11 U.S.C. § 362

The automatic stay applies to domestic relations proceedings that affect a debtor’s financial condition or property, including the distribution of marital assets.

In Re Ford · filed 1987-10-08

It is clear to us that the automatic stay applies to any domestic relations matters which impacts upon a debtor’s financial condition or property. Thus, matters involving distribution of marital assets perforce must be subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362 permits lifting the automatic stay so a matrimonial court can adjudicate a nondebtor spouse’s rights while retaining the stay against enforcement affecting property of the estate.

Matter of Palmer · filed 1987-10-15

ORDERED, that the stay is vacated to permit an adjudication by the matrimonial court of the rights, obligations duties and property interests of the non-debtor spouse. The stay, however, remains in full force and effect regarding enforcement of those rights as it affects property of the estate.

Section 362(a) stays a post-petition motion to modify a divorce property division because the motion continues the original divorce action.

Zick v. Zick (In Re Zick) · filed 1990-11-28(a)

The wife’s motion was for modification of the property division, which clearly falls within the prohibitions of the automatic stay because it is a continuation of the original divorce action.

Section 362 stays further divorce proceedings after a spouse files for bankruptcy, but an appeal in a proceeding to collect maintenance and support is exempt from the stay.

Rothberg v. Rothberg · filed 1991-06-06

Moreover, further proceedings in this divorce action are stayed pursuant to 11 USC § 362 until plaintiff can successfully move to vacate or modify the automatic stay to allow the divorce proceeding to go forward (In re White, 851 F2d 170 [6th Cir]). However, since the order appealed was entered in a proceeding for the collection of maintenance and support, this appeal insofar as it is part of those proceedings is exempt from the stay (In re Stringer, 847 F2d 549 [9th Cir]).

Section 362(a) does not bar a family court award of attorney fees that creates a post-petition obligation.

Boudakian v. Boudakian (In Re Boudakian) · filed 1992-02-07(a)

The Family Court order of January 7, 1991, awarding Stephen Fortunato an additional attorney fee of $2,000 is a post-petition obligation of the Debtor, and is not dischargeable, and was not obtained in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 does not bar a divorce court from imposing sanctions for failure to file an inventory and appraisement when the sanctions make no determination or disposition of property.

Falasco v. Falasco · filed 1992-03-02

Our granting of the requested sanctions do not violate the automatic stay provision as we are not making any determination or disposition regarding the parties’ property.

Section 362(a) stays disposition of marital property that enters the bankruptcy estate when a spouse files a bankruptcy petition, though the divorce itself may proceed.

DiGiacomo v. DiGiacomo · filed 1992-05-19(a)

Therefore, the business and the marital home were properly subject to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, and to the extent that the final judgment of divorce addresses the disposition of those assets, that part of the order must be vacated.

Section 362(a) stays divorce and custody proceedings unless an exception in § 362(b) applies, though relief from the stay should be freely granted for those matters because they usually have little effect on the debtor’s economic affairs.

In Re Simpson · filed 1992-06-03(a)

In fact, all proceedings not within the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) are stayed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), including divorce and custody proceedings. However, relief should be freely given as to such matters, since they usually impinge upon the Debtor’s economic affairs to only a relatively slight degree.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay may be modified to permit a state domestic relations court to apportion marital property during bankruptcy.

In Re Donnelly · filed 1992-07-01(a)

Without deciding that issue, however, the bankruptcy court has discretion to lift or modify the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) to permit a divorce proceeding to continue in state court. ... Based upon the foregoing, this Court modifies the automatic stay for the express purpose of permitting the state domestic relations court to apportion the marital property between the debtor and Janet Donnelly.

Section 362(a) renders void the portions of a divorce decree that direct transfers of bankruptcy estate property when relief from the stay has not been obtained.

Anderson v. Briglevich (In Re Briglevich) · filed 1992-10-08(a)

Here, defendant Rose Briglevich did not seek or obtain relief from the stay pursuant to § 362(d). Those portions of the divorce decree entered in August, 1987 and recorded in October, 1988, which affect and direct any transfer of property of the bankruptcy estate clearly violate the automatic stay and are void.

Section 362(a) bars enforcement of a nondebtor spouse’s unsecured claim arising from a state court’s equitable distribution of marital property.

In Re Price · filed 1993-04-14(a)

The enforcement of that claim, however, is barred by the stay of § 362(a) and now that the debtor has received her discharge, the injunction of § 524(a) of the Code.

Section 362(a) stays division of a debtor’s property in a dissolution action while the bankruptcy petition is pending.

Peters v. Peters, No. Fa 94-0360792-S (Jan. 23, 1996) · filed 1996-01-23(a)

Since actions involving the defendant's property are stayed by the defendant's bankruptcy petition, it makes little sense to proceed at this time on the remaining issues when an essential aspect of the dissolution action cannot be addressed.

Section 362(a) stays an appeal seeking to enlarge a spouse’s property rights at the debtor’s expense, but does not stay a challenge to the divorce itself.

Hunter v. Hunter · filed 1997-06-20(a)

We follow these authorities here, and conclude that while the automatic stay set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) does not apply to the wife's contentions regarding the correctness of the divorce, it does apply to the wife's claim on appeal that the trial court inequitably divided the marital property, which seeks enlargement of her property rights at the expense of the husband/debtor's property rights.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(iv) allows a civil action for dissolution of marriage to continue despite the automatic stay.

Shavers v. Shavers · filed 2000-10-03(b)(2)(A)(iv)

Because the automatic stay pursuant to 11 United States Code, Section 362, does not operate as a stay for the continuation of a civil action for the dissolution of marriage, we proceed with the issues before us on appeal.

Section 362 stays adjudication of property and debt division and attorney fees in a divorce case during the debtor spouse’s bankruptcy, even when that spouse filed the divorce case, but does not stay divorce, custody, or support matters.

Shin v. Shin · filed 2001-07-12(a)(1)

Considering all of the above, we conclude that the automatic stay did not apply to family court proceedings regarding the divorce, alimony/spousal support, child custody and visitation, child support, healthcare, and educational expenses. On the other hand, the automatic stay applied to family court proceedings involving Stanley’s rights and claims regarding the division and distribution of property and debts of the parties and the award of attorney fees and costs. This means that all family court orders post-July 7, 1999, and pre-October 13, 1999, involving Stanley’s rights and claims regarding the division and distribution of property and debts of the parties and the award of attorney fees and costs are void.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a divorce proceeding to the extent it divides property within the debtor’s estate while bankruptcy is pending.

DEVINE II v. Devine · filed 2001-09-21(a)(1)

Thus, the filing of a petition for bankruptcy protection stays proceedings in a divorce action as it pertains to the division of property within the debtor's estate, but it does not operate as a stay as to the dissolution of the marriage itself or the award of child support or alimony.

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar a state court from dissolving a marriage, although the court is constrained in matters involving property of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Surgent · filed 2003-11-06(a)(1)

Although the bankruptcy case was pending at the time his wife filed for divorce, the automatic stay did not serve as a complete bar to the divorce action in state court. The trial court had jurisdiction to hear matters pertaining to the dissolution of the marriage, even though it was constrained in matters relating to property that was part of the bankruptcy estate.

The automatic stay bars an action to reduce maintenance owed to a debtor to offset the debtor’s failure to satisfy a property division obligation.

In Re Harris · filed 2004-05-25(a)(1), (a)(7), (b)(2)(A)(ii)

Requiring the Debtor to show cause in a state court proceeding that could have been commenced prior to the Debtor’s bankruptcy petition violates § 362(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, since Chet’s Motion sought to reduce maintenance payable to the Debtor as a result of the Debtor’s failure to comply with the terms of the property division portion of the Divorce Judgment, Chet’s action was in the nature of a setoff of his maintenance obligation against the Debtor’s property division obligation. Such a setoff is prohibited by Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)(7).

