11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362 stay-violation remedies cannot be waived through an arbitration agreement; the bankruptcy court may decide whether the stay was violated.

Cavanaugh v. Conseco Finance Servicing Corp. (In Re Cavanaugh) · filed 2001-11-05

In view of the foregoing, and having found that Congress has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of a remedies under 11 U.S.C. § 362 for violations of the automatic stay, the Court shall enter an order denying Conseco’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss the Adversary Proceeding.

Actions against creditors for automatic-stay violations belong in bankruptcy court, and the Tax Court may defer complex stay and remedy questions to that court.

Meadows v. Comm'r of IRS · filed 2005-04-06(h)

We decide only that the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in deferring such issues to the expertise and authority of the bankruptcy court, in light of the several reasons discussed herein. ... We note that actions against creditors for violations of the automatic stay ... are to be brought in the bankruptcy court.

Section 362(h) allows a bankruptcy court to decide whether to award damages in a debtor’s sole pending bankruptcy case for a stay violation in an earlier case before the same court.

County of Ventura Tax Collector v. Brawders (In Re Brawders) · filed 2005-05-10(h)

Moreover, these Debtors returned to the very same bankruptcy court (although a different bankruptcy judge). We have no difficulty in concluding that the bankruptcy court in the Second Case had jurisdiction to determine the res judicata issues and decide whether to award damages under Section 362(h).

District courts have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate claims under Section 362(h) for damages caused by willful violations of the automatic stay.

Justice Cometh, Ltd. v. White · filed 2005-09-30(h)

Because we find that statutory provision controlling, we consider the Seventh Circuit’s Price decision more persuasive, and join in finding that the district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate § 362(h) claims.

An alleged violation of Section 362's automatic stay must be raised in bankruptcy court rather than through a Section 1983 action in district court.

Balaber-Strauss v. Town/Village of Harrison · filed 2005-12-15

Any claimed violation of the automatic stay of enforcement proceedings provision of the Bankruptcy Code must be brought before the Bankruptcy Court, not before this Court as a § 1983 action.

A claim alleging a violation of the automatic stay under Section 362 must be filed in the bankruptcy court with jurisdiction over the bankruptcy action.

Truong v. Litman · filed 2009-02-26

The district court correctly found that the Truongs’ claim that the defendants violated the automatic stay provision set forth in 11 U.S.C. Section 362 is properly filed in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court with jurisdiction over the Truongs’ bankruptcy action.

Claims for violation of Section 362’s automatic stay generally belong in bankruptcy court; a district court may decline to hear one when the bankruptcy reference has not been withdrawn.

Gagnon v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2017-01-03(k)(1)

The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claim for violation of the automatic stay. Plaintiff has not, to date, filed a motion to withdraw the reference to the bankruptcy court.

Section 362(k) provides an independent action for a willful automatic stay violation that a district court has jurisdiction to hear outside the bankruptcy proceeding.

Potter v. Newkirk · filed 2020-02-04(k)

As we concluded, “a § 362(k) action no matter when instituted is a case under title 11.” Id. As such, a district court has jurisdiction to entertain it.

A debtor may seek relief in bankruptcy court for an alleged violation of the automatic stay without first exhausting state administrative remedies.

Jones v. Lexington Medical Center · filed 2020-07-08

The bankruptcy court has the authority under the Bankruptcy Code to enforce the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and its orders, including the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 and the Court’s discharge order. The plaintiffs are not required to exhaust any administrative remedies before they seek remedies for the defendant’s alleged violations of the Bankruptcy Code and the Court’s discharge order.

A damages claim for violation of the automatic stay under § 362 must be brought in bankruptcy court rather than district court.

Palmer v. The City of New York · filed 2021-09-30

The Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over that claim. The Second Circuit has held that “such a claim must be brought in the bankruptcy court, rather than in the district court.”

Relief for a violation of Section 362’s automatic stay must be sought in bankruptcy court; a district court lacks original jurisdiction over such claims.

Inn World Report, Inc. v. MB Financial Bank NA · filed 2021-10-25

Because Plaintiffs’ claims all arise from alleged violations of an automatic bankruptcy stay, I do not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

A claim for violation of the automatic stay in bankruptcy proceedings belongs in bankruptcy court rather than district court.

Bishop · filed 2025-11-12

As Magistrate Judge Stafford correctly determined, a claim for violation of an automatic stay in a plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceedings is properly suited for Bankruptcy Court, not the district court.

Claims for sanctions for violating the automatic stay fall within exclusive federal jurisdiction and may be heard by the bankruptcy court.

Simpkins · filed 2026-04-09

Ms. Booker alleges that the Simpkins violated a bankruptcy automatic stay and discharge. ECF No. 13 at 2–3; ECF No. 24 at 1–2. A federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over these claims.

A bankruptcy court may decide a timely filed proceeding alleging an automatic stay violation after the underlying bankruptcy case is dismissed.

Skaggs v. Fifth Third Bank of Northern Kentucky (In Re Skaggs) · filed 1995-06-26

The Court concludes that, even though the underlying Chapter 13 case has been dismissed, this Court retains jurisdiction to decide an adversary proceeding involving an alleged violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) stays enforcement of state tax-clearance requirements against a liquor-license renewal application when the debtor files for bankruptcy during the renewal grace period.

In Re Nejberger · filed 1990-09-28(a)

Inasmuch as the licensee’s bankruptcy petition was filed during the renewal application grace period, the state regulatory scheme as to delinquent taxes was stayed by operation of the bankruptcy code — in this instance, the indefinite stay of § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(1) stays a liquor licensing board’s refusal to renew a license solely to collect prepetition taxes when the board acts as a collection agent and the police or regulatory exception does not apply.

Nejberger v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (In Re Nejberger) · filed 1990-04-13(a)(1)

I therefore agree that the mere power of the Liquor Control Board to block a renewal until delinquent taxes are paid cannot be equated to an exercise of police or regulatory power, where there exists no other type of control over the licensee. ... Accordingly, I find that the Board’s actions are violative of the stay under § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(3) and (a)(6) do not prohibit a government agency from withholding an education grant pending discharge when the denial neither controls estate property nor seeks to coerce repayment of a prepetition debt.

Saunders v. Reeher (In Re Saunders) · filed 1989-09-27(a)(3), (a)(6)

As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed, communication of institutional policy which is not designed to coerce repayment does not constitute a violation of § 362(a)(6). ... Thus, the instant denial of a college education grant pending notice of the debt- or’s discharge did not violate § 362(a)(3).

Section 362 does not require a higher education corporation to remove a prepetition student-loan default notation when the debtor files bankruptcy or confirms a Chapter 13 plan.

In Re Colon · filed 1997-06-27

The Court concludes that the failure of a higher education corporation to remove a default notation upon the filing of bankruptcy or the confirmation of the plan, does not violate the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a senior lienholder’s foreclosure when it risks extinguishing a valid but unrecorded junior mortgage held by the debtor.

Cardinal Industries, Inc. v. Buckeye Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1989-09-28(a)(3)

The Court finds that the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) stay the Defendants’ actions to foreclose their first mortgage liens where such foreclosures necessarily risk extinguishment of valid, but unrecorded, second mortgages held by either of these Debtors.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a senior lienholder’s foreclosure when it would extinguish the debtor’s junior lien on property owned by a third party.

Monumental Life Insurance Co. v. Bibo, Inc. (In Re Bibo, Inc.) · filed 1996-08-30(a)(3)

Debtor’s junior lien interest in the real property is property of the estate. This interest is protected by the automatic stay from foreclosure by a senior lienholder until such time as relief from the stay is granted, or the stay is no longer in effect.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a senior lienholder’s foreclosure on property owned by a nondebtor when foreclosure could extinguish the debtor’s second lien interest, even if the senior lienholder is not a creditor of the debtor.

In Re Three Strokes Ltd. Partnership · filed 2008-12-01(a)(3)

Thus, Section 362 applies to automatically stay the foreclosure proceedings. The foreclosure proceedings could have the effect of extinguishing the Debtor’s second lien interest. The foreclosure proceedings would constitute an exercise of control over property of the estate, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 362(a)(3).

