11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(b)(4) precludes payment of disgorgement awards in bankruptcy proceedings.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Great White Marine & Recreation · filed 2005-11-16(b)(4)

In Bilzerian, the court interpreted the impact of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), an automatic stay provision that precludes payment of disgorgement awards in bankruptcy proceedings. Since the Distribution Award is not governed by the Bankruptcy Code, the automatic stay provision does not apply.

Section 362(d)(2) does not require a court to consider the effects of lifting the stay on third parties when the debtor lacks equity in the property and it is not necessary to an effective reorganization.

Reverend C.T. Walker Hous. Dev. Fund Corp. v. City of N.Y. · filed 2018-03-05(d)(2)

However, § 362(d)(2) says nothing about contemplating the effects of lifting the stay on third parties.

A holder of a note and mortgage may seek relief from the automatic stay as a party in interest under § 362(d); an existing state foreclosure judgment can support that status.

In re: Caires · filed 2021-01-15(d)

A holder of the note and mortgage qualifies as a “party in interest” who may seek relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) from the automatic bankruptcy stay. See In re Sterling, 737 Fed. App’x 52, 53 (2d Cir. 2018). In light of the existing state court foreclosure judgment obtained by the Bank, the Bankruptcy Court had plausible grounds to conclude that the Bank qualified as a party in interest who could seek relief from the automatic stay.

A creditor with a foreclosure lien is a party in interest that may seek relief from the automatic stay even if it has not filed a proof of claim.

Dawn C. Ohlsson v. U.S. Bank National Association · filed 2022-10-12(d)

Under Rule 3002(a), U.S. Bank’s failure to file a proof of claim does not “void” this lien. Accordingly, U.S. Bank is a party in interest capable of seeking relief from the auto- matic stay.

Section 362(b)(9)(D) permits a postpetition tax assessment without violating the automatic stay, but a resulting lien does not attach to estate property that is never transferred or revested in the debtor.

Spero v. Community Chevrolet, Inc. (In re Grooms) · filed 2017-08-22(b)(9)(D)

Thus, although pursuant to Section 362(b)(9)(D) the U.S lien could arise with the issuance of the criminal order in July 2016 during the Grooms’ bankruptcy without violating the automatic stay, it does not attach to the preference action proceeds which are property of the bankruptcy estate being administered by the Trustee.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits conduct that pressures a debtor to pay a debt covered by the automatic stay, even without a direct demand for payment.

Malloy v. J & V Developers, Inc. (In re Malloy) · filed 2017-08-24(a)(6)

Also, it is well established that § 362(a)(6) prohibits .any action that amounts to pressure on a debtor to pay a debt subject to the automatic stay, even if there is no direct demand for payment.

Section 362(a)(3) treats a creditor’s continued possession of estate property seized before bankruptcy as an exercise of control that violates the automatic stay.

Thompson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., LLC · filed 2009-05-27(a)(3)

For these reasons, we find that the act of passively holding onto an asset constitutes “exercising control” over it, and such action violates section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a lawsuit that attempts to exercise control over property of the bankruptcy estate.

Harpley v. Five Star Tickets, Inc. (In Re Premier Sports Tours) · filed 2002-07-24(a)(3)

Next, the filing of the lawsuit in Illinois was a clear attempt to exercise control over property of the estate, which was protected by the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) provides that the filing of a Petition will stay any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a creditor committee from filing a complaint asserting estate causes of action without prior court permission.

Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n of Florida (In Re General Homes Corp.) · filed 2002-03-11(a)(3)

Filing a complaint asserting causes of action belonging to the estate without first obtaining permission from the court is a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a secured creditor from transferring title to a repossessed vehicle after a bankruptcy filing when the debtor retains a title interest, even if the right to redeem has ended.

In Re Nowell · filed 1999-03-09(a)(3)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), therefore, that title interest, however limited it may be because of the termination of the debtor’s right to redeem, is still a legal interest which is property of the bankruptcy estate. CAR was not free to exercise any control over that legal interest without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a party from suing to enjoin a Chapter 7 trustee from pursuing an estate-property and exemption dispute while the bankruptcy court has yet to resolve that dispute.

Guy v. Dzikowski (In Re Atlas) · filed 1998-03-06(a)(3)

Therefore, there is no basis for this Court to reverse the Order of the Bankruptcy Court where Bankruptcy Judge Robert A. Mark found that Guy’s filing of the Complaint to enjoin the Chapter 7 trustee falls within the scope of the 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) prohibition against actions to obtain possession of or exercise control over property of the estate, and that sanctions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) were properly assessed to cover damages incurred by the trustee.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar foreclosure of a maritime lien against a nondebtor vessel merely because the vessel contains estate property and the foreclosure indirectly delays the debtor’s use of that property.

In Re Chugach Forest Products, Inc. · filed 1994-04-28(a)(3)

We hold that Northern Stevedoring did not "exercise control" over Chugach's property and thus did not violate Sec. 362(a)(3) by foreclosing its maritime lien on the Hermes Island.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a creditor’s state court alter ego action against a debtor’s shareholder when the alter ego cause of action is estate property.

Himmelspach v. Railcar Specialties, Inc. (In Re R.C.S. Engineered Products Co.) · filed 1994-05-31(a)(3)

As explained earlier, the alter ego cause of action constitutes estate property. That being the case, Spartan’s prosecution of its state lawsuit is contrary to § 362(a)(3) insofar as it asserts such a cause of action.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a sale of a nondebtor shareholder’s stock when the sale would extinguish a tax benefit belonging to the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Cumberland Farms, Inc. · filed 1993-12-15(a)(3)

If the stock is sold to anyone other than Haseotes, the Debtor’s benefit from the Haseotes suspended loss would terminate. That result is sufficient for the sale to be an “act ... to exercise control over property of the estate” within the meaning of section 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) is violated when an entity that knows of a bankruptcy filing continues to retain estate property it seized before the filing.

Coats v. Vawter (In Re Coats) · filed 1993-12-09(a)(3)

The continued retention of debtors’ collateral repossessed prepetition, by an entity with knowledge of the bankruptcy, is itself a violation of the automatic stay.

A surety does not violate the automatic stay by asking an obligee to withhold payment when the request merely communicates that the surety does not consent to payment.

Merchants Bonding Co. v. Pima County · filed 1993-10-06(a)(3)

We disagree. The notice merely requests that Pima County make no further payments to REM and is nothing more than Merchants’ notification that it did not consent to the final payment.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits efforts to force an unjustified Chapter 7 conversion to weaken a debtor’s ability to pursue its claims.

INSLAW, Inc. v. United States (In Re INSLAW, Inc.) · filed 1988-02-06(a)(3)

3. Stanton’s actions (i) in pressuring United States Trustee William C. White to convert the INSLAW case, (ii) in seeking to obtain the transfer of Assistant Trustee Harry Jones from New York to EOUST for that purpose, and (iii) in retaliating against White by withholding staff support, (iv) when Stanton knew there was no factual or legal basis upon which liquidation could be sought, and (v) when the effect which DOJ intended to achieve by such a conversion was to weaken or eliminate INSLAW’s ability to press its contract disputes with DOJ, constitute “act[s] to obtain possession of” INSLAW’s property in violation of section 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a landlord from withholding heat and hot water to force a debtor out of a leased unit.

Aponte v. Aungst (In Re Aponte) · filed 1988-02-23(a)(3)

Regardless of whether the problem was caused by broken pipes or failure to purchase oil, his inaction and action was clearly designed to obtain possession of the unit, in violation of § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits seizing a debtor’s leasehold or other property of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Lile · filed 1989-07-26(a)(3)

The attempted seizure by the IRS of the leasehold premises and other personal property constituted an act to obtain possession or to exercise control over property of the estate and therefore was a violation of the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a government agency from holding payments owed to a debtor because withholding the funds exercises control over property of the estate.

