11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(a) automatically stays appellate proceedings upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition.

Stromback Living Trust v. Palo Petroleum · filed 2008-09-04(a)

The filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers an automatic stay of all appellate proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2004); Tex. R. App. P. 8.2.

Section 362 automatically stays further action in an appeal when the appellant files for bankruptcy.

MCI Sales and Service, Inc. v. James Hinton, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Dolores Hinton · filed 2008-10-29

Appellant MCI Sales and Service, Inc. has filed a bankruptcy proceeding. Tex. R. App. P. 8.1. Further action in this appeal is automatically stayed. See 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362’s automatic stay applies to an appeal involving an appellee that filed a Chapter 11 petition, staying the appellate briefing schedule.

Media Queu, LLC v. Netflix, Inc. · filed 2010-10-29

lt appears that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 are applicable.

A stay relief proceeding under § 362 requires only a colorable claim to the property and does not decide the merits of that claim.

Zacky & Sons Poultry, LLC · filed 2021-04-01

In granting stay relief, the court only determines whether the party seeking stay relief should be released from the stay to argue the merits of its claim in a separate proceeding by showing only that it has a colorable claim to the subject property, but the stay relief proceeding is summary in nature and does not determine the merits of the claim.

Section 362 stays further proceedings in a pending appeal against parties who have filed for Chapter 13 relief until the bankruptcy proceeding ends or the bankruptcy court lifts the stay.

Marble v. King · filed 2022-08-30

IT IS ORDERED that all further proceedings in this appeal are stayed pending termination of the bankruptcy proceedings or an order of the Bankruptcy Court lifting the automatic stay provided for under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a) stays a pending appeal after an appellee files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.

Cruz Castrejon, Rodolfo v. Twin Investments, LLC · filed 2025-06-23(a)

Asimismo, la parte apelada nos solicita la paralización del proceso de apelación a tenor con la Sección 362(a) del Código de Quiebras (11 USC sec. 362(a)). Examinada la referida moción, la declaramos Ha Lugar. Cónsono con ello, se dicta Sentencia y decretamos la paralización de los procedimientos en el presente caso.

Section 362(a) stays the commencement or continuation of a judicial proceeding against a party for whom a bankruptcy petition has been filed.

Comptroller of the Treasury v. MCI International Telecommunications Corp. · filed 2003-08-26(a)

With the case still pending a petition for bankruptcy, which operates as a stay of the commencement or continuation of a judicial proceeding against a party under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a), was filed with respect to one of the parties.

Section 362(a) stays the commencement or continuation of a judicial proceeding against a party when a bankruptcy petition is filed.

PG & E Energy Trading-Power, L.P. v. Caledonia Generating, LLC · filed 2003-08-26(a)

With the case still pending a petition for bankruptcy, which operates as a stay of the commencement or continuation of a judicial proceeding against a party under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a), was filed with respect to one of the parties.

Pending counterclaims against a secured creditor do not prevent relief from the automatic stay when they do not undermine the creditor’s basis for relief.

Central Penn National Bank v. Zimmerman (In Re Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Co.) · filed 1983-10-13(d)(1)

Since the counterclaims in this action do not controvert the essence of Central Penn’s claim for relief, we will defer their adjudication and grant the request for relief from the stay.

Section 362(a) gives effect to the automatic stay for a person named as a debtor in a bankruptcy petition even if the filing was unauthorized, until the petition is dismissed, the caption changes, or relief from the stay is granted.

Connie J. Wekell, Fka Connie J. Allotta v. United States · filed 1994-01-11(a)

The simple rule is also the fairest: So long as a person is listed as a debtor in a bankruptcy petition, everyone involved is entitled to count on the automatic stay. To the extent the stay tolls the statute of limitations on collection of certain debts, it will do so until the petition is dismissed, the case caption is changed or the bankruptcy court grants relief from the stay.

Section 362(a) imposes the automatic stay when an involuntary petition is filed, even before an order for relief is entered.

In Re Memphis-Friday's Associates · filed 1988-06-07(a)

Of course, the filing of an involuntary petition triggers the automatic stay.

Section 362(d) requires a creditor seeking relief from the automatic stay during the gap period of an involuntary Chapter 7 case to move for relief; the debtor cannot bind the estate by stipulating to it.

In Re E.D. Wilkins Grain Co. · filed 1999-07-08(d)

Because there is no one who can agree on behalf of the estate, relief from the automatic stay must be requested by an appropriate motion pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4001(a), and Local Bankruptcy Rules 4001-1 and 9014-1.

Section 362’s automatic stay protects the estate upon the filing of an involuntary petition, including before an order for relief is entered.

Bankvest Capital Corp. v. Boston (In Re Bankvest Capital Corp.) · filed 2002-04-18(a)

The filing of an involuntary petition pursuant to section 303 creates an estate. There is nothing in the Code or the underlying policies of section 362 (including the protection and preservation of assets for the benefit of all creditors) that suggests that an estate, however created, should not be protected by the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar an involuntary debtor from recording a declaration of homestead between the petition and the order for relief because the specific rights preserved by § 303(f) prevail.

In Re Gaudreault · filed 2004-09-02(a)(3)

Accordingly, I conclude that § 362(a)(3) does not apply here where an involuntary Debtor has recorded a Declaration of Homestead during the gap period.

The automatic stay takes effect upon filing an involuntary petition, and a debtor’s ability to operate during the gap period does not shield creditors that act against estate property from stay liability.

Signature Apparel Group LLC v. Laurita (In re Signature Apparel Group LLC) · filed 2017-08-24

Section 303(f) of the Bankruptcy Code cannot be used to absolve a creditor from liability for violating the automatic stay where it takes action against property of the estate after an involuntary petition is filed.

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar setting aside the dismissal of a suit against the debtor when restoring it to the docket does not advance it toward a judicial determination.

In Re Cobb · filed 1988-07-12(a)(1)

By the same token, this Court does not find that the motion to set aside the dismissal violated the automatic stay. The possible outcomes of that motion were denial, i.e. the dismissal would stañd, or approval, i.e. the case would be on the state court’s docket but would be no closer towards a judicial determination than it was on March 3, 1988.

Section 362(a)(1)-(3) does not stay arbitration of a postpetition seniority dispute when the award only allocates wages already payable and neither reaches estate property nor creates or enforces a lien.

Brodsky v. Local 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (In Re Marine Pollution Service, Inc.) · filed 1988-07-14(a)(1)-(3)

Nor is it accurate to suggest that such a submission to the arbitrator violated the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362. ... Thus the arbitrator’s award could not result in any increased wage burden on the estate inasmuch as it does not require that any particular number of drivers be employed. Again, the award has nothing to do with how much will be paid in wages, only with who will receive those wages. Therefore, no interest protected by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (2) or (3) has been threatened.

Section 362(a) does not stay arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement when applying the stay would effectively alter the union’s right to arbitrate and § 1113(f) protects that right.

In Re Bunting Bearings · filed 2003-06-06(a)

Consequently, since the automatic stay of § 362(a) would have effectively altered the UAW’s right to arbitrate issues concerning its Pension Plan, the protections afforded to the DIP by § 362(a) must be subordinated to those protections afforded to the UAW under § 1113(f).

Section 362(a) does not stay arbitration required by a collective bargaining agreement when applying the stay would let the debtor avoid its obligation to arbitrate without complying with § 1113.

In Re Chestnut Hill Rehab Hospital, LLC · filed 2008-03-25(a)

The Court finds that the arbitration proceedings are not stayed by § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The proceedings were brought pursuant to a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that required the Debtors to arbitrate the underlying disputes. Consequently, the application of the stay to the arbitration proceedings would allow the Debtors to unilaterally modify the collective bargaining agreement by avoiding their obligation to arbitrate. Such a result is not permitted by § 1113(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(k)(1) damages for an automatic stay violation do not require an adversary proceeding.

In re Ballard · filed 2013-10-11(k)(1)

Accordingly, the language of Rule 7001(1) does not require that an adversary proceeding be prosecuted in order for a debtor to recover damages under § 362(k)(l).

Section 362(h) damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay may be sought by motion under Bankruptcy Rule 9014.

In Re Forty-Five Fifty-Five, Inc. · filed 1990-03-21(h)

The Zavarellis, together with their counsel, contend that the Debtors’ sanction requests are not properly before this Court because Bankruptcy Rule 7001 requires the filing of an adversary proceeding to obtain relief under § 362(h). This Court disagrees. ... Accordingly, this Court finds that the Motion for damages under § 362(h) is properly before the Court under Bankruptcy Rule 9014.

