11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays judicial proceedings against a debtor after the debtor files for bankruptcy.

U S Bank Trust Company National Association v. Gatson · filed 2024-03-12(a)(1)

The Court ORDERS that, because the claims against Helen Gatson in this case are subject to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)’s automatic stay protections and, in an exercise of the Court’s sound discretion, the case should be stayed, subject to this stay being lifted upon the motion of any party once the 11 U.S.C. § 362 automatic stay is lifted – either by conclusion of the bankruptcy or on order from the bankruptcy court granting relief from the automatic stay – and all pending, unexpired deadlines are terminated.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay an action to divide funds held by a court when the action is not against the debtor and determines the debtor’s share of those funds.

Pereyo Diaz, Francisco Jose v. Alvarez Fernos, Alexandra Maresa · filed 2024-03-15(a)(1)

Aclarado lo anterior, concluimos que, según determinado por el TPI, el caso no quedó paralizado como consecuencia de la presentación de la Petición. Ello porque el caso de referencia no es “contra” la Demandada, en el contexto del significado de dicho término bajo la ley federal. Adviértase que el caso gira en torno a cómo se dividirán unos fondos consignados en el tribunal y sobre los cuales la Demandada tiene interés, pero los cuales no controla ni forman actualmente parte de su caudal.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a shareholder’s Section 16(b) action against a debtor corporation even when the corporation is named only as a nominal defendant.

Donoghue v. BurgerFi International, Inc. · filed 2024-11-18(a)(1)

The Court concludes that Section 362(a)’s automatic stay applies. The Court reads the statute’s plain language as encompassing this action, which Plaintiffs brought “against” BurgerFi, even if only as a nominal defendant.

Section 362(a) stays proceedings against a defendant who files for bankruptcy while allowing the case to proceed against a corporate codefendant.

Ameris Bank, through its division, Balboa Capital Corporation v. Geaux Express Incorporated · filed 2025-08-18(a)

On June 20, 2025, Palles filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy (Doc. 20), and the Court, in turn, stayed this matter as to Palles, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (Doc. 21). ... Accordingly, Ameris’ motion for default judgment for money damages that are requested in Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint is GRANTED solely as to Geaux Express, its request for attorney’s fees and expenses that is found in Count III of the Amended Complaint is HELD IN ABEYANCE pending Ameris’ submission of a separate motion and evidentiary support, and the motion for default judgment is DENIED with leave to refile as to Palles after his bankruptcy case is resolved, and if appropriate.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays proceedings on claims against a debtor when a bankruptcy petition is filed, even if the court does not know of the filing.

World Express & Connection, Inc. v. Crocus Investments · filed 2025-12-18(a)(1)

Although the Court was not made aware of the July 3, 2025 bankruptcy petition, its filing triggered a mandatory, automatic stay over all proceedings involving claims against the Debtors, including the present case.

Section 362(a)(1) is not violated by an attorney’s statements about pending litigation unless the statements advance the proceeding against the debtor.

Frangos · filed 2026-02-13(a)(1)

In order to violate the automatic stay, his statements needed to advance the proceeding somehow, and specifically for Mr. Frangos.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a debtor’s motion to vacate an adverse judgment in a prepetition action against the debtor because the motion continues that action.

Powell · filed 2026-03-31(a)(1)

The automatic stay generally prohibits any continuation of a pre-petition judicial action against debtors, even if the debtors themselves continue the case by filing a notice of appeal, or in this case, a motion to vacate an order or judgment.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a debtor’s postpetition pursuit of contested dismissal in a prepetition action against the debtor when that pursuit continues adjudication of the claims.

In re Medplus Urgent Clinic, LLC · filed 2026-05-14(a)(1)

Under the unusual posture presented here, however, the Court concludes that the Debtors’ affirmative pursuit of contested Rule 41(b) dismissal relief in litigation originally commenced against them constituted continuation of a judicial proceeding against the Debtors within the meaning of § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(1)'s automatic stay applies to judicial proceedings against the debtor; it does not stay an action filed by the debtor.

Craneworks, Inc. v. RPM Cranes, LLC · filed 2017-06-16(a)(1)

We note that the automatic-stay provision in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362, applies only to "the commencement or continuation ... of a judicial ... action or proceeding against the debtor." (Emphasis added.) The action underlying these appeals was filed by RPM.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays a prepetition motion seeking costs from a debtor.

WOLGAST v. Richards · filed 2012-01-18(a)(1)

In this case, both parties correctly conclude that Defendant’s Rule 68 motion is automatically stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. ... Thus, the continuation of Defendant’s proceeding against Plaintiff is automatically stayed because of the bankruptcy filing.

Section 362(a)(1) bars a creditor from filing and serving a postpetition eviction motion against the debtor, even if the creditor believes the debtor has no property interest in the residence.

In re Salov · filed 2014-06-06(a)(1)

By filing a motion for a writ of eviction against the Debtor in state court and serving her with notice of that action, Creditors violated the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(1) does not automatically stay a debtor’s own lawsuit when no counterclaim has been filed against the debtor.

Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc. v. Hiscox Insurance Company, Inc. · filed 2020-06-11(a)(1)

In other words, the proceeding is not “against” Plaintiff pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), and the automatic stay was not triggered.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against the debtor, but does not bar a response to a claim the debtor affirmatively filed.

Johnston v. Court-Appointed Receiver · filed 2025-07-02(a)(1)

The plain language of the Bankruptcy Code stay provision applies only to an “action or proceeding against the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(1) (emphasis added).

Section 362(a)(3) cannot support a stay of a banking regulator’s authorized administrative actions when 12 U.S.C. § 1818 bars the bankruptcy court from affecting them.

Firstcorp, Inc. v. Office of Thrift Supervision (In Re Firstcorp, Inc.) · filed 1991-07-12(a)(3)

Although § 1334(d) grants the district court — and, by referral, the bankruptcy court — exclusive jurisdiction over the property of the bankrupt estate, § 1818(i)(l) withdraws that jurisdiction to the extent a party attempts “to affect” a banking regulatory authority’s enforcement of any notice or order which § 1818 grants it the authority to issue. ... Therefore, the bankruptcy court had no authority to enter a stay of those actions under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362’s automatic stay does not apply to a temporary cease and desist order issued by the Office of Thrift Supervision under 12 U.S.C. § 1818, even when the order requires transfer of bankruptcy estate assets.

Carlton v. Firstcorp, Inc. · filed 1992-06-02

We, therefore, affirm the district court’s ruling that the automatic stay does not apply to the temporary order.

Section 362(a)(1) stays affirmative actions against the debtor, but does not stop a deadline from expiring through the mere passage of time.

In re Castle · filed 1992-06-23(a)(1)

It is well recognized, however, in the 8th Circuit that the automatic stay does not stay actions based on the mere passage of time, but operates to stay affirmative actions against the debtor. ... Section 362(a) does not stay the Court’s action in this case.

Section 362 stays a mortgagee’s collection of postpetition rents that remain the debtor’s property until the stay is lifted.

5028 Wisconsin Avenue Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Copy King, Inc. (In Re 5028 Wisconsin Avenue Associates Ltd. Partne · filed 1994-05-05

Inside bankruptcy, the mortgagee’s right to continue to collect the rents for application to the mortgage debt is frozen by the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362 bars a mortgagee from collecting postpetition rents that are property of the bankruptcy estate, even when the mortgagee has a security interest in those rents.

