11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(b)(10) permits a landlord to recover possession of nonresidential real property when the lease expires by its stated term during the bankruptcy case.

General Hospitals of Humana, Inc. v. Hampton (In Re Hampton) · filed 1987-10-09(b)(10)

As the lease terminated by the expiration of its stated term during the pendency of this case, 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(10) directs this Court to lift the automatic stay as to the leased property so Humana may obtain possession of such property.

Section 362(b)(10) permits a lessor to seek possession of nonresidential real property after the lease expires by its stated term following the bankruptcy filing.

Matter of Hejco, Inc. · filed 1988-06-13(b)(10)

Under § 362(b)(10), the automatic stay does not prohibit any act by a lessor to gain possession of nonresidential real property after the termination of the lease by expiration of the stated term after the commencement of the case. Because the lease had terminated by the time the lessor had commenced the state court action to regain possession of the property, the commencement of the state proceedings did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(10) permits a landlord to seek possession without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay when a nonresidential lease terminates by expiration of its stated term during bankruptcy.

In Re Policy Realty Corp. · filed 1999-07-14(b)(10)

The language of § 362(b)(10) clearly indicates that it is not necessary for a landlord to move in the Bankruptcy Court to vacate the automatic stay when the Debtor is operating under a lease of non-residential real property that has terminated by the expiration of the stated term during a case under this title.

Section 362(b)(10) permits a lessor to recover possession of nonresidential property after the lease expires by its stated term without first obtaining a judicial declaration that the lease ended.

Fitz & Pal, Inc. v. International Pipe Fabrication, L. L. C. · filed 2001-07-12(b)(10)

Respondent’s companion assertion — that even where, as here, a lease has terminated by lapse of time, a judicial declaration confirming the termination is required before the 11 USC § 362 (b) (10) exception applies — is without merit.

Section 362(b)(10) excludes a lessor’s repossession of nonresidential real property from the automatic stay when the lease was validly terminated under state law before bankruptcy, even before its stated end date.

In Re Southcoast Express, Inc. · filed 2006-02-13(b)(10)

Further, at the hearing I explained that I have always ruled from the bench that under § 362(b)(10), a lease could have terminated under the terms of the lease and not solely by the expiration of the stated term of the lease. ... After re-reviewing these cases, I am convinced that my interpretation of the statute is correct.

Section 362(b)(10) excludes a lessor's recovery of possession under a nonresidential lease that expires before or during bankruptcy, even if the debtor retains a possessory interest.

Maryland Port Administration v. Premier Automotive Services, Inc. (In Re Premier Automotive Services, Inc.) · filed 2007-06-15(b)(10)

Aside from this general deficiency, Premier’s bankruptcy petition was properly dismissed on the particular grounds that property of the estate does not include, and the automatic stay does not apply to, an expired lease of nonresidential property. A mere possessory interest under an expired lease is insufficient to trigger an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(b)(10) excludes a lessor's recovery of possession of nonresidential real property from the automatic stay when the lease expires before or during the bankruptcy case.

In Re: Premier Automotive v. · filed 2007-06-15(b)(10)

A mere possessory interest under an expired lease is insufficient to trigger an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(10) (2000). Section 362 excludes from its protections nonresidential real property leases that expire "before the commencement of or during a case."

Section 362(b)(10) does not permit proceedings concerning a potentially expired nonresidential lease to continue until the bankruptcy court determines whether the lease falls outside the estate.

Total Petroleum Puerto Rico Corp. v. Figueroa · filed 2009-07-27(b)(10)

In view of the above, this case is stayed until such time if ever the bankruptcy court determines that the lease agreement in question falls outside the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(10).

Section 362(b)(10) does not permit a landlord to terminate a nonresidential lease after a bankruptcy petition when termination requires further action by the landlord rather than occurring automatically.

C.O.P. Coal Development Co v. C.W. Mining Co. (In Re C.W. Mining Co.) · filed 2010-02-03(b)(10)

In such a case, the exception found at § 362(b)(10) would not apply and the automatic stay would bar any action by the landlord to terminate the lease.

Section 362(b)(10) does not exempt an eviction from the automatic stay when a debtor has an implied holdover tenancy whose stated term has not expired.

