11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(k) allows a claim for stay violation damages to continue even if the property has been sold to a third party.

In re: Laurel Belkin Greenstein · filed 2016-01-26(k)(1)

Because Debtor was seeking stay violation damages under § 362(k), this appeal would never be moot. Further, it does ... not appear from the record that Wells Fargo has sold the Property to a third party. Even if it has, that fact would not absolve ... Wells Fargo from any potential stay violation damages.

The automatic stay does not bar granting leave to amend a stayed action to add defendants, even if the stay may later apply to proceedings against them.

RMG Media v. Donovan Marine Inc · filed 2024-09-17

Although this rule may operate to stay proceedings against Donovan Marine and BIG once they are part of RMG I, the court finds no bar to granting leave to RMG to amend its complaint in RMG I to add these defendants.

Section 362 stays the filing and service of an amended complaint against a debtor after its Chapter 11 petition unless the plaintiff obtains relief from the automatic stay.

Gibbons v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. (In Re Princeton-New York Investors, Inc.) · filed 1996-04-25

The Trustee, as a result, must seek relief from the automatic stay in GAR’s Chapter 11 case to file afld serve the amended Complaint against GAR.

Section 362(a)(1) prevents a court from adding a new claim against a debtor while the bankruptcy stay remains in place.

Bentley v. Greensky Trade Credit, LLC · filed 2015-12-30(a)(1)

The Court will not add this claim against TriState, because of the stay currently in place.

Section 362(a)(1) prevents a plaintiff from amending a complaint in an action stayed by the debtor’s bankruptcy.

Bell v. Koss · filed 2020-01-22(a)(1)

The automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C § 362 prevents the “continuation, including the issuance or employment of process,” of this action. That means that Plaintiff cannot amend the complaint.

Section 362(a)(3) stays execution of a writ of possession against a residential tenant whose continued possession is property of the bankruptcy estate, even after the tenant’s legal right to possession has ended.

Di Giorgio v. Lee (In Re Di Giorgio) · filed 1996-09-06(a)(3)

The Court does not believe that Congress intended to exclude mere possession of real property, even possession without a legal basis, from the “property of the estate.” ... Therefore, the bankruptcy court correctly held that enforcement of the writ of possession violated § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) protects a residential tenant’s option to redeem a lease after an eviction warrant issues until actual eviction or voluntary dispossession.

In Re Reinhardt · filed 1997-06-11(a)(3)

The opportunity granted by the state court to pay the judgment, even after a warrant of eviction has been issued, is an interest that the residential tenant retains until actual eviction or voluntary dispossession/abandonment. Absent physical dispossession, the option to redeem a residential lease is a recognizable interest to this Court, and accordingly is granted the protection of section 362(a).

Section 362(a)(3) protects a debtor’s possessory interest in real property even without an accompanying legal or contractual interest.

Buncher Co. v. Flabeg Solar US Corp. (In re Flabeg Solar US Corp.) · filed 2013-10-02(a)(3)

Furthermore, this Court holds that a possessory interest, without any accompanying legal or contractual interest, is sufficient to invoke the application of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) protects a debtor’s possession of a foreclosed residence from eviction even when the debtor has no ownership interest.

Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Wells (In re Wells) · filed 2015-08-14(a)(3)

The Debtor’s possession, even without an accompanying legal interest, gave rise to the protections of the automatic stay. The automatic stay applies and precludes the eviction of the Debtor from the Residence without relief from stay.

Section 362 protects a debtor’s possessory interest against ejectment, but does not stay foreclosure of property outside the bankruptcy estate when the debtor has no legal or equitable title interest.

Mackinley Ross, Jr. · filed 2019-02-06(a)

Considering the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Debtor likely retains a personal possessory interest in the Property vital enough to grant the protection of the automatic stay against ejectment from the Property (a relief which Wilmington does not presently pursue). However, the total absence of any legal or equitable property interest in the title to the Property means that it is not a part of the bankruptcy estate for purposes of shielding it from foreclosure by way of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) protects a debtor’s possessory interest in property against attempts to take possession from the debtor.

Kennedy, Jr. v. Najarian Capital, LLC · filed 2021-04-13(a)(3)

Plaintiff had at least a possessory interest in the property, protected by the automatic stay, when Defendant allegedly attempted to change the locks and regain possession of the Subject Property.

Section 362’s automatic stay is an injunction that bankruptcy courts may enforce against creditors participating in the bankruptcy case, including a state that filed a proof of claim.

Headrick v. Georgia (In Re Headrick) · filed 1996-09-26

The enforcement of the stay, an injunction, is integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship and fundamental to the court’s equitable jurisdiction. ... Bankruptcy courts therefore maintain equitable jurisdiction to enforce the automatic stay against creditors participating in the orderly distribution of the estate assets.

Section 362(a)(3) stays removal of property in the debtor’s possession regardless of who holds title, unless the bankruptcy court permits removal.

Specialty Mills, Inc. v. Citizens State Bank · filed 1997-02-05(a)(3)

Regardless of where title to the machinery and equipment properly belonged, the automatic stay applied; SMI was therefore prohibited from removing it without first seeking permission from the bankruptcy court. ... Property “from” the estate refers to property in possession of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a debtor’s exercise of control over estate property, including settlement of a prepetition personal injury claim.

In Re Stinson · filed 1998-05-29(a)(3)

What is stayed here under § 362(a)(3) is the debtor’s exercise of control over the estate property.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits removing property from a debtor’s possession after bankruptcy filing even if the debtor does not own it.

In Re Atlantic Medical Management Services, Inc. · filed 2008-04-08(a)(3)

Therefore, regardless of whether Debtors own the property which Dr. Pontell removed, he violated the stay by taking it from the Offices and retaining it in his possession.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay foreclosure on claims owned by a debtor's limited liability company because those claims are outside the debtor's bankruptcy estate.

Beane v Beane · filed 2011-01-24(a)(3)

So this was not an act to obtain possession or control of or to exercise control over “property of the estate” of Alan’s bankruptcy under § 541(a), and therefore not a violation of the automatic stay under § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a) does not stay foreclosure of property owned by a debtor’s LLC merely because the debtor is an LLC member and guarantor of the loan.

Lecia A. Taylor · filed 2026-03-20(a)

Thus, according to 11 U.S.C. § 362’s plain language, the automatic stay only applies to property of the debtor and the bankruptcy estate. ... Therefore, under 11 U.S.C. § 362, the automatic stay does not apply to the Properties.

Section 362(a)(3) stays actions to obtain property in the debtor’s bare possession until the stay is lifted, even when the property is not part of the debtor’s estate.

California Security Management Corp. v. Kennedy (In Re Kennedy) · filed 1984-05-23(a)(3)

Thus, although the Act precluded plaintiffs from pursuing this action until the Bankruptcy Court lifted the automatic stay, it did not vest jurisdiction in that Court to entertain plaintiffs’ action.

Section 362 prevents a security interest from attaching to estate property after the petition is filed as a debtor’s attorney performs postpetition work.

In Re IPS Systems, Inc. · filed 1997-02-13

The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 would preclude attachment of a security interest in property of the estate post-petition as work is performed on the debtor’s behalf.

Section 362(a) renders postpetition perfection of a security interest in violation of the automatic stay void.

Roost v. Green Tree Financial Servicing Corp. (In re Stoerck) · filed 1998-11-25(a)

To the extent that the application for exemption and its allowance accomplish perfection (because of the previously recorded trust deed), the perfection occurred postpetition and in derogation of the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), and is therefore void.