In Re Mews Associates, L.P. · filed 1992-09-17(a)(3)

As shown, all rents collected post-petition are an asset of the bankruptcy estate. Therefore, as to such rents, the automatic stay of Code § 362 prohibits any action by RNA to collect such rents.

Section 362(a) does not stay collection of a postpetition debt from the debtor’s postpetition property after confirmation revests estate property in the debtor.

Hudson v. United States Ex Rel. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Hudson) · filed 1994-01-24(a)

In this case, the IRS is seeking to collect a post petition debt, taxes due for calendar year 1990 from property of the debtor, a tax refund due for calendar year 1992. The stay of § 362(a) does not apply. There is no stay violation and no basis for a finding of contempt.

Section 362 bars a mortgagee from taking possession of property or seeking appointment of a receiver to collect rents belonging to a bankruptcy estate without seeking relief from the automatic stay.

McM Funding 1997-1 v. Amware Distrib., Unpublished Decision (6-29-2006) · filed 2006-06-29(a), (d)

Thus, Tisci makes clear that once the bankruptcy petition was filed by Park Place, the premises and the rents accruing thereon from the Sublease became part of Park Place's bankruptcy estate and passed into the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court and, therefore, MCM was prohibited from either taking possession of the property or requesting the appointment of a receiver in order to collect the rents absent a request for relief from stay from the Bankruptcy Court.

Section 362(a)(6) does not prohibit bills or disconnect notices seeking payment solely for postpetition debt.

Alberto Rodriguez and Tressa Margaret Rodriguez · filed 2024-03-26(a)(6)

The postpetition bills and the disconnect notice, all of which predated the discharge, did not request payment of any prepetition debt and thus did not violate the stay.

The automatic stay does not bar collection of debts incurred after a Chapter 7 petition, even if the debtor later adds those debts to the bankruptcy schedules.

Iain Curtis-Shanley · filed 2025-08-29(a)(6)

As established by the Debtor’s own Amended Schedule of Creditors, the debts owed to the Banks that are the subject of the Motion were incurred after the Petition Date. Consequently, efforts by the Banks to collect those debts are not enjoined by the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) protects a debtor’s surviving interest in a cooperative apartment from eviction when that interest remains property of the bankruptcy estate despite a prepetition possession judgment.

In Re Robertson · filed 1992-10-07(a)(3)

The Debtor’s interest in her cooperative apartment was not terminated prior to the petition. Therefore, said interest is property of the bankruptcy estate protected by the automatic stay and the Debtor has the right to cure the monetary defaults under the Proprietary Lease in the context of her Chapter 13 Plan. Consequently, Harrison Park’s motion must be and hereby is denied.

Section 362(a)(3) bars appointment of a receiver over property in which the debtor asserts legal title, even when the action names a separate entity as the sole defendant.

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Holme Circle Realty Corp. · filed 1992-10-08(a)(3)

Under those circumstances, appointment of a receiver to operate the Property as to which Cohen personally asserts a claim to legal title would constitute an act “to exercise control over [a property interest] of the estate”, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), and thus would be barred by the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a creditor’s state court action to appoint a receiver for the debtor’s property when the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.

In Re Fairview-Takoma Ltd. Partnership · filed 1997-03-05(a)(1)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), Condor’s state law action to appoint a receiver for the Property was stayed by Fairview’s bankruptcy petition.

The automatic stay permits a creditor to apply a prepetition credit to calculate the debtor’s prepetition obligation, unless the adjustment is coupled with a demand for payment of the prepetition debt.

In Re Gross Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc. · filed 1992-10-27

Such an adjustment constitutes an amendment to the Fund’s pre-petition claim against the debtor, and does not violate the automatic stay unless it is coupled with a demand for payment of the pre-petition debt.

Lifting the automatic stay under § 362(d) does not deprive the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction over the debtor’s tax liability.

United States of America Internal Revenue Service v. Edwin Paul Wilson, and John W. Guinee, Jr., Trustee-Appellee · filed 1992-10-29(d)

Nowhere does the statute state, or even suggest, however, that the bankruptcy court loses jurisdiction when it terminates the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) does not void a state-court trial record made during the stay when the creditor did not then seek to fix the debtor’s liability.

Gibson v. Gibson · filed 1993-01-20(a)(1)

In short, there is nothing in the letter or spirit of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provisions which would support a “voiding” of the trial record made before the stay was lifted. At no time during the day in question did Plaintiff’s counsel ever purport to be acting to fix or liquidate liability in Defendant.

Section 362(a)(1) stays entry of a judgment in a prepetition action against the debtor after a bankruptcy petition is filed and deprives the court of jurisdiction to act inconsistently with the stay.

Ex Parte Reichlyn · filed 1993-02-22(a)(1)

The automatic stay imposed by section 362 deprived the trial judge in Reichlyn's action against COCC of subject matter jurisdiction to take any action inconsistent with the stay.

Section 362(a)(1) stays entry of a judgment in an action against a debtor after the bankruptcy petition is filed, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to enter that judgment.

South Carolina Department of Health & Environmental Control v. Columbia Organic Chemical Co. · filed 1993-02-22(a)(1)

The automatic stay imposed by section 362 deprived the trial judge in Reichlyn’s action against COCC of subject matter jurisdiction to take any action inconsistent with the stay.

The automatic stay suspends a pending suit against the debtor but does not dismiss it or deprive the court of jurisdiction.

Bond v. EI Du Pont De Nemours and Co. · filed 1993-07-22(a)

We therefore agree that “a stay of a suit pending in another court against the bankrupt is not a dismissal of the suit nor does it deprive the court of jurisdiction over the matter; it merely suspends the proceedings.”

Section 362(a) makes state court action taken in violation of the automatic stay void even if no party moved to stay the proceeding.

Hamilton Life Ins. v. Lefebvre, No. 057927 (Jun. 26, 2001) · filed 2001-06-26(a)

Accordingly, even if a party fails to file a motion, pursuant to Practice Book § 14-1 , 1 to stay an on-going non-bankruptcy proceeding, any state court action taken in violation of the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code is void.

Section 362 stays a state court’s power to proceed against a debtor while the bankruptcy petition is pending, but does not eliminate the court’s underlying subject matter jurisdiction over the type of proceeding.

Sullivan v. Krawski, No. Cv 92-0703872 (Aug. 31, 2001) · filed 2001-08-31

While the bankruptcy stay may oust the jurisdiction of the state court so as to stay its power to proceed without the consent of the bankruptcy court while the bankruptcy petition remains pending, this court fundamentally has subject matter jurisdiction over condemnation proceedings.

An automatic stay suspends an eviction proceeding but does not deprive the court of jurisdiction or preclude the landlord from maintaining the proceeding after the stay ends.

Hymil Associates v. Scott · filed 2006-04-21(a)(3)

However, even assuming, arguendo, that the bankruptcy stay remained in effect at the time that the holdover petition was served, “the stay did not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the [proceeding] commenced but merely suspended the proceedings” (Kleinsleep Prods, v McCrory Corp., 271 AD2d 411, 412 [2000], quoting International Fid. Ins. Co. v European Am. Bank, 129 AD2d 679 [1987]; accord Baker v Bloom, 146 AD2d 859 [1989]; cf. Storini v Hortiales, 16 AD3d 1110 [2005]).