Acevedo v. SC Real Estate, LLC · filed 2014-09-30(b)(10)

Having concluded that Acevedo’s holdover tenancy comes within the meaning of “lease” as defined by § 365(m), it is plain that the § 362(b)(10) exception to the automatic stay does not apply. That exception applies only to leases that have terminated “by the expiration of the stated term” and so is plainly inapplicable here — either because implied tenancies do not have “stated terms” or because the implied expiration date of the year-to-year tenancy was November 30, 2012, nearly a month after SC continued to prosecute its eviction action in state court.

Section 362(b)(10) excepts a nonresidential real property lease from the automatic stay only when it ends by expiration of its stated term; an early termination for the debtor’s default does not qualify.

In re Ind. Hotel Equities, LLC · filed 2018-06-18(b)(10)

The Court agrees with the Debtor's statutory interpretation. ... For this reason, neither § 362(b)(10) nor § 541(b)(2) applies, and the IAA's Motion must be denied. ... The Court concludes that under the only reasonable reading of the statutory language at issue, the lease termination in this case was a termination other than at or by "the expiration of the stated term of the lease." It clearly was a termination of the Lease earlier than at the end of the Lease's stated term, due to Debtor's default.

Section 362(b)(10) allows a landlord to recover possession of nonresidential property without the automatic stay when the lease terminated by its terms before the bankruptcy filing.

GKNY1 INC. · filed 2026-01-08(b)(10)

Since the lease terminated before the bankruptcy petition was filed, the automatic stay was never triggered.

Section 362(b)(10) allows a landlord to pursue possession of nonresidential property when the lease terminated under its terms before the bankruptcy petition.

Portofindough, LLC · filed 2023-12-22(b)(10)

The Lease was terminated prepetition within the meaning of section 362(b)(10). ... Accordingly, the automatic stay does not apply to the Lease because the Lease was terminated before the Petition Date.

Section 362(d) provides for relief from an automatic stay, but does not provide a mechanism to reinstate a lifted stay or stay foreclosure.

Stacy Fuel & Sales, Inc. v. Ira Phillips, Inc. (In Re Stacy) · filed 1994-04-19(d)

§ 362(d) relates only to the seeking of relief from the automatic stay, while Rule 4001 provides a means for implementing § 362(d). Neither provision provides a mechanism for reinstatement of the stay or for a stay of foreclosure.

A court may decline to reimpose the automatic stay after granting partial relief when delaying a long-pending, multiparty trial would be unfair to the other parties.

In Re Yaffe · filed 1986-01-02

This Court could accede to the Debtor’s request and reimpose the automatic stay, or it could request the Superior Court to postpone trial once again, in order to await the outcome of whatever litigation may be brought in this Court. However, the Superior Court case has already been pending for a number of years and involves many parties in addition to this one Debtor. It would seem to be grossly unfair to all those other parties to delay the Superior Court case yet again at this late date, to suit the convenience of this one individual.

Section 362(c)(2) terminates the automatic stay when a bankruptcy case is closed or dismissed or a discharge is granted or denied; reopening the case does not reimpose the stay absent a bankruptcy court order.

Allison v. Commissioner · filed 1991-11-18(c)(2)

Accordingly, we hold that when a bankruptcy case is closed, dismissed, or a discharge has been granted or denied pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 362(c)(2), the automatic stay is terminated, and the reopening of a case does not, absent an order from the bankruptcy court, reimpose the stay.

Once a bankruptcy court takes action that terminates the automatic stay under § 362(c)(2), vacating that action does not reinstate the stay absent an express indication from the bankruptcy court.

Chan Q. Kieu and Quynh Kieu v. Commissioner · filed 1995-12-07(c)(2)

Simply stated, where a bankruptcy court has taken action that serves to terminate the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. section 362(c)(2) (1988), the automatic stay remains terminated absent an express indication from the bankruptcy court to the contrary.

Section 362(c)(2) ends the automatic stay when discharge is denied, and a later order vacating that denial does not automatically reinstate the stay absent an express indication from the bankruptcy court.

Kieu v. Commissioner · filed 1995-12-07(c)(2)

Simply stated, where a bankruptcy court has taken action that serves to terminate the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. section 362(c)(2), the automatic stay remains terminated absent an express indication from the bankruptcy court to the contrary.

Section 362 imposes an automatic stay when a court orally reinstates a dismissed bankruptcy case, before entry of a written order.

In Re Nail · filed 1996-05-22

This Court also finds that section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code imposed an automatic stay on the actions of the movant at the same moment the oral order was issued.

Section 362’s automatic stay may be treated as remaining in effect between dismissal and reinstatement when the bankruptcy court treats the stay as continuous.