The automatic stay bars division of marital assets that are bankruptcy estate property but permits establishment of spousal support during a Chapter 13 case.

Sitzman v. Sitzman, Unpublished Decision (6-26-2006) · filed 2006-06-26(a), (b)(2)(A)(ii)

This Court finds that, while the trial court had jurisdiction to order spousal support, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to divide the parties' marital assets and property.

Section 362(a) stays divorce proceedings to divide property belonging to the bankruptcy estate, and a property division entered without relief from the stay is void.

Morris v. Wright (In Re Wright) · filed 2007-07-05(a)

Further proceedings under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1610 to determine the extent of his property interests in the marital estate were automatically stayed by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) upon the filing of his bankruptcy in January of 2005. Neither of the Wrights sought or obtained relief from the stay to proceed with the divorce property division. Therefore, the November 2005 divorce decree, which memorialized the settlement agreement of the Wrights, is void and of no effect, at least with respect to the purported division of the tax refund.

The automatic stay renders a dissolution judgment’s division of bankruptcy-estate property void, but does not invalidate provisions dissolving the marriage or providing spousal and child support.

In Re the Marriage of Cam · filed 2007-12-05(a)(1), (b)(2)

The judgment that the trial court entered during the pendency of husband’s bankruptcy case purported to divide the parties’ real property and to require husband to make payments on the money judgment that was part of that property division. So far as we can tell from the record, all of husband’s interest in the property was part of the bankruptcy estate. The entry of that judgment was the continuation of a judicial action against husband that was commenced before the commencement of the bankruptcy case. That is precisely what the automatic stay prohibits a court from doing. ... Those portions of the judgment are void, and the trial court correctly set them aside. ... On the other hand, the portions of the judgment that dissolved the marital relationship and that provided for spousal and child support fit into the exceptions to the automatic stay. The automatic stay did not render those portions void.

The automatic stay does not bar continuation of a civil action for dissolution of marriage when no determination of property division is made.

Shavers v. Shavers · filed 2008-05-22(b)(2)(A)(iv)

Because the automatic stay pursuant to 11 United States Code, Section 362, does not operate as a stay for the continuation of a civil action for the dissolution of marriage, we proceed with the issues before us on appeal. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(iv). Nothing in this opinion is to be construed as a determination of the division of property.

The automatic stay applies to distribution of marital property in divorce proceedings.

May v. May · filed 2012-05-22(b)(2)(A)(iv)

In divorce proceedings, the bankruptcy code’s automatic stay applies to the distribution of marital property.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(iv) does not except requests to divide property of the bankruptcy estate from the automatic stay in a divorce proceeding.

In re Kallabat · filed 2012-07-13(b)(2)(A)(iv)

There is no question that this section purports to determine the division of property that is property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate. This request violates § 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code and is not within the exception to the automatic stay of § 362(b)(2)(A)(iv).

Section 362(b)(2) permits domestic relations proceedings but does not authorize division of estate property or collection of a claim that is not a domestic support obligation.

In re Coats · filed 2014-05-05(b)(2)

Indeed, the automatic stay generally does not preclude post-bankruptcy litigation involving paternity, custody, spousal support, and similar domestic relations matters within the traditional hegemony of the state courts, 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2), but nothing in that exception authorizes any entity to “determine the division of property that is property of the estate” or provide for the collection of any claim (such as Dr. Styer’s contingent indemnification claim) that does not fall within the federal definition of “domestic support obligation.”

Section 362’s automatic stay applies to divorce proceedings at least to the extent they seek to divide the marital estate.

Adeleye v. Driscal · filed 2016-04-28(b)(2)(A)(iv)

The stay specifically applies to divorce proceedings at least to the extent they seek to divide the marital estate.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(iv) excepts divorce from the automatic stay, but an equitable distribution claim does not constitute dissolution of a marriage and remains subject to the stay.

In re Jones · filed 2016-08-22(b)(2)(A)(iv)

The court finds that an equitable distribution claim does not constitute a “dissolution of a marriage,” and thus is not excepted from the automatic stay under' § 362(b)(2)(A)(iv).

Section 362 stays a marriage dissolution proceeding only to the extent it seeks to divide property of the bankruptcy estate; a sanctions order that does not divide estate property is not stayed.

Webb v. Webb · filed 2017-06-13(b)(2)(iv)

We take judicial notice of Deborah’s recent filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a petition filed under Chapter 13 only operates as a stay of a proceeding for the dissolution of marriage “to the extent that such proceeding seeks to determine the division of property that is property of the estate.” (11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(iv).) Here, the sanctions order at issue does not “determine the division of property” belonging to the estate. Therefore, no stay applies.

Section 362's automatic stay bars division of the marital estate in a divorce proceeding, and a division entered in violation of the stay is void.

Adeleye v. Driscal (In re Adeleye) · filed 2018-02-27(b)(2)(A)(iv)

The trial court's division of the marital estate in this case was void because it occurred in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(iv) allows a divorce action to continue to implement a final property division, because implementing an existing division does not determine the division of estate property.

Ronald William Kipps v. · filed 2024-06-07(b)(2)(A)(iv)

The State Court’s order falls within the exception but not the exception to the exception, so it did not violate § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a) does not bar a divorce judgment entered after the bankruptcy stay is lifted.

A.K. v. S.K. · filed 2025-01-29(a)

Here, the judge correctly found there was no violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) because the divorce complaint was filed January 13, 2015, and the JOD effectuating the PSA and the MMA was not entered until March 18, 2015, after the bankruptcy court approved the global settlement agreement in December 2014.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) permits modification of a child-support order to include college expenses without relief from the automatic stay.

In re Welsch · filed 2019-07-30(b)(2)(A)(ii)

Ms. Welsch wants to modify an order that governs the debtor's obligation to pay child support so that the order includes college expenses. That would be a "modification of an order for domestic support obligations" that is specifically excepted from the stay in § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii).

Section 362(b)(2) excepts the establishment or modification of support orders and the collection of support from property outside the bankruptcy estate from the automatic stay.

McCloskey v. McCloskey (In Re McCloskey) · filed 2016-10-31(b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(B)

Second, at the time Christopher filed for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code included exceptions to the automatic stay for “the establish- ment or modification of an order for alimony, maintenance, or support” 6 and for “the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate.” 7 Those two exceptions cover all of the relevant state-court orders.

Section 362(b)(2)(A) permits proceedings to establish or modify domestic support and to dissolve a marriage during bankruptcy, except insofar as they seek to divide property of the bankruptcy estate.

In re Marriage of Okhrimovskaya CA2/4 · filed 2015-09-16(b)(2)(A)(ii), (iv)

The automatic stay resulting from bankruptcy proceedings (11 U.S.C. § 362(a)) “does not operate as a stay – . . . of the commencement or continuation of a civil action or proceeding – . . . for the establishment or modification of an order for domestic support obligations [or] . . . for the dissolution of a marriage, except to the extent that such a proceeding seeks to determine the division of property that is property of the estate.” (11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) & (iv).) Thus, nothing about the ongoing bankruptcy proceedings precluded Seva (or Dina) from seeking to modify the February 2009 support order or memorialize at least some portions of the Deal Memorandum in a court order.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) allows a child support proceeding to continue despite a party’s bankruptcy filing.

Elkin v. Labis · filed 2014-01-09(b)(2)(A)(ii)

Further, plaintiffs filing for bankruptcy protection does not operate as a stay of this proceeding (see 11 USC § 362 [b] [2] [A] [ii]).

Section 362 permits a civil contempt order enforcing prepetition child support arrears when the order does not require payment from the bankruptcy estate.

