11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(b)(18) permits post-petition ad valorem property tax liens to arise and become secured despite the automatic stay.

Wasden v. City of Savannah (In Re Owens) · filed 1996-11-07(b)(18)

Previously, these tax lien claims received an administrative priority status. Because of the addition of Section 362(b)(18) they now are afforded a secured position.

Section 362(a) prevents a prepetition federal tax lien from taking effect against property acquired with postpetition assets during a Chapter 13 case.

Jones v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Jones) · filed 1997-03-26(a)

During the pendency of this chapter 13 case, the federal tax liens do not attach to such post-petition property (or, perhaps more accurately, are not given effect with respect to such property by reason of the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)).

Section 362(b)(18) permits a lien for real estate taxes coming due after the bankruptcy petition to be filed without violating the automatic stay.

In Re Fay Associates Ltd. Partnership · filed 1998-08-15(b)(18)

The real estate tax claims are scheduled as coming due on July 1,1998, after the filing of the petition such that a lien could be filed for such tax claims without violating the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) protects estate insurance assets from depletion through continued litigation against affiliates that share those assets with the debtor.

The Roman Catholic Diocese of Syracuse, New York v. LG 35 Doe · filed 2021-03-05(a)(3)

Diminishing the estate’s joint insurance policies and the corresponding $25.7 million fund through continued litigation will not only violate § 362(a)(3) but also reduce coverage available to the approximately 96% of child-victims who chose not to object to a stay of state court actions.

In a PROMESA Title III case, Section 362(a)(3) stays a liability action against the debtor’s insurer when the insurance policy and proceeds are property of the debtor.

Berrios-Correa v. MAPFRE · filed 2020-11-25(a)(3)

Considering the above as well as the substantially broader scope of the automatic stay established by PROMESA, this Court finds that the liability insurance contract and proceeds in this case constitute “property of the debtor” as defined under PROMESA.

Section 362 generally stays claims against a debtor’s liability insurance policy, but it does not bar substitution of the insurer when there is only one claimant against the policy and other creditors cannot be harmed.

Baxendale v. Martin, Pc 94-2303 (1999) · filed 1999-02-10

A policy of liability insurance is generally held to be an asset of the debtor which is subject to the automatic stay order that results when an individual files for bankruptcy. ... As in Giroux , here there is no evidence on the record to indicate that, besides the plaintiff, there are any other claimants against the defendant's insurance policy. Therefore, as in Giroux , the plaintiff here is the only claimant against Dr. Martin's policy with the insurers and, as such, no harm can befall the defendant's other creditors who are not entitled to the funds from the liability insurance in any event.

Section 362(a)(3) does not automatically stay claims against nondebtor directors and officers merely because the debtor paid for their liability insurance; the policy is an estate asset only to the extent it increases the debtor’s worth or diminishes its liabilities.

Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Sinay (In Re Zenith Laboratories, Inc.) · filed 1989-08-29(a)(3)

The cases relied upon by the bankruptcy court do not stand for the proposition that an insurance policy paid for by the debtor is, ipso facto, a debtor asset. An insurance policy purchased by the debt- or is only an asset to the extent that it increases the debtor’s worth or diminishes its liabilities. If the policy, although paid for by the debtor, fails to meet this test, it cannot be said to be a debtor asset.

Section 362 does not bar a judgment creditor from proceeding against the debtor’s insurer to collect from available insurance coverage when the bankruptcy court has modified the stay to permit that action.

Anderson v. Robinson · filed 1991-11-04

Consistent with the foregoing, we hold that where a plaintiff has obtained a judgment against a tortfeasor who has filed a petition for bankruptcy in federal court, the “automatic stay” provisions contained in 11 U.S.C. § 362, as amended, which are part of the federal bankruptcy laws, do not preclude the plaintiff from proceeding in the circuit courts of this state against the tortfeasor’s insurer to satisfy the judgment where the bankruptcy court has modified the automatic stay in order for the plaintiffs lawsuit to proceed to the extent of available insurance coverage.

Section 362(a)(3) stays an insurer’s action to limit coverage under a debtor’s insurance policy when that coverage is property of the estate.

Pintlar Corp. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York (In Re Pintlar Corp.) · filed 1994-11-10(a)(3)

Accordingly, the insurance coverage is property of the estate and the automatic stay prevents the filing of any action to limit the extent of such coverage.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a third party suit merely because it may reduce insurance coverage also available to the debtor.

Goldin v. Primavera Familienstiftung, Tag Associates, Ltd. (In Re Granite Partners, L.P.) · filed 1996-04-16(a)(3)

This implies that the mere threat to the policy does not implicate the automatic stay, and that the Court should not extend the automatic stay if that is the only “injury” that the debtor can show. In this regard, the debtor’s insurance policy is property of the estate as is its contractual right to indemnification coverage under the policy. The directors’ and officers’ contractual right to liability coverage, however, is not.

Section 362(a)(3) prevents a court from ordering a debtor’s liability insurance proceeds deposited in an interpleader action while the automatic stay is in effect.

Lawhorne v. Employers Insurance · filed 1996-08-02(a)(3)

In their answer to the interpleader complaint petitioners asked that Employers be ordered either to pay the funds into the registry of the court or to place them with a trustee for investment in an interest bearing account(s). The automatic stay removed the court’s power to order Employers to do so.

Section 362(a)(3) bars collection of a monetary judgment against debtors or their officers when collection would reduce insurance proceeds belonging to the bankruptcy estate.

Harden v. Gilbert (In Re International Heritage, Inc.) · filed 1999-08-27(a)(3)

However, the stay provided by § 362(a)(3) does apply and the State of Montana may not collect a monetary judgment against the debtors or the individual defendants since the effect would be to reduce the insurance proceeds which are property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prevent an insurance policy from expiring under its terms when the debtor fails to pay premiums, and the insurer’s notices of the impending lapse do not constitute acts to obtain estate property.

J.E. Adams Industries, Ltd. v. Aurora National Life Assurance Co. (In Re J.E. Adams Industries, Ltd.) · filed 2001-09-28(a)(3)

In the case at bar, the notices to the Debtor did not cancel, terminate, or cause the lapse of, the Policy. Further, it was error to characterize the notices as seeking possession of the Debtor’s estate. It was Debtor’s failure to make timely premium payments that led to the cancellation of the Policy.

Section 362(a)(3) does not automatically stay litigation over D&O insurance proceeds in which the debtor has no present property interest.

In Re Adelphia Communications Corp. · filed 2003-08-25(a)(3)

Here, as far as I can tell, Adelphia does not have a property interest in the proceeds of the insurance policies yet. ... The fact that the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) may not apply automatically does not render the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to stay litigation between the Rigases and the insurers necessarily subject to reversal.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits acts to obtain possession of or exercise control over a debtor’s contractual rights that constitute property of the bankruptcy estate.

Roman Forest Public Utility District No. 3 v. Roman Forest Consolidated Public Utility District (In re Roman Forest Publ · filed 2005-02-08(a)(3)

This section forbids acts to obtain possession of property of the estate, or to obtain possession of property from the estate, or to exercise control over property of the estate. There is no question that the Contract, and the rights of the Debtor under the Contract, constitute property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Hence, the Debtor has the right to examine the Individual Defendants on whether they have committed acts that are in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) stays actions against shared insurance proceeds that are estate property when those actions diminish the debtor’s interests in the proceeds.

Metropolitan Mortgage & Securities Co. v. Cauvel (In Re Metropolitan Mortgage & Securities Co.) · filed 2005-06-20(a)(3)

The debtors and all other insureds have undivided, unliquidated interests in the identical asset, i.e., the policy proceeds. Continued diminution of those proceeds affects the debtors’ interests in and rights to recover the proceeds. The stay prevents any action which affects the debtors’ interests in the proceeds.

Section 362(a)(3) requires parties seeking directors’ and officers’ liability policy proceeds for defense costs to obtain relief from the automatic stay before accessing those proceeds.

Sexton v. Executive Risk, et al. · filed 2007-09-24(a)(3)

The first question that ought to be addressed is whether parties wishing to access proceeds of the D&O policies for defense costs must first seek relief from the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. I believe that they must.