Section 362(a)(1) stays actions against a debtor when a bankruptcy petition is filed; an action commenced in violation of the stay does not deprive the court of jurisdiction but suspends proceedings while the stay is in effect.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ranalli · filed 2016-06-29(a)(1)

Although the filing of a bankruptcy petition results in an automatic stay of actions against a debtor (see 11 USC § 362 [a] [1]), the commencement of an action in violation of the automatic stay does not deprive the court of jurisdiction but merely suspends the proceedings during the pendency of the automatic stay (see Kleinsleep Prods, v McCrory Corp., 271 AD2d 411, 412 [2000]; International Fid. Ins. Co. v European Am. Bank, 129 AD2d 679, 679 [1987], amended 143 AD2d 426 [1988]).

Section 362(a) does not prevent a receivership court from retaining jurisdiction over the receivership estate when a bankruptcy petition is filed in violation of that court’s anti-litigation injunction.

Big Shoulders Capital LLC v. San Luis & Rio Grande Railroad, Inc. · filed 2019-11-18(a)

Inherent to the Byers holding, however, is that if a party violated the anti-litigation injunction by filing a bankruptcy petition, the automatic stay would not affect the court’s jurisdiction over the receivership estate.

Relief from the automatic stay permits another court to proceed but leaves the bankruptcy court with concurrent jurisdiction over the affected property or claims.

In re: Fog Cap Retail Investors LLC · filed 2022-08-17(d)

And if the bankruptcy court grants relief from the stay with respect to certain property or claims, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), (e), (f), the bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction over those matters, although its jurisdiction is concurrent with that of other courts of competent jurisdiction.

Section 362 suspends proceedings covered by the automatic stay without divesting the court of jurisdiction.

Stonecipher v. Tewalt · filed 2023-03-13

The automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362 suspends those proceedings to which it applies and does not divest this court of jurisdiction.

Section 362’s automatic stay deprives a state court of authority to decide a pending matter against the debtor after the bankruptcy filing and until the bankruptcy court permits proceedings to resume.

Malave Concepcion, Gilbert a v. Alpha One Security Solutions · filed 2024-05-28

Ante dicha circunstancia, y cónsono con lo expresado por el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico en el citado caso de Marrero Rorado v. Marrero Rosado, supra, desde ese momento el TPI estaba privado de jurisdicción para considerar y atender la Moción de Reconsideración pendiente ante sí, de lo que se deriva que su Orden de 25 de marzo fue dictada sin autoridad para ello.

Section 362(a)’s automatic stay prevents a state court from processing a claim against the debtor but does not divest the court of personal jurisdiction.

In re New York City Asbestos Litigation · filed 1998-02-24(a)

Plaintiffs’ contention that a New York State court lacks personal jurisdiction over an entity to whom the statutory stay applies lacks merit. Jurisdiction for a tort committed within the State lies pursuant to CPLR 302. That a party who knowingly commences an action in violation of the statutory stay may, as argued by plaintiffs, be in contempt, does not mean that the State court lacks jurisdiction over the action. Clearly upon application of a debtor, the State action would have to be stayed and the suit could not be processed.

Section 362’s automatic stay suspends state court proceedings without depriving the state court of jurisdiction; proceedings can move forward once the stay is lifted.

Butler v. Household Mortgage Services, Inc. · filed 2000-06-07

Once the stay is lifted, state court proceedings can move forward.

Section 362 stays the assessment of litigation costs against a debtor when the opposing party became entitled to those costs before the bankruptcy petition, even if the claim had not yet matured.

Franklin Savings Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision · filed 1993-01-21(a)(6)

Thus, FSC’s liability for costs was a prepetition debt, which was subject to the automatic bankruptcy stay.

Section 362(a)(1) stays discovery obligations that continue a prepetition lawsuit against the debtor, including obligations imposed on the debtor’s bank and an officer acting for the debtor.

Matter of United Imports Corp. · filed 1996-08-19(a)(1)

The discovery obligations of the debtor and the First National Bank of Omaha and Joseph Abboud, in his capacity as President or other officer of the debtor, pursuant to the order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York are a continuation of a prepetition lawsuit against the debtor, and are stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362.

The automatic stay bars enforcement of a bill of costs against Chapter 11 debtors but permits adjudication of costs against a jointly and severally liable nondebtor defendant.

Aerotech Resources, Inc. v. Dodson Aviation, Inc. · filed 2005-12-19(a)

Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff is precluded from enforcing the bill of costs as to defendants Dodson Aviation, Inc. and Dodson International Parts, Inc. However, because defendant Robert L. Dodson, Jr. is jointly and severally liable for judgment against defendants, the court will address defendants’ other arguments.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits postpetition invoices that demand payment of a prepetition debt from the bankruptcy estate.

George E Lyle, Jr. and Sabrina Chambers Lyle · filed 2024-06-21(a)(3)

The invoices do, however, make a demand on the bankruptcy estate of Mr. Lyle in violation of the plain language of section 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(1) stays a creditor’s attempt to execute a prepetition money judgment against a debtor pursuing bankruptcy reorganization.

In re: National Medical Imaging, LLC v. · filed 2023-06-29(a)(1)

But NMI is seeking to reorganize in bankruptcy; so § 362(a)(1)’s automatic stay precludes U.S. Bank from going forward.

Section 362 bars collection of prepetition attorney fees during the automatic stay, and a court may address the violation by requiring disgorgement of fees received in connection with the bankruptcy.

Louie Joseph Aquilino and Robin Aquilino · filed 2023-02-06(a)(6)

Moreover, SGRYV is seeking to collect pre-petition fees in the Pennsylvania Case, in violation of the automatic stay, and for services that were allegedly included in that $3,500 pre-petition payment. ... The Court concludes that the stay violation is adequately addressed as part of the requirement that SGRYV disgorge all fees in connection to the bankruptcy.

Section 362(a)(6) bars garnishment of a debtor’s postpetition earnings to collect a prepetition judgment while the stay applies, even when the creditor alleges that the debt is nondischargeable.

Paugh, Jr. v. Graham · filed 2023-02-06(a)(6)

Here, it is undisputed that the Defendant violated the automatic stay when she collected upon her judgement by garnishing the Plaintiff’s post-petition earnings. Notably, the Defendant’s allegation that the judgment is nondischargeable does not impact the court’s analysis regarding a stay violation because she did not obtain that determination before collecting upon her judgement.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits repeated post-petition contacts seeking to collect a pre-petition debt.

Gates v. RAC Acceptance Texas, LLC, d/b/a Acceptance Now · filed 2020-11-05(a)(6)

The repeated contacts made by RAC to Gates, therefore, clearly fall within the parameters of an impermissible attempt to collect on a pre-petition debt under § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(6) prevents a creditor holding a prepetition tax debt from collecting that debt while the automatic stay is in effect.

Putnam v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Putnam) · filed 2014-01-14(a)(6)

As a creditor with a pre-petition debt in Case # 2, the IRS was prevented by the automatic stay in Case # 2 from collecting on the debt.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a lender from sending a payment-demand letter to a debtor while the personal stay remains in effect, even if the stay has ended as to the collateral.

In re Law · filed 2013-08-29(a)(6)

Ally’s April 15, 2013 Letter, as stated earlier, crosses the line into being a stay violation. It looked and smelled like a collection attempt or other attempt to put pressure on a Debtor who quite plainly expressed an intent to surrender the Truck — and who, quite plainly, was still in a bankruptcy case and represented by counsel.

Section 362 does not prevent a judgment creditor from voluntarily withdrawing a citation to discover assets after the debtor files for bankruptcy.

In re Tires N Tracks, Inc. · filed 2013-08-27

While it may be true that § 108(c) automatically preserves a judgment creditor’s lien, a judgment creditor is not prevented by § 362 from voluntarily withdrawing its citation to discover assets.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a condominium association from enforcing a bylaw that denies a debtor voting rights because of unpaid prepetition condominium fees.