Small Business Administration v. Harold Rinehart Marilyn Rinehart · filed 1989-10-06(a)(3)

Regardless of whether SBA’s “hold” is an “offset” under section 362(a)(7) of the automatic stay provisions, however, it surely is an act “to exercise control over the property of the estate,” which is forbidden by section 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits obtaining and enforcing a state court restraining order that seeks possession of property of the bankruptcy estate.

Taxel v. Electronic Sports Research (In Re Cinematronics, Inc.) · filed 1990-01-10(a)(3)

However, ESR’s action of filing a motion for temporary restraining order and acquiring and enforcing the Illinois TRO against the trustee at the AMOA trade show, and resisting the trustee’s efforts to resume marketing the “World Series” game at the AMOA trade show, in this court’s view, constituted an act to obtain possession of property of the estate, i.e., possession of the World Series game, drawings and brochures and therefore was a violation of § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) stays acts to take or control estate property even when the relevant claims or events arise after the bankruptcy petition.

222 Liberty Associates v. Prescott Forbes Real Estate Corp. (In Re 222 Liberty Associates) · filed 1990-02-16(a)(3)

However, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) is not limited in its application to prepetition claims or events. Therefore, even if we conclude that § 362(a)(7) is inapplicable, the automatic stay arises by reason of § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay an action to recover foreclosed property when the property is outside the bankruptcy estate and the Chapter 13 debtor’s possession is not possession by the estate.

In Re Crawley · filed 1990-03-01(a)(3)

The mortgaged property, however, was not possessed by the estate, and therefore ITT’s commencement of its unlawful detainer action was not an act to obtain possession of the mortgaged premises “from the estate.”

Section 362(a)(3) stays a post-petition attempt to transfer a vested fee interest belonging to the bankruptcy estate, and an act violating the stay is void even without actual notice.

Rose v. Carlson (In Re Rose) · filed 1990-04-05(a)(3)

Because the debtors’ vested fee interest in the 150 acre farm was property of the bankruptcy estate, appellant’s attempt to transfer such interest to her grandchildren after the bankruptcy petition was filed was an attempt to “exercise control over property of the estate” in violation of the stay. Actions taken in violation of the stay are void and without effect even where there is no actual notice of the stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a court’s determination of the scope or existence of a debtor’s privilege, because that determination is not an act to obtain possession of estate property.

In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation · filed 1990-06-18(a)(3)

Even if the Company had the privileges claimed, the magistrate’s determination of the scope or existence of a privilege is not an “act to obtain possession of property.”

Section 362(a)(3) bars obtaining estate property or exercising control over it, including an earnest money deposit that became estate property.

Uecker v. Davidson (In Re Bair Island Marina & Office Center) · filed 1990-06-22(a)(3)

Having found that the $100,000 earnest money was property of the estate, it follows that Davidson was stayed from doing anything to obtain that money or exercising control over it pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), and that his conduct constituted a violation of the stay.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a proceeding to revoke a debtor’s trucking operating authority when that authority is property of the estate.

Brizendine v. Humboldt Express, Inc. (In Re Brown Transport Truckload, Inc.) · filed 1990-09-14(a)(3)

The Authorities must be considered property of the estate within this Court’s jurisdiction, and the TPSC proceeding is an act to obtain property of the estate which is stayed by § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(3) requires the debtor to identify estate property and show that someone is attempting to possess or control it.

Golden Distributors Ltd. v. Reiss (In Re Golden Distributors Ltd.) · filed 1990-12-21(a)(3)

In order to invoke 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), the debtor must show what property of the estate is implicated and that some entity or individual is attempting to obtain possession or exercise control over such property of the estate.

Section 362(a) stays a creditor’s acts to gain possession of real property needed to enforce a security interest in rents, so the creditor must obtain stay relief before taking those acts.

In Re Hall Elmtree Associates, Ltd. · filed 1991-03-01(a)

The enforcement of that interest requires possession of the real property, and acts to gain possession are stayed by 11 U.S.C. section 362(a). Olde Salem must therefore obtain relief from stay to make the rents cash collateral.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a nondebtor's act that would diminish or eliminate estate property, including a parent's worthless stock deduction that would destroy the debtor's net operating loss carryforward.

In Re Prudential Lines Inc. · filed 1991-03-20(a)(3)

Similarly, where a non-debtor's action with respect to an interest that is intertwined with that of a bankrupt debtor would have the legal effect of diminishing or eliminating property of the bankrupt estate, such action is barred by the automatic stay. In the instant case, PSS' interest in its worthless stock deduction is intertwined with PLI's NOL. If PSS were permitted to take a worthless stock deduction on its 1988 tax return, it would have an adverse impact on PLI's ability to carryforward its NOL. Accordingly, despite the fact that PSS' action is not directed specifically at PLI, it is barred by the automatic stay as an attempt to exercise control over property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a nondebtor’s action that would legally diminish or eliminate estate property, even when the action is directed at an interest intertwined with the debtor’s rather than at the debtor itself.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. PSS Steamship Co. · filed 1991-03-20(a)(3)

Similarly, where a non-debtor’s action with respect to an interest that is intertwined with that of a bankrupt debtor would have the legal effect of diminishing or eliminating property of the bankrupt estate, such action is barred by the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a state-court action to obtain possession of estate property while it remains in the bankruptcy estate unless the claimant obtains relief from the stay under section 362(d).

Streams Condominium No. 3 Ass'n v. Bosgraf · filed 1991-10-07(a)(3)

The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code states that the filing of a bankruptcy operates as a stay of any act to obtain possession or control of property of the bankruptcy estate. (11 U.S.C. §362(a)(3) (Supp. V 1987).) This provision prevented Streams from filing a forcible entry and detainer complaint in State court while the property was part of the DTS-2 bankruptcy estate unless Streams sought and received relief from the stay pursuant to section 362(d) (11 U.S.C. §362(d) (Supp. V 1987)).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from unilaterally disposing of estate property after the bankruptcy petition is filed, even when the creditor took possession before filing.

Nigro v. Oxford Development Co. (In Re M.J. Shoearama, Inc.) · filed 1992-03-11(a)(3)

Defendant violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) in June of 1988 when it unilaterally disposed of the inventory and fixtures remaining in debtor’s place of business at the time it was padlocked. It exercised control over property of the estate when it disposed of estate property.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a governmental agency from applying regulations that immediately and pervasively control property of a bankruptcy estate.

Gumport v. Interstate Commerce Commission (In Re Transcon Lines) · filed 1992-10-09(a)(3)

The ICC Bankruptcy Regulations purport to exercise immediate and pervasive control over the estate’s property and therefore are violative of § 362(a)(3) which prohibits acts “to exercise control over property of the estate.”

Section 362(a)(3) bars a sale of a debtor’s stock when the sale would exercise control over a net operating loss carryforward that is property of the estate.

In Re Phar-Mor, Inc. · filed 1993-03-29(a)(3)

The Court finds that at this juncture, the sale of stock is prohibited by § 362(a)(3) as an exercise of control over the NOL, which is property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a secured creditor from using an agent to exercise control over estate property after a bankruptcy filing, even if nonbankruptcy law would otherwise permit that control.

Kaiser v. Leader Federal Bank for Savings (In Re Kaiser) · filed 1993-07-14(a)(3)

After this bankruptcy case was filed, Leader Federal violated the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) by retaining Mortgage Service Associates to exercise control over property of the bankruptcy estate. Any right which Leader Federal had under applicable non-bankruptcy law, such as HUD regulations, to exercise control over the property of Ms. Kaiser was limited by § 362 upon the filing of this bankruptcy ease.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a creditor from exercising control over casualty insurance proceeds that belong to the bankruptcy estate.

