11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(d)(1) permits a bankruptcy court to annul an automatic stay for cause, including granting retroactive relief; Acevedo does not limit that authority.

Patel v. Patel · filed 2025-07-08(d)(1)

This appeal, in contrast, concerns section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, which grants bankruptcy courts the power to modify or annul a stay and permit another court or entity to exercise control over an asset or claim. ... Acevedo does not apply in this context.

Section 362(d) requires cause to annul an automatic stay retroactively; lack of equity alone need not establish cause when the debtor is current under a confirmed Chapter 13 plan.

In Re Smith · filed 2000-01-13(d)

While Smith has no equity in the real estate, I find that under the circumstances of this case, cause does not exist to annul the automatic stay at this time. I will deny Commercial’s motion for both retrospective and prospective relief from the automatic stay, without prejudice, in the event Smith defaults in either his post-petition payments to the mortgagees or his Chapter 13 plan payments to the Chapter 13 trustee.

Section 362(d)(1) allows a bankruptcy court to annul the automatic stay retroactively for cause when compelling circumstances justify relief.

In Re Webb · filed 2003-07-03(d)(1)

In light of the above analysis and a review of the law and facts in this case, the Court concludes that cause exists under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to annul the automatic stay. The Court finds that BOA has met its burden to demonstrate that compelling circumstances exist justifying retroactive annulment of the automatic stay. Therefore, BOA’s Motion will be granted and the foreclosure sale of the property conducted on April 29, 2003 will be ratified.

Section 362(d) authorizes a court in appropriate limited circumstances to annul the automatic stay, granting retroactive relief and validating an action that might otherwise be ineffective.

In Re Batton · filed 2004-04-13(d)

Specifically, § 362(d) authorizes the court, in appropriate limited circumstances, to annul the automatic stay, the effect of which is to grant retroactive relief and validate an action taken which might otherwise be of no effect.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a bankruptcy court to annul the automatic stay for cause after notice and a hearing.

In Re Pleasant · filed 2004-12-13(d)(1)

The court finds that the IRS is entitled to setoff, and this matter warrants the retroactive annulment of the stay as of March 21, 2004 so that the IRS’s action offsetting the Debtor’s 1995 income tax liability against his 2003 income tax overpayment is valid.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a court to annul an automatic stay retroactively for cause when enforcing it would serve no bankruptcy purpose and merely delay the creditor.

Schonscheck v. Deere & Co. (In re Schonscheck) · filed 2018-10-18(d)(1)

The court separately concludes that the stay should be annulled for cause, based on the facts and circumstances of this case, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).

Section 362(d) permits a bankruptcy court to annul the automatic stay for cause after considering the circumstances.

Crawford v. Hertzberg (In re Hertzberg) · filed 2014-11-04(d)

In addition, the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 is hereby annulled for purposes of the commencement, litigation, trial, and appeal (if any) of this adversary proceeding.

Section 362(d)(1) permits retroactive annulment of the automatic stay for cause, which may be established using the In re Robbins factors.

Kadlecek v. Schwank USA, Inc. · filed 2013-02-05(d)(1)

For the reasons stated, the court finds that the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that cause existed under section 362(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code to annul the automatic stay retroactively.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a bankruptcy court to annul the automatic stay so a foreclosure committee can pursue approval of a sale when the annulment order allows it.

U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Giblen · filed 2019-05-21(d)(1)

We reject the defendants’ contention that the sole purpose of the Bankruptcy Court’s annulment of the automatic stay was to permit the committee to recover fees and expenses.

Section 362(d) allows retroactive annulment of the automatic stay, making the stay inapplicable to the covered action from the bankruptcy petition date.

Ball C M, Inc. v. Cenci · filed 2020-05-05(d)

Put differently, the retroactive annulment under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) rendered the automatic stay inapplicable in the first instance, so it is irrelevant whether the RFS Order was issued before or after the filing of the ... NOR.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a court to annul the automatic stay retroactively for cause, considering the circumstances of the case.

Brian Michael Ferris · filed 2023-03-31(d)(1)

The Court thus opts to avoid needless delay and expense by granting retroactive stay relief. Not only is there cause to do so, but retroactive relief will prevent any unnecessary expenditure of the parties’ time and money and will preserve judicial resources.

Section 362(d) permits a court to annul the automatic stay even when the court assumes without deciding that the petition initially triggered it.

Flag Boy Properties, LLC v. Merriell · filed 2022-08-18(d)

The Court need not determine for purposes of this case whether the petition triggered the automatic stay, as, assuming without deciding that it did, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the undisputed facts support annulment of the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(d).

Section 362(d)(1) allows retroactive annulment of the automatic stay for cause.

POTTER v. CUMBERLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT · filed 2023-07-17(d)(1)

The automatic bankruptcy stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) may be terminated, annulled, modified, or may have conditions placed upon it “for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of [a] party in interest.” § 362(d)(1). ... It was thus not an abuse of discretion and must be affirmed.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a bankruptcy court to annul the automatic stay for cause after balancing the equities, including the creditor’s lack of notice and the prejudice that enforcing the stay would cause.

Brett L.A. Long · filed 2025-06-05(d)(1)

Case law requires a balancing of the equities in considering whether to annul a stay. Here, without question, the equities all run in favor of UCB. The stay must be annulled, and an order granting that relief to UCB will be entered.

Section 362(d)(4)(B) permits retroactive annulment of an automatic stay when multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property are part of a scheme to delay or hinder creditors; the creditor’s knowledge of the stay does not bar relief.

Cohen v. SN Servicing Corporation as servicer for U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee of the SCIG Series II · filed 2025-08-11(d)(4)(B)

Though the Bankruptcy Court did not cite § 362(d)(4)(B) in its Order, it set forth sufficient factual findings to satisfy the standards under that provision. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in confirming the absence of—and effectively annulling—the automatic stay arising from the 2024 Case.

Section 362’s automatic stay applies to a debtor’s exempt interest in property held as tenants by the entireties.

Sovran Bank, N.A. v. Darl Duane Anderson, Individually, and F/t/a Anderson Electronics and Engineering, and Dean W. Swor · filed 1984-09-11

We are of opinion the automatic stay provision of § 362 applies to the exempt entireties interest, and the parties recognize that rule.

Section 362 continues to protect exempt property held by the debtor from a creditor’s lien enforcement even after the property leaves the bankruptcy estate.

Allen v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. (In Re Hartley) · filed 1987-06-07(a)(5), (c)(1)-(2)

As stated previously, the mere fact that exempt property is no longer property of the estate for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1) does not remove such property from the protection afforded debtors under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) and (c)(2).

Section 362(a)(2) stays enforcement of a prepetition judgment against property the debtor holds as a tenant by the entirety; a foreclosure sale that violates the stay is void.

In Re Cynthia WARD, Debtor-Appellee. Appeal of BOWEST CORPORATION · filed 1988-01-15(a)(2)

Accordingly, when Charles Ward filed his petition on January 9, 1986, the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) operated to stay any action that would affect property which he held as a tenant by the entirety. ... The foreclosure sale conducted by the Camden County sheriff was just such a stayed action. Since the sale was conducted in violation of the stay, it was void and without effect.

Section 362 protects a residence that remains property of the estate even when the debtor has claimed an exemption for part of its value.

In Re Barksdale · filed 2002-07-23(a)

Because the court finds that the residential real estate is property of the estate, even though the debtor has claimed an exemption for part of the value thereof, Ms. Bridgers’ motion for relief from the automatic stay must be denied.

Section 362(a)(4) stays acts to create, perfect, or enforce liens against estate property; the stay does not bar a mortgage on a homestead exempt from the bankruptcy estate.

Tribeca Lending Corp. v. Real Estate Depot, Inc. · filed 2010-07-14(a)(4)

The automatic stay under bankruptcy law operates as a stay of “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4). However, the Thorntons’ homestead in this case was property that was exempt from the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362 does not protect or recapture for the estate funds determined to have been exempt as of the petition date.