Gordon Properties, LLC v. First Owners Ass'n (In Re Gordon Properties, LLC) · filed 2011-09-20(a)(6)

The court concludes that enforcing Bylaws Article IV, Section 7 for a past-due pre-petition condominium fee violates the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a creditor from sending a debtor a postpetition statement demanding payment on a prepetition account.

Butz v. People First Federal Credit Union (In Re Butz) · filed 2011-03-30(a)(6)

Tasked to evaluate the Statement, I conclude that it is, in part, an invoice demanding payment on the account. ... I find that by sending the Statement to the Plaintiff, the Defendant violated the automatic stay under § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(1) prohibits continuing a state court collection proceeding against a debtor after a bankruptcy petition, including obtaining an order setting a later status hearing.

In Re Hall-Walker · filed 2011-02-22(a)(1)

The court finds that obtaining the order of October 14, 2010 setting the matter for status on April 5, 2011 was a willful violation of section 362(a).

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a creditor from applying funds automatically deposited into a debtor’s account toward payment of a pre-petition debt because that affirmative step is an act to collect the debt.

Krivohlavek v. Boys Town Federal Credit Union · filed 2009-05-22(a)(6)

For purposes of this appeal, we do not need to determine whether a creditor’s mere receipt of an automatic payment constitutes a violation of the stay because here the Credit Union took an affirmative step beyond the mere receipt of an automatic payment – it applied a portion of the funds automatically deposited into the Debtor’s account toward payment of a debt. And that affirmative step constitutes an act to collect a debt prohibited by § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(6) does not bar a creditor from reporting an unpaid judgment to a medical licensing agency and following up when those acts are not efforts to coerce payment of the debt.

In Re Grau · filed 1994-09-19(a)(6)

Similarly, the Court does not believe that Branham’s actions were efforts to coerce payment of his pre-petition claim. ... All of this, however, does not amount to an act or effort to collect a debt.

Section 362(a) bars post-petition collection of pre-petition attorney-fee debts under retainer agreements.

In Re Symes · filed 1994-10-20(a)

This Court concludes the retainer agreements are pre-petition debts dischargeable upon entry of discharge. Respondents are enjoined from further collection activities by the express terms of sections 362(a), 524(a) and by this order.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a college from withholding or threatening to withhold a debtor’s degree or transcripts to collect prepetition tuition debt before the debt is determined nondischargeable.

Carson v. Logan College of Chiropractic (In Re Carson) · filed 1993-02-04(a)(6)

The act of threatening to not confer the degree, and the act of threatening to not deliver the transcripts are, in the circumstances presented here, acts to collect a debt that has not yet been determined to be non-dischargeable. As such, these acts are in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a creditor from continuing automatic withdrawals to pay a prepetition debt when the debtor has not affirmatively authorized postpetition payments, despite an unconsummated proposal to reaffirm the debt.

Houseworth v. Three Rivers Federal Credit Union (In Re Houseworth) · filed 1994-12-15(a)(6)

This Court is not convinced that the indications given by the Plaintiff in this case would amount to the level of “positive indication” that would excuse the Defendant for making unwarranted withdrawals on the Plaintiffs account when the reaffirmation agreement was. not consummated and no express authorization was asked for or given. ... Thus, the Court finds that Defendant did violate the automatic stay. Accordingly, all funds received by the Defendant from the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition should be returned to the Plaintiff.

Section 362(a) bars a utility from pursuing collection of a prepetition debt after receiving notice of the debtor’s bankruptcy petition.

Tarrant v. City of Douglas (In Re Tarrant) · filed 1995-11-13(a)

The City violated the automatic stay of section 362 by pursuing collection efforts of a pre-petition debt after receiving notice of Debtor’s bankruptcy petition.

Section 362(a)(6) bars an indirect attempt to collect a prepetition debt by threatening to suspend the debtor’s employees’ benefits unless the debtor pays.

In Re a and C Elec. Co., Inc. · filed 1995-11-21(a)(6)

Thus, that letter was a violation of the automatic stay under § 362(a)(6), and the Trustees’ threat to suspend benefits to the Debtor’s employees was, and until rescinded is, a violation of the automatic stay under § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(6) bars repeated postpetition bills seeking payment of a prepetition debt.

Meis-Nachtrab v. Griffin (In Re Meis-Nachtrab) · filed 1995-12-18(a)(6)

Moreover, Griffin’s repeated postpetition billings for the Prepetition Debt plainly represented acts “to collect ... a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(6) bars coercive efforts to collect a prepetition debt through a debtor’s employees even when the debtor has no property interest in their benefits.

Divane v. a and C Elec. Co., Inc. · filed 1996-03-26(a)(6)

Such conduct violates Section 362(a)(6) without regard to whether A & C has an interest in its employees’ plan benefits, because that provision by its terms bars “any act to collect” and is not limited to actions against property of the debtor.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a postpetition administrative proceeding to recover a prepetition claim against the debtor, and a liability determination made without stay relief is void.

In Re the Women's Technical Institute, Inc. · filed 1996-04-05(a)(1)

The determination of liability occurred postpetition without relief from the automatic stay. It was the product of an administrative proceeding against the Debtor that could have been commenced before the Debtor filed its bankruptcy petition and that was brought to recover a claim against the Debtor that arose before the commencement of the case. As such, it was subject to the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). Having been conducted without relief from the stay, it was a violation of the stay and therefore is void.

Section 362(a)(6) prevents a creditor from taking an affirmative step after the bankruptcy filing, such as sending a notice of acceleration, to collect its debt.

In Re Tarkio College · filed 1996-05-13(a)(6)

Thereafter, the automatic stay prevented FBIT from taking any further affirmative act, such as sending a notice of acceleration to collect its debt.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a debt collector from sending the validation notice required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g after the debtor files for bankruptcy.

Maloy v. Phillips · filed 1996-06-25(a)(6)

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a collector from sending the notice required by § 1692g.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a mortgage servicer from demanding payment of preconfirmation arrears through a negative escrow balance after those arrears are provided for in a confirmed Chapter 13 plan.

Fed'l Home Loan Mortgage v. McCormack · filed 1996-08-29(a)(6)

It is upon the present record that the court herewith finds and rules that the bankruptcy court did not err when it deemed C M M C 's actions to be a breach of the automatic stay; specifically, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (6).

Section 362(a) bars a creditor from demanding payment from a debtor after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

In Re Driggers · filed 1996-11-04(a)

In this case, it is clear that Nati-onsBank has violated the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) by continuing to make demands on the debtors for payment notwithstanding the filing of their bankruptcy petition.

Section 362’s automatic stay bars a creditor from withholding a debtor’s property after the bankruptcy filing to collect prepetition debt.

Enjet, Inc. v. Stapp Towing Co. (In re Enjet, Inc.) · filed 1997-03-05

At the moment Stapp refused to discharge the Product, Stapp violated the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a creditor from sending invoices that demand payment of a prepetition debt, even when the invoices say they are for informational purposes.

In Re Draper · filed 1999-05-27(a)(6)

However, Capstead’s invoices set forth the amount of payments past due and asked the Debtor to remit this amount using an attached payment coupon and enclosed envelope. Capstead’s actions clearly were geared toward collection of the debt which is prohibited by § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(1) bars a creditor from using state court citation proceedings to investigate or collect a prepetition debt after the debtor files for bankruptcy.