Ledford v. Fidelity Financial Services (In Re Hill) · filed 1994-11-22(a)(3)

Having determined that the casualty insurance proceeds are property of the debt- or’s chapter 13 estate, the court finds that Fidelity has violated the automatic stay by exercising control over these funds.

Section 362(a)(1) and (3) bars a creditor from seeking a state-court injunction that would control estate property when relief from the stay permits only adjudication of the creditor’s rights.

In Re Sparks · filed 1995-04-13(a)(1), (a)(3)

Therefore, the Court concludes that, assuming this Court’s April 6, 1993 Order did not authorize it, Margaret’s act of filing the state court motion violates the automatic stay, specifically § 362(a)(1) and (3).

Section 362(a)(3) stays a debtor’s postpetition recording of a homestead declaration to claim estate property as exempt.

Martinson v. Michael (In Re Michael) · filed 1995-06-15(a)(3)

This Court holds that the Debtors’ post-petition recordation was stayed by the automatic stay of § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit a third party from securing property at the trustee’s direction when the trustee has the right to possess it, even if the debtor has claimed it as exempt.

In the Matter of Thomas R. SALZER, D/B/A TRS Automotive, Debtor-Appellant · filed 1995-06-14(a)(3)

Consequently, Stinson was acting under the valid direction of the trustee, and Stinson did not violate the automatic stay by securing the personal property notwithstanding Salzer’s claim of exemption.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits an action seeking to enjoin a trustee from obtaining scheduled estate property or litigating a claimed exemption in that property.

In Re Atlas · filed 1995-06-26(a)(3)

The Debtors’ interest in the Plans was listed as property of the estate in the Debtors’ schedules, and an action to enjoin the Trustee from obtaining that property or from litigating over the claimed exemption as to that property falls within the scope of the 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) prohibition against actions to obtain possession of or exercise control over property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) stays acts that eliminate or reduce the potential value of estate property by exercising control over it.

Stern v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Alcohol Beverage Control Commission (In Re J.F.D. Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 1995-06-26(a)(3)

In the instant case, the ABCC’s substitution of the Buyer on the Delinquency List is an act which has the effect of eliminating or reducing the potential value of the License to the estate. Therefore, it is an act to control property of the estate in violation of § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) requires a creditor that repossesses estate property without knowledge of the bankruptcy to return it within a reasonable time after receiving notice.

In Re Belcher · filed 1995-11-16(a)(3)

This court will follow the majority position on this issue. In determining that the creditor had a duty under 11 U.S.C. § 362 to return the vehicle and re-establish the status quo as of the day of the filing of the petition, a factual issue arises. ... This court concludes that the delay until July 21, 1995 by BCT was reasonable. Perhaps even a fifth day could be allowed. After that, BCT had a duty to return the vehicle to the place from where it was taken.

Section 362 prohibits withholding Medicare interim payments owed to a debtor when doing so interferes with the debtor’s use of estate property.

First American Health Care of Georgia, Inc. v. United States Department of Health & Human Services Ex Rel. Shalala (In R · filed 1996-02-23

I am compelled to conclude that the Defendants’ suspension of PIPs when they have no clue as to how much Debtor owes, and Defendants’ threat to withhold all future PIPs cannot be condoned. Those acts infringe on First American’s right to use property of the estate and constitute, or will constitute, a violation of 11 U.S.C. Section 362.

Section 362(a)(3) does not treat a creditor’s passive retention of property lawfully repossessed before the petition as a stay violation while adequate protection is resolved.

In Re Young · filed 1996-03-13(a)(3)

Read in this context, the prohibition against an act to exercise control does not reach the passive act of continuing to possess property.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a creditor from retaining a repossessed vehicle after a chapter 13 debtor requests its return, because withholding possession and use exercises control over estate property.

In Re Sharon · filed 1996-07-30(a)(3)

This court holds that the phrase “exercise control” encompasses acts of a creditor in denying a chapter 13 debtor possession and use of a debtor’s vehicle when the return of the property has been requested.

Section 362(a)(3) stays litigation seeking to recover funds held by alleged fraudulent transferees when those funds are property of the estate.

In Re Swallen's, Inc. · filed 1997-02-26(a)(3)

We hold, on the authority of In re MortgageAmerica, 714 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir.1983), that funds in the hands of putative fraudulent transferees are property of the estate. Those funds are the target of the Stelter litigation. The Stelter litigation therefore is violative of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) may bar voiding a debtor’s valid lease during the automatic stay.

Matter of Edward M. Smith and Helen v. Smith, Debtors. Edward M. Smith and Helen v. Smith v. Mary M. Albert · filed 1997-04-08(a)(3)

And even if it were good cause, we would not reverse the bankruptcy court for abuse of discretion, because we cannot say that "no reasonable person could agree with the trial court's judgment" that the Smiths had a valid lease, and that Albert violated that automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 when she voided the lease.

Section 362(a)(3) stays acts that exercise control over estate property, but an act does not violate it merely by reducing that property’s value.

In Re Albion Disposal, Inc. · filed 1997-08-11(a)(3)

Nevertheless, section 362(a)(3) does not stay acts that reduce the value of property of the estate; it stays acts to exercise control over estate property.

Section 362(a)(3) stays postpetition acts to enforce termination of a franchise that is property of the bankruptcy estate and to obtain possession of that franchise.

Krystal Cadillac Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. General Motors Corp. (In Re Krystal Cadillac Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc.) · filed 1998-04-23(a)(3)

Accordingly, GM's acts to enforce the state court's termination of the franchise agreement and to obtain possession of the GMC franchise violated the automatic stay provision of section 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) stays postpetition delivery and recording of tax deeds when those acts obtain the debtor’s bare legal title from the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Samaniego · filed 1998-08-13(a)(3)

Delivery and recording of the Treasurer’s deeds are clearly acts to obtain possession of that bare legal title from the estate and establish control over it.

Section 362(a)(3) stays filings that seek to obtain or control estate property, including a debtor’s cause of action, and acts against third parties that might affect that property.

Application of County Treasurer & Ex Officio County Coll. · filed 1999-09-21(a)(3)

Accordingly, both Cambridge's motion to reconsider and its appeal violated the automatic stay imposed by section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code as attempts to obtain or control "property of the estate." Because the filings violated subsection (a)(3), they were also invalid with respect to the Bank. Subsection (a)(3) stays acts against third parties which might affect property of the estate as well as acts taken with respect to the debtor.

Section 362(a)(3) stays filings that seek to obtain or control estate property, including filings against third parties that might affect that property.

Cambridge Investment Group v. First Chicago Bank · filed 1999-09-21(a)(3)

Accordingly, both Cambridge’s motion to reconsider and its appeal violated the automatic stay imposed by section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code as attempts to obtain or control “property of the estate.” Because the filings violated subsection (a)(3), they were also invalid with respect to the Bank. Subsection (a)(3) stays acts against third parties that might affect property of the estate as well as acts taken with respect to the debtor.

Section 362(a)(3) bars negotiating checks that become property of the bankruptcy estate after the petition is filed.

Huennekens v. Gilcom Corp. of Virginia (In Re SunSport, Inc.) · filed 2000-03-30(a)(3)

Because the SunSport bankruptcy petition was filed in July 1997, these checks received in August and September became property of the SunSport bankruptcy estate. Giller’s and Edney’s negotiation of these checks constituted an action in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a government agency’s postpetition cancellation of licenses that are property of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Kansas Personal Communication Services, Ltd. · filed 2000-08-16(a)(3)

The FCC’s “automatic cancellation” of the Licenses was stayed by the filing of the bankruptcy under § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) bars postpetition acts that exercise control over property of the bankruptcy estate.