In re Sutton-Robinson · filed 2012-03-19

The purpose of the § 362 automatic stay is to protect debtors and their property from their creditors while bankruptcy proceedings are underway. ... Here, the traceable property at issue has been determined to be exempt property. Therefore, neither Code sections are applicable to either protect or recapture the funds for the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) protects estate property; a debtor cannot claim injury from a hold on funds before they revest if the debtor has no right to possess or control them, or after they revest because they are no longer estate property.

Mwangi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In Re Mwangi) · filed 2014-08-26(a)(3)

The Debtors cannot allege a plausible injury under § 362(a)(3) based on the operation of Wells Fargo’s administrative pledge before the account funds revested because the Debtors had no right to possess or control the account funds during this period. Similarly, the Debtors failed to allege a plausible injury under § 362(a)(3) based on the operation of Wells Fargo’s administrative pledge after the account funds revested because § 362(a)(3) applies only to estate property.

The automatic stay no longer applies to an interest once it is exempted from the bankruptcy estate.

In Re: James Zachman v. State of Delaware · filed 2024-12-26(a)

We agree with the district court that, once Zachman’s interest in Real Time Data was exempted from the estate, it was no longer property of the estate and was no longer subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a creditor’s pursuit of fraudulent transfer claims against nondebtors when that pursuit would obtain or control property of the estate.

Aerospace Engineering & Support, Inc. · filed 2024-05-09(a)(3)

SI’s continued pursuit of its UVTA Claims against the Non- Debtor Defendants in the Collection Action therefore is an act to obtain control of property of the estate or to obtain possession of property from the estate stayed under Section 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a) stays a creditor’s pending fraudulent-transfer action when the transferor files for bankruptcy.

Carlton v. Baww, Inc. · filed 1985-01-28(a)

We held that property that the debtor has fraudulently conveyed remains "property of the estate," see 11 U.S.C. Sec. 541(a)(1): "The automatic stay under [11 U.S.C.] section 362(a) thus applies and prevents a creditor from continuing to pursue a cause of action under the Texas Fraudulent Transfers Act after a petition for bankruptcy has been filed [by the transferor]." Id. at 1275. Thus, Shelton's bankruptcy, standing alone, barred prosecution of this lawsuit.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a creditor’s action to appropriate property fraudulently conveyed from the bankruptcy estate when the claim belongs to creditors generally rather than to that creditor exclusively.

Dana Molded Products, Inc. v. Brodner · filed 1986-01-21(a)(3)

The claim thus does not belong “specifically and exclusively” to the plaintiff in a way which would justify non-application of the stay.

Section 362(a) stays a creditor’s fraudulent conveyance action against third parties when the claim rests on the debtor’s continuing interest in the transferred property.

Famous Supply Co. v. Central Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. (In Re Central Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc.) · filed 1986-08-29(a)

Since Famous’ claim under the Ohio statute is based upon the theory of á continued property interest by Central, that claim is owned by Central and part of the debtor’s estate protected by § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(1) stays a creditor’s prepetition fraudulent transfer action against a third party when the action seeks to recover a claim against the debtor.

In Re Saunders · filed 1989-05-15(a)(1)

Thus, § 362(a)(1) operates to stay a creditor with a claim against the debtor from commencing or continuing a fraudulent transfer action or from utilizing the process of another court, as is the situation in this case, to recover that claim from property that should have been available for levy and execution but for the transfer to a third party in fraud of creditors.

Section 362(a) stays FDIC fraudulent conveyance actions involving estate property even when the FDIC has superior recovery rights under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17).

Matter of Colonial Realty Co. · filed 1991-12-24(a)

In sum, I hold that § 1821(d)(17) does not abrogate the automatic stay of § 362(a) for FDIC fraudulent conveyance rights.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a fraudulent transfer action against third-party transferees when it seeks to recover a claim against the debtor, even if the debtor is not a defendant.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.) · filed 1992-11-20(a)(1)

We conclude that although the Florida Action is not an “act to obtain possession of property of the estate” within the meaning of § 362(a)(3) or an “action ... against the debtor” within the meaning of § 362(a)(1), it is an “action ... to recover a claim against the debtor” within' the meaning of § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(1) stays a creditor’s action to recover property fraudulently transferred to a third party when the action seeks to recover a claim against the debtor.

Krondes v. O'Boy · filed 2002-05-21(a)(1)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has concluded that an action to recover property fraudulently transferred, as is the case with the property held by Carmela O’Boy, is an action “to recover a claim against the debtor”; In re Colonial Realty Co., 980 F.2d 125, 131-32 (2d Cir. 1992); and, therefore, subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) temporarily bars individual creditors from pursuing fraudulent conveyance actions, but after discharge, dismissal, or closure they may pursue available remedies except against estate property.

United States v. Mazzeo · filed 2004-02-23(a)

Although the automatic stay temporarily prevents individual creditors from pursuing fraudulent conveyance actions on their own, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), once the debtor receives a discharge or the case is otherwise dismissed or closed, creditors are free to pursue such remedies as are. available to them, except insofar as they cannot proceed against property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a creditor’s fraudulent conveyance action against a transferee even when the creditor seeks to return the property to the debtor’s estate for the benefit of all creditors.

In Re Hirsch · filed 2006-03-10(a)(1)

Thus, even when a creditor seeks to have fraudulently conveyed property returned to the debtor-transferor’s estate, the creditor’s action against the transferee remains an attempt to recover its claim against the debtor, if indirectly, and is stayed by section 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a) stays a judgment creditor’s supplementary proceeding under Florida law to recover assets fraudulently transferred by the debtor.

Romagosa v. Thomas (In Re Van Diepen) · filed 2007-05-31(a)

Once the P.A. filed for bankruptcy, Romagosa’s supplementary proceeding action was properly stayed by the bankruptcy court.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a creditor’s action against third-party transferees to recover property allegedly fraudulently conveyed by the debtor.

In re Barkany · filed 2015-12-29(a)(1)

They are stayed from pursuing the fraudulent conveyance action and lack standing to prosecute such claims.

Section 362(a)(3) stays an individual creditor’s state fraudulent-transfer action to recover property in which the debtor retains an equitable interest.

Benny R. Knight, Sr. · filed 2023-08-07(a)(3)

For this reason, such actions are appropriately stayed as “act[s] to obtain possession of property of the estate” under § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a) stays a creditor’s fraudulent transfer claim concerning property transferred by a debtor before bankruptcy.

Newman v. Benefytt Technologies, Inc. · filed 2023-08-31(a)

For the foregoing reasons, MDP’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, stay, is granted in part insofar as the fraudulent transfer claim is stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays a creditor’s fraudulent transfer action against a nondebtor transferee to recover a claim against the debtor, regardless of who requests the stay.

Bank of Boston Connecticut v. Piscatelli · filed 1991-02-27(a)(1)

It must be emphasized, moreover, that a stay is compelled by the theory and language of the statute. A stay of the action upon a filing of the bankruptcy petition is mandatory and automatic. If a stay is mandated, as the cases hold, when requested by a bankruptcy trustee, it is equally mandated when requested by a defendant or, for that matter, no one at all. The statute simply does not differentiate between those situations.

Section 362 automatically stays an individual creditor’s state court fraudulent conveyance action against a debtor’s transferee.

NBD Bank, N.A. v. Fletcher (In Re Fletcher) · filed 1995-01-10(a)(1), (a)(3)

This court holds it is axiomatic that once a bankruptcy case is filed, state court fraudulent conveyance or other avoidance actions by individual creditors are automatically stayed.

Section 362(a)(6) stays a creditor’s unjust enrichment suit against a third party when the suit seeks recovery for a debtor’s transfer and depends on the creditor’s claim against the debtor.

Meoli v. Huntington National Bank (In re Teleservices Group, Inc.) · filed 2012-01-18(a)(6)

In sum, postpetition fraudulent transfer actions by creditors are prohibited by the automatic stay because they cannot stand independent of that creditor’s claim against the debtor. ... Indeed, it is for this very reason that the automatic stay prohibits El Camino from continuing with its remaining count in the district court litigation.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a creditor’s fraudulent conveyance claim against a transaction while the trustee exercises its avoidance powers over that same transaction, even if the trustee relies on a different theory.