In Re Fridge · filed 1999-09-22(a)(1)

However, during pendency of a debtor’s bankruptcy, any use of state court process for collection of debts violates the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) makes a creditor’s postpetition attempt to perfect a contractual right to attorney fees through a payment demand in a dischargeability complaint void from the outset.

American Express Travel Related Services, Inc. v. Jawish (In Re Jawish) · filed 2000-11-20(a)(6)

Under the Code, however, any effect the paragraph might have is void ab initio because it violates the automatic stay.

Section 362 bars creditors, including a debtor’s attorney, from collecting prepetition debts after the bankruptcy filing; negotiating postpetition checks to collect such a debt violates the automatic stay.

In Re Newkirk · filed 2002-02-08

Upon the bankruptcy filing, the Section 362 automatic stay went into effect. This legal injunction restrained creditors, including Lezman, from collecting their prepetition debts or acting against Newkirk’s property. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2001). ... Being well aware of Newkirk’s bankruptcy, Lezman’s negotiation of New-kirk’s postpetition checks was a wilful violation of the stay and the discharge injunction.

Section 362 bars a creditor from giving a debtor a post-petition notice of default on a pre-petition promissory note.

In Re Loewen Group International, Inc. · filed 2002-02-19

At that point, Claimants could not have provided Debtors with notice of default because such post-petition notice would have constituted a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) requires a creditor to discontinue a post-petition collection action; maintaining an active collection action itself violates the stay.

Eskanos & Adler, P.C. v. Leetien · filed 2002-11-07(a)(1)

The maintenance of an active collection action alone adequately satisfies the statutory prohibition against “continuation” of judicial actions. Consistent with the plain and unambiguous meaning of the statute, and consonant with Congressional intent, we hold that § 362(a)(1) imposes an affirmative duty to discontinue post-petition collection actions.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a creditor from threatening harm to a debtor’s business to pressure payment of a debt.

In Re Crudup · filed 2002-12-20(a)(6)

The letter clearly states that his efforts will cease if Mr. Crudup pays him the $17,500 he last offered to accept. This letter violates both purposes behind the automatic stay: it harasses and threatens the debtor, and it seeks to put Mr. Donovan ahead of other creditors in the distribution of assets.

Section 362 prevents a creditor from taking steps to trigger a contractual payment increase, including giving a required payment notice, unless the creditor obtains relief from the automatic stay.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. OpTel, Inc. (In Re OpTel, Inc.) · filed 2003-03-25(a)(6)

Because Nationwide did not obtain relief from the automatic stay, it was unable to give notice, as required pursuant to section § 2(b)(i) of the Agreement of Sale, that it was exercising its right to receive the Deferred Payment.

Section 362(a)(6) does not prohibit a creditor from threatening to pursue a nondebtor’s pledged annuity and merely allowing the debtor to execute a new note as an alternative.

Paglia v. Sky Bank (In Re Paglia) · filed 2003-09-18(a)(6)

Defendant therefore did not violate the automatic stay by undertaking an act to collect a pre-petition claim against debtor when it threatened to take legal action against the annuity belonging to debtor’s mother and then instead permitted debtor to execute the second promissory note as an alternative.

Section 362(a)(6) bars filing postpetition tax liens against nondebtor transferees to collect a debtor’s prepetition tax debt from transferred property.

Gonzales v. United States (In Re Silver) · filed 2004-01-16(a)(6)

Accordingly, the IRS’s filing of Postpetition Tax Liens was an act to collect a prepetition claim against the Debtors in violation of the stay imposed under § 362(a)(6).

Funding a student-loan consolidation after the bankruptcy petition, thereby extinguishing the original loans, does not violate Section 362(a)(6) because funding is not an act to collect, assess, or recover a prepetition claim.

Buwana v. U.S. Department of Education (In Re Buwana) · filed 2004-05-03(a)(6)

It cannot be disputed that the Direct Consolidation Loan at the time of funding—that is, November 20, 1996—extinguished the GSLs. Nevertheless, the funding of a loan is quite different from such acts “to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title.”

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits withholding a debtor’s pension benefits to collect a prepetition debt without seeking court approval, even when the creditor describes the withholding as an administrative freeze.

Radcliffe v. International Painters & Allied Trades Industry Pension Fund (In Re Radcliffe) · filed 2008-07-08(a)(6)

More importantly, International did more than make statements of its intentions. It actually followed through and did not pay Radcliffe his benefits and did not seek the Bankruptcy Court’s approval before taking such action. ... These cases are starkly different from the present one because here International held all of the cards, announced its intention, carried it out without seeking court approval, and left Radcliffe virtually no option but to pursue litigation. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court was correct in holding that International violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits retaliatory conduct only when intended to collect a prepetition debt, and collection intent may be inferred from the circumstances without an express demand for payment.

In Re the Original Barefoot Floors of America, Inc. · filed 2008-11-18(a)(6)

Under the plain language of the statute, if an act is not designed or intended to collect a debt, it does not fall within the reach of the automatic stay, even though it may be wrongful in other ways. ... Put another way, an attempt to collect a debt can be implied from the circumstances even if the creditor does not say, in so many words, “I’ll go away if you pay my debt.”

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits repossessing collateral to collect a debtor’s prepetition debt even when the collateral is not property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

Lightfoot v. Borkon (In Re Lightfoot) · filed 2008-10-08(a)(6)

Hence they were never property of her bankruptcy estate. ... More to the point, this makes the Defendant’s act of repossessing the two trucks an impermissible act to collect a prepetition debt, and a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) may prohibit a school from seeking payment of a prepetition tuition debt as a condition of class registration.

In Re Lynch · filed 2009-10-01(a)(6)

The Court believes that UNI’s attempt to have Debtors pay the outstanding pre-petition tuition bill may violate the automatic stay. Debtors’ request to pay the outstanding UNI bill from the tax refund is denied.

Section 362(b)(11) permits presentment of a debtor’s post-dated checks, but § 362(a)(6) bars calls, letters, and returned-check charges to collect pre-petition attorney’s fees.

In Re Waldo · filed 2009-10-27(a)(6), (b)(11)

Nevertheless, although the presentment of the post-dated checks did not violate the automatic stay, the same cannot be said for other collection activity engaged in by Clark & Washington and Mr. Crawford; the telephone calls and collection letters from Clark & Washington and Mr. Crawford to the Debtors concerning payment of checks returned for insufficient funds were not excepted by § 362(b)(11) or any other subsection, nor was the collection of charges for returned checks, all of which clearly fall within the scope of acts “to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(6) bars creditor conduct that materially advances recovery of a prepetition debt and is unfair under the circumstances, including conduct aimed at buyers of estate property.

Lewis v. Negri Bossi USA, Inc. (In Re Mathson Industries, Inc.) · filed 2010-01-26(a)(6)

The conduct more specifically violates § 362(a)(6) in that it (1) could reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the creditor’s ability to collect, assess, or recover a pre-petition debt, and (2) is contrary to what a reasonable person would consider fair under the circumstances.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a student loan creditor from assessing late fees or other penalties solely because its pro rata Chapter 13 payments fall below the contractual monthly minimum while the debtor is in bankruptcy.

In Re Harding · filed 2010-02-08(a)(6)

The automatic stay prohibits Sallie Mae from assessing penalties for payment shortfalls occurring while the Debtor is in bankruptcy, and § 1328 discharges such penalties should Sallie Mae ever attempt to assess them in the future.