Section 362(d)(1) allows a court considering relief from the automatic stay for cause to inquire whether the debtor sought stay protection in good faith toward the creditor seeking relief.

Carolin Corporation v. Robert J. Miller, Jr. · filed 1989-09-28(d)(1)

Just as Sec. 1112(b) inferentially permits inquiry into a debtor's good faith in the context of an interested party's motion to dismiss, Sec. 362(d)(1)'s "for cause" language authorizes the court to determine whether, with respect to the interests of a creditor seeking relief, a debtor has sought the protection of the automatic stay in good faith.

Section 362(d)(1) requires relief from the automatic stay for cause, including lack of adequate protection, when a debtor’s repeated failure to comply with a plan makes a virtually identical replacement plan infeasible.

Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Jones (In Re Jones) · filed 1989-10-12(d)(1)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, the court must lift the stay if “cause” exists, “including the lack of adequate protection.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (supp. 1989). It is impossible to rationalize or to reconcile the dismissal of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy case because the plan was “not feasible,” and because the debtor had failed, time and again, to comply with that plan, with a finding two days later that a second very similar Chapter 13 plan was “feasible” and provided “adequate protection” to the secured creditor.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause after notice and hearing; a court may continue the stay temporarily while developing the record needed to decide whether it should remain in place.

In Re Apex Oil Company · filed 1989-10-13(d)(1)

After notice and hearing, the bankruptcy court may terminate or modify an automatic stay for cause. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(d)(1). ... After consideration of the problems with the record in this case, we temporarily affirm the stay, pending further development of a record upon which a reasonable decision as to the permanency of the stay can be made.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay so personal injury and wrongful death claimants can liquidate their claims in an appropriate nonbankruptcy forum.

In Re Allegheny International, Inc. · filed 1989-10-17(d)(1)

The motion of the O’Dell mov-ants for relief from stay is granted.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a Chapter 13 debtor defaults on a secured debt incurred after filing.

In Re Glover · filed 1989-11-17(d)(1)

In any case, if the stay does apply, the circumstances of this ease justify relief for cause pursuant to § 362(d)(1).

Section 362(d)(1) does not require relief from the automatic stay when the creditor shows only that one payment was seven days overdue.

In Re Nikokyrakis · filed 1989-11-20(d)(1)

The Motion of SOCIETY does not meet either of the two standards set forth in Sec. 362(d). The only cause for relief relied upon by the Bank is the fact that one payment was at that time seven days past due. That does not constitute sufficient cause as required by 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(d)(1).

Section 362(d)(1) allows relief from the automatic stay for cause, but a creditor seeking to pursue a setoff counterclaim in another court must show that the hardship of maintaining the stay considerably outweighs the hardship to the debtor from lifting it.

Matter of Video Cassette Games, Inc. · filed 1989-11-30(d)(1)

Though the setoff claim appears to be a viable one, Sanwa has failed to show this Court that its hardship from the maintenance of the automatic stay would considerably outweigh the hardship to Debtor from lifting the stay. Specifically, if San-wa is allowed to pursue the setoff as a counterclaim in the District Court action, it may preclude Debtor from subordinating that claim in a later equitable subordination proceeding in this Court.

When lack of insurance is offered as cause to lift the automatic stay for inadequate protection under § 362(d)(1), the court must consider evidence about the coverage and make specific findings.

Matter of T & H Diner, Inc. · filed 1989-12-20(d)(1)

This court takes no issue with that decision insofar as it impacts upon the question of whether the debtor was in default; however, with regard to the apparent inadequate protection under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), the bankruptcy court should have considered the affidavit. The lack of insurance was identified as the cause “shown to vacate the automatic stay.” Therefore, this matter will be remanded to the bankruptcy court for specific findings with regard to the vacation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) does not permit relief from the automatic stay based solely on pending state court actions in another jurisdiction.

In Re Marie Pastor's Morningstar Management, Ltd. · filed 1990-01-16(d)(1)

Movants have not established cause for relief from the automatic stay in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) because the lone fact that state court actions are pending in another jurisdiction is not evidence sufficient to warrant relief from the stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits the court to modify the automatic stay for cause when further delay would leave a creditor’s interest in property inadequately protected.

In Re Wallace · filed 1990-02-01(d)(1)

If the debtors default in performing these acts, the court, upon certification by GMAC of such default shall enter an order deeming the lease rejected and modify the automatic stay of Section 362 for “cause” to allow GMAC to obtain possession of the subject vehicle insofar as the court finds that GMAC’s interest in the vehicle would not be adequately protected in the event of any further delay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause to expedite a secured creditor’s recovery of collateral.

In Re Reinbold · filed 1990-02-05(d)(1)

Realizing that justice delayed is justice denied, the Court will grant DCB’s motion for relief from the automatic stay in order to expedite the recovery of its collateral.

Section 362(d)(1) does not allow relief from the automatic stay based solely on brief nonpayment during bankruptcy, particularly when the debtor has equity, the creditor is adequately protected, and the Chapter 12 plan deadline has not passed.

In Re Kerns · filed 1990-03-08(d)(1)

... this Court does agree that mere nonpayment for a short period of time during bankruptcy is not sufficient cause, particularly where there is equity and adequate protection and where the time for filing the plan of reorganization has not even passed.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for lack of good faith, but filing a bankruptcy petition minutes before a foreclosure sale alone does not establish bad faith warranting relief.

In Re Willowood East Apartments of Indianapolis II Ltd. · filed 1990-03-22(d)(1)

While a lack of good faith may constitute “cause” for relief from stay, the fact that a petition is filed minutes before a foreclosure sale does not, standing alone, establish bad faith which warrants relief from the automatic stay.

A bankruptcy petition filed minutes before a foreclosure sale does not, by itself, establish bad faith warranting relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d)(1).

In Re North Indianapolis Venture · filed 1990-03-22(d)(1)

While a lack of good faith may constitute “cause” for relief from stay, the fact that a petition is filed minutes before a foreclosure sale does not, standing alone, establish bad faith which warrants relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits denial of relief from the automatic stay for cause when the creditor’s alleged security interest is too speculative to justify relief.

Matter of FRG, Inc. · filed 1990-04-27(d)(1)

There is ample evidence to sustain the bankruptcy court’s finding that appellant’s alleged security interest was too speculative to justify relief for cause.

Section 362(d)(1) requires a movant seeking relief from the automatic stay for cause to establish a legally sufficient basis for the proposed action.

In Re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. · filed 1990-05-03(d)(1)

Accordingly, the courts have uniformly ruled that cause under section 362(d)(1), requires the establishment of a legally sufficient basis for the action sought.

Section 362(d)(1) requires a party seeking relief from the automatic stay during an ongoing reorganization to show continuing postpetition harm attributable to the stay; delay in exercising contractual or state law rights alone does not establish cause.

In Re Cardinal Industries, Inc. · filed 1990-05-14(d)(1)

This Court believes that where a reorganization effort is ongoing, the Mov-ants must show more than a delay in their ability to exercise rights granted under the Partnership Agreements. The Movants must demonstrate continuing postpetition harm that is specifically attributable to their inability to exercise those rights.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when the debtor retains only bare legal title after a sheriff’s sale and the purchaser holds equitable title.

Soliman v. Spencer (In Re Spencer) · filed 1990-05-18(d)(1)

Therefore, the Court concludes that because Spencer holds only bare legal title and Solimán holds the equitable title to the Property, which is the title which has real value under Delaware law, the Court must reverse the decision of the Bankruptcy Court on the issue of “cause” and lift the stay to allow the Delaware Superior Court’s confirmation hearing to proceed.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause only when the balance of hardships from denying relief tips significantly in the movant’s favor.

In Re FRG · filed 1990-06-04(d)(1)

Section 362(d)(1), in turn, permits a bankruptcy court to lift or modify the automatic stay “for cause.” This latter subsection has long been viewed as a vehicle for creditors to obtain relief from the automatic stay only upon a showing that the balance of hardships from not obtaining relief tips significantly in their favor.