In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation · filed 2013-09-23(a)(1)

Section 362(a)(1) stays fraudulent conveyance claims by creditors for as long as the trustee is exercising its avoidance powers, so the stay deprives the Individual Creditors’ of standing to bring SLCFC claims against the same transactions that the Committee is currently targeting.

Section 362(b)(6) does not shield a setoff based on commodity murabaha agreements that function as loans rather than securities contracts.

In Re: Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(C) · filed 2022-05-23(b)(6)

In addition, and as the Bankruptcy Court noted, the murabahas, by their own terms, do not qualify as securities because Section 101(49)(B)(vii) specifically excludes a “debt or evidence of indebtedness for goods sold and delivered or services rendered.” See 628 B.R. at 464 n.52. The murabaha transactions fall within this exclusion for debts, for they provide for the purchase, and repurchase, of the same commodities, plus an increase. Accordingly, the findings and judgment of the Bankruptcy Court are affirmed.

Section 362(b)(6) does not let an insolvent broker liquidate a customer’s securities account because of the broker’s own insolvency.

In Re Amcor Funding Corp. · filed 1990-05-01(b)(6)

This statutory exception to the automatic stay, while directed at the admittedly intricate nature of securities transactions, was not meant to permit insolvent brokers from liquidating their customers’ accounts, whether within Chapter 11 or without, as a result of their own insolvency rather than in furtherance of the goals envisioned by Congress.

The automatic stay does not prevent a broker from timely closing out an open securities commitment.

Securities & Exchange Commission v. M.S. Wien & Co. (In re M.S. Wien & Co.) · filed 1985-02-01

In fact, the trustee is correct in saying that a timely closeout would not have violated the stay. ... Since this amendment did not change the Bankruptcy Code, Merit could have closed out without violating the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(6) exempts a stockbroker’s liquidation of pledged stock securing a margin loan from the automatic stay.

Wolkowitz v. Shearson Lehman Bros. (In Re Weisberg) · filed 1996-03-14(b)(6)

In our view, and consistent with the foregoing authorities, it is appropriate to equate the pledge with a sale in order to afford the stockbroker or financial institution holding stock as collateral to move quickly to avail itself of the collateral before it self-destructs. Therefore, the exception of § 362(b)(6) would exempt Shear-son from the stay of § 362(a).

Section 362’s financial contract safe harbors may protect setoffs under related security agreements or credit enhancements, but summary judgment requires enough facts to determine whether the setoffs qualify.

Lehman Bros. Holdings v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings) · filed 2015-09-30(b)(6), (b)(7), (b)(27)

To be sure, Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, upon which Plaintiffs’ claim relies, contains safe harbors insulating transactions from later judicial scrutiny for financial institutions exercising their “contractual rights” under “any security agreement or arrangement or other credit enhancement forming a part of or related to” a protected contract, 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(6) (securities contract), 362(b)(7) (repurchase agreement), 362(b)(27) (master netting agreement). However, the parties’ briefs and Local Rule 56.1 Statements do not provide sufficient detail regarding the circumstances surrounding the alleged setoffs to permit the Court to determine whether those transactions&emdash;if they are in fact set-offs&emdash;were subject to the safe harbor. Accordingly, the Court denies summary judgment on Counts 26, 28, and 33 as well as Counts 29 and 34, the associated remedial counts.

Section 362(a)(8) stays a Tax Court proceeding only if it concerns the debtor’s tax liability; a whistleblower award case does not qualify merely because it shares facts with that liability.

John F. Carter · filed 2024-10-03(a)(8)

The amendment clarifies what we understood, that the automatic stay applies only if the case before us concerns the tax liability of the debtor-taxpayer.

Section 362(a)(8) does not stay a Tax Court proceeding to determine a partnership’s individual partners’ tax liabilities when the partners, rather than the debtor partnership, are the actual parties.

Madison Recycling Associates v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 2002-09-04(a)(8)

On appeal, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order, holding — correctly, we conclude — that under the Internal Revenue Code, the actual parties in an FPAA proceeding are the partners, not the partnership. ... We likewise reject the argument that listing the partnership in the heading of the Tax Court action made the debtor a party.

Section 362(b)(8) permits the IRS to request consent to extend the time to assess taxes during the automatic stay when the request is part of its procedure for determining tax deficiencies.

Curtis R. Richmond Barbara Richmond v. United States · filed 1999-03-19(b)(8)

Because these forms were an integrated part of the procedure for determining tax deficiencies, they “fall within the umbra of § 862(b)(8).” ... Accordingly, the IRS did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362 stays pending Tax Court proceedings during bankruptcy without divesting the Tax Court of jurisdiction.

Thomas L. Freytag and Sharon N. Freytag v. Commissioner · filed 1998-02-05(a)(8), (c)(2)(C)

On the other hand, the present Bankruptcy Code merely stays Tax Court proceedings while the case is processed by the bankruptcy court. See 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a)(8), (c)(2)(C).

Section 362(a)(8) does not stay a TEFRA partnership proceeding for readjustment of partnership items when the partnership is the bankruptcy debtor, because the proceeding concerns the partners’ tax liabilities.

Hoyt & Sons Ranch Props. v. Commissioner · filed 1998-02-23(a)(8)

Consistent with the WROG case, we hold that the automatic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a)(8) (1988) did not bar the filing of the petition for readjustment in this case.

Section 362(a)(6) stays assessment of a tax against a debtor when the debtor files a Chapter 7 petition.

In Re Bowen · filed 1990-06-14(a)(6)

Because 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) stayed assessment against Mr. Bowen when the Debtors filed their Chapter 7 petition December 17, 1987, the Tax Department, through W.Va.Code § ll-10-15(d), is provided 60 days after the stay is discontinued to assess Mr. Bowen for the tax.

Section 362(a)(8) does not stay a Tax Court partnership proceeding when the partnership is in bankruptcy because the proceeding ultimately determines the tax liabilities of the individual partners.

1983 Western Reserve Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner · filed 1990-07-12(a)(8)

For the above reasons, we hold that neither the commencement nor the continuation of these proceedings is affected by 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a)(8) (1988) .

Section 362(a)(8) bars a debtor from filing a Tax Court petition while the automatic stay is in effect, and a petition filed during that period cannot confer Tax Court jurisdiction.

Thompson v. Commissioner · filed 1985-04-08(a)(8)

In these circumstances the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code precluded petitioner from commencing a proceeding before the Tax Court until after February 12,1985, the date the Bankruptcy Court granted a final discharge in bankruptcy. The improper petition filed on July 9, 1984, therefore, was filed in violation of the automatic stay provisions at a time when this Court could not acquire jurisdiction over Mr. Thompson.

Section 362(a)(8) stays Tax Court proceedings concerning a debtor, and a petition filed in violation of that stay is invalid and cannot confer Tax Court jurisdiction.

Glickman v. Commissioner · filed 1986-06-23(a)(8)

The petition was filed in violation of the automatic stay of proceedings. It is therefore not a valid petition and it is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this Court.

Section 362(a)(8) bars a debtor from commencing a Tax Court proceeding after filing for bankruptcy until the bankruptcy case ends or the stay is lifted.

Computer Programs Lambda, Ltd. v. Commissioner · filed 1987-07-27(a)(8)

Once PII filed a petition in bankruptcy, it was barred from commencing an action in this Court until the bankruptcy proceeding was completed or the stay was lifted.

Section 362(a)(8) bars a debtor from commencing a Tax Court proceeding while the bankruptcy stay is in effect.

Nichols v. Commissioner · filed 1988-06-14(a)(8)

The plain language of section 362(a)(8) refutes petitioner's argument that the Bankruptcy Code's stay provisions, which were intended to operate for the protection of the debtor, apply only to proceedings commenced against the debtor. Contrary to petitioner's argument, section 362(a)(8) prohibits this Court from entertaining a proceeding commenced during the pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 362(a)(8) bars a debtor from starting or continuing a Tax Court proceeding during the automatic stay; a petition filed in violation is invalid and gives the Tax Court no jurisdiction.