In Re Application of County Collector for Delinquent Taxes · filed 1997-08-14(c)(2)

Because the bankruptcy court treated the stay as remaining in effect, and such a position is in conformity with the stated legislative intent of allowing the orderly resolution of all claims against a creditor's estate, we will treat the stay as remaining in effect for purposes of granting a petition for sale in error.

Section 362’s automatic stay resumes when a dismissed Chapter 13 case is reinstated.

Diviney v. Nationsbank of Texas (In Re Diviney) · filed 1997-08-19(c)(2)

In this case, the automatic stay was reinstated on August 26, 1996, with the entry of the Reinstatement Order by Judge Abramson.

After a section 362(a) stay has been lifted, a debtor seeking to reimpose it must obtain a new injunction.

Kenneth H. Roberson, Jr. and Vickie H. Roberson · filed 2020-10-23(a)

Once the section 362 stay has been lifted, a debtor can only seek to reimpose the stay by obtaining a new injunction pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s authority under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).

The automatic stay ends at discharge, but a bankruptcy court may reimpose it against a creditor when concerns about the legality of collection efforts justify doing so.

In Re Cuascut · filed 1988-09-27(c)(2)(C)

We believe that these concerns about the legality of any efforts of Ajax to enforce the Stipulation or its rights generally against the Debtor justify our re-imposition of the stay, at least as to Ajax.

Section 362(a)(6) cannot prohibit a creditor’s public criticism absent a clear and present danger of significant interference with the debtor’s reorganization or the bankruptcy court’s functions.

Tantilla v. Stonegate Security Services, Ltd. (In Re Stonegate Security Services, Ltd.) · filed 1986-01-31(a)(6)

Thus, in the absence of some language presenting a clear and present danger of some signifcant interference with the debtor’s reorganization, or with the functions of the bankruptcy court, § 362 cannot prohibit public criticism.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits posting a public sign demanding payment of a prepetition debt, even when the creditor invokes First Amendment free speech rights.

Collier v. Hill (In Re Collier) · filed 2009-04-07(a)(6)

Thus, the posting of the Scottsville sign was clearly an act to collect a debt in violation of the automatic stay. ... The scope of the automatic stay may at times incidentally impact free speech, but those isolated intrusions are justified in order to accomplish the significant governmental interest in providing uniform bankruptcy laws and an effective means by which to implement them.

The automatic stay applies to debts declared nondischargeable under § 523 until the creditor obtains stay relief or an event terminating the stay under § 362(c)(2) occurs.

In Re Neilsen · filed 2011-02-07(a)

For the following reasons, the Court finds that the automatic stay found in § 362(a) applies to debts declared non-dischargeable under § 523, and thus, the Movant must either obtain relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d) or wait for the occurrence of one of the events found in § 362(c)(2).

Section 362(a) stays indemnity or contribution claims rooted in prepetition conduct even when the state-law cause of action becomes cognizable after the bankruptcy filing.

In Re Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1986-02-11(a)

As long as a cause of action is a “claim” within the meaning of the Code, such a claim must be adjudicated under the reorganization umbrella, and the automatic stay applies. ... Thus, for federal bankruptcy purposes, a prepetition “claim” may well encompass a cause of action that, under state law, was not cognizable until after the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Section 362 prohibits a postpetition state court suit against debtors on a claim arising from their prepetition misconduct, even when the creditor discovers the injury after the petition.

Roach v. Edge (In Re Edge) · filed 1986-05-09

In conclusion, a right to payment and thus a claim arose at the time of the debtors’ prepetition misconduct. Plaintiffs postpetition state court action against the debtors was prohibited by the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a tort claim arising from prepetition conduct even if the injury manifests after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Grady v. A.H. Robins Co. · filed 1988-02-04(a)(1)

We hold only that the Dalkon Shield claim in the case before us, when the Dalkon Shield was inserted in the claimant prior to the time of filing of the petition, constitutes a "claim" "that arose before the commencement of the case" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(3) and (6) prevent a creditor from recouping a prepetition claim from postpetition payments without bankruptcy court approval.

In Re Memorial Hospital of Iowa County, Inc. · filed 1988-02-05(a)(3), (6)

The bankruptcy judge found that recoupment, although it is not prohibited in express terms, is clearly within the broad language of the automatic stay, and I agree.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a state from using a liquor-license transfer condition to collect prepetition sales taxes while the stay remains in place.