Ramette v. Al & Alma's Supper Club Corp. (In Re Bame) · filed 2000-08-22(a)(3)

Finally, the Defendants’ actions clearly exercised control over property of the estate. Therefore, the undisputed evidence establishes that the Defendants violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) requires a creditor whose collection agent seized estate property before bankruptcy to take affirmative steps to return it after receiving notice of the bankruptcy filing.

In Re Johnson · filed 2001-06-05(a)(3)

As a result, when they received notice of the bankruptcy filing, Creditors were charged with the affirmative duty to effect a return of the seized property of the estate or risk violation of the automatic stay.

Sections 362(a)(3) and (a)(6) require an affirmative post-petition act; passive retention of funds withheld before bankruptcy does not violate the automatic stay.

Pardo v. Nylcare Health Plans, Inc. (In Re APF Co.) · filed 2001-12-18(a)(3), (a)(6)

I find that NYLCare’s post-petition conduct in this case was not an affirmative action within the meaning of § 362(a)(3) or (a)(6). Sections (a)(3) and (a)(6) require more than a mere passive act of failing to remit the Withheld Payments.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a receiver from using another court's process to collaterally attack a bankruptcy court order concerning estate property.

Sterling Consulting Corp. v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Indian Motocycle Manufacturing Co.) · filed 2003-01-29(a)(3)

(3) That the Receiver violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) by seeking to use the process of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado to attack collaterally Judge Boroffs Order of August 3, 2001.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a buyer from bringing an action to recover property of the bankruptcy estate based on rights under UCC § 2-502 unless the automatic stay is modified.

Rare, LLC v. Marciano (In Re Rare, LLC) · filed 2003-08-05(a)(3)

But since their “rights” under UCC § 2-502 consist of nothing more than the right to bring a legal action to recover property, the Court reads 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) to prohibit the exercise of those rights absent the granting of a modification of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a person other than the bankruptcy trustee from exercising control over property of the bankruptcy estate without leave of the bankruptcy court.

Service Lane.com, Inc. v. Pagosa Technologies, Inc. (In re ServiceLane.com, Inc.) · filed 2005-02-01(a)(3)

Without leave of the bankruptcy court, a person, other than the bankruptcy trustee, may not exercise control over property of the bankruptcy estate.

Demanding preconfirmation loan payments exceeding the amount authorized by the note violates the automatic stay when the payments are sought from property of the estate.

Han v. GE Capital Small Business Finance Corp. (In Re Jung Bea Han) · filed 2005-09-26(a)(3)

Therefore, writing to Han and his attorney and telling them that payments of $1,465 per month were due in expectation of receiving that sum were actions taken “to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). ... These were actions to “obtain possession of property of the estate” and the court concludes they were violations of the automatic stay.

A foreign reorganization order does not violate the automatic stay when it affects no property interest of the debtor, including rights under an exclusive distribution agreement.

Daewoo Motor America, Inc. v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2006-08-11(a)(3)

The district court correctly concluded that the order of the Korean court approving the Modified Reorganization Plan of Daewoo Korea did not affect any property interest of Daewoo America and did not violate the automatic stay.

A notice of default on an executory contract later rejected in bankruptcy does not violate the automatic stay when it does not affect property of the estate.

MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS v. US Fidelity · filed 2006-09-27(a)(3)

However, Neosho motioned on November 9, 2001, to reject the executory contract with DOTD in its bankruptcy proceeding. [4] The bankruptcy court granted this motion on December 6, 2001. Therefore, because the notice of default did not affect property of the estate, it was not in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay.

Section 362(a)(3) may support a claim against persons who exercise control over estate-owned litigation and dispose of it to the estate's detriment.

Reed v. Rabe · filed 2006-11-15(a)(3)

The court thus believes that the appropriate issue to be tried in this matter, if any, is whether the Defendants exercised control over property of the estate in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) and, through that exercise of control, effected a disposition of that property to the detriment of the estate. ... ORDERED that the Trustee may amend the Complaint to include a cause of action against the Defendants for violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) within ten (10) days of entry of this order.

Section 362(a)(3) protects intangible estate property by assessing the nexus between the challenged conduct and the estate’s property rights, the degree of impact on the estate, and competing legal interests of non-debtors.

Allentown Ambassadors, Inc. v. Northeast American Baseball, LLC (In Re Allentown Ambassadors, Inc.) · filed 2007-02-05(a)(3)

The determination whether a non-debtor’s acts constitute the exercise of control over the intangible property rights of the bankruptcy estate in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) requires several steps. ... Third, if the non-debtor’s actions will adversely impact the estate’s property interests, the court must then evaluate (1) the nexus between the conduct at issue and the property interests of the bankruptcy estate, (2) the degree of impact on the bankruptcy estate ... and (3) the competing legal interests of the non-debtor parties.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits recording a notice of cancellation and affidavit of noncompliance to terminate the estate’s contract-for-deed rights when the debtor has timely and effectively cured the default.

In re Edina Development Corp. · filed 2007-06-08(a)(3)

Since the contract for deed was not cancelled, Montgomery’s filing of the notice of cancellation and affidavit of noncompliance was an act to obtain possession of property of the bankruptcy estate or to exercise control over property of the bankruptcy estate, i.e., the Debtor’s rights as vendee under the contract for deed, in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits filing a state-court lawsuit seeking a constructive trust over estate property even if the complaint is never served.

Byrd v. Hoffman · filed 2008-03-31(a)(3)

They first contend that they did not violate the automatic stay because they merely filed the state court complaint but never served the complaint on the Trustee. The Court rejects outright Appellants’ argument on this point, as Appellants’ offer no case support for the proposition that there exists a legal distinction between filing and service of a complaint for the purposes of an automatic stay violation. ... Initiating a lawsuit seeking a constructive trust against the property of a bankruptcy estate, as Appellants did here, qualifies as an “act” in violation of the automatic stay.

The automatic stay protects property in the estate’s possession independently of its protection of property of the estate, including a home whose foreclosure sale was incomplete when bankruptcy was filed.

Gomez v. Kamper Investments, LLC (In Re Gomez) · filed 2008-04-03(a)(3)

Therefore, not only is this property, “property of the estate” and subject to the statutory restraint of the automatic stay, it is also property in the possession of the estate to which the statutory restraint independently applies.

A derivative suit asserting an estate-owned cause of action violates § 362(a)(3) and is void, and injured nondebtors have standing under § 362(k)(1) to seek damages for a deliberate act taken with knowledge of the bankruptcy even if the actor believed it was proper.

McCall v. Telerent Leasing Corp. (In Re BICC Ltd. Partnership) · filed 2008-03-21(a)(3), (k)(1)

The conclusion is inescapable that McCall’s filing of a derivative suit on behalf of BICC to recover the same asset that BICC’s trustee sold in the bankruptcy case was a violation of § 362(a)(3). Accordingly, the filing was a void act, and McCall’s complaint must be dismissed. ... McCall contests defendants’ standing, as non-debtors, to bring a claim for damages under § 362(k). However, the plain language of the statute supports their standing. ... As for willfulness, McCall was aware of the bankruptcy case and the impending sale of the causes of action to defendants. His filing of suit against defendants was therefore a willful act notwithstanding he may have believed he acted appropriately.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits selling property of a chapter 13 estate without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay.

Walker v. Creative Loans, LLC (In Re Walker) · filed 2009-04-16(a)(3)

The 37th Street and 84th Street properties were assets of Walker’s chapter 13 bankruptcy estate. No one can take any action to obtain possession of property of the chapter 13 estate without first receiving relief from the automatic stay. That was not done, and the actions in selling these properties to the Thurgoods without first receiving court approval violated § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) supports dismissal of a tort action filed in violation of the automatic stay when the plaintiffs also violate a bankruptcy court order directing dismissal.

