11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362 permits a creditor to postpone a foreclosure sale after confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan while the debtor remains in default, because postponement maintains the status quo.

In Re John Jeffrey Peters, Debtor. Mason-Mcduffie Mortgage Corporation v. Peters · filed 1996-11-25

Because confirmation of the reorganization plan does not effect a cure, the positions of the debtor and creditor are fundamentally the same pre- and post-confirmation. The debtor continues to be in default until it pays the arrearage. Thus, the Roach court’s holding is applicable in the post-confirmation context because the postponements merely continue to maintain the status quo.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit postponing a sheriff’s foreclosure sale to a date certain while the creditor promptly seeks relief from the stay, where the postponement preserves the status quo and the sale occurs after relief is granted.

Taylor v. Slick (In Re Taylor) · filed 1997-05-01(a)

We find that postponement of the sheriffs sale to a date certain did not violate the stay under the circumstances of this case and that the sale comported with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 362(a) does not bar postponing a previously scheduled foreclosure sale, publishing legal notices of the postponement, or notifying interested parties when those acts merely preserve the prepetition status quo.

Atlas MacHine & Iron Works, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (In Re Atlas MacHine & Iron Works, Inc.) · filed 1998-08-03(a)

This Court agrees with the Defendants and finds that, as the majority of courts in similar scenarios have ruled, that the postponements of the foreclosure sales, the legal notices accompanying them, and the letter to interested parties were actions taken to maintain the status quo and are not violations of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not bar a creditor from postponing a foreclosure sale by a one-time public announcement in accordance with state procedure while the automatic stay is in effect.

Roche v. Franklin First Federal Savings Bank (In Re Roche) · filed 1998-12-18(a)

In the same vein, neither can this Court perceive of any disadvantage to these Debtors by requiring that they be aware of the current state of the law and be mindful of the continued sale date. It is on this basis that I register my agreement with those courts that have found no violation of the automatic stay under these circumstances.

Section 362(a)(1) does not prohibit a single postpetition continuance of a foreclosure sale if the creditor files a motion for relief from stay before the continued sale date; other continuances require individual assessment.

In Re Heron Pond, LLC · filed 2001-01-18(a)(1)

I hold that a single continuance of a foreclosure sale following the filing of a petition is not a violation of the automatic stay if, before the continued sale date, the creditor filed an appropriate motion for relief from stay. In all other instances of continued sales, the cases will be treated individually.

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar postponing a sheriff's sale and giving oral notice of the new date when those acts preserve the status quo.

In Re Townsville · filed 2001-10-03(a)(1)

Under the holding in Taylor, the continuation of the Sheriffs Sale and oral notice of the new date did not violate the automatic stay because it merely preserved the status quo.

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar a creditor from postponing a foreclosure sale to preserve the stayed proceeding.

In Re Fine · filed 2002-11-21(a)(1)

Postponement of a foreclosure sale is certainly an act, but it is not a continuation of a proceeding against the debtor prohibited by § 362.

Postponing a sheriff's foreclosure sale in accordance with state law does not violate the automatic stay.

Worthy v. World Wide Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2004-12-13(a)(1)

Viewing these cases in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, a postponement of a sheriffs sale in accordance with state law does not violate the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision (11 U.S.C. § 362). Therefore, MERS did not violate the automatic stay provision when it postponed the foreclosure sale until February 4, 2004.

Section 362(a)(1) permits postponing a foreclosure sale for three months to preserve the status quo where the postponement does not harass the debtor or revive financial pressures.

Hart v. GMAC Mortgage Corp. (In Re Hart) · filed 2000-03-27(a)(1)

Moreover, the Court finds that, under the circumstances of this case, Fannie Mae did not violate the automatic stay by postponing the foreclosure sale to a date certain after the Debtor filed his Chapter 13 petition. ... Moreover, the Court finds that the Debtor’s testimony was insufficient to permit a finding that the mere postponement of sale revived the financial pressures on him or harassed him.

Section 362(a)(1) permits a single postpetition continuance of a foreclosure sale only if the creditor moves for stay relief before the continued sale date, and further continuances without stay relief violate the stay.

Lynn-Weaver v. ABN-AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc. (In Re Lynn-Weaver) · filed 2008-03-27(a)(1)

Here, the mortgagee and its counsel did not move for relief from the automatic stay before the date to which they initially postponed the sale. It follows that the initial continuance was a violation of the automatic stay. No relief from the stay having been obtained for the subsequent continuances, they too were violations of the stay. A mortgagee’s right to continue a foreclosure sale notwithstanding the automatic stay is a limited exception.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit recording a foreclosure sale after the bankruptcy petition when the debtor had no interest in the property on the petition date.

Bishop v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC (In re Bishop) · filed 2011-12-27(a)

The automatic stay prohibits certain actions against the debtor, property of the debtor, and property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). In this case, Debtor retained no interest in her residence on the petition date, so it did not become property of the estate. Consequently, GMAC did not violate the automatic stay by recording the sale post-petition.

Section 362(a)(1) and (a)(6) do not prohibit automatic postponement of a prepetition foreclosure sale when the postponement merely maintains the status quo and does not advance the foreclosure or collect a debt.

Henson v. Bank of America, N.A. (In re Henson) · filed 2012-09-11(a)(1), (a)(6)

For the following reasons, the Court concludes that the automatic continuance of the sale date, by itself, serves only to maintain the status quo and does not fit within the definition of a “continuation” of a legal proceeding in violation of § 362(a)(1), nor is it an act to collect a debt in violation of § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(1) does not prohibit a creditor from postponing a foreclosure sale after the petition when the postponement merely preserves the status quo.

Perez v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. ex rel. Certificate Holders of Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC · filed 2016-09-28(a)(1)

Given that this is the same issue that the First Circuit addressed in In re De Jesus Saez and identified in Roach, we now hold that In re De Jesus Saez is not simply analogous but is, in fact, binding precedent. As such, we must conclude the second postponement was not violative of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit postponing a foreclosure sale by giving notice of a new sale date during the automatic stay.

Singh v. Federal National Mortgage Association · filed 2018-04-23(a)

Here, Quality did not violate the automatic stay by mailing Singh a notice of postponement and postponing the trustee's sale to June 3, 2016. Continuing the sale did not violate the stay because "[p]ostponement notices which specify a new sale date do not violate 11 U.S.C. § 362." Roach,660 F.2d at 1318.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit mailing a notice postponing a trustee’s foreclosure sale and postponing the sale to a new date.

Singh v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n · filed 2018-06-15(a)

Here, Quality did not violate the automatic stay by mailing Singh a notice of postponement and postponing the trustee's sale to June 3, 2016.

Section 362 permits notices that merely postpone a trustee’s sale to a new date during the automatic stay because they maintain the status quo.

Richard D. Davis, LLP., a Texas General Partnership, Richard D. Davis, LLP, a Nevada Limited Liability Partnership and P · filed 2019-03-05(c)(2)

Notices which specify a new date of sale merely maintain the status quo and are thereby consistent with the purpose of section 362(c)(2).

Section 362(a)(1) does not prohibit merely postponing a previously scheduled nonjudicial foreclosure sale to maintain the status quo during bankruptcy.

Matthew James Winters · filed 2019-07-16(a)(1)

The postponement of the nonjudicial foreclosure sale in this matter, followed by its cancellation, did not constitute a violation of the automatic stay as a matter of law.

Section 362 does not bar postponing a foreclosure sale until after dismissal of the bankruptcy case.

Adelson v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2020-11-10

Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, Defendants did not violate the automatic stay by postponing the foreclosure sale until after the dismissal of the bankruptcy case.

A mortgagee’s postponement of a foreclosure sale violates the automatic stay if it harasses the debtor or revives the financial pressures that drove the debtor into bankruptcy.

Caroline Joyce Rellstab · filed 2020-11-10(a)(1)

For a mortgagee’s postponement of a foreclosure sale to rise to the level of violating the automatic stay, its actions must harass the debtor or revive the financial pressures that drove the debtor into bankruptcy.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit adjournment of a foreclosure sale while the automatic stay is in effect.

Adelson v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2023-01-31(a)

But the adjournment of a foreclosure sale does not violate a bankruptcy stay, and, in fact, shows that the party looking to foreclose is respecting the stay.