The automatic stay does not bar recovery under a third party’s liability insurance policy naming the debtor as an additional insured when the policy is not estate property and was acquired after the bankruptcy filing.

Vibratech, Inc. v. Frost · filed 2008-03-27(a)(3)

The primary asset at issue is the insurance policy owned by TCM. It is not owned by Vibratech and thus is not an asset protected by the automatic stay. ... Rather, because the insurance policy at issue was acquired after the side agreement expired on its own terms and after Vibra-tech filed for bankruptcy, it was not subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) stays payment to another insured from shared insurance coverage to the extent the payment would draw on the debtor’s accrued right to proceeds.

In Re Petters Co., Inc. · filed 2009-08-31(a)(3)

The automatic stay does prohibit the payment of a claim by a party other than the Debtors, that would be made from that portion of the aggregate coverage that is attributable to accrued rights to payment in favor of the Debtors.

Section 362(a)(3) protects a debtor’s insurance policies as estate property from actions that would deplete their value.

In re W.R. Grace & Co. · filed 2012-06-11(a)(3)

In the instant litigation, Grace’s insurance policies certainly constitute an “important asset” of its bankruptcy estate that are entitled to § 362(a) injunctive relief.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay to allow payment of directors’ and officers’ insurance defense costs when that payment will not presently prejudice the bankruptcy estate.

In re Pasquinelli Homebuilding, LLC · filed 2012-01-17(d)(1)

While the Court is sympathetic to the Trustee’s concerns regarding the erosion of the insurance proceeds, the Court is not inclined to prohibit Illinois National from exercising its contractual rights to pay defense costs. The Court is not convinced that any prejudice will inure to the Estate at this time if the Pasquinelli Insureds are allowed to seek coverage of their defense costs.

Section 362(a)(3) protects a debtor’s insurance policies as property of the bankruptcy estate from actions that would diminish their value.

In Re Wr Grace & Co. · filed 2012-01-30(a)(3)

In the instant litigation, Grace's insurance policies certainly constitute an "important asset" of its bankruptcy estate that are entitled to § 362(a) injunctive relief.

Section 362(a)(3) can stay litigation against a nondebtor when the litigation would materially diminish an insurance policy that is property of the debtor’s estate.

James F. Humphreys & Associates, L.C. v. Horne (In re James F. Humphreys & Associates, L.C.) · filed 2016-09-26(a)(3)

That prospect of diminution is sufficiently serious to support a stay under section 362(a)(3), pending the District Court declaration.

Section 362(h)’s damages remedy was unavailable for conduct that occurred before its enactment in 1984.

Frederick Henry Vahlsing, Jr. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., Inc. · filed 1991-03-22(h)

Section 362(h) was enacted in 1984, ... and thus was not available to Vahlsing.

Section 362(h) does not require prejudgment interest on an award for an automatic stay violation; the award is discretionary.

Matter of Coxson · filed 1995-01-26(h)

The Fifth Circuit has stated that "[t]he award of prejudgment interest is generally discretionary with the trial court." Whitfield v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298, 1306 (5th Cir.1988); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2nd Cir.1984) (stating that standard of review for award of prejudgment interest is abuse of discretion).

Section 362(h) does not permit recovery of sale proceeds as actual damages for an alleged stay violation when the sold property never became part of the bankruptcy estate.

Glenshaw v. Ontario Grape · filed 1995-09-29(h)

Although Glenshaw's complaint requested both actual and punitive damages, the district court awarded only actual damages -- the $1,365,452 in sale proceeds realized by the Grape Growers from the post-petition sale of the product -- for both conversion of estate property and violation of the automatic stay. We have already determined that Glenshaw is not entitled to recover the sale proceeds because the grape product never became part of the bankruptcy estate. Inasmuch as Glenshaw is unable to support a basis for recovering actual damages, we need go no further.

Section 362(h) permits damages only for a willful stay violation; a court need not decide willfulness when the debtor proves no damages beyond amounts recoverable on another ground.

Jones v. United States (In Re Jones) · filed 1997-08-01(h)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h), an individual may recover damages for only a willful violation of the stay. However, the court need not decide whether the Service willfully violated the stay because the only damages proven by the debtor are the amounts of the refund improperly offset.

Section 362(h) requires an award of damages to an individual injured by a willful violation of the automatic stay.

A&J Auto Sales v. USA · filed 1998-06-24(h)

The United States' argument is based on the court's finding that while section 362(h) mandates awarding damages to individuals injured by a willful violation of the automatic stay, the bankruptcy court's civil contempt power under section 105 allows the court discretion to sanction other stay violations.

Section 362(k)(1) requires a willful violation to award damages and attorney’s fees; an unclear discharge injunction did not establish willfulness here.

Cadles Grassy Meadows II, L.L.C. v. Gervin (In Re Gervin) · filed 2008-11-21(k)(1)

Section 362(k)(1) provides that “an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” However, the record does not support a finding that Cadles’s actions were willful. Cadles’s violation was not willful given the fact that the bankruptcy court’s 1998 discharge injunction was not clear on the scope of G. Gervin’s stake in the 401 Group.

Section 362(k)(1) does not provide damages for accepting foreclosure proceeds after the automatic stay has been lifted.

Liebman v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2021-11-02(k)(1)

After the bankruptcy court lifted the stay, Ocwen was not barred from accepting the pro- ceeds.

Section 362(h) permits a debtor to recover damages when a creditor knowingly retains a repossessed vehicle in willful violation of the automatic stay.

LaTempa v. Long (In Re LaTempa) · filed 1986-03-17(h)

In light of these decisions, based on the facts presented, the Court concludes that the Defendant’s conduct clearly reflects a willful violation of the automatic stay of § 362(a). The Defendant continued in possession of the vehicle with full knowledge of the filing and explanation of the Order staying levy and garnishment. ... Accordingly, we find that the Debtors are entitled to recover damages under § 362(h).

Section 362(h) allows attorney fees, costs, and punitive damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

In Re Riddick · filed 1999-03-04(h)

Based upon the foregoing the Court finds that Aman willfully violated the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362. Additionally, the Court finds that due to such willful violation, Ms. Riddick is entitled to recover from Aman her attorney fees and costs, as well as punitive damages.

Section 362(h) makes damages for willful stay violations available to natural persons, but not corporate debtors.

Singer Furniture Acquisition Corp. v. SSMC Inc. N.V. · filed 2000-09-28(h)

Based on this controlling precedent, the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that sanctions under section 362(h) are unavailable to corporate debtors is affirmed.

Section 362(h) does not excuse a willful stay violation because a computer automatically generated the creditor’s bill.

Rijos v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (In Re Rijos) · filed 2001-06-19(h)

We find that under the standard articulated by the court in Kaneb, the “computer did it” defense is not viable and that the bankruptcy court erred in absolving Citibank from liability under § 362(h) on the grounds that the computer automatically issued a bill while a new software system was being installed.

Section 362(h) makes a creditor who willfully violates the automatic stay liable for damages.

In Re Ocasio · filed 2002-02-21(h)

In view of the test articulated by the First Circuit in Kaneb for the determination of a § 362(h) violation, namely knowledge of the automatic stay and an intent to do those acts that constitute a violation of the stay, [9] the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that Varela willfully violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(h) requires an individual injured by a willful stay violation to recover actual damages including costs and attorney’s fees, with punitive damages available in appropriate circumstances.

Associated Credit Services, Inc. v. Campion (In Re Campion) · filed 2003-06-04(h)

Associated Credit’s mistake was mere forgetfulness that was not of a character that would deprive it of knowledge for purposes of § 362(h) willfulness. The evidence of Associated Credit’s knowledge of the existence of the automatic stay for purposes of § 362(h) willfulness is .compelling. Once a creditor knows of the existence of the automatic stay, forgetting about it does not erase the knowledge.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay, including retroactive annulment, for cause after notice and a hearing, while § 362(h) provides actual damages for willful violations and permits emotional distress damages subject to the court's threshold.