Bavely v. Ohio, Department of Liquor Control (In Re Terwilliger's Catering Plus, Inc.) · filed 1988-06-02(a)(1)

By the terms of the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, the State is enjoined, so long as the stay remains in place, from collecting its pre-petition claim. ... We hold, therefore, that 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) directly enjoins the operation of ORC § 4303.26.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays further proceedings against a debtor on a wage claim that arose before the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Jacoy v. Tawil · filed 1989-02-16(a)(1)

Consequently, it was improper to allow this court to entertain a pre-petition claim brought against the defendant without apprising the court of the ongoing bankruptcy proceedings. Any further proceedings in this court which relate to the pre-petition claim for wages are automatically stayed.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a lender from increasing loan payments to collect a prepetition escrow deficiency being cured through a Chapter 13 plan.

In re Christensen · filed 1989-10-24(a)(6)

The action of Lomas in seeking collection of the prepetition deficiency by increasing the loan payments to $727.00 a month was an act to recover a claim against the Debt- or which arose before the commencement of the case. Such an act violates the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a creditor from collecting a prepetition claim during a Chapter 13 case before the debtor receives a discharge, including by sending invoices directly to the debtor.

In Re Newell · filed 1990-04-30(a)(6)

The Court finds that Section 362(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code clearly prohibits any action by a creditor to collect a prepetition claim during the pendency of a Chapter 13 case and prior to the granting of a discharge to the debtor. CFS’ actions in sending the two invoices violated that prohibition.

Section 362(a)(6) does not treat a state’s refusal to revive corporate privileges suspended before bankruptcy as an act to collect a prepetition tax claim.

In Re Feature Homes, Inc. · filed 1990-07-18(a)(6)

There is no reason why the court should construe the State’s conduct as constituting an affirmative action violative of the Code’s stay provisions. The suspension occurred prepetition at a time when the automatic stay was clearly not in effect.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a creditor from applying account funds to claims against the debtor after the bankruptcy petition.

Woodrum v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dillard Ford, Inc.) · filed 1990-08-16(a)(6)

Moreover, the stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 prohibited FMC from applying funds in the account to claims against Dillard.

The automatic stay bars postpetition proceedings against third parties when the creditor uses them to collect a prepetition judgment against the debtor; orders from another court do not shield those collection efforts without modification of the stay.

In Re Alberto · filed 1990-11-28(a)(6)

CIT had a pre-petition judgment against the Debtor, and it received additional relief post-judgment. CIT had no judgment against the third parties it cited in post-petition. Its post-petition actions were taken incidental to its efforts to fully collect and satisfy its judgment against the Debtor. The district court’s orders did not purport to modify the stay. Neither did such orders insulate CIT’s actions taken in procuring same, absent a modification of the stay.

Section 362(a)(6) bars actions to collect a prepetition claim against the debtor even when the action concerns property that is not the debtor’s or the estate’s.

Express America, Inc. v. Pierce (In Re Express America, Inc.) · filed 1991-10-10(a)(6)

To begin with, § 362(a)(6), unlike § 362(a)(2), (3), (4), and (5), makes no reference to debtor’s property or to property of the estate. Any action taken by defendant with regard to these accounts receivable in an attempt to collect on a prepetition claim against debtor is in violation of § 362(a)(6), whether or not they are property of debtor or its bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(a)(6) stays further postpetition collection activity but generally does not require a creditor to undo a collection action taken before the bankruptcy filing.

Najafi v. Cabrini College (In Re Najafi) · filed 1993-05-13(a)(6)

Normally, a creditor is merely stayed from taking further post-petition collection activities by § 362(a)(6). However, a creditor is normally not required to undo collection actions taken pre-petition thereby, unless an avoidance power is successfully invoked against it.

Section 362(a)(1) bars a creditor from pursuing district court costs on a claim that arose before the debtor filed for bankruptcy.

Franklin Savings Association v. Office Of Thrift Supervision · filed 1994-08-02(a)(1)

As a prepetition claim, the Director's action for costs in district court is barred by the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays a suit against a debtor on a claim that arose before the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Saeedi v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. · filed 1995-01-19(a)(1)

Because appellant’s claim against Greyhound arose on July 7, 1989, before Greyhound filed its bankruptcy petition on June 4, 1990, appellant’s case is covered by § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits attempts to collect a claim against the debtor that arose before the bankruptcy case began.