Section 362 does not stay a foreclosure purchaser’s right to possession when the sale occurred before the bankruptcy petition was filed.

In Re Cadet · filed 1985-10-15

But these statements were not accurate; the debtors were no longer the owners of the property; the arrearages were no longer subject to cure, and the Chapter 13 petition could not stay Standard’s right to possession of the property which it has bought at the foreclosure sale.

Sections 362(a)(1) and (a)(3) bar a state regulator from revoking a debtor’s license that is property of the estate without relief from the automatic stay.

In Re National Cattle Congress, Inc. · filed 1995-01-20(a)(1), (a)(3)

At that point, the act to revoke the license constituted control over property of the estate which violated the automatic stay provisions of § 362(a)(1) and § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) stays a government’s revocation of a debtor’s business license that is property of the estate; the government must obtain relief from the stay before revoking it.

In Re Burgess · filed 1999-05-28(a)(3)

Therefore, we conclude that the County’s action in revoking the debtor’s license falls within the scope of § 362(a)(3), for which there is no corresponding government exception. It may very well be that the County has the power under state law to revoke a brothel license at any time, but when the holder of such a license is in bankruptcy, the County must first seek relief from the automatic stay. As the County did not seek such relief in this case, its action thus violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) requires a court order lifting the automatic stay before an agency may give effect to regulations automatically cancelling a debtor’s licenses.

In Re NextWave Personal Communications Inc. · filed 2000-01-31(a)

The FCC was correct in May 1999-Section 362(a) does indeed require a court order lifting the automatic stay before the “automatic cancellation provisions may take effect ... so that the Licenses may cancel automatically.” No such order was granted in June 1999, and none was sought prior to the January 12 Declaration. Both the January 12 Declaration and the purported automatic retroactive cancellation of the Licenses are violations of the automatic stay.

Section 362 bars the FCC from taking action against a Chapter 11 debtor’s license for nonpayment of license fees without first obtaining authority from the bankruptcy court.

United States Ex Rel. Federal Communications Commission v. Kansas Personal Communications Services, Ltd. · filed 2003-03-04

At issue in Nextwave was a question which dominates this case: whether an FCC license holder who has filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is protected by the provisions of 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 and 525 from cancellation of the license for non-payment of license fees. ... The Chapter 11 filing barred the FCC from taking any action against the license of Kansas Personal Communication Services, Ltd. without first obtaining authority to do so from the bankruptcy court.

The automatic stay requires prompt reinstatement of a contractor’s license suspended solely for unpaid prepetition taxes, and continued suspension solely to collect those taxes falls outside the police and regulatory power exception.

Bertuccio v. California State Contractors License Board (In Re Bertuccio) · filed 2008-12-31(a)(1), (b)(4)

It was simply a matter of owing back taxes. It is clear, therefore, that the continued suspension of the Debt- or’s license was done solely to advance the pecuniary interests of the EDD. For that reason, the Defendants actions fail the “pecuniary interest” test for the police powers exception. ... For the above stated reasons, the Court finds that the Defendants, collectively, violated the automatic stay by failing to reinstate timely the Debtor’s contractor’s license upon receiving actual notice of his bankruptcy filing and request for reinstatement.

Section 362(d) permits a bankruptcy court in a Chapter 9 case to require adequate protection as a condition of continuing the automatic stay.

Alliance Capital Management L.P. v. County of Orange (In Re County of Orange) · filed 1995-03-08(d)

Accordingly, both from the standpoint of the County’s actual and implied consent to the application of § 362 in Chapter 9, this court has the power to order the County to provide the Movants with adequate protection as a condition for the continuance of the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(3) does not provide expedited relief from the automatic stay for a marina that conducts a boating business beyond renting moorings.

In Re Kkemko, Inc. · filed 1995-04-26(d)(3)

Application of that distinction reenforces our conclusion that what is at hand is not subject to § 362(d)(3). A marina has for its business the provision of moorings for boats. The evidence established that the business of the marina is something more than simply rental of moorings.

Section 362(d)(3) permits relief from the automatic stay for a secured creditor in a single asset real estate case when the debtor fails to file a reorganization plan within 90 days after the order for relief.

In Re Philmont Development Co. · filed 1995-05-12(d)(3)

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that each of the limited partnerships constitute a “single project” within the purview of section 101(51B). Accordingly, since the Debtor limited partnerships did not file a plan of reorganization within 90 days of the filing of them bankruptcy petitions, Chemical Bank is entitled to relief from the automatic stay pursuant to section 362(d)(3) in each of the jointly administered Debtor limited partnership cases.

Section 362(d)(3) requires relief from the stay in a single asset real estate case when the debtor misses the statutory plan deadline and fails to make qualifying interest payments; prior adequate protection payments from the creditor’s collateral do not count as those interest payments.

NationsBank, N.A. v. LDN Corp. (In Re LDN Corp.) · filed 1996-01-02(d)(3)

If the Court permitted the prior adequate protection payments of LDN to count towards the § 362(d)(3) interest payments, it would encourage the delay the statute was meant to prevent; LDN would simply be using NationsBank’s own collateral to prolong the inevitable. That does not further the purposes of the 1994 amendments to the Code and therefore the Court need not reach the issues of what rate of interest is required and what value that interest rate should be based upon. The Court views relief under § 362(d)(3) to be mandatory where its provisions are not strictly complied with.

Section 362(d)(3) does not impose its expedited stay relief schedule when aggregate secured debts exceed $4 million; the full amount of secured claims counts regardless of the property’s value.

In Re Oceanside Mission Associates · filed 1996-01-25(d)(3)

Debtors with secured debts exceeding $4,000,000 are excused from compliance with the expedited schedule of section 362(d)(3). ... The interpretation which best suits this purpose is that “aggregate non-contingent, liquidated secured debts in an amount no more than $4,000,000,” refers to the total amount of all secured claims without regard to the value of the property.

Section 362(d)(3) does not require stay relief against a full service hotel whose operations and additional businesses place it outside the definition of single asset real estate.

Centofante v. CBJ Development, Inc. (In Re CBJ Development, Inc.) · filed 1996-09-17(d)(3)

Thus, although merely calling a building a hotel is insufficient to remove it from the definition of “single asset real estate,” the operation of a full service hotel is more than the mere operation of property. ... We conclude that the Hotel is not “single asset real estate.”

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause in a single asset real estate case before the ninety-day period in § 362(d)(3) expires.

Duvar Apt., Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance (In Re Duvar Apt., Inc.) · filed 1996-10-21(d)(1)

It seems clear that although subsection (3) addresses the specific situation of single asset real estate cases, subsections (1) and (2) apply in those cases as well. A bankruptcy court has authority to grant relief from the stay for cause in a single asset real estate case before the expiration of § 362(d)(3)’s ninety day period.

Section 362(d)(3) requires relief for a secured creditor when a single asset real estate debtor fails to meet its plan or payment deadline, but permits the court to condition or modify the stay instead of terminating it.

Condor One v. Archway Apartments, Ltd. (In Re Archway Apartments, Ltd.) · filed 1997-02-14(d)(3)

This Court agrees that relief for the secured creditor is mandatory; however, relief does not necessarily require that the stay be lifted, only that the stay be modified, conditioned, annulled, or terminated.

Section 362(d)(3) allows a court to condition the automatic stay instead of terminating it when a secured creditor seeks relief in a single asset real estate case.

Riggs Bank, N.A. v. Planet 10, L.C. (In Re Planet 10, L.C.) · filed 1997-10-29(d)(3)

Under § 362(d)(3), the unconditional lifting of the stay is not mandatory. ... Therefore, the court will condition the stay to remain in effect pending a further hearing on February 4, 1998.

Section 362(d)(3) does not require relief from the automatic stay when the debtor actively conducts substantial business enterprises on the property rather than merely holding a passive real estate investment.

In Re Prairie Hills Golf & Ski Club, Inc. · filed 2000-11-08(d)(3)

Prairie Hills does not simply hold a passive real-estate investment. Since it is actively conducting various enterprises on the property, it does not fit the mold of the single asset real estate cases at which § 362(d)(3) appears to be directed. This is not a case involving “single asset real estate” and § 362(d)(3) is not applicable.