Stinson v. Bi-Rite Restaurant Supply Inc. (In Re Stinson) · filed 2003-06-12(d)(1), (h)

Therefore, § 362(d) "gives the bankruptcy court wide latitude in crafting relief from the automatic stay, including the power to grant retroactive relief from the stay." ... Here, the court properly balanced the equities in refusing to grant relief from stay retroactively. Therefore, it did not err in denying the annulment of the automatic stay. ... Therefore, we follow the Seventh Circuit in holding that emotional distress damages are recoverable under § 362(h), subject to the threshold described below. ... Here, in order to be entitled to emotional distress damages, there must be significant economic loss caused by the willful violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(h) requires an injured individual to show a willful stay violation, which requires at least actual notice of the stay.

Rowell v. Chase Manhattan Automotive Finance Corp. · filed 2004-11-08(h)

There can be no dispute that the term “willful violation” requires, at a minimum, that the creditor had actual notice of the stay.

Section 362(k)(1) requires a debtor seeking relief for a willful automatic stay violation to show an injury caused by the violation.

In re Traversa · filed 2018-06-05(k)(1)

Nowhere in the Motion, the memorandum or the adversary complaint does the Debtor reference an injury or damage. Therefore, I will not grant the Motion for the purpose of bringing an adversary complaint against LRS for violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(k) treats a stay violation as willful when a creditor knows of the stay and intentionally acts, even if it believes in good faith that it has a right to the property.

Hoover v. PHH Mortgage Corporation · filed 2022-09-16(k)

The creditor does not need to have a specific intent to violate the automatic stay to support a finding of ... willfulness: it is sufficient if the conduct is intentional, regardless whether the creditor believes in good faith that it has a right to the property. ... Based on the undisputed facts, the bankruptcy court’s finding that appellants willfully violated the automatic stay is affirmed.

Section 362(a) bars a creditor from pursuing a state court contempt action to collect a prepetition debt after the debtor files for bankruptcy; knowingly doing so can be a willful stay violation.

Brock v. Barlow (In Re Brock) · filed 1986-03-14(a)

Since Barlow was properly listed as a creditor at the time Brock’s petition was filed, received notice of the bankruptcy, and was directly advised by one or more attorneys that her actions in seeking a contempt order were in violation of the bankruptcy court’s automatic stay provisions, the court must conclude that her violation of the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) was willful.

Section 362(k) permits damages for an automatic stay violation when the violation was willful and caused actual damages.

Barrett v. Vehicle Acceptance Corp. (In re Chamberlayne Auto Sales & Repair, Inc.) · filed 2018-02-22(k)

A party seeking damages for violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) must establish three elements: (1) that a violation occurred; (2) that the violation was committed willfully; and, (3) that the violation caused actual damages.

Section 362(h) permits damages for a willful stay violation when a creditor acts despite knowing of the bankruptcy; specific intent to violate the stay is unnecessary.

International Painters and All v. Radcliffe · filed 2009-04-23(h)

But because damages are only available for a willful violation, see section 362(h) of the code, the question remains as to whether the Fund acted willfully. We think it’s clear that it did. A willful violation does not require specific intent to violate the stay; it is sufficient that the creditor takes questionable action despite the awareness of a pending bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 362(k)(1) requires an award of actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, for an individual injured by a willful violation of the automatic stay.

In Re Beebe · filed 2010-08-20(k)(1)

The reasonableness and necessity of attorneys’ fees and costs for the prosecution of a willful violation of the automatic stay must be judged on a case by case basis.

Section 362(k)(1) entitles a debtor to actual damages when a creditor knows of the automatic stay and intentionally takes actions that violate it.

Gazzo v. Ruff (In re Gazzo) · filed 2014-01-03(k)(1)

Here, this Court finds that the Defendants had knowledge of the automatic stay that was in effect during the November 20, 2012 hearing and at all times thereafter. Furthermore, this Court finds that the Defendants intended their conduct in relation to the November 20, 2012 hearing December 5 Order. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Defendants conduct constituted willful violations of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(l) and the Plaintiff is entitled to actual damages as a matter of law.

A § 362(k) claim against a defendant requires facts showing that the defendant violated the automatic stay.

Heghmann v. Bank of America · filed 2019-10-30(k)

The Heghmanns have not pled facts that demonstrate that Bank of America or TD Bank willfully violated the stay, or that they violated the stay at all. All that is alleged is that the unnamed violators have bank accounts with the Defendants. These allegations are grossly insufficient.

Actual damages under § 362(k) must be tied to losses caused by the stay violation; when the loss is the dismantling of property, the measure may be its reasonable reassembly cost.

Carmichael v. Balke · filed 2021-03-11(k)

Specifically, there was not a sufficient factual basis linking the Demo Unit’s disassembly to an award of damages based on the cost of refurbishing the MST 1000 unit. Instead, the appropriate measure of damages is the reasonable cost of the Demo Unit’s reassembly.

A stay violation is willful when the creditor knows of the bankruptcy case and deliberately acts despite that knowledge.

Brett M Koss · filed 2021-03-24(k)(1)

To determine whether a stay violation is willful, the injured party must establish that the violator had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case and, notwithstanding that knowledge, acted deliberately.

Section 362(k)(1) requires proof of an automatic stay violation before a debtor can recover damages.

Tworog v. Burke · filed 2023-02-24(k)(1)

Thus, the Court concludes as a matter of law that Mr. Burke did not violate the automatic stay. With this finding, it is unnecessary to decide the damages issues.

Section 362(k)(1) requires a willful stay violation and proven injury to recover damages.

DLB II, LLC · filed 2023-09-08(k)(1)

The Court finds no willful violation of the automatic stay here. Moreover, Debtor has failed to show adequate injury to support recovery.

Section 362(k) does not treat a reasonable delay in staying a pending prepetition hearing as a willful stay violation when the creditor does not advance the proceeding.

Sutton v. Nordike · filed 2025-05-16(k)

Nordike’s stated intention to stay the matter, his work situation which prohibited him from communicating with prospective counsel, counsel for the Suttons or the state court, and his prompt action to remedy the violation upon his return from the work trip evidence that the delay in filing the stay motion did not amount to a willful violation under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k).

Section 362(k)(1) does not impose liability for a later garnishment when a creditor promptly directs collection to stop, receives confirmation that it has stopped, and acts promptly upon learning it continued.

Jennifer C. Krohn · filed 2025-03-28(k)(1)

This was sufficient to create an assurance “that the collection activity had ceased” and negated the need for an additional follow-up.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) excludes a proceeding to establish child support from the automatic bankruptcy stay.

R.L.H. v. C.J.P. · filed 1998-10-23(b)(2)(A)(ii)

Thus, the automatic stay did not apply to the custodian’s proceeding, which sought to establish an order for child support.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause so a creditor may seek an increase in child support in state court.

In Re Hill · filed 1989-07-31(d)(1)

The court finds that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in lifting the stay in order for the creditor to proceed in state court for an increase in child support. The bankruptcy court should not interfere with the state court’s jurisdiction over a motion to increase child support payments.

Section 362 permits limited relief from the automatic stay for a state court to adjudicate marital property rights and enter judgment, while enforcement against bankruptcy estate property remains stayed.

Hohenberg v. Hohenberg (In Re Hohenberg) · filed 1992-07-10(d)

In summary, relief from the automatic stay is granted to permit adjudication and entry of judgment by the state court concerning the property interests of the parties. However, the stay remains in effect for any enforcement of those property rights and/or judgment as that enforcement affects property of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(d)(1) permits limited relief from the stay so a nondebtor can seek modification of a support order as a defense to the debtor’s contempt action when the state court’s interest in support matters and fairness to the nondebtor favor relief.

In Re Pemberton · filed 1992-12-23(d)(1)

Despite our skepticism of the merits of Gray’s efforts to reduce support to the Debtor, we will grant her motion, in limited fashion, due to the coalescence of two factors: (1) the substantial interest of the state and its courts in domestic relations matters, such as support, relative to this court; and (2) our perception that it is unfair for Gray to be subject to liability without an opportunity to raise a very typical defense.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a Chapter 13 debtor’s failure to separately classify child support arrears shows bad faith.