Adams v. Commissioner · filed 1988-07-26(a)(8)

Mr. Adams' Tax Court petition was therefore filed in violation of 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a)(8) (1982) . Where a taxpayer's petition is filed in violation of the automatic stay provision, it is invalid, giving us no jurisdiction to hear his case.

Section 362(a)(8) automatically stays a debtor from commencing a Tax Court proceeding while the stay is in effect.

Ash v. Commissioner · filed 1989-07-25(a)(8)

Section 362(a)(8) of title 11 provides for an automatic stay of "the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor." (Emphasis added.) This provision essentially prohibits a debtor-taxpayer from filing a petition in this Court during the imposition of the stay.

Section 362(a)(8) stays a bankrupt common parent from starting a Tax Court proceeding concerning its consolidated tax liability until the bankruptcy proceeding ends or the bankruptcy judge lifts the stay.

J & S Carburetor Co. v. Commissioner · filed 1989-08-03(a)(8)

Pursuant to section 362(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code a petition for bankruptcy stays “the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.” Thus, Sutton Investments is prohibited from challenging respondent’s determinations in the notice of deficiency in this Court until the bankruptcy proceedings are terminated or until the bankruptcy judge chooses to lift the stay.

Section 362(a)(8) stays Tax Court proceedings concerning a debtor; a petition filed while no stay is in effect remains valid even if the bankruptcy case is later reopened.

Kimmerling v. Commissioner · filed 1989-09-13(a)(8)

Section 362(a)(8) of title 11 provides for an automatic stay of "the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor." For an individual taxpayer, the automatic stay remains in effect until the bankruptcy proceedings are terminated or until the bankruptcy judge chooses to lift the stay. 11 U.S.C. sec. 362 (c) and (d) (1982) . When the Bankruptcy Court reopened the Kimmerlings' case, it is clear that the stay became operational again with respect to proceedings in this Court. The petition was filed in this Court, however, when no stay was in effect. Thus, the petition filed herein was not filed in violation of the automatic stay provisions and is valid.

Section 362 does not stay actions to determine a debtor’s income tax liability.

In Re Moore · filed 1991-05-24

Based upon my review of the cases, I find that the automatic stay in § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code does not operate to stay actions to determine the income tax liability of a bankrupt debtor.

Section 362(a)(8) stays the commencement or continuation of Tax Court proceedings concerning a debtor, whether the tax deficiency arose before or after the bankruptcy petition.

Halpern v. Commissioner · filed 1991-06-24(a)(8)

Stated another way, we conclude and hold that the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(8) bars the commencement or continuation of proceedings in this Court, regardless of whether the underlying claim relates to prepetition or postpetition deficiencies.

Section 362(a)(8) stays proceedings presently before the Tax Court, but does not stay an appeal after the Tax Court has entered final judgment.

Cheng v. Commissioner Internal Revenue Service · filed 1991-07-05(a)(8)

Section 362(a)(8) by its terms precludes the commencement or continuation of a proceeding that is presently before the Tax Court. It has no application to appeals to this court following the termination of proceedings in the Tax Court.

Section 362(a)(8) bars a Tax Court petition while a bankruptcy case is pending, and under § 362(c)(2) the stay ends upon dismissal so the petition filing period begins to run.

Woods v. Commissioner · filed 1991-09-04(a)(8), (c)(2)

The pendency of petitioner's bankruptcy proceeding from September 24, 1985, through its dismissal on February 1, 1989, barred petitioner from filing a petition with this Court during such period. 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a)(8) (1988) . The 90-day period for filing his petition in this Court began to run when the bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed. 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(c)(2) (1988) .

Section 362(a)(8) stays the period for filing a Tax Court petition for redetermination until bankruptcy proceedings are dismissed.

Woods v. Commissioner Internal Revenue Service · filed 1992-06-02(a)(8)

Here, Woods was involved in bankruptcy proceedings at the time that the IRS mailed him notice of the deficiency. These proceedings stayed the statutory period for filing a petition for redetermination in tax court until the bankruptcy proceedings were dismissed. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(8).

The automatic stay prevents a debtor from joining a Tax Court petition but does not invalidate a nonbankrupt spouse’s petition in response to a joint notice of deficiency.

Dubin v. Commissioner · filed 1992-09-14(a)(8)

The bankruptcy of petitioner’s husband prevented him from joining petitioner in filing the petition in this case. See 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a)(8), (c), (d) (1988); McClamma v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 754, 756-757 (1981). However, that bankruptcy has no effect on the validity of the petition filed by the nonbankrupt spouse (petitioner) in response to the joint notice of deficiency.

Section 362(a)(8) bars a taxpayer from filing a Tax Court petition while the taxpayer’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case is pending.

Roy v. Commissioner · filed 1992-09-23(a)(8)

However, on July 6, 1988, petitioner filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and under the provisions of 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a)(8) (1988) , a taxpayer is prohibited from filing a petition with this Court while the bankruptcy case is pending.

Section 362(a)(8) bars a debtor from filing a Tax Court petition while the automatic stay is in effect, so a petition filed during the stay does not confer Tax Court jurisdiction.

Reagoso v. Commissioner · filed 1993-09-28(a)(8)

In the present case, the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code precluded petitioners from commencing a proceeding before the Tax Court until after August 6, 1992, the date the bankruptcy court granted a final discharge in bankruptcy. The improper petition filed on October 31, 1991, therefore, was filed in violation of the automatic stay provision at a time when this Court could not acquire jurisdiction over petitioners.

Section 362(c)(1) does not keep the automatic stay in effect after discharge for Tax Court proceedings that determine tax liability and reject a claimed overpayment without taking or controlling estate property.

Oren G. Bigelow Debra G. Bigelow, Deceased and Pamela E. Bigelow v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue · filed 1995-08-24(c)(1)

The ruling by the Tax Court was not an “act against property of the estate” within the meaning of § 362(c)(1). The Tax Court proceedings following the order of discharge did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) stays a state tax proceeding after a bankruptcy petition is filed and prevents the tax authority from proceeding further.

In Re Williams · filed 1995-10-28(a)

However, the petition was filed after the bankruptcy petition which stayed the proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and precluded the Department of Taxation from proceeding further.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a taxing authority’s postpetition motion to dismiss a debtor’s tax challenge when the motion continues a prepetition property tax collection process; a dismissal obtained in violation of the stay is void.

Tucson Electric Power Co. v. Apache County · filed 1995-11-21(a)(1)

When the process is thus assessed by considering substance over form, it becomes clear that appellees’ filing their motion to dismiss El Paso’s complaint was not a purely defensive action to protect themselves, as the tax court concluded. It was a continuation of the long-pending process by which appellees, as required by statute, sought to collect property taxes on El Paso’s property. Because this action was undertaken after El Paso commenced bankruptcy proceedings, it violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). Thus, the tax court’s dismissal of El Paso from the action was void as a matter of federal law.

Section 362(a)(8) prohibits a debtor from filing a Tax Court petition while the bankruptcy case is pending.

Sicari v. Commissioner · filed 1997-03-03(a)(8)

However, if the taxpayer is involved in bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor- taxpayer is prohibited from filing a petition with this Court while the bankruptcy case is pending.

Section 362(a)(8) bars a debtor from filing a Tax Court petition while the bankruptcy case is pending.

Clevenger v. Commissioner · filed 1998-01-28(a)(8)

However, if the taxpayer is involved in bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor-taxpayer is prohibited from filing a petition with this Court while the bankruptcy case is pending.

Section 362(a)(8) bars a debtor from filing a Tax Court petition while the automatic stay is in effect.

Howard v. Commissioner · filed 1998-08-19(a)(8)

Because petitioner's bankruptcy petition under chapter 13 was pending on the dates that the notices of deficiency for 1989, 1990, and 1991 were issued, it follows that petitioner was barred from filing a petition for redetermination with the Court by virtue of the automatic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(8).

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a taxpayer-initiated Tax Court redetermination proceeding or its appeal period, and section 362(a)(8) does not stay the running of that period after the Tax Court enters its decision.