Section 362(d)(3) gives a single asset real estate debtor 90 days before failure to file a viable plan or begin monthly payments can support relief from the automatic stay.

In Re National/Northway Ltd. Partnership · filed 2002-06-11(d)(3)

The plain language of section 362(d)(3), however, gives the Debtor a 90-day breathing space before the foregoing obligations become the basis for a motion for relief. The passage of 90 days is a predicate to relief under this section.

Section 362(d)(3)(B) allows a single asset real estate debtor to avoid stay relief by making adequate protection payments equal to interest at the current fair market rate on the creditor’s interest in the property; the payments need not be interest payments.

In Re Cambridge Woodbridge Apartments, L.L.C. · filed 2003-05-08(d)(3)(B)

Section 362(d)(3) does not provide that the debtor must make interest payments but payments that “are in an amount equal to interest at a current fair market rate ....” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)(B). This Court considers Debtor’s adequate protection payments in the amount of Nineteen Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($19,250.00) to be payments in an amount equal to interest at a current fair market value rate of Old West’s interest in Wood-bridge. Accordingly, Old West is not entitled to relief under § 362(d)(3).

Section 362(d)(3)(B)'s requirement of monthly interest payments in a single asset real estate case is not satisfied by offering one payment two months into bankruptcy.

In Re 652 West 160th LLC. · filed 2005-09-26(d)(3)(B)

Moreover, assuming ... that a timely payment was proffered, one interest payment made two months into the bankruptcy does not meet the statutory requirement of “monthly payments.”

Section 362(d)(3) gives single asset real estate debtors thirty days after the court determines that they are subject to the provision to file a reorganization plan or commence interest payments to secured lenders when the initial ninety-day period has expired.

Kara Homes Inc. v. National City Bank (In Re Kara Homes, Inc.) · filed 2007-03-12(d)(3)

Pursuant to 11 USC § 362(d)(3), the Affiliated Debtors, as single asset real estate debtors, have thirty (30) days from the entry of the Order on the within motions to either file a plan of reorganization or commence making interest payments to the secured lenders, since the initial ninety (90) day period has long since expired.

Cause to extend the deadline for a single asset real estate debtor to begin interest payments requires a concrete substitute for the secured creditor’s statutory expectation of payment.

In Re Heather Apartments Limited Partnership · filed 2007-03-28(d)(3)

Under the present posture of this case, the entitlement under § 362(d)(3)(B) is the only one at issue. Its undeniable import is that any proffer of cause for excusing a debtor’s compliance must include a concrete substitute for the creditor’s statutorily-fixed expectation of payment, if the debtor is to be excused.

Section 362(d)(3) does not authorize stay relief against a timber business whose substantial employee-driven operations make it ineligible for classification as a single asset real estate debtor.

In Re Scotia Development, LLC · filed 2007-04-05(d)(3)

Scopac’s revenues are the product of its substantial and expansive commercial, silvicultural and scientific operations by its employees which occur on its property. ... For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Scopac is not a Single Asset Real Estate debtor. ... As such, 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) is not applicable to Scopac and the Court will not order relief from the automatic stay on those grounds.

A motion for relief from the stay under Section 362(d)(3) is premature if filed before the single asset real estate debtor’s 90-day period expires, even when the hearing occurs after that period.

In Re Hope Plantation Group, LLC · filed 2007-06-14(d)(3)

However, the time limits imposed on the debtor should not be shortened by the filing of a motion before the expiration of the 90-day period which leads to a hearing immediately after that time.

Section 362(d)(3) permits judgment lien creditors to seek relief from the stay against single asset real estate even if the monthly-payment alternative is unavailable against them.

In Re Windwood Heights, Inc. · filed 2008-02-25(d)(3)

Merely because one of two alternatives available to a debtor to thwart a stay relief motion may not available against a judicial or statutory lien creditor does not mean that a judicial or statutory lien creditor is not able to take advantage of the single asset stay relief allowance under § 362(d)(3).

Section 362(d)(3)(A) requires only a reasonable possibility of plan confirmation to preserve the stay in a single asset real estate case, so merely showing that confirmation is questionable does not justify stay relief.

In Re Harmony Holdings, LLC · filed 2008-09-11(d)(3)(A)

Lastly, receiving relief from stay pursuant to § 362(d)(3)(A) requires more than a showing that confirmation of a proposed plan is questionable. ... Lastly, there is no evidence that suggests to the Court that Debtors’ proposed plan of reorganization is patently unconfirmable. Relief is denied under § 362(d)(3).

Section 362(d)(3) applies to Chapter 7 cases involving single asset real estate.

Suntrust Bank v. Global One, L.L.C. (In Re Global One, L.L.C.) · filed 2009-07-21(d)(3)

Therefore, the plain language of the statute is conclusive that § 362(d)(3) applies to Chapter 7 cases.

Section 362(d)(3) permits a single asset real estate debtor to retain the automatic stay by filing a plan with a reasonable possibility of timely confirmation or making the required monthly interest payments.

In Re Rim Development, LLC · filed 2010-08-13(d)(3)

Section 362(d)(3) provides that as to single asset debtors, the stay terminates 90 days after the latter of the petition date or the date the Court determines that the debtor is a single-asset debtor unless one of two conditions is met. The stay may continue in effect if the debtor has filed a plan “that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed in a reasonable time” or if the debtor has commenced monthly payments equal to interest at the applicable non-default contract interest rate on the value of the debtor’s real estate.

Section 362(d)(3)(B)(ii) measures a single asset real estate debtor’s monthly payments using the nondefault contract interest rate even when a prepetition judgment imposes a different interest rate.

In Re Erie Playce LLC · filed 2010-12-07(d)(3)(B)(ii)

In light of the fact that Erie is not attempting to enforce the contract and that the language of the statute is plain, the interest rate to be applied under § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii) is 5.990%, the original contract rate.

Section 362(d)(3) requires relief from the automatic stay for a creditor secured by single asset real estate unless the debtor timely files a viable reorganization plan or begins the specified monthly payments; the bankruptcy court determines whether the debtor took corrective action in the first instance.

Meruelo Maddux Properties-760 S. Hill Street, LLC v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2012-01-27(d)(3)

The order acknowledges the bankruptcy court’s discretion to determine appropriate relief under § 362(d) and is silent as to whether the debtor has taken any corrective action under § 362(d)(3)(A) or (B), leaving those determina- tions for the bankruptcy court to make in the first instance. We conclude that there is no error in this approach and no error in the district court’s application of § 101(51B).

Section 362(d)(3)(A) permits relief from the automatic stay in a single asset real estate case when the debtor misses the 90-day deadline for a plan reasonably likely to be confirmed within a reasonable time.

River East Plaza, Ll v. Lnv Corpora · filed 2012-01-19(d)(3)(A)

He refused to consider the third proposed plan, lifted the automatic stay, and dis- missed the Chapter 11 proceeding. In doing these things he did not abuse his discretion—the applicable standard of appellate review. ... With River East having compromised its credibility by submitting two plans that sought to circumvent the statute, and the 90- day deadline having expired long ago (the Chapter 11 petition was filed on February 10, 2011, and the third proposed plan on August 23—194 days later), and LNV having waited years to enforce its lien, the bankruptcy judge was not required to stretch out the Chapter 11 proceeding any longer.

Section 362(d)(3) permits relief from the automatic stay in a single asset real estate case when the debtor cannot present a plan with a reasonable possibility of confirmation within a reasonable time.

In Re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC · filed 2012-03-14(d)(3)

Under § 362(d)(3), a single asset real estate debtor may not take an unlimited time in which to file a plan that “has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time.” ... This Debtor has had ample opportunity to present a confirmable plan for use of its property, but remains unable to demonstrate economic feasibility. Therefore, it is proper to lift the automatic stay and dismiss this case so that CenterPoint can proceed with its foreclosure action.

Section 362(d)(3) warrants modification of the automatic stay in a single asset real estate case unless the debtor timely files an appropriate plan, begins payments to the secured creditor, or obtains an extension for cause.