Section 362(a)(4) and (5) bar a postpetition amendment to a financing statement that increases a creditor’s perfected security interest in a prepetition claim.

Automatic Weaponry, Inc. v. Friedman · filed 2001-10-25(a)(4), (5)

A postpetition amendment to the financing statement increasing AWI’s perfected security interest from $200,000 to $875,000 would have entailed the perfection or enforcement of a claim that arose before Brown’s bankruptcy petition and would have been a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) voids an act during the automatic stay that backdates vehicle titles to create a security interest.

Guttman v. Citicapital Commercial Corp. (In Re Furley's Transport, Inc.) · filed 2002-10-04(a)

The backdating, therefore, is void under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) as an act taken during the stay period to create a security interest.

Section 362(a)(4) bars a postpetition assignment of a security interest that gives the assignee a new secured claim against estate property.

Heritage Christian Schools of Ohio Inc. · filed 2022-02-14(a)(4)

Thus, the post-petition assignment was an act to create a lien against property of the estate and violated the automatic stay.

Section 362’s automatic stay has exceptions, and a party invoking the stay must establish that it applies before a divorce decree can be treated as void.

Tyrone Sterling v. Williams · filed 2002-09-10(b)

And the automatic stay is not absolute; the bankruptcy code itself contains a list of exceptions. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b). ... Under the circumstances of this case, we do not think the appellant has shown that the divorce decree is void.

Section 362(a)(2) stays a former spouse from seeking to modify a prepetition divorce decree’s property settlement in state court during the bankruptcy case.

In Re Ladak · filed 1997-02-27(a)(2)

In the instant case, Respondent seeks in state court a modification of debtor and creditor rights. There is no question that the hold harmless provision of the Final Divorce Decree in this case is a dischargeable property settlement, not a support provision. Dis-chargeability of debts is our primary jurisdiction and is not shared with the state family courts. Accordingly, we find Respondent has violated the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code by seeking a modification of the divorce decree.

Section 362(a) stays enforcement of a divorce property division requiring a debtor to reimburse a former spouse for an automobile loan.

Hill v. Hill · filed 1999-03-12(a)

Because the payment of the automobile loan was part of the property division, we conclude that the trial court erred by ordering the husband to pay the wife the amount she had paid to satisfy the automobile loan. That order "seeks enlargement of [the wife's] property rights at the expense of the husband/debtor's property rights"; it therefore violates the automatic stay.

Section 362 permits equitable distribution of a debtor’s non-estate property but bars distribution of estate property in kind without relief from the automatic stay.

In Re Howell · filed 2004-07-01(a)(3)

The automatic stay does not apply to Rebecca Howell’s state court action for equitable distribution of the debtor’s property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate; e.g. exempt property, postpetition earnings, property abandoned by the trustee, or debtor surplus. ... Property of the estate, however, is protected by the automatic stay under § 362(a)(3) and is subject to the superior rights of the trustee as a hypothetical lien judgment creditor under § 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(iv) allows divorce proceedings to dissolve a marriage, but dividing property of the bankruptcy estate requires relief from the automatic stay.

Meeks v. Nalley (In re Nalley) · filed 2014-03-26(b)(2)(A)(iv)

The Bankruptcy Code prohibits property division between spouses without first obtaining relief from the § 362 stay which provides the Trustee and creditors with notice and an opportunity to protect their interest.

Section 362(a)(3) and (a)(4) protect postconfirmation wages that remain Chapter 13 estate property under a delayed revesting plan from a creditor’s collection efforts unless the creditor first obtains relief from the stay.

Clark v. United States (In Re Clark) · filed 1997-03-20(a)(3), (a)(4)

The conclusion compelled by the clear language of the debtors’ plan, the court’s confirmation order, and the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, is that the debtors’ postpetition wages remain property of the estate, and have not revested in the debtors; and, as a result, remain protected by the automatic stay. The Service may not take any action to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate, nor may the Service act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate, without first obtaining relief from the stay.

Section 362(a)(3) requires a creditor to return a vehicle seized before bankruptcy after the debtor files; retaining it violates the automatic stay.

City of Chicago v. Shannon · filed 2019-06-19(a)(3)

Applying Thompson to the facts before us, we conclude, as each bankruptcy court did, that the City violated the auto‐ matic stay pursuant to § 362(a)(3) by retaining possession of the debtors’ vehicles after they declared bankruptcy.

A creditor willfully violates the automatic stay by retaining estate property after learning of the bankruptcy case and refusing repeated requests to surrender it.

Lewis v. Money Mayday Loan, Inc. · filed 2019-05-16(a)(3)

The Court finds that Defendants willfully violated the automatic stay by retaining the Vehicle after they were informed of Debtor’s bankruptcy case and refusing to surrender it despite repeated requests.

Section 362(a)(3) does not require a creditor that lawfully repossessed a car before bankruptcy to return it before receiving adequate protection when the debtor lacked the right to possess it at filing.

In Re Fitch · filed 1998-02-02(a)(3)

Since the right to possess the car was not among the property interests which became property of the estate, Autoflow’s acts to exercise control over the right to possess the car did not violate the stay. Autoflow did not violate the automatic stay by retaining the car pending adequate protection.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit a creditor from passively retaining collateral lawfully repossessed before a Chapter 13 filing while the court determines the debtor’s right to recover it and the creditor’s adequate protection.

Brown v. Joe Addison, Inc. (In Re Brown) · filed 1997-07-03(a)(3)

Accordingly, because I find no automatic turnover duty to a Chapter 13 debtor, because the Chapter 13 debtor’s use of property is subject to a prior ruling on adequate protection, and because I find that passively maintaining the status quo in property lawfully repossessed pre-petition does not amount to an “act ... to exercise control,” I hold that Defendant did not violate the automatic stay.

A creditor that repossessed a vehicle before bankruptcy does not violate the automatic stay by declining to surrender it voluntarily at the start of the case while adequate protection is in question.

Spears v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In Re Spears) · filed 1998-08-06(a)(3)

Looking to the facts presented here, at the commencement of this case, FMCC justifiably had doubts as to plaintiffs ability to provide adequate protection, as she had previously failed to fund another Chapter 13 plan that contained substantially the same terms as the plan that has been confirmed in this ease. FMCC brought a motion to modify the stay within several weeks of the petition, and there was no apparent obstacle to the bringing of an adversary proceeding for turnover had plaintiff chosen to do so. Taking these considerations into account, the court concludes that FMCC did not violate the automatic stay in refusing to voluntarily surrender plaintiffs vehicle to her at the commencement of this case. Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for sanctions is denied.

Section 362 does not require a creditor to return property repossessed before bankruptcy solely because the debtor filed a petition.

Nash v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In Re Nash) · filed 1999-01-28(a)

However, there is no express language in § 362 requiring a creditor to return property repossessed pre-petition solely because a bankruptcy petition was filed.

Section 362(a) is willfully violated when a creditor that knows of the bankruptcy filing refuses the trustee’s demand to return a repossessed estate vehicle.

McCarthy v. Imported Cars of Maryland, Inc. (In Re Johnson) · filed 1999-02-19(a)

College Park — now fully aware of the bankruptcy filing — has not acquiesced to the plaintiffs demands. Therefore, College Park willfully violated the automatic stay. Accordingly, the court will grant partial summary judgment to allow the trustee to recover any damages suffered on or after February 23,1998.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit a creditor from retaining property lawfully repossessed before bankruptcy until a turnover order transfers the right of possession to the estate.