Kessler v. Nickless & Phillips P.C. · filed 2009-04-23(a)(3)

The action was properly dismissed because it was filed in direct violation of the automatic stay, and Appellants violated the bankruptcy court’s order directing them to dismiss the action.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit a mortgage lender’s misallocation of payments or sending of default notices when those acts do not obtain possession or control of estate property.

Cano v. GMAC Mortgage Corp. (In Re Cano) · filed 2009-08-10(a)(3)

The contention that misallocating funds or sending default notices violates § 362(a)(3) misinterprets the scope of “acts” covered by that provision. Section 362(a)(3) is essentially an “anti-grab-law” statute. The intent and purpose of (a)(3) is to prohibit physical taking of property or refusal to turn-over property within a creditor’s physical possession.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar discovery from nondebtor LLC members of company records they can access in their individual capacities.

In Re Resource Energy Technologies, LLC · filed 2009-12-01(a)(3)

Thus, to the extent the requested discovery encompasses documents of the Debtor, Thorpe and Charles have access to this information in their capacities as individual members of the LLC. The Court does not find that this constitutes an act to “obtain possession of’ or “exercise control over property of the estate.” Accordingly, there is no violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) and (a)(6) bar terminating service under an estate contract and demanding a release to gain control over estate property or recover a prepetition claim.

In Re Wvf Acquisition, LLC · filed 2009-12-02(a)(3), (a)(6)

Based on the evidence presented, WBS’s termination of service and attempt to obtain a general release were acts to obtain possession or control over property of the estate in violation of section 362(a)(3) and acts to recover on a pre-petition claim in violation of section 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(3) bars executing, accepting, and recording a deed that transfers property of the bankruptcy estate because those acts obtain possession of or exercise control over estate property.

Bohm v. Howard (In Re Howard) · filed 2009-12-10(a)(3)

The execution, acceptance of delivery, and recording of the Quit Claim Deed are acts to effectuate the transfer of property of the estate and constitute acts “to obtain possession of property of the estate” or to “exercise control over property of the estate” proscribed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) is violated when a counterparty declares force majeure to repudiate an estate contract; the court may grant declaratory relief without additional sanctions when it awards damages for the breach.

Miller Bros. Coal v. Consol of Kentucky, Inc. (In Re Clearwater Natural Resources, LP) · filed 2009-12-11(a)(3)

The court believes that the Plaintiff has demonstrated that the Defendant’s action in declaring a force majeure event rises to the level of a violation of the automatic stay, and that the Plaintiff should have a declaratory judgment to that effect. Despite the violation of the automatic stay and because of the damages awarded above, the court does not believe the imposition of further sanctions is appropriate.

Section 362(a)(3) bars enforcement of a payment-priority shift triggered by bankruptcy when enforcement would deprive the debtor’s estate of a valuable property interest.

Lehman Bros. Special Financing Inc. v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd. (In Re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.) · filed 2010-01-25(a)(3)

Thus, any attempt by any party to enforce Noteholder Priority or subordinated payment under Condition 44 would violate the automatic stay because it would deprive LBSF and its creditors of a valuable property interest.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a shareholder suit that would interfere with a debtor in possession’s administration of the bankruptcy estate, even when the suit seeks equitable relief against directors.

In Re General Growth Properties, Inc. · filed 2010-03-24(a)(3)

Plaintiffs Complaint directly interferes with the bankruptcy administration, violates the Automatic Stay, and must be stayed if not dismissed.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar a mortgage lender from recording bankruptcy-related fees in its internal records without attempting to collect them or modify the mortgage.

Jacks v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2011-06-07(a)(3)

The mere recordation of fees incurred by Wells Fargo on its internal records, without any attempt to collect these fees from the debtor or estate or to modify the mortgage, is not an “act” in violation of § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a landlord from removing and disposing of a debtor’s personal property while it remains property of the bankruptcy estate.

In re Seaton · filed 2011-11-28(a)(3)

The acts of removal and disposal of the Seatons’ personalty at the Apartment were intentional “act[s] to obtain possession of property of the estate ... or to exercise control over property of the estate” in contravention of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), done with knowledge of the pending Petition.

Section 362(a)(3) and (4) bar a tax purchaser from obtaining a tax deed to estate property while the automatic stay applies because doing so seeks possession of estate property and enforces a tax lien against it.

Alexandrov v. LaMont · filed 2014-01-07(a)(3), (4)

Alexandrov’s attempt to obtain a tax deed is an act to obtain possession of property of the estate and to enforce his lien for taxes. It is therefore properly forbidden by the stay.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits voiding a prepetition vehicle sale after the bankruptcy filing because doing so would affect possession and control of estate property.

Palmer v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc. (In re Lainhart) · filed 2017-02-02(a)(3)

Voiding the sale is certainly an action that would affect possession and control of the truck, so it would violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars debtors from continuing to prosecute claims that belong to the bankruptcy estate while only the trustee may pursue them.

Ukrainian Future Credit Union v. Garak (In re Garak) · filed 2017-03-21(a)(3)

As matters currently stand, only the Chapter 7 Trustee may prosecute the counterclaims, and Defendants’ continuing prosecution of these claims would violate the automatic stay, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) bars acts to obtain title to property of the bankruptcy estate, including a foreclosure purchaser’s postpetition payment of the bid price.

Elbar Invs., Inc. v. Okedokun (In re Okedokun) · filed 2018-11-06(a)(3)

An act to obtain title to estate property violates the stay pursuant to the very language of § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a landlord who knows of the bankruptcy from changing the locks and refusing access to premises and personal property that belong to the estate.

Vu v. Lin (In re Vu) · filed 2018-11-07(a)(3)

I find and conclude, therefore, that by changing the locks and failing to respond to counsel's request for access to the restaurant Premises, Defendant acted to obtain possession of and to exercise control over the Premises and Plaintiff's personal property, all of which were property of the estate. When Defendant changed the locks to the Premises and failed to respond to Plaintiff's request for access to the personal property, he knew that Plaintiff was in bankruptcy. His conduct therefore constituted a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a creditor from interfering with a debtor’s possession of estate property.

In re Johnson · filed 2019-05-14(a)(3)

Mr. Zewdi violated the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(a)(3) by interfering with the Debtor's possession over property of the estate on multiple occasions.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits a demand to surrender property from the bankruptcy estate even when the demand is sent to the debtor’s attorney rather than directly to the debtor.

Angela Yvonne Holyfield · filed 2019-06-03(a)(3)

After considering the evidence and reviewing the letter at issue, the Court concludes the letter from Ms. Bonnie to Mr. Goldberg dated December 19, 2018 is a violation of the automatic stay. ... Moreover, the final sentence stating, “If your client would like to avoid the expense of exposing her bankruptcy issues, please have her immediately turn over possession of” the Property is a continued attempt to obtain possession of property from the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) requires an act to obtain possession of or exercise control over estate property; an employer’s mere delay in returning garnished wages does not supply that act.

Somers v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. · filed 2019-10-24(a)(3)

Section 362(a)(3) requires an act to obtain possession of or to exercise control over property of the estate. ... Mere delay, standing alone does not supply the requisite act.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits filing a postpetition action to strike a judgment that is property of the bankruptcy estate without relief from the stay.

Edward James Kaushas, Jr - Adversary Proceeding · filed 2020-06-02(a)(3)

Regardless of whether it was successful, the mere post-petition filing of the State Court Petition without relief from the bankruptcy court was a violation of the automatic stay imposed by § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits diverting estate funds by obtaining possession of or exercising control over them, whether directly or through an agent.

Englander v. Blunt, Sr. · filed 2020-09-30(a)(3)

Both General Blunt and Ms. Bowers violated the automatic stay by obtaining possession of and exercising control over the Talisman Transfers. Ms. Bowers did so directly, and General Blunt did so though his agent, Mr. Westbury, acting on his behalf, allowing General Blunt to realize the benefit of the funds.