John W. Roberts, Cheryl W. Roberts v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue · filed 1999-05-04(a)(1), (a)(8)

In sum, we hold that the Tax Court proceeding regarding the Robertses’ petition for redetermination was neither a proceeding “against the debtor” nor a proceeding “to recover a claim against the debtor” within the meaning of section 362(a)(1). Accordingly, section 362(a)(1) did not operate to stay the 90-day period for filing a notice of appeal from the Tax Court’s decision. ... Because there was no continuing proceeding before the Tax Court concerning the petitioners on December 30, no automatic stay could have arisen on that date pursuant to section 362(a)(8).

Section 362(a)(8) does not stay a debtor from choosing to proceed in Tax Court to determine the debtor’s tax liability.

Thompson v. United States ex rel. Internal Revenue Service (In re Thompson) · filed 1999-09-03(a)(8)

However, read in its entirety, § 362 plainly applies to “all entities” attempting to collect a debt or obtain property from the debtor or the debtor’s estate. Clearly, the debtor does not fit within this classification of “all entities.” Mr. Thompson is not an entity seeking to further efforts to collect a debt against himself or his estate. Therefore, his decision to proceed in the tax court rather than this forum is not covered under the § 362(a)(8) stay.

Section 362(a)(8) bars the commencement or continuation of Tax Court proceedings against a taxpayer who has filed for bankruptcy.

George v. Commissioner · filed 1999-11-23(a)(8)

Once a taxpayer files a petition in bankruptcy, the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(8) (1994) bars the commencement or continuation of proceedings against the debtor in the Tax Court.

Section 362 bars a debtor with Federal tax liabilities from petitioning the Tax Court until the bankruptcy case closes, is dismissed, or a discharge is granted.

BLANKSON v. COMMISSIONER · filed 2003-02-14(a)(8), (c)

Bankruptcy law prohibits debtors with Federal tax liabilities from petitioning this Court until the earlier of the closing of the case, the dismissal of the case, or the granting of a discharge. 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a)(8), (c) (2000).

Section 362(a)(8) stays a pending Tax Court proceeding when the taxpayer files for bankruptcy; an opinion and decision entered during the stay may be withdrawn and vacated.

MAYO v. COMMISSIONER · filed 2003-05-15(a)(8)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C sec. 362(a)(8), on Feb. 20, 2002, we withdrew our opinion, vacated the decision, and stayed the proceedings in this Court.

Section 362(a)(8) bars filing a stand-alone Tax Court petition for relief from joint and several tax liability while the automatic stay remains in effect, leaving the Tax Court without jurisdiction over a petition filed in violation of the stay.

Drake v. Commissioner · filed 2004-12-14(a)(8)

Consistent with the plain language of 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(8), which expressly bars “the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor”, we conclude that the petition for determination of relief from joint and several liability in this case was filed in violation of the automatic stay, and, therefore, we lack jurisdiction.

Section 362(a)(8) bars a debtor from commencing a Tax Court collection review proceeding while the automatic stay is in effect, and a petition filed in violation of the stay does not confer jurisdiction.

Prevo v. Comm'r · filed 2004-12-14(a)(8)

Consistent with the plain language of 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(8), which expressly bars “the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor”, we conclude that the petition for lien or levy action in this case was filed in violation of the automatic stay, and, therefore, we lack jurisdiction.

Section 362(a)(8) bars commencement or continuation of Tax Court proceedings concerning a debtor during the automatic stay, making petitions filed and decisions entered in violation of the stay void.

Adkins v. Comm'r · filed 2005-11-03(a)(8)

Because the automatic stay has been in place throughout this proceeding, and our entering of the parties’ stipulated decision also occurred during that time, our entering of that decision violated the automatic stay and, hence, the decision is void. ... Because a petition that is filed in violation of the automatic stay is invalid and of no consequence, ... we shall dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction after we vacate the decision that was entered on March 30, 2005.

Section 362(a)(8) automatically stays Tax Court proceedings concerning a debtor when the debtor files for bankruptcy, nullifying an opinion issued during the stay.

Stafford v. Commissioner · filed 1992-11-02(a)(8)

Consequently, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a)(8) (1988), the proceedings in this Court with respect to petitioner Clyde E. Stafford were automatically stayed on August 3, 1992, thus nullifying our opinion filed August 13, 1992.

Section 362(a)(8) stays Tax Court proceedings, tolling the correction period for a section 4971(b) penalty while the stay is in effect.

In Re CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc. · filed 1992-11-25(a)(8)

Since 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(8) precludes the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court, the correction period extends until sixty days after the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding. Therefore, the running of the correction period is tolled during the period in which the automatic stay is in effect and no 100% penalty may be assessed.

Section 362(a)(8) automatically stays Tax Court proceedings when the taxpayer files a bankruptcy petition.

Hicks v. Commissioner · filed 1993-06-29(a)(8)

Consequently, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(8) (1988) , all proceedings in this Court were automatically stayed, and on January 8, 1993, we vacated and set aside our order of dismissal and decision and we also withdrew and rescinded T.C. Memo. 1992-649 .

Section 362(a)(1) stays an appeal from a Tax Court judgment concerning the debtor’s alleged tax deficiency.

Larry D. Delpit Dorothy D. Delpit v. Commissioner Internal Revenue Service · filed 1994-03-09(a)(1)

We conclude that both clauses of Section 362(a)(1) apply to an appeal pending before us from a Tax Court judgment concerning an alleged tax deficiency on the part of the debtor.

Section 362(a)(8) prohibits a taxpayer from filing a Tax Court petition while a bankruptcy case is pending.

Gaston v. Comm'r · filed 2016-08-15(a)(8)

However, if the taxpayer is involved in bankruptcy proceedings, the taxpayer is prohibited from filing a petition with this Court while the bankruptcy case is pending. 11 U.S.C. sec. ... 362(a)(8).

Section 362(a)(1) stays a surety’s postpetition initiation of procedures to cancel a debtor’s bond as a proceeding against the debtor.

Wegner Farms Co. v. Merchants Bonding Co. (In Re Wegner Farms Co.) · filed 1985-05-01(a)(1)

In particular, Merchants’ efforts to cancel the bond constituted a “proceeding” against the Debtor within the meaning of section 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay a creditor’s action against a third-party surety on a contractor’s license bond that is not property of the debtor’s estate.

Lockard v. Lockard · filed 1989-09-05(a)(3)

O'Malley's state court action against Allied is not, therefore, subject to the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a) does not stay a shareholder derivative action against officers and directors in their individual capacities when the bankrupt corporation is only a nominal defendant.

Gershman v. Kiam · filed 1985-05-07(a)

The court concludes that the defendant officers and directors or former officers and directors in the present action are being sued in their individual capacities and that the bankrupt corporation, Wells Benrus, is only a nominal defendant. Applying the reasoning of the cases discussed, the court concludes that the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) should not apply to this shareholders’ derivative action filed by the plaintiff Gershman.

Section 362(a)(3) permits a bankruptcy court to enjoin shareholder derivative claims because those claims belong to the bankruptcy estate.

San Mateo v. At Home Corp. · filed 2005-11-23(a)(3)

A bankruptcy court may enjoin a derivative claim brought by shareholders because the claim is the property of the bankrupt estate.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a plaintiff from pursuing derivative claims belonging to a debtor’s bankruptcy estate because that would exercise control over estate property.

Sehoy Energy LP v. Haven Real Estate Group, LLC · filed 2017-04-17(a)(3)

Under Section 362(a)(3), a plaintiff who asserts such derivative claims would be acting to exercise control over property of the estate and violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) permits an informational mortgage statement that does not demand payment or threaten consequences and clearly disclaims any attempt to collect a debt.

Schatz v. Chase Home Finance (In Re Schatz) · filed 2011-07-25(a)(6)

I find that Chase did not violate the automatic stay by sending the Statement to the Debtor after the Debtor had filed his bankruptcy petition. I characterize the Statement as an informative mailing and not an attempt by the creditor to collect a pre-petition debt. The language of the disclaimer, which is found in the center of the first page, in an outlined box, is important to my findings and conclusion.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a creditor from harassing a debtor about a prepetition claim by contacting the debtor’s employer and suggesting that the employer reconsider the debtor’s employment; a willful violation supports damages and attorney fees under Section 362(h).