Section 362(a) supports a plausible automatic stay claim when a creditor requires a Chapter 13 debtor to pay more than the claim amount approved by the bankruptcy court.

Patterson v. HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL LLC · filed 2010-03-24(a)

Homecomings’ claim was satisfied when the Pattersons paid Homecomings what had been allowed by the bankruptcy court. But Homecomings required more, and this court finds that the Pattersons have alleged a plausible claim that the automatic stay was violated.

Section 362(a) prohibits postpetition notices demanding payment of a prepetition debt from the debtor.

McCool v. Beneficial (In Re McCool) · filed 2010-04-27(a)

Whether involving the automatic stay or the discharge injunction, postpetition notices sent to a debtor demanding payment of a prepetition obligation is a quintessential form of acts undertaken to collect a debt, and therefore such notices are proscribed by bankruptcy law.

Section 362(a)(6) stays acts to collect or recover a prepetition claim against the debtor even when the property involved is not an asset of the bankruptcy estate; acts that violate the stay are void.

LaHood v. Covey (In Re LaHood) · filed 2010-09-30(a)(6)

While several of the provisions of § 362(a) are couched in terms of the assets of the estate or the debtor, subsection (6) is stated much more broadly and refers to claims against the debtor rather than assets of the estate. ... Thus, the Court finds no error in the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that Richard’s actions violated the automatic stay and are void.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a creditor’s notice rescinding acceleration of a debt when sending the notice is an act to collect, assess, or recover on a claim.

Delaware Trust Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holding Co. (In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.) · filed 2015-03-26(a)(6)

Sending a notice of rescission is an act to “collect, assess or recover” on a claim, especially when the Noteholders have already been paid their full principal and accrued interest.

Section 362(a)(6) bars coercive acts to induce payment of a prepetition debt; when the record does not show whether a creditor acted to collect prepetition debt or only postpetition arrears, summary judgment on a stay violation is unwarranted.

Torres v. Asociacion Residentes Miraflores (In re Torres) · filed 2015-10-05(a)(6)

Thus, at this juncture, there is no evidence that the HOA acted in a coercive manner by deactivating the Debtors’ beepers to induce collection of a pre-petition debt pursuant to section 362(a)(6), or that the actions taken by the HOA were only for post-petition arrears and in accordance with the regulations.

Section 362(a)(1) prohibits a mortgagee from seeking reimbursement from debtors for prepetition property taxes it paid.

Citimortgage, Inc. v. Garnier (In re Garnier) · filed 2016-09-02(a)(1)

The attempt to secure payment of prepetition taxes violates § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(6) stays acts to collect a prepetition claim against the debtor even if those acts do not affect property of the estate.

Brodgen v. Holmes Motors Inc. (In re Brodgen) · filed 2018-03-30(a)(6)

The plain language of § 362(a)(6) requires only an act to collect a claim, irrespective of whether the act has any effect on property of the estate.

The automatic stay bars a homeowners’ association from enforcing a lien or collecting delinquent assessments after the debtor files for bankruptcy.

Faitalia v. Village Park Cmty. Ass'n · filed 2018-07-05(a)(4), (a)(6)

Indeed, once the Faitalias filed for bankruptcy, Village Park was prohibited from taking the actions described in the fee statute, because the automatic stay applies to all proceedings seeking to “enforce any lien against property” and “to collect, assess, or recover a claim.” See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4), (6).

Section 362(a)(6) stays attempts to collect a prepetition debt, and continued billing after notice of bankruptcy can be a willful stay violation.

Comer, Jr. v. Carilion Clinic · filed 2019-11-22(a)(6)

In this case, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Carilion willfully violated the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Carilion sought to collect the balance for pre- petition services after receiving notice that the Debtors filed bankruptcy.

Section 362(a) prohibits a creditor from threatening to obtain a lien on a debtor’s house to collect a prepetition debt.

Robert Chester Nocek · filed 2020-04-07(a)

The court has no difficulty concluding that a promise to obtain a lien comes squarely within the kind of conduct prohibited by both the letter and spirit of § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(6) bars collection letters and wage garnishments aimed at collecting a debt that arose before bankruptcy.

Sharrell D. Reed · filed 2020-03-20(a)(6)

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits creditors from engaging in “any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before commencement of the case. . . .” The Department’s letters explicitly state, in bold type, “THIS IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT. . .” (Debtor’s Ex. # 1). Further, the garnishments are clearly a debt collection attempt.

A debtor plausibly alleges a violation of the automatic stay when a creditor sends a letter during the stay that conspicuously calls itself an attempt to collect a debt, despite disclaimers and no express demand for payment.

Kelly v. Quicken Loans Inc · filed 2020-04-18(a)(1)

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court holds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a debt-collection effort—namely, the Gilbert Letter—by Defendant during the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) bars acts to collect a prepetition debt from the debtor.

Wernes v. Kroesen · filed 2020-05-01(a)(6)

Any act to collect on a debt against the debtor that arose prepetition violates the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits acts to collect a debt against the debtor that arose before the bankruptcy filing.

Kroesen v. Wernes · filed 2020-05-01(a)(6)

Any act to collect on a debt against the debtor that arose prepetition violates the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) stays a creditor’s notice to a licensing agency of an unpaid prepetition judgment when the notice would pressure the debtor to pay that judgment.

First Florida Living Options LLC · filed 2020-06-05(a)(6)

The Court holds that the Kunzes’ proposed notice to AHCA would be a violation of the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(a)(6) because it would be an attempt to collect a claim against the Debtor that arose before the filing of the case.

Section 362(a)(6) does not prohibit harassing personal communications when their connection to collecting a prepetition debt is too attenuated.

Cole, Jr. v. Rossman · filed 2021-04-29(a)(6)

The connection between the personal communications about Debtor’s romantic exploits and the debt due to PRN is simply too attenuated to show any violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 prohibits a law firm from obtaining postpetition repayment of a filing fee it advanced when the debtor’s repayment obligation arose before the petition.

Lavonia Valerie McCoy · filed 2021-06-16

A law firm that advances the fee with the expectation of repayment postpetition is violating section 526 by advising the debtor to incur a debt “to pay for bankruptcy related legal services”, violating 11 U.S.C. §362 and, assuming the debtor gets his or her discharge, violating 11 U.S.C. §524.

Section 362 bars a law firm from obtaining postpetition repayment of a filing fee it advanced when the bankruptcy petition was filed, because the debtor’s reimbursement obligation arose prepetition.

Charmeen L Mcfarland · filed 2021-06-16

The filing fee is due upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Therefore, 40F the debtor’s obligation to repay the filing fee to the firm is a prepetition obligation that is dischargeable. A law firm that advances the fee with the expectation of repayment postpetition is violating section 526 by advising the debtor to incur a debt “to pay for bankruptcy related legal services”, violating 11 U.S.C. §362 and, assuming the debtor gets his or her discharge, violating 11 U.S.C. §524.

Section 362 bars a law firm from seeking postpetition repayment of a filing fee it advanced when the debtor’s reimbursement obligation arose before the petition.

Cheryl Brown · filed 2021-06-16

A law firm that advances the fee with the expectation of repayment postpetition is violating section 526 by advising the debtor to incur a debt “to pay for bankruptcy related legal services”, violating 11 U.S.C. §362 and, assuming the debtor gets his or her discharge, violating 11 U.S.C. §524.

Section 362(a)(6) stays acts to collect a prepetition claim against the debtor only when the creditor has an enforceable right to payment from the debtor.