In re South Side House, LLC · filed 2012-06-15(d)(3)

This means that, unless a single asset real estate debtor files an appropriate plan or commences making payments to the secured creditor within the statutory time period, or receives an extension of these time periods for cause, modification of the stay is warranted.

Section 362(d)(3) requires relief from the stay in a single asset real estate case when the debtor has neither a plan with a reasonable prospect of timely confirmation nor timely statutory payments.

In re RYYZ, LLC · filed 2013-04-04(d)(3)

As the Debtors did not demonstrate that the plan has a reasonable prospect of being confirmed, stay relief must be granted unless the Debtors made timely payments pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)(B). The Debtors admit that they did not commence making statutory payments within the required time (ECF No. 86-2 ¶¶ 4, 7), and therefore have not satisfied Section 362(d)(3)(B).

Section 362(d)(3) permits relief from the automatic stay when a single asset real estate debtor fails to file a plan with a reasonable possibility of confirmation within a reasonable time.

In re 231 Fourth Avenue Lyceum, LLC · filed 2014-02-28(d)(3)

Because 231 Fourth Avenue Lyceum, LLC has failed to file a plan of reorganization that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time, as required by § 362(d)(3), P.B.’s motion to lift the automatic stay is granted.

For a single asset real estate debtor, disputed property rights omitted from the proposed plan do not establish plan feasibility or prevent relief from the stay under § 362(d)(3).

In re 231 Fourth Avenue Lyceum, LLC · filed 2014-07-17(d)(3)

Even if the Debtor’s lack of ownership of the air rights and adjacent lot had not been finally determined in state court, the stay would have been lifted. These disputed rights were not proposed to be dealt with in the Plan, and the existence of a disputed claim to air rights and an adjacent lot adds nothing to the feasibility of the Plan.

Section 362(d)(3)(A) allows a timely filed reorganization plan with a reasonable possibility of confirmation within a reasonable time to satisfy the stay requirement even if the debtor later amends the plan after the 90-day deadline.

MB Financial Bank NA v. T-L Conyers, LLC · filed 2015-02-04(d)(3)(A)

Consequently, the Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling that the Appellees filed a plan in accordance with § 362(d)(3), even though that plan was subsequently amended.

Section 362(d)(3) requires a single asset real estate debtor to make monthly interest payments or file a plan with a reasonable possibility of timely confirmation to avoid relief from the automatic stay.

In re Kachina Village, LLC · filed 2015-09-15(d)(3)

Having determined the Property is SARE, Debtor must do one of the following within 30 days to avoid stay relief under § 362(d)(3): (1) commence interest-only payments to LANB; or (2) file a plan of reorganization that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time.

Section 362(d)(3) requires a single asset real estate debtor to file a plan with a reasonable likelihood of success or begin monthly payments within 90 days of the petition to preserve the stay as to a secured creditor.

Chicora Life Center, LC v. UCF 1 Trust 1 (In re Chicora Life Center, LC) · filed 2016-06-15(d)(3)

Debtor is a single asset real estate entity as defined by § 101(51D)(A) and is therefore subject to the terms of § 362(d)(3) such that the automatic stay shall expire as to UCF within ninety (90) days of the Petition Date, in this case August 14, 2016, absent the filing of a Plan of Reorganization which has a reasonable likelihood of success, or the commencement of monthly payments.

Section 362(d)(3) applies to single asset real estate cases and requires stay relief unless the debtor timely files a plan reasonably likely to be confirmed or begins the required monthly payments to the lienholder.

In re 9 Houston LLC · filed 2017-12-20(d)(3)

There is no question that this case is a so-called single asset real estate case and, therefore, that § 362(d)(3) applies. Under this provision, it is mandatory that this Court terminate, annul, modify, or condition the automatic stay unless the Debtor, by no later than the 90th day after the Petition Date, takes one of two actions: (a) files a plan of reorganization “that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time;” or (b) commences making monthly payments to the lienholder “in an amount equal to interest at the then applicable nondefault contract rate of interest.”

Section 362(d)(3) requires stay relief when a single asset real estate debtor fails to file a reorganization plan or begin required monthly payments within the statutory period.

5th Street Parking LLC · filed 2020-01-24(d)(3)

Debtor’s failure to comply with section 362(d)(3)’s statutory requirements necessitates lifting the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(3)(A) requires a bankruptcy court to resolve a legal barrier to plan confirmation before denying a secured creditor’s motion for relief from the stay in a single asset real estate case.

The Aspen Club & Spa, LLC v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado · filed 2020-07-24(d)(3)(A)

Before denying the § 362(d)(3) motion, the SARE standard required the Bankruptcy Court to rule on whether exit priming lien financing needed to fund the Plan is permissible as a matter of law.

Timely commencement of monthly payments satisfies § 362(d)(3) in a single asset real estate case even if the debtor later stops paying.

Northbelt, LLC · filed 2020-09-02(d)(3)

While it may be true that Debtor has failed to make a payment since March 2020, the Debtor has not vio- lated § 362(d)(3) because the Debtor commenced monthly payments within the prescribed time limit as discussed in the Court’s May 29, 2020 Memorandum Opinion and Order. That is what the statute calls for, the commencement of payments. Since the requirements under § 362(d)(3) are to be read disjunctively, it has not been violated. Accordingly, the Court denies Wilmington Trust, N.A.’s request to grant stay relief under § 362(d)(3).

Section 362(d)(3) does not provide relief from the stay when the property falls within the residential exception to the single asset real estate definition.

ETS of Washington LLC · filed 2021-02-04(d)(3)

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the Property owned by the Debtor falls under the Residential Exception and that the Debtor is therefore not a single asset real estate debtor as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B). As a result, the Court finds that 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) is not applicable and concludes that the Motion for Relief must be denied.

Section 362(d)(3) applies its 90-day deadline to a single asset real estate debtor that acknowledges its SARE status in its bankruptcy petition.

1121 Pier Village LLC · filed 2022-01-11(d)(3)

Section 362(d)(3) requires a SARE debtor to satisfy these requirements within ninety (90) days after commencement of the case (or thirty (30) days after the court determines that the Debtor is a SARE debtor). Here, the Debtors acknowledged in their petitions that they SARE debtors, making the 90-day deadline applicable.

A timely filed single asset real estate plan can satisfy § 362(d)(3) if it is reasonably confirmable within a reasonable time, even if it was not confirmable when filed.

JSAA Realty, LLC · filed 2022-02-24(d)(3)

Although the Trust, by these objections, may have shown why the Original Plan was not confirmable when it was filed, the Trust has failed to show that these alleged infirmities prove that the Original Plan was not reasonably confirmable within a reasonable time.

Section 362(d)(3) does not prevent a court from granting stay relief in a single asset real estate case under § 362(d)(1) or (d)(2).

East/Alexander Holdings,LLC · filed 2022-05-12(d)(3)

The existence of § 362(d)(3) does not preclude the Court from exercising its authority to fashion appropriate relief in single asset real estate cases when sought under § 362(d)(1) or (d)(2).

Section 362(d)(3) gives a single asset real estate debtor 30 days after the court determines that the provision applies to file a viable reorganization plan when that deadline is later than the initial 90-day period.

544 York Partners, LLC · filed 2022-08-05(d)(3)

The 2005 amendment to section 362(d)(3) modified the filing deadline, probably because it was unclear in some instances whether a case was indeed a single asset real estate case. Thus, the 2005 amendment added a 30-day deadline from the court’s finding on that issue.

Section 362(d)(3) allows a secured creditor to obtain stay relief in a single asset real estate case when the debtor neither makes the required monthly interest payments nor files a plan with a reasonable possibility of timely confirmation.

Veterans Holdings, LLC · filed 2025-07-09(d)(3)

Thus, the Court finds that Richards met its burden under 11 U.S.C. 362(d) to obtain an Order of this Court terminating the automatic stay.

For a single asset real estate debtor that has not begun monthly payments, § 362(d)(3)(A) requires stay relief if the timely filed plan lacks a realistic prospect of confirmation within a reasonable time.

Bordeaux Ventures, LLC · filed 2025-10-17(d)(3)(A)

Therefore, the only issue is whether the Debtor’s Plan filed on the ninetieth day has a “reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time” pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)(A). ... The Court finds that the Plan is patently unconfirmable and does not present a realistic prospect of confirmation within a reasonable time.

