lien capable of perfection.

Rico v. Mujica (In re Mujica) · filed 2013-04-09(b)(3)

Hence, the Court finds that FirstBank failed to show that it has a secured claim and/or a lien subject to be perfected under Section 362(b)(3).

Section 362(b)(3) does not exempt postpetition mortgage perfection from the automatic stay when the creditor failed to submit a prerequisite purchase deed before the bankruptcy petition.

Ramos v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico (In re Ramos) · filed 2013-05-24(b)(3)

Once the bankruptcy petition is filed, the automatic stay prevents BPPR from presenting the Purchase Deed in the Registry. If BPPR had exercised due diligence by presenting the Purchase Deed when it presented the Mortgage Deed then it would be entitled to have its mortgage recorded post-petition under § 362(b)(3).

Section 362(b)(3) excepts a creditor’s retention of property from the automatic stay when continued possession perfects or maintains a possessory lien protected by § 546(b).

In re Vega · filed 2013-06-20(b)(3)

B & R’s retention of possession of the vehicle was an “act to perfect, or to maintain or continue the perfection of, an interest in property to the extent that the trustee’s rights and powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b) of this title,” within the meaning of § 362(b)(3). As a result, B & R did not violate the automatic stay of § 362(a) by retaining such possession.

Section 362(b)(3) does not except postpetition lien perfection from the automatic stay when the creditor has only an interest in property and its mortgage cannot be recorded.

Rico v. Perez Mujica (In re Perez Mujica) · filed 2014-03-31(b)(3)

In the instant case, the document presented by FirstBank cannot be inscribed or recorded until lot number 18 is duly recorded in the Property Registry. As of this date, FirstBank does not have a validly perfected lien. First-Bank only has an interest in property which is not synonymous of a lien under Puerto Rico law. Hence, the document presented by FirstBank does not meet the elements of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) to perfect a lien post-petition.

Section 362(a)(4) prohibits post-petition recording of an attorney’s lien against property of the estate.

In re Saroff · filed 2014-03-31(a)(4)

Lewis King is correct that Tennessee law provides for an attorney’s lien; however, the act of recording the lien itself, post-petition, violated the automatic stay which prohibits, among other things, “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.”

Section 362(b)(3) permits a creditor to maintain or continue perfection of a security interest without violating the automatic stay.

800 Bourbon Street, LLC v. Bay Bridge Building Ltd. (In re 800 Bourbon Street, LLC) · filed 2015-11-20(b)(3)

The continuation of perfection by Bay Bridge is not a civil court proceeding. Instead, it is governed by section 362(b)(3), which specifically allows the maintenance or continuation of a security interest without violating the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(3) does not except a towing company’s retention of a debtor’s vehicle from the automatic stay when the company has no statutory lien to perfect.

Petralia v. 145 Marston St., Inc. (In re Petralia) · filed 2016-09-30(b)(3)

As such, Coady’s did not have a statutory lien that would limit the reach of the automatic stay in accordance with §§ 362(b)(3) and 546(b)(1)(A).

Section 362(b)(3) permits a creditor to retain property after a bankruptcy filing when continued possession is necessary to maintain perfection of a statutory possessory lien.

In re Avila · filed 2017-03-21(b)(3)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the City has not violated the automatic stay because its post-petition retention of the Vehicle was an act to maintain perfection of its possessory statutory lien within the meaning of § 362(b)(3).

Section 362 bars the filing of mechanic’s liens against estate property when the liens were not timely perfected under state law; the perfection exception does not apply, and the liens are void.

Scarver v. Ellis · filed 2019-06-27(a)(4), (b)(3)

Accordingly, the Second Ellis Lien and the Viaduct Lien were not properly perfected and enforceable. No exception to the automatic stay applies. The Second Ellis Lien and Viaduct Lien are therefore void in violation of the automatic stay, and summary judgment is warranted for Plaintiff on Counts Thirteen and Fifteen.

Section 362(b)(3) permits a creditor to perfect a prepetition lien after bankruptcy when applicable law makes the perfected lien effective against intervening property interests.

Jennifer Marie Cloward · filed 2019-11-19(b)(3)

In other words, these sections create an exception to the stay for a creditor with a pre-petition lien interest in a debtor’s property that was not perfected when the debtor filed for bankruptcy, and that would be effective against a third party acquiring rights in the property prior to the creditor’s perfection of its lien interest.

Section 362(a)(4) voids a postpetition attempt to perfect a lien against estate property for a prepetition claim.

Hurston Law Offices, PLLC v. Briggman · filed 2020-07-21(a)(4)

The court agrees with the bankruptcy court and finds that any act by Hurston to perfect his lien postpetition for any work completed prepetition is in violation of the automatic stay and is void.

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition perfection of a lien covered by section 546(b) without violating the automatic stay.

Quality Plus Feeds, Inc. v. Compeer Financial, FLCA · filed 2023-01-13(b)(3)

We also agree that bankruptcy law permitted Quality Plus to perfect its agricultural dealer supply lien postpetition without violating the automatic stay. Section 362(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code allows the perfection of a lien covered by section 546(b) even after the bankruptcy filing.

Section 362(b)(3) permits perfection of a prepetition mechanic’s lien in a Chapter 13 case if the lien remains valid and the perfection meets section 546(b).

Nickolas Joseph Clarey and Darci Jean Clarey · filed 2024-11-18(b)(3)

That action alone is not a violation of the automatic stay if the lien complied with South Dakota law and had not ceased to exist pre-petition.

Section 362(a) makes a mortgage lien void when the mortgage is first presented for registration during the automatic stay and the creditor has no prepetition property interest.

Banco Popular De Puerto Rico v. Elliot Elija Torres Martínez T/C/c; Elliot Torres Martínez T/C/C Elliot Eliju Torres Mar · filed 2025-08-25(a)

De conformidad a la precitada casuística y a la naturaleza constitutiva de nuestro derecho hipotecario, determinamos la nulidad de la hipoteca objeto de litigio por violentar la paralización automática.