A request for sanctions under § 362(h) for a willful violation of the automatic stay may proceed by motion as a contested matter.

Fortune & Faal v. Zumbrun (In Re Zumbrun) · filed 1988-07-19(h)

Bankruptcy Rule 7001 sets forth ten proceedings which are to be filed as an adversary proceeding. A sanctions request for willful violation of the automatic stay is not included within the Rule nor can it be logically implied within Bankruptcy Rule 7001 proceedings.

A motion for damages under Section 362(k) for violation of the automatic stay is a contested matter governed by Bankruptcy Rule 9014.

In Re Longoria · filed 2009-01-14(k)

Similarly, considered as a motion under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) for damages for violation of the automatic stay, the Turnover and Contempt Motion was a contested matter governed by Rule 9014.

Section 362(k)(1) does not limit a bankruptcy court’s inherent power to dismiss an automatic-stay damages action as a sanction for fraud on the court.

In re: Rafail Theokary v. · filed 2015-02-05(k)(1)

The plain language of § 362(k)(1) neither modifies nor limits the Bankruptcy Court’s inherent powers.

Section 362(b)(4) permits a district court to enter sanctions for litigation misconduct to punish the debtor and protect the judicial process despite the automatic stay.

Leonard v. RDLG, LLC · filed 2015-04-06(b)(4)

In addition, the bankruptcy court was correct in holding that section 362(b)(4) applies and allows the entry of a sanctions order by a district court in this type of situation. Both the pecuniary purpose test and the public policy test were met.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays an appeal of a proceeding originally brought against the debtor, suspending a court-ordered deadline for an appellate statement.

Stop Blight, Inc. v. Dinardo, M. · filed 2023-09-29(a)(1)

As the conservatorship action was originally brought against Ms. Dinardo, her bankruptcy filings automatically stayed the instant appeal. Accordingly, even if the statement had been subject to the court’s ordered timeframe, it would be deemed timely.

Section 362(a) does not toll the time to file a notice of appeal from a state court judgment after a bankruptcy petition is filed.

Production Credit Ass'n of Minot v. Burk · filed 1988-07-21(a)

We conclude that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) do not toll the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal from a state court judgment after a bankruptcy petition has been filed and that the extension of time provisions of 11 U.S.C. 108(b)(2) govern the time for filing such a notice of appeal.

Section 362(a)(1) stays an appeal arising from an action against the debtor, and the debtor’s filing of an appeal bond during the stay is void.

Nautical Landings Marina, Inc., David I. Denham v. First National Bank in Port Lavaca · filed 1990-05-31(a)(1)

The filing of that appeal bond vis-a-vis Nautical was void and had no legal effect.

Section 362 stays proceedings against the debtor but does not revive a jurisdictional deadline that expired before the bankruptcy filing.

Matter of Qual Krom South, Inc. · filed 1990-07-19

While 11 U.S.C. § 362 stays virtually all proceedings against the debtor, it does not resurrect otherwise expired jurisdictional mandates, such as compliance with the requirements of I.R.C. § 6511.

Section 362(a)(5) does not extend a state-law deadline to file an addendum continuing a mortgage lien.

Farm Credit Services v. Roth (In Re Roth) · filed 1994-08-04(a)(5)

Nothing within the plain meaning language of Section 362(a)(5), however, provides that state law duties to extend valid liens are to be eliminated or extended.

Section 362(a)(1) stays appeals and motions to reargue in an action against the debtor, suspending the appeal period until the stay ends.

Knutson Mortgage Corp. v. Salata · filed 1999-11-23(a)(1)

Thus, the filing of an appeal or motion to reargue by any party in this case was prohibited by the § 362 stay and the appeal period could not run.

Section 362 stays further proceedings against parties seeking Chapter 11 relief, including a pending appeal that is dismissed without prejudice as to those parties.

Hoffman v. AC&S, INC. · filed 2001-03-14

Further proceedings against Pittsburgh-Corning Corporation and Asbestos Claims Management Company are therefore stayed by operation of 11 USC § 362, and this appeal is dismissed without prejudice as to those parties.

Section 362’s automatic stay applies to a defendant in bankruptcy and postpones its deadline to object to a magistrate judge’s report until the stay is lifted.

Fun Spot of Florida, Inc. v. Magical Midway of Central Florida, Ltd. · filed 2002-11-06

The automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362, therefore applies to this defendant, the limited partnership. Accordingly, defendant Magical Midway of Central Florida, Ltd. shall file and serve objections to this report and recommendation within ten days of the entry of an order that has the effect of lifting the stay.

Section 362’s automatic stay applies to an appeal after an appellee files a Chapter 11 petition and stays the appellate briefing schedule.

American Patent Development Corp. v. Movielink, LLC · filed 2010-10-29

The appellees inform this court that B1ookbuster, Inc. filed a Chapter 11 Vo1untary Petition. lt appears that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 are app]_icab1e.

Section 362 automatically stays further action in a pending appeal after the appellant files a bankruptcy petition.

Texas Outdoor Concepts, LLC, D/B/A Texas Greens by Design v. Christian House of Prayer · filed 2013-04-11

Further action in this appeal has been automatically stayed.

Section 362 automatically stays further action in an appeal from a judgment on a counterclaim against a debtor who has filed for bankruptcy.

Billy and Candace Schoppe v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company · filed 2013-11-05

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, further action in this cause is automatically stayed.

Section 362 stays appellate proceedings involving a party who has filed for bankruptcy.

Olde Towne Tyrone, LLC v. Multibank 2009-1 CRE Venture, LLC · filed 2014-03-18

Although Seymour originally was named as an Appellant, we dismissed him as a party to this appeal because the record shows that he has filed a petition for bankruptcy, and, as a result, all proceedings involving him have been stayed pursuant to 11 USC § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362 does not extend the effective period of a New Jersey notice of settlement or the deadline to record the mortgage described in it.

Sywilok v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Gianninoto) · filed 2015-10-16

Chase argues that the purpose of the automatic stay is to preserve the status quo, which is true, but the status quo in this case was that Chase’s notice of settlement was set to expire on February 17, 2015. None of the cases cited by Chase supports the argument that § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code would (or should) operate to extend this period.

Section 362(a) automatically stays proceedings in an appellate court when a bankruptcy petition is filed.

Gorman IV v. Westech Capital Corp. · filed 2016-07-21(a)

The filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically stays all proceedings in this Court.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not toll the one-year deadline for removing a diversity case.

Nocelli v. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. · filed 2020-01-15

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the automatic bankruptcy stay did not toll the one-year removal period under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1).

Section 362 automatically stays further action in a pending appeal after the appellants file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

Pearl Resources Operation Co. LLC, and Pearl Resources, LLC v. Transcon Capital, LLC · filed 2020-03-06

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, any further action in this appeal is automatically stayed.

Section 362 can stay a pending appeal after a party files for bankruptcy protection.

Assadi v. Amir Batoei Family AB Austin Feb5, LP And Lee AB Land, LLC · filed 2020-07-31

Accordingly, this appeal is stayed. See 11 U.S.C. § 362; Tex. R. App. P. 8.2.

Section 362’s automatic stay takes effect when a debtor files a Chapter 13 petition and requires withdrawal of an appellate disposition order entered after the filing.

HSBC Bank USA v. McMillan · filed 2025-02-03

... petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.) on January 22, 2025, triggering the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362; Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Summary Disposition Order entered on January 31, 2025, is withdrawn.

Section 362 stays proceedings when a debtor files a Chapter 13 petition, requiring withdrawal of an appellate disposition entered after the filing.

HSBC Bank USA v. Mcmillan · filed 2025-03-21

...Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.) on March 11, 2025, triggering the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362, and that HSBC Bank USA, National Association is identified on the creditor list, In re McMillan, No. 25-00218, United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Hawai#i, Dkt #3 (Mar. 11, 2025); Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Summary Disposition Order filed on March 13, 2025, is withdrawn.

Section 362 automatically stays further action in an appeal while the appellant’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy case is pending.

in the Estate of Julia Lopez · filed 2020-03-11

Furthermore, there is no indication that appellants’ bankruptcy case is no longer pending. Therefore, given the above, further action in this appeal has been automatically stayed. See 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay covers state foreclosure proceedings; when stay relief allows the proceedings to resume, the remaining time to appeal begins to run again.