In Re Bunn · filed 1994-08-19(d)(1)

Public policy favors preferential treatment of child support debts in chapter 13 cases. Such treatment at a minimum entails separate classification of the child support debt. If a debtor does not propose a plan that separately classifies the child support arrearage, it may be inferred that the debtor proposed the plan in bad faith for the purpose of circumventing child support obligations. As such, the ex-spouse should be entitled to relief from the stay to collect the arrearage outside of the plan.

A bankruptcy court may deny relief from the automatic stay to pursue prepetition child support arrears in state court when the debtor proposes to pay the claim in full through a Chapter 13 plan and resolving the claim does not require substantial inquiry into family law.

In Re Fullwood · filed 1994-08-22(d)

The Court finds that the instant case is distinguishable from Carver, and therefore declines to grant Movant’s request to lift the automatic stay. ... The issue before this Court does not mandate that the Court delve too deeply into family law in order to resolve the conflict.

Section 362 permits relief from the automatic stay to allow a state court to determine former spouses' interests in marital property when the balance of estate prejudice and hardship favors lifting the stay.

Buis v. Roberge · filed 1996-08-27

Here, those factors weigh heavily in favor of lifting the stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for a dependent spouse to enforce a nondischargeable support obligation when the balance of hardships favors that relief, while other financial claims may remain stayed.

In Re Sokoloff · filed 1996-09-18(d)(1)

On this record, we are unwilling to find that the balance tips in the Wife’s favor as to any relief except her own quest for support through enforcement of the Agreement, and except for any desires on her part to pursue the generally non-economic issues of the parties’ marital status and child custody.

Section 362 permits the automatic stay to be relaxed so a state court can resolve divorce-related property and contempt issues, including division and sale of estate property.

In Re Dennis · filed 1997-09-08

The automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 is relaxed to permit the Chancery Court of St. Francis County, Arkansas, to adjudicate all issues of property and contempt against the Debtor, including division and sale of real and personal property of the estate arising out of or related to the divorce proceeding in St. Francis County Case No. E-93-48.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay to allow state court proceedings to liquidate and collect nondischargeable child support obligations.

Waller v. Kriss (In Re Kriss) · filed 1998-02-26(d)(1)

Having determined that any unpaid Article VIII Obligations are non-dischargeable, and that we should abstain from calculating the amount of those obligations, it follows that we will grant Waller stay relief and allow her to commence appropriate proceedings in State Court to liquidate and satisfy her claim for unpaid child support.

Section 362 permits modification of the automatic stay to allow a state court to decide divorce, support, and property division, while distribution of joint property remains subject to bankruptcy administration.

In Re Bamman · filed 1999-09-30

The automatic stay is hereby modified so that the Circuit Court of Jackson County can determine the issues pertaining to the marital dissolution of Michael and Karen Bamman, including the actual dissolution of the marriage of Karen Bamman and Debtor Michael Wayne Bamman; the determination as to whether either party is entitled to maintenance or support and the amount thereof; the characterization of the Bammans’ property and debts as separate or joint; and any other issues pertaining to the dissolution of their marriage. The Circuit Court may make an award of property to the individual parties; however, such an award may not be distributed or effectuated until after the joint property has been administered through this bankruptcy estate according to bankruptcy law.

Section 362 requires a creditor to obtain relief from the automatic stay before pursuing a state court action to determine whether a prepetition debt is dischargeable, even when the action concerns a family law matter.

Sprague v. Spiegel-Sprague · filed 2003-01-09(a)(1)

Accordingly, the characterization action was a core bankruptcy proceeding. Booth therefore could proceed in state court on the characterization action only by first obtaining relief from the automatic stay from the bankruptcy court.

A non-debtor spouse should seek relief from the automatic stay before asking a state court to modify a dissolution decree, and the state court's authority is limited by the order lifting the stay.

Marriage of Birt v. Birt · filed 2004-08-12

Here, the trial court’s authority was limited by the bankruptcy court’s order lifting the bankruptcy stay. ... The order lifting the stay permitted Wife to seek relief from the superior court, making clear that a Rule 60 motion would not violate the bankruptcy stay. ... To preserve the authority of the state court to determine what debts were discharged or to make modifications in the dissolution decree, the non-debtor spouse should seek relief from the automatic bankruptcy stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Relief from the automatic stay for domestic proceedings requires balancing prejudice to the bankruptcy estate against hardship to the movant, with any debtor-owned property remaining protected from collection absent further bankruptcy-court order.

In Re Katzburg · filed 2004-12-08

When determining whether to grant relief from stay to allow a state court to decide a domestic matter, this Court must “balance the potential prejudice to the bankruptcy debtor’s estate against the hardships that will be incurred by the person seeking relief from the automatic stay if relief is denied.” ... Therefore, in light of the foregoing, the Court grants Katzburg relief from the automatic stay to pursue remedies under state law so that the State Court can establish the extent of the parties’ interests in the Matrimonial Accounts and distribute the amount of assets Katzburg is entitled to receive under New York law. ... Furthermore, property interests of the Debtor in the Matrimonial Accounts that the State Court establishes remain property of Debtor’s bankruptcy estate and should not be collected absent further order of this Court.

The automatic stay may be lifted to permit state-court confirmation of a prepetition foreclosure sale when the debtor shows no basis to prevent confirmation or obtain a redemption period sufficient for the plan and remains able to contest confirmation or seek an extension in state court.

Agee v. Fenton Poured Walls, Inc. (In Re Agee) · filed 2005-08-12(d)(1)

Because Agee had not yet argued in the case that the sale would not be confirmed, or that the statutory period of redemption would be extended by the state court, the Bankruptcy Court found cause to lift the stay. Bankr.Op. at 25. Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Court found that lifting the stay would not prejudice Agee to the extent that lifting the stay would allow him to contest confirmation of the sale or seek extension of the redemption period. Given these circumstances, this Court holds that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion by lifting the stay.

Section 362(d) gives bankruptcy courts broad discretion to grant relief from the automatic stay, including retroactive annulment to allow state courts to resolve pending divorce proceedings.

Barnes v. Barnes · filed 2008-05-28(d)

Bankruptcy courts are given broad discretion to fashion relief from the automatic stay, including retroactive annulment if warranted. ... For these reasons, courts have often permitted the lifting of the automatic stay to allow the state court to resolve pending divorce proceedings. ... The bankruptcy court properly exercised its discretion in lifting the stay.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) does not exempt child support collection efforts that implicate Chapter 13 estate property, including the debtor’s income, from the automatic stay.

In Re Diaz · filed 2009-09-30(b)(2)(B)

Their collection actions implicated property of the estate, including the Debtor’s income, which was essential for funding his Plan. Respondents’ attempts to collect the purported child support arrearage while the automatic stay was in effect were not insulated by the Section 362(b)(2) exception.

Section 362(d)(1) permits limited relief from the automatic stay so a divorce court may divide marital property and enter judgment, with enforcement reserved to the bankruptcy court.

In Re Dryja · filed 2010-03-03(d)(1)

For the reasons stated herein, the Motion is GRANTED to the extent that Noeske may proceed in the Divorce Action to conclusion and the entry of judgment, with enforcement to take place in this Court.

Section 362(d)(1) requires a good-faith assessment when deciding whether to lift the stay so a domestic support creditor can collect arrears provided for in a Chapter 13 plan.

In re Miller · filed 2013-11-14(d)(1)

Consequently, when a DSO creditor seeks relief from the automatic stay to proceed in state court to collect a past due DSO that is provided for in the debtor’s plan as a priority debt, the determination whether “cause” exists to grant relief from the automatic stay requires that the bankruptcy court evaluate whether the case has been filed in good faith, much in the same manner as the court determines whether the automatic stay should be extended under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B).

Section 362(d) relief from stay proceedings do not resolve the merits of a debtor’s avoidance claim under § 547.

Colvin v. Amegy Mortgage Co. · filed 2014-03-28(d)

A lift stay proceeding is not a proceeding to determine the underlying merits of a debtor’s counterclaims or defenses, including an avoidance claim under § 547.

A § 362(d) relief from stay proceeding is summary and asks whether the movant has a colorable claim to estate property.