Section 362(b)(3) permits timely postpetition perfection of an Alabama materialman’s unpaid balance lien when § 546(b) applies.

Garvin v. West Coast WinSupply, Inc. · filed 2025-10-03(b)(3)

Winsupply could have done so after the bankruptcy filing, if timely, and the trustee would have had no recourse.

Section 362(b)(3) exempts lien perfection from the automatic stay to the extent the trustee’s rights are subject to that perfection under § 546(b).

Levin v. Potts Welding & Boiler Repair Co. (In Re Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, Inc.) · filed 1984-07-30(b)(3)

Although the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) would otherwise bar the commencement or continuation of efforts to perfect a lien, § 362(b)(3) exempts from the stay actions to perfect an interest in property to the extent that the trustee’s rights and powers are subject to such perfection under 11 U.S.C. § 546(b).

Section 362(a)(4) stays an attempt to perfect a lien against estate property when the bankruptcy petition is filed before the recording authority receives the filing.

QUALITY HOLSTEIN LEASING v. McKENZIE · filed 1985-02-11(a)(4)

Filing the petition rendered nugatory Borg-Warner's attempt to perfect its lien. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a)(4) (1982) (automatically staying "any act to ... perfect ... any lien against property of the estate").

Section 362(b)(3) allows an act to perfect a lien covered by § 546(b) despite the automatic stay.

In Re Birdview Satellite Communications, Inc. · filed 1988-03-10(b)(3)

The automatic stay does not stay an act to perfect such a lien. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3).

Section 362(b)(3) permits subcontractors to perfect a statutory mechanic's lien after the debtor files for bankruptcy.

In Re Heitkamp · filed 1998-03-11(b)(3)

The subcontractors had a statutory lien against the house, see N.D. Cent.Code § 35-27-03 (1987), and could have perfected a security interest in the house even after the Heitkamps filed for bankruptcy, see id. §§ 35-27-13, -14; 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(3), 546(b)(1).

Section 362(b)(3) permits a creditor to perfect a lien after a bankruptcy petition is filed despite the automatic stay.

Holt Texas, Ltd. v. Zayler (In Re T.S.C. Seiber Services, L.C.) · filed 2014-11-03(b)(3)

We note that post-bankruptcy-petition perfection of liens is expressly allowed by the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (exception to automatic stay).

Section 362(b)(3) did not prevent the creditor from renewing its judgment lien before the lien expired.

Johns v. Mannington Home Center, Inc. · filed 2022-08-22(b)(3)

First, the court finds the trustee’s explanation of § 362(b)(3) to be accurate and his reliance on In re Constr. Supervision Servs. to be persuasive. ... Despite not being precluded by the automatic stay, Mannington never timely acted to extend the effectiveness of its judgment lien.

Section 362(a) does not bar subpoenas directed to nonparties for records relevant to litigation involving a debtor when obtaining those records is not an action against the debtor.

Constitution Bank v. Levine · filed 1993-09-14(a)

In its response, plaintiff asserted that the documents sought from the non-parties were relevant to its racketeering case against all defendants and that obtaining records from those entities did not constitute an action against Paletta. After reviewing both parties’ submissions, I agree with plaintiff. See In re Barsky, 11 B.R. 478, 480 (E.D.Pa.1981) (The subpoena “was not issued against the debtors but instead was directed to the debtors’ accountants, thereby placing the applicability of this section [the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)] in doubt.”). Accordingly, I will deny defendant’s motion to quash.

Obtaining a debtor’s bank account records by subpoena to the bank, without seizing or freezing the account, does not violate the automatic stay because the records are not estate property and the subpoena is not an action against the debtor.

Lynch v. Bulman · filed 2007-10-15(a)(1), (a)(3)

Because the records do not constitute “property of the estate” and the issuance of the subpoena was not an action “against the debtor,” Defendants’ conduct in obtaining these records did not violate § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar cancellation of services under a debtor’s contract when the cancellation does not terminate the contract.

In Re Bobbitt · filed 1993-09-30(a)(3)

Therefore, the Court holds that since the cancellation of services did not constitute a termination of the contract, MFCU did not violate the automatic stay.

Filing a lis pendens after a bankruptcy petition does not violate the automatic stay under § 362.

McKoy v. McKoy (In re McKoy) · filed 1993-11-01

Finally, debtor’s application for order to show cause based upon Mrs. MeKoy’s filing postpetition of a memorandum of lis pendens must be denied. The filing of a lis pendens has been held by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals not to be a violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a) prohibits a creditor from recording a postpetition lis pendens against the debtor’s residence as part of an effort to recover a prepetition claim.

Barnett v. Edwards (In Re Edwards) · filed 1997-11-05(a)

The bankruptcy court correctly concluded that the recording of the lis pendens violated the stay. It was part of Barnett’s continued efforts to recover from Edwards on the remaining portion of her claim.

Section 362(a)(3) makes a debtor’s postpetition recording of a lis pendens against estate property void as an exercise of control over that property, while § 362(a)(6) does not apply to an action filed and a lis pendens recorded by the debtor.

Brooks-Hamilton v. City of Oakland (In Re Brooks-Hamilton) · filed 2006-08-25(a)(3), (a)(6)

Section 362(a)(6) would not apply to an action filed and a lis pendens recorded by the debtor. ... As noted above, under California law, the recordation of a lis pendens prevents a buyer of the real property from claiming bona fide purchaser status with respect to the asserted claim. Thus, it creates a cloud on title and interferes with a bankruptcy trustee’s attempt to sell the real property, perhaps, even reducing the sale price. This qualifies as the exercise of control over the real property. Consequently, because the Court concludes that the recordation of the Lis Pendens violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) was therefore void, the Trustee is entitled to summary judgment on the sixth claim for relief.