In the Matter of Faith A. F. · filed 2013-07-26(b)(2)

It is clear that the child support arrearage which served as the basis of the holding that Father was in civil contempt was pre-petition. The court subsequently modified its order in accordance with the bankruptcy court’s directive to provide that the order was not to be interpreted to require payment of the arrearage from the bankruptcy estate. Under these circumstances, the court’s order calculating the arrearage and holding Father in civil contempt did not violate 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) excepts collection of support from the automatic stay only when the debtor owes the support to the debtor’s spouse, former spouse, or child under a separation agreement, divorce decree, or court order.

In Re Virden · filed 2002-06-20(b)(2)(B)

It is well settled that the scope of the reference to alimony, maintenance or support contained in Section 362(b)(2)(B) is consistent with that contained in Section 523(a)(5). That is to say, the term “support” is restricted to amounts payable by the debtor to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debt- or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record. That is not the nature of the debt here, and consequently, the movant’s claim is not excepted from the application of Section 362(a).

Section 362(b)(2)(B) excepts a state court contempt proceeding to collect support-related legal fees from a Chapter 7 debtor’s postpetition wages from the automatic stay.

Gunther v. Glabb (In Re Glabb) · filed 2001-03-05(b)(2)(B)

Our examination of the totality of the circumstances presented in this case leads us to conclude that the pending contempt proceeding against debtor in state court lies within the scope of § 362(b)(2)(B).

Section 362(b)(2)(B) excepts a visitation-based contempt petition and related attorney fees and costs from the automatic stay as support.

Burrell v. Lewis · filed 2001-02-28(b)(2)(B)

We find that Mother's contempt petition based on a visitation issue, and the trial court's subsequent award of attorney fees and costs to her, did fall within that exception.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) permits collection of maintenance or support from property outside the bankruptcy estate despite a bankruptcy filing.

Stahl v. Stahl (In Re Stahl) · filed 2001-03-05(b)(2)(B)

The filing of a bankruptcy petition does not stay an action to collect maintenance or support from property that is not part of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) excepts collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from non-estate property from the automatic stay when the debt is actually in the nature of support.

Ippolito v. Blyn · filed 2001-01-16(b)(2)(B)

Section 362(b)(2)(B) of 11 U.S.C. excepts from the automatic stay "the collection of alimony, maintenance or support from property that is not property of the estate." Id. To fall within this statutory exception, the monies sought to be collected must constitute a debt in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).

Section 362(b)(2)(B) allows collection of alimony from property outside the bankruptcy estate, but a personal contempt action against the debtor violates the automatic stay.

Kortus v. Weihs · filed 2001-01-10(b)(2)(B)

Turning to the issue of sanctions, although Kortus was entitled to pursue alimony on behalf of Kenkel from Weihs’s post-petition wages, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B) (automatic stay does not prohibit collection of alimony from property that is not property of bankruptcy estate), he was not entitled to file a contempt action against Weihs personally.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) permits collection of support from property outside the estate, but state court enforcement remains stayed when a Chapter 13 plan keeps the debtor's future income in the estate.

Mudd v. Jacobson (In Re Jacobson) · filed 1999-03-12(b)(2)(B)

11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B) exempts from the operation of the stay “the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate.” Under the Debtor’s plan, all future income would remain property of the estate until the plan payments are fully made, thereby making the enforcement of such obligations in the state court subject to the stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2).

Section 362(b)(2)(B) permits collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property outside the bankruptcy estate despite the automatic stay.

Nevettie v. Doering (In Re Nevettie) · filed 1998-03-10(b)(2)(B)

The filing of a petition under Title 11 of the United States Code does not operate as a stay of the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B).

Section 362(b)(2) does not except collection of a support claimant’s attorney’s fees from the automatic stay, even if the fees may be nondischargeable as support.

Weisberg v. Abrams (In Re Weisberg) · filed 1998-03-12(b)(2)

We further hold that there is no language in § 362(b)(2), like the language in § 523(a)(5) referencing actions “in connection with” support, which even arguably extends the scope of § 362(b)(2) to cover collection of attorneys’ fees for a support-plaintiff’s counsel.

Section 362(b)(2) excepts proceedings to collect child support and related attorney fees from the automatic stay to the extent collection is from property outside the bankruptcy estate.

Sinewitz v. Sinewitz (In Re Sinewitz) · filed 1994-04-29(b)(2)

The Court also concludes that proceedings to collect the said obligations or such additional judgments of contempt for failure to pay court ordered child support are excepted from the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. ... An exception from the operation of the automatic stay applies only to the extent that such proceedings or actions are not instituted against property of the estate.

Section 362(b)(2) does not except collection of prepetition alimony or support from the automatic stay when collection is sought from property of the bankruptcy estate.

Farmer v. Cole (In Re Farmer) · filed 1991-01-07(b)(2)

This being an effort by defendant Betty Rex Ann Farmer to enforce against property of the estate a judgment which was obtained before the commencement of the bankruptcy case, her actions are not excepted from the constraints of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) by the provisions of subsection (b)(2).

Section 362(b)(2) permits collection of previously awarded child support from property outside the estate, but does not exempt proceedings to increase child support from the automatic stay.

Dexter v. Grove (In Re Dexter) · filed 1990-06-27(b)(2)

Accordingly, this court likewise determines that the modification proceeding in as far as it sought an increase in child support payments was stayed on December 22, 1988 when the debtor filed his chapter 7 petition and all subsequent post-petition activity with respect to this modification request violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(2) permits collection of child support from a Chapter 7 debtor’s post-petition wages without relief from the automatic stay because those wages are not property of the estate.

Matter of Daugherty · filed 1990-06-25(b)(2)

On the facts of the instant case, the obligation sought to be enforced by the Deputy County Attorney is a child support obligation. The obligation is within the Section 362(b)(2) exception to the automatic stay. Further, this is a Chapter 7 case and the Deputy County Attorney seeks to collect the obligation from debtor’s post-petition wages. The wages are not property of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. Therefore, I conclude that the Deputy County Attorney is entitled to enforce the debtor’s child support obligation without obtaining relief from the stay.

Section 362(b)(2) does not stay an equitable distribution award that is part of an award for maintenance.

Hilsen v. Hilsen · filed 1990-05-22(b)(2)

Although, there is some uncertainty on this point and the parties have not addressed the question of whether the equitable distribution award may possibly be subject to such stay, we consider it part of the award for maintenance and not subject to an automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(2) does not except collection of a divorce decree property settlement obligation from the automatic stay.

Matter of Cline · filed 1990-03-22(b)(2)

These were acts to enforce a property settlement obligation and not acts to collect a support obligation. Accordingly, the exception to the automatic stay for alimony, maintenance and support does not apply.

Section 362(b)(2) permits collection of an obligation in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support from property outside the bankruptcy estate; a debtor’s second mortgage payments intended to support his former spouse and children fall within that exception.

Gianakas v. Gianakas (In Re Gianakas) · filed 1990-03-22(b)(2)

These findings compel a conclusion that the obligation in question is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) and is, therefore, not subject to the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(b)(2) allows collection of support through garnishment of postpetition wages that are not estate property.

Catlett v. Jackson (In Re Jackson) · filed 1985-04-23(b)(2)

The postpetition salary of the debtor is clearly not property of the bankruptcy estate and therefore is not protected by the provision of the § 362 stay.

Section 362(b)(2) allows enforcement of alimony and child support obligations despite the filing of a Chapter 13 petition.

In Re Gomez Molina · filed 1987-08-21(b)(2)

The filing of a Chapter 13 proceeding does not automatically stay the enforcement of alimony and child support obligations.