Section 362(a)(3) stays quiet-title claims that seek possession of property of a bankruptcy estate.

Kim v. United States of America · filed 2021-01-28(a)(3)

Plaintiff’s claims appear to be an “act to obtain possession of property of the estate” of Trail Management and are therefore subject to an automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) may bar a creditor from pursuing funds from a nondebtor to the extent the recovery would reach estate property exceeding the amount owed to the creditor.

Moon Group, Inc. v. KORE Capital Corporation · filed 2022-09-30(a)(3)

As a result, any funds collected from StoneMor in excess of the amount owed to Kore, would be estate funds and Kore cannot pursue those estate assets without (potentially) violating the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a state-court action that attempts to control estate property by asserting rights superior to the trustee’s claims in the same assets.

Leslie Klein · filed 2025-04-28(a)(3)

By filing the State Court Actions, which assert purportedly superior rights in the same life insurance proceeds and assets sought by Trustee in the Life Capital Action, and which would denude Life Capital of enormous value, Respondents have violated § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) bars a court from exercising control over collateral that includes property of a debtor’s bankruptcy estate during the automatic stay.

Porter Capital Corporation v. Sunset Logistics Inc · filed 2025-05-02(a)(3)

Under the bankruptcy code, the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as an automatic stay against “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). Thus, because several of the debtors on the UCC financing statement have filed bankruptcy petitions, and the description of collateral covers their property, the court finds that it may not exercise control over such collateral in light of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) stays acts to take possession of estate property; withdrawing funds from a debtor bank account after conversion to chapter 7 can violate that stay.

Jordan v. Beskrone · filed 2025-05-30(a)(3)

To be crystal clear about the gravity of the Plaintiff’s actions, based on his own admissions, there is prima facie evidence he intentionally violated the automatic stay of Bankruptcy Code section 362(a)(3), which “operates as a stay . . . of [] any act to obtain possession of property of the estate . . . .”

Section 362(a)(3) stays any act to obtain possession or control of property of the bankruptcy estate.

Byline Bank v. Bank of America · filed 2025-06-30(a)(3)

As the subject cashier’s checks are the property of the bankruptcy estate, any act to either obtain possession or control over them has been stayed pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(3) stays acts to obtain or control bankruptcy estate property, including when a party outside bankruptcy claims an interest in that property as an acquirer of the debtor’s assets.

Reyna · filed 2026-01-21(a)(3)

While Regeneron is not itself in bankruptcy, § 362 states that the automatic bankruptcy stay extends to “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate,” id. § 362(a)(3), and Regeneron has an interest in the property of the estate as the alleged acquirer of 23andMe’s assets.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar collection of a post-petition debt from Chapter 13 funds that revested in the debtor upon plan confirmation and are no longer property of the estate.

In Re Petruccelli · filed 1990-03-14(a)(3)

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the funds in debtor’s account at the time of the IRS levy were not property of the estate because they had revested in the debtor. Because the IRS was seeking to collect on post-petition debt from property of the debtor, not property of the estate, the automatic stay of § 362 did not bar the levy.

Section 362(a)(5) and (6) continue to bar creditors with prepetition claims from enforcing liens against the debtor’s property or collecting from the debtor after confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan.

Mellon Financial Services Corp. 9 v. Broman (In Re Broman) · filed 1988-02-17(a)(5), (a)(6)

I agree with the reasoning in the McCollum case and will continue to follow the long-standing precedent in this District of the Richardson case, and hold that 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(5) and (6) do apply post-confirmation to creditors whose claims arose pre-petition, and that the only remedy for a debtor’s default post-confirmation is to seek dismissal of the case under 11 U.S.C. § 1307.

A creditor bound by a confirmed Chapter 13 plan cannot obtain relief from the automatic stay to act contrary to the plan.

In Re Gleason · filed 1988-09-26(d)

Because APC is bound by the terms of her confirmed plan, it is incapable of asserting any right to relief from the stay under § 362(a) for the purpose of permitting it to proceed contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of Gleason’s plan.

Section 362(a)(3) stays acts to dispossess a Chapter 13 debtor of a possessory interest in residential real property before and after plan confirmation.

Schewe v. Fairview Estates (In Re Schewe) · filed 1989-01-12(a)(3)

Notwithstanding authority to the contrary, this court holds the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) is applicable to a debtor’s possessory interest in residential real property both prior to and subsequent to confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan.

A confirmed Chapter 13 plan does not bar a secured creditor from seeking relief from the automatic stay when the plan does not provide for its secured claim.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Burgess (In Re Burgess) · filed 1993-07-13(d)

Upon consideration of the Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay filed by Sears, Roebuck and Company, and the answer of the Debtors thereto, this Court concludes that relief from the automatic stay is not barred by the terms of the Chapter 13 plan.

When a confirmed Chapter 13 plan vests estate property in the debtor, § 362(c)(1) ends the stay as to that property upon confirmation; § 362(a)(5) does not continue the stay because it never applied to property of the estate.

In re Honey · filed 1995-09-06(c)(1), (a)(5)

Because each of the plans filed by these debtors provides for the vesting of all estate property in the debtor upon confirmation, the stay terminated as to such property upon confirmation. ... The difficulty with this argument is that the stay set forth in section 362(a)(5) never applied to the property in question, because after the petition was filed, the property was not “property of the debtor”; rather, it was “property of the estate.”

Section 362(a)(5) continues to stay enforcement of a prepetition lien against property that vests in a Chapter 13 debtor at confirmation until the stay ends under § 362(c)(2).

In Re Whigham · filed 1996-04-24(a)(5), (c)(2)

Although Judge Rhodes ruled that the stay was no longer in effect under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1) based on Paragraph I.D. of the Plan (because the property was no longer property of the estate), the Court believes that creditor’s secured claim is subject to the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) which under Section 362(c)(2) remains in effect.

Section 362(a)(3) does not protect property that vested in a Chapter 13 debtor upon plan confirmation, unless the plan provides otherwise, because that property is no longer part of the estate.

City of Chicago v. Fisher (In Re Fisher) · filed 1997-01-07(a)(3)

Applying our interpretation in the instant case, we hold that the City did not violate § 362(a)(3) of the automatic stay. Section 362(a)(3) prohibits only actions to obtain possession of, or exercise control over, “property of the estate.” Fisher’s car was property of the estate at the time of the plan’s confirmation, but under § 1327(b) vested in her when the plan was confirmed; the plan did not provide otherwise. Thus, at the time the City took the actions at issue here, the car was no longer property of the estate protected by § 362(a)(3).

The § 362 stay ceases to apply to collateral when confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan vests that property in the debtor.

In re Campbell · filed 1997-01-29(c)(1)

... § 362 does not apply, and the ear was no longer “property of the estate” as contemplated by § 363.

Section 362(a)(5) bars a creditor from repossessing a debtor’s property after Chapter 13 plan confirmation to enforce a prepetition lien while the automatic stay remains in effect.

Cox v. Billy Pounds Motors, Inc. (In Re Cox) · filed 1997-09-23(a)(5)

The defendant enforced its prepetition lien by repossessing the debtors’ automobile following plan confirmation. This is an act that is specifically prohibited by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5).

Section 362(c)(1) does not end the automatic stay merely because confirmation of a plan returns estate property to the debtor; the stay continues to protect that property until a terminating event under subsection (c)(2) or another provision of subsection (c).

Concrete Structures, Inc. v. Tidewater Crane & Rigging Co. (In Re Concrete Structures, Inc.) · filed 2001-03-30(c)(1)

Thus, the legislative history makes patently clear that the automatic stay is not lifted under § 362(c)(1) merely because the property is returned to the debtor’s estate. Instead, for such property, the stay is lifted upon the happening of the specified acts in subsection (2) or some other provision of § 362(c).