FARZAN v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING LLC · filed 2021-02-17(a)

To begin, although “appeals from final judgments of courts shall be filed within 45 days,” N.J. Ct. R. 2:4-1, a window which Farzan missed long ago, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) automatically stays all judicial and foreclosure proceedings against a debtor who files for bankruptcy, and Farzan filed his Chapter 13 petition at the eleventh hour, just before the deadline to appeal the September 2019 judgment, presumably tolling whatever time remained in the appeals period. ... As a result, the state court action resumed as soon as the USBC lifted the stay, and Farzan’s remaining time to appeal the judgment began to run at that point.

Section 362(b)(11) excepts only voluntary negotiable instruments proffered by a debtor before bankruptcy; a creditor’s continued withholding of funds transferred by cashier’s check through garnishment violates the automatic stay.

In Re Zunich · filed 1988-07-25(b)(11)

Our narrow reading of § 362(b)(ll) would encompass only those voluntary instruments proffered by the Debtor pre-petition. The funds transferred by PNB via a cashier’s check were distributed in response to the garnishment proceedings. Regardless of who initiated the removal of the funds, the transfer to this creditor was not accomplished with the agreement of the Debtors. Therefore, any continued withholding of those funds is an act to collect, assess or recover a claim against the Debtors that arose prepetition and is a separate violation of the stay.

Section 362(b)(11) exempts presentment of a negotiable instrument, including a debtor’s prepetition check presented to the payor bank, from the automatic stay.

In Re Ronald Roete, Debtor (Appellee Below). Ronald Roete v. Charles Smith and Carol Smith · filed 1991-07-10(b)(11)

Thus, the district court was correct in concluding that the automatic stay was not violated by the Smiths’ presentment of a negotiable instrument. The creditors’ actions clearly fall within the plain meaning of section 362(b)(ll).

Section 362(b)(11) permits presentment of a check without violating the automatic stay but does not authorize a transfer of rights in the debtor’s account.

Wittman v. State Farm Life Insurance (In Re Mills) · filed 1994-11-15(b)(11)

Section 362(b)(ll) does not authorize any transfer of rights in the debtor’s account; it merely allows for the presentment of a check without violating the stay.

Section 362(b)(11) does not except cashing postdated checks from the automatic stay when the payee cannot enforce the checks because the underlying debt is dischargeable.

Hines v. Gordon (In Re Hines) · filed 1996-04-05(b)(11)

In this case, the debt to Gordon was dis-chargeable in Hines’ bankruptcy case. Therefore, Gordon was not entitled to enforce the postdated checks. ... As a result, § 362(b)(ll) does not protect Gordon’s acts from constituting a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(11) permits presentment of a negotiable instrument despite the automatic stay, but does not authorize payment from bankruptcy estate property.

Premji v. Commissioner · filed 1996-07-03(b)(11)

Although 11 U.S.C. section 362(b)(11) (1994) creates an exception to the automatic stay for presentment of negotiable instruments, case law interpreting that provision indicates that the exception does not authorize a transfer of bankruptcy estate property.

Section 362(b)(11) does not except from the automatic stay the attempted presentment of postdated checks for a prepetition attorney fee debt subject to discharge.

In Re Zapanta · filed 1997-01-16(b)(11)

Since Debtors could present the defense of a discharge in bankruptcy, Gordon’s actions do not satisfy the definition of presentment under Cal.Com. Code section 3501, and accordingly do not fall under the protections of section 362(b)(ll).

Section 362(b)(11) excepts presentment of a debtor’s personal check, as a negotiable instrument, from the automatic stay.

Franklin v. Kwik Cash of Martin (In Re Franklin) · filed 2000-11-01(b)(11)

In the case at bar, it is clear that the check Franklin tendered to Kwik Cash on May 8, 2000, is a negotiable instrument within the meaning of both the Bankruptcy Code and the T.C.A. It is also clear that Kwik Cash did not violate the § 362 automatic stay when it presented Franklin’s check to First Citizens on May 22nd and June 1st.

Section 362(b)(11) permits postpetition presentment of postdated checks without violating the automatic stay, but does not authorize a resulting transfer of estate property.

Thomas v. Money Mart Financial Services, Inc. (In Re Thomas) · filed 2004-06-14(b)(11)

In concluding that Money Mart’s actions do not violate the automatic stay, this Court sides with a number of others that have held that the presentment of postdated checks after the filing of a petition is protected by the provisions of § 362(b)(ll). ... Section 362(b)(ll) does not authorize any transfer of estate property, it merely permits the presenter’s performance of an act that would otherwise be a stay violation.

Section 362(b)(11) permits a creditor to present a debtor’s check and receive payment when the bank honors it, even if the creditor knows of the bankruptcy.

Brewer v. QC Financial Services, Inc. (In Re Brewer) · filed 2004-08-26(b)(11)

There is simply no support for the debtors’ position that the creditor violated the stay by presenting the debtors’ check and receiving the funds after it is honored by the debtors’ bank, regardless of whether the creditor knew of the bankruptcy.

Section 362(b)(11) excepts postpetition presentment of prepetition checks from the automatic stay when the presentment is not coercive or harassing.

In Re Noffsinger · filed 2004-10-19(b)(11)

In the instant case KASP attempted to deposit 19 checks post-petition. These checks were returned unpaid and marked with the notation “closed account.” This mere presentment, absent evidence of any other conduct by KASP, is not coercive or harassing. ... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Debtor’s Motion be DENIED and that the Creditor’s act of presenting prepetition checks postpetition was not a violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(b)(11) excepts a creditor’s postpetition presentment of prepetition checks from the automatic stay when the debtor has not yet received a discharge, even if the debt may later be discharged.

Coyita v. Thomas v. Money Mart Financial · filed 2004-12-10(b)(11)

When Money Mart presented the checks, Thomas had not received her discharge and whether she would or not was open to question. ... Thus, we agree with the bankruptcy court that, under Missouri law, Money Mart was a person entitled to enforce the checks and thus its demand for payment constituted presentment covered by the exception to the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(11)'s exception for negotiable instruments does not permit a creditor to demand payment from a debtor after bankruptcy to collect a debt arising from a bad check.

In Re Henry · filed 2004-12-28(b)(11)

Section 362(b)(11) clearly does not grant a creditor license to dun a debtor following a bankruptcy filing to collect a debt arising from a bad check.

Section 362(b)(11)’s protection for routine check transactions, read with section 542(c), protects third parties dealing with a debtor and does not excuse the debtor’s duty to turn over estate funds.

In Re Sawyer · filed 2005-03-30(b)(11)

In analyzing § 362(b)(ll), which states that the automatic stay does not apply to the presentment of a negotiable instrument, such as a check, and the giving of notice of dishonor of such instrument, ... and 11 U.S.C. § 542(c), ... the Court discerns a Congressional policy that certain routine transactions in commerce, whether pertaining to an individual debtor or a large corporate entity as a debtor, will not be disrupted, particularly if the entity engaged in the potential transfer of bankruptcy estate property has no actual notice or knowledge of the debtor’s having commenced a bankruptcy proceeding. This protection, however, appears to apply only to those third parties which engage in transactions with the debtor.

Section 362(b)(11) excepts presentment of a negotiable instrument from the automatic stay without requiring the holder also to give notice of or protest dishonor.

Thomas v. Money Mart · filed 2005-11-04(b)(11)

The three actions are merely listed in the order in which they would occur. The statute reflects that an instrument holder is not limited to presenting the check, but also may advise the debtor of its dishonor and of the holder’s position regarding that dishonor, without violating the stay.

Section 362(b)(11) excepts postpetition presentment of a payday-loan check from the automatic stay when the check qualifies as a negotiable instrument under state law.

Blasco v. Money Services Center (In Re Blasco) · filed 2006-10-26(b)(11)

Thus the check is a negotiable instrument, and its negotiation, deposit and presentment for payment fell within the exception to the automatic stay provided by Section 362(b)(ll) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(b)(11) excepts postpetition presentment of prepetition checks and debit requests from the automatic stay and authorizes the resulting transfers for purposes of section 549(a)(2)(B).

In Re Minter-Higgins · filed 2007-03-23(b)(11)

11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(ll) states an exception to the operation of the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), by providing that "the presentment of a negotiable instrument and the giving of notice of and protesting dishonor of such an instrument” do not violate the automatic stay. This provision very clearly, and quite simply, means that the presentment by the payees of the debtor’s checks and debit requests to Advance Federal Credit Union subsequent to the date of the petition was excepted from the operation of the automatic stay, and was therefore an authorized transfer of property from the debtor's account at that financial institution under 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)(2)(B).