DeGiacomo v. Raymond C. Green, Inc. (In re Inofin Inc.) · filed 2014-06-12(d)

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay was a summary proceeding at which the ultimate issue was whether RCG established a col-orable claim to the estate’s property.

Section 362(d)(1) permits lifting the automatic stay for cause so a state court can determine support obligations in divorce proceedings.

Bush v. Heimer (In re Heimer) · filed 2016-04-22(d)(1)

Section 362(d)(1) authorizes relief from the stay, including termination, modification or conditioning of such stay, “for cause.... ” Federal courts generally abstain from deciding cases involving divorce, child custody, and ehild support. Relief from the stay is therefore generally granted in situations involving alimony, maintenance, or support in order to avoid entangling the federal court in family law matters, which are best left to State courts.

Relief from the automatic stay requires a creditor to show a colorable claim to estate property, without adjudicating the validity of the claim or the debtor’s defenses.

HRN Group, LLC v. Najarian Capital, LLC · filed 2019-12-18(d)

The purpose of a relief from stay proceeding is simply to determine “whether a creditor has a colorable claim to property of the estate.”

Section 362 permits limited relief from the automatic stay so a divorce court can clarify whether an obligation in its decree is domestic support when the bankruptcy record does not establish the decree’s intent.

Sidney John Toche · filed 2020-07-10(d)(1)

The absence of compelling evidence of sufficient weight to justify a conclusive determination of the intent of the controverted provision of the FJD, in the view of this Court, constitutes cause to grant limited relief to allow for clarification by the divorce court.

Section 362(a)(3) and (a)(6) prohibit withholding postpetition Medicare payments to recover prepetition overpayments when the creditor has not established a right of recoupment and the debtor reasonably expected current payments.

Tidewater Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bowen (In Re Tidewater Memorial Hospital, Inc.) · filed 1989-09-05(a)(3), (a)(6)

Because the Government has not established its right of recoupment as a matter of evidence, and because under the circumstances the Hospital had the right to expect current payments to be made, the Court concludes the action of the Medicare authorities in withholding payments in February 1989 was a violation of the automatic stay under § 362(a)(3) and (a)(6).

Section 362(a) bars a government agency from withholding payment for postpetition Medicare services to recover prepetition overpayments when the provider agreement was not assumed and recoupment does not apply.

In Re University Medical Center · filed 1992-10-21(a)

We agree with the district court that the Secretary's withholding of UMC's Medicare reimbursement, due for services rendered post-petition, in an attempt to recover pre-petition Medicare overpayments, violated the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay.

The automatic stay does not prevent Medicare from adjusting reimbursement for a provider’s postpetition services to account for its prepetition overpayments when those claims form one transaction.

United States v. Consumer Health Services of America, Inc. And Roger Schlossberg, Trustee · filed 1997-03-18(a)

Nor does our analysis differ significantly under the doctrine of equitable recoupment, which exempts a debt from the automatic stay when the debt is inextricably tied up in the post-petition claim. ... In sum, it does not matter whether we consider the government's claim in terms of its statutory substantive liability or in terms of the equitable recoupment doctrine. Under either analysis, the automatic stay is of no consequence.

Section 362(a)(7) does not stay recoupment of Medicaid overpayments from later reimbursements when the payments arise from the same continuous transaction.

Carematrix Corp. ex rel. Carematrix of Needham, Inc. v. Division of Medical Assistance · filed 2003-07-28(a)(7)

Here, CareMatrix’s provider agreement was not ex-ecutory at the time it petitioned for bankruptcy protection. Thus, it would seem, even under University Medical Center the Division could recover pre-petition overpayments without violating the automatic stay. ... To this Court, the “continuous system of estimated payments and subsequent adjustments” constitutes “(t]he same transaction for purposes of recoupment.”

Section 362(a)(7) does not stay Medicare’s withholding of prepetition overpayments from postpetition reimbursements when the withholding merely calculates the net amount owed to the debtor.

Slater Health Center, Inc. v. United States (In Re Slater Health Center, Inc.) · filed 2004-02-17(a)(7)

There is no need to consider re-coupment when there is a single obligation to the debtor and the only issue is whether the amount in question must be deducted in order to calculate the sum owed to the debtor. In such cases, since the debtor has no claim to the amount in question, there is nothing that can be offset. Furthermore, the amount in question cannot be part of the debtor’s estate. Therefore, the automatic stay is inapplicable.

Section 362(a)(6) does not bar recoupment of pension overpayments against benefits arising from the same transaction because recoupment is not collection of a claim.

Pennsylvania State Employees' Retirement System v. Thomas (In re Thomas) · filed 2015-05-01(a)(6)

Because neither the automatic stay nor bankruptcy discharge precludes PSERS from “recouping” the overpayments at issue, judgment on the pleadings shall be entered in favor of PSERS. ... Recoupment, on the other hand, is purely defensive in nature and is not an effort to collect a “debt” or “claim.”

Section 362(a)(7) does not bar recoupment of Medicare overpayments because recoupment is not a setoff.

Slater Health Center, Inc. v. United States (In Re Slater Health Center, Inc.) · filed 2005-02-16(a)(7)

The dispositive issue in this case is simply whether Medicare's adjustment to Slater's reimbursement claims for prior overpayments constituted an invalid setoff that contravened the bankruptcy code's automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7), or instead a valid recoupment, which would not be affected by bankruptcy but could simply be deducted from debts owed to Slater as a matter of course. ... The answer to this question is controlled by our recent decision in In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc. In that case we held, in conformity with the majority of other circuits to consider the question, that Medicare's adjustment for an overpayment constitutes a recoupment, not a setoff: "Both the Medicare statute and the provider agreement -- by contemplating [Medicare's] payment of estimated costs, corrective audits, and retroactive adjustments or partial adjustments for overpayments and underpayments in determining [Medicare's] net liability for current cost-year services -- strongly indicate that the contractual relationship between [Medicare] and Holyoke constitutes one, ongoing, integrated transaction." Id. at 4. We further held that once adjustments for Medicare overpayments had been determined to be recoupments, further "equitable balancing" was improper. Id. at 5.

Section 362’s automatic stay bars the SSA from withholding benefits payable after a bankruptcy filing to recover earlier overpayments.

Lee v. Schweiker · filed 1984-06-29

Although the paying agency can ordinarily recover overpayments, just as creditors can ordinarily obtain payment from a debtor's future income, the Bankruptcy Code protects a debtor's future income from such claims once a petition has been filed, and the SSA violated the automatic stay in continuing to withhold part of Lee's benefits after she had filed her petition.

Section 362(a) does not stay a judgment creditor from pursuing a supersedeas-bond surety after the debtor loses the appeal and has no remaining interest in the bond.

Bennie Edwards and Joann Edwards v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., the Celotex Corporation · filed 1993-12-22(a)

While we need not state the precise reach of Sec. 362(a) to third parties, we hold that the automatic stay cannot be invoked to paralyze judgment creditors from pursuing the surety of a supersedeas bond once the debtor has lost the appeal for which the bond was posted.

Section 362(a) does not stay a judgment creditor from pursuing a supersedeas bond surety after the debtor loses the appeal and the bond becomes enforceable.

Edwards v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. · filed 1993-11-05(a)

While we need not state the precise reach of § 362(a) to third parties, we hold that the automatic stay cannot be invoked to paralyze judgment creditors from pursuing the surety of a supersedeas bond once the debtor has lost the appeal for which the bond was posted.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a creditor’s action against a third-party surety on a contractor’s license bond that is not property of the debtor’s estate.

O'Malley Lumber Co. v. Lockard (In re Lockard) · filed 1989-09-05(a)(3)

In keeping with the prevailing authority, we conclude that the surety bond at issue in this case is not “property of the estate,” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541. O’Malley’s state court action against Allied is not, therefore, subject to the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a) determines whether an action is against the debtor by considering the debtor’s status in the initial proceeding.

Nationwide Power Corporation v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems · filed 1989-12-07(a)

In determining whether § 362(a) prohibits an action "against the debtor" the status of the debtor at the initial proceeding is considered.