Matthews v. United States (In Re Matthews) · filed 1995-04-11(a)(6)

The IRS violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) when it attempted “to collect ... or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.”

Section 362(a)(6) does not treat a newspaper’s refusal to accept a debtor’s advertisement, without more, as an act to collect a prepetition claim.

Gulf Coast Orthopedic Center v. Times Publishing Co. (In Re Gulf Coast Orthopedic Center) · filed 1997-02-03(a)(6)

This Court is unwilling to accept the proposition that the refusal to accept the advertisement was an act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the Debtor, which arose pre-petition.

Section 362(a)(6) stays a creditor’s postpetition collection of foreclosure proceeds held in escrow to satisfy a prepetition judgment against the debtor.

In Re Just Brakes Corporate Systems, Inc. · filed 1997-03-13(a)(6)

Here, the trademark was sold to satisfy appellants' pre-petition "claim against the debtor"--their 1988 judgment. After the sale, appellants applied to the state court and received the sale proceeds out of escrow, clearly an "act to collect" on their judgment.

Section 362 stays civil enforcement of prepetition claims by nongovernmental creditors.

Buckner v. Westmoreland Coal Co. (In Re Westmoreland Coal Co.) · filed 1997-09-05

Finally, civil enforcement of prepetition claims by non-governmental creditors is prohibited by operation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) bars levy notices and wage levies aimed at recovering a prepetition tax claim.

In Re Parker · filed 2002-03-15(a)(6)

The Notice of Levy, April 30, 2001 letter and wage levy in May 2001 clearly violated the stay. These actions were all efforts to recover a prepetition tax claim. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

Section 362 stays a lawsuit against a debtor for prepetition lease-breach damages arising from automatic rejection of the lease.

In Re Slack · filed 2002-07-17(a)(1)

Under Section 365(g), damages resulting from the breach of this lease agreement constitute pre-petition claims subject to the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a suit to collect a contract claim when the creditor’s right to payment arose before the bankruptcy petition, even if payment or the alleged breach occurred later.

Montgomery Ward, LLC v. Wiseknit Factory, Ltd. (In Re Montgomery Ward, LLC) · filed 2003-04-17(a)(1)

Wiseknit had a right to payment which arose either when it tendered the goods to Fritz in Hong Kong or, at the latest, when it tendered the documents through normal banking channels. Both of these events occurred pre-petition. Wiseknit’s effort to recover on its contract claim in the first count of its complaint in California violated the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a creditor from applying a postpetition payment to a prepetition debt without court authorization.

Gordon v. Taylor (In Re Taylor) · filed 2010-03-18(a)(6)

That action constitutes a violation of the stay because it allows Deutsche to recover its prepetition claim against Debtor, which is explicitly stayed by § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(1) stays a creditor’s suit against a debtor on a prepetition claim while the bankruptcy case is open, and a suit filed in violation of the stay is void as to the debtor.

In re J.S. II, L.L.C. · filed 2010-04-09(a)(1)

The court concludes that the Ruizes violated the automatic stay by filing the civil action against entities whose bankruptcy cases were open. That violation makes the civil action void as to Debtors J.S. II, LLC and River Village I, LLC.

Section 362(a)(1) stays service of process against a Chapter 11 debtor on an asbestos claim arising from exposure before the bankruptcy filing.

Nye v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc. · filed 2011-06-07(a)(1)

Applying the pre-petition relationship test to Mrs. Nye’s claim, we conclude that her claim arose when her husband was exposed to the asbestos-containing products. Therefore, these manufacturers were not subject to service of process in Tennessee because Mrs. Nye’s claims against these manufacturers arose before the filing of their bankruptcy cases.

Section 362(a)(6) bars depositing postdated checks after a bankruptcy filing to collect a prepetition attorney-fee claim.

Walton v. Clark & Washington, P.C. · filed 2011-07-12(a)(6)

The postdated checks give rise to pre-petition claims because they represent a right to payment that arose before the petition date. As a consequence, the act of depositing the postdated checks after a bankruptcy case has been filed violates the section 362 automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits invoicing a debtor during bankruptcy to collect a prepetition claim.

In Re Talsma · filed 2012-03-27(a)(6)

Not only is the payment of the claim recoverable under Code § 549(a); also there can be no question but that invoicing the amount of the claim to ... Debtors was an “act to collect ... or recover a claim against [Debtors] that arose before the commencement of [Debtors’ chapter 11 cases].” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). BMY thus violated Code § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(1) stays a lawsuit against the debtor seeking damages for prepetition breaches of rejected contracts or related fiduciary duties.