Section 362(a)(1) and (a)(3) prohibit a postpetition lis pendens that continues a prepetition lawsuit and interferes with the sale of estate property.

Tarpenning v. Peer Street, Inc. · filed 2025-03-24(a)(1), (a)(3)

Similar to these cases, Appellant’s filing of the Lis Pendens is a violation of the automatic stay and is void ab initio. The Lis Pendens is predicated on the claims asserted in the Verified Petition and its filing is the continuation of a judicial action that was commenced prior to the Petition Date in violation of section 362(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, the Lis Pendens frustrated and delayed Peer Street’s sale of the Property and is, therefore, an act taken to exercise control over property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(1) bars a state from continuing a driver's license suspension used to collect an unpaid motor vehicle judgment after the judgment debtor files for bankruptcy.

In Re Duke · filed 1994-04-15(a)(1)

Notwithstanding RIDOT’s argument that enforcement of the Rhode Island statute is an exercise of the State’s regulatory or police power, it is clear to this (and most other courts) that such statutes are collection devices provided by the State to assist in the recovery of claims by motor vehicle accident judgment creditors. As such, the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) bars RI-DOT from enforcing this collection remedy, after the judgment debtor files a petition under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(6) does not require a city to reinstate a driver’s license suspended before bankruptcy when the city takes no postpetition action to collect the debt.

Kimsey v. Suskie (In Re Kimsey) · filed 2001-06-11(a)(6)

There is no evidence, however, that the City has in fact taken any action to collect the debt, and the mere refusal to lift the suspension of his license is not a violation of the stay.

Section 362(a) does not require a judgment creditor to notify the motor vehicle registry of a bankruptcy filing or initiate reinstatement of a license suspended before filing when state law assigns reinstatement to the registry on the debtor’s application.

In Re Beckett · filed 2011-07-07(a)

While the protections of the automatic stay are unquestionably among the most important offered to a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code, nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or First Circuit jurisprudence placed an affirmative duty on Metropolitan to notify the Registry of Beckett’s Chapter 7 filing or to take action to reinstate his driver’s license.

Section 362(h) does not create a right of contribution for a party liable for violating the automatic stay.

Walker v. Cadle Co. (In Re Walker) · filed 1994-04-15(h)

It follows that because the enactment of subsection (h) of Section 362 does not specifically provide for a right of action for contribution, Congress has functionally indicated a contrary intent.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit foreclosure against a nondebtor vessel merely because arresting the vessel incidentally delays the debtor’s use of estate property aboard it.

Chugach Timber Corp. v. Northern Stevedoring & Handling Corp. (In re Chugach Forest Products, Inc.) · filed 1994-04-28(a)(3)

On its face, § 362(a)(3) appears broad enough to encompass Northern Stevedoring’s conduct. ... Closer scrutiny reveals, however, that the statute does not apply to such an indirect exercise of control.

Section 362(a)(4) bars a creditor from recording an abstract of judgment that creates a lien on estate property when an order lifting the stay authorized only a state court hearing.

Thornburg v. Lynch (In Re Thornburg) · filed 2002-03-12(a)(4)

Given that under the foregoing statute the recording of the judgment created a lien on the real property of the Debtor located in Bowie County (regardless of whether the lien was a valid one which is a separate issue under Texas homestead law), given Lynch’s admission that she filed or caused to be filed, the Abstract of Judgment complained of by Debtor, the Court must conclude that Lynch violated the prohibitions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 by her “act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate” to the extent that there was estate property in Bowie County: which was the case.

Section 362(a)(3) stays an action against a nondebtor when the action seeks to exercise control over property of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Centers of Ny · filed 2010-05-14(a)(3)

The State Court Plaintiffs violated the automatic stay by bringing the State Court Action that sought to exercise control over property of the estate. Although the State Court Action was brought against the New York State Department of Health and did not name the Debtors, this technicality does not insulate the State Court Plaintiffs from 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) bars an IRS levy on undistributed Chapter 13 trustee funds that remain property of the estate because the levy seeks to possess or control those funds.

In re Montgomery · filed 2015-01-14(a)(3)

Thus, any act to obtain possession of undistributed funds or to exercise control over or interfere with undistributed funds violates 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3)'s automatic stay does not cover transfers of a nondebtor corporation's assets merely because the debtor owns its shares.

Geltzer v. Brizinova (In re Brizinova) · filed 2018-09-26(a)(3)

And because ENSI is not a debtor, the post-petition transfer of ENSI assets did not violate the automatic stay, because it does not apply to ENSI.

Section 362(h) permits punitive damages when a creditor leaves in place a collection system that repeatedly violates the automatic stay.

Flynn v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Flynn) · filed 1994-05-13(h)

The IRS’ recalcitrance and indifference to the fact that its current system guarantees that it will repeatedly violate the automatic stay, persuade me that an award of $10,000.00 in punitive damages is appropriate in this ease.

Section 362(h) does not allow punitive damages for a stay violation when the debtor suffered no actual damages.

McHenry v. Key Bank (In Re McHenry) · filed 1995-03-22(h)

We further conclude no punitive damages should be awarded in the absence of actual damages, for two reasons.

Section 362(h) permits punitive damages for intentional violations of the automatic stay and can make the creditor and its attorney jointly and severally liable.

In Re Baker · filed 1995-06-15(h)

Alternatively, if Norwest and its counsel decline to implement such internal policies, then punitive damages are awarded in the amount of $2,500 in each case under § 362(h) for said intentional violations of the automatic stay herein, for which Norwest and its counsel are jointly and severally liable.

Section 362(h) permits punitive damages for deliberate, repeated automatic-stay violations even when the debtor fails to prove nonspeculative actual harm.