Section 362’s automatic stay prevents enforcement of awards against a bankrupt debtor but does not prevent enforcement against a guarantor of the debtor’s liabilities.

PepsiCo, Inc. v. Burden · filed 1990-02-21

The automatic stay prevents enforcement of awards against the debtor, Lee Way, not against PepsiCo, the parent corporation which guaranteed the workers’ compensation liabilities of its wholly-owned subsidiary.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a defensive proceeding responding to claims asserted by the debtor, even when the debtor is named as a defendant.

Lovett v. Honeywell, Inc. (In Re Transportation Systems International, Inc.) · filed 1990-02-23(a)(1)

The Court holds that section 362(a)(1) was not applicable to Honeywell’s action before the ICC because that action was not “against the debtor,” as provided in that section. Honeywell’s action was a response to claims asserted by the debtor, TSI, for undercharges.

Section 362 stays appellate adjudication of claims against a defendant who files for bankruptcy while the appeal is pending.

Bath v. Bushkin · filed 1990-08-30

Accordingly, the automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362, which stays judicial actions "against the debtor" prohibited us from adjudicating the plaintiffs' claims against Smith.

Section 362 prevents adjudication of claims against a debtor who has filed for bankruptcy.

Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas · filed 1990-08-30

Accordingly, the automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362, which stays judicial actions "against the debtor” prohibited us from adjudicating the plaintiffs’ claims against Smith.

Section 362(a) does not extend the automatic stay to actions against a debtor’s guarantors.

AMA Management Corp. v. Strasburger · filed 1992-08-10(a)

The automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) does not extend to actions against guarantors of the debtor.

The automatic stay does not bar collection from a debtor’s employer on its own corporate liability for failing to honor a prepetition garnishment summons.

In Re Sowers · filed 1994-02-08

In sum, collection activities against a debtor’s employer on a corporate debt that was created because of the failure of that employer to honor a pre-petition garnishment summons do not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362 stays the commencement and continuation of claims against parties in bankruptcy, requiring dismissal of claims brought in violation of the stay.

In Re Phar-Mor, Inc. Securities Lit. · filed 1994-08-31

Because both of these parties are in bankruptcy, the commencement and continuation of this action against them is in violation of the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362. We have no jurisdiction to entertain such claims and they will be dismissed sua sponte.

Section 362 bars commencement or continuation of an action against a party in bankruptcy.

Trio v. Coopers & Lybrand · filed 1994-08-31

Because both of these parties are in bankruptcy, the commencement and continuation of this action against them is in violation of the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay enforcement of a supersedeas bond against a surety to recover the surety’s own property.

In Re Purifiner Distribution Corp. · filed 1995-04-11(a)(3)

An act to enforce the liability of the surety is an act to obtain property of the surety'from the surety, not property of the estate from the estate. Such an act is not stayed by § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a) does not stay claims against payment bonds furnished by nondebtor general contractors when the bonds are not property of the debtor’s estate.

In Re Petroleum Piping Contractors, Inc. · filed 1997-02-28(a)

It is therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that § 362(a) Automatic Stay does not apply to any claims by Water-Pro as to any project bond provided on either the New Lenox or Arbury Projects.

Section 362(a) does not stay claims against parties who are not debtors in the bankruptcy case.

In Re Biscayne Investment Group, Ltd. · filed 2001-05-29(a)

If Heigrodt wishes to pursue her claims against either Drexl or BIGI in the state court, she is free to do so at her option inasmuch as the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) did not operate to bar any such claims against them during the pendency of the case as neither was or is a debtor before the bankruptcy court; the stay has terminated as a result of the dismissal as a matter of law pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B); and no discharge injunction exists pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 727(a)(1) or 1141.

Section 362’s automatic stay generally protects the debtor, but does not shield a nondebtor surety from a creditor’s claim arising from the debtor’s unpaid obligation.

United States v. Washington International Insurance · filed 2001-11-15(a)(6)

WIIC is neither the debtor nor has N&B’s duty payment been satisfied; therefore, the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362 does not shield WIIC from Customs’ claims.

Section 362 does not automatically stay actions against a debtor’s nondebtor codefendants absent an identity of interests that makes the debtor the real party defendant.

Snow v. AC&S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(a)

First, there was no 11 U.S.C. § 362 automatic stay of actions available to the non-debtor co-defendants of the debtor, Federal-Mogul/Gasket Holdings.

Section 362 ordinarily stays claims against a debtor in bankruptcy but does not extend the stay to nondebtor codefendants without an identity of interests that makes the debtor the real defendant.

Armstrong v. Able Supply Company · filed 2002-01-03

Section 362 is rarely, however, a valid basis on which to stay actions against non-debtors.

Section 362 generally does not stay actions against nondebtor codefendants.

Volkmann v. ACands Inc · filed 2002-01-03(a)

Section 362 is rarely, however, a valid basis on which to stay actions against non-debtors.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against the debtor, but a suit against an individual who is not the debtor is not automatically stayed by the debtor’s bankruptcy.

Greer v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance · filed 2003-04-30(a)(1)

Because Greer individually is the defendant in the state court proceeding, he is not protected by the bankruptcy of G & L Drywall, who is the debtor.

Section 362(a)(1)'s automatic stay protects corporate directors in bankruptcy from an action naming them as defendants.

Albers v. Guthy-Renker Corp. · filed 2004-03-17(a)(1)

Although the Second Amended Complaint named Ad Choice's directors as defendants despite their bankruptcy status, the district court correctly noted that the directors were protected by the automatic stays imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). Thus, we presume for purposes of this disposition that the court’s dismissal was not intended to affect either defendant. Consequently, we need not, and do not, reach Appellants’ argument that the court's dismissal violated the automatic stays and should be vacated.

Section 362(a) does not bar a judgment imposing personal liability on an employer-garnishee for failing to comply with a prepetition garnishment when neither the debtor nor property of the bankruptcy estate is involved.

Kenosha Hospital & Medical Center v. Garcia · filed 2004-07-08(a)

The judgment at issue in the present case is not against the debtor, Garcia, but against the garnishee, Richter Industries, for failing to comply with the garnishment statutes. The judgment taken by Kenosha Hospital against Richter Industries does not involve Garcia, the debtor, or property of the estate. Accordingly, the automatic stay does not prohibit Kenosha Hospital's actions.

Section 362 does not stay claims against a nondebtor control person without the necessary identity of interest with the debtor, and subsection (a)(3) does not protect allegedly preferentially transferred assets until the trustee recovers them.

Catholic Order of Foresters v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc. · filed 2004-09-27(a), (a)(3)

First, by its terms, § 362 does not apply to a non-debtor such as Crosser. ... There is no suggestion in the present record that there is a “formal tie,” “contractual indemnification,” or “joint obligation” between Crestland Cooperative and Crosser to create the necessary “identity of interest.” ... Moreover, even if the Bondholders were seeking “the same” assets from Crosser as the trustee in the Crestland Cooperative bankruptcy, those assets do not become part of the bankruptcy estate until the trustee recovers them. ... Consequently, § 362(a)(3) does not bar any action by the Bondholders to recover those assets until and unless the trustee has recovered them.

Section 362(a)(3) automatically stays an action seeking to obtain property of the bankruptcy estate even when the debtor is not a defendant.

Amedisys Inc v. Natl Century Fin · filed 2005-09-13(a)(3)

The automatic stay of § 362(a) applies by its terms not only to actions against the debtor, see § 362(a)(1), but also to actions seeking to obtain property of the bankruptcy estate, see § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) automatically stays actions seeking estate property even against nondebtors, without requiring unusual circumstances justifying a preliminary injunction.

In Re: National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc., Debtor. Amedisys, Inc. v. National Century Financial Enterprises, I · filed 2005-09-13(a)(3)

Accepting Amedi-sys’ argument that the bankruptcy court failed to find unusual circumstances justifying a preliminary injunction would require an unwarranted limiting of § 362(a)(3), a subsection that requires application of the automatic stay without reference to whether the debtor is the defendant in the stayed action. Because the Louisiana action seeks to obtain property of the bankruptcy estate, we affirm the order enforcing the stay.