In re Qimonda AG · filed 2012-11-07(a)(1)

The Court finds that the Altis lawsuit, insofar as it requests damages for pre-petition breaches of the JDAs, or for pre-petition breaches of fiduciary duty, is a violation of the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), and the Court will enjoin the prosecution of the lawsuit with respect to such allegations.

Section 362(a)(6) stays attempts to collect claims arising before the bankruptcy petition, but does not stay collection of claims arising afterward.

McJonathan v. Wayne Building Co. (In re McJonathan) · filed 2015-02-11(a)(6)

The automatic stay under § 362(a) is triggered by the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Section 362 provides, among other provisions, that “any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case ...” outside the course of the bankruptcy proceeding is stayed during the bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). The stay applies only to claims arising pre-petition, not to claims which arise post-petition.

Section 362(a)(6) stays collection of a claim arising from prepetition conduct even when liability remains contingent on a postpetition event.

Saint Catherine Hospital of Indiana, LLC v. Indiana Family & Social Services Administration · filed 2015-08-28(a)(6)

Since all of the ... conduct that could have given rise to the 2013 HAF occurred pre-petition, we find that the claim is subject to the automat- ic stay. ... That St. Catherine’s continued operation as an eligible hospital on July 1, 2012 may have been required in order for the 2013 HAF to be assessed does not change our analysis. This fact would simply make the claim “contingent” upon the hospital’s continued eligibility on July 1, 2012.

Section 362(a)(6) bars acts to collect, assess, or recover a prepetition claim against a debtor.

In re Martinez · filed 2016-08-19(a)(6)

Under Section 362(a)(6), the automatic stay precludes any act to collect, assess, or recover any pre-petition claim against the debtors.

Section 362(a)(1) bars filing an action based on prepetition claims that could have been brought before the bankruptcy petition.

In re Paxton · filed 2019-01-29(a)(1)

Because the Declaratory Relief Action was based on pre-petition claims that could have been commenced prior to the date in which this bankruptcy case was filed, the filing of the Declaratory Relief Action violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays proceedings against a debtor on preexisting claims when the debtor files a bankruptcy petition and voids later proceedings on those claims.

Mac Truong v. · filed 2019-02-22(a)(1)

The Bankruptcy Code prohibits “the commencement or continuation” of any proceeding against a debtor for a preexisting claim. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). The automatic stay in Mergenthaler’s case went into effect upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition, which was filed prior to this adversary proceeding, and voided any subsequent proceedings or actions regarding the alleged pre-existing debt.

Section 362(a)(1) can stay litigation over a claim that arose before bankruptcy even when the complaint disclaims recovery on prepetition claims.

Hickam v. Westphal · filed 2019-07-05(a)(1)

I don’t agree with Westphal that he can circumvent the stay by characterizing the claims as having accrued after the petition date and disclaiming both any right to recover at all if the claims instead turn out to have accrued before bankruptcy and in any case from property that Hickam acquired from Old Ed’s before bankruptcy.

Section 362(a) automatically stays litigation against a debtor over claims arising before the bankruptcy case began.

Chesapeake Operating LLC v. CC Forbes LLC · filed 2020-11-20(a)

The Bankruptcy Code imposes an automatic stay of litigation against a debtor for claims arising prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Thus, the bankruptcy action automatically stayed the Milanovich action.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a lawsuit against a debtor seeking relief on prepetition claims, even when the complaint also alleges postpetition conduct.

Josue Cepero and Leticia Cepero · filed 2021-07-19(a)(1)

However, the Court finds that the November 2020 Lawsuit was a knowing violation of the automatic stay. The Court does not understand the argument that Ms. Gallego is not a creditor. Perhaps Ms. Gallego did not file a claim in the bankruptcy case, but the November 2020 Lawsuit was clearly an act “to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(1). While there are certain instances in which acts to recover on claims that arise postpetition are not a stay violation, the Court does not have to address those exceptions here because the November 2020 Lawsuit included relief relating to alleged prepetition claims.

Section 362(a)(6) stays pursuit of an attorney fee claim arising from litigation filed before the bankruptcy petition, regardless of when the fees were incurred.

BELL v. INTEGRITY WHOLESALE FURNITURE, LLC · filed 2022-03-28(a)(6)

As a result, the Court determines that Integrity's claim to attorneys' fees is a pre-petition claim and subject to the automatic stay. And this conclusion applies to Integrity's claim to fees regardless of when such fees were incurred.