In Re Seal · filed 1996-02-16(h)

The Debtors are not entitled to any actual damages for Rosenberg’s violations of the automatic stay because they failed to prove that he caused any nonspeculative harm by his actions. ... However, the award of punitive damages to the Debtors is appropriate in these circumstances.

Section 362(h) permits punitive damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay in appropriate circumstances.

Goldstein v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. (In Re Goldstein) · filed 1996-09-26(h)

Goldstein’s separate claim for punitive damages (Count III) need not be discussed independently since punitive damages are potentially available for a violation of the automatic stay as well as for a violation of the discharge injunction.

Section 362(h) permits punitive damages for a willful stay violation when the creditor knew or recklessly disregarded that it was violating the stay.

In Re Novak · filed 1997-11-07(h)

Punitive damages may only be awarded where the creditor acts with actual knowledge or with reckless disregard that it was violating the automatic stay. ... An award of punitive damages are warranted under any of these standards in this case.

Section 362(h) permits a court to deny punitive damages for a willful stay violation when a substantial attorney-fee award sufficiently punishes and deters the violator.

In Re Klein · filed 1998-10-21(h)

Taking into account the gravity and duration of the offense, the nature of Greenber-ger’s conduct the extent of the harm caused to Klein, and guided by the ease authority referenced in this opinion, I find that attorney’s fees in this case are likely to “constitute a significant amount” and are sufficient to serve as both punishment and as a deterrence to any such future conduct by Green-berger. Consequently, punitive damages are not necessary and the court denies Klein’s request for same.

Section 362(h) permits punitive damages for a stay violation only when the misconduct goes beyond a merely willful violation.

Brown v. Town & Country Sales & Service, Inc. (In Re Brown) · filed 1999-06-22(h)

Punitive damages require more than mere willful violation of the automatic stay imposed by section 362(a).

Section 362(h) permits a bankruptcy court to award punitive damages in appropriate circumstances after finding a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Solfanelli v. Core States Bank · filed 2000-01-31(h)

Once the Bankruptcy Court finds a willful violation, it has discretion to impose punitive damages in "appropriate circumstances."

Section 362(h) permits punitive damages for a violation of the automatic stay even when compensatory damages are unavailable.

In Re Shade · filed 2001-03-19(h)

Notwithstanding the District Court’s determination that compensatory damages are not recoverable, punitive damages under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) may still be warranted for a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(h) permits punitive damages for a willful automatic stay violation when the creditor’s misconduct is egregious and intentional.

Davis v. Gatorwheel, Inc. (In Re Davis) · filed 2001-06-21(h)

An award of punitive damages under § 362(h) requires not only a willful violation of the automatic stay but there must be also the existence of appropriate circumstances to justify such damages. ... In the instant case, I find that the actions of the Defendants Gatorwheel, Inc. and Iraj Ghahdarijani rise to the level of egregious intentional misconduct.

Section 362(h) permits a court to offer a reduction in punitive damages for a willful stay violation if the creditor reviews its bankruptcy policies and shows the violation was aberrational.

In Re Dunning · filed 2001-10-03(h)

For the Court to encourage creditors to look at their policies and procedures regarding bankruptcy and to provide the opportunity to demonstrate that a willful violation of the automatic stay is nonetheless aberrational in light of its existing policies, is not an abuse of the Court’s powers under § 362(h).

Section 362(h) permits punitive damages and attorney fees for a willful automatic stay violation even when the debtor’s harm is not compensable.

Baggs v. McClain Ford-Mercury, Inc. (In Re Baggs) · filed 2002-07-19(h)

Punitive damages and attorney fees may be awarded under Section 362(h), even where the actual harm suffered is not compensable.

Section 362(h) permits punitive damages against a municipality that recklessly disregards the automatic stay by failing to prevent further violations after receiving notice of an earlier violation.

In Re Rosa · filed 2004-08-11(h)

The City’s failure to take appropriate steps to prevent the issuance of the Notice of Impending Foreclosure, after receiving notice of its inadvertent violations in issuing the Notice of Tax Taking and in recording the Tax Taking itself, was in reckless disregard of the automatic stay. ... Mailing the Notice of Impending Foreclosure, however, does warrant such an award.

Section 362(h) permits punitive damages for an automatic stay violation without overt wrongful intent when there is a strong showing of bad faith or reckless disregard of the law.

In Re Bivens · filed 2004-08-18(h)

Therefore, even in the absence of any overt wrongful intent, this Court will follow the rule, as has been applied by other courts, that an award of punitive damages may still be appropriate for a violation of the automatic stay when there is a strong showing that the creditor acted in bad faith or otherwise undertook their actions in reckless disregard of the law.

Under § 362(h), punitive damages generally require more than a willful stay violation and depend on the creditor’s conduct, ability to pay, motive, and any provocation by the debtor.

Heghmann v. Indorf (In Re Heghmann) · filed 2004-11-03(h)

However, punitive damages usually require more than mere willful violation of the automatic stay. Relevant factors are: (1) the nature of the creditor’s conduct; (2) the creditor’s ability to pay damages; (3) the motive of the creditor; and (4) any provocation by the debtor.

Under § 362(h), an institutional creditor's use of frivolous defenses to burden a consumer debtor after an obvious stay violation warrants punitive damages as an abusive continuation of the violation.

Curtis v. LaSalle National Bank (In Re Curtis) · filed 2005-03-31(h)

When an institutional creditor responds to an obvious violation of the automatic stay or discharge injunction against a consumer debtor by employing its superior resources ... to make frivolous responses that tax the resources of that debtor, those responses should be viewed as nothing more than an abusive continuation of the original improper conduct being complained of. It is the most appropriate occasion for imposition of punitive damages.

Section 362(h) does not warrant punitive damages for a promptly corrected stay violation that caused no actual injury and involved no egregious, vindictive, malicious, or bad-faith conduct.