Section 362(d)(1) requires a party seeking relief from the automatic stay to make an initial showing of cause; without it, the debtor need not justify continued protection.

In Re Sonnax Industries, Inc., Debtor. Sonnax Industries, Inc. v. Tri Component Products Corp. · filed 1990-06-25(d)(1)

If the movant fails to make an initial showing of cause, however, the court should deny relief without requiring any showing from the debtor that it is entitled to continued protection.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the stay for claim liquidation in another forum without requiring a merits analysis in every case.

Peterson v. Cundy (In Re Peterson) · filed 1990-06-28(d)(1)

To require a merits analysis in every case would in large part defeat this objective and frustrate the effort to resolve § 362(d) motions expeditiously.

Section 362(d)(1) permits modification of the automatic stay for cause when a lessor’s interest in leased property is completely unprotected.

RTO Rents v. Benson (In Re Benson) · filed 1990-07-02(d)(1)

No discussion of § 362(d)(2) is necessary to this decision, because “cause” exists under § 362(d)(1) to modify the automatic stay. ... Therefore, the leases cannot be provided for under any modified plan proposed by the debtor and RTO Rents’ interest in the leased property is completely unprotected.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a bankruptcy court should let an advanced state court action resolve state-law claims, while enforcement of any judgment remains stayed.

Christensen v. Tucson Estates · filed 1990-08-30(d)(1)

A bankruptcy court "shall" lift the automatic stay "for cause." Id. Sec. 362(d)(1). ... Where a bankruptcy court may abstain from deciding issues in favor of an imminent state court trial involving the same issues, cause may exist for lifting the stay as to the state court trial. ... The bankruptcy court abused its discretion in imposing the stay except as to the execution of any judgment.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when abstention in favor of a pending state court trial is appropriate, while execution of any judgment remains stayed.

Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.) · filed 1990-08-30(d)(1)

Where a bankruptcy court may abstain from deciding issues in favor of an imminent state court trial involving the same issues, cause may exist for lifting the stay as to the state court trial. ... We reverse the district court’s decision affirming the bankruptcy court’s reimposition of the stay, except as to execution of the judgment.

Section 362(d)(1) treats a postpetition transfer of property to a debtor outside its ordinary course of business and without prior court approval as presumptively bad faith, providing cause to lift the automatic stay unless the debtor rebuts the presumption.

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Oklahoma P.A.C. First Ltd. Partnership (In Re Oklahoma P.A.C. First Ltd. Partnersh · filed 1990-10-18(d)(1)

Surely given the facts in this matter sufficient “cause” has been shown under Section 362(d)(1) to vacate the automatic stay as to the Surprise Property. This particular parcel of real property was transferred to the Debtor in bad faith. This Court concludes that any property transferred to, a debtor postpetition, outside the ordinary course of business of the Debtor and without prior Court approval, is presumptively done in bad faith. The debtor may rebut this presumption, but it is a heavy burden.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a court to modify the automatic stay for cause so pending state court eviction litigation can proceed to a final conclusion after the debtor has already litigated its lease rights there.

In Re 3220 Erie Boulevard East, Inc. · filed 1990-11-01(d)(1)

This Court is convinced, however, that there is sufficient cause within the meaning of Code § 362(d)(1) for it to modify the stay imposed pursuant to Code § 362(a) to permit the Movants and the Debtor to continue the state court litigation from the point to which it had progressed at 4:23 p.m. on August 3, 1990 to a final conclusion.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause; the possibility of trying some issues twice does not by itself require denial of relief.

In Re Salisbury · filed 1990-12-04(d)(1)

While it will be necessary for the Bankruptcy Court to determine dischargeability in the event Sem-ple is successful in his counterclaims, the possibility of having to try some issues twice is not such a great hardship that relief from stay should be denied.

A court may defer relief from the automatic stay for cause under § 362(d)(1) pending an evidentiary hearing when disputed arrears and possible excuses for nonpayment affect that request.

In Re Lippman · filed 1990-12-19(d)(1)

As the following summary of this history demonstrates, a decision to lift the automatic stay is premature at this time. An evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine the amounts owed by Lippman to the Movant, whether the Movant unjustifiably sought to evict Lippman and his subtenants, and whether any non-payment was justified or excused under relevant law by such acts, if proven.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a debtor cannot effectuate a reorganization plan and its delay prejudices creditors.

In re Belmont Realty Corp. · filed 1991-02-22(d)(1)

On November 17, 1990, this Court entered an Order granting RIHT’s Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay, for cause, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) and § 362(d)(2), based upon Belmont’s clear inability to effectuate a plan of reorganization, as well as Belmont’s prolonged and unproductive pattern of conduct which was intended to, and which has in fact caused unreasonable delay that is prejudicial to creditors.

Section 362(d)(1) permits modifying the automatic stay for cause so a tax court can finish determining tax liability when that court has expertise and the case is nearly ready for trial.

Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States Internal Revenue Service (In Re Universal Life Church, Inc.) · filed 1991-03-25(d)(1)

The automatic stay in this case should be modified to permit the tax court to finish what it had nearly completed. That forum has special expertise in deciding difficult and contested tax issues.

A former spouse’s financial hardship from unpaid property settlement and alimony payments can constitute cause to modify the automatic stay under § 362(d)(1).

In Re Kelly · filed 1991-03-29(d)(1)

The movant has stated in her Affidavit that her total aggregate income is $750 per month while her monthly expenses total $1,006. Due to the debtor’s nonpayment, the movant has been forced to diminish her reserve funds of less than $17,000 to survive (the reserve represents the proceeds remaining from the settlement and alimony payments made by the debtor prior to his filing bankruptcy.) This Court finds that the aforementioned hardships imposed upon the movant constitute “cause” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a debtor fails to pay postpetition rent under a nonresidential lease and shows no ability to cure the default, provide adequate protection, or assure future performance.

In Re Rocchio · filed 1991-03-29(d)(1)

The Debtors’ failure to pay postpetition rent, together with a total absence of evidence that they will: (1) cure the default, (2) provide adequate protection, or (3) give adequate assurance of future performance, all violate the clear requirements of § 365(d)(3), and we hold that said violations (individually and cumulatively) constitute “cause” under § 362(d)(1) to lift the stay and to allow UPI to continue the state court eviction litigation.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a debtor files a second Chapter 11 petition in bad faith after defaulting on a confirmed plan and the claimed changed circumstances were foreseeable.

Integon Life Insurance v. Mableton-Booper Associates (In Re Mableton-Booper Associates) · filed 1991-06-06(d)(1)

The Court concludes that Debtor did not make a sufficient showing of unanticipated changed circumstances to justify the filing of a new petition, and that the new filing was in bad faith. ... Accordingly, the Court finds cause for relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d), and Integon’s Motion is GRANTED.

Section 362 permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when legal title held by the debtor as trustee provides no benefit to the bankruptcy estate.

Chase Manhattan Bank v. Walt Robbins, Inc. (In Re Walt Robbins, Inc.) · filed 1991-06-07(d)(1)

However, since this bankruptcy estate receives no benefit from this legal interest, the court finds that cause exists to grant Chase’s request for relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause to let a former spouse litigate nondischargeability in state court when the balance of harm favors that forum and the litigation will not affect estate administration.

In Re Moralez · filed 1991-06-25(d)(1)

Therefore, the balance of harm weighs in favor of allowing Mrs. Moralez to proceed with her claim in state court. ... Nothing suggests that litigating this nondischargeability issue in state court will have any effect on the administration of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. ... For these reasons, the motion to lift stay is granted.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a debtor fails to honor a payment stipulation with a secured creditor.

In Re Leonard and Jeanette Wieseler, Debtors. Production Credit Association of the Midlands v. Leonard and Jeanette Wies · filed 1991-07-08(d)(1)

In this case, the question presented is whether debtors’ failure to honor a settlement requiring them to pay their debts constitutes “cause” for lifting the stay under § 362(d)(1). ... In sum, we hold that as a matter of justice and equity, the bankruptcy court should have lifted the bankruptcy stay when it did so, and should never have vacated its order lifting the stay.