In Re Smith · filed 1994-10-27(a)(6)

The legislative history of Sections 362(a)(1) and 362(a)(6) indicate that it was Congress’s intent to protect debtors from all forms of harassment. This includes a creditor contacting a debtor’s employer concerning an unpaid claim and suggesting his employment with the company be reconsidered. Lowe’s letter controverts the Congressional intent of Section 362 to protect debtors from all harassment and was a willful violation of the automatic stay as provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).

Section 362(a)(6) does not bar a creditor from requesting payment of a debt unless the creditor harasses or coerces the debtor.

Haymaker v. Green Tree Consumer Discount Co. · filed 1994-04-07(a)(6)

Requests by a creditor for payment of a debt are not in violation of § 362(a)(6) without a showing of harassment or coercion by the creditor.

A single, mostly informational letter about estate funds does not violate the automatic stay when no adverse impact on the estate is shown.

Ohio Farmers Insurance v. Hughes-Bechtol, Inc. (In Re Hughes-Bechtol, Inc.) · filed 1990-06-29(a)(3)

It is difficult for this court to understand why OFIC, which appeared in numerous proceedings in this bankruptcy and filed numerous documents and requests for relief, would have failed to seek a court determination of the extent of the automatic stay prior to taking the action complained of; nevertheless, the court concludes that the mailing of the non-repetitive, predominately informational correspondence, which in this motion for summary judgment has not been demonstrated to have adversely impacted on the estate, does not constitute a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) treats a postpetition letter saying a prepetition debt is due and payable as contrary to the automatic stay, but a debtor needs evidence of an intentional collection attempt to defeat summary judgment.

Spaulding v. Citizens Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Dayton (In Re Spaulding) · filed 1990-03-29(a)(6)

The court does not doubt that from Citizens’ point of view the letters are mildly worded and non-coercive; however, it should be recognized that a creditor’s standard letter stating that a prepetition debt is “due and payable” issued to a debtor after the filing of a bankruptcy is contrary to the language of the automatic stay, § 362(a)(6). ... Further, based on the absence of any evidence from the debtor that the defendant intentionally attempted to exercise control over property of the estate or to collect or recover its prepetition claim, and, noting that the evidence reflects that Citizens voluntarily paid two hundred fourteen dollars and seventy-one cents ($214.71) to the debtor and then voluntarily paid the remaining thirteen dollars and thirty-nine cents ($13.39), the court finds that Citizens is entitled to summary judgment in its favor as to Count I of the debtor’s complaint.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a creditor from directly urging a debtor to contact it about reaffirming a prepetition debt after learning of the bankruptcy.

Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union (In Re Brown) · filed 1985-05-30(a)(6)

PSECU’s letter advising the debtor that, “[i]f you desire to reaffirm your obligation, you should immediately contact the Credit Union so that the appropriate papers may be prepared” cannot be reconciled with the intended effect of the automatic stay provision.

Section 362(a)(6) does not prohibit a creditor from merely telling a bankruptcy petitioner that it will refuse future dealings unless the debtor reaffirms the debt.

In Re Delores C. Brown, Debtor v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union · filed 1988-06-27(a)(6)

We therefore reject the proposition that a creditor violates section 362(a)(6) or 524(a)(2) of the bankruptcy code, as a matter of law, merely by informing a bankruptcy petitioner that it will refuse to deal with her unless she reaffirms her debt.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not bar counsel from exchanging legal theories about a creditor’s possible post-discharge remedies.

Murray v. Great Valley Savings Ass'n (In Re Murray ) · filed 1988-08-26(a)(6)

The automatic stay does not protect an attorney from his opponent’s legal theories.

Section 362(a) bars a creditor from sending a postpetition demand letter that threatens the loss of a debtor’s rights unless the debtor responds within a deadline.

In Re Nelson · filed 1991-02-13(a)

The Court concludes that a post-petition FmHA county supervisor letter, sent without modification of the automatic stay, which demands contact within 45 days, violates 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) to the extent such letter threatens a loss of rights if the demanded action does not occur.

Section 362(a)(1) permits a creditor to offer a debtor loan servicing options and set a deadline for accepting them.

United States of America, Through the Farmers Home Administration v. David E. Nelson Marsha R. Nelson · filed 1992-07-07(a)(1)

It is not a violation of the stay to offer extraordinary options for loan servicing and then to put limits on the time within which they must be exercised.

A claim under § 362(h) based on a creditor’s request for payment must allege harassment or coercion.

Cox v. Zale Delaware, Inc. · filed 1999-11-24(h)

A successful § 362(h) claim must therefore include some allegation of harassment or coercion.

Section 362(a) bars a mortgagee from pressuring a debtor to repay advances but permits mere notice of advances or escrow deficiencies.

Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Padgett · filed 2001-09-25(a)

Thus, while section 362(a) prohibits a mortgagee from exerting pressure on a mortgagor to repay advances, it does not prohibit a mortgagee from merely providing necessary information or notice to a mortgagor of escrow deficiencies.

Section 362(a)(6) permits settlement negotiations over a discharge dispute unless they are improperly coercive or harassing; a threat to report the debtor to a licensing commission, standing alone, does not violate the stay.

In re John J. Diamond III · filed 2002-12-13(a)(6)

Nevertheless, it is not so coercive or harassing, standing alone, as to qualify as a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) does not bar a creditor from using a related, good-faith threat of administrative action to negotiate a discharge dispute when the threat, standing alone, is not improperly coercive or harassing.

In Re Diamond · filed 2002-12-13(a)(6)

Pratt’s alleged threat to report Diamond to the Real Estate Commission and have his license revoked if he did not settle plainly qualifies as hard bargaining. Nevertheless, it is not so coercive or harassing, standing alone, as to qualify as a violation of the automatic stay.

Harassing communications that do not seek to coerce payment of a debt do not violate the automatic stay and are not sanctionable under § 362(h).

In re Pomeroy · filed 2005-11-16(a), (h)

The Court heard argument of counsel, considered the exhibits attached to the Motion and finds that while the letters by Mr. Lamb were highly inappropriate, none of them contain any intimation that it was sent for the purpose of coercing or attempting to coerce the Debtor into the payment of a debt allegedly owed by the Debtor to Mr. Lamb. There is no doubt that the correspondence sent by Mr. Lamb to the business associates of the Debtor and to the Lee County Health Department were letters of harassment; however, this Court is satisfied that they were not a violation of the automatic stay and, therefore, are not sanctionable.

Section 362(a)(6) permits noncoercive mortgage statements providing information a debtor needs, but payment requests after the debtor elects to surrender the collateral may violate the stay.

Connor v. Countrywide Bank NA (In Re Connor) · filed 2007-04-02(a)(6)

While Mr. Connor was in chapter 13, he had an interest in receiving current information about the status of his mortgage. In order to formulate a confirmable chapter 13 plan, Mr. Connor needed to know the amount of his mortgage arrears and current payments. The complaint does not allege that the monthly statements were threatening or coercive. Therefore, the complaint does not state a claim insofar as those statements are concerned. ... The only purpose for sending the monthly statements after that point was to induce Mr. Connor to make payments on a prepetition debt which was dischargeable and has now been discharged. Making a request for payment in that circumstance could be a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) permits a stay-violation claim based on payment coupons seeking payments outside a confirmed Chapter 13 plan when the trustee pays the creditor, and resulting attorney fees alone can constitute actual damages under § 362(k)(1).

Cousins v. CitiFinancial Mortgage Co. (In Re Cousins) · filed 2009-04-28(a)(6), (k)(1)

The payment coupon, with a place to write in the amount enclosed and address for sending payments, has no other purpose that the court can conceive except to collect the debt outside of the bankruptcy case, an act prohibited by § 362(a)(6). ... The court concludes that the Debtor has sufficiently pleaded actual damages with his allegations that he was forced to consult with his attorney. Because these attorney fees constitute actual damages under the language of the statute, no other injury is required before awarding attorney fees.

Section 362(a) permits a creditor to communicate a claimed mortgage payment increase without violating the automatic stay unless the communication is accompanied by coercion or harassment.