In Re Rivera · filed 2005-09-29(h)

An award of punitive damages under section 362(h) requires not only a willful violation of the automatic stay, but also a finding of “appropriate circumstances.” ... The IRS promptly remedied the problem and reversed the setoff once it became aware of the error. The Debtor’s interest, if any, in the 2004 Overpayment was never impaired and the Debtor suffered no actual injury. Based on this record, the court cannot find that the IRS’ acts were egregious, vindictive, malicious, or accompanied by bad faith such as to warrant punitive damages.

Section 362(h) permits punitive damages to deter a prolonged, intransigent willful stay violation committed without a good-faith belief in the lawfulness of the conduct.

In Re Chew · filed 2006-07-13(h)

As noted in the Findings and Rulings, the Creditors not only acted in violation of the stay but refused to stand down for the two weeks between that violation and the Court’s order directing the dissolution of the objectionable attachment. Their stance was intransigent and their violation protracted, precisely the circumstances requiring deterrence. ... They did not act with a good faith belief in the lawfulness of their conduct but in defiance of known infirmities in their position.

Section 362(k)(1) permits punitive damages for a pattern of willful collection efforts by a creditor that knows the automatic stay remains in effect under an adequate protection order.

In Re Hildreth · filed 2006-12-14(k)(1)

However, this Court has never before experienced a creditor who files a motion for relief from the automatic stay, negotiates an adequate protection order, which leaves the automatic stay in place, and then wilfully violates the automatic stay whose existence was carefully negotiated in the adequate protection order. The Court will stress that it is not imposing punitive damages for a single violation of the automatic stay. Rather, this is a pattern of conduct. ... For this reason, the Court will impose punitive damages in the amount of $18,000.00, twice the amount of the actual damages.

Section 362(k)(1) permits punitive damages for arrogant defiance of federal law, including selling repossessed property despite the bankruptcy court’s warnings that proceedings remain pending.

Davis v. Matt Gay Chevrolet, Inc. (In Re Davis) · filed 2007-02-14(k)(1)

The Defendants’ sale of the Silverado in disregard of this Court’s statements and admonitions at the May 2006 hearing represents an arrogant defiance of federal law. ... When the Defendants’ actions are examined collectively, I conclude that they are sufficient to trigger an award of punitive damages under Section 362(k).

Section 362(k)(1) permits punitive damages for a willful stay violation involving malicious threats of arrest and criminal prosecution to collect a debt when prosecution is unavailable under state law.

Hodge v. Money Shop, LLC. (In Re Hodge) · filed 2007-05-07(k)(1)

In this case, by any of these standards, punitive damages are appropriate. Ms. Benny’s conduct was malicious in that her threat to have the debtor arrested and criminally prosecuted was wrongful and against right. ... Under Alabama law, the maker of a check which is given pursuant to this statute and which is dishonored upon presentment because of insufficient funds cannot be criminally prosecuted under the State’s worthless check statute. ... For these reasons, the court concludes that punitive damages are appropriate in this circumstance.

Section 362(h) permits increased punitive damages for stay violations when a creditor’s disregard of court proceedings shows that a smaller award would not adequately deter misconduct.

In Re Panek · filed 2009-03-05(h)

When the temerity of those actions and omissions — now not only a violation of the Debtor’s rights, but a rank affront to this Court’s processes — are added to the stay violations themselves, it is clear that Delta Management has failed to appreciate the gravity of its transgressions. An increase in the amount of punitive damages, therefore, appears to be best suited to send a message which will be heard.

Section 362(k) permits punitive damages for a willful automatic stay violation when the creditor’s conduct is sufficiently reprehensible.

Jones v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. · filed 2013-03-19(k)

Section 362 allows for the award of actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, as a result of a stay violation, and punitive damages “in appropriate circumstances.” ... Based upon the factual record before it, the Bankruptcy Court was correct in deeming Wells Fargo’s behavior reprehensible and finding that an award of punitive damages was appropriate.

Section 362(k)(1) permits punitive damages when a creditor knowingly and intentionally violates the automatic stay and refuses to mitigate the effects of its conduct.

Credit Nation Lending Services, LLC v. Nettles · filed 2013-03-25(k)(1)

When a creditor knowingly and intentionally violates an automatic stay and the debtor’s fundamental rights thereunder and refuses to mitigate the effects of its unlawful conduct, “appropriate circumstances” exist for the imposition of punitive damages pursuant to section 362(k).

Section 362(k)(1) permits punitive damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay only in appropriate circumstances involving egregious conduct.

Monge v. Rojas (In Re Monge) · filed 2016-06-14(k)(1)

The court may award punitive damages for willful violation of an auto- matic stay “in appropriate circumstances,” 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1), which we have held requires “egregious conduct.”

Section 362(k) permits punitive damages for an automatic stay violation in appropriate circumstances, including when the violation is egregious.

Waldrop v. Discover Bank (In re Waldrop) · filed 2016-11-10(k)

Bankruptcy Code § 362(k) permits the recovery of punitive damages for violation of the automatic stay “in appropriate circumstances.” This Court will have to determine whether there was a violation of the automatic stay, determine any actual damages for same and, if the violation was egregious, i.e. “appropriate circumstances”, whether punitive damages might be awarded.

Section 362(k) permits punitive damages to deter repeated stay violations even when actual damages are scant and the conduct is not egregious.

Tina Marie St. Laurent · filed 2019-08-12(k)

The Court is unwilling to countenance the landlord’s behavior, even in the face of scanty evidence of actual damages and even in circumstances that may not be fairly characterized as egregious. To deter similar conduct in the future, punitive damages of $750.00 are hereby awarded under section 362(k).

Section 362(k)(1) permits punitive damages for egregious or vindictive stay violations, including knowing collection calls and threats of criminal action to collect a debt.