Ruiz v. Ruiz · filed 2022-10-06(a)(6)

Because Ms. Ruiz did not allege and support with well-pleaded factual contentions that Mr. Ruiz had a prepetition claim against her, the stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) did not apply to his requested modification of the support obligation.

Section 362(a)(6) bars postpetition statements seeking to collect a prepetition debt while the automatic stay remains in effect.

Joshua Eugene Vibbard and Michelle Renee Vibbard · filed 2022-09-12(a)(6)

The predischarge statements were acts by PAMC to collect prebankruptcy debts and thus violated the stay.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a creditor from sending postpetition statements to collect prepetition debts while the automatic stay remains in effect.

Joshua Eugene Vibbard and Michelle Renee Vibbard · filed 2022-09-13(a)(6)

The predischarge statements were acts by PAMC to collect prebankruptcy debts and thus violated the stay.

Section 362(a)(6) can support relief for a creditor’s postpetition conduct only if the debtor establishes that the conduct was intended to coerce repayment of a prepetition debt.

Neosha L Rogers · filed 2023-10-19(a)(6)

The only plausible basis for relief, at least before discovery could have demonstrated otherwise, was under section 362(a)(6)—and only if Ms. Rogers later could establish that TitleMax’s conduct was intended to coerce her into repaying her prepetition debt.

Section 362(a)(6) permits a stay violation claim based on allegations that a creditor invoiced prepetition charges and withheld legal work to induce payment.

Coomes v. Moran · filed 2024-01-09(a)(6)

At this juncture, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that defendants attempted to collect pre- petition debts. Specifically, plaintiff cites to one incident where, in response to asking for a draft of her brief, defendant replied to an email with an invoice for charges previously incurred. Plaintiff persuasively argues that this action was intended to show that he held her appeal “hostage by refusing to prepare and file the brief since Ms. Coomes owed a balance . . . .” Id. ¶ 56. This would appear to be a violation of the stay.

Section 362(a) prohibits continued efforts to collect a prepetition debt after bankruptcy filing, including collection calls, letters, and garnishment.

Schullo v. Apex Roofing & Restoration, LLC · filed 2024-03-04(a)

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Apex’s continued efforts to collect on a pre-petition debt without any regard for the automatic stay amount to willful violations of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(6) bars acts to collect a prepetition debt after the bankruptcy case begins.

In Re Mansfield · filed 2008-10-02(a)(6)

Mr. Murphy should well know, given that he is an experienced debtor's attorney that sending bills concerning a prepetition debt after a debtor files a bankruptcy case is a fundamental violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) bars acts to collect or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the bankruptcy case began.

Newcomer v. Litton Loan Servicing, L.P. (In Re Newcomer) · filed 2010-09-30(a)(6)

Section 362(a)(6), prohibits a creditor from taking “any act to collect ... or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.”11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). ... Thus, Homecomings’ effort to collect the Prepetition Escrow Deficiency through post-petition Loan Payments was an “act to collect ... or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case” in violation of § 362(a)(6). 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (emphasis added).

Section 362(a)(6) bars acts to collect a prepetition debt, including a debt collector’s notice that it is attempting to collect that debt during bankruptcy.

Simon v. FIA Card Services, N.A. · filed 2013-10-07(a)(6)

We will affirm the dismissal of the Simons’ § 1692e(11) claim because the mini-Miranda requirement conflicts with the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(1) does not extend a debtor partnership’s automatic stay to its nondebtor general partners merely because they are partners.

Patton v. Richard Bearden, Robert Bearden, and J.M. Bearden, Individually, and D/B/A Bearden Fish Farms · filed 1993-10-21(a)(1)

We agree that defendants’ mere status as general partners does not entitle them to protection under the automatic stay of the debtor-partnership.

Section 362(a) does not stay foreclosure of partnership real estate when an individual partner files bankruptcy but has no property interest in the real estate.

In Re Berlin · filed 1993-03-19(a)

Accordingly, because these properties are not property of the bankruptcy estate for purposes of 11 U.S.C. section 541(a), the automatic stay does not apply to them.

Section 362(a) does not stay foreclosure on property owned by a nondebtor partnership merely because a debtor is a general partner and claims rights in that property.

Hudgins v. Life Savings Bank (In Re Hudgins) · filed 1993-04-12(a)

The automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) applies only to debtors in bankruptcy and then only to their property.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay precludes a state health agency from terminating a debtor's inactive certificate of need while the stay remains in effect.

Agency for Health Care Administration v. ORHS, INC. · filed 1993-04-20(a)

In the case at bar, these provisions are inapplicable because, as stated, the stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) precluded AHCA's right to terminate the DBGH's inactive certificate and nothing in the record shows that AHCA obtained relief from the stay entered.

Reopening a discharged Chapter 7 case does not reimpose the automatic stay under section 362(a) without a bankruptcy court order staying the proceedings.

Roth v. Commissioner · filed 1993-05-24(a)

Accordingly, in view of the discharge of petitioner's chapter 7 case on March 12, 1990, and the lack of an order by the bankruptcy judge staying the proceedings, the automatic stay is not reimposed in this case.

Converting a Chapter 13 case to Chapter 7 does not trigger a new automatic stay under § 362(a).

American Industrial Loan Ass'n v. Voron (In Re Voron) · filed 1993-07-29(a)

... this Court finds that the conversion of the debtor’s Chapter 13 case to Chapter 7 did not operate as a new automatic stay.

A claim under § 362(a)(6) for collecting a prepetition debt may proceed when the alleged collection occurred after the bankruptcy case was reopened and facts could establish a stay violation.

Burke v. United States · filed 1995-11-17(a)(6)

Count II of the complaint alleges a violation of the section 362(a) automatic stay against acts to collect or enforce a pre- petition debt. See 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(6) . Liberally construing the complaint in favor of plaintiffs with all allegations taken as admitted, Jenkins, supra, the claim of a stay violation must be allowed to go forward as facts may be proven to establish a stay violation by the IRS after March 7, 1995, the date the order was entered reopening the case.

Section 362(a) imposes an automatic stay upon filing a bankruptcy petition, but reopening a closed case does not reinstate the stay after it has terminated.

Burke v. United States Ex Rel. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Burke) · filed 1996-07-18(a)

Reopening does not impose the stay of § 362(a).

A claim for damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay survives dismissal of the bankruptcy case.

Burgner v. Georgia Federal Credit Union (In Re Burgner) · filed 1998-03-18(h)

Obviously, it does not retroactively approve a violation of the automatic stay that occurred before dismissal. ... The court sees no meaningful distinction between this proceeding and those cases. Therefore, the court will enter an order denying GFCU’s motion to dismiss.

Section 362’s automatic stay is invoked again when a bankruptcy case is reopened and continues until the case is reclosed.

Mercury Capital Corp. v. Shepherds Beach, Inc. · filed 2000-03-16(c)

Accordingly, the court opines that the reopening of the bankruptcy case again invoked the automatic stay provisions of 11 USC § 362 to the extent that the Statute of Limitations was tolled pursuant to CPLR 204 until the bankruptcy case was “reclosed.”

Reopening a bankruptcy case does not reinstate the automatic stay after the stay ended upon closure of the case or discharge.

Compañia Franco Panameña de Inversiones, SA v. EHG Enterprises., Inc. · filed 2002-06-13(c)(2)

Además, como hemos expresado antes, la reapertura de un caso en virtud de la Sección 350 del título 11 U. S.C., no reinstala la paralización automática de la Sección 362 (a).

Section 362(a) stays a civil action against a defendant who files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.