For single asset real estate, § 362(d)(3) requires stay relief when the debtor neither makes the specified monthly payments nor files a plan reasonably likely to be confirmed within a reasonable time.

In re 700 17th Street, LLC · filed 2026-06-02(d)(3)

Because Debtor did not make the monthly payments required by § 362(d)(3)(B), it was required to show it had filed a plan of reorganization that had a reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time. Debtor did not meet that burden. Its First Plan was patently unconfirmable, and its Amended Plan is not confirmable. Thus, “stay relief is mandatory.” /d. The Court will grant the Stay Relief Motion.

Section 362(d)(3) does not apply to separate properties that are not used together as a single project.

In Re McGreals · filed 1996-10-28(d)(3)

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Debtor’s Properties do not constitute “single asset real estate” for purposes of Code §§ 101(51B) and 362(d)(3).

Section 362(d)(3) does not apply when a debtor conducts a substantial business on the property and therefore is not a single asset real estate debtor.

In Re Larry Goodwin Golf, Inc. · filed 1997-11-26(d)(3)

NOW THEREFORE FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED ... that based on the Court’s finding that Debtor is not a single asset real estate case, 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) is not applicable, and Debtor is to hereinafter reduce its monthly adequate protection payments from $6,793.00 to $4,000.00.

Section 362(h)’s federal remedy for willful automatic stay violations preempts state tort claims based on those violations.

Koffman v. Osteoimplant Technology, Inc. · filed 1995-05-04(h)

Allowing state tort actions based on allegedly bad faith bankruptcy fillings or violations of the automatic stay to go forward ultimately would have the effect of permitting state law standards to modify the incentive structure of the Bankruptcy Code and its remedial scheme. Because such a result threatens to erode the exclusive federal authority in this area, and because it would threaten the uniformity of federal bankruptcy law, the Court finds that OTI’s state tort suits are preempted by the federal Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(h) preempts state law claims against creditors and their lawyers based on conduct whose illegality arises solely from violating the automatic stay.

Smith v. MITCHELL CONST. CO., INC. · filed 1997-03-12(h)

These principles dictate our holding: § 362 (h) preempts Smith’s state law claims against Mitchell Construction and its lawyers for the actions they took in violation of Smith’s bankruptcy stay.

Section 362(h) preempts state law claims based on conduct alleged to violate the terms of an order lifting the automatic stay.

Stivali v. Aquiport Aylesbury, Inc. · filed 2000-06-09(h)

Thus, even if Stivali’s claim that appellees violated the terms of the bankruptcy court’s order lifting the stay were true, his causes of action based on that alleged conduct are preempted by 11 USC § 362 (h).

Section 362(h) provides a federal sanction for willful violations of the automatic stay, and state law claims based on stay violations are impliedly preempted.

Glannon v. Garrett & Associates, Inc. · filed 2001-04-10(h)

The court finds plaintiffs state law claims based upon the filing of the involuntary bankruptcy petition, filing of the adversary proceeding, and violation of the automatic stay are impliedly preempted by the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(k) remedies for automatic-stay violations do not establish congressional intent to preempt state malicious-prosecution claims based on bankruptcy adversary proceedings.

Graber v. Fuqua · filed 2009-01-09(k)

Section 362(k) sanctions only violations of the unique automatic stay, conduct that occurs outside of the bankruptcy proceedings. Because the automatic stay is another custom-built area of bankruptcy, its sanctions are more likely to preempt related state claims. But this provision does not evidence a preemptive intent related to adversary proceedings because the two areas—regulating the conduct of persons outside the proceeding and regulating the conduct of litigants inside an adversary proceeding—are so unrelated that an intent to preempt in one cannot evidence an intent to preempt the other.

Section 362(k)(1) provides the federal damages remedy for a stay violation and preempts a state wrongful foreclosure claim based entirely on that violation.

Sundquist v. Bank of America CA3 · filed 2013-09-05(k)(1)

We have nothing to add to the Georgia court’s analysis. The Sundquists’ cause of action for wrongful foreclosure is based entirely on the sale of their property in violation of the automatic stay. Any remedy the Sundquists have for damages incurred because of that wrongful foreclosure must be sought in federal court.

Section 362(k) provides a damages remedy for automatic stay violations that preempts a state-law claim seeking to remedy the same wrong.

Adkins v. Universal Federal Credit Union (In re Adkins) · filed 2016-08-05(k)

In sum, Ms. Adkins alleges that the same conduct that violated the automatic stay under § 362 also contravened the WVCCPA. She thus attempts to remedy the same wrong for which a remédy is already provided for under § 362(k) of the Code. Inasmuch as the state law claim is preempted, it is ORDERED that Universal’s Motion to Dismiss on this ground be, and hereby is, GRANTED.

Section 362’s automatic stay and damages remedy preempt an Illinois consumer fraud claim based solely on a violation of the stay.

Bednar v. Pierce & Associates, P.C. · filed 2016-11-10(k)

The alleged misconduct complained of in this case, the filing of a personal deficiency judgment, is allegedly unlawful because it violated the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision. The Plaintiff, however, did not avail himself of the remedy available to him under the Bankruptcy Code to punish such misconduct. ... To allow Plaintiff to bring his claim now would pile on additional state-law deterrent that is improper given the comprehensive regulations provided by the bankruptcy system.

The Bankruptcy Code preempts a state debt collection claim to the extent it is premised on a violation of the automatic stay.

Guthrie v. PHH Mortgage Corporation · filed 2022-03-04

Having considered the relevant case law, the Court is persuaded that this plaintiff's N.C. Debt Collections Act claim is preempted by the Bankruptcy Code to the extent it is premised on a violation of the automatic stay or discharge injunction.

Section 362 bars postpetition creation and perfection of an ERISA lien; the exemption for terminating a pension plan does not exempt imposition of the lien from the automatic stay.

In Re Kent Plastics Corp. · filed 1995-06-02(a)(4), (a)(5)

Although ERISA exempts termination of a plan from the automatic stay, there is no language which purports to exempt the imposition of a hen from the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(3) allows a lien claimant to file a notice perfecting a lien after a bankruptcy petition when state law makes timely perfection effective against parties who acquired rights before the notice was filed.

DeBaillon v. Wilson (In Re Jack/Wade Drilling Inc.) · filed 1997-07-15(b)(3)

Thus, the automatic stay would not have been a barrier preventing a lien claimant from perfecting a lien under LSA-R.S. 9:4862.

Section 362(b)(3)'s exception for lien perfection does not override the trustee's avoidance powers under Section 544(a).

Ostrander v. Gardner (In Re Millivision, Inc.) · filed 2005-10-12(b)(3)

The automatic stay exception under § 362(b)(3) functions with §§ 547(e)(2)(A) and § 546(b) to prevent valid acts under those sections from simultaneously, and irreconcilably, violating the automatic stay. ... Neither of those sections of the Code “override the effect of § 544(a)”; ... and, consequently, § 362(b)(3) is of no assistance to the Defendants.

Section 362(b)(3) permits a creditor to maintain or continue a lien during the automatic stay but does not require the creditor to do so.

River Parishes Dirt & Gravel, LLC v. Bankplus (In re Willow Bend Ventures, LLC) · filed 2019-05-31(b)(3)

Shamus Holdings is not the only case to find that § 362(b)(3) is permissive rather than mandatory. ... This court does not buy the argument and holds that BankPlus was not required to reinscribe its mortgage to maintain its secured status, because § 108(c)(2) tolls the period in which it must reinscribe until 30 days after the stay is lifted in the debtor's bankruptcy case.

The automatic stay bars postpetition acts to create, perfect, or enforce liens against estate or debtor property, subject to statutory exceptions.

Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Gotta (In Re Gotta) · filed 1985-03-01(a)(4), (a)(5)

Section 362(a)(4) and (5) provide that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of any act to “create, perfect, or enforce” any lien against property of the estate or the debtor. Any post-petition attempt to perfect a security interest violates the automatic stay and is void and of no effect.

Section 362(b)(3) permits an act to perfect an interest in property when the trustee's rights are subject to perfection under § 546(b), without violating the automatic stay.