Barringer v. Eab Leasing (In Re Barringer) · filed 1999-10-04(a)(3)

A creditor who continues to possess property in which the estate has an interest can be said to “exercise control” over estate property only if the right of possession belongs to the estate. ... We instead conclude that the right must be judicially recognized in the form of a court order compelling turnover. Upon entry of such an order, the right of possession is in effect transferred from the creditor to the trustee. ... For the reasons stated, an order shall enter dismissing the complaint insofar as it alleges that in failing to return the truck to the Debtor, the Defendants violated the automatic stay.

Section 362 bars a creditor from selling a repossessed vehicle after the bankruptcy filing when the debtor still had a right to recover it at filing, unless the creditor first obtains court approval.

Patterson v. Chrysler Financial Co. (In Re Patterson) · filed 2001-05-24(a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6)

Therefore, there can be no doubt that Chrysler’s post-petition sale of the Automobile, without first seeking court approval, was a violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5) and (a)(6).

Section 362’s automatic stay is violated when a creditor keeps a repossessed vehicle in which the debtor’s bankruptcy estate has an interest.

Baker v. Health Services Credit Union (In Re Baker) · filed 2001-07-26

The Court concludes that there is no reason to reconsider its finding that Defendant is in violation of the automatic stay by maintaining possession of a vehicle in which Plaintiffs estate has an interest.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar a secured creditor from retaining and selling collateral it lawfully repossessed before the bankruptcy petition when the estate has only a right to redeem and no turnover order was obtained.

Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Alberto (In Re Alberto) · filed 2001-12-12(a)(3)

Only Alberto’s right to redeem the vehicle was property of the estate absent a turnover order. Thus, M & T Trust’s retention and sale of the collateral pursuant to state law did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) suspends a secured creditor’s collection remedies against a repossessed vehicle when the debtor files for bankruptcy while still owning the vehicle.

In Re Sanders · filed 2003-03-18(a)

Until the creditor disposes of the property, the debtor remains the legal and equitable owner, subject only to the creditor’s debt collection remedies, which are suspended by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) when a bankruptcy petition is filed.

Section 362’s automatic stay reaches a repossessed vehicle when the debtor retains a redemption right in the estate and proposes to exercise it in a Chapter 13 plan.

In Re Marlene Moffett, Debtor, Tidewater Finance Company, No. 03-1279. v. Moffett · filed 2004-01-23(a)(3)-(5)

Moffett proposes to exercise her right to redeem the. vehicle in her reorganization- plan, thus making the vehicle subject to the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay and turnover provisions.

Section 362 requires a creditor to obtain stay relief before disposing of a vehicle repossessed before a Chapter 13 filing when the debtor retains legal and equitable interests under Kansas law, despite the creditor's repossession title.

Estis v. Credit Union of Johnson County (In Re Estis) · filed 2004-07-13(a)(3)

Because the plaintiff retained legal and equitable title in the repossessed vehicle on the date of her Chapter 13 petition and the defendant’s “repossession title” was merely a mechanism for passing legal title upon exercising remedies under the UCC, the Court concludes that the repossessed vehicle became part of the plaintiffs bankruptcy estate pursuant to section 541 and that the defendant needed relief from the automatic stay prior to any disposition of the repossessed vehicle.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from retaining a vehicle repossessed before bankruptcy after the debtor demands its return and provides proof of insurance; a creditor disputing adequate protection must seek relief from the bankruptcy court.

Mitchell v. BankIllinois · filed 2004-07-28(a)(3)

If Banklllinois considered the proof of insurance inadequate to protect its interest in the vehicle, it could have filed a motion under section 362(e), on an emergency basis if necessary under section 362(f). ... Once Mitchell provided proof of insurance on the automobile, however, Banklllinois could not retain the automobile based on its unilateral determination that the insurance was not adequate protection. The record and applicable law support the bankruptcy court’s determination that Banklllinois’s refusal to return the vehicle violated the section 362 automatic stay.

Section 362(h) does not require relief for withholding a vehicle lawfully repossessed before bankruptcy when the debtor has neither paid reasonable repossession and storage costs nor arranged payment on terms acceptable to the creditor or repossessing agent.

In Re Powers · filed 2005-05-12(h)

If a vehicle has been legally repossessed by a secured creditor prior to the filing of a Chapter 13 case by the owner of the vehicle, as was the case with the Voyager: ... 2. In order to obtain a release of the vehicle, the debtor must pay those reasonable Repossession Costs in full, or otherwise provide for the payment of those Costs on terms acceptable to the secured creditor or repossessing agent, which can include the payment of those Costs as a secured claim in the debtor’s plan, independent of the allowed secured replacement value claim of the creditor, if that arrangement is acceptable to the secured creditor or the repossessing agent; ... The Debtors’ Motion for Contempt is in all respects denied.

Section 362(a) applies to a vehicle repossessed before bankruptcy under Ohio law but not sold or otherwise disposed of, because the debtor retains ownership and the vehicle remains property of the bankruptcy estate.

Tidewater Finance Co. v. Curry (In Re Curry) · filed 2006-08-10(a)

Because the vehicle is property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate, the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) apply.

Section 362(a) applies to a vehicle repossessed before bankruptcy under Ohio law but not sold or otherwise disposed of, because the debtor retains ownership and the vehicle becomes estate property.

In re: Laquita Curry v. · filed 2006-08-10(a)

Because the vehicle is property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate, the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) apply.

Retaining a vehicle repossessed before bankruptcy after notice of the petition violates the automatic stay and is willful despite a mistaken belief that return requires adequate protection payments or a filed Chapter 13 plan.

In Re Singer · filed 2007-04-20(a)(3), (k)

There is no question that Commerce’s actions in retaining the Vehicle after the bankruptcy petition was filed constituted a violation of the stay. ... The uncontroverted evidence is that Commerce knew of the Debtor’s pending bankruptcy case as his attorneys sent a copy of the petition and followed up with demands for the return of the Vehicle. Commerce’s erroneous belief that it had no obligation to return the Vehicle until it received adequate protection payments or a Chapter 13 plan was filed does not mitigate the willfulness of its conduct.

Section 362(a)(3) requires a creditor holding a vehicle repossessed before bankruptcy to release it after learning of the petition or seek relief from the stay; retaining it instead can be a willful stay violation.

Castillo v. Three Aces Auto Sales (In Re Castillo) · filed 2011-05-25(a)(3)

Accordingly, the Court finds that, beginning with the Respondent’s failure to either release the Vehicle on January 13, 2011 or to file a motion for relief from the automatic stay, the Respondent was in willful violation of section 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from retaining collateral repossessed before bankruptcy when the debtor still has an interest in it at filing.

In Re Herbst · filed 2012-04-11(a)(3)

Since the debtor’s interest in the property remains until it is sold, it is property of the estate, and subject to the automatic stay. Therefore, by the principals in Whiting Pools and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Thompson, the bank is in violation of § 362(a)(3) by retaining the collateral.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a creditor from retaining an estate vehicle repossessed before bankruptcy or conditioning its return on proof of insurance without promptly seeking relief from the bankruptcy court.

Stephens v. Guaranteed Auto, Inc. (In re Stephens) · filed 2013-07-03(a)(3)

Guaranteed Auto violated the automatic stay when it refused to return the car to Ms. Stephens and when it demanded proof of insurance coverage but did not promptly file a motion to bring the insurance issue before the Court.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a creditor from repossessing a debtor’s vehicle after the bankruptcy petition; the violation is willful when the creditor has notice of the petition.