Allen v. Forest · filed 2003-03-04(a)

The individual defendant, Raymond Forest, filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida on September 16, 2002 (Docket No. 7), and, as a result, this action is stayed as to him, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a) automatically stays further court action against a defendant that files for bankruptcy.

K.W. Muth Co. v. Bing-Lear Mfg. Group, L.L.C. · filed 2003-09-19(a)

SLI’s filing acts as an automatic stay of any further action by the Court against SLI.

Reopening a closed bankruptcy case does not automatically reinstate the automatic stay under Section 362.

Crocker v. Crocker · filed 2007-01-16(c)(2)

Accordingly, although there is no automatic reinstatement of the automatic stay after the reopening of a closed bankruptcy case, § 105(a) provides the bankruptcy court with broad equitable powers to preserve its own jurisdiction.

Section 362 automatically stays proceedings against a debtor that has filed a Chapter 7 petition, so a court order in the pending case does not apply to that debtor.

Arista Records LLC v. Usenet. Com, Inc. · filed 2009-06-30

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, an automatic stay is therefore in place with respect to Sierra, and it is not subject to the Court's Order and Opinion.

A damages claim under § 362(k)(1) for violation of the automatic stay remains viable after dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case.

Johnson v. Smith · filed 2009-08-05(k)(1)

The great weight of case authority supports our conclusion that a § 362(k)(1) proceeding remains viable after termination of the underlying bankruptcy case.

A stay of appellate proceedings under § 362 can be lifted after the bankruptcy case is dismissed.

US Philips Corp. v. International Norcent Technology, Inc. · filed 2010-04-02

On December 16, 2008, this court stayed briefing pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 due to Jennifer Long’s pending bankruptcy petition. Long informs the court that the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California has dismissed the bankruptcy case. ... (1) The motion is granted. .The stay is lifted, the appeals are reactivated, and the appeals are dismissed.

An appeal from an order lifting the automatic stay is moot after the underlying bankruptcy case is dismissed because no bankruptcy estate remains to support the stay.

Goldsmith v. Winnecour · filed 2013-01-09

This Court is powerless to afford Mr. Goldsmith any relief regarding those lifts of stay, because there is no longer a bankruptcy estate in existence over which to exercise any such authority. The Court holds that because Mr. Goldsmith’s bankruptcy case has been dismissed, the three appeals in 12-cv-517, 12-cv-589, and 12-cv-684 must be dismissed as moot.

Reopening a closed Chapter 7 case does not reimpose the automatic stay on property previously abandoned to the debtor.

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Brumfiel (In re Brumfiel) · filed 2014-08-13(a)

The Court finds that the reopening of Ms. Brumfiel’s case did not reimpose the automatic stay as to the Property.

Section 362's automatic stay does not prohibit filing a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case itself.

Avalos v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Avalos) · filed 2015-06-12(a)

However, as the opinion in LaGrone explains, “it is well established that the automatic stay does not prohibit actions in the bankruptcy itself.” LaGrone, 525 B.R. at 425.

Section 362’s automatic stay is not reinstated merely because a discharged debtor reopens a bankruptcy case.

Andrews v. Andrews · filed 2017-12-15

However, once a debtor has been discharged, the automatic-stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 are not triggered by the simple reopening of a bankruptcy case.

A Chapter 11 filing triggers the automatic stay, and proceedings subject to it remain stayed until the bankruptcy court dissolves, modifies, or lifts the stay.

Moeller v. The Aliera Companies · filed 2021-07-16

All proceedings in this case are suspended and stayed pending dissolution, ... modification, or lifting of the 11 U.S.C. § 362 automatic stay by order of the United States Bankruptcy Court of the District of Delaware.”

Reopening a dismissed bankruptcy case to interpret a prior order does not reinstate the automatic stay, which terminated on dismissal.

JAMES J LEE and KELLY LEE · filed 2022-09-30(c)

The automatic stay did not arise anew when the Lees reopened the bankruptcy case.

Section 362(a) automatically stays actions against a defendant when it files a bankruptcy petition.

Nunn v. Bitwise Industries, Inc. · filed 2023-07-17(a)

Pursuant to Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, all actions against a defendant who has filed a bankruptcy petition are automatically stayed once the petition is filed.

Reopening a bankruptcy case does not reinstate the automatic stay under § 362(a); filing a bankruptcy petition effectuates the stay.

Susan S Ruffalo · filed 2023-07-27(a)

Only the filing of a bankruptcy petition effectuates the automatic stay under § 362(a).

Section 362(a) automatically stays litigation against a Chapter 11 debtor, including pending motions, until the stay is lifted.

Habbaba v. Gorilla Mind, LLC · filed 2025-04-29(a)

This action as to Holdings is STAYED pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a bar association from requiring payment of disciplinary costs from a Chapter 13 debtor’s future income before considering reinstatement, despite the police and regulatory power exceptions.

In re Williams · filed 1993-07-02(a)(3)

The ISB’s refusal to permit the hearing to go forward is both an “act to obtain possession of property of the estate” in violation of subsection (a)(3) (the property here being future income), and an attempt to enforce a money judgment in violation of subsection (b)(5).

Section 362(a)(7) stays setoff.

In Re Newport Offshore, Ltd. · filed 1987-10-07(a)(7)

Besides the explicit reference in the order to setoff, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) also stays setoff.

Section 362(a)(7) generally requires court approval before asserting a setoff against a claim raised by the debtor outside the bankruptcy case.

Petrano v. Hall · filed 2023-03-31(a)(7)

Under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, court approval is generally required before asserting setoff to a claim raised ... by the debtor, at least outside the bankruptcy case itself.

Section 362(a)(7) covers a creditor’s postpetition setoff of debts and its continued maintenance of that setoff.

Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(C) · filed 2023-02-03(a)(7)

Indeed, the exercise of a setoff is explicitly covered by Section 362(a)(7), a distinct statutory section that was not applicable in the Fulton case.

Under § 362(a)(6), whether an administrative hold or freeze is an act to collect or recover a prepetition claim depends on the circumstances, including whether it merely maintains the status quo or pressures payment.

In Re: Waters · filed 2021-03-31(a)(6)

The court concludes that whether an administrative hold or “freeze” is an act to collect or recover on a claim for purposes of § 362(a)(6) depends on the particular facts and circumstances.

Section 362(a)(7) stays Social Security benefit withholdings used to recover an unrelated prepetition debt because those withholdings are setoff rather than recoupment.

Social Security Administration v. Logan · filed 2020-12-21(a)(7)

The bankruptcy court correctly determined that the SSA’s withholdings are in the nature of a setoff that is subject to the stay.

Section 362(a)(7) stays a creditor from setting off payments that would otherwise flow to the debtor under a state-court charging order.

In re Johnson · filed 2019-04-12(a)(7)

More specifically, the automatic stay shall encompass any attempt by the Creditors to set-off any payments which otherwise would flow to the Debtor based upon a charging order that the state court might impose.

Withholding child support to offset a discharged debt after notice of the automatic stay, without seeking relief from the stay, is a willful stay violation for which the debtor may recover the withheld amounts.

Sherman v. Proyect (In re Proyect) · filed 2013-12-11(a)(7)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Sherman’s actions of withholding child support — even after being informed that his actions may be a violation of the automatic stay and without ever moving to have the stay lifted — amount to willful violations of the automatic stay. As a result, Ms. Proyect is entitled to recover the amounts that he withheld. However, the Court does not find that punitive damages are appropriate under the circumstances of this case.