Section 362(b)(11) permits check presentment but does not protect retention of estate funds after notice of bankruptcy, which violates the automatic stay and requires unconditional return of the funds and reasonable attorney fees for a willful violation.

In Re Meadows · filed 2008-01-07(a)(3), (b)(11), (k)(1)

Simply, § 362(b)(ll) does not except the post-petition holding of estate funds from the stay. That stay exception protects the process of presentment of checks, no more, no less. However, once Buckeye held estate funds, it had an obligation to return those funds without any attached condition or prerequisite. ... The court finds Buckeye, as of June 26, 2007, has intentionally retained the funds received from presentment of the check which are property of the estate and imposed its own conditions for the return of the funds with notice of the bankruptcy and, therefore, that this conduct constitutes a willful violation of the stay. Buckeye’s erroneous interpretation of the scope of § 362(b)(ll) does not mitigate Meadows’ right to recover all reasonable attorney fees incurred after June 26, 2007 related to this contested matter.

Section 362(b)(11) exempts presentment of a negotiable instrument from the automatic stay but does not authorize a post-petition transfer of estate property to pay it.

Yoon v. Minter-Higgins · filed 2008-02-08(b)(11)

This Court finds that the plain language of § 362(b)(ll) and the case law interpreting that provision mandate the conclusion that § 362(b)(ll) does not authorize transfers of estate property for the payment of negotiable instruments presented post-petition.

Section 362(b)(11) permits postpetition presentment and payment of a prepetition check, and retaining the proceeds after notice of bankruptcy does not violate the stay because the transferred funds are no longer estate property.

Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Meadows (In Re Meadows) · filed 2008-11-12(a)(3), (b)(11)

Because the funds in the Debtor's bank account were no longer property of the estate once they were transferred to Buckeye, Buckeye's retention of the funds was not a violation of the automatic stay. ... It would be illogical to interpret § 362(b)(11) to mean that the holder of a check can hand the check to a bank teller but cannot take the cash the teller hands over the counter without violating the stay, or that the holder may accept the funds but must immediately return them to the drawer.

Section 362 does not prohibit retaining funds received from a prepetition check honored after the bankruptcy filing because the transferred funds cease to be property of the estate.

Davison v. Kanipe · filed 2009-02-05(a)(3), (b)(11)

The Court also finds no violation of the automatic stay in this case. Because the funds in Ms. Davison’s bank account were no longer property of the estate once transferred to Quick Money, Quick Money’s retention of the funds was not a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(11) excepts presentment of a negotiable instrument from the automatic stay even when the check is post-dated or presented later than the underlying credit transaction.

In Re Kearns · filed 2010-03-30(b)(11)

By its terms, § 362(b)(11) does not exclude transactions involving post-dated, allegedly “noncon-temporaneous” checks, nor is there any restriction on the timing of presentment of the instrument in relation to the credit transaction.

Section 362(b)(11) excepts the presentment of a negotiable instrument, including a personal check, from the automatic stay even when the check is negotiated after the bankruptcy filing.

In Re Webb · filed 2010-05-19(b)(11)

1. The post-petition negotiation of the debtor’s personal check is not a violation of the automatic stay as a result of the exception found in § 362(b)(ll).

Section 362(b)(11) excepts presenting a negotiable instrument and giving notice of or protesting its dishonor from the automatic stay.

Thomas v. Money Mart Financial Services, Inc. (In Re Thomas) · filed 2004-12-10(b)(11)

We conclude that Money Mart’s presentment of Thomas’s checks were excepted from the automatic stay and thus we affirm the bankruptcy court’s decision declining to award her damages.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay civil contempt sentencing used to coerce compliance with court orders rather than collect a creditor’s judgment.

US Sprint Communications Co. v. Buscher · filed 1988-08-08(a)(1)

This court must be able to take effective action to coerce his compliance with the preliminary injunction issued by this court and with future orders to appear before this court. For this reason, the court finds that its sentencing power is not stayed by defendant’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing, and he will be sentenced with all due speed.

Section 362 stays a contempt proceeding insofar as it seeks to collect a discharged property settlement, but does not stay contempt for disobeying a court order before bankruptcy.

Stovall v. Stovall · filed 1990-11-30

Appellant’s motion for a restraining order is granted only insofar as the citation of contempt pending in the Superior Court of Paulding County seeks to collect the $16,500.00 debt which has been discharged by the Bankruptcy Court. The pending citation for contempt is not stayed insofar as it relates to the failure of the Appellant to obey the Superior Court’s order in the months prior to bankruptcy, nor as it may seek to have the previous divorce decree modified due to changed circumstances, nor as it relates to any actions arising from the earlier divorce which are unrelated to the discharged $16,500.00 debt.

Section 362(b)(1) excepts enforcement of a criminal contempt order from the automatic stay.

In Re Robert D. Rook, Debtor. Robert D. Rook v. Lisbeth Rook · filed 1991-04-01(b)(1)

Both the bankruptcy court and the district court analyzed the criminal/civil distinction in depth and found that the contempt order in this instance was criminal in nature and, therefore, excepted from the automatic stay under section 362(b)(1). Our review of the record and the district court's opinion discloses that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 362(a) does not stay an unconditional, punitive contempt sentence for a debtor’s prepetition failure to obey an order requiring payment of a debt.

Scully v. Iowa District Court for Polk County · filed 1992-07-22(a)

We conclude that the July 30, 1991 order unconditionally sentencing Scully to thirty days in jail is a contempt citation that is punitive in nature and is, therefore, exempt from the section 362(a) automatic stay provisions.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a contempt proceeding that protects the dignity of the court.

Nnoli v. Nnoli · filed 1994-08-31(a)(1)

One aspect of a pending suit that an automatic stay will not suspend is a contempt proceeding, provided that the contempt proceeding is to protect the dignity of the court.

Section 362(a)(1), (2), and (6) stay the continuation of a contempt proceeding and incarceration used to compel payment of a prepetition debt.

In Re Hyo Jin Moon · filed 1996-10-04(a)(1), (2), (6)

The continued prosecution of the contempt proceeding initiated by Ms. Moon to compel payment of the $65,000 awarded by the Probate Court in its February 28, 1996 order and the continued enforcement of the contempt order by incarceration of the debtor constitute a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (2) and (6).

The automatic stay under § 362(a) is statutory rather than a court order, so violating it cannot itself support civil contempt proceedings.

Matter of Rimsat, Ltd. · filed 1997-04-03(a)

The automatic stay is not a court order, and thus, cannot be the basis for civil contempt proceedings.

Section 362(a) does not stay a civil contempt order enforcing a pre-bankruptcy discovery order when the contempt order vindicates the court’s authority rather than seeks payment of a judgment.

Booth v. Wilson · filed 1997-05-01(a)

Accordingly, as I stated last Monday, I find that this contempt order enforcing my pre-bankruptcy order to compel discovery is not stayed by § 362(a) as it is “vindicating] the integrity of the court.”

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings on civil contempt orders against a debtor until the bankruptcy court lifts the stay, but does not stay a criminal contempt order.

Hutchins v. Hutchins · filed 1997-10-30(a)(1)

All actions with respect to the civil contempt orders are stayed in the Chancery Court and in the Court of Appeals until such time as the automatic stay provided for in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) has been lifted by the Bankruptcy Court. The criminal contempt order is not stayed.

Section 362(a) does not stay a contempt hearing concerning a pre-bankruptcy order when the hearing protects the dignity of the court.

Kilburn v. Filby (In Re Filby) · filed 1998-09-25(a)

Second, at the August 6 hearing, counsel for Kilburn did raise the issue that a hearing on contempt of a pre-bankruptcy order to protect the dignity of the court is not a violation of the automatic stay. This Court has adopted that position in two eases, and does so again today.

Section 362(a) stays civil contempt proceedings that affect or touch the debtor’s property; only proceedings with no such effect are exempt.

Redmond v. Redmond · filed 1998-10-02(a)

It is also for this reason that we believe that only those civil contempt proceedings that do not in any way affect or touch on the debtor’s property are exempt from the stay in § 362(a).

Section 362(a) stays a contempt proceeding that threatens a debtor with a fine or imprisonment to compel payment of prepetition marital obligations.

Tipton v. Adkins (In Re Tipton) · filed 2000-02-07(a)

Regardless of the alleged intent behind the contempt motion, an objective reading of the motion leads one to the inescapable conclusion that the debtor was being threatened with a fine and imprisonment unless he paid his prepetition marital obligations. As such, the motion and the contempt proceeding was a violation of the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(2) stays execution of a civil contempt arrest warrant used to collect a prepetition judgment, and the creditor must take affirmative steps to prevent its execution.