Lisalyn Merritt Wright and Jacob Anthony Wright · filed 2019-12-03(k)(1)

Abdelmessih’s aggressive stance in attempting to collect the $2,000.00 by threatening criminal action and repeatedly calling Wright with full knowledge of the stay being in effect satisfies this threshold. The Court finds sufficient “egregious or vindictive conduct” in order to justify an award of punitive damages of $500.00.

Section 362(k)(1) imposes no statutory cap on punitive damages for willful violations of the automatic stay.

Vaidya v. Choudhary · filed 2021-02-03(k)(1)

Section 362(k)(1) doesn’t provide for criminal sanctions for willful violations of the automatic stay, nor does it put a statutory limit on the amount of punitive damages that may be awarded.

Section 362(k) permits punitive damages for an automatic stay violation when a creditor’s inadequate bankruptcy notice procedures warrant them, even without malicious conduct.

Session v. American Honda Finance Corporation · filed 2021-05-18(k)

Although the Court does not find Honda’s conduct to be malicious, it finds Honda’s failure to employ adequate processes to insure the proper, timely processing of not only the Chapter 13 but also this Adversary sufficient to warrant punitive damages.

Section 362(k) permits punitive damages for a willful stay violation even without specific evidence of the violator’s ability to pay when the other circumstances warrant an award.

Vynogradov v. Buzyukova · filed 2021-11-04(k)

However, a lack of specific evidence of a party’s ability to pay is not dispositive of whether an award of punitive damages is warranted.

Section 362(k) permits punitive damages for a sufficiently egregious willful violation of the automatic stay.

Tami Terrelle Davis · filed 2023-05-30(k)

Thus, Defendant’s willful stay violation is sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages of $12,000—approximately twice Debtor’s actual damages.

Section 362(k)(1) permits punitive damages for an automatic-stay violation only when the evidence shows appropriate circumstances.

Denisha Semaj Johnson · filed 2025-05-23(k)(1)

Based on the evidence presented at the February hearing, the Court does not consider this as a case presenting “appropriate circumstances” for punitive damages under § 362(k)(1), nor does the Court believe that Ms. Johnson’s claims for fraud or similar misconduct in the Dispossessory Proceeding have any merit.

Section 362(h) permits punitive damages for a willful stay violation when the violator engages in egregious, intentional misconduct.

In Re Ketelsen · filed 1989-07-10(h)

The cases interpreting "appropriate circumstances" indicate to us that egregious, intentional misconduct on the violator's part is necessary to support a punitive damages award.

Section 362(h) requires a willful stay violation and appropriate circumstances for punitive damages; disputed physical contact during repossession did not suffice here.

Johnson v. Credit Acceptance Corp. · filed 2001-03-20(h)

To recover punitive damages under the bankruptcy code, a finding of a willful violation is required, as well as a finding of appropriate circumstances. ... There is an issue of fact concerning the physical contact between Hoff and Moeckel, Sr., but even accepting Plaintiffs allegations as true, such facts would not support an award of punitive damages under the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages is dismissed.

Section 362(k)(1) permits punitive damages for a stay violation only if the creditor acted with malice or bad faith.

HSBC Bank USA v. Crawford (In re Crawford) · filed 2012-08-06(k)(1)

Before imposing punitive damages, therefore, a bankruptcy court must find as fact that a creditor acted with malice or in bad faith in violating a stay.

Section 362(a) prevents the IRS from attempting to collect post-petition taxes, penalties, and interest that accrued during a debtor’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy.

Solito v. United States · filed 1994-06-21(a)

In this case, the government was prevented by the automatic stay provided for in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) from attempting to collect the post-petition taxes, penalties and interest that accrued during the time that the Solito’s were under their previous Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 362(a)(1) makes a creditor’s failure to reverse a tax refund intercept after the debtor files for bankruptcy a continuing violation of the automatic stay.

In Re Herron · filed 1995-02-27(a)(1)

Moreover, the fact that Great Lakes took no action to reverse the intercept procedure after debtor’s filing constitutes a continuing violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 stays government tax collection after a Chapter 7 filing until entry of the debtor’s discharge.

Klingshirn v. United States (In Re Klingshirn) · filed 1997-07-07(a), (c)(2)(C)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and (c)(2)(C), the automatic stay resulting from Klingshirn’s March 6, 1991 chapter 7 filing prevented the government from collecting the taxes until the discharge was entered on July 25, 1991.

Section 362(a)(1) bars issuance of a collection due process notice of determination during the automatic stay because it continues an administrative collection action against the debtor.

Smith v. Commissioner · filed 2005-02-08(a)(1)

Consistent with the foregoing, it follows that the issuance to petitioner of the notices of determination constituted the continuation of administrative collection actions against petitioner (after the commencement of the bankruptcy case) within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(1) (2000).

Section 362(b)(9)(D) excepts a tax assessment and demand for payment from the automatic stay, but does not except an IRS notice of levy sent to a bank to collect estate funds.

Jacoway v. Department of Treasury-Internal Revenue Service (In Re Graycarr, Inc.) · filed 2005-08-18(b)(9)(D)

The Court believes that the Request For Payment falls within the purview of § 362(b)(9)(D) of the code and is not a violation of the automatic stay. ... The mailing of the Notice of Levy constitutes a collection effort by the IRS and advises the taxpayer of specific consequences if payment is not made within a specified period of time. It is not an assessment and demand for payment and is not excepted from the automatic stay by § 362(b)(9)(D). That action by the IRS is sufficient for the Court to find that the IRS violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) bars the IRS from issuing a postpetition determination denying innocent-spouse relief that continues a prepetition collection action, and the determination is void.

In Re Drake · filed 2006-01-11(a)(1)

It was a post-petition continuation of the pre-petition collection action for the liabilities. Since the Notice of Determination was issued while the stay was in place, it was a violation of the automatic stay. The First Circuit has explained that violations of the automatic stay are void.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay collection of taxes arising after the bankruptcy petition, and conversion to Chapter 7 does not start a new stay; § 362(a)(3) does not bar a levy on funds already transferred out of the bankruptcy estate.