Rivera v. Oriental Bank (In re Rivera) · filed 2016-09-19(a)(3)

Thus, the court finds that Oriental Bank’s violation of the stay under section 362(a)(3) was willful, and therefore grants the plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Section 362(a)(3) does not make a creditor’s retention of a vehicle repossessed before bankruptcy a stay violation while the creditor awaits proof of insurance as adequate protection.

In re Denby-Peterson · filed 2017-10-20(a)(3)

The court sees no reason to abandon the long established practice of maintaining the status quo in repossessed vehicle cases until a debtor provides proper proof of adequate protection, i,e., insurance.

Section 362(a)(3) requires a creditor to return estate property seized before a Chapter 13 filing; continued retention exercises control over that property and violates the automatic stay.

City of Chicago v. Fulton · filed 2019-06-19(a)(3)

Applying Thompson to the facts before us, we conclude, as each bankruptcy court did, that the City violated the auto‐ matic stay pursuant to § 362(a)(3) by retaining possession of the debtors’ vehicles after they declared bankruptcy.

Section 362(a)(3) does not require a creditor to return collateral lawfully repossessed before the bankruptcy filing merely because the creditor learns of the filing.

Joy Denby-Peterson v. · filed 2019-10-28(a)(3)

Guided by the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay and turnover provisions, the legislative purpose and policy goals of the automatic stay, and the reasoning of the Supreme Court and our two sister circuits, we hold that a creditor in possession of collateral that was repossessed before a bankruptcy filing does not violate the automatic stay by retaining the collateral post-bankruptcy petition.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit a creditor from asking about insurance and adequate protection while retaining a vehicle repossessed before bankruptcy when the inquiry does not alter the vehicle’s status quo.

Rogers v. TitleMax of Wisconsin, Inc. · filed 2023-08-21(a)(3)

By inquiring about insurance and adequate protection, TitleMax did not engage in any conduct that altered the status quo of the vehicle as of the time Ms. Rogers filed her bankruptcy petition—which Fulton says is required to “exercise control” of property—and therefore did not violate 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a) permits a judgment creditor to seek renewal or revival of a state court judgment when those steps merely maintain the status quo.

Wussler v. Silva (In Re Silva) · filed 1997-07-29(a)(2), (a)(4)

Thus, the application for renewal and the motion for revival did not violate the automatic stay, but simply served to maintain the status quo, actions not adverse to the policy of the bankruptcy law, but in harmony with it.

Section 362(a)(1) stays renewal of a prepetition judgment when the renewal procedure continues a judicial proceeding against the debtor.

In Re Lobherr · filed 2002-09-12(a)(1)

From such requirements this Court concludes that renewal of the judgment was a continuation of a proceeding against the Debtor as contemplated by § 362(a)(1) and, as such, was a violation of the automatic stay.

The automatic stay does not prohibit filing an Arizona judgment-renewal affidavit because the filing is ministerial and does not enforce the judgment.

Lachter v. Smith · filed 2004-12-01(a)(4)

As a matter of Arizona law, however, the filing of an affidavit of renewal is simply a ministerial action intended in part to alert interested parties to the existence of the judgment. Such a ministerial filing serves a notice function and does not seek to enforce a judgment. ... It therefore is not prohibited under Arizona law by an automatic bankruptcy stay or any stay of the enforcement of the judgment, such as might be imposed by the filing of a supersedeas bond.

Section 362(a) does not bar renewal of an Oklahoma judgment by filing a notice of renewal that merely maintains the status quo and requires no judicial proceeding.

3M Dozer Service, Inc. v. Baker · filed 2006-05-02(a)

However, the simple filing of a notice of renewal is not a judicial proceeding and does nothing more than maintain the status quo. We conclude—as did the bankruptcy court—that the automatic stay did not prevent Creditor from filing the notice of renewal.

Section 362(a)(5) does not bar renewal of an existing judgment lien against a debtor’s property when renewal merely preserves the lien’s existing status.

Brian Walter Ohm · filed 2020-07-31(a)(5)

It was not an act to create, perfect or enforce a lien. It was a continuation of his original lien. Debtor failed to meet his burden of proof that Mr. Miller violated the automatic stay by renewing the lien.

Section 362(a)(4) does not bar a creditor from petitioning to revive a dormant judgment when revival maintains the status quo.

In re Contreras · filed 2017-08-14(a)(4)

Additionally, as a petition for the revival of a judgment does not violate the automatic stay, nothing precludes Unifund from petitioning an Illinois state court to revive its debt.

Section 362’s automatic stay delays the start of the thirty-day removal period until relief from the stay is obtained.

Patterson v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 959 · filed 1997-08-15

If an automatic stay is in effect at the time the plaintiff files a state court action (which was the situation here), the thirty-day period for removal does not begin to run until relief is obtained from the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) does not support stay sanctions for noncoercive settlement negotiations when the debtor consents to the payment.

Frank D. Formica · filed 2021-05-12(a)(6)

Based upon all the facts surrounding this matter, the court cannot find that the negotiations were coercive, that threats were made, and Mr. Formica was harassed. Parke may have gotten away with something at closing here, and it certainly leaves a bad taste in the court’s mouth, but one cannot consent to action and then turn around and ask for sanctions.

Section 362(a) does not bar creditors from communicating with each other or negotiating about a proposed Chapter 11 plan or other aspects of a bankruptcy case.

Matter of Rimsat, Ltd. · filed 1997-09-11(a)

The automatic stay does not prohibit creditors from communicating with one another or negotiating with regard to either a proposed plan or other aspects of the bankruptcy case.

Section 362(a)(6) permits a creditor to request payment during reaffirmation if the request is made without coercion or harassment; a complaint alleging a stay violation on this basis must plead coercion or harassment.

Singleton v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In Re Singleton) · filed 2001-11-13(a)(6)

Similarly, to avoid dismissal here, the Plaintiff must allege coercion or harassment by the Defendant during the reaffirmation or debt collection process. ... In the absence of a claim of coercion or harassment, the motion to dismiss Count II is GRANTED.

Section 362(a)(6) permits post-petition settlement negotiations following a pattern of pre-petition negotiations if the creditor does not use coercive or harassing tactics.

In re Keaty · filed 2006-09-14(a)(6)

Wdiile the instant case has a dissimilar fact pattern, this court agrees that post-petition settlement negotiations, following a pattern of pre-petition negotiations, does not violate the provisions of section 362(a), provided that the creditor does not engage in “coercive or harassing tactics.” Under the facts presented, the court concludes that Mr. Danner’s conduct was neither coercive nor harassing.

The automatic stay does not prevent a bankruptcy trustee from correcting an erroneous mortgage cancellation on behalf of the estate.

Terlecky v. American Community Bank (In Re Godwin) · filed 1997-10-07(a)(4), (a)(5)

The Trustee, however, is not similarly stayed by the bankruptcy filing from correcting the erroneous cancellation of the Citizens’ hen on behalf of the estate.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not prevent a debtor or bankruptcy trustee from asserting a claim against another party.

Curen v. Federal Crop Insurance · filed 2014-04-21

The automatic stay applies to actions against a debtor, but does not prevent a debtor from offensively asserting a claim.

Section 362(k)(1) requires proof of some injury caused by a willful stay violation before sanctions may be awarded.

In Re Miller · filed 2011-03-01(k)(1)

Debtors’ failure to prove some injury arising from Ettinger’s willful stay violation is fatal to their Sanctions Motion. Without injury, Debtors are missing the critical third element required for an order of sanctions pursuant to Section 362(k)(l).

Section 362(k) permits a stay violation claim to proceed when the debtor plausibly alleges a recoverable injury from the creditor’s collection of estate property.