A debtor’s failure to comply with a chapter 12 plan can constitute cause for relief from the automatic stay.

Wilfred REINBOLD, Appellant, v. DEWEY COUNTY BANK, Appellee · filed 1991-08-27(d)(1)

Reinbold’s failure to comply with his chapter 12 plan supports ... the bankruptcy court’s decision to grant DCB relief from the automatic stay for cause under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when creditors barred from asserting claims in the bankruptcy case have a pending prepetition lawsuit against the debtor.

Matter of Thomson McKinnon, Inc. · filed 1991-08-28(d)(1)

The movants have established that cause exists for relief from the automatic stay. First, they are barred from asserting their claim in this court. Second, they have a pending prepetition lawsuit against the debtor for the same claims they wish to assert in this court and that lawsuit may be removed to this court.

Section 362(d)(1) permits modification of the automatic stay for cause, including lack of adequate protection.

In Re Feimer · filed 1991-09-24(d)(1)

Based upon the reasons already provided and upon the remaining facts of this case, the automatic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362 should be modified for cause, including lack of adequate protection.

Section 362(d)(1) permits the stay to remain in place when a shareholder seeking a state-court stock valuation has not shown extraordinary circumstances justifying relief for cause.

In Re I. Burack, Inc. · filed 1991-10-16(d)(1)

The plaintiff has not established extraordinary circumstances justifying relief from the automatic stay for cause pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) so as to be authorized to proceed to complete a state court stock valuation proceeding with respect to the plaintiff’s equity interest in the debtor corporation.

Section 362(d)(1) requires a court to consider the Curtis factors when deciding whether a movant has shown cause to lift the automatic stay.

United States v. Northland Associates, Inc. (In Re Abrantes Construction Corp.) · filed 1991-10-18(d)(1)

After In re Sonnax, there is no doubt that a court’s determination of whether a movant has met its burden of proof on the issue of “cause” must include an analysis of the Curtis factors.

A creditor’s preserved right to set off mutual prepetition debts can constitute cause for relief from the automatic stay.

United States Ex Rel. Internal Revenue Service v. Orlinski (In Re Orlinski) · filed 1991-12-16(d)(1)

Accordingly, I find the IRS’s right of setoff, preserved by § 553(a), is “cause” for relief from stay to permit the setoff.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for a bad faith bankruptcy filing and gives effect to a debtor’s prepetition agreement to allow stay relief.

In Re Club Tower L.P. · filed 1991-12-26(d)(1)

A bad faith filing of a bankruptcy petition constitutes “cause” justifying relief from the automatic stay under Section 362(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. ... Pre-petition agreements regarding relief from stay are enforceable in bankruptcy.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a debtor uses the stay to prolong occupation of property while pursuing other litigation instead of using bankruptcy procedures to sell it.

In Re De Kleinman · filed 1992-01-15(d)(1)

With respect to Apartment 26A, this court reaffirms its ruling that it is required to lift the automatic stay for cause under Bankruptcy Code § 362(d)(1). ... This court is not disposed to allow the Debtor to brandish the 1987 ruling as a shield to repel common charges and debt service obligations and the automatic stay as a sword to prolong occupation of the Apartment 26A. The non-bankruptcy liti-gations are in an advanced stage and should be allowed to run their respective courses unfettered by the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) allows relief from the automatic stay for cause to complete a prepetition foreclosure sale by reuniting legal and equitable title in the purchaser.

Community Development Administration v. De Souza (In Re De Souza) · filed 1992-01-31(d)(1)

Movant seeks to complete the transfer of legal title with relation back to the date of the foreclosure sale. The court finds that cause exists to lift the stay, namely, the need to reunite legal and equitable title in the hands of the foreclosure purchaser.

A Chapter 11 petition filed in bad faith constitutes cause for relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d)(1).

RCO Investment Co. v. Belair 301-50 S.W. Quadrant Commercial Properties, Inc. · filed 1992-02-14(d)(1)

Although neither statute includes an express requirement of good faith, the lack of good faith in filing a petition under Chapter 11 constitutes “cause” under both § 1112(b) and § 362(d)(1).

Section 362(d)(1) permits modification of the automatic stay for cause when a debtor retains only a bare possessory interest after a valid prepetition forfeiture of the debtor’s equitable interest in real property.

In Re Layton · filed 1992-03-17(d)(1)

Because she has no remaining equitable interest in the property, other than a bare possessory interest, and VA properly declared its forfeiture approximately six months before this Chapter 13 petition was filed, cause has been shown to modify the automatic stay pursuant to section 362(d)(1).

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when existing state court proceedings can resolve the dispute more efficiently and lifting the stay will not prejudice the bankruptcy estate.

Hohol v. Essex Industries, Inc. (In Re Hohol) · filed 1992-04-08(d)(1)

The instant action is within the line of cases finding cause to grant relief from the automatic stay. ... In light of the extensive proceedings already undertaken in the Court of Common Pleas and Hohol’s failure to point to any reason why that Court cannot render a competent decision, the Court of Common Pleas would “more economically, conveniently, and quickly” resolve the present dispute. ... Moreover, Hohol has not shown that the bankruptcy estate would be prejudiced by the lifting of the stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a court to lift the automatic stay for cause after considering state-law expertise, judicial economy, and whether the bankruptcy estate can be protected.

In Re Harry C. Robbins, a Single Person, Debtor. Revalle Robbins v. Robbins · filed 1992-05-27(d)(1)

The factors that courts consider in deciding whether to lift the automatic stay include (1) whether the issues in the pending litigation involve only state law, so the expertise of the bankruptcy court is unnecessary; (2) whether modifying the stay will promote judicial economy and whether there would be greater interference with the bankruptcy case if the stay were not lifted because matters would have to be litigated in bankruptcy court; and (3) whether the estate can be protected properly by a requirement that creditors seek enforcement of any judgment through the bankruptcy court.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause so pending litigation against the debtor may proceed to judgment, while execution remains stayed until further court order.

In Re Anton · filed 1992-06-24(d)(1)

The Court is granting the relief requested by the Movants and is lifting the automatic stay, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to permit the District Court case to proceed against Anton up to, but not including, execution on any judgment against him.

Section 362(d)(1) uses a cause requirement for relief from the automatic stay that is substantively the same as the cause requirement for dismissal under § 1112(b).

In re Belair 301-50 S.W. Quadrant Commercial Properties, Inc. · filed 1992-08-17(d)(1)

The cause requirement for dismissal under § 1112(b) is not substantively different from the cause requirement for relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d)(1).

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a debtor cannot meet partnership capital calls and continued protection shifts the financial burden to the other partners.

Breeden v. Catron (In Re Catron) · filed 1992-09-07(d)(1)

The final issue is whether there is cause for lifting the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). Here the evidence shows that the debtor failed twice prepetition to meet his obligation to respond to capital calls and that he has no likelihood of meeting future capital calls. ... Accordingly, I find that the burden left upon the remaining partners sufficiently establishes cause under § 365(d)(1) for lifting the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits lifting the stay to enforce a noncompete injunction when delay would outlast the covenant and the creditor’s resulting harm outweighs harm to the debtor.

Matter of Udell · filed 1992-09-17(d)(1)

An obligation capable of being enforced will no longer exist if the court requires Carpetland to wait until the debtor receives his discharge and the stay terminates as a matter of law. ... Thus, Carpetland can only receive the benefit of its bargain with the debtor if the court lifts the stay now. ... As a result, this court concludes that the potential harm to Carpetland by continuing the stay outweighs the potential harm to the debtor which may flow from terminating it.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause so a probate receiver or administrator can pay estate debts and expenses without separate stay-relief motions from individual creditors.