Section 362(a)’s automatic stay does not extend to actions against independently liable sureties, so the debtor’s bankruptcy does not toll the limitations period for those actions.

Restaurant Co. v. United Leasing Corp. · filed 2006-04-21(a)

Because the automatic stay did not bar United’s independent right to proceed against the Sureties, Havana’s filing for bankruptcy protection did not toll the statute of limitations with regard to United’s claim against the Sureties.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a private antitrust action seeking to block the disposition of estate assets even when the debtor is not named as a defendant.

Adelphia Communications Corp. v. America Channel, LLC (In Re Adelphia Communications Corp.) · filed 2006-06-26(a)(3)

Bankruptcy Code section 362(a)(3) protects the in rem jurisdiction of the Court, and prohibits interference with the disposition of the assets that are under the Court’s wing — whether or not the Debtor is named as a defendant as part of the effort. ... The absence of any applicable written exception appears to be beyond dispute. The defendants have not pointed to any other section of the Bankruptcy Code, or of the United States Code, that provides an exception for a private litigant asserting an antitrust claim.

Section 362(a) does not bar a creditor from reporting a debtor’s default to a third-party guarantor to obtain repayment or collecting the guaranteed debt from that guarantor.

Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Cordero · filed 2007-01-19(a)

Chase did not violate the stay by communicating a default to the FHA, where the purpose of the communication was simply to obtain repayment from a third-party guarantor. ... And Chase did not violate the stay by collecting from a third-party “guarantor” of the Corderos’ mortgage debt.

Section 362's automatic stay does not protect a debtor's nonbankrupt personal guarantor or the other nondebtor parties to the action.

Park East Sales v. Clark-Langley, Inc. · filed 2007-10-02

Edwards, who is a personal guarantor of a portion of Clark's debt to plaintiff, did not file for bankruptcy. Clark's automatic stay does not apply to her or any of the other parties in this case.

Section 362(a) stays litigation against nondebtor officers when their indemnification claims threaten to deplete estate insurance proceeds shared by multiple claimants.

SN Liquidation, Inc. v. Icon International, Inc. (In Re SN Liquidation, Inc.) · filed 2008-06-02(a)

Here, the Icon Action names only the Individual Defendants and not the Debtors. The Icon Action does, however, threaten the Debtors’ property, i.e., the Primary Policy. ... Having concluded that the Insurance is property of the estate and that Icon has violated the automatic stay, the analysis turns to whether or not the Court should enjoin further prosecution of the Icon Action for Icon’s violating the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362. ... Where, as here, there are finite insurance proceeds available to multiple litigation claimants, one of the salutary benefits the automatic stay affords is preventing a litigant from gaining any advantage by having its case heard first or compelling an early settlement.

Section 362(a)(3) stays suits against nondebtors based on the same acts as the trustee’s avoidance claims when any recovery may be paid from proceeds of the alleged fraudulent transfers or preferences.

In Re Cincom iOutsource, Inc. · filed 2008-10-31(a)(3)

Because the transfers that the Trustee seeks to avoid arise from virtually the identical acts which form the bases of the claims dealt with in lawsuits filed by the Respondents that are now pending in the New York, New Jersey and California federal courts ... and because any recovery that Respondents receive may well have to be paid out of the proceeds of the putative fraudulent transfers and preferences upon which the Trustee bases his claims against Systems and its related companies, the automatic stay under § 362(a)(3) stays those actions (including the third party action) from further prosecution.

Section 362 does not stay collection from nondebtor alter egos on liability independently arising from a nondebtor's obligation merely because they also control the debtor.

Levey v. Systems Division, Inc. (In Re Tekner, LLC) · filed 2009-04-29

SDI’s claim against the alter egos does not depend on the alter egos’ misconduct with respect to the debtor. SDI has equal recourse against the alter egos because of the injury suffered by Electronics. ... The fact that the same alter egos controlled both Electronics and Teknek is not sufficient to bring SDI’s claim against Electronics under the umbrella of the bankruptcy proceeding.

The automatic stay does not bar collection from nondebtor alter egos on a judgment based on an independently liable nondebtor's separate injury, even when the same alter egos also controlled the debtor.

Teknek, LLC v. Systems Division Inc · filed 2009-04-29

It therefore ruled that SDI’s claims were not subject to the automatic stay under § 362, nor to an injunction under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code. We agree with the district court and therefore hold that it properly vacated the bankruptcy court’s injunction. ... The fact that the same alter egos controlled both Elec- tronics and Teknek is not sufficient to bring SDI’s claim against Electronics under the umbrella of the bankruptcy proceeding. ... As in Hendrix, now that SDI’s claim has been reduced to judgment, its collection action is only nominally against Electronics and Teknek, because the only relief sought is against the non-debtor alter egos.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not apply to claims against a bankrupt debtor’s surety.

Empire Enterprises JKB, Inc. v. Union City Contractors, Inc. · filed 2009-09-25

The automatic stay does not apply, however, to claims against the bankrupt debtor’s sureties.

Section 362(a)(1) generally stays actions against the debtor, but does not automatically protect a guarantor of the debtor’s obligations.

In Re Bora Bora, Inc. · filed 2010-01-20(a)(1)

While the scope of the automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362, is broad, it only stays actions against the debtor and does not extend its protection to guarantors.

Section 362(a) does not stay an action to collect an employer’s independent liability for services a debtor rendered for free before bankruptcy when recovery comes from the employer’s property.

In Re Bowers · filed 2010-02-25(a)

For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the automatic stay was not violated by pursuit of the § 16-579 action with respect to work the debtor performed prepetition.

Section 362(a) does not stay litigation or collection against a nondebtor corporation merely because its owner has filed for bankruptcy.

Saleh v. Bank of America, N.A. (In Re Saleh) · filed 2010-04-06(a)

In addition, the court concludes that Bank of America’s continued litigation and collection activities against Food City, Inc. do not violate the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) bars actions against third parties that would adversely affect property of the bankruptcy estate.

Kagan v. Saint Vincents Catholic Medical Centers · filed 2011-05-23(a)(3)

Accordingly, contrary to Kagan’s assertions, the automatic stay provision is not limited solely to actions against the debtor, but rather bars actions against even against third-parties that would have an adverse impact on the property of the estate.

Section 362(a) generally does not stay a creditor’s claims against nondebtors, including claims against a debtor’s relatives to recover property transferred to them before bankruptcy.

In Re Irwin · filed 2011-09-15(a)

After working through them, I have held that the fundamental bankruptcy principle — that § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code generally does not restrain actions by one non-debt- or against another non-debtor — is decisive here and therefore, prosecution of the Receiver’s claims against the Non-Debtor Targets is not subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) does not prevent actions against guarantors of a debtor’s obligations.

Epes v. B.E. Waterhouse, LLC · filed 2012-06-19(a)(6)

Plaintiffs reliance is misplaced, as federal courts have held that the automatic stay does not prevent actions against guarantors of loans.

Section 362(a)(3) does not extend the automatic stay to a suit against a separate nondebtor merely because the suit may have a minor effect on the value of estate property.

National Bank of Arkansas v. Panther Mountain Land Devel. · filed 2012-07-25(a)(3)

We find no support for the view that any and all minor impacts on the value of estate property can justify the extension of the stay.

Section 362(a) generally does not stay proceedings against a nondebtor codefendant unless continuing those proceedings would put bankruptcy estate assets at risk.

In re Xenon Anesthesia of Texas, PLLC · filed 2014-05-05(a)

It does not apply to actions against a non-debtor except in situations where assets of the bankruptcy estate would be at risk in allowing a court proceeding to continue against a codefendant.

Section 362(a) does not automatically stay a creditor’s action against a nondebtor; an order extending the stay is needed to protect that person.

Wigley v. Wigley · filed 2016-09-21(a)

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in entering this order because the stay did not apply in the first instance to the action by Lariat (a creditor) against Barbara Wigley (a non-debtor). No order was entered extending the automatic stay to Mrs. Wigley.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a creditor's fraudulent conveyance claims against nondebtor transferees when the claims seek estate property to collect a prepetition debt.