Patterson v. Homecomings Financial, LLC (In Re Patterson) · filed 2011-02-23(k)

For these reasons, the Court denies Homecomings’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint for failing to allege the requisite injury under § 362(k).

Section 362(h) supports monetary sanctions when a creditor continues collection efforts in violation of the automatic stay after notice of bankruptcy and a court warning.

In Re Chavis · filed 1997-10-08(h)

Wake Medical Center has ignored the automatic stay, the debtor’s motions, and this court’s order. Clearly, monetary sanctions are needed to get this creditor’s attention. The court addressed a similar issue with respect to another hospital in this area and imposed a sanction of $3,000. Wake Medical Center’s continued collection activities after the entry of this court’s order of July 24, 1997, present more egregious circumstances that compel a more severe sanction.

Section 362 bars a creditor from seeking interest and cost calculations on a prepetition judgment in another court, and the violation may be sanctioned by disallowing the related costs from the creditor’s claim.

In re B-E Holdings, Inc. · filed 1999-01-08(h)

There is no doubt that Veltze’s requests to the Peruvian court for interest and cost calculations were a violation of the automatic stay. ... Accordingly, as a sanction for violation of the automatic stay, the element of Veltze’s claims pertaining to the Peruvian awarded courts costs shall be disallowed.

Section 362(h) provides sanctions for dramatic violations of the automatic stay and should not be invoked lightly.

In Re Huminski · filed 2000-08-14(h)

11 U.S.C. § 362(h) is for dramatic violations of the automatic stay provisions of § 362, and it should not be invoked lightly.

Section 362(h) does not provide costs and fees when the action involves no violation of a stay.

Chute v. Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc. · filed 2002-02-21(h)

We deny Chute’s request for cost and fees pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(h), because his action does not involve a violation of a stay.

Section 362(h) permits an agent to be held liable for a willful violation of the automatic stay even when acting for a principal; liability is not limited to secured creditors.

Smith v. Homes Today, Inc. (In Re Smith) · filed 2003-07-21(h)

Second, as a matter of law, the universe of those who may be held liable for a violation of the automatic stay is not limited to secured parties. Any entity which takes possession of property of the estate in violation of the automatic stay may be held liable regardless of their status. Therefore, even if the Court were to find that both Stutts and Homes Today were agents for Royal Park Estates, they could still be held liable for a violation of the automatic stay independent of the liability of Royal Park Estates.

Section 362(a) requires a creditor to promptly rescind a foreclosure deed upon learning of the debtor’s bankruptcy, and failure to rescind violates the automatic stay.

Goodrich v. Union Planters Mortgage · filed 2006-08-07(a)

Union Mortgage had a duty to promptly rescind the deed upon learning of Debtors’ bankruptcy proceedings. Its failure to rescind the trustee’s deed for two years after knowing of the stay was indeed a violation of the automatic stay.

A technical violation of the automatic stay that causes no damages does not warrant sanctions under § 362(k).

Liebzeit v. FVTS Acquisition Co. (In Re Wolverine Fire Apparatus Co.) · filed 2012-01-31(k)

The technical violation of the automatic stay by FVTS did not result in damages to the trustee, and his request for sanctions is denied.

Claims for violating the automatic stay may remain in bankruptcy court when arbitration would conflict with the Bankruptcy Code’s purposes.

In re Jorge · filed 2017-05-26

This Court finds that the claims for violations of the automatic stay and the discharge injunction in the Motion for Contempt derive exclusively from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and arbitration of those claims would conflict with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, this Court has the discretion not to compel arbitration of Mr. Jorge’s claims where, as here, there is an inherent conflict between arbitration and the underlying purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362 does not make a loan servicer liable for an alleged automatic-stay violation committed by someone else before the servicer became involved with the debt.

Shoemake v. SN Servicing Corp. · filed 2018-07-12(a)

The Appellees, however, were not involved in any manner with this debt during the automatic stay. Appellees were not involved at the time the bankruptcy was going on and were not involved in whatever occurred prior to the bankruptcy closing. Any action that allegedly violated the automatic stay was taken by someone other than Appellees. ... Appellees did not violate the automatic stay.

Contempt damages for violating the automatic stay require clear and convincing evidence that the creditor knew the stay applied to its conduct and intentionally acted in violation of it; a good faith belief that the stay did not apply bars contempt damages even if unreasonable.

In re: The Preserve, LLC · filed 2018-09-07(a)

In summary, on remand, the bankruptcy court may award damages only if it finds that the Trustee presented clear and convincing evidence that RESS knew that the stay applied to its conduct and acted intentionally in its conduct that violated the stay. A good faith belief, even if unreasonable, precludes an award of damages for contempt.

Only debtors and trustees have standing to challenge violations of the automatic stay.

Bank Of New York Mellon v. Hill · filed 2019-09-30

Thus, the Court finds In re Pecan Groves of Arizona controls and that Bank of New York Mellon does not have standing to challenge the foreclosure sale as a violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay because it was neither a party, a debtor, or a trustee in Hill’s bankruptcy matter.

Section 362 does not give a deed-of-trust holder standing to challenge an automatic stay violation solely because the holder is a creditor of the debtor whose property secures the deed of trust.

The Bank of New York Mellon v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC · filed 2020-03-19

Accordingly, because BNYM’s only alleged relationship with the bankruptcy proceedings is that debtor-Borrowers also possess an interest in the Property for which BNYM seeks to quiet title, BNYM does not have standing to assert its lone theory for relief.

Only the trustee has standing to seek damages for a § 362(a) stay violation that harms property of the bankruptcy estate.

Synergy Law, LLC · filed 2020-05-04(a)

Here, the property at issue was property of the estate at the time the automatic stay was violated, and as already discussed, it is only the trustee who has standing to sue for a violation of the automatic stay harming property of the estate.

A creditor lacks standing to challenge a violation of the automatic stay; that challenge belongs to the debtor or bankruptcy trustee.

CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Corte Madera Homeowners Association · filed 2020-07-27(a)

Citi was neither the debtor nor the trustee. Thus, Citi lacks standing to challenge any purported violation of the automatic stay in Horton’s bankruptcy case.

Section 362(a)(3) does not make a debtor’s failure to turn over estate property a stay violation merely to enforce the turnover duty under § 542(a).

Michael Edward McCaffrey, Sr. · filed 2023-08-30(a)(3)

To expand stay violations and assess damages and sanctions against a debtor in a case such as this one does not support the objectives of the statute. Such a ruling would effectively create an “enforcement arm” for Section 542(a) which is contrary to the Supreme Court’s direction in City of Chicago v. Fulton.

A bankruptcy court acts within its discretion by declining to sanction one party for litigation during the automatic stay when both parties litigated the same appeal.

Carmack v. Carmack · filed 2024-04-03

Even if it’s true that the automatic stay barred the parties from litigating Eva’s appeal of the contempt award dur- ing the relatively short period between when she filed her bank- ruptcy petition and received her Chapter 7 discharge, we cannot say that the bankruptcy court abused its considerable discretion when it declined to sanction Gary for this violation, particularly be- cause it appears that both Gary and Eva violated the automatic stay by litigating Eva’s appeal of the contempt order.

Section 362(k) does not authorize sanctions for a creditor’s failure to file a garnishment release when the bankruptcy stay has already invalidated the garnishment under state law.

In re Benjamin and Brittany Thompson · filed 2026-03-10(k)

A garnishment release was not necessary as a matter of state law because the garnishment was already invalidated. As a result, the failure to file a release did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) and (4) prohibit a creditor from seeking relief from the stay in another bankruptcy court to foreclose on a Chapter 11 debtor’s property.