In Re KDR Building Specialties, In. · filed 1987-08-14(b)(3)

Accordingly, a stop notice may be perfected under § 546(b) without violating the automatic stay provisions of § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(4) stays acts to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against property of the bankruptcy estate.

Town of East Lyme v. New England National, LLC · filed 2002-05-14(a)(4)

Subdivision (4) of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) provides that an automatic stay is applicable to “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate . . . .” We agree with the court that because the guarantor did not have an ownership interest in the subject property and because the filing of the certificates did not constitute enforcement of a judgment, ... the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) did not invalidate the liens.

Section 362 prohibits a secured creditor from continuing a foreclosure sale after Chapter 13 plan confirmation to preserve its ability to foreclose immediately on a cured prepetition default.

Peters v. Mason-McDuffie Mortgage Corp. (In Re Peters) · filed 1995-07-07(a)(1), (a)(5), (a)(6)

Continued postponement of the foreclosure sale gives Mason an advantage to which it is not entitled: the right to immediately foreclose for a prepetition default. ... Mason’s attempt to regain its position in violation of the confirmed plan is a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 prohibits continuing a foreclosure sale by public proclamation during bankruptcy when the process requires the debtor or a representative to attend to learn the new sale date.

Fritz v. Washington Mutual (In Re Fritz) · filed 1995-09-18

It is the conclusion of this Court that the employment of the public proclamation process, which necessarily requires the attendance of the debtor or the debtor’s representative is violative of the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a debtor’s postpetition recording of a homestead declaration to claim an exemption in property of the estate.

Martinson v. Michael (In Re Michael) · filed 1995-08-14(a)(3)

This Court holds that the Debtors’ post-petition recordation of their homestead declaration was stayed by operation of § 362(a)(3).

The automatic stay prevents creditors of a nondebtor spouse from executing against property held by the entirety when the debtor spouse’s interest is included in the bankruptcy estate.

Weaver v. Hamrick · filed 1995-08-28(a)

When, as in the present case, the interest of one spouse as a tenant by the entirety is included in the bankruptcy estate, the creditors of the other spouse are precluded by the automatic stay from taking any action which would affect any interest in the property. Thus, First Tennessee and TriCity were enjoined from executing on their judgment liens against the Dry Branch Road property for as long as the automatic stay remained in effect.

Section 362(a) imposes an automatic stay when a debtor files a new bankruptcy case despite a prior order dismissing an earlier case with prejudice as to refiling against a creditor.

Norwest Financial Tennessee, Inc. v. Coggins (In Re Coggins) · filed 1995-08-30(a)

In the debtor’s most recent prior case, number 94-29190-D, an Order had been entered providing that if that ease were dismissed, such dismissal would be with prejudice as to any refiling against Norwest. Notwithstanding that Order, the filing of the present case imposed an automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

A bankruptcy petition filed in violation of an order barring refiling is a nullity and does not stay a later foreclosure sale.

In Re Casse · filed 1998-04-21(a)

For the reasons more fully set forth below, the Debtor’s Chapter 13 filing made in violation of the Order is a nullity. The Order was proper and effective to carry out its intended purpose of allowing completion of the foreclosure sale by Key Bank unimpeded by further bankruptcy filings of the Debtor under any provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the Debtor’s motion to set aside Key Bank’s post-petition foreclosure sale is denied and this Chapter 13 case is dismissed.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay creditors’ personal claims against nondebtors when those claims belong to the creditors rather than the bankruptcy estate.

Apostolou v. Fisher · filed 1995-10-19(a)(3)

The fact that the appellants may also be regarded as creditors of Lake States does not alter the decision we have reached but merely indicates that this case may, in the alternative, also fall into the second line of cases, since the appellants may have both a derivative and a direct injury. The appellants’ claims, therefore, do not belong in bankruptcy and should not be subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a shareholder’s Section 16(b) action against corporate insiders when the claim belongs to the shareholder rather than the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

Schaffer Ex Rel. Lasersight Incorporated v. Cc Investments, Ldc · filed 2003-10-02(a)(3)

Thus, the Court is persuaded that the § 16(b) right of action at issue here belongs not to the bankruptcy estate, but to Schaffer, and consequently is not affected by the automatic stay pursuant to § 362.

Section 362(a) does not make a party’s refusal to pay a debt owed to the debtor a violation of the automatic stay; the debtor may seek turnover under § 542(a).

Dougherty v. Internal Revenue Service, Special Procedures Division (In re Dougherty) · filed 1995-10-25(a)

We should also note that we consider the Debtors’ invocation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) to be misplaced. The Debtors are simply invoking 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) to seek a turnover of estate funds allegedly due to them from the IRS. ... A debtor can more properly simply file an adversary proceeding to recover the sums due without invoking § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) does not make a party’s mere failure to pay a debt owed to the bankruptcy estate a violation of the automatic stay, even when the failure lacks good cause.

Mountaineer Coal Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance (In Re Mountaineer Coal Co.) · filed 2000-04-11(a)(3)

In conclusion, the Court finds that a party does not violate the automatic stay when its conduct is limited to its failure, even without good cause, to pay over to the debtor-in-possession or trustee a debt which it owes to the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(a) is not violated when a bank fails to turn over funds it owes a debtor under a deposit contract.

In Re Williams · filed 2000-06-06(a)

For another, failure to make turnover under 11 U.S.C. § 542(b) is not a violation of the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(4) does not bar a duplicate tax lien notice filed after the petition when the original filing already secured the same claims and the duplicate creates no new rights or advantage over other creditors.

In Re Carlson · filed 1995-12-05(a)(4)

However, the duplicate fifing of the Tax Lien Notice by the IRS cannot be construed as an act to “create, perfect, or enforce” a lien interest, since due to the prior fifing it could not establish new rights, or advantage the IRS vis-a-vis other creditors during the bankruptcy. Thus, it does not constitute a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(4) does not bar a duplicate tax lien notice that creates, perfects, or enforces no new rights.

In the Matter of Herbert P. Carlson and Margaret P. Carlson, Debtors. Herbert P. Carlson and Margaret P. Carlson v. Unit · filed 1997-12-02(a)(4)

The duplicative April 29 lien notice, though, “create[d], perfect[ed], or enforce[d]” nothing; it could not establish any new rights beyond those already acquired by the February 9 filing, therefore it did not violate the stay at all.

Section 362 stays statutory notices that advance enforcement of a tax lien against property, and acts violating the stay are void from the outset.

Rebuild America and REO America v. Mark E. and Tammy L. Davis · filed 2015-04-09(a)(4)

Therefore, we hold that the acts required under West Virginia Code § 11A-3-2(a) and (b) constitute acts in enforcement of a lien against property and, where there exists an automatic stay pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362, such acts are violative of the stay. ... Therefore, we further hold that acts taken in violation of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 are void ab initio.

Section 362(a)(1) applies to actions against a debtor outside the United States, including a foreign creditor’s filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition after the debtor files for Chapter 11.

Nakash v. Zur (In Re Nakash) · filed 1996-01-12(a)(1)

Consequently, despite the presumption against extraterritoriality, I find that the stay applies to actions against the debtor and his property outside the U.S.

Section 362(a) applies extraterritorially, but foreign reorganization orders approving an asset sale do not violate the stay when they do not affect property rights belonging to the debtor’s estate.

Daewoo Motor America, Inc. v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2004-08-26(a)

While the Court agrees with DMA that the protections of § 362(a) apply extraterritorially, ... the salient question herein is not whether the stay extends to property located outside the United States, but rather whether the Korean Court’s orders adversely affected any of DMA’s property rights under the Distribution Agreement. ... Because DMA does not, by virtue of the Distribution Agreement, ... possess the exclusive right to sell GMDAT-manufactured cars, the Korean Court’s orders approving the MTA and Modified Reorganization Plan did not affect any property of DMA’s estate and did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362 applies extraterritorially to property of the bankruptcy estate wherever located.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Arcapita Bank B.S.S.(c) v. Bahrain Islamic Bank (In re Arcapita Bank B.C.C. · filed 2017-10-13

Second, the Court rejects the Defendants’ contention that Sections 542(b) and 362 do not apply extraterritoriality. ... The same is true for Section 362. That section incorporates the definition of property of the estate provided in Section 541, which includes property “wherever located.”