Michaelesco v. United States · filed 2009-08-10(a)(1), (a)(3)

As to § 362(a)(1), Michaelesco filed her bankruptcy petition in 2001, but the IRS sought to collect taxes that should have been paid in 2003 and 2004, after the commencement of the bankruptcy case. The involuntary conversion of the case from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 does not affect the inapplicability of § 362(a)(1) to this case. ... As to § 362(a)(3), the IRS levied Michaeles-co’s accounts after the bankruptcy trustee transferred money from the bankruptcy estate; the IRS did not levy property of the estate.

The automatic stay of tax collection against a debtor continues until discharge when the tax lien reaches property beyond the bankruptcy estate.

Severo v. Commissioner · filed 2009-11-20(c)(2)

The Seve-ros filed for bankruptcy on September 28, 1994, triggering Section 362(a)(6)’s automatic stay against IRS collection of their 1990 tax liability. Because the tax lien was not limited to property of the bankruptcy estate but rather applied to any and all of the Severos’ property interests, that stay remained in effect until the March 17, 1998, discharge order.

Section 362(a)(6) stays collection of a prepetition tax debt against a debtor upon a bankruptcy filing, and section 362(c)(2) keeps that stay in effect until discharge when the case has not been closed or dismissed.

Severo v. Cir · filed 2009-11-20(a)(6), (c)(2)

The Severos filed for bankruptcy on Septem- ber 28, 1994, triggering Section 362(a)(6)’s automatic stay against IRS collection of their 1990 tax liability. Because the tax lien was not limited to property of the bankruptcy estate but rather applied to any and all of the Severos’ property interests, that stay remained in effect until the March 17, 1998 discharge order.

Section 362(a)(1) stays continuation of IRS tax lien collection proceedings after a bankruptcy petition, including issuance of a notice of determination after administrative review; a notice issued during the stay is invalid.

Yuska v. Comm'r · filed 2015-04-20(a)(1)

When petitioner filed a petition in bankruptcy (after the request for administrative review under section 6320), it is clear that the commencement and/or continuation of collection activity was barred as a result of the stay provisions in 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a)(1). Nevertheless, respondent issued the notice of determination sustaining the IRS collection action during the pending bankruptcy. We conclude that the notice of determination issued while the bankruptcy was pending was in violation of the stay and accordingly is invalid.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar an action to declare state-law rights against a debtor’s insurer when the action seeks no payment and the bankruptcy court has allowed the underlying liability action to proceed.

Grillo v. Zurich Insurance Co. · filed 1994-07-15(a)(3)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), the filing of a bankruptcy petition stays “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.” ... A declaration of Grillo’s rights under state law may or may not advance the Underlying Action, but it is not prohibited by the Omnibus Order or the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay an insurer’s declaratory action seeking only to determine nondebtor coinsureds’ coverage rights when the action does not exercise control over estate property.

Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee of Spaulding Composites Co. (In Re Spaulding Composi · filed 1997-02-26(a)(3)

Even if it is assumed Liberty’s New York action included property interests of the estate, the suit asked only for a declaration of its liability to two non-debtors. We fail to see how such an action amounts to an “exercise of control over the property of the estate.”

Section 362(a)(2) does not stay enforcement of a judgment against a debtor’s insurer when collection seeks liability-policy proceeds that are not property of the estate.

Landry v. Exxon Pipeline Co. · filed 2001-03-28(a)(2)

A tort plaintiff is not suing to enforce the debtor’s policy rights, a tort plaintiff wishes to enforce the judgment against the proceeds of that policy, in other words, funds payable by the insurer on account of the insurer’s contractual assumption of liability via its insurance policy with the debtor. Such funds are not property of the estate, and thus, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) would not apply.

The automatic stay does not bar a declaratory judgment action against nondebtor insurers concerning their duty to defend when defense payments do not reduce policy limits or affect the debtor's bankruptcy estate.

Triton Realty Limited Partnership v. Essex Mutual Ins. Co., 03-2061 (2006) · filed 2006-08-09(a)

Essex's policy provides that it will pay all reasonable expenses pertaining to its duty to defend the insured and that "[t]hese payments will not reduce the limits of insurance." Accordingly, any declaration herein in relation to Essex's duty to defend will not affect Derco's bankruptcy estate, and, as a result, the automatic stay does not apply to this proceeding.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a direct action against a debtor’s liability insurer when the insurance proceeds are property of the bankruptcy estate, but does not stay the action when the proceeds are outside the estate.

Sosebee v. Steadfast Insurance Company · filed 2012-11-27(a)(3)

Where a court finds insurance proceeds to be property of the bankruptcy estate the automatic stay will apply to direct actions against insurers, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(3), but where the proceeds of the insurance policies are not property of the bankruptcy estate, direct actions against insurers will not be affected by the stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362. Therefore, because the proceeds from Steadfast’s policy are not property of Harvest’s bankruptcy estate, the automatic stay does not apply to the direct action in this case.

Section 362(a)(2)-(3) does not stay a judgment creditor’s direct action against a debtor’s liability insurer when the creditor obtained judgment before bankruptcy and the insurance proceeds are not estate property.

Vallejo v. Fire Insurance Exchange CA3 · filed 2022-11-21(a)(2)-(3)

Here we conclude that because Vallejo obtained a judgment against the Savoys before they filed for bankruptcy, the stay in the Savoys’ bankruptcy action did not bar Vallejo from filing this action against Farmers and, therefore, the stay did not toll the statute of limitations for him to file this action.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a declaratory judgment action against a debtor even when the plaintiff seeks only a ruling that it owes the debtor no damages.