Murray v. Mares (In Re Murray) · filed 1992-09-23(d)(1)

Accordingly, to the extent that property of the late Mr. Murray's estate may constitute property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, the court finds cause exists to grant relief from stay for the purpose of allowing the temporary special receiver and any subsequent administrator of the estate to proceed according to Virginia law with the payment of estate debts and expenses. Individual creditors of Mr. Murray’s estate need not bring separate and individual motions for relief.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when debtors possess property without contractual justification after their interest terminated before bankruptcy.

Miller v. Romberger (In Re Romberger) · filed 1992-10-14(d)(1)

In accordance with our consideration of the record, this Court finds that cause exists under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to grant relief from the automatic stay inasmuch as the debtors are merely in possession of the premises without any contractual justification for same.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause to allow a party to seek interpretation and enforcement of a prepetition state court judgment in state court.

In Re Gene E. Wade Joyzelle I. Wade, Debtors. E. Gene Wade Joyzelle I. Wade v. United Development, Inc. · filed 1992-11-10(d)(1)

Here, the bankruptcy court's order did not address the merits of UDI's claims. It merely allowed UDI to seek interpretation and enforcement of a state court judgment, rendered prior to the Wades' bankruptcy petition, in state court. Given these circumstances, the BAP correctly determined that cause existed to lift the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits modifying the automatic stay for cause to allow a landlord’s mortgagee to pursue foreclosure affecting a debtor-tenant’s subordinated lease, while delaying enforcement.

Matter of Village Rathskeller, Inc. · filed 1992-11-20(d)(1)

There are several factors which lead me to believe that cause exists for modification of the automatic stay. First, the debtor assumed the lease containing the subordination clause. Second, the subordination clause is enforceable. Third, the mortgagee cannot complete its foreclosure of the landlord's building absent relief from the stay. Fourth, the building is not marketable, or is worth little, with the lease in place. ... Accordingly, I will modify the stay to allow the foreclosure to proceed up to the point of judgment. No enforcement may be had until the earlier of vacation of the premises by the Village Gate or April 30, 1993.

Section 362(d)(1) permits termination of the automatic stay for cause when a debtor has only a tenuous possessory interest and the stay has prolonged interference with a creditor’s property rights.

Grimes v. Green Point Savings Bank (In Re Grimes) · filed 1992-11-20(d)(1)

Ms. Grimes’ scintilla of a property interest, coupled with the protracted frustration of Green Point’s state law property rights, constitute “cause” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) for termination of the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause to be limited to termination of a servicing agreement upon payment of a contractually required termination fee.

In re Commonwealth Mortgage Co. · filed 1992-12-03(d)(1)

The motion for relief from stay will be granted to the extent of allowing CHFA to cancel the Servicing Agreement, if it so desires, upon payment of the fee provided.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a bankruptcy case was filed in bad faith.

In Re Ocean Beach Properties · filed 1992-12-08(d)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds that these cases were filed in bad faith, that there is, therefore, cause to lift the automatic stay, and the motion to lift stay is granted.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when the debtor proceeds in bad faith.

Grand Traverse Development Co. v. Board of Trustees of the General Retirement System (In Re Grand Traverse Development C · filed 1993-02-08(d)(1)

The court now moves to § 362(d)(1), the question of whether lift of stay is appropriate for cause. The court concludes that lift of stay is indeed appropriate for cause, that cause being the Debtors’ bad faith.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for bad faith, assessed under the totality of the circumstances, including the debtor’s conduct after filing.

In Re Grand Traverse Dev. Co. Ltd. Partnership · filed 1993-02-16(d)(1)

“Bad faith” is a grounds for lifting the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), which provides that the Section 362(a) automatic stay can be lifted for cause. ... It would have been inappropriate and contrary to the requirement that bad faith is to be determined by looking at the totality of circumstances for the bankruptcy court to focus, as Debtors insist, on the instant that the latest bankruptcy filing occurred — or even upon a specific later event. The bankruptcy court appropriately considered the actions of Debtors in the course of the bankruptcy proceeding as well as their initial status.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause so a pending state court defamation action may proceed to judgment, without allowing execution on that judgment pending further bankruptcy court determination.

Roberts v. Goidel (In Re Goidel) · filed 1993-02-17(d)(1)

In furtherance of this procedure, the automatic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) shall be lifted for cause, as expressed in 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), so that Bonnie Roberts may proceed with her state court defamation action to judgment, but there shall be no execution on any such judgment pending further determination by this court.

Section 362(d)(1) permits lifting the automatic stay for cause when a debtor fails to make regular mortgage payments as they become due.

In Re Taylor · filed 1993-03-09(d)(1)

A debtor’s failure to make regular mortgage payments as they become due constitutes sufficient “cause” to lift the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) generally permits relief from the automatic stay for a secured creditor in a Chapter 7 case when the creditor has a valid security interest and the debtor is not making payments.

In Re O'Hara Bros., Inc. · filed 1993-03-15(d)(1)

Proof of a valid security interest plus an absence of payments generally entitles a secured creditor to relief from the automatic stay to recover secured property from a Chapter 7 debtor pursuant to § 362(d)(1).

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when judicial economy and serious health and welfare concerns favor continuation of an administrative proceeding.

Finfrock v. Interco Inc. (In Re Interco Inc.) · filed 1993-04-27(d)(1)

In addition to these general principles of judicial economy, the Court must consider the specific circumstances that have been presented by the Movant in this case. There are very significant health and welfare concerns in that Movant suffers from AIDS. This Court finds that, although the automatic stay applies here, cause has been shown to exist such that relief from the stay is appropriate.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a debtor files in bad faith, lacking both the objective ability and subjective intent to reorganize.

Mueller v. Sparklet Devices, Inc. (In Re Sparklet Devices, Inc.) · filed 1993-04-30(d)(1)

Lacking both the objective ability and subjective intent to reorganize, the Court finds that “cause” exists under § 362(d)(1) to lift the stay to permit Mr. Mueller to return to state court and proceed under the order of specific performance.

Under § 362(d)(1), the party seeking relief from the automatic stay must make a prima facie showing of cause before the debtor must demonstrate adequate protection.

In Re Phoenix Pipe & Tube, L.P. · filed 1993-05-19(d)(1)

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) provides that relief from the automatic stay may be granted upon the showing of “cause.” Bell, movant herein, bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of cause, at which point the burden of proof shifts to debtor to demonstrate adequate protection.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when prolonged family court litigation and that court’s familiarity with its own order favor letting it resolve marital property and debt issues.

In Re Schweikart · filed 1993-05-28(d)(1)

In this case, we find that cause exists, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), to grant Ms. Sehweikart’s motion, given the protracted litigation that has already taken place in the Family Court, and its familiarity with this particular case, its experience in such matters, and the fact that the resolution of these issues involves an inquiry into the intent behind its December 16, 1987 Order.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause to let a pending nonbankruptcy trial determine the debtor’s liability when doing so will not jeopardize the estate and may assist formulation of a Chapter 12 plan.

Agribank v. Fay (In Re Fay) · filed 1993-07-02(d)(1)

Relief from the automatic stay may be granted for, among other reasons, cause. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). ... Based on the record presented in this expedited proceeding, the Court has determined that allowing the nonbankruptcy proceeding to go forward will not jeopardize the bankruptcy estate in that collection of any judgment that may be entered against the Debtor will be subject to further order of the Bankruptcy Court. In fact, allowing the nonbankruptcy matter to proceed may assist the parties in the formulation of the Chapter 12 plan. ... The Court has determined that cause exists to grant this request for relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) requires a court to grant relief from the automatic stay when cause exists.

Goya Foods, Inc. v. Unanue-Casal (In Re Unanue-Casal) · filed 1993-08-03(d)(1)

Section 362(d) directs the court to grant relief from the stay for cause by using the word “shall.”

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a debtor fails to adequately protect partners who must bear the debtor’s share of partnership funding.

Breeden v. Catron (In Re Catron) · filed 1993-08-20(d)(1)

The court agrees with the reasoning expounded by the bankruptcy court. Appellant Catron has not provided adequate protection to his partners. Rather, he is attempting to ride “piggyback” on their financial resources. Accordingly, the court FINDS that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion and AFFIRMS that court’s decision to lift the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a Chapter 11 petition was filed in bad faith.