Coleman American Companies, Inc. v. Littleton National Bank (In Re Coleman American Companies, Inc.) · filed 1981-01-15(a)(3), (a)(4)

Section 362 of title 11 U.S.C., though broader than Bankruptcy Rules 401, 601 and 11-44, encompasses all of the prohibitions of those rules and pursuant to subsections (a)(3) and (4) and possibly (a)(1) and (5) prohibits the act taken against these Chapter 11 debtors by LNB in Colorado.

Section 362(h) provides a claim for a willful violation of the automatic stay that may be brought in district court after bankruptcy proceedings end.

Swanson v. Indiana · filed 2001-12-14(h)

The Bankruptcy Code creates a private right of action for the violation of an automatic stay, a statutory injunction against debt-collection efforts outside of the bankruptcy proceeding. ... The cause of action survives the termination of the bankruptcy proceedings and may be brought initially in a district court, as Swanson’s suit was. ... Because the facts Swanson alleged suggest that the Swindalls violated the stay willfully, his complaint stated a claim.

Section 362(h) requires damages for an individual injured by a willful stay violation and permits punitive damages in appropriate circumstances.

In Re Davy · filed 2006-06-21(h)

Chase properly sought permission from the Court by filing its Motion for Relief. The Debtors were in default at the time the Motion for Relief was filed. The fact that Chase later withdrew its Motion for Relief does not change the propriety of the motion. Indeed, Debtors have cited no authority suggesting that § 362(h) sanctions would apply to a motion for relief from an automatic stay, nor has the Court’s research revealed such authority. The Court finds there has been no “willful violation” of the automatic stay, and therefore declines to impose sanctions under § 362(h).

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar a Rule 41(b) dismissal for failure to prosecute when dismissal requires no consideration of the underlying merits and does not harm the debtor or undermine the stay's purposes.

O'Donnell v. Vencor, Inc. · filed 2006-10-30(a)(1)

Thus, the magistrate judge’s dismissal of O’Donnell’s first action under Rule 41(b) does not constitute a “continuation” of a judicial proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) such that it is void for having violated the auto- matic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) does not prevent a court from dismissing an action against a debtor for failure to prosecute because dismissal is not a continuation of the action.

Pro Star Logistics v. Bluestem Brands · filed 2022-11-18(a)(1)

Because the dismissal of an action does not constitute the commencement or continuation of a legal action, the automatic stay does not apply.

Section 362(a)(1) bars a court from issuing a notice to terminate a proceeding against a debtor for inactivity while the automatic stay is in effect, because the notice continues the judicial proceeding.

Tyson v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2024-01-16(a)(1)

We conclude that the Notice of Termination, therefore, constituted a judicial act towards the disposition of the case and thus a “continuation” of judicial proceedings – which was prohibited by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar dismissal for failure to prosecute because dismissal is not a continuation of a judicial proceeding against the debtor.

173D Airborne Brigade Association v. Geller · filed 2025-08-28(a)(1)

However, the Court’s dismissal for the failure to prosecute is nevertheless appropriate as to this entire action because such a dismissal does not constitute a “continuation” of a judicial proceeding against Defendant Michael Geller, and does not, therefore, run afoul of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)’s automatic stay prevents dismissal of a pending state court action for want of prosecution while the stay is in effect.

Boatman's National Bank v. Moss · filed 1997-10-30(a)

Also, this court’s interpretation of its Rule 41(b) to prevent a want-of-prosecution dismissal of a pending state court action after a § 362(a) is in effect, eliminates a plaintiff from refiling the action in the future, serves judicial economy and avoids possible statute of limitation and priority claim problems.

Section 362(c)(2)(B) ends the automatic stay when a bankruptcy case is dismissed; an appeal of the dismissal alone does not reinstate the stay.

Paul Alfred Rosberg · filed 2021-06-21(c)(2)(B)

Any appeal of this order alone will not, automatically, reinstate the automatic stay and Ms. Rosberg can execute on real estate to collect her judgment. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B) (“the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section continues until … the time the case is dismissed.”).

Section 362(c)(2)(B) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed.

Gdowik v. United States (In Re Gdowik) · filed 1997-11-06(c)(2)(B)

The automatic stay imposed by the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B), expires upon dismissal of a ease.

Section 362(c)(2)(B) automatically terminates the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed, so a later sale does not violate the stay.

Gonzales v. Checker Taxi Company and Checker Taxi Association · filed 1998-12-11(c)(2)(B)

Second, the sales of the car and medallion were not violations of the automatic stay, because the stay was terminated automatically when the bankruptcy case was dismissed.

The automatic stay terminates immediately when the dismissal order is docketed.

In Re Doherty · filed 1999-01-27(c)

When a case is dismissed, the automatic stay terminates immediately upon the docketing of the dismissal order.

Section 362(c)(2) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy court enters a signed dismissal order, even if the clerk has not yet docketed it.

Saunders v. United States (In Re Saunders) · filed 1999-02-25(c)(2)

Parties should be able to reasonably rely on a written order, signed by a Judge, that the party has actually received, even if this Order does not get docketed. This is exactly what occurred here. The IRS physically had in its revenue officer’s hands, a signed order from the bankruptcy court with a date stamp of 2:01 p.m., September 8, 1994. Relying upon this signed order, which caused the automatic stay to no longer be in effect, the IRS immediately filed a notice of federal tax lien. The Court holds that the filing of this notice of federal of tax lien did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(c)(2)(A) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case closes, allowing a creditor to resume its claim against the debtor.

DeLeon v. Beneficial Construction Co. · filed 1999-02-26(c)(2)(A)

The stay prevents creditors from making any attempt to collect from the debtor until the bankruptcy court has had an opportunity to collect, liquidate and distribute debtor’s assets, and will remain in effect until the case is closed, dismissed, or the debtor is discharged.

Section 362(c)(2) terminates the automatic stay when a bankruptcy case is dismissed, and reinstating the case cannot retroactively revive the stay to invalidate an intervening foreclosure sale.

Nicholson v. Nagel (In Re Nagel) · filed 1999-06-07(c)(2)

A review of the case law provided by the parties and the court’s own research reveals no basis in law for the proposition that the automatic stay continues after dismissal of a case. A retroactive reinstatement of the automatic stay is not consonant with this conclusion.

Section 362(c)(2)(B) terminates the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed.

Mirzai v. Kolbe Foods, Inc. (In Re Mirzai) · filed 2001-11-05(c)(2)(B)

Accordingly, it was not entitled to res judi-cata, and Kolbe was not prevented from collecting on its judgment once the first case was dismissed and the automatic stay terminated.

Section 362’s automatic stay ends when the bankruptcy case is dismissed, leaving the debtor and assets unprotected from creditors’ collection efforts.

In Re Hanson · filed 2002-07-25

In addition, upon dismissal, the automatic stay provided by Section 362 was no longer available to protect the Debtor or his assets from efforts by his creditors to collect their debts.

Section 362(c)(2) terminates the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed.

Regency Savings Bank v. Chavis · filed 2002-09-20(c)(2)

Under section 362(c)(2) of the United States Code (11 U.S.C. §362(c)(2) (1994)), an automatic stay remains in effect only until the earlier of the time the case is closed or the time the case is dismissed.

Section 362(c)(2)(B) terminates the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed; an appeal of the dismissal does not continue the stay without a stay pending appeal.