AP Orangevale, LLC · filed 2024-02-21(a)(1)

The declaratory judgment action that Cable Park seeks to assert against the debtor is subject to the automatic stay even if Cable Park only pursues a determination that it does not owe damages to the debtor.

Section 362(a)(3) stayed the claims against the insurers and prevented timely state court adjudication for mandatory abstention.

Alexander v. Travelers Indemnity Company · filed 2022-09-02(a)(3)

Since the automatic stay applies to Alexander’s claims against the Century Parties, the action as to these claims cannot be timely adjudicated in state court, leaving the fourth condition for mandatory abstention unsatisfied.

Section 362(a)(3) and (a)(4) no longer stay acts against real estate once the trustee abandons it and it leaves the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Koeller · filed 1994-08-09(a)(3), (a)(4)

Because the property at 6200 South Walrond is no longer property of the estate, the stay imposed by § 362(a)(3) and § 362(a)(4) no longer applies.

Section 362(a)(5) protects a debtor’s legal interest in abandoned property from lien enforcement even when the debtor lacks a possessory interest.

Adams v. Hartconn Associates, Inc. (In Re Adams) · filed 1997-09-10(a)(5)

Since property can enjoy the status of “property of the estate” notwithstanding a debtor’s bare legal title, it follows that, after abandonment, property enjoys the status of “property of the debtor” notwithstanding a debtor’s bare legal title. There is no discernible reason why a debtor must have a possessory interest in property abandoned by the trustee for that property to constitute “property of the debtor” under § 362(a)(5).

Section 362(a)(3)’s automatic stay does not apply to a lease and equipment excluded from the bankruptcy estate through court-approved rejection and abandonment.

CMI Hospital Equipment Corp. v. de Salud · filed 2007-05-30(a)(3)

Al conceder la solicitud de rechazo, el contrato de arrendamiento y el equipo objeto del contrato quedaron fuera del caudal y por lo tanto, fuera de la jurisdicción del Tribunal de Quiebras. Por esta razón, la paralización automática no procede en cuanto a este contrato y equipo.

Section 362(a)(3) stays RTC’s foreclosure of property tied to an estate fraudulent conveyance claim despite the anti-injunction provision in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j).

McGowan v. Ciccone (In Re Ciccone) · filed 1994-08-12(a)(3)

We also conclude that where, as here, there is an apparent conflict between statutes, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) does not hinder the operation of § 362.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a pending federal receivership proceeding against the debtor when an involuntary bankruptcy petition is filed, unless an exception applies.

Gilchrist v. General Electric Capital Corp. · filed 2001-09-05(a)(1)

On this appeal, we only determine that, in the present circumstances, the stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) must be recognized until further order in the bankruptcy proceeding.

Filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition triggers the automatic stay of a pending federal receivership, even when the receivership court took custody of the debtor’s assets first.

Gilchrist v. General Electric Capital Corporation · filed 2001-09-05(a)

Section 1334(e) of title 28 is unequivocal in its grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court, and S 362(a) imposes an automatic stay on all proceedings merely upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. If we were to frustrate these express provisions to further a first-filed policy, we would have to deny bankruptcy jurisdiction to every bankruptcy court in which foreclosure proceedings had already commenced against the debtor's property, on the grounds that the in rem nature of the foreclosure proceeding precludes the bankruptcy court from taking custody of the res.

The automatic stay does not bar billing a debtor for postpetition condominium assessments that are not prepetition claims.

Beeter v. Tri-City Property Management Services, Inc. (In Re Beeter) · filed 1994-09-12(a)(1), (a)(6)

Here, Tri-City holds no dischargeable claim for postpetition assessments; therefore, it violated neither the automatic stay nor the discharge injunction.

Sections 362(a)(5) and (a)(6) bar liens and money judgments to collect post-petition condominium assessments under New Jersey law when the debtor acquired title before filing, because those assessments are part of a pre-petition claim.

In Re Hawk · filed 2004-08-06(a)(5), (a)(6)

They are a pre-petition claim because they arose upon the Debtor taking title to the property, which occurred pre-petition. The post-petition assessments that are at issue here are merely the “contingent”, “unmatured” portion of that prepetition claim. ... Consistent with the statutory definitions and case law discussed above, the Court finds that the Debtor’s post-petition condominium arrears qualify as a claim under the Bankruptcy Code. As a result, by obtaining a lien against the property, the Association violated § 362(a)(5). By obtaining a money judgment against the Debtor, the Association violated § 362(a)(6).

Section 362 does not prohibit a creditor from postponing a foreclosure sale by public proclamation while the automatic stay is in effect.

Washington Mutual v. Fritz (In Re Fritz) · filed 1998-02-20

After Peters, such a course of conduct cannot be viewed as a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 does not prohibit publicly postponing a scheduled foreclosure sale to a new date when the postponement merely preserves the status quo.

WORKINGMEN'S SAV. & LOAN ASS'N. v. Kestner · filed 1994-12-21

Under the prevailing view, postponing a foreclosure sale is not violative of the automatic stay provisions. ... We agree that this is a correct view and, therefore, adopt it. Such a view is entirely consistent with the protection intended by the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 and the rule of Pa.R.C.P. 3129.3(b).

Section 362 does not prohibit publicly postponing a foreclosure sale to a specified date, because the postponement preserves the status quo between creditor and debtor.

Workingmen's Savings & Loan Ass'n of Dellwood Corp. v. Kestner · filed 1994-12-21

Under the prevailing view, postponing a foreclosure sale is not violative of the automatic stay provisions.

A creditor may postpone a foreclosure sale after confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan without violating the automatic stay when the postponement merely preserves the status quo while the debtor remains in default.

Barry v. BA Properties, Inc. (In Re Barry) · filed 1996-06-25(a)

Therefore, the Court affirms the bankruptcy court’s holding that a post-confirmation postponement does not violate the automatic stay.