Section 362(b)(2) permits collection of child support, including mortgage and utility payments under a temporary support order, from property outside the bankruptcy estate despite the automatic stay.

In Re Weidenhammer · filed 1988-02-11(b)(2)

Thus, the proposed contempt petition, targeted as it would be on the failure to pay support, including the mortgage and utilities, meets the first part of the § 362(b) test. ... The caveat in § 362(b) is that actions to collect support are not covered by the automatic stay as long as the collection will be made from property that is not property of the estate.

Section 362(b)(2) allows collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property outside the bankruptcy estate to proceed despite the automatic stay.

Levine v. Levine (In Re Levine) · filed 1988-03-25(b)(2)

However, the automatic stay does not affect the continuance of matrimonial actions. Specifically, 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2) directs that actions for the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate are not stayed.

Section 362(b)(2) permits collection of child support already ordered before bankruptcy, but does not exempt modification of a child support order from the automatic stay.

In Re Charles Stringer, Ii, Debtor. Charles Stringer, Ii, Debtor-Appellant v. Aristela Huet, Claimant-Appellee · filed 1988-05-24(b)(2)

Review of the language of the statutory exemption in context, the legislative history of the automatic stay and its exemptions, and the existing caselaw convinces us that that modification of an order of child support cannot be considered “collection” of child support.

Section 362(b)(2) permits collection of support payments from property that is not part of the bankruptcy estate despite the automatic stay.

Gianakas v. Gianakas (In Re Gianakas) · filed 1989-06-09(b)(2)

It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Debtor’s obligation to make payments specified in Paragraph 3A of the December 24, 1982 Agreement between Paul Chris Gianakas and Karen Gianakas is a support obligation which is non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). Therefore the motion for determination that certain payments are not subject to the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 is GRANTED, and Movant may proceed to collect said payments from property which is not property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2).

Section 362(a)(1) stays a civil contempt action seeking to compel payment of temporary alimony that accrued before the bankruptcy petition.

Bible v. Bible (In Re Bible) · filed 1990-02-23(a)(1)

The civil contempt action against the debtor to recover prepetition accrued temporary alimony is an action commenced against the debtor to recover a claim against the debtor pending at the time of the commencement of this Chapter 11 proceeding and is, therefore, stayed under § 362(a).

Section 362(b)(2) excepts collection of support obligations from the automatic stay when collection is from property outside the estate, and an obligation to pay a mortgage on the former marital home can qualify as support.

In Re Paul Chris Gianakas, Debtor. Karen Gianakas v. Gianakas · filed 1990-10-19(b)(2)

Although each determination of the nature of an obligation involves an ad hoc inquiry, in light of the record in this case we agree with the district court that it was not error for the bankruptcy court to have concluded, even though the burden of proof was upon Karen, that Paul’s obligation to make payments on the second mortgage was in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. It follows that the debt was not dischargeable and was unaffected by the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(2) permits a spouse to collect support from a chapter 11 debtor’s income earned for services performed after the bankruptcy filing.

Gautier-Adams v. El-Amin (In Re El-Amin) · filed 1991-02-11(b)(2)

Therefore, by virtue of § 362(b)(2), a spouse may proceed to collect from income received by the chapter 11 debtor for services performed after the commencement of the case.

Section 362(b)(2) allows enforcement of alimony, maintenance, or support obligations against a Chapter 7 debtor’s assets and income acquired after the bankruptcy petition.

In Re the Marriage of Barber · filed 1991-04-25(b)(2)

Therefore, the automatic stay does not prohibit the enforcement of alimony, maintenance, or support obligations against the post-petition assets and income of the debtor in a Chapter 7 case.

Section 362(b)(2) does not except child support garnishment from the automatic stay when it reaches postpetition earnings that belong to a Chapter 13 estate.

In Re Raboin · filed 1991-04-26(b)(2)

Therefore, the debtor’s earnings are property of the estate in this case, and the exception of section 362(b)(2) would not except the garnishment order from the stay.

Section 362(b)(2) permits collection of mortgage payments that constitute alimony, maintenance, or support from property outside the bankruptcy estate.

Pazienza v. Pazienza · filed 1991-07-18(b)(2)

Moving on to the questions mentioned earlier, we turn to the question of whether the mortgage payments that Robert agreed to pay constitute “alimony, maintenance, or support” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2). Clearly they are.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not protect a Chapter 13 debtor from a state court proceeding to collect a nondischargeable child support obligation.

Miller v. Miller · filed 1991-07-05

Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in denying Jay’s motion to vacate the contempt hearing and in finding Jay to be in contempt. We agree with the district court’s rationale that since a child support obligation cannot be discharged under Chapter 13, Jay does not obtain any protection against a debt collection proceeding by reason of a bankruptcy court stay.

Section 362(b)(2) exempts collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property outside the bankruptcy estate from the automatic stay, permitting appellate review of an alimony award despite the debtor’s bankruptcy.

Uslar v. Uslar · filed 1992-01-23(b)(2)

There is no question of our jurisdiction to pass upon this issue, notwithstanding the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. The Bankruptcy Code in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2) exempts from the automatic stay provision "the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate."

Section 362(b)(2) does not prevent pursuit of the debtor for payment of post-petition child support.

In Re Melenyzer · filed 1992-04-20(b)(2)

As for child support ordered post-petition, this was always the obligation of Dr. Melenyzer and not of the Trustee. The automatic stay never prevented Ms. Mele-nyzer from pursuing Dr. Melenyzer for payment. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2).

Section 362(b)(2) does not allow a creditor to garnish a Chapter 13 debtor’s future wages, which are estate property, to collect past-due child support.

Gaertner v. Choske (In Re Henry) · filed 1992-07-09(b)(2)

This exception permits the collection of alimony, maintenance and support from property which is not property of the bankruptcy estate. However, future income in a Chapter 13 is property of the estate. ... This court holds that the collection order entered after the filing of the Chapter 13 petition violated the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362 does not stay a proceeding to set child support on a postpetition claim, but it prohibits collecting that support from a Chapter 13 debtor’s postpetition wages because they are estate property.

Heflin v. Heflin (In Re Heflin) · filed 1992-09-04

The court finds that the claim against William Heflin did not arise until after his bankruptcy petition was filed, and therefore the stay was not applicable to the hearing to set the amount of current child support owed by William Heflin. ... Although § 362(b) excepts the collection of support from the provisions of the automatic stay, it only permits collection “from property that is not property of the estate.” Section 1306 of the Bankruptcy Code defines property of the estate in a chapter 13 case to include property acquired postpetition and personal service earnings of the debtor acquired postpetition. Therefore, the collection of support from the wages of William Heflin constituted a violation of the provisions of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(2) permits collection of support despite the automatic stay only from property that is not property of the estate.

Lawson v. Lackey (In Re Lackey) · filed 1992-12-18(b)(2)

However, this exception is only for collection from property that is not property of the estate. In the case at hand, there is no such property.

Section 362(a)(2) stays enforcement of a prepetition support judgment through garnishment of a Chapter 13 debtor’s postpetition earnings.

In Re Suarez · filed 1993-01-08(a)(2)

The operation of a garnishment order to enforce a judgment for support is, therefore, automatically stayed.

Section 362(b)(2) allows collection of support from property outside the bankruptcy estate; the stay applies when there is no such property available for collection.

In Re Walter · filed 1993-02-05(b)(2)

It does not appear that there is any non-estate property to which § 362(b)(2) would apply in the present ease.

Section 362(b)(2) allows collection of child support from property outside the bankruptcy estate without relief from the automatic stay.

Coleman v. McCord (In Re McCord) · filed 1993-04-02(b)(2)

Thus, in light of this Court’s March 15, 1993 order in this case, which found that the debts owed by Debtor Joseph McCord to Coleman were non-dischargeable as being in the nature of child support, there is no automatic stay in operation as to these debts, as to property that is not property of the estate.