First American Bank of Georgia v. Coastal Nursing Center, Inc. (Coastal Nursing Center, Inc.) · filed 1993-08-25(d)(1)

A Chapter 11 petition filed in bad faith may be “cause” for a court to grant relief from the automatic stay under section 362(d)(1), as well as for dismissal of a case under section 1112 of the Code.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a failed reorganization and a proposed sale to a secured creditor would leave post-petition municipal property taxes unpaid.

Matter of Henry · filed 1993-09-15(d)(1)

Thus, based on ah of the above, the court concludes that the borough has satisfied the requirement of “cause” necessary to grant relief from the stay pursuant to § 362(d)(1).

Relief from the automatic stay to enter a state court judgment is unwarranted when that judgment cannot preclude relitigation of dischargeability issues.

Outlaw v. Cuffey (In Re Cuffey) · filed 1993-09-29(d)(1)

Since the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable, there is no basis at the present time to allow the state court case to proceed. Therefore, an order will be entered denying plaintiffs’ motion for relief from stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits modification of the automatic stay for cause, including lack of adequate protection when the debtors cannot obtain the proposed Chapter 13 relief and the original mortgagors have abandoned their interest in the property.

In Re Threats · filed 1993-10-05(d)(1)

Because the Debtors are not entitled to the relief they seek in their proposed plan, and the Mortgagors have abandoned their interest in the property, the Court finds that Fleet’s interest is not adequately protected. Just cause exists therefore to modify the stay to allow it to proceed to foreclosure.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when bankruptcy leaves a creditor receiving less than its bargain without a remedy.

In Re Food Barn Stores, Inc. · filed 1993-10-13(d)(1)

This Court interprets the phrase “for cause” to mean any reason whereby a creditor is receiving less than his bargain from a debtor and is without a remedy because of the bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 362(d) permits lifting the automatic stay when a bad faith Chapter 11 filing places a single asset in a new debtor and deprives a secured creditor of access to the original debtor’s other assets.

In Re Schmitt Farm Partnership · filed 1993-11-15(d)

Judge James did suggest that principle as a possible alternate ground for his decision — and this Court does more: It expressly finds that doctrine separately supports the lifting of the stay. Schmitt Farm’s very creation, when followed by its Chapter 11 filing, operated to deprive USAA of access to the millions of dollars of equity in Orchard Valley if USAA could not recover full payment out of the proceeds of sale of the Property — an access that USAA would have had in the event of an Orchard Valley Chapter 11 filing, the only other way in which USAA’s foreclosure action could have been forestalled.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause; once a creditor makes a prima facie showing of cause, the debtor bears the burden of showing adequate protection through equity in the secured property.

Blackwell v. GMAC (In Re Blackwell) · filed 1993-12-08(d)(1)

Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence to support Judge Twardowski’s conclusion that GMAC Mortgage had made out a prima facie case that cause to set aside the stay existed and to shift to the appellant debtor the burden of proving that his creditors had adequate protection by virtue of the amount of his equity in the secured property.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay so an at-will licensor acting in good faith can serve notice and recover possession after a debtor’s license has expired.

In Re MJ & K. Co., Inc. · filed 1993-12-10(d)(1)

Under these facts, and as a licensor at will, it cannot be required to continue its business relationship with Debt- or. Accordingly, it is entitled to relief from the automatic stay to serve the Proposed Notice ... and take appropriate steps to recover possession of the Premises.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a bankruptcy petition is filed in bad faith.

Manhattan King David Restaurant Inc. v. Levine · filed 1993-12-14(d)(1)

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Receiver demonstrated cause for lifting the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). ... Numerous cases have found a lack of good faith in filing a bankruptcy petition to constitute “cause” for lifting the stay. ... On these facts, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in finding a bad faith filing.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when abusive repeat bankruptcy filings are coupled with disregard of legal duties, such as filing tax returns.

Internal Revenue Service v. Bacha · filed 1993-12-29(d)(1)

Certainly, abusive, repetitive, filings of bankruptcy cases when coupled with utter disregard for other legally required duties, such as filing of tax returns, may form the basis for a finding that cause exists for relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause, including a debtor’s lack of equity, failure to make post-petition mortgage payments, or inadequate protection of a creditor’s interest in the property.

In Re Robert H. Landry, Debtor-Appellant. Robert H. Landry v. Chevy Chase Federal Savings Bank and David Skelton, Truste · filed 1994-01-20(d)

Under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(d), the bankruptcy court can grant relief from the automatic stay "for cause." Cause includes a debtor's lack of equity in a property, debtor's failure to make post-petition mortgage payments, and inadequate protection of a creditor's interest in the property.

Section 362(d)(1) requires courts deciding whether cause exists to lift the automatic stay to balance the moving party’s potential hardship against prejudice to the debtor and the estate.

Internal Revenue Service v. Robinson (In Re Robinson) · filed 1994-03-14(d)(1)

In deciding whether “cause” has been shown, the bankruptcy court must balance the potential hardship that will be incurred by the party seeking relief if the automatic stay is not lifted, against the potential prejudice to the debtor and the debt- or’s estate.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause to let a creditor pursue its claim in the proper forum.

In re Solkow · filed 1994-03-28(d)(1)

Finally, there is cause to modify the automatic stay to allow Shearson to prosecute its claim in the proper forum. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1994).

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a bankruptcy case was filed in bad faith.

In Re Maurice · filed 1994-03-31(d)(1)

The Court’s finding that this case was filed in bad faith constitutes further “cause” under section 362(d)(1) for lifting the stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits modification of the automatic stay for cause when allowing a state court appeal to proceed promotes judicial economy and avoids inconsistent rulings.

Metz v. Poughkeepsie Savings Bank, FSB (In Re Metz) · filed 1994-04-12(d)(1)

It would be very prudent to modify the automatic stay to promote judicial economy and prevent possibly inconsistent rulings.

Section 362(d)(1) permits modification of the automatic stay for cause when allowing a pending state court action to proceed will not greatly prejudice the estate, the creditor faces greater hardship from maintaining the stay, and the creditor shows a probability of success.

In Re South Oakes Furniture, Inc. · filed 1994-05-12(d)(1)

Having found that the elements of the Pro Football test are satisfied, the Court further finds that Movant has carried its burden of showing “cause” for modification of the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause so a creditor can pursue a state-court appeal resolving unsettled receivership issues while the bankruptcy proceeding is suspended.

In Re Milestone Educational Institute, Inc. · filed 1994-05-25(d)(1)

The Court finds that allowance of Milton’s motion for relief from stay for cause and concomitant suspension of all activity in this case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 305 will preserve the bankruptcy petition filing date for purposes of bringing preference actions, while permitting the Massachusetts Appeals Court to review the Superior Court’s order and address novel and unsettled issues of receivership law that may include 1) whether a state court receiver can be empowered to commence a bankruptcy case for the corporation in the absence of consent by the directors; and 2) if so, whether a receiver can be empowered to act on behalf of a corporation and a debtor in a bankruptcy case in all respects so it is clear that the corporation not the receivership is the debtor.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a claimant seeks to litigate state law claims in state court.

In re Judkins · filed 1994-06-10(d)(1)

Cause may exist where the party requesting relief from the automatic stay seeks to litigate state law claims in state court.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when the equities favor allowing a pending lawsuit to proceed in another forum to liquidate a claim.

Smith v. Tricare Rehabilitation Systems, Inc. (In Re Tricare Rehabilitation Systems, Inc.) · filed 1994-06-16(d)(1)

Section 362(d) of Title 11 of the U.S.Code provides that the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the automatic stay for “cause.” “Cause” for granting relief from the stay may exist if the equities in a particular case dictate that a lawsuit, or some other similar pending action, should proceed in a forum other than the bankruptcy court for the purpose of liquidating the claim upon which the lawsuit is premised.