Goodman v. Albany Realty Co. (In Re Goodman) · filed 2001-10-15(a)(2)

In conclusion, the Court holds that the automatic stay prevents execution of the arrest warrant issued by the superior court for Debtor’s civil contempt because it was issued to aid in the collection of a judgment. Therefore, a permanent injunction is unnecessary. Furthermore, as the creditor seeking to collect that judgment, Albany has a duty to take affirmative steps to ensure that, so long as the automatic stay is in effect, Debtor is not arrested under that warrant.

Section 362(a) stays efforts to obtain damages from a debtor but does not bar proceedings to determine whether the debtor should be held in contempt and sanctioned for violating a court order.

America Online, Inc. v. CN Productions, Inc. · filed 2002-01-31(a)

Given the apparent hybrid nature of this proceeding, it follows that the automatic stay operates to bar any effort by AOL to obtain damages from Uhrig, but not any effort to determine whether Uhrig should be held in contempt of court and sanctioned.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay enforcement of a state court civil contempt order when the state court’s primary purpose was to uphold the dignity of an earlier order.

Lowery v. McIlroy & Millian (In Re Lowery) · filed 2003-04-16(a)(1)

Accordingly, the Court adopts the majority position and holds that any attempt to enforce a civil contempt order issued by a state court is not within the ambit of § 362(a) provided that the state court’s primary purpose in issuing the order is to uphold the dignity of a previous order.

Section 362(a)(1) stays the civil contempt portion of an order against a debtor, limiting a court to addressing the criminal contempt portion while the stay is in effect.

in Re: Todd Jerome Bailey · filed 2003-12-23(a)(1)

Because the automatic stay applies to the civil portion of the order, we are only at liberty to address the merits of relator’s complaints concerning the criminal portion of the order.

Section 362(a) stays civil contempt proceedings intended to coerce compliance with court orders for a private party’s benefit, even when the issuing court labels the contempt criminal.

In Re Wiley · filed 2004-08-30(a)

Each cited act of contempt is a civil contempt or one intended to enforce compliance with a court order, rather than to punish, and therefore is subject to the automatic stay. The order of contempt sought to coerce future compliance with prior court orders. ... The transcript makes clear that, while the court referred to the contempt as a criminal contempt, the debtor was clearly permitted to purge himself of the attachment and contempt by complying with the court’s order and appearing for a deposition.

Section 362's automatic stay does not bar imposing a suspended sentence for indirect civil contempt when the contempt finding and expiration of the opportunity to purge preceded the bankruptcy filing.

Burge v. Burge, Unpublished Decision (12-16-2005) · filed 2005-12-16

Further, appellant did not file for bankruptcy until September 3, 2004, well after the deadline for his opportunity to purge had expired. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in imposing appellant's suspended sentence arising from the prior finding of indirect civil contempt despite appellant's subsequent bankruptcy filing and suggestion of stay.

Section 362(a) requires a creditor with notice of a bankruptcy filing to seek recall of a prepetition civil bench warrant obtained to collect a debt.

Galmore v. Dykstra (In Re Galmore) · filed 2008-07-25(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(6)

Although not developed by Galmore’s counsel as a theory of liability, pursuant to Fed. R. Bank. P. 7054(a)/Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c), the court determines that Dykstra violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) by his failure to take any steps to recall the Lake Superior Court’s bench warrant upon receipt of notice of Galmore’s filing of her bankruptcy case. ... The court determines that Dykstra’s failure to take action to seek to “recall” the Lake Superior Court’s bench warrant violated 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1), 362(a)(2) and 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a) bars postpetition discovery and contempt measures used to enforce a monetary judgment, including enforcement of a prepetition discovery order, unless the automatic stay is lifted.

In re Long · filed 2008-11-06(a)

Similarly, the district court’s September 28, 2008 order in this case clearly violated the statutory automatic stay. Additionally, although the district court’s September 8, 2008 minute order was filed before the bankruptcy petition was filed, and thus was not expressly prohibited at that time by the automatic stay provision, any action to require Long to now comply with that order would likewise be prohibited by section 362 unless the automatic stay is lifted.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not apply to a contempt commitment order entered to uphold the dignity of the court rather than to collect on a judgment.

Citibank, N.A. v. Angst, Inc. · filed 2009-04-14

Since the February 8, 2008 commitment order was entered to uphold the dignity of the court, not collect on a judgment, the automatic stay provisions of 11 USC § 362 do not apply (see In re Altchek, 124 BR 944, 959 [SD NY 1991]).

Section 362 stays a civil contempt order coercing payment of past spousal support even if the order labels the contempt criminal, where the debtor can avoid jail by paying and the stay relief does not authorize enforcement.

In Re Small · filed 2009-05-07(a)(1), (b)(1)

Even though the order states relator is being sentenced to a jail term for “criminal contempt,” it also provides relator may avoid jail time by making the four installment payments to McMaster. Therefore, we conclude the order is actually a civil contempt order. ... We need not decide which approach to follow because, under either, the October 31, 2008 contempt order violates the bankruptcy stay. Under the first approach, the civil contempt order is subject to the bankruptcy stay because civil contempt is not one of the enumerated exceptions found in the bankruptcy code. The contempt order also violates the bankruptcy stay under the second approach because it is designed to coerce relator’s compliance with the November 1, 2005 order awarding the temporary spousal support. ... Moreover, we further conclude the bankruptcy court’s February 15, 2008 order for partial relief from the bankruptcy stay does not allow the trial court to enter a civil contempt order.

Section 362(a)(1) stays enforcement of a civil contempt order when enforcement would continue prepetition litigation to recover damages or collect a judgment.

In re White · filed 2012-09-27(a)(1)

The Contempt Order granted Beach Lane two specific forms of relief: (1) liquidate its damages resulting from White’s disobedience of the Subpoenas; and (2) compel White’s compliance with the Subpoenas, and if necessary, imprison him until he does so. Asking to enforce the former against White at this time is clearly an effort to continue a litigation that was commenced pre-petition and to recover a pre-petition claim for damages. The latter relief serves no purpose except to enforce the collection of the Judgment which is stayed, and Beach Lane no longer seeks White’s arrest.

Section 362(a) stays a coercive, purgeable civil contempt order compelling a debtor to pay a debt covered by the automatic stay.

Cathers v. Iowa District Court for Greene County · filed 2014-12-10(a)

Here, with respect to the failure to pay the furniture debt, the district court’s order of contempt was coercive in nature as it allowed the possibility that Kenny could purge the contempt. Such civil contempt orders fall within the scope of the automatic stay under section 362(a).

Section 362(a) ordinarily stays civil contempt proceedings, including contempt sanctions that a debtor can purge by complying with a debtor examination.

ALPER VS. DIST. CT. (PLISE) · filed 2015-06-25(a)

Section 362(a) ordinarily stays a civil-contempt proceeding because, by definition, such a proceeding is not criminal in nature. ... When the district court included this opportunity to purge the imprisonment, it put a civil remedy in the place of the punishment—Plise would only remain imprisoned until he submitted to the judgment debtor examination.

Section 362(a)(1) requires a creditor and counsel to take affirmative steps to stop a pending collection proceeding after the debtor files for bankruptcy, including enforcement of a civil contempt order used to collect a dischargeable property settlement.

In re Lawrence Wohleber, Jr. · filed 2019-03-04(a)(1)

Upon the filing of Wohleber’s bankruptcy, it was incumbent upon Gentile and Skurko to seek relief from the stay or to obtain a determination from the bankruptcy court that the stay did not apply. A creditor cannot sit idly by, appear at a collection proceeding, and allow the debtor to be jailed because he did not pay the judgment creditor’s dischargeable debt. The burden was on the creditor and her legal counsel to stop the collection proceeding once the bankruptcy was filed.

Section 362(a)(1) requires a creditor and her counsel to take affirmative steps to stop a civil contempt proceeding used to collect a prepetition property settlement debt.

Wohleber v. Skurko (In re Wohleber) · filed 2019-03-04(a)(1)

Upon the filing of Wohleber's bankruptcy, it was incumbent upon Gentile and Skurko to seek relief from the stay or to obtain a determination from the bankruptcy court that the stay did not apply. A creditor cannot sit idly by, appear at a collection proceeding, and allow the debtor to be jailed because he did not pay the judgment creditor's dischargeable debt.