Section 362(b)(2) does not exempt collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from a chapter 13 debtor’s post-petition income because that income is property of the estate, so relief from the stay is required.

Pidgeon v. Pidgeon (In Re Pidgeon) · filed 1993-05-13(b)(2)

Since the “collection of alimony, maintenance, or support” exception to the automatic stay is qualified by the phrase “... from property that is not property of the estate,” and since a chapter 13 debtor’s post-petition income is property of the estate, stay relief is required in a chapter 13 proceeding.

Section 362(b)(2) excludes garnishment of a debtor’s future earnings from the automatic stay when it collects an obligation in the nature of alimony or support.

In Re Michaels · filed 1993-07-23(b)(2)

And I further conclude that the garnishment proceedings that the movant contemplates are excluded by 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2) ... from the operation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(2) permits collection of nondischargeable support obligations from property outside the bankruptcy estate, but the automatic stay bars collection from estate property.

Kearns v. Orr (In Re Kearns) · filed 1994-05-20(b)(2)

Section 362(b)(2) excepts from the automatic stay the collection of nondischargeable support obligations from property that is not property of the estate. ... Nevertheless, the automatic stay still applied to any attempts to collect support obligations from property of the estate.

Section 362 stays a county’s proceeding to establish a prepetition child-support reimbursement obligation when the 1994 exception for establishing support orders does not apply to the bankruptcy case.

In Re Carlson · filed 1995-01-11(b)(2)(A)(ii)

A juvenile court proceeding to establish a support obligation, pursuant to Minn.Stat. Chapter 260, is excepted from the 11 U.S.C. § 362 stay, as the statute now reads. However, the amendments made by the 1994 Act apply only to cases filed after its effective date. ... Accordingly, the amendments do not apply. The conduct of the County, in seeking to establish an order for support against the Debtors from the juvenile court, violated the 11 U.S.C. § 362 stay, as it applies to this case.

Section 362 does not stay a contempt motion to collect a nondischargeable child support obligation for college expenses.

Hill v. Hill, No. Fa 770166874 (May 26, 1995) · filed 1995-05-26(b)(2)(B)

It is not dischargeable in bankruptcy and, therefore, CT Page 5144 the automatic stay is inapplicable to this motion for contempt.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) permits proceedings to collect support from property outside the bankruptcy estate, but stays collection from estate property.

In Re Campbell · filed 1995-06-28(b)(2)(B)

Motions or proceedings that seek to collect maintenance or support are excepted from the stay only if they do not seek to collect from property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B).

Section 362(b)(2) does not stay a state court’s enforcement of prepetition alimony and support orders through incarceration for nonpayment.

In Re Montana · filed 1995-08-22(b)(2)

Based on the foregoing, the Court determines that the bankruptcy filing does not stay the State Court’s right to carry out its orders of incarceration of the Debtor for his failure to pay court ordered support and alimony obligations.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) permits collection of both prepetition and postpetition nondischargeable support from non-estate property.

In Re Cole · filed 1996-11-01(b)(2)(B)

Accordingly, section 362(b)(2)(B) covers both prepetition and postpetition, nondischargeable support.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) excepts from the automatic stay a state court action to determine whether a debt imposed by a prepetition divorce order is support and nondischargeable.

In Re Massengill · filed 1997-08-20(b)(2)(A)(ii)

For all the foregoing reasons, it is the conclusion of the Court that the filing of the dischargeability action in state court was excepted from the stay by Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii).

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) excepts a judgment establishing a support obligation from the automatic stay.

In Re Lewis · filed 1998-11-23(b)(2)(A)(ii)

The debtor also asserts that one of the judgments, entered by the state court after the filing of the bankruptcy case, is void as a violation of the stay. This contention is not true since it was a support obligation and thus not a violation of the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii).

Section 362(b)(2)(B) allows collection of support from a Chapter 12 debtor’s postconfirmation earnings to the extent those earnings are no longer estate property and are not needed to fund the plan.

In Re Jeffrey · filed 1999-05-12(b)(2)(B)

In this case, in the words of § 362(2)(B), the JCDSS was engaged in the “collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate” because of paragraph 9 of the July 14, 1997 Confirmation Order. Thus, no violation of § 362 occurred if JCDSS’s levy reached only those earnings of the Debtors not dedicated to fulfillment of the Plan, in effect, earnings not necessary for submission to the trustee.

Section 362(b)(2) excepts proceedings to establish or modify a support award from the automatic stay.

Taylor v. Taylor (In Re Taylor) · filed 1999-05-12(b)(2)

The further proceedings before Justice Diamond were clearly within the exception to the automatic stay for an action to establish or modify a support award.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) permits collection of support from property outside the bankruptcy estate, but a contempt petition seeking collection beyond that property remains subject to the automatic stay.

Lori v. Lori (In Re Lori) · filed 1999-10-05(b)(2)(B)

While § 362(b)(2)(B) would permit collection efforts against property not of the estate, such as wage attachment under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8127(a)(2), the Petition to hold Adrian Lori in contempt for violating the January 21, 1997 Order was not so limited.

Section 362 permits a former spouse to seek an alimony order and collect alimony from post-petition wages that are outside the bankruptcy estate.

Vargason v. Porter (In Re Vargason) · filed 2001-04-05(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)

Pursuit of such a remedy is within the exemption carved out by section 362(b)(2)(A) and (B) and the Superior Court of Guam in its September 20, 2000 Order vacated the property settlement award and instead awarded Porter alimony to be paid by means of an assignment of Vargason’s future wages.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) does not except a civil contempt proceeding to collect support from the automatic stay when it seeks payment from property of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate.

Peare v. Jackson · filed 2001-08-02(b)(2)(B)

The contempt nonetheless did not come within the exception to the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B) for collection of support, because it was not targeted to compel payment “from property that is not property of the estate.”

Section 362(b)(2)(B) does not except support collection from the automatic stay when the creditor pursues Chapter 13 estate property, including post-petition earnings.

Colon v. Rivera (In Re Colon) · filed 2001-08-21(b)(2)(B)

The bankruptcy court properly rejected Rivera’s argument that her repeated post-petition efforts to collect divorce-related obligations were excepted from the automatic stay by § 362(b)(2)(B). The record was uncontroverted on the point. Rivera’s (sometimes successful) actions to collect the obligations from Colon’s liquidated retirement funds and his post-petition earnings necessarily involved pursuit of estate property since the Chapter 13 estate includes not only pre-petition assets, but the property and earnings acquired and earned post-petition as well.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) excepts proceedings to establish or modify support orders from the automatic stay even when the support claims arose before bankruptcy.

Hutchison v. Birmingham (In Re Hutchison) · filed 2001-12-07(b)(2)(A)(ii)

The better view, then, is that § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) encompasses proceedings based on prepetition support claims.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) permits collection of support obligations from non-estate property, including through civil contempt.

In Re Bezoza · filed 2002-01-03(b)(2)(B)

As noted, however, the stay does not apply to the collection of support obligations from non-estate property. Hence, the use of contempt is similarly permissible in those circumstances.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) exempts proceedings to modify spousal support and dissolution appeals to the extent they concern spousal support from the automatic stay.

Jacqueline Allen, Creditor/plaintiff in Bankruptcy Court v. Christopher Lynn Allen, Debtor/defendant in Bankruptcy Court · filed 2002-01-11(b)(2)(A)(ii)

The question we now consider is whether Jacqueline’s efforts with respect to her dissolution proceedings should have been excepted from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii), which exempts “the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding for ... the establishment or modification of an order for alimony, maintenance, or support.” We hold that, to the extent they relate to spousal support, the dissolution proceedings fall within this exemption.