Singh v. U.S. Bank (In Re Singh) · filed 2011-09-16(a)

It is when coercion or harassment is coupled with the communication that they can be in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) permits a student-loan creditor to send a polite, noncoercive letter explaining that federal law conditions a new loan on payments toward a defaulted prepetition loan.

Moss v. Sallie Mae, Inc. Ex Rel. USA Funding (In Re Moss) · filed 2012-04-18(a)(6)

Thus, it does not violate the automatic stay for Sallie Mae to write a polite explanatory letter to the Debtor any more than it violates the automatic stay for a creditor to politely offer a reaffirmation agreement or even condition reaffirmation of a secured debt on the reaffirmation of an unsecured debt.

Section 362(a)(6) does not prohibit one creditor’s attorney from discussing with another creditor’s attorney how to avoid discharge of a debt.

Davis v. Kohler (In re Davis) · filed 2013-09-25(a)(6)

The Court declines to extend the already broad scope of section 362(a)(6) to find that a violation of the automatic stay occurs when one creditor’s attorney discusses with another creditor’s attorney how to avoid having a debt discharged in a debtor’s bankruptcy.

Section 362(a)(6) does not prohibit an informational letter telling a debtor that a prepetition account was sold and where payments should be sent when the letter is not an attempt to collect the debt.

Torres v. Santander Financial Services, Inc. (In re Crespo Torres) · filed 2015-06-22(a)(6)

In the instant case, the court finds that SFS did not violate the automatic stay, namely 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6), by mailing a letter that simply informed the Debtor that his account was sold on March 26, 2014 to Midland Funding, LLC and that payments should be made to the address included in the letter. The court further finds that the letter sent by SFS was not an attempt to collect a pre-petition debt, but was merely an informative letter from a predecessor creditor disclosing the name and address of a successor creditor.

Section 362(a)(6) treats a communication about a debt as an act to collect if it demands or coerces payment or lacks a valid informational purpose.

Thomas v. Seterus Inc. (In re Thomas) · filed 2016-08-05(a)(6)

The communication of the existence of a debt is an “act to collect” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) only if it overtly demands payment, has the effect of coercing payment, or lacks a valid informational purpose.

Sections 362(a)(1) and (a)(6) do not prohibit a creditor’s message to a debtor when it neither continues a prepetition proceeding nor attempts to collect a prepetition debt.

Macie Marie Wilcox · filed 2024-01-25(a)(1), (a)(6)

The court concludes that the text message violates neither. In other words, the text message is neither the continuation of a prepetition action or proceeding against the debtor nor is it an act or attempt to collect a prepetition debt from or recover on a prepetition claim against the debtor.

Section 362(a)(6) bars creditor communications designed to coerce payment of a prepetition debt, but permits informational communications.

Kenneth Gene Wilkinson · filed 2025-09-16(a)(6)

But not all communications between a debtor and a creditor are prohibited; it is only those designed to coerce payment of a prepetition debt.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay an action to renew a prebankruptcy judgment when renewal merely preserves the judgment and does not enforce, collect, or expand it.

Barber v. Emporium Partnership · filed 1990-10-16(a)(1)

An action to renew a judgment does not violate the automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy code. A renewal is not an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the original judgment.

Section 362(a)(2) makes a postpetition filing to revive a prepetition judgment without court permission a nullity.

Ward v. Equibank (In re Ward) · filed 1985-06-12(a)(2)

The post-bankruptcy filing of the revival of the judgment June 6, 1983 without obtaining the permission of the Court is a nullity under the express provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) and (d).

Section 362 bars entry of a judgment after a bankruptcy petition is filed, and such a judgment is subject to being declared void.

Marsh v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance · filed 1990-04-23

It should also be noted that entry of the judgment after filing in bankruptcy was in violation of the automatic stay provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362, and, in the event of litigation, was subject to being declared void.

Section 362(a)(4) does not bar a creditor from reviving a judgment lien in state court when revival merely continues the existing lien without enlarging it.

Guertler v. Barlow Woods, Inc. · filed 1992-06-09(a)(4)

An attempt by Barlow Woods to revive its judgment against Cavazos in State court, therefore, could not have violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not bar attendance at a status hearing that serves only to determine whether the automatic stay applies and does not resume the litigation.

In Re: Andrena Diane Crockett · filed 2023-08-15(a)

Based on this evidence from the record, this Court agrees with the Bankruptcy Court that the status hearing “served informational purposes” and did not “entail a resumption of the litigation.” ... Nationstar therefore did not violate the automatic stay by attending the status hearing.

Section 362 does not give bankruptcy courts exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether the automatic stay applies to a prepetition state court action; state courts may decide that question too.

Siskin v. Complete Aircraft Services, Inc. (In Re Siskin) · filed 2001-02-13

In view of the foregoing, this Court believes that the majority view is correct and holds that a proceeding to determine whether the automatic stay applies to a prepetition state court action is a proceeding that arises in or is related to a bankruptcy case and, in the absence of a provision in Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code or Section 157 of the Judiciary Code depriving state courts of jurisdiction, the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to decide the issue.

The court hearing litigation alleged to be stayed under section 362 has jurisdiction to decide whether the automatic stay applies to that litigation.

In Re Baldwin-United Corporation Litigation · filed 1985-06-17

The court in which the litigation claimed to be stayed is pending has jurisdiction to determine not only its own jurisdiction but also the more precise question whether the proceeding pending before it is subject to the automatic stay.

A court hearing litigation claimed to be stayed under Section 362 has jurisdiction to decide whether the automatic stay applies to that litigation.

Erti v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. · filed 1985-06-17

The court in which the litigation claimed to be stayed is pending has jurisdiction to determine not only its own jurisdiction but also the more precise question whether the proceeding pending before it is subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not stay the FAA’s revocation of airline landing slots that are not property of the debtor’s estate.

Air Illinois, Inc. v. United States (In Re Air Illinois, Inc.) · filed 1985-06-24(a)

The slots are not property of the debtor’s estate under § 541 of the Code, and therefore, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is inapplicable toward the agency.

Section 362(a) does not stay a postpetition action against a trustee that is not against property of the estate.

Kranzdorf v. Alter (In re Fidelity America Financial Corp.) · filed 1985-10-18(a)

Since the cause of action arose postpetition and is not against property of the estate, the automatic stay does not bar such an action.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a proceeding arising from events after the bankruptcy petition, and § 362(a)(3) does not stay an interpleader seeking to resolve competing claims to estate property.

Holland America Insurance Company v. Succession of Shepherd J. Roy, the Union Bank and Central Pecan Shelling Company, I · filed 1985-12-04(a)(1), (a)(3)

The stay simply does not apply to post-bankruptcy events. ... Holland America’s interpleader action did not have the object of “obtaining possession of property of the estate” as is required by subsection 3 of § 362(a).

Section 362 imposes an automatic stay on proceedings concerning property listed in a pending bankruptcy case.

Hammond v. City of Chicago · filed 1985-12-10

The bankruptcy code provides for an automatic stay of proceedings pending resolution of the bankruptcy. (11 U.S.C. sec. 362 (Supp. II 1978).) Once the subject property was listed in the bankruptcy proceedings, it was subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362's automatic stay does not apply to an action brought by the debtor rather than against the debtor.

Ellis v. Twin Falls Canal Co. · filed 1985-12-20

In the instant case the action was not against Ellis as a debtor, and hence the automatic stay provisions do not apply.

Section 362(a) automatically stays actions against the debtor and property of the debtor’s estate, but does not stay actions against a separate nondebtor party.

Taran Furs, Inc. v. Champagne Bridals, Inc. · filed 1986-01-24(a)

Only actions against the debtor and the property of the debtor’s estate are automatically stayed upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy (11 USC § 362 [a]). Plaintiff’s action is not against Coles but against Champagne.

Section 362(a) does not stay foreclosure on a nondebtor landlord’s property merely because the debtor leases it.