Section 362(a)(1) stays an evidentiary hearing on a civil contempt request against a debtor after the debtor files for bankruptcy.

DHL Network Operations (USA) Inc v. Federal Aviation Title Company of Oklahoma LLC · filed 2019-06-10(a)(1)

The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) applies to “the commencement or continuation … of a judicial … proceeding against the debtor that was … commenced before the commencement of” the bankruptcy.” Those conditions are met with respect to the evidentiary hearing previously set for June 14, 2019. Accordingly, based on the stay, the June 14 hearing, which was for the purpose of taking evidence on plaintiff’s request that defendants be held in contempt for their failure to appear for hearings set by Magistrate Judge Suzanne Mitchell, is STRICKEN.

Section 362(a)(1) stays civil contempt proceedings against a debtor when no applicable exemption permits them to proceed.

Martinez v. First Class Interiors of Naples, LLC · filed 2020-04-07(a)(1)

Although the Court finds that the automatic stay is in effect as to the contempt proceedings against Reyes, FCI cannot evade its discovery obligations by claiming that FCI’s documents are in the possession, custody, or control of Reyes.

Section 362 stays civil contempt proceedings seeking to compel a debtor’s compliance with a prepetition divorce decree.

CARLOS A. DILLON, SR. · filed 2020-07-14(b)(1)

But the stay does apply to civil contempt proceedings. 315 B.R. at 687. ... Because the contempt hearing was held after Carlos filed this bankruptcy case, both the hearing and the Judgment violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar a court from assessing civil contempt sanctions for violation of its orders when necessary to uphold their dignity.

Prague City of v. CAH Acquisition Company 7 LLC · filed 2021-03-11(a)(1)

The Court finds that the assessment of sanctions set forth herein “is necessary to uphold the dignity of the Court” and is not precluded by the automatic-stay provision.

The automatic stay does not prevent a federal court from adjudicating contempt and sanctions motions to enforce its own orders.

Select Distributors, LLC v. Breeze Smoke, LLC · filed 2021-08-04

As set forth on the record, the Court may adjudicate Defendants’ motions for contempt and sanctions as an exception to the Chapter 11 automatic stay under the “[f]ederal courts[’] inherent authority to devise sanctions in response to abuses of the judicial process, including violations of their orders.” In re Leonard, 644 Fed. Appx. 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2016).

The automatic stay may be enforced through civil contempt under § 105(a) when a debtor knowingly violates it and has no objectively reasonable basis for believing the conduct lawful.

Satija, Chapter 7 Trustee v. Page · filed 2023-08-03

Applying the Taggart standard and based on the evidence presented, the Court finds with regard to the Debtor that: (1) she knowingly and intentionally violated a definite and specific order of the court requiring her to deliver the post-petition distributions to the Trustee; (2) she did so with knowledge of the automatic stay and the requirement that she deliver the post-petition distributions to the Trustee; and (3) there is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the Debtor’s conduct might be lawful. Based on the forgoing, the Court finds that the Trustee’s MSJ under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) for civil contempt against the Debtor for violation of the automatic stay is granted.

A voluntary bankruptcy petition automatically stays the commencement or continuation of most civil proceedings against the debtor.

Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Nortia Logistics, Inc. · filed 2025-09-24(a)(1)

Voluntary bankruptcy petitions trigger an automatic stay of “the commencement or continuation” of most civil proceedings against a debtor.

A creditor’s good faith does not prevent civil contempt for violating § 362(a)’s automatic stay.

In Re Ashby · filed 1984-01-25(a)

The principle of law announced in McComb applies with equal force to the injunction of the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Thus, notwithstanding the alleged good faith of ORS, the court finds that the ORS acted in contempt of its order.

Section 362(a)(2) stays recovery of post-petition fines arising from pre-petition civil contempt citations.

United States v. Chris-Marine, U.S.A., Inc. (In re Chris-Marine, U.S.A., Inc.) · filed 2004-12-08(a)(2)

Although the Court does not base its decision primarily on this ground, Chris-Marine’s argument for an automatic stay in this case is well taken. Chris-Marine effectively contends that Section 362(a) encompasses all claims or civil causes of action, including civil contempt actions, which arose pre-petition. As such, the United States could not recover a post-petition accrual of a fine for pre-petition civil contempt citations, because those citations would be subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362’s automatic stay applies to contempt proceedings used to compel payment of a money judgment or expenditure of funds from the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Marriage of Lytle · filed 1982-05-05(a)

We first conclude that where, as here, contempt is invoked as a sanction for failure to pay a judgment for money, or to compel the expenditure of money from a bankrupt’s estate, rather than to uphold “the dignity of the court,” the proceedings are not exempt from the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay does not bar a contempt judgment entered to uphold the dignity of a court.

In Re Dunham · filed 1994-11-18(a)

A contempt judgment entered to uphold the dignity of the court does not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) and (6) stay a creditor’s contempt proceeding brought to collect a prepetition debt under a property settlement agreement.

In Re Dill · filed 2003-10-03(a)(1), (a)(6)

Nonetheless, on advice of her present counsel and with full knowledge of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, she commenced the contempt proceeding with the intent to collect a prepetition claim. This was a violation of the automatic stay imposed by § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a) did not bar actions to enforce a prepetition state court contempt order under the facts of this case.

Caldwell v. DeWoskin · filed 2015-03-31(a)

Even if the Bankruptcy Court had not relied on Rooker-Feldman as the basis for its ruling, summary judgment was appropriate under the facts of this case in that Defendants’ actions were clearly not a violation of the automatic stay, but taken instead to enforce a prior court order.

Section 362(b)(1) permits a criminal contempt sentencing hearing to proceed, but the automatic stay bars a purge condition requiring payment of a pre-petition debt to a creditor.

Yuval Golan · filed 2019-12-19(b)(1)

For all the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the contempt sentencing hearing which took place post-petition comes within the purview of § 362(b)(1) because contempt had been found pre-petition for Debtor’s willful violation of the state court’s pre-petition order. However, when the state court set a contempt purge provision which required the Debtor to pay $20,000 to a pre-petition creditor, Kroll, the stay was violated.

The automatic stay did not prevent the court from enforcing its civil contempt order.

Muderis v. Hernandez · filed 2023-03-24(b)(4)

Based on In re Dingley, the Court finds that the automatic stay provides no protection to Defendants. Despite Defendant Fred Hernandez’s Notice of Bankruptcy, it remains this Court’s prerogative to enforce its civil Contempt Order.

Section 362(b)(1) exempts criminal contempt proceedings from the automatic stay, but civil contempt proceedings used to collect arrears remain stayed.

Wheeler-Brown v. Brown · filed 2008-04-23(b)(1)

Accordingly, this court holds that the instant matter constitutes a civil contempt proceeding. Although this court has the inherent power to enforce its orders through civil contempt, actions for civil contempt are considered private collection devices and are within the ambit of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not stay a contempt action for unpaid court-ordered sanctions unless the proceeding turns on determining or collecting the underlying judgment.

Yellow Express, LLC v. Dingley (In Re Dingley) · filed 2014-08-06(a)

Although we recognize these different approaches to the issue before us, the precedent of this circuit is set by Hooker as followed post-Code by Dumas: a contempt action for nonpayment of court-ordered sanctions is exempted from the automatic stay unless the proceeding turns on the determination or collection of the underlying judgment.

Section 362(a) does not stay a contempt proceeding for nonpayment of court-ordered sanctions unless the proceeding determines or collects the underlying judgment.

In re: Mark Dingley · filed 2014-08-06(a)

Although we recognize these different approaches to the issue before us, the precedent of this circuit is set by Hooker as followed post-Code by Dumas: a contempt action for nonpayment of court-ordered sanctions is exempted from the automatic stay unless the proceeding turns on the determination or collection of the underlying judgment.

Section 362(b)(13) requires a motion to invoke the ship mortgage foreclosure exception, but the movant need only show that 90 days have passed since the bankruptcy petition and that the Secretary of Commerce seeks to foreclose a qualifying mortgage.

In Re Trawler Eagle, Inc. · filed 1988-11-10(b)(13)

Since the statute clearly states a petition must be filed under Section 362 of Title 11, this Court must construe the wording to mean a motion for relief must be filed invoking the Section 362(b)(13) exception. ... It is the conclusion of the Court, a movant for relief under Section 362(b)(13) must prove only that 90 days have elapsed since the petition in bankruptcy was filed, and the Secretary of Commerce seeks to foreclose either a preferred ship or fleet mortgage in a vessel or a mortgage in a fishing facility.