Section 362(d)(1) requires an unsecured creditor seeking relief from the automatic stay to show that the balance of hardships favors relief when it has no security or other special interest in the debtor’s property.

In Re Weatherley · filed 1994-07-22(d)(1)

Failing to establish its security or other special interest in the Debtor’s property against which it wished to proceed, the IRS was obliged to establish, in the role of an unsecured creditor, that the balance of hardships tipped in its favor to entitle it to relief under § 362(d)(1).

Section 362(d) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when the debtor’s propensity to evade taxes and dissipate assets threatens collection.

In the Matter of Guy E. McGaughey Jr., Debtor-Appellant · filed 1994-07-22(d)

The singularly relevant matter is Debtor’s propensity to evade taxes and dissipate his assets. Therefore, giving due deference to the district court’s findings regarding Debt- or’s behavior, we must conclude that notwithstanding any superfluous discussion of non-dischargeability, the court did not abuse its discretion. The decision of the court to partially lift the automatic stay is affirmed.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when continuing a prepetition eviction suit has no connection with the bankruptcy case and will not prejudice creditors or the trustee.

In Re Touloumis · filed 1994-08-11(d)(1)

Under these circumstances, the landlord has made a prima facie showing that cause exists under Section 362(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code to grant relief from the stay to permit the landlord to continue its pre-petition litigation against the Debtor. The lease lacks any connection with the Debtor’s bankruptcy case and the litigation in state court will have no prejudice on or afreet the interests of either the creditors or the trustee.

Section 362(d)(1) generally permits relief from the automatic stay to continue litigation when the stay prevents a judgment creditor from collecting from a third party and no other source of payment exists.

In Re Keene Corp. · filed 1994-08-11(d)(1)

Where the continuation of the stay deprives the judgment creditor of the opportunity to collect the judgment from a third party — and no other sources of collection exist — a court will generally lift the stay to permit the litigation to continue.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a court to lift the automatic stay for cause to distribute marital property when the estate retains enough assets to pay all creditors in full.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 76,048 Edward N. Claughton, Jr. v. Mixson · filed 1994-08-17(d)(1)

Applying section 362(d)(1), the bankruptcy court concluded that “cause” existed to lift the stay to allow Mixson to receive the marital property awarded to her by the Florida state court because the debtor’s estate contained assets of sufficient value to pay in full all of its creditors even after distribution of the marital property to Mixson. We find that the bankruptcy court, in making this decision, properly exercised the discretion granted to it pursuant to section 362(d)(1).

Section 362(d)(1) does not provide cause to lift the stay based on alleged bad faith when the creditor fails to prove bad faith and its interest remains adequately protected.

In Re Bellevue Place Associates · filed 1994-08-29(d)(1)

The Bank stipulates that it is un-dersecured, and there is no evidence indicating that its interest in the Hotel is diminishing in value or is not otherwise adequately protected. Furthermore, there is no “cause” to grant relief from the stay in light of this Court’s earlier findings that the Bank has not met its burden of showing that the petition was filed in bad faith.

Section 362(d)(1) does not permit relief from the automatic stay for cause when the creditor is adequately protected and the debtor can modify the creditor’s surviving mortgage claim through a Chapter 12 plan.

In re Bunke · filed 1994-09-01(d)(1)

The parties having stipulated that FCBO’s interest is adequately protected and the Court having found that Debtor’s mortgage relationship with FCBO still exists and may be modified under 11 U.S.C. § 1222(b)(2), the Court concludes FCBO has not shown cause for relief from the automatic stay.

A debtor’s lack of good faith in filing a bankruptcy petition constitutes cause to lift the automatic stay under § 362(d)(1).

In Re Laguna Associates Limited Partnership, Debtor. Laguna Associates Limited Partnership v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co · filed 1994-09-09(d)(1)

Because we see no substantive difference between the cause requirement for dismissal of a petition under Section 1112(b) ... and the cause requirement for relief from an automatic stay under Section 362(d)(1), it necessarily follows under this Court’s eases that a lack of good faith constitutes “cause” for lifting an automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for missed Chapter 13 mortgage payments, subject to a deadline for the debtor to cure the default.

In re Wade · filed 1994-10-12(d)(1)

Viewing the totality of circumstances in this case, this Court will deny Monroe’s Motion for Relief from Stay, subject to Debtor’s curing all late payments by October 17,1994. If said payments are not made by this time, Monroe’s Motion will be reinstated and granted without further notice to Debtor or opportunity for a hearing.

A debtor’s failure to comply with section 521(2) is a prima facie basis for cause to grant a secured creditor relief from the automatic stay.

In Re Weir · filed 1994-10-18(d)(1)

Violation of section 521(2) serves as a prima facie basis for a finding of cause for relief from stay.

A creditor that establishes a right to setoff under § 553(a) makes a prima facie showing of cause for relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d)(1).

In Re Whitaker · filed 1994-10-20(d)(1)

By establishing its right to setoff under 11 U.S.C. § 553(a), a creditor makes a prima facie showing of “cause” for relief from stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause to let a state court resolve a disputed claim when judicial economy favors that forum, while leaving collection of any judgment stayed.

In Re Neal · filed 1994-11-02(d)(1)

Accordingly, in the interests of judicial economy, Hainline is granted relief from stay to pursue final resolution of the battery claim in state court. The final decree or judgment rendered by the state court shall be determinative of the amount Hainline’s claim for battery. Hainline is not granted relief from stay to collect any judgment rendered in the tort proceeding.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when abstention is appropriate so that a state court action may proceed.

Benedor Corp. v. Conejo Enterprises, Inc. (In Re Conejo Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 1994-11-16(d)(1)

Since abstention is appropriate, cause clearly exists for granting relief from the automatic stay. Consequently, the Court finds that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in denying relief.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for debtor misconduct as cause, even without a lack of adequate protection.

In re Madison Hotel Corp. · filed 1994-11-23(d)(1)

Debtor misconduct can constitute cause under § 362(d)(1).

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause after weighing relevant factors and the hardships to the parties.

Burger Boys, Inc. v. South Street Seaport Ltd. Partnership (In Re Burger Boys, Inc.) · filed 1994-12-15(d)(1)

Because there is no evidence to support a conclusion that the Bankruptcy Court erred in weighing the Curtis factors or balancing the hardships to the parties, the Order of the Bankruptcy Court granting relief from the automatic stay was proper.

Section 362(d)(1) allows relief from the automatic stay for cause, assessed by weighing the parties’ hardships and the Bankruptcy Code’s goals, including whether relief benefits the debtor.

In the Matter of C & S Grain Company, Incorporated, Debtor-Appellant · filed 1995-03-08(d)(1)

In determining whether cause exists, the bankruptcy court should base its decision on the hardships imposed on the parties with an eye towards the overall goals of the Bankruptcy Code. ... Among the permissible justifications for modifying the stay is whether such action will benefit the debtor.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause despite ordinary litigation costs to the bankruptcy estate.

Santa Clara County Fair Ass'n v. Sanders (In Re Santa Clara County Fair Ass'n) · filed 1995-04-05(d)(1)

Ordinarily, litigation costs to a bankruptcy estate do not compel a court to deny stay relief.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition in bad faith.

In Re Kornhauser · filed 1995-04-11(d)(1)

With further reference to Section 362(d)(1), it is well settled that a bad faith filing constitutes “cause” for relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a debtor breaches a court-approved stipulation barring delay of foreclosure or fails to meet Chapter 13 eligibility requirements.

In re Brumlik · filed 1995-04-11(d)(1)

City National established “cause” for granting relief from the stay by demonstrating the Debtor’s breach of the Stipulation’s provisions precluding any action to delay a foreclosure sale beyond November 21, 1994, and by the Debtor’s violation of the Order requiring the parties to comply with the terms of the Stipulation. In addition, failure to meet the eligibility requirements for filing for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code constitutes “cause” for granting relief from the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). The movant establishing “cause” for relief from the stay, the burden shifted to the Debtor, who failed to demonstrate he is entitled to protection of the automatic stay.