Juneau's Builders Center, Inc. v. First National Bank of Gonzales (In Re Juneau's Builders Center, Inc.) · filed 1986-01-27(a)

Section 362(a) prohibits actions against the debtor, actions against property of the debtor, and actions against property of the estate. Since there was no act or an action against the Debtor, against the property of the Debtor, or against property of the estate, there was no violation of the stay.

Section 362 automatically stays claims against the debtor, the debtor’s property, and the bankruptcy estate, but does not stay foreclosure against a nondebtor owner’s property.

Hamel v. American Continental Corp. · filed 1986-02-05

It should be self-evident from the clear language of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1983) that the automatic stay granted petitioners in bankruptcy is directed at only claims against the “debtor,” the “property of the debtor,” and the “estate” and not acts against others.

Section 362 requires a creditor to obtain relief from the automatic stay before commencing or continuing a state-court action against the debtor; belief that the bankruptcy filing was in bad faith does not excuse a stay violation.

In Re Henstra · filed 1986-03-31

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, and in light of the history of dealings between the Debtor Henstra, Spring Water Dairy Farm, Inc., and PCA, the post-petition commencement and continued prosecution by PCA of the state court replevin action involving the Debtor without first obtaining relief from the stay was inappropriate, unjustified and inexcusable. The time to seek dismissal of a case believed to have been filed in bad faith or in the alternative, relief from stay, is before— not after — taking action against the Debtor in a non-bankruptcy forum. Belief of bad-faith filing is not justification for violation of the stay.

Section 362 bars a separate claim against the debtor during bankruptcy, but stay relief is unnecessary for claims against third parties that do not involve the bankruptcy.

Wayne Film Systems Corp. v. Film Recovery Systems Corp. · filed 1986-05-14

If Wayne wishes to pursue a claim against FRS aside from its proof-of-claim, that claim is barred by § 362, and we see no reason to lift the stay at this time. ... Since the claims against the third-party defendants do not involve FRS’ bankruptcy, Wayne would not need relief from the stay in order to pursue those claims, making Count X superfluous.

Section 362 stays a prepetition creditor’s suit against a debtor until the bankruptcy closes or is dismissed, requiring stay relief before the creditor proceeds.

Acevedo v. Van Dorn Plastic MacHinery Co. · filed 1986-06-18

In order to insure exclusive Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction over a debtor’s financial affairs, 11 U.S.C. § 362 automatically stays the commencement of a judicial proceeding outside of Bankruptcy Court by a pre-petition creditor against a debtor, until the debtor’s bankruptcy is closed or dismissed.

Section 362 restrains postpetition creditors from taking action against Chapter 13 estate property to collect postpetition debts while the case is pending.

In Re Woodall · filed 1987-01-22

As long as the chapter 13 case is pending, the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 restrains postpetition creditors from taking action against “property of the estate” to collect their postpetition debts.

Section 362 prevents a debtor from waiving the automatic stay through postpetition consent to tax assessments without approval of the estate’s other creditors.

In Re Best Finance Corp. · filed 1987-05-13

Since the general rule is that a debtor may not waive the provisions of 11 U.S.C. sec. 362, the consent for assessments signed by debtor post petition without being submitted for the approval of the other creditors of the estate are null, void, and without any binding legal effect. A debtor cannot waive the automatic stay, since the purpose of its enactment by Congress was not only to protect debtors and creditors, but also to provide an “orderly and efficient administration of a bankruptcy estate.”

Section 362 requires a creditor to obtain a determination of whether the automatic stay applies before bringing an adversary proceeding against a debtor and to seek relief from the stay when appropriate.

Allegheny, Inc. v. Hipak Industries, Inc. (In Re Allegheny, Inc.) · filed 1987-05-29

In the future, however, any adversary proceeding brought against a debtor must be prefaced by a determination of the applicability of the automatic stay, and if appropriate, relief from the stay must be sought.

Section 362’s automatic stay bars a creditor from continuing a lawsuit after a Chapter 13 filing to collect a prepetition dissolution-decree obligation.

Classe v. Classe (In re Classe) · filed 1987-06-23(a)

The record clearly indicates that the Plaintiff in this Adversary Proceeding continued and prosecuted a non-bankruptcy proceeding against this Debtor in February, 1987. This non-bankruptcy proceeding was an attempt to enforce collection of a provision of a pre-bankruptcy dissolution decree involving the Plaintiff and the Defendant/Debtor. The Plaintiff had been listed as a creditor in this Chapter 13 proceeding and had received notice of the Debtor’s proposal to pay her claim through the Chapter 13 plan. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff’s continuation of the non-bankruptcy lawsuit after commencement of this Chapter 13 case was in violation of the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362 stays an appeal against a debtor during bankruptcy but does not stay the appeal against a bank that is not a debtor.

Andy Marine, Inc., a California Corporation v. Zidell, Inc., an Oregon Corporation v. The Commercial Bank of Korea, Ltd. · filed 1987-07-06

By an order filed March 11, 1986, this court ruled that, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, the appeal against Andy Marine was "stayed pending resolution of its petition in bankruptcy or until such time as relief from stay is granted by the bankruptcy court, whichever occurs first.” The court ruled that, because the Bank is not a debtor and is not included in the automatic stay, the appeal might proceed against the Bank.

Section 362(a) bars a creditor from continuing a postpetition setoff process, including retaining a payment check diverted to the creditor.

In Re Rinehart · filed 1987-07-24(a)

Therefore, the Court holds that the SBA’s postfiling continuation of its offset process, including holding of the Department of Agriculture check payable to the SBA, violated the automatic stay provisions of Bankruptcy Code Section 362(a).

Section 362’s automatic stay bars unauthorized repossession of property in a trustee’s custody, and a willful violation may be punished as civil contempt.

In re Miami General Hospital, Inc. · filed 1987-07-24

Hoskins Motor Trend Leasing and Jules Krasner are held to be in willful violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362 by reason of their removing the Ford Aerostar Mini-van from the possession, custody and control of the trustee without authorization and failing to return the same and are hereby held to be in civil contempt.

Section 362 does not authorize staying an action that seeks no recovery from the debtor or the debtor’s property.

A.H. Robins Co., Inc. v. Baker · filed 1988-05-16

In light of Oberg, it appears the district court misstated its grounds for jurisdiction. Oberg teaches that Sec. 362 does not provide jurisdiction for staying actions which seek no recovery from the debtor or property of the debtor, specifically, Robins' insurance proceeds.

Section 362’s automatic stay cannot be used by a prime tenant to delay its own rent obligation after the debtor subtenant’s possessory estate has been terminated.

Cucinotta v. Saljon Enterprises, Ltd. · filed 1988-08-10

Having itself terminated the bankrupt’s possessory estate, respondent is now seeking to use the section 362 automatic stay, not to shield the bankrupt, but rather to delay its own independent obligation to petitioner.

Section 362(a) does not bar an order directing a third party to preserve a debtor’s property for the bankruptcy trustee when the order determines no rights in that property.

Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Labrum · filed 1988-09-09(a)

Because the trial court’s order was against Malouf rather than the Labrums or their estate, the § 362 automatic stay had no effect on the February 8 order.

Section 362(a) does not stay a debtor’s counterclaim.

Malone v. Hughes (In Re Hughes) · filed 1988-11-18(a)

Debtor has not suggested that the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) has any application to this case. ... In any event, the stay does not apply to debtor’s counterclaim.

Section 362(a)(3) stays creditor actions to obtain existing estate property, but does not itself bar actions to obtain property that the trustee might later recover from third parties.

Barnett v. Stern · filed 1988-11-30(a)(3)

Strictly speaking, however, it does not prohibit creditor actions to obtain possession of property that the trustee might recover from third parties — either by enforcing the debtor’s rights of action or by avoiding improper transfers — but has not.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against the debtor but does not prevent proceedings against a solvent co-defendant.

Greene & Kellogg, Inc. v. Oxford Hospital, Inc. · filed 1989-01-09(a)(1)

This motion is made by Kensington alone. Oxford is not involved with this motion, and could not be because of the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The stay provisions do not prohibit this Court from continuing proceedings that relate only to the solvent co-defendant of a bankrupt, the solvent co-defendant being Kensington.