First Bank of Dalton v. Manton Family P'ship, LLLP (In re Manton) · filed 2018-02-28(a)(3)

Therefore, regardless of who the defendants are, the claims at issue in this case are attempts to collect on account of prepetition debts owed by the Debtor from property of the estate, and therefore all the claims at issue in this Fraudulent Conveyance Action against all the Defendants were stayed by the automatic stay of § 362(a).

Section 362(a) does not stay a suit solely against a nondebtor to collect an obligation the bankruptcy debtor assigned to that nondebtor.

Fortitude Energy, LLC v. Sooner Pipe LLC · filed 2018-08-30(a)

The automatic stay provision of section 362 is not applicable to this case involving parties that are not in bankruptcy.

Section 362(a) automatically stays judicial actions against a debtor when it files for bankruptcy.

The Scripps Research Institute v. Cempra Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2019-12-30(a)

The bankruptcy filings operate as an automatic stay of all judicial actions against those Defendants pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a)’s automatic stay generally does not apply to actions against nondebtors.

Southern California Sunbelt Developers, Inc. And Dan Baer v. Donald B. Grammer Colchester Management Services, LLC Blanc · filed 2019-12-31(a)

Thus, we conclude that the automatic stay in section 362 did not apply to stay Appellants’ underlying action against the nondebtor Appellees.

Section 362(a) does not stay collection actions against nondebtor companies merely because the debtor owns membership interests in them and the actions may indirectly reduce the value of those interests.

Baron v. Pan · filed 2020-01-06(a)

Thus, to the extent that Debtor argues that Defendants’ collection activities violate the automatic stay because such actions indirectly impact the value of her membership interests, that argument fails under clearly established law regarding the scope of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not extend the automatic stay to a creditor’s action against a nondebtor indemnitor liable on the debtor’s debt.

Hamilton v. Elite of Los Angeles, Inc. · filed 2020-03-02(a)

The bankruptcy court did not err by concluding that the automatic stay did not extend to Elite’s state-court action against HCC.

Section 362(a)(1) can stay a suit against a nondebtor when the debtor’s indemnification obligation would immediately harm the bankruptcy estate.

In Re: Sears Holdings Corporation · filed 2021-09-27(a)(1)

In short, and in light of the conclusions reached above, the Bankruptcy Court correctly interpreted Queenie to determine that the stay applies to the Underwriters in this situation, where there would be an immediate adverse impact on the Debtors’ estate.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay litigation against nondebtor affiliates over uninsured events when that litigation implicates no property interest of the debtor’s estate.

The Diocese of Buffalo, N.Y. v. 100 Doe · filed 2021-10-21(a)(3)

Such uninsured events implicate no property interest that would impose an automatic stay of litigation against defendants other than the Diocese itself.

Section 362(a) stays proceedings against the bankruptcy debtor, so it does not toll the limitations period for a foreclosure action against a nondebtor.

MLB Sub I, LLC v. Clark · filed 2022-01-26(a)

The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled because the prior foreclosure action was commenced against the defendant, who was not the debtor in the bankruptcy proceeding ( see 11 USC § 362; Lubonty v U.S. Bank N.A. , 34 NY3d 250; Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Jackson , 192 AD3d 813).

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a creditor’s foreclosure action against a nondebtor landlord when the debtor is not named and its lease and purchase option remain intact.

HBL SNF, LLC · filed 2022-02-01(a)(1)

The Debtor clearly—and correctly—views this motion as not its fight but rather a dispute between these two non-debtors. Given the record, therefore, the Court agrees that the actions contemplated by Security Benefit would not run afoul of the stay.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a prepetition suit against the debtor; litigation concerning only separate nondebtor defendants is not stayed merely because the debtor has a related bankruptcy proceeding.

Belfor U.S.A. Group, Inc. v. Salem Consumer Square OH LLC · filed 2022-04-22(a)(1)

Salem is focused in on § 362(a)(1), which bars a creditor from pursuing a pre-petition lawsuit against the debtor. But the litigation only concerns the claims of Moonbeam (a separate legal entity from Salem) and Williams.

Section 362(a) does not automatically stay a suit against a nondebtor merely because the nondebtor has a contractual right to indemnity from the debtor.

Izabella Boginsky · filed 2024-02-21(a)

But section 362(a), by itself, does not stay Respondents’ fraudulent transfer suit against JP Morgan Chase.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay third-party claims that belong to the plaintiffs and do not arise from the debtor.

Orly Genger · filed 2025-06-20(a)(1)

The Court disagrees. In the MSM Action, the Plaintiffs are asserting claims that are particular to them, and particularly against the defendants. They do not assert claims against the Debtor or claims that arise from the Debtor. The claims are based upon independent actions taken by the defendants. Section 362(a)(1) does not stay prosecution of the MSM Action.

Section 362(a) does not stay actions against a debtor’s sureties.

Board of Trustees of the Employee Painters Trust v. Quality Services, Inc. · filed 2025-06-26(a)

Because the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 does not stay actions against sureties, defendant Quality Service’s bankruptcy stay will not affect claims against WSC.

The automatic stay bars filing claims against a bankruptcy estate.

Dam v. Waldron · filed 2026-03-19

Dam violated the automatic stay by bringing claims against the estate.

Section 362(a) stays further action against defendants involved in bankruptcy proceedings.

Pikofsky v. Jem Oil · filed 1985-05-02(a)

At the status conference of April 12, 1984, the Court was also advised that defendants Jem Oil and Olav E. Jore are now involved in bankruptcy proceedings. Accordingly, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), all further action against them in this case was stayed.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay does not apply to a claim against someone who is not the debtor.

Grimmett v. Brown · filed 1996-01-26(a)

Even if Siragusa could have raised her RICO claim in some form in the bankruptcy proceeding, see In re The Monetary Group, 2 F.3d 1098, 1099 (11th Cir.1993), she could have simultaneously pressed her claim in federal court since the automatic stay did not apply to her claim against Brown, who was not the debtor, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); In re Kalispell Feed & Grain Supply, 55 B.R. 627, 629 (Bankr.D.Mont.1985).

Section 362(k) creates an independent federal bankruptcy cause of action for an automatic stay violation, and a complaint alleging sufficient facts to establish a violation and entitlement to relief may proceed.

Montalvo v. Autoridad de Acueducto y Alcantarillados (In re Montalvo) · filed 2015-09-24(k)

The court finds that the Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts, that if accepted as true, establish sufficient basis for the alleged violation of the automatic stay and entitlement to relief which this court has jurisdiction to entertain, given that 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) creates an independent federal bankruptcy cause of action.

A nonbankruptcy court may determine whether the automatic stay applies to a matter pending before it; that inquiry differs from granting relief from the stay under § 362(d).

Singleton v. Fifth Third Bank of Western Ohio (In Re Singleton) · filed 1999-03-04(d)

The Debtor confuses jurisdiction to grant relief from the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) with jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies in the first instance.

A claim based solely on violation of Section 362’s automatic stay belongs exclusively in bankruptcy court.

Hawthorne v. Hameed · filed 1989-09-12

Accordingly, we need not address Appellants’ other contentions, as we find the state district court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear Hawthorne’s cause of action arising from violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362’s automatic stay cannot be enforced through a summary contempt citation for a violation of the statute alone without express authority.

In Re Hunter · filed 1995-12-26

While the Court is aware that it is the practice of some bankruptcy judges in some jurisdictions to punish violations of section 362 by contempt, this Court is unaware of any authority that would give this Court jurisdiction to punish violations of purely statutory provisions by contempt citations.

State courts lack jurisdiction to impose § 362(h) sanctions for willful violations of the automatic stay.

Halas v. Platek · filed 1999-09-27(h)

For these reasons, the court concludes that state courts do not have jurisdiction to impose sanctions under § 362(h).

A damages claim for violation of the automatic stay is property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate and must be heard in the district where that bankruptcy case began.

Williams v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In Re Williams) · filed 2000-01-19(h)

Because a damages action to remedy the violation of the automatic stay is property of the estate, jurisdiction over that cause of action lies exclusively in the court in which the bankruptcy case was commenced.