Section 362(d) permits a court to lift the automatic stay for cause so divorce proceedings and related appeals may continue and a final divorce decree may be recorded.

Chunn v. Chunn (In Re Chunn) · filed 1995-04-14(d)(1), (2)

Cause exists, pursuant to Section 11 U.S.C. Section 362(d)(1), (2), to permit lifting of the stay for purposes of continued prosecution of the state court action and any and all appeals in connection therewith, and for purposes of permitting the filing of the Final Decree of Divorce in the Real Property Records of Fort Bend and Harris Counties, Texas.

Section 362(d)(1) does not supply cause to lift the stay for a state equitable distribution action filed after bankruptcy when that action cannot change the estate’s existing interest in the marital property.

Roberge v. Roberge (In Re Roberge) · filed 1995-04-25(d)(1)

Such a finding, quite simply, would have no effect on this Court, given that the Debtor’s 50% interest in the Florida property is now, and has been since the date of the petition, a part of the bankruptcy estate. As of the date of the bankruptcy petition, no equitable distribution proceeding had been instituted by Mrs. Roberge. ... Accordingly, this Court finds that cause does not exist to justify relief from the automatic stay in this instance.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a debtor promptly refiles after dismissal to challenge the prior bankruptcy orders and abuse the bankruptcy process.

In re Kennedy · filed 1995-05-02(d)(1)

I conclude that cause exists to lift the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(d)(1). Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the refiling of bankruptcy within four days of dismissal of the predecessor case amounts to an impermissible collateral challenge to the orders of the bankruptcy court and an abuse of the bankruptcy process.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause so a state agency can distribute funds to grain claimants with established interests in those funds.

In Re Childress · filed 1995-05-25(d)(1)

The Court finds that cause exists under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to lift the automatic stay to allow the Department to distribute the funds in its possession to the grain claimants listed in the Childresses’ bankruptcy schedules in accordance with an appropriate state court order.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause, which can include a debtor’s bad-faith bankruptcy filing.

In Re Trident Associates Limited Partnership · filed 1995-05-25(d)(1)

The bankruptcy court may lift the automatic stay "for cause." Sec. 362(d)(1). Under Sec. 1112(b), a court may dismiss a Chapter 11 petition "for cause." Neither Sec. 362(d) nor Sec. 1112(b) define "cause," so "courts must determine whether discretionary relief is appropriate on a case-by-case basis." In re Laguna Associates, 30 F.3d at 737. Under both of these sections, bad faith can constitute cause.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay when a creditor lacks adequate protection or the debtor filed the petition in bad faith.

In Re Eatman · filed 1995-05-26(d)(1)

In conclusion, the Condominium has demonstrated that it is entitled to relief from the automatic stay, not merely because it lacks adequate protection, but also because the debtor filed his petition in bad faith.

Section 362(d)(1) requires a party seeking modification of the automatic stay to demonstrate cause.

In Re Spectrum Information Technologies, Inc. · filed 1995-06-22(d)(1)

Thus, in order to warrant modification of the stay, Home must demonstrate that cause exists therefor.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause to pursue litigation against the debtor in another court; cause is assessed case by case.

In re Kansas Psychiatric Institutes, Inc. · filed 1995-07-13(d)(1)

However, the stay may be modified “for cause” to allow commencement or resolution of non-bankruptcy actions against the debtor. ... Section 362(d)(1) does not define “cause” and courts are required to consider this issue on a case-by-ease basis.

Section 362(d)(1) allows a court deciding whether cause warrants stay relief to consider the debtor’s prospects for effective reorganization and the equity in the property.

In Re Darrell Creek Associates, L.P. · filed 1995-07-28(d)(1)

For all of these reasons, this Court concludes that the Debtor has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood of an effective reorganization. The many factors considered by the Court and discussed above have to be considered in the context of the level of protection afforded Wachovia by the value of the subject property. If this Court had been convinced that there was significant equity in the property, it would have given the Court great pause to grant relief from the stay for cause under § 362(d)(1) at this stage of the case.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a court to lift the automatic stay for cause to allow a pending state court action to determine ownership of property claimed by the bankruptcy estate.

Stephens v. Meininger (In Re Credit Life Corp.) · filed 1995-08-01(d)(1)

In balancing the equities involved, this Court is satisfied that it is appropriate to lift the automatic stay in order to permit Appellant to pursue their claim that they are the rightful owner of life insurance policy no. 0420394252.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause to let a tax sale certificate holder obtain a tax deed after the debtor’s redemption period expires.

Milne v. Johnson (In Re Milne) · filed 1995-08-03(d)(1)

Regardless of whether Jackson or QF Finance provides the proper conceptualization, relief for cause from the automatic stay was proper.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a debtor cannot show a viable reorganization plan.

In Re Sims · filed 1995-08-30(d)(1)

The debtor has not sustained her burden of proof under Section 362(g)(2). The Court finds that “cause” exists and relief from the automatic stay is due to be granted under Section 362(d)(1).

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause, but a creditor has no cause to obtain a debtor’s promissory notes when the facts warrant neither an equitable lien nor a constructive trust over them.

In Re Texas State Optical, Inc. · filed 1995-09-13(d)(1)

In conclusion, the Court does not believe that the facts of this case warrant the imposition of an equitable lien or a constructive trust. Consequently, there is no cause for the modification of the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when limited state court filings preserve a potential claim against the debtor for pursuit after the bankruptcy proceedings.

Grant v. Thurston Group, Inc. · filed 1995-09-14(d)(1)

Allowing The Thurston Group, Inc. to ensure that it would have no timeliness problems if it were to seek to proceed in the state court following ... resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings is sufficient cause to grant relief from the stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits stay modification for cause beyond lack of adequate protection, but relief may be deferred when an intervening settlement could affect the creditor’s foreclosure rights.

Hudgins v. Security Bank of Whitesboro (In Re Hudgins) · filed 1995-10-06(d)(1)

“Cause” under § 362(d)(1) is not limited to those situations where the property of a party lacks adequate protection in the bankruptcy estate. ... Therefore, the Court does not believe it is appropriate to modify the automatic stay until such time as the Court determines how the “Settlement Agreement” was breached and how that breach might affect the validity of the bank’s foreclosure.

Relief from the automatic stay for cause cannot rest on mandatory abstention when the creditor’s claim is a core proceeding and mandatory abstention does not apply.

Benedor Corp. v. Conejo Enterprises · filed 1995-12-06(d)(1)

The district court concluded that because Benedor's state action was subject to mandatory abstention, there was cause to grant Benedor relief from the automatic stay. Because the district court premised its grant of relief on an erroneous interpretation of law, i.e., that Benedor's state action was a non-core proceeding, we hold that the district court abused its discretion by granting relief from the stay.

A debtor’s inability to invoke the automatic stay to block foreclosure of property she does not own and whose mortgage debt she does not owe supplies cause for relief from the stay under § 362(d)(1).

Ulster Savings Bank v. Kizelnik (In Re Kizelnik) · filed 1995-12-14(d)(1)

The Court’s conclusion that Kizelnik does not have the right to de-aceelerate and cure the Steins’ long-defaulted mortgage or to invoke the automatic stay to preclude USB from exercising its right to foreclose warrants either relief from the stay under section 362(d)(1) for “cause,” or dismissal of Kizelnik’s Chapter 13 case.

A technical default based only on a Chapter 7 filing does not constitute cause to terminate the automatic stay under § 362(d)(1).

In Re Boodrow · filed 1995-12-27(d)(1)

Thus, while the filing of a Chapter 7 petition may be an event of default under the prepetition loan documents, a “technical” default does not constitute “cause” under Code § 362(d)(1) warranting termination of the stay.

Section 362(d)(1) generally requires a secured creditor seeking relief from the automatic stay for cause to show that continuing the stay will cause it affirmative harm.

Capital Communications Federal Credit Union v. Boodrow · filed 1996-06-24(d)(1)

It is true that a creditor can obtain relief under Section 362(d) for “cause.” ... In general, however, there must be a showing that continuation of the stay will cause some affirmative harm to the secured creditor.