Section 362(a)(6) stays acts to collect a prepetition claim, but a creditor with no right to payment from the debtor has no claim covered by that stay.

TitleMax of Alabama Inc v. Wills · filed 2024-07-27(a)(6)

Section 362(a)(6) provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of . . . any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). ... Under these circumstances, TitleMax did not have a “claim” against Mr. Wills as defined by the Bankruptcy Code because TitleMax had no right to seek payment from Mr. Wills.

Section 362(a) prohibits a creditor from pursuing a state court action to collect a prepetition claim without relief from the automatic stay.

Hill v. Windward Hills Condominium Ass'n (In Re Hill) · filed 1989-06-13(a)(1), (6)

It is apparent that a portion of the relief WHCA sought in the State Court action was based on a prepetition claim. At no time did WHCA seek a grant of relief from the automatic stay to pursue its State Court action against the Debtors. Its conduct was in violation of the aforementioned provisions of § 362(a).

Section 362's automatic stay bars payment of prepetition license fees and taxes demanded as a condition of renewing a debtor's casino license.

Elsinore Shore Associates v. Casino Control Commission (In Re Elsinore Shore Associates) · filed 1986-08-29(a)

For the reasons set forth in the opinion to follow, the Court denies the present application of ESA for authority to pay pre-petition license fees and taxes as such payment would violate the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a) does not impose an immediate duty on an attorney to stop an eviction already underway when the attorney did not initiate it and had no reasonable chance to consult the client.

Connor v. Russell · filed 2022-06-07(a)

The Court concludes, based on the undisputed facts, that an affirmative duty did not arise instantaneously on February 3, 2021, for Mr. Russell to attempt to stop an eviction already in process without even being able to discuss the matter with his client.

Section 362(a)(3) protects a month-to-month residential lease as property of the estate, so a landlord must obtain relief from the automatic stay before terminating it by notice.

Carol Lynne Myers · filed 2021-10-22(a)(3)

To this end, any acts to terminate the Lease may be pursued only after entry of an order granting relief from stay.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a landlord from taking possession of a debtor’s property during the automatic stay, so the landlord cannot be faulted for failing to mitigate damages during that period.

ABRAMSON-OBAL, LLC VS. SUKETU SHAH (L-7636-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-04-20(a)(3)

Defendants' bankruptcy filing and the imposition of the automatic stay barred plaintiff from attempting to mitigate any damages during that period.

Section 362(b)(10) does not except eviction proceedings involving a debtor’s residence from the automatic stay.

Neal v. Behind the Gates, Inc. · filed 2020-12-02(b)(10)

It is undisputed that the subject premises were defendant’s residence; the house was not a “nonresidential real property,” as required by 11 USC § 362(b)(10).

Section 362(a)(1) stays eviction proceedings against a debtor after a bankruptcy petition is filed, even if the debtor does not own the property.

In re Jean-Francois · filed 2015-07-01(a)(1)

However, because the Debtor’s “mere possessory interest” in the Building was sufficient to trigger the protection of the automatic stay, whether the Debtor owned the Building at the time of the eviction is not relevant.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar a preliminary notice of nonrenewal that preserves a landlord’s right to seek possession later without terminating the lease or interfering with estate property.

Evans v. Schneider · filed 2001-03-07(a)(3)

In this owner occupancy holdover proceeding, we agree that the 120-150-day notice of nonrenewal (9 NYCRR 2524.4 [a] [4]; 2524.2 [c] [3]), served by landlord without knowledge of tenant’s then pending — but since concluded — bankruptcy proceeding, should not be regarded as in conflict with, or voided by, the automatic stay provision of the United States Bankruptcy Code barring “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate” (11 USC § 362 [a] [3]). Such a notice is preliminary only, and merely advises of the landlord’s intent not to renew the lease upon its subsequent expiration. It does not initiate a legal proceeding, purport to obtain possession or exercise control over property of the estate.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a lease terminated before the bankruptcy filing.

In Re Knight Jewelry · filed 1994-05-24(d)(1)

Since the lease was terminated before the bankruptcy case was filed, cause exists to grant relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a landlord’s acts to obtain possession of leased premises when the lease was not properly terminated before bankruptcy.