Section 362(a) stays proceedings to enforce a preferred ship mortgage, including confirmation of a vessel sale, until the bankruptcy court lifts the stay.

Adams v. S/V "Tenacious," · filed 1996-10-29(a)

The automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 governs proceedings to enforce the preferred ship mortgage in this case unless and until the stay is lifted by the bankruptcy court.

Section 362(a)(5) protects the debtor against liens on the debtor’s property, so a trustee lacks standing to enforce that stay provision.

Zurn v. Kessler · filed 2022-03-31(a)(5)

With respect to Section 362(a)(5), which prohibits “any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien . . .”, that stay provision is designed to benefit the Debtor, not the Trustee. As a result, the Trustee lacks standing to enforce that automatic stay provision.

Section 362 does not give outside parties rights to invoke the automatic stay for their own benefit against the bankruptcy estate.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 72,689 in Re Globe Investment and Loan Company, Inc., Debtor. Giovanni B. Magnoni v. Globe Investment a · filed 1989-02-08

Whatever argument may be made for extending the protection of section 362 to creditors, it clearly does not confer any rights to outside parties.

Section 362 does not give the trustee of a later bankruptcy estate standing to challenge a violation of an earlier estate’s stay when the later debtor was neither a creditor nor a joint debtor in the earlier case.

In Re Elna Kay Brooks, Debtor. Nancy James, Trustee v. Washington Mutual Savings Bank · filed 1989-03-23

However, the trustee of Mrs. Brooks’ estate is not asserting that Mrs. Brooks was a creditor of Mr. Brooks’ bankruptcy estate or that she joined in his petition under 11 U.S.C. § 302 so as to become a joint debtor of the estate. Accordingly, the trustee of Elna Brooks’ bankruptcy estate, who may assert only the rights of Mrs. Brooks and her creditors, does not have standing to challenge the deed under § 362.

Section 362 limits enforcement of the automatic stay to the debtor and the bankruptcy trustee; a creditor cannot invoke the stay for its own benefit after they have waived an objection.

Woolworth v. Micol Land Company · filed 1989-10-09

While there is federal case law to the contrary, we find the majority rule as stated in Globe more persuasive. The clear purpose of the legislative scheme involving the automatic stay is fully served by limiting its enforcement to the debtor and the trustee. The rights of creditors are fully protected in the administration of the bankruptcy estate. To allow the stay to be used to benefit an individual creditor where the debtor and the trustee have waived any objection to the action taken in violation of the stay, appears to be contrary to its primary purpose. The rule limiting enforcement of stay provisions to the debtor and trustee, thus, is consistent with the purpose of the stay.

Section 362(h) does not give a solvent third-party garnishee that is a potential judgment debtor of a creditor standing to challenge automatic stay violations or recover damages.

Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Alside Supply Center of Knoxville (In Re Clemmer) · filed 1995-02-15(h)

Accordingly, the court holds that MetLife, as a solvent third party, garnishee, and potential judgment debtor of Alside, does not have standing under § 362 to challenge violations of the automatic stay, enjoin Alside’s prosecution of the state court action, and recover damages.

Section 362 does not give a nondebtor co-owner standing to challenge an alleged automatic-stay violation when her interest in the collateral is outside the bankruptcy estate.

Catherine Norwood Winters, Acting by and Through Her Attorney-In-Fact, Toni Louise McMahon v. George Mason Bank Robert O · filed 1996-08-23

This court declines to address this issue, finding that Mrs. Winters lacks standing to challenge the agreement as either void or voidable, because she is not the debtor and her interest in the stocks was not part of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362 does not give a person standing to enforce the automatic stay on his own behalf merely because he may be a co-debtor with the debtor in some other capacity.

Radogna v. Twp · filed 2009-05-21

Nor does Radogna’s potential status as a “co-debtor” with his mother in some other capacity (which he does not assert) confer standing to enforce the automatic stay.

Absent extraordinary circumstances, a non-debtor third party lacks standing to invoke the debtor’s automatic stay under Section 362 to challenge a judicial tax sale.

Tobyhanna Army Depot Federal Credit Union v. Monroe County Tax Claim Bureau · filed 2011-11-01

Further, the Credit Union is not the debtor, but a non-debtor third party, and, therefore, absent extraordinary circumstances, the Credit Union lacks standing to assert the debtor’s (King’s) automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code to contest the validity of the judicial sale.

A borrower who is neither a debtor nor a creditor lacks standing to enforce the automatic stay on her own behalf or on behalf of the debtor.

Carr v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc.) · filed 2014-02-08

At the time she filed this adversary proceeding, Ms. Carr was neither a debtor nor a creditor of the Debtors and, therefore, she lacks the authority to enforce the automatic stay either on behalf of the Debtors or herself.

Section 362(a) does not let a nondebtor challenge an alleged automatic-stay violation when the debtor and trustee do not invoke the stay.

Danko v. O'Reilly CA1/2 · filed 2014-11-26(a)

Nor, as California recognizes, is the violation of a bankruptcy stay a sword in the hands of “nondebtor entities” such as O’Reilly.

Section 362’s automatic stay cannot be invoked by a nondebtor to invalidate a judgment against him when the bankruptcy trustee does not seek to enforce the stay.

Danko v. O'Reilly · filed 2014-12-18(a)

Nor, as California recognizes, is the violation of a bankruptcy stay a sword in the hands of “nondebtor entities” such as O’Reilly.

A creditor lacks standing to pursue claims for violations of the automatic stay.

Mario Botello Soria and Leticia Ramirez Garcia · filed 2020-02-28

Thus, Claimants lack standing to prosecute, in this court or anywhere else, claims based on alleged violations of the automatic stay.

For bankruptcy appellate standing, Section 362’s automatic stay protects the debtor and the debtor’s estate, so an individual creditor has no independent standing to appeal a decision about a stay violation.

Barrett v. 2298 Driftwood Tide Trust · filed 2020-10-28

In sum, for bankruptcy appellate standing purposes, the automatic-stay provisions in the Bankruptcy Code are intended “solely” for the benefit of the debtor and the debtor’s estate.

Section 362 gives creditors no independent standing to enforce a debtor’s automatic stay when the debtor does not seek to enforce it.

National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh PA v. Boy Scouts of America & Delaware BSA LLC · filed 2023-03-28

Under clear Ninth Circuit precedent, Lujan Claimants have no independent standing to enforce the Archbishop’s automatic stay. Because Lujan Claimants do not have standing to enforce the automatic stay on behalf of the Archbishop or in their own right, I will not permit Lujan Claimants to pursue their stay-related arguments.

Section 362’s automatic stay cannot support a claim based on maintaining liens when the complaint does not allege that the plaintiff filed for bankruptcy.

Harris · filed 2026-03-05

Davis-Harris’ objections can also be read to argue that the Makower Defendants maintained liens on her property in violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362. See ECF No. 132, PageID.1464-65 (responding to that argument). But nowhere in Plaintiff’s SAC does she state that she ever filed for bankruptcy, so this argument is unsupported by any evidence or any allegation in her complaint.

A party without standing to assert a violation of § 362(a)’s automatic stay cannot raise that violation as a basis for dismissal.

Plowman v. Bedford Financial Corp. (In Re Plowman) · filed 1998-03-10(a)

Had one of the Named Defendants who or which is a debtor in a bankruptcy raised the impact of the Named Plaintiffs’ violation of the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) caused by the institution of the Removed Action, this Court would have had to resolve whether one or more of the removal-dismissal lines of authority would support dismissal of this case instead of its remand. This did not occur and the only parties to put forward the stay violation issue were those without standing to so do.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay termination of an executory contract to make a loan when section 365(e)(2)(B) permits termination after the bankruptcy filing.

Watts v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Co. · filed 1989-06-05(a)(3)

The question remains whether the automatic stay applies even though the Code expressly permits the post-filing termination of an executory contract to make a loan. We conclude it does not.

Section 362(a)(3) protects executory contracts as estate property before the debtor assumes or rejects them.

Alert Holdings, Inc. v. Interstate Protective Services, Inc. (In Re Alert Holdings Inc.) · filed 1992-12-15(a)(3)

I concluded then, as I do now, that under the Code an executory contract is property of the estate protected by the automatic stay.

Section 362 protects a debtor’s rights under an executory contract from unilateral termination after the bankruptcy filing, and a transfer that terminates those rights may be set aside as a stay violation.