A willful violation of the automatic stay does not excuse a Chapter 13 debtor's failure to make required plan payments.

In Re Waugh · filed 2007-04-10(a)

Even a willful violation of the automatic stay would not be a defense to the Debtor’s failure to make his plan payments under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362 prevents creditors from pursuing estate property for post-petition debts, but its stay ceases to protect assets that revest in a Chapter 13 debtor upon plan confirmation.

Kolve v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Kolve) · filed 2011-09-22(a)(3), (a)(4)

This revesting meant that the automatic stay — which had previously acted to prevent post-petition creditors from pursuing property of the estate — was no longer “in effect” as to those assets.

Section 362 stays an insurer from bringing a declaratory action against an estate continued under a confirmed plan.

Veros Energy, LLC v. GCube Ins. Servs., Inc. (In re Veros Energy, LLC) · filed 2018-04-26(a)(1), (a)(3), (c)(1), (c)(2)

Because the Plan continued the Estate in effect post-confirmation, the Underwriters are stayed, by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 362, from commencing an action in New York state court to obtain a declaration that they are not liable on the Claims.

Section 362(d)(1) does not require relief from the automatic stay while a creditor is adequately protected by payments under a confirmed Chapter 13 plan and the debtor complies with that plan.

Joseph C. Morrone, Jr. · filed 2020-08-27(d)(1)

Finally, the court concludes that Brettell is adequately protected by the terms of the confirmed plan. In the confirmed plan, the Debtor has provided for full payment of the value of his share of the non-exempt equity. So long as the Debtor complies with the provisions of the plan, Brettell’s interest in the bankruptcy estate is adequately protected. ... THEREFORE, for these reasons, Brettell’s motion for relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) is DENIED.

Section 362(c)(2) keeps the automatic stay against prepetition creditors in effect after Chapter 13 plan confirmation until the case is closed or dismissed or the debtor’s discharge is granted or denied, unless the court orders otherwise.

Littke v. Trustcorp Mortgage Co. (In Re Littke) · filed 1989-07-14(c)(2)

It does not terminate upon confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan. ... Unless ordered by the court, the stay does not terminate until the case is closed or dismissed or the debtor’s discharge is granted or denied, as contemplated by § 362(c)(2).

Section 362(c)(2)'s automatic stay ends after Chapter 11 plan confirmation when estate property revests in the debtor and the debtor receives a discharge, unless the plan provides otherwise.

Nelkin & Nelkin P.C. v. Two Rivers Coffee · filed 2026-01-12(c)(2)

Accordingly, because confirmation of the plan both revests estate property into the debtor and discharges the debtor from all dischargeable debts, the automatic stay no longer exists after confirmation unless otherwise noted by the plan.

Section 362(a) does not shield a debtor from contempt proceedings to enforce a prepetition injunction against violating another party’s property rights.

Rudaw/Empirical Software Products Ltd. v. Elgar Electronics Corp. (In Re Rudaw/Empirical Software Products Ltd.) · filed 1988-02-19(a)

The automatic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) may not be used as a shield to sanction contumacious conduct in violation of a prepetition order enjoining a debtor from violating a party’s property rights.

Section 362(a)(3) does not toll the limitations period for a damages claim based on an ownership interest that was never property of the bankruptcy estate.

Shanghai Pearls & Gems, Inc. v. Paul · filed 2025-03-13(a)(3)

Plaintiff's contention that the limitations period was tolled by the automatic bankruptcy stay because the Pink Diamond was allegedly property of D&M's estate ( see 11 USC § 362[a][3]) is meritless. Plaintiff seeks money damages, not injunctive relief to obtain possession of the Pink Diamond, and plaintiff's one-third interest in that diamond was never the D&M's estate's property ( see CenTrust Servs. v Guterman , 160 AD2d 416, 418 [1st Dept 1990]).

Section 362(k) sets no limitations period for damage claims arising from willful violations of the automatic stay.

Stanwyck v. Bogen (In Re Stanwyck) · filed 2011-05-20(k)

Congress did not establish any limitations period for damage claims under § 362(k).

Section 362(c)(2), together with § 108(c), preserves a creditor’s time to bring a civil claim during the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding.

Hermosilla v. Hermosilla · filed 2011-03-21(c)(2)

However, as the Bankruptcy Court noted, sections 108(c) and 362(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code toll the statute of limitations for such actions during the pendency of a debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings.

Section 362(h) does not set a filing deadline for a claim based on a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Nelson v. Post Falls Mazda (In Re Nelson) · filed 1993-11-01(h)

Congress passed section 362(h) without limiting the period in which such a cause of action might be filed.

Actions to remedy violations of the automatic stay are not subject to the two-year limit in § 549(d).

Warsco v. Schaller Trucking Corp. (In Re R. & L. Cartage & Sons, Inc.) · filed 1990-08-21(a)

Consequently, where a creditor acts in direct violation of the automatic stay of § 362, it may not seek refuge behind § 549(d) when it is eventually called upon to account for its misconduct. There is no statute of limitations upon actions which seek to remedy violations of the automatic stay.

Section 362 bars commencement of an action against a debtor but does not suspend the running of the applicable statute of limitations.

Grotting v. Hudson Shipbuilders, Inc. · filed 1988-04-14

There is no language either in the Automatic Stay provision or the Extension of Time provision of the Bankruptcy Code that suspends a statute of limitations from running. The Automatic Stay provision merely prohibits a cause of action from being commenced against a debtor.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not itself toll a statute of limitations.

Swartzman v. Harlan · filed 1988-11-16

There is nothing in section 362, however, which tolls any statute of limitations.

Section 362(a) stays proceedings against a bankrupt defendant but does not extend the stay to codefendants in pending litigation.

Wright v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. · filed 1989-11-06(a)

Section 362(a) does not apply to codefendants in pending litigation.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not itself toll the statute of limitations for an action against the debtor.

Panzella v. Hills Stores Co. · filed 1994-07-25

The court finds that § 108(c) of the Bankruptcy Code does not suspend the statute of limitations; nor does the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, § 362, toll the statute of limitations.

Section 362 prevents dismissal of an appeal for failure to perfect while the automatic stay is in place.

Gianniny v. Gianniny · filed 1994-09-30

Because there is an automatic stay in place under the Bankruptcy Law (see, 11 USC § 362), the appeal cannot be dismissed for failure to perfect.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not bar a judgment against a surety whose liability is independent of the debtor’s obligations.

OSBORNE BONDING & SURETY COMPANY v. Glaze · filed 1998-03-05

Accordingly, the automatic stay provisions of 11 USC § 362 do not constitute a bar ... to the issuance or enforcement of the judgment against Osborne as the surety over Esposito’s son’s estate.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not itself toll the statute of limitations for a creditor’s action against the debtor.

National Bank of Commerce Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Ham · filed 1999-04-09(a)(1)

Our reading of §§ 108(c)(2) and 362 indicates that neither section tolls the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 362 does not toll a mortgage foreclosure limitations period when the prior foreclosure action ended before the bankruptcy filing and the next began after dismissal of the petition.

Saini v. Cinelli Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2001-12-13

With regard to the claimed effect of defendant’s bankruptcy filing on the Statute of Limitations, we find that it neither renewed nor tolled the six-year Statute of Limitations. The first action had been discontinued prior to the time that defendant filed its bankruptcy petition in December 1997 and the bankruptcy petition was dismissed in December 1998, long before this second foreclosure action was commenced and, thus, the bankruptcy proceeding never operated to toll a pending foreclosure action (see, Zuckerman v 234-6 W. 22 St. Corp., 167 Misc 2d 198; 11 USC § 362; cf., Zuckerman v 234-6 W. 22 St. Corp., 267 AD2d 130, lv denied 94 NY2d 764).