Section 362(a)(3) applies to estate property abroad, but a bankruptcy court needs personal jurisdiction over a foreign entity to enforce the automatic stay against it.

Sheehan v. Breccia Unlimited Company · filed 2021-09-24(a)(3)

The automatic stay applies extraterritorially. ... Thus, there is no dispute that the automatic stay applied to both the Blackrock Shares and the Ballyheigue Property (assuming, of course, that both properties were part of Sheehan’s estate). Nonetheless, “a bankruptcy court can enforce the automatic stay extraterritorially only against entities over which it has [personal] jurisdiction.”

Section 362(a)(3) reaches estate property abroad, but a bankruptcy court can enforce the stay against a foreign entity only if it has personal jurisdiction over that entity.

Sheehan v. Murran · filed 2021-09-24(a)(3)

Thus, there is no dispute that the automatic stay applied to both the Blackrock Shares and the Ballyheigue Property (assuming, of course, that both properties were part of Sheehan’s estate). Nonetheless, “a bankruptcy court can enforce the automatic stay extraterritorially only against entities over which it has [personal] jurisdiction.” Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 474 B.R. at 82.

Section 362(a) imposes an automatic stay when a new bankruptcy case is filed despite a last opportunity order entered in a prior case.

Friend v. Chemical Residential Mortgage Corp. (In Re Friend) · filed 1996-01-24(a)

However, such orders simply can not have the effect of negating the Bankruptcy Code’s provisions concerning the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(4) requires a scheme to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors, so multiple bankruptcy filings do not justify relief without a creditor's prima facie showing of fraud.

In Re Abdul Muhaimin · filed 2006-04-25(d)(4)

To satisfy this second element for obtaining relief under BAPCPA § 362(d)(4), the court must find the filing of the petition commencing a bankruptcy case was part of a scheme to delay and to hinder and to defraud creditors. ... In order to obtain relief under Section 362(d)(4), a creditor must make a prima facie showing of cause for relief, and Deutsche, Chase and Community each fall short of making such a showing of a scheme to defraud.

Section 362 suspends pending state court contempt proceedings but does not disturb a contempt adjudication entered before the bankruptcy petition.

Gibbs v. Gibbs · filed 2016-09-07

While the bankruptcy petition’s filing suspended the contempt proceedings, it did not have any effect on the trial court’s previous adjudication of contempt.

Section 362(h) damages claims for violations of the automatic stay are subject to judicial immunity when brought against judicial personnel acting within their official duties.

Williams v. Gruber (In Re Williams) · filed 1996-03-28(h)

Judicial officers are immune from damage suits such as these. ... This rule holds true even where the action seeks damages for violation of the automatic stay.

A creditor lacks standing to recover damages under § 362(k)(1) when the estate has been fully administered and creditors have received equal distribution.

In re: Demas Wai Yan · filed 2015-02-26(k)(1)

Accordingly both Globe and Pecan Groves stand for the principle that where the estate has been fully administered and equal distribution between creditors accomplished, creditors do not have standing to recover damages under § 362(k)(1).

Section 362(k)(1) permits a creditor to seek damages for a stay violation only for an injury suffered in the creditor’s capacity as a creditor of the estate.

In re Ampal-American Israel Corp. · filed 2013-12-16(k)(1)

First, the creditor seeking relief must allege an injury in his capacity as a creditor of the estate rather than in some other capacity.

Section 362(h) places on the debtor the burden to prove the extent of damages caused by a willful stay violation.

Clayton v. King (In Re Clayton) · filed 1998-02-25(h)

However, the burden is on the debtor to demonstrate the extent of any damages.

Section 362(h) requires an individual seeking damages for a willful stay violation to allege injury caused by the violation.

Sylver v. Security Pacific Financial Services, Inc. (In Re Sylver) · filed 1997-11-13(h)

Moreover, as the bankruptcy judge correctly observed, Zeida failed to assert any harm caused by the alleged stay violation. Section 362 allows an “individual injured by any wilful violation of a stay” to recover actual damages, costs and attorney’s fees. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (emphasis added). By failing to allege any injury caused by Security’s action, the Complaint was insufficient on its face.

Section 362(h) treats a bankruptcy trustee who incurs damages on behalf of the estate as an “individual” eligible to recover for a willful stay violation.

Morris v. St. Joseph Medical Center, Inc. (In Re Fisher) · filed 1996-03-29(h)

This Court agrees with the opposing views expressed in Pace, and finds that the term “individual” in § 362(h) includes trustees incurring damages on behalf of the estate.

Section 362(h) permits only individual human debtors, not corporations, to claim damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

In Re Material Corp., Inc. · filed 1996-05-20(h)

The term “individual” applies only to human debtors, while the term “person” encompasses legal entities such as corporations and partnerships. Since the debtor herein is a corporation, and not a natural person, it does not have standing to claim damages under § 362(h).

Section 362(h) limits its remedy for willful automatic stay violations to natural persons; corporations and other artificial entities cannot obtain relief under it.

Jove Engineering, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 1996-08-29(h)

Concluding otherwise, we affirm the district court's holding that Jove is not entitled to relief under § 362(h) because the term "individual" is limited to natural persons and does not include corporations or other artificial entities.

Section 362(h) requires proof of actual injury before damages may be awarded for a stay violation; loss of use of funds may qualify if the creditor’s acts actually deprived the debtor of their use.

Bearden v. United States Ex Rel. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Bearden) · filed 1997-09-24(h)

This court agrees with Debtor that the loss of use of funds may represent compensable damages under § 362(h). However, in this court’s view, there must be a showing by Debtor that the acts of IRS in fact deprived her of possession and of the use of the withheld 1994 income tax refund.

Section 362(h) allows natural persons, but not corporate debtors, to recover damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

American Chemical Works Co. v. International Nickel, Inc. (In Re American Chemical Works Co.) · filed 1999-06-01(h)

We agree with the majority view, wherein the cases hold that the section does not include corporations, and interpret “individual” to mean natural persons only.

Damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay under § 362(h) require injury to the debtor.

In Re: Abdur Amin Rashid · filed 2000-04-14(h)

An injured debtor may only recover actual damages including attorneys' fees for a willful violation of a stay and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages. 11 U.S.C. S 362(h). We agree with the Bankruptcy and District Courts that Rashid cannot allege any injury from the lien.

Section 362(h) gives an injured secured creditor an independent right to recover damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Long Beach Acceptance Corp. v. City of Chicago (In Re Madison) · filed 2000-06-27(h)

Plaintiff holds an independent right under § 362(h) to recover from Defendant, completely irrespective of any present actions or inactions of the Debtor.

Section 362(h) permits a chapter 11 trustee to seek sanctions for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Phillips v. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (In Re Fas Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.) · filed 2004-01-09(h)

In my opinion a chapter 11 trustee stands in an even stronger position to seek § 362(h) sanctions than a corporate debtor.

A trustee may recover damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay under § 362(h) and/or § 105.

Anderson v. Dick Smith Nissan, Inc. (In Re Joyner) · filed 2004-01-05(h)

Under these authorities the Court finds that both Debtor and Trustee may recover damages utilizing § 362(h) and/or § 105.

Section 362(h) permits recovery for individuals, but not for legal entities such as bankruptcy estates.

In Re Stephen Raymond Strand Kristie Gale Strand, Debtors, Bruce Leichty v. William T. Neary, United States Trustee · filed 2004-07-09(h)

However, because § 362(h) applies only to individuals, and not legal entities such as the bankruptcy estate involved in this case, had Leichty prevailed, he would have been forced to rely on the broad provision of 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).

Section 362(h) permits corporate creditors injured by a willful violation of the automatic stay to recover damages.

Paradise Towing, Inc. v. CIT Group/Sales Financing, Inc. · filed 2005-09-09(h)

The Court finds that corporate creditors are clearly intended to benefit from the protection provided under section 362, and the remedy provided under subsection (h) thereof.

Section 362(k)(1) permits stay-violation damages only for natural persons, excluding professional associations and other artificial entities.