Slater v. Smith (In Re Albion Disposal Inc.) · filed 1993-03-18

The lease to SSWS here constituted a wrongful exercise of exclusive dominion over, and unilateral termination of, the Debtor’s interest in the combined property. It created a “leasehold” in a portion of the properties and conveyed it, and thereby deprived OSL and the affiliated companies of the benefits those companies enjoyed under an executory contract to share in the profits or proceeds of the combined properties. As such, the lease may be set aside as a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362, together with § 365(e)(1), can prevent termination of an executory contract even when state law permits termination at will.

Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus. Inc. (In Re Elder-Beerman Stores Corp.) · filed 1997-02-12

Thus it is not state law but rather the interaction of §§ 362 and 365(e)(1) that prevented the contract in question from being terminated.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar a debtor in possession from proposing higher prices under an unassumed executory contract with another debtor in possession because the contract is unenforceable against the proposing debtor.

In Re National Steel Corp. · filed 2004-10-26(a)(3)

Hence, the submission of the Amended Price Proposal to the Creditor did not constitute an act to obtain possession of property of the Creditor’s bankruptcy estate or to exercise control over property of its estate in violation of § 362(a)(3).

Section 362 permits a trademark plaintiff to obtain summary judgment on liability against a debtor as a predicate to equitable relief despite a pending bankruptcy proceeding.

Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Sultana Crackers, Inc. · filed 1988-03-14

Hence, following the persuasive reasoning of Judge Claire in Steak & Brew, Inc., notwithstanding the bankruptcy court’s order, plaintiff should be permitted to secure against Nu Service the limited relief sought on this motion — that is, summary judgment as to liability as a predicate to obtaining equitable relief.

Section 362(a) may not protect a debtor who actively litigates a state court action and unreasonably delays notifying the court of the bankruptcy until just before judgment.

In re John Richard Calder · filed 1990-06-29(a)

In our view, it would be inequitable to allow Calder to claim any protections of the automatic stay under section 362(a) to defeat the Jobs' state court judgment.

Section 362(a) does not protect a debtor who actively litigates a state court action and unreasonably delays notice of the bankruptcy until just before judgment, then invokes the stay to defeat the judgment.

Job v. Calder (In re Calder) · filed 1990-06-29(a)

In our view, it would be inequitable to allow Calder to claim any protections of the automatic stay under section 362(a) to defeat the Jobs’ state court judgment.

Section 362(a)(1) does not let a debtor void a judgment for violating the automatic stay when the debtor actively litigated without disclosing the bankruptcy and invoked the stay only after an adverse result.

In Re Downing · filed 1992-06-22(a)(1)

This Court believes the exception should apply in this case and the Court should grant relief from the stay to allow the jury trial, on punitive damages, to proceed. The Debtor, in this case, actively litigated the state court action against him which had been filed post-petition and in violation of the stay. The Debtor did not notify the opposing parties, the state court, his bankruptcy attorney or the bankruptcy court about this violation of the stay. Neither Plastering nor the state court had any knowledge of the bankruptcy proceeding until after the summary judgment in regard to compensatory damages which had been entered and the Debtor filed his motion to vacate that judgment. This is exactly the type of conduct that has been condemned by the Tenth Circuit as gambling on a state court trial and then when you loose, playing the trump card of the automatic stay and asking that the judgment be voided. This is not fair or equitable and cannot be done.

Section 362(a)(1) permits a narrow equitable exception to the automatic stay in divorce proceedings when the debtor withholds notice until after the decree, uses the stay unfairly, and enforcement would undermine fair play without protecting other creditors.

Roseman v. Roseman · filed 1993-12-09(a)(1)

While we adhere to the Easley standard, we affirm application of an equitable exception when a debtor: (1) withholds notice of the stay from a state court until after the entry of a decree of absolute divorce, child support and alimony; (2) uses the stay as a litigation tactic unfairly; and (3) has not entered into a property settlement agreement in an attempt to defraud other creditors. The exception is recognized only when the state court's disposition of the marital assets was appropriate in light of the rights of other creditors, and the enforcement of the stay would offend the due process notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Section 362(a) permits an equitable exception to the automatic stay when a debtor conceals the bankruptcy from an unaware creditor and the court, allowing the collection action to proceed through judgment and attachment before invoking the stay.

Rivera Vázquez v. Padilla · filed 2008-07-31(a)

La jurisprudencia antes reseñada considera como una posible excepción a la paralización automática, como cuestión de equidad, el desconocimiento por parte del acreedor de la petición de quiebra, dada la “conducta irrazonable ” asumida por el propio deudor. Ante la conducta del Sr. Silva, entendemos que resulta procedente aplicar la referida excepción en el presente caso y resolver que los procedimientos en la causa I4CI2005-00794 ante el TPI no quedaron paralizados, precisamente por razón de que quien ahora se vale del “automatic stay” fue el mismo deudor-demandado (Sr. Silva) que omitió incluir en los “schedules" de la Petición de Quiebra la demanda en la causa I4CI2005-00794 y también escondió tal información al TPI y al demandante, Sr. Rivera, luego del emplazamiento de la demanda.

The automatic stay does not impede issuance of a copyright preliminary injunction when a motion to lift the stay is pending before the same bankruptcy judge who lifted a corporate codefendant’s stay and the requested relief is injunctive rather than monetary.

RDI of Michigan, LLC v. Michigan Coin-Op Vending, Inc. · filed 2008-12-04

Nonetheless, for the following reasons, the Court holds that the Mirch bankruptcy proceeding shall not impede the issuance of a preliminary injunction in this matter: ... (1) Plaintiff has moved to have an order entered lifting the stay in the Mirch bankruptcy case, ... (2) The Mirch bankruptcy matter is pending before the same Bankruptcy Judge who is handling the Coin-Op bankruptcy, and ... (3) The matters at issue in this motion for preliminary injunction involve injunctive relief (as opposed to monetary relief).

Section 362(a) permits a narrow equitable exception to the automatic stay when a debtor unfairly uses it to avoid an unfavorable result, leaving postpetition stay violations voidable.

In re Johnson · filed 2017-02-10(a)

In this Court’s view, the Debtor is “attempting to use the stay unfairly to avoid an unfavorable result[.]” ... Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that post-petition actions taken by the Movants at the Partnership meeting held on April 27, 2016, and afterwards, were merely voidable rather than void, in recognition of the narrow equitable exception to the operation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit a notice of default to a debtor when the notice does not seek possession of estate property or otherwise act against the estate.

Am-Haul Carting, Inc. v. Contractors Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1998-11-13(a)

In the case before us there has been no attempt by Sea Crest to obtain possession of the property of the debtor. In addition, Sea Crest made no further claim against Sovereign, commenced no judicial proceeding against it, and took no further action of any kind against Sovereign that would cause any detriment to the estate. Indeed, Sea Crest has maintained and protected a quantity of funds on Sovereign’s behalf. There is no reason why the default notice should be prohibited.

Section 362(a)(3), (4), and (5) prohibits sending letters threatening foreclosure against estate property even when addressed only to a nondebtor spouse.

Newcomer v. Litton Loan Servicing, L.P. (In Re Newcomer) · filed 2009-04-29(a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5)

Although addressed only to Mrs. Newcomer, a non-debtor, they were mailed to her at the Property, where Plaintiff also resided. The threat to schedule for foreclosure the “property that is collateral for the Note” is a threat to foreclose on property of the estate. By sending these letters, Defendant violated the automatic stay imposed by § 362(a)(3), (4) and (5).

A creditor does not violate § 362(a)(3) by failing to remove foreclosure advertisements placed before the bankruptcy filing when it takes no active steps to readvertise or reset the sale.

McCormick v. CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES, LLC · filed 2025-06-10(a)(3)

The Court finds that failing to cancel foreclosure advertisements does not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not bar mailing notices of a mortgagor’s rights under the Homeowners Emergency Assistance Act because mailing them does not commence or continue an action or proceeding.

Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Lee · filed 1989-07-07(a)

It is not a continuation or commencement of an action or proceeding for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a) prohibits a creditor from mailing and filing notice that initiates a new foreclosure sale while the automatic stay remains in effect.

Chapel v. Derringer (In Re Derringer) · filed 2007-09-24(a)

The automatic stay was still in effect when Appellants mailed the Foreclosure Notice to Derringer and caused it to be filed in the New Mexico state court. These actions did not constitute a “postponement” or “continuation” of a previously scheduled foreclosure sale. Instead, they served to initiate an entirely new sale. The bankruptcy court’s determination that the filing and mailing of the Foreclosure Notice was a willful violation of the automatic stay was not clearly erroneous.