Section 362(b)(2)(B) allows collection of support arrears from non-estate property, but a support order requiring payment without regard to the source of the funds violates the automatic stay.

Johnston v. Parker (In Re Johnston) · filed 2003-08-08(b)(2)(B)

Because the Minute Entry Order was overly broad and did not consider how the Debtor would pay the Judgment from non-estate property, it violated the stay.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) exempts an appeal continuing a child support establishment or modification proceeding from the automatic stay.

Estelle Frame v. Frame Jr. · filed 2003-09-16(b)(2)(A)(ii)

From the plain language of this statute, we find the stay exemption created by § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) to be applicable in this case. In the instant matter, Father is appealing the decision of the trial court to grant Mother’s petition for establishment and modification of his support obligations. This appeal, in essence, is a continuation of Mother’s petition and, therefore, Father’s appeal of the trial court’s ruling establishing the arrearages and modifying his child support obligations was not stayed.

Section 362 exempts a divorce proceeding from the automatic stay to the extent it establishes an attorney’s fee obligation in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.

Eden, Larry v. Chapski, Robert A. · filed 2005-04-22(b)(2)(A)(ii)

The Kane County court ultimately deter- mined that the attorney-fee obligation was a debt in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support, and as such was a non-dischargeable debt pursuant to section 523(a)(5) of the Code. That determination in turn makes clear that the divorce proceeding that resulted in that obligation was, in relevant part, a proceeding to establish an order for alimony, maintenance, or support. As such, it was exempt from the automatic stay.

Section 362 stays enforcement of a prepetition personal judgment arising from a dispute over state child-support payments when the judgment is not itself an award of alimony, maintenance, or support, and further collection attempts are sanctionable.

In Re Mercier · filed 2005-07-25(a), (b)(2)(B), (h)

This Court having concluded that the Judgment based on the Arbitration Award does not represent an award of alimony, maintenance, support of a spouse, or a child of the spouse but merely seeks to impose and enforce a pre-petition claim against the Debtor which is within the protective provision of Section 362(a). ... ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that upon reconsideration this Court is satisfied that the Judgment based on the Arbitration Award represents a pre-petition personal obligation of the Debtor, thus, is within the protection of the automatic stay imposed by Section 362(a) and any further attempt to collect the same is sanctionable pursuant to Section 362(h) of the Code.

Section 362(b)(2)(B)'s exception for collecting support from nonestate property requires a determination that the debt is support excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(5).

Hartnett v. Mustelier (In Re Hartnett) · filed 2005-09-09(b)(2)(B)

11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B) provides an exception to the automatic stay for "the collection of alimony, maintenance or support from property that is not property of the estate.” However, to come within the purview of this exception, there must be a determination that the monies subject of the collection efforts constitute a debt that would be excepted from discharge as a debt in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).

Determining whether divorce-related attorney’s fee awards qualify for the domestic-support exception to the automatic stay requires an evidentiary hearing when material facts bearing on their support character remain unresolved.

In Re O'Brien · filed 2006-03-23(b)(2)(B)

The filing of a bankruptcy case does not stay the collection of a domestic support obligation from property that is not property of the estate, 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B). ... Having considered the Motions, the arguments, the record and applicable law, the Court concludes that there are material factual matters relevant to the determination of the Fee Awards as domestic support obligations requiring an evidentiary hearing.

Section 362(b)(2) excepts proceedings to establish reimbursement for actual counsel fees and costs incurred in enforcing custody orders from the automatic stay because those expenses are child support or in the nature of child support under federal law.

Corapcioglu v. Roosevelt · filed 2006-09-20(b)(2)

The proceedings were being prosecuted to recover sums Mother expended that were child support, or in the nature of child support, within the meaning of section 523(a)(5), as interpreted under federal law; and therefore the proceedings were excepted from the automatic stay under subsection 362(b)(2).

Income necessary to make Chapter 13 plan payments remains estate property protected by the automatic stay and falls outside the exception for collecting support from property outside the estate.

FL Dept. of Revenue v. Omine · filed 2007-05-11(b)(2)(B)

The automatic stay does not bar “collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B). ... Accordingly, we agree that Omine’s income is essential to the Omines’ ability to make plan payments and therefore is estate property.

Former Section 362(b)(2)(B) excepts proceedings to enforce support, including attorney fees awarded as support, from the automatic stay to the extent they do not seek payment from property of the bankruptcy estate.

Laine v. Gregory-Laine (In Re Laine) · filed 2008-02-19(b)(2)(B)

The contempt motion seeks to enforce valid support orders, both with respect to unpaid child support as well as attorneys fees that Laine was ordered to pay as part of his support obligations. Former § 362(b)(2)(B) excepted from the stay actions to enforce alimony, maintenance or support so long as the movant did not seek payment from property of the estate. To the extent the Texas contempt motion sought assets of Laine’s estate, it was stayed. ... Therefore, to the extent Gregory stakes no claim to property of the estate, the Texas motions are excepted from the ambit of stay under former § 362(b)(2)(B) and may proceed.

Under pre-BAPCPA Section 362(b)(2), determining support obligations and collecting them from exempt retirement plans that are not estate property are excepted from the automatic stay.

MacGibbon v. MacGibbon (In Re MacGibbon) · filed 2008-02-29(b)(2)

Here, all of the actions debtor complains of were excepted from the stay by § 362(b)(2): the assessments were to determine the amount of his Additional Support obligations, and the collections were directed against his exempt retirement plans, not property of the estate.

Under pre-BAPCPA § 362(b)(2)(B), the automatic stay does not bar collection of support from post-confirmation income when a Chapter 13 plan vests all estate property in the debtor at confirmation.

In Re Dagen · filed 2008-03-26(b)(2)(B)

This general provision of continued coverage of the automatic stay does not apply to domestic support obligations. The terms of § 362(b)(2) expressly except support debts from the scope of the automatic stay once the property loses its status as “property of the estate.” Thus, § 362(c)(2)’s continued stay of acts prohibited under § 362(a) is ineffective to prevent a collection effort expressly authorized by § 362(b). Section 362(b)(2) prevents collection of support debts only as to “property of the estate.” Loss of this status on confirmation then triggered the loss of the stay as to the Debtor’s post-confirmation income.

Former § 362(b)(2) permits collection of support from property outside the bankruptcy estate despite the automatic stay.

McCloskey v. Anne Miriam McCloskey, Michael A. Craig, and Fidelity Investments D/B/A National Financial S · filed 2010-03-23(b)(2)

Because the garnishment action was an action for the “collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate” under former section 362(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, it did not viol ate the bankruptcy stay.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) leaves proceedings to establish or modify a domestic support order outside the bankruptcy automatic stay.

Vanderheiden v. MARANDOLA · filed 2010-05-05(b)(2)(A)(ii)

While this appeal was pending, defendant filed for relief from his creditors in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Rhode Island. That filing has no effect on the case at bar as this issue pertains to child support. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) (recognizing that the filing of a bankruptcy petition will not operate as an automatic stay with respect to die establishment or modification of an order for domestic support).

Section 362(b)(2)(B) excepts support enforcement from the automatic stay only when enforcement is limited to property outside the bankruptcy estate.

McMaster v. Small · filed 2012-08-16(b)(2)(B)

There is no evidence they attempted to limit enforcement to property not part of the estate. As such, the enforcement motion was outside the Section 362(b)(2)(B) exception.

Section 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) excepts proceedings to establish or modify domestic support orders from the automatic stay regardless of the timing or finality of the order.

In re Cohen · filed 2015-10-05(b)(2)(A)(ii)

When read together with Section 101, the Support Exception of Section 362(b) explicitly excepts from the automatic stay actions taken to establish or modify orders for domestic support obligations without regard to timing or finality of the order or judgment.