In Re Musikahn Corp. · filed 1986-02-14(a)(3)

The landlord’s acts to obtain possession of the premises are stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

The automatic stay does not apply to a lease terminated under applicable state law before the bankruptcy petition.

In Re 163rd Street Medical Corp. · filed 1986-11-18

A lease terminated due to non-payment of rent and under applicable state law is not assumable nor subject to the application of the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a landlord from pursuing eviction of a tenant-debtor, even for grounds arising after the bankruptcy filing, without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay.

Whitt v. Philadelphia Housing Authority (In Re Whitt) · filed 1987-11-13(a)(3)

Hence, a landlord cannot attempt to maintain an eviction action against a tenant-debtor, even if the grounds for eviction have arisen solely post-petition, without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) requires a landlord to obtain relief from the automatic stay before evicting a debtor tenant, even if the debtor failed to assume the lease under § 365(d)(4).

In Re Boston Business MacHines · filed 1988-07-27(a)(3)

Therefore, a landlord must obtain relief from the automatic stay before seeking to dispossess a tenant irrespective of the debtor-tenant’s failure to assume, and hence its implicit rejection of, a lease under § 365(d)(4).

Section 362(a) does not stay a landlord from repossessing residential premises from a holdover debtor whose tenancy ended before bankruptcy, so long as the landlord seeks possession alone and does not enforce the judgment for money damages.

Marquand v. Smith (In Re Smith) · filed 1989-08-30(a)(1)-(3)

Based upon the foregoing, I conclude that the Stay does not enjoin a landlord from regaining possession of residential premises from a wrongfully holding-over bankruptcy debtor/tenant, as long as the landlord seeks only to repossess the property and not to enforce any other portion of his unlawful detainer judgment against the debtor and the bankruptcy estate, such as collecting money damages.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a landlord from seeking to evict a debtor from property the debtor occupies as a tenant.

In the Matter of Zagata Fabricators, Inc. v. Superior Air Products, Creditor · filed 1990-01-12(a)(3)

Although ostensibly directed at actions to dispossess debtors of property they own, section 362(a)(3) also applies to creditors seeking to evict debtors from property they merely inhabit as tenants.

When a lease is deemed rejected under § 365(d)(4), the landlord may obtain relief from the automatic stay to pursue eviction.

In Re Morningstar Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1991-04-04(a)

In light of the foregoing, we will enter an Order giving the Landlord immediate relief from the automatic stay, but requiring it to forebear from physically evicting the Debtor for about 25 days, i.e., until after April 30, 1991.

Section 362(a) does not stay eviction when an eviction warrant issued before the bankruptcy filing extinguished the debtor’s interest in the premises.

Radol v. Centeno · filed 1995-02-24(a)

Respondents had no interest in the premises to qualify as property of the estate under 11 USC §§ 541 and 1306. Accordingly, the automatic stay provided by section 362 does not apply under the facts of this case.

The automatic stay preserves a tenant debtor’s existing right to cure a rent default and redeem a residential lease while eviction proceedings are stayed.

Brattleboro Housing Authority v. Stoltz · filed 1999-11-29(a)

This right was preserved by the granting of the automatic stay under Section 362. Thus, she continues to be in lawful possession.

Section 362(a) does not stay service of a required notice of intent not to renew a residential lease when the notice does not affect administration of the debtor’s estate.

Evans v. Schneider · filed 1999-12-15(a)

For the interrelated reasons set forth below, however, this court holds that the automatic stay provision does not extend to service of the predicate notice of intent not to renew the lease in this residential context and denies respondent’s motion.

Section 362(a)(1) renders postpetition notices of lease default and termination void when issued without relief from the automatic stay.

In Re Metrobility Optical Systems, Inc. · filed 2001-10-03(a)(1)

Since HECOP issued the Notices of Default and Termination of the Lease after the filing of the petition and without relief from the automatic stay, those notices are void.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a landlord from enforcing a residential eviction judgment when the debtor retains an equitable possessory interest under state law, even after an unlawful detainer judgment; the landlord must seek relief from the bankruptcy court.

Westside Apartments, LLC v. Butler (In Re Butler) · filed 2002-01-09(a)(3)

Under California law, a bankruptcy debtor/tenant has an equitable possessory property interest which is protected by § 362(a)(3) even after a landlord obtains an unlawful detainer judgment. Therefore, in order to obtain relief from the automatic stay, a landlord must request relief from the bankruptcy court.

Section 362(a) stays a landlord’s postpetition eviction action, removal of a debtor’s belongings from a rented