The automatic stay under § 362(a) tolls Nevada’s five-year period for bringing an action to trial under NRCP 41(e) for the time the stay remains in effect.

Rickard v. Montgomery Ward & Co. · filed 2004-09-02(a)

Thus, we conclude that § 362(a)’s automatic stay tolled the five-year period under NRCP 41(e).

Section 362(a) stays an appeal when an appellant files for bankruptcy.

Penny v. El Patio, LLC D/B/A El Patio Motel · filed 2011-09-30(a)

Appellee El Patio, LLC d/b/a El Patio Motel filed a notice of appellant 190 Orange Avenue's bankruptcy with this Court ( In re: 190 Orange Avenue a/k/a 190 Orange Avenue, Inc ., United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. California, San Diego Division, Chapter 7, Cause No. 11-11250-LT7). Accordingly, this appeal is stayed.

Section 362(a) automatically stays an appeal affected by an appellant’s bankruptcy.

Phuongvi an Nguyen, Baytown Manor Apartments, LLC and PVN, Inc. v. Richard Mik and Sky 3D Investments, LLC · filed 2014-08-05(a)

This appeal is stayed pursuant to the Suggestion of Bankruptcy the Appellant filed on July 29, 2014. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000) (automatic stay in bankruptcy).

The automatic stay under § 362 does not itself suspend the running of a state tax-collection limitations period.

Collins v. Tennessee Department of Revenue · filed 2016-08-03

As discussed below, the Court finds that ... the statute of limitations did not toll during the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) bars a creditor from suing a debtor over a loan default while the automatic stay is in effect, triggering tolling under a state law that excludes periods of statutory prohibition.

In re Washington · filed 2017-03-24(a)

The automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) in each bankruptcy case prohibited the City from commencing an action against Debtor for the default on the loan, and therefore tolled the statute of limitations of the claim.

Section 362 requires a creditor to obtain relief from the automatic stay before fixing its rights under an assignment of rents after the bankruptcy filing.

In Re Aloma Square, Inc. · filed 1988-04-20

A creditor should, and must, obtain relief from the automatic stay prior to fixing its rights under the assignment.

Section 362(a)(4) bars a mortgagee from collecting rents after a Chapter 11 filing when its interest in those rents remains inchoate.

In Re Prichard Plaza Associates Ltd. Partnership · filed 1988-03-28(a)(4)

We also conclude, because the Bank’s interest in rents is inchoate, that the Bank had no right to collect rents and is therefore not entitled to retain them. ... The Bank’s collection of rents after this Chapter 11 case began, moreover, was a violation of the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4).

Section 362(b)(3) permits a creditor to perfect a security interest in future rents after the bankruptcy petition by giving a § 546(b) notice when applicable state law gives that interest priority.

In Re 1350 Piccard Ltd. Partnership · filed 1992-04-08(b)(3)

The only question therefore is whether § 546(b) in conjunction with 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) allows such perfection to be effective. ... The result is that, at least as to future rents, the security interest can be perfected under § 546(b).

Section 362(a) prevents a mortgagee from enforcing a prepetition assignment of rents against new tenants after the bankruptcy filing without relief from the stay.

In Re Dupell · filed 1999-07-19(a)

Following the bankruptcy filing, the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), came into play to enjoin the Bank from further action to enforce its rent assignment against the Debtor or his property. The Bank is thus prohibited, without obtaining relief from the stay, from sending notification of the assignment to new tenants and assuming constructive possession of their units.

Section 362(d)(1) requires a court to consider the totality of the circumstances before enforcing a prepetition agreement to relief from the automatic stay.

Brian P. Gates · filed 2022-07-21(d)(1)

A finding of cause to support the enforceability of the Stay Relief Stipulation turns on the Court’s examination of the totality of the relevant facts and circumstances of the case.

Section 362(d)(1) allows a prepetition waiver of the automatic stay to be considered as one factor in deciding whether cause exists to lift the stay.

In re 4848, LLC · filed 2013-04-08(d)(1)

Nevertheless, the Desai court and others have persuasively held that a waiver can be a consideration in determining “cause” for relief from stay. It is not the only consideration and must be only one of many possible circumstances that can constitute cause. This Court finds this latter approach is the better view.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a pre-petition agreement binds the debtor to allow that relief.

In Re Citadel Properties, Inc. · filed 1988-05-11(d)(1)

Thus, this Court holds that the terms of the pre-petition stipulation are binding upon the parties and that sufficient cause exists to lift the automatic stay pursuant to section 362(d)(1).

In a proceeding for relief from the automatic stay, a debtor may raise a counterclaim even though the proceeding may not be the proper forum to adjudicate it fully.

Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank · filed 1988-05-31(d)

Despite these cases, it is clear that while stay proceedings may not be proper for adjudication of a counterclaim, a party may, nevertheless, raise its counterclaim at that time.

A party may raise a counterclaim in a proceeding for relief from the automatic stay, even if that proceeding is not the proper place to adjudicate it.

Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank · filed 1988-07-01(d)

Despite these cases, it is clear that while stay proceedings may not be proper for adjudication of a counterclaim, a party may, nevertheless, raise its counterclaim at that time.

Section 362(d) does not entitle a debtor who successfully defends a motion for relief from the automatic stay to attorney fees under a state contractual fee reciprocity statute.

Hassen Imports Partnership v. KWP Financial VI (In Re Hassen Imports Partnership) · filed 2000-12-21(d)

If Congress intended debtors to recover fees for successfully defending motions for relief from stay, it could have included a provision allowing such recovery. ... Absent such a Congressional mandate, the state law of attorneys’ fees is simply inapplicable in a matter involving bankruptcy substantive law.

Section 362(a) stays appellate proceedings against debtor entities upon a Chapter 11 filing, excluding those entities from the appellate decision.

In Re: Digital Island Securities Litigation William Blair Massey, Lead as Representative of a Class Consisting of All Ho · filed 2004-02-06(a)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), this filing operates to stay all proceedings against Digital Island and Dali. Digital Island is a defendant in Plaintiffs' Section 14(e) claim, and Dali is a defendant in Plaintiffs' Best Price Rule Claim. Although the stay of proceedings against Digital Island and Dali does not affect our reasoning, it does mean that our decision today does not reach either entity.

The automatic stay suspends a pending appeal upon the appellant's bankruptcy filing until an event permits reinstatement.

Britton Cherish Walters v. Columbia/St. David's Healthcare System · filed 2004-02-13

Therefore, in accordance with the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362, and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 8, this appeal is suspended until an event occurs that would allow the appeal to be reinstated.

When deciding a stay-relief motion, which ordinarily must be determined within 30 days under Section 362(e), a court may reserve lender-liability or misconduct issues for later decision.

Tese-Milner v. TPAC, LLC (In Re Ticketplanet.com) · filed 2004-06-10(e)

It is commonplace to sever issues regarding lender liability or misconduct to later decision when a court decides a motion for relief from the stay, which by statute must ordinarily be determined within a 30-day period.

Section 362(a) automatically stays pending appellate proceedings upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition.

John Mining D/B/A Fast Action Bail Bonds v. State · filed 2006-05-11(a)

The filing of the bankruptcy petition automatically stays these proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2004); Tex. R. App. P. 8.2. Accordingly, we abate Mining’s appeal.

Section 362 automatically stays further action in a pending appeal when the appellant files a voluntary bankruptcy petition.

Dawn Gayken, D.D.S. v. Ann D. Ewton, Individually and as Independent of the Estate of Merle Clement Ewton, D.D.S. · filed 2007-10-25

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, any further action in this appeal is automatically stayed.