Section 362(b)(2)(C) permits collection of a domestic support obligation despite the automatic stay, but that exception does not override the binding effect of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan.

State of Florida Department of Revenue v. Gonzalez · filed 2016-08-11(b)(2)(C)

The legislative intent behind § 362(b)(2)(C), which permits a DSO creditor to collect notwithstanding the automatic stay, does not indicate that Congress intended the exception to interfere with the binding effect a confirmed plan per § 1327(a). As such, although the DOR did not violate the automatic stay when it intercepted Gonzalez’s reimbursement payment, it did violate the confirmed plan.

Section 362(b)(2) exempts collection of maintenance from the automatic stay, including enforcement of a mortgage payment obligation that is actually support.

Chunn v. Chunn · filed 1997-03-06(b)(2)

Pursuant to § 362(b)(2), which specifically exempts actions for the collection of maintenance, the automatic stay did not apply to the support order.

Section 362 does not extend the automatic stay to protect a nondebtor junior lienholder by tolling its state-law reinstatement period.

In Re Eagles · filed 1984-02-10

Although there is a certain intrinsic logic and fairness in this thinking, we must agree with the Triangle Management Services court that Congress simply did not intend for the automatic stay to protect junior lien holders from a tolling of the reinstatement period.

Section 362(a) does not give a junior lienholder the right to invoke the automatic stay on behalf of a debtor.

Keller v. Hand · filed 1985-03-13(a)

It does not provide substantive or procedural rights to a junior lienholder.

Section 362’s automatic stay protects a debtor partnership but ordinarily does not protect its individual general partners absent extraordinary circumstances.

Bankers Trust (Delaware) v. 236 Beltway Inv. · filed 1994-09-28

The partnership filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition on August 17, 1994 and, as a result, the partnership is protected by the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362. Absent extraordinary circumstances not present here, the stay does not protect the individual general partners.

Section 362 protects a debtor’s junior mortgage interest from foreclosure by a senior mortgagee, requiring the senior mortgagee to obtain relief from the automatic stay before foreclosing.

Ormond Beach Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Citation Mortgage, Ltd. (In Re Ormond Beach Associates Ltd. Partnership) · filed 1996-12-30

It is clear that one of the reasons RTC needed relief from the automatic stay in the Southmark bankruptcy case in order to commence a foreclosure action of the 1983 mortgage was the existence of the 1986 mortgage held by South-mark. A foreclosure of the 1983 mortgage could extinguish the 1986 mortgage, and the law is settled that the automatic stay protects a debtor’s inferior security interest.

Section 362’s automatic stay protecting a bankrupt general partnership does not protect its partners in their individual capacities.

Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Turner · filed 1997-10-07

The "automatic stay” — pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code— which protects the partnership — Turner Expediting Service — does not, however, protect the partners in their individual capacities.

Section 362(a) ordinarily stays proceedings against the debtor or its property and does not shield the debtor’s liability insurers from suit.

Tucker v. American International Group, Inc. · filed 2010-09-30(a)

In sum, the insurers in the present case are not and have never been shielded from liability-under the automatic stay or the permanent discharge injunction of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a) generally does not protect a debtor’s guarantor when a creditor seeks judgment against the guarantor without reaching the debtor or its assets.

Weaver v. Texas Capital Bank N.A. · filed 2011-10-17(a)

Further, as a guarantor, Weaver is not entitled to the protections of a debtor’s automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Automatic-stay provisions generally only protect the debtor and very rarely extend to protect third parties.

A delayed claim for violation of the automatic stay can be barred by laches when the delay is inexcusable and prejudices the alleged violator.

Terrace Housing Associates, LTD · filed 2023-10-25

The undersigned agrees with Judge Fehling’s conclusion that the prejudice to HUD was established; the Debtor’s delay caused a disadvantage to HUD in being able to take actions or refrain from taking actions during and after the dismissal of the Debtor’s case to eliminate or minimize the risk of a claim that it was in breach of the automatic stay. As such, the second element of HUD’s Laches Defense is established, and HUD is entitled to summary judgment on the Laches Defense.

The automatic stay under § 362 may yield to laches when equitable considerations strongly favor the creditor and the debtor helped create the problem.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 69,953 in the Matter Of: Arthur R. Matthews, Jr., Debtor-Appellant v. Martin J. Rosene and John K. Knea · filed 1984-06-29

The equitable doctrine of laches can apply in a similar manner in this case to defeat Matthews’ claims. Section 362 is designed to benefit a debtor by preventing harassment and frustration of rehabilitation efforts through pursuit by creditors in individual actions. Suspension of Section 362 automatic stay provisions may be consonant with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act when equitable considerations weigh heavily in favor of the creditor and the debtor bears some responsibility for creating the problems.

Laches does not bar voiding a lien imposed in violation of the automatic stay when the lienholder fails to establish unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice.

Gucci v. Sinatra · filed 2006-09-18(a)

Here, we conclude that the factual findings underlying the bankruptcy court’s determination that the defendants could not establish the second and third required elements of laches (unreasonable delay and resultant prejudice) were not clearly erroneous and, indeed, were well supported by the record. ... As such, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the defendants could not make out the affirmative defense of laches.

A claim for damages under § 362(k) may be barred by laches when an inexcusable delay prejudices the defendant.

In re Terrace Housing Associates, Ltd. · filed 2017-11-22(k)

Because I find that Debtor’s section 362(k) claim is time-barred by laches, a ruling on whether HUD’s conduct violated the automatic stay cannot affect the rights of the parties in the case before me and would therefore constitute an improper advisory opinion.

Section 362(k) damages claims may be subject to laches, which requires unreasonable delay and prejudice to the defendant.

Soriano v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Soriano) · filed 2018-06-18(k)

The equitable doctrine of laches, however, may be applicable to determine if Soriano's § 362(k) demand is time-barred, and Wells Fargo asserts the doctrine here. ... At least at this stage of the litigation, and based on the record before it, the Court finds there exists a triable issue of fact as to "unreasonable delay" and "substantial prejudice" required for the establishment of Wells Fargo's affirmative defense of laches.

Claims for willful violations of the automatic stay have no statutory limitations period, but laches can bar claims brought after an unjustified delay.

Heghmann v. Hafiani · filed 2022-10-26

Although Congress did not enact a statute of limitations for claims involving willful violations of an automatic stay, we agree with the district court that the Heghmanns’ 17-year delay in filing the underlying complaint while they admittedly forum shopped for a court that would hear their case is gravely concerning. Under these circumstances, we conclude that, even if the Heghmanns’ claims were not barred by res judicata, they would be barred by the doctrine of laches.

Section 362(a) prohibits a prepetition creditor from levying a debtor’s wages after the debtor files for bankruptcy, even if the levy results from a clerical error.

In Re Conti · filed 1984-07-23(a)

Based upon the evidence before the Court it appears that the IRS due to clerical error, inadvertently violated the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) when it instituted a levy upon the debtor’s wages after the debtor had filed for bankruptcy.

Section 362(a)(4) bars postpetition acts that create real property tax liens, even if those acts also perfect the liens.

Makoroff v. City of Lockport (In Re Guterl Special Steel Corp.) · filed 1989-01-18(a)(4)

Therefore, the acts of publication, confirmation, and adoption are acts of creation. Even if we were to determine that these actions were simultaneously acts to create and perfect, Lockport and Niagra must lose, because these acts to create and perfect still occurred postpetition in violation of § 362(a)(4).

Section 362 requires the IRS to neutralize prepetition and postpetition levies after notice of bankruptcy and promptly return seized funds or seek stay relief; delay can trigger sanctions under subsection (h).