In Re Walker · filed 2006-12-05(k)(1)

Thus as a professional association, Rotella is ineligible for stay violation damages pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).

Section 362(k)(1) permits stay violation damages only for natural persons, excluding professional associations and other artificial entities.

Rotella v. Lundborg · filed 2006-12-05(k)(1)

Thus as a professional association, Rotella is ineligible for stay violation damages pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(l).

A chapter 7 trustee acting as the estate’s representative is not an individual entitled to recover damages for a stay violation under former section 362(h), now section 362(k)(1).

Gecker v. Gierczyk (In Re Glenn) · filed 2007-12-12(h)

For the reasons stated below, the court concludes that a trustee is not such an “individual” for purposes of former section 362(h), and summary judgment must be granted in favor of the defendant.

Section 362(k) gives a remedy for automatic stay violations to an individual, but a bankruptcy trustee is not an individual eligible for its mandatory sanctions.

Kapila v. Clark Ex Rel. Matthew Wortley Trust (In Re Trafford Distributing Center, Inc.) · filed 2009-08-31(k)

Section 362(k) provides a remedy to an “individual” who has been damaged by a violation of the automatic stay. However, the state of the law in this Circuit, consistent with the plain language of the statute, is “that a trustee is limited to sanctions under Section 105(a) when confronted with a stay violation,” and is not an individual within the meaning of Section 362(k).

Section 362(k) gives injured prepetition creditors standing to seek damages for willful violations of the automatic stay.

St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. Labuzan · filed 2009-08-18(k)

Therefore, based on § 362(k)’s plain language, its legislative history, the Bankruptcy Code’s purposes, and the weight of judicial authority, we hold: pursuant to § 362(k), the Labuzans, as pre-petition creditors of CTL, have standing to assert a claim against St. Paul.

Section 362(k)(1) allows a bankruptcy trustee to seek damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Bohm v. Howard (In Re Howard) · filed 2010-05-14(k)(1)

That is, this Court concludes that the Trustee does have standing to prosecute a motion and/or complaint for damages pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) because it seems unlikely that Congress intended to exclude bankruptcy trustees from the protections afforded by Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(k)'s injury element is sufficiently pleaded when a creditor allegedly demands payment during the automatic stay after receiving notice of it.

Lomax v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2010-08-18(k)

Based on the foregoing authority, therefore, that the plaintiffs allege BofA demanded payment during the automatic stay of which BofA had received notice is sufficient to plead the element of injury.

Section 362(k) does not give a non-debtor spouse standing to recover for a stay violation when her injury falls outside the interests the automatic stay protects.

Rushing v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC (In Re Rushing) · filed 2010-10-06(k)

The Court concludes that Berry’s interest in seeking redress for her grievances are not arguably within the zone of interests protected by § 362(k) and therefore, as a non-debtor, she does not have standing to pursue a stay violation remedy under § 362(k).

Section 362(k)(1) allows an individual injured by a willful stay violation to recover damages, but a trustee representing a bankruptcy estate is not an individual eligible for that remedy.

In Re Sayeh · filed 2011-02-23(k)(1)

“Individual,” which the Bankruptcy Code does not define, means a natural person or human being and does not mean “entity,” which, too, is not a defined term but is used elsewhere in § 362(k). ... The Trustee therefore may not have recourse to § 362(k)(l).

Section 362(k) does not permit an entity to recover damages for a violation of the automatic stay; its damages remedy is available to an injured individual.

McCord v. Sofer (In re Sofer) · filed 2014-03-13(k)

Because the Landlord is not an individual, it may not seek relief under § 362(k), and any relief for damages incurred from a violation of the automatic stay lies with the court’s contempt power and § 105.

Section 362(k)(1) does not give a Chapter 7 debtor standing to recover for a stay violation involving estate property in which the debtor has no interest.

Owen v. Garrett Auto Sales, LLC (In re Owen) · filed 2014-09-08(k)(1)

Applying these general rules here, as a Chapter 7 debtor, Mr. Owen, does not have standing to pursue a section 362(k)(l) cause of action against GAS for its alleged violation of the automatic stay because he did not possess any property interest in thé Mustang.

Section 362(k)(1) does not allow a bankruptcy trustee to recover damages for a stay violation because the trustee represents the estate rather than herself as an individual.

Gordon v. White (In re Morgenstern) · filed 2015-12-24(k)(1)

The Court agrees with the cases that apply the more narrow definition of individual, because a trustee represents the bankruptcy estate, not herself as an individual. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Trustee may not seek relief under § 362(k).

Section 362(k) allows an individual, but not a corporation or limited partnership, to recover damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Barnard v. Town of Huntington (In re Joe's Friendly Service & Son, Inc.) · filed 2016-06-01(k)

Section 362(k) applies solely to individuals, and does not extend to entities like the Debtors, which are a limited partnership and a corporation.

Section 362(k) excludes chapter 7 trustees acting as representatives of bankruptcy estates from its damages remedy.

In re: Gold Strike Heights Homeowners Association · filed 2017-04-24(k)

Chapter 7 trustees, as representatives of bankruptcy estates, however, are excluded from § 362(k).

Section 362(k) allows a creditor to seek damages for a willful stay violation only for harm suffered in the creditor’s capacity as a creditor.

Lee v. McCardle · filed 2018-01-26(k)

As explained above, Lee may be the Peepleses’ creditor, but McCardle’s alleged automatic-stay violation didn’t harm him in that capacity. Lee’s claim for damages therefore falls outside of § 362(k)’s zone of interests.

Section 362(k)(1) does not allow a bankruptcy trustee to recover damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay because a trustee is not an "individual."

Helms v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. (In re O'Malley) · filed 2019-05-23(k)(1)

Here, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that a trustee is not an "individual" under § 362(k) and is thus not entitled to damages for willful violation of the automatic stay under that statutory provision.

Section 362(k) allows a corporate debtor to seek damages for a violation of the automatic stay.

Preferred Ready-Mix LLC v. Berleth · filed 2022-11-14(k)

The Court does not find that persuasive, as the Fifth Circuit has noted that a corporate debtor fell within the definition of an individual.

Section 362(k)(1) permits an official committee of unsecured creditors injured by a willful automatic stay violation to recover actual damages.

Scungio Borst and Associates LLC · filed 2023-08-04(k)(1)

Ultimately, based upon the foregoing, particularly the Third Circuit’s adoption of a broad definition of “individual” for purposes of § 362(k) and the dual purposes of the automatic stay to protect the interests of both debtors and creditors in property of the estate, the Court is persuaded that the Official Committee may recover actual damages as an individual entity injured by the Subcontractor Lienholders’ automatic stay violations.

Section 362(k) damages for an automatic-stay violation must be sought through an adversary proceeding.

Rebecca J. Almy · filed 2025-03-31(k)

Because section 362(k) permits an individual injured by a stay violation to recover money damages, it can be enforced only by an adversary proceeding.

Section 362(k)(1) limits its damages remedy for willful automatic stay violations to natural persons; corporations cannot recover under that subsection.

Kenneth Brown Hood · filed 2025-11-07(k)(1)

However, in line with the majority interpretation of the term “individual” in that section, the Court finds that § 362(k)(1) does not extend its remedy to corporate entities such as Helena.

Section 362(k)(1) limits its damages remedy for willful stay violations to natural persons, excluding corporations and other entities.

Howard Allen Hood · filed 2025-11-12(k)(1)

In line with the majority view, Page 15 of 25 the Court finds that the term “individual” within § 362(k)(1) does not extend to entities and corporations like Helena.

Section 362(k)(1) limits recovery of damages for a willful automatic stay violation to natural persons; corporations cannot recover under that provision.

William Cary Hood · filed 2025-11-12(k)(1)

In line with the majority view, Page 15 of 25 the Court finds that the term “individual” within § 362(k)(1) does not extend to entities and corporations like Helena.

Section 362(h) makes its remedy for willful automatic stay violations available only to natural persons, not corporate debtors.

Georgia Scale Co. v. Toledo Scale Corp. (In Re Georgia Scale Co.) · filed 1991-12-05(h)

Section 362(h) provides an additional remedy for a violation of the automatic stay available only to natural persons.