Holdampf v. H.E. Butt Grocery Company, Bob Robinson and Q. Garcia · filed 2003-02-27(c)(2)(B)

The automatic stay has been terminated by the dismissal of the case by the order of the bankruptcy judge. Although a stay may be continued pending appeal, the debtor must affirmatively act to obtain that stay pending appeal and post a supersedeas bond.

Section 362(c)(2)(B) terminates the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed.

Frank J. Holdampf, Individually and D/B/A Patriot Oil Company v. Jasmine Road Development Company, L.L.C. · filed 2003-03-06(c)(2)(B)

The automatic stay has been terminated by the dismissal of the case by the order of the bankruptcy judge.

Section 362(c)(2) ends the automatic stay when a bankruptcy case is dismissed, and later vacatur of the dismissal does not restore the stay retroactively.

In Re Hill · filed 2003-04-04(c)(2)

Although a case may remain open after dismissal, the automatic stay of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code terminates when the case is dismissed. Section 362(c)(2) provides that the automatic stay terminates upon the earlier of the time the case is closed, the time the case is dismissed, or the time a discharge is granted or denied. ... Clearly, according to the strong weight of authority, vacating the order dismissing the case does not impose or reinstitute or revive the automatic stay retroactively to the date of the vacated order.

Dismissal of a bankruptcy petition terminates the automatic stay, allowing a creditor to resume foreclosure against the debtor’s property.

In Re Garnett · filed 2003-10-21(c)(1)

Thus, dismissal of the bankruptcy petition has the simultaneous effect of undoing the bankruptcy estate and lifting the automatic stay, just as the filing of the petition creates the bankruptcy estate and imposes the automatic stay.

The automatic stay terminates upon dismissal of the bankruptcy case, rendering a challenge to lifting the stay moot when dismissal is upheld.

Sparrgrove v. Bank of Monticello (In re Sparrgrove) · filed 2004-08-11(c)(2)(B)

The propriety of the automatic stay is moot; an automatic stay terminates upon dismissal, 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B), and I have already concluded that dismissal was warranted.

Dismissal of a bankruptcy case immediately lifts the automatic stay.

Heghmann, et al v. Town of Rye, et al · filed 2004-07-22(c)(2)(B)

The First Circuit has found on more than one occasion that the automatic stay is immediately lifted upon the dismissal of a bankruptcy petition. ... Accordingly, M r . Heghmann is unlikely to succeed in demonstrating that the automatic stay in his case was in effect at the time that the Portsmouth District Court issued ... the May 2 3 , 2003 writ of possession, or anytime thereafter.

The automatic stay remains in effect when an order grants a motion to dismiss but does not actually dismiss the bankruptcy case.

In Re Adell · filed 2005-06-21(c)(2)(B)

This is so because this record leaves no doubt that the mere entry of an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss did not dismiss the case. The case was, and still is, before this Court and will remain so until, if ever, the District Court revokes the reference. From this it follows, that the automatic stay never ceased to exist and still protects the Debtor, notwithstanding the conclusion to the contrary of the Michigan Bankruptcy Court.

Under section 362(c)(2), the automatic stay expires when the bankruptcy court dismisses the bankruptcy case.

INCO DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. Superior Court · filed 2005-08-04(c)(2)

Plaintiffs have misread the statutory requirements. The bankruptcy stay automatically expired when the bankruptcy court dismissed the action. (11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2).)

Dismissal of a Chapter 7 case ends the automatic stay against collections and other actions against the debtor and the debtor’s property.

In re Kennedy · filed 2005-08-17

That the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 is lifted and the filing of this case no longer acts as a stay against collections and other actions against the debtor and the debtor’s property; it is further ... DONE AND ORDERED.

Dismissal of a bankruptcy case terminates the automatic stay.

Ruesch v. Household Automotive · filed 2005-12-05(c)

Dismissal of a case terminates all existing stays. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c).

Voluntary dismissal of a bankruptcy petition terminates the automatic stay and renders an appeal from an order lifting the stay moot.

In Re Montelione · filed 2006-05-15(c)

Here, once the Chapter 13 proceedings were voluntarily dismissed, the District Court could not have granted relief with respect to the lifting of the automatic stay. See In re Barbieri, 199 F.3d 616, 621 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that “under 11 U.S.C. §§ 349(b) and 362(c), a voluntary dismissal results in the debtor forfeiting the protections afforded by the automatic stay.”). Thus, Montelione’s voluntary dismissal of her bankruptcy petition rendered moot her appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s order lifting the automatic stay.

Voluntary dismissal of a bankruptcy petition ends the automatic stay and renders an appeal from an order lifting that stay moot.

Montelione v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n · filed 2006-05-15(c)

Here, once the Chapter 13 proceedings were voluntarily dismissed, the District Court could not have granted relief with respect to the lifting of the automatic stay. ... Thus, Montelione’s voluntary dismissal of her bankruptcy petition rendered moot her appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s order lifting the automatic stay.

Dismissal terminates the automatic stay, and a later foreclosure is not stayed where no order reinstates the stay.

Laurent v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc · filed 2006-07-18(c)(2)

Upon filing a petition for bankruptcy, an automatic stay is imposed and continues until the earliest of the following: the case is (1) closed; (2) dismissed; or (3) discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2). ... Moreover, to the extent Laurent implies that the automatic stay was in effect sometime after January 2004, he does not point to any order reinstating the stay and our own review of the record has not revealed such an order.

The automatic stay terminates upon dismissal of the bankruptcy case, rendering an order granting relief from the stay moot when dismissal is affirmed.

Rice v. Dunbar · filed 2006-12-11(c)(2)(B)

11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B) provides that the automatic stay terminates at the time the case is dismissed. Because we are affirming the dismissal of the case, the order granting Commerce relief from stay is moot.

Section 362(c) terminates the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case closes, allowing individual creditors to resume fraudulent-transfer actions.

Rooz v. Kimmel (In Re Kimmel) · filed 2007-04-11(c)

Once the case is closed, however, the automatic stay terminates (11 U.S.C. § 362(c)) and the right reverts to creditors.

Under section 362(c), abandonment of a lawsuit terminates the automatic stay as to that lawsuit, making a motion for relief from the stay moot.

In Re Jaynes · filed 2007-07-18(c)

Because the automatic stay terminated upon abandonment of the lawsuit, § 362(c), the debtor’s motion for relief from stay is moot and must be denied as well.

Section 362(c)(2) terminates the automatic stay upon dismissal of a bankruptcy case, but the stay is reinstated pending further deliberations when the dismissal that supplied the basis for stay relief is reversed.

Kelly v. Herrell (In Re Kelly) · filed 2007-07-24(c)(2)

This argument is internally inconsistent, because the automatic stay is lifted when a bankruptcy case is dismissed. ... Therefore, while the bankruptcy court engages in further deliberations whether to dismiss the case, the automatic stay will be reinstated.

Under § 362(c)(1), the stay against estate property ends when the trustee abandons it, and proceeds from its subsequent sale are not subject to that stay.

In Re Hermosilla · filed 2007-08-06(c)(1)

In this case, as noted above, after the Trustee abandoned his interest in the Property, it was no longer property of the estate and the automatic stay terminated. The Proceeds, which the Debtor obtained after subsequently selling the Property, were never property of the estate or subject to the automatic stay.

The automatic stay ends upon dismissal of the bankruptcy case, making a challenge to earlier stay relief moot when foreclosure occurs only after dismissal.