Matter of Fernandez · filed 1991-03-22(h)

It is this Court’s belief the IRS has the duty to ensure that its pre-petition or post-petition levies are not only neutralized upon notification of the bankruptcy, but the IRS must seek to turn over the funds seized quickly or seek adequate protection or relief from the automatic stay in the bankruptcy court. Here, the IRS sought to turn over the funds but did not move efficiently. If they have an efficient method of collection, they must have an efficient turnover mechanism to prevent sanctions under Section 362(h).

Section 362 does not bar the IRS from receiving and applying bank deposits after a bankruptcy filing when a prepetition tax levy already divested the debtor of any interest in those deposits.

In Re Abercrombie · filed 1993-07-02(a)(3)

Because the pre-petition levy on the debtors’ cash or cash equivalent deposits divested the debtors of any interest in that property, the debtors brought no property interest in the $14,000 into this bankruptcy estate under § 541. The IRS did not, therefore, exercise control over property of the estate in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 continues to protect property levied before bankruptcy when the levy has not transferred complete ownership to the creditor.

Ramirez v. Fuselier (In Re Ramirez) · filed 1995-05-25(c)(1)

Because Goldberg did not seek complete ownership of the levied property, the property was a part of the estate after Ramirez filed his bankruptcy petition. Therefore, the automatic stay applied to the levied property.

Section 362(a)(3) does not require a creditor that obtained constructive possession of a bank account through a prepetition tax levy to tell the bank after the bankruptcy filing not to honor the levy.

Gouveia v. Internal Revenue Service of the United States (In Re Quality Health Care) · filed 1997-07-28(a)(3)

Based on the foregoing analysis the Court does not find that the failure or refusal of the IRS to notify the Bank postpetition that it should not honor the prepetition Notice of Levy constitutes a violation of § 362(a)(3), as the IRS had no such duty.

Section 362(a)(6) does not bar assessment of income tax liability arising at year-end after the bankruptcy petition when the debtor has not elected to split the taxable year.

Parker v. Comm'r · filed 2006-06-08(a)(6)

The Government’s claim to petitioner’s 1994 income tax liability arose no earlier than December 31, 1994. Thus, because the claim to the tax liability arose after the commencement of the case in bankruptcy, the assessment of ... petitioner’s 1994 tax liability was not subject to the bankruptcy stay.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay does not bar collection from a debtor of tax liabilities arising after the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Imarah v. Comm'r · filed 2008-05-20(a)

With regard to petitioners’ 1998 tax liability, we need not apply the principle of equitable tolling to determine the date to which the 3-year lookback period extends because petitioners’ 1998 tax liability arose after the filing of the petitions in both case No. 1 and case No. 2. Respondent thus was at no time barred by the automatic stay from collecting petitioners’ 1998 tax liability.

Section 362 does not stay a final notice of intent to levy for federal income tax liability arising after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Haubrich v. Comm'r · filed 2009-02-24(a)(1), (a)(6)

Because the claim to the tax liability arose after petitioner filed his bankruptcy petition, it is a postpetition claim, and the final notice was not subject to the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a) does not stay collection of tax liabilities for years after the bankruptcy filing.

Bullock v. Comm'r · filed 2017-08-21(a)

Without an automatic stay in place under 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a) (2012), respondent may pursue collection action against Mrs. Bullock. In any event, any automatic stay would not affect collection action with respect to her 2012 and 2013 tax years, which postdate her alleged bankruptcy filing.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay prohibits the IRS from pursuing postpetition tax collection through levies.

Nichols v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Nichols) · filed 1992-07-08(a)

While the facts show an intentional violation of the automatic stay by the IRS, this Court is bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to follow the Nordic Village decision.

Section 362 permits a state to adjudicate traffic violations and impose fines, but bars threats of license suspension or arrest to collect prepetition fines.

Colon v. Hart (In Re Colon) · filed 1989-07-11(a)(1), (6)

Toward that end they are free, even postpetition, to issue summonses, compel a resolution of guilt or innocence, and impose fines. Once guilt is established and a fine is imposed, however, they are not free to enforce collection of the fine by revoking or threatening to revoke driving privileges or by threatening arrest.

Section 362(b)(1) excepts enforcement of a prepetition criminal contempt sentence, including collection from estate property, from the automatic stay.

United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., Inc. · filed 1984-07-27(b)(1)

The Court concludes that enforcement of the sentence declared in the pre-petition criminal contempt judgment against Troxler or the property of its estate in bankruptcy is excepted from the automatic stay by 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1).

Section 362(b)(1) permits enforcement of criminal fines against a debtor despite the automatic stay.

134 Baker Street, Inc. v. State of Ga. · filed 1984-09-04(b)(1)

For the reasons which follow, this court concludes that 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) permits the appellee State of Georgia to enforce criminal sentences in the nature of money fines against appellant 134 Baker Street, Inc., notwithstanding the fact that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) otherwise prevent the enforcement of monetary judgments against a debtor who has filed a petition for bankruptcy.

Section 362(a) stays collection of criminal fines unless the bankruptcy petition is dismissed for bad faith.

United States v. Landstrom Distributors, Inc. (In Re Landstrom Distributors, Inc.) · filed 1985-12-12(a)

However, in the absence of a dismissal for bad faith filing, this court concludes that the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is applicable to the collection of criminal fines.

Section 362(b)(5) does not permit a state to force the sale of a debtor’s real property to collect a criminal fine, because a fine is a money judgment.

Blair v. Alabama (In Re Blair) · filed 1986-07-09(b)(5)

Likewise, the proposed forced sale of the debtor’s real property is not within the exception set out in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5). This exception does not apply to the enforcement of a “money judgment.” By its very definition, a fine is a money judgment: “A pecuniary punishment imposed by lawful tribunal upon person convicted of crime or misdemeanor. A precuniary penalty.”

Section 362’s automatic stay does not apply to collection of a criminal contempt fine and costs.

United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., Inc., and Gerald S. Schafer, Trustee · filed 1986-08-04

The district judge found that the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. II 1984) did not apply to the collection of the fine and costs for criminal contempt and that such fine survived the bankruptcy. ... We adopt the excellent opinion of Chief Judge Hiram H. Ward filed July 28, 1984, 41 B.R. 457, and we affirm.

Section 362(b)(4) excepts enforcement of criminal fines, restitution, imprisonment, and community service obligations from the automatic stay.

In Re Ferris · filed 1988-12-02(b)(4)

In light of the City of Longmont’s questions concerning the applicability of the automatic stay under § 362 to this issue, I hold that the automatic stay is not applicable to the enforcement of criminal fines, restitution, imprisonment, or community service obligation because of the specific exception provided for by 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Section 362(b)(1) allows enforcement of a criminal fine despite the automatic stay because collecting the fine continues the criminal proceeding.

United States v. Palm Beach Cruises, S.A. · filed 1996-04-18(b)(1)

Indeed, PBCSA’s proposed reading of section 362(b)(5) would eviscerate section 362(b)(1), because the Government’s right to commence or continue criminal proceedings against a bankrupt debtor is of no moment unless the Government also is entitled to enforce the penalties imposed at the culmination of the proceedings.

Section 362(a) does not stay the United States’ enforcement of a criminal fine or restitution order against a debtor’s property, including property nominally held by the bankruptcy estate, because 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a) overrides the stay.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2013-06-14(a)

It is also likewise clear § 3613(a) trumps the automatic stay of § 362(a): again, the United States may enforce its order “notwithstanding any Federal law.” Therefore, the Court determines that § 3613(a) allows the United States to enforce a criminal fine or restitution order against all property of the person ordered to pay, regardless of whether the debtor in bankruptcy or the bankruptcy estate holds nominal title to such property.