Dempsey, Gordon B. v. Carter, George C. · filed 2007-08-31(c)(2)(B)

The issue is moot, however. “The stay is dependent on the existence of the bankruptcy.” In re Statistical Tabulating Corp., 60 F.3d 1286, 1290 (7th Cir. 1995). Even if the bankruptcy court had never lifted the stay Dempsey would have been no better off because the Carters did not foreclose on Walnut Court until after his petition was dismissed.

The automatic stay depends on the continued existence of the bankruptcy case, so a challenge to lifting it is moot when foreclosure occurs only after the petition is dismissed.

In re Dempsey · filed 2007-08-31

The issue is moot, however. ... Even if the bankruptcy court had never lifted the stay Dempsey would have been no better off because the Carters did not foreclose on Walnut Court until after his petition was dismissed.

Under section 362(c)(1), the stay against estate property terminates when Chapter 11 plan confirmation revests that property in the debtor, unless the plan provides otherwise, leaving no stay from which relief can be granted.

In Re Globokar · filed 2007-09-18(c)(1)

Therefore, because “property of the estate” no longer exists and the automatic stay is terminated pursuant to § 362(c)(1), the Court is unable to grant the relief requested by GMAC.

Dismissal of a bankruptcy case renders a pending motion for relief from the automatic stay moot.

In Re Vitale · filed 2007-11-16(a)

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Hollowbrook’s Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay is rendered MOOT by the dismissal of this case.

Under Section 362(c)(1), property surrendered pursuant to a confirmed Chapter 13 plan leaves the estate and is no longer subject to the automatic stay, so accepting a deed to that property requires no stay relief.

In Re Rehanna · filed 2008-02-04(c)(1)

Moreover, this surrender was accomplished with the permission of the Court, as set forth in the Plan Confirmation Order. Once the property had been surrendered, it was no longer property of the estate or subject to the automatic stay and the Strankos are not now required to seek stay relief from this Court.

Abandonment of real property from the bankruptcy estate terminates the automatic stay as to actions affecting that property, so foreclosure initiated afterward does not violate the stay.

In Re: Albert Fields · filed 2008-02-27(c)(1)

When the abandonment became effective, the real property was no longer property of the bankruptcy estate. ... Accordingly, the automatic stay did not apply to actions affecting the Penns Grove property.

Under § 362(c)(2)(B), mandatory dismissal under § 521(i) does not terminate the automatic stay until the court enters an order dismissing the case.

In Re Spencer · filed 2008-05-13(c)(2)(B)

Furthermore, making the dismissal effective on day 46 of the case would be inconsistent with longstanding bankruptcy practice that even when it is plain that dismissal of a case is required, the automatic stay is not lifted under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B) unless and until the court enters an order dismissing the case.

The automatic stay does not protect a debtor from a foreclosure sale conducted after dismissal of a prior bankruptcy case and before a new petition is filed.

In re: William Oliver v. · filed 2009-02-17(c)(2)(B)

The Olivers’ argument that the automatic stay was in place when BankFirst foreclosed on the property also fails. The second chapter 13 case was filed on November 14, 2007, and dismissed on December 20, 2007. The foreclosure sale took place on February 1, 2008. The third chapter 13 case was not filed until April 9, 2008. There was no automatic stay in place on February 1, 2008.

Dismissal of a bankruptcy case ends the automatic stay and allows creditors to pursue collection from the debtor.

In Re Grant · filed 2010-05-24(c)(2)(B)

From the unsecured creditors’ perspective, they are still stayed by the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a) and 1301, and they have received nothing as promised under the plan. If the case is dismissed, as it should be, the stay lifts as a matter of law and the unsecured creditors are free to pursue collection of their claims from the Debtor.

Section 362(c)(2) ends the automatic stay upon dismissal, so a foreclosure sale while the case is dismissed does not violate the stay.

In Re Jackson · filed 2011-07-18(c)(2)

The June 29 sheriffs sale did not violate the automatic stay because the case was dismissed, and the stay did not exist.

The stay against estate property ends when confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan revests that property in the debtor.

Santander Consumer, USA, Inc. v. Houlik (In re Houlik) · filed 2012-10-29(c)(1)

As a result, in this case, the automatic stay imposed with respect to the Truck when the Houliks filed their Chapter 11 petition terminated upon Plan confirmation.

Section 362(c)(2) terminates the automatic stay when the bankruptcy petition is dismissed.

Douglas v. Niklas · filed 2014-03-31(c)(2)

Moreover, although generally “a debtor’s bankruptcy petition results in an automatic stay of all claims or proceedings against the debtor,” Dole v. Hansbrough, 113 B.R. 96, 97 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)), any stay in the underlying bankruptcy action here was terminated when Mohamed’s bankruptcy petition was dismissed. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2).

Section 362(c)(2)(B) terminates the automatic stay immediately when the bankruptcy case is dismissed.

In re Soppick · filed 2014-08-28(c)(2)(B)

Upon dismissal, the bankruptcy stay is immediately terminated by virtue of section 362(c)(2)(B).

Section 362(c)(2)(B) terminates the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed, permitting a stayed appeal to be reinstated.

Miller v. James Prince A/K/A James Smith · filed 2014-09-18(c)(2)(B)

Appellee correctly asserts that dismissal of appellant’s bankruptcy terminates the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. §362, thereby authorizing reinstatement of the pending appeal in our Court. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B).

Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay against estate property when that property is abandoned, permitting collection efforts to resume.

Anderson v. West · filed 2015-04-29(c)(1)

We agree with the BAP’s decision in Egbert and extend its sound reasoning to the circumstances presented here. Although Egbert involved lifting the automatic stay, in the context of this case we see no reasoned distinction between lifting the stay (allowing collection efforts to continue) and abandoning property (severing it from the bankruptcy estate, returning it to the debtor, and permitting collection efforts to continue).

Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay against estate property when that property leaves the estate, so abandonment permits creditors to resume collection against it.

Anderson v. West (In re Anderson) · filed 2015-04-29(c)(1)

Although ... involved lifting the automatic stay, in the context of this case we see no reasoned distinction between lifting the stay (allowing collection efforts to continue) and abandoning property (severing it from the bankruptcy estate, returning it to the debtor, and permitting collection efforts to continue). ... Whether property is abandoned or the automatic stay is lifted the property is beyond the control of the bankruptcy court.

Section 362(c)(2)(B) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed.

In re Paternity of Jerry Thomas Leber, Jerry Dillon v. State of Indiana and Laurie Leber (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-09-28(c)(2)(B)

Thus, Father was no longer involved in bankruptcy proceedings and the ... automatic stay was no longer in effect. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B).

Section 362(c)(2)(B) terminates the automatic stay when a bankruptcy case is dismissed, making a request for prospective stay relief moot.

In re Basrah Custom Design, Inc. · filed 2019-05-21(c)(2)(B)

That is so because the automatic stay will terminate upon the dismissal of this case.

Section 362(c)(2)(B) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed.

Tolano v. El Rio Bakery · filed 2019-08-20(c)(2)(B)

On February 19, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed Defendant Vargas Mendoza’s Chapter 13 Petition, thus lifting the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B).

Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay over estate property when dismissal removes that property from the bankruptcy estate.

Wilson v. Trustees Under Stan S. Cutler Revocable Trust Agreement · filed 2019-12-06(c)(1)

That dismissal terminated the automatic stay as to the two parcels of property. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(c)(1), 349(b)(3).

Section 362(c)(1) ends the automatic stay as to estate property when dismissal of a Chapter 13 case returns that property to the debtor.

Gilvia Vonzella Wilson · filed 2019-12-10(c)(1)

That dismissal terminated the automatic stay as to the two parcels of property. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(c)(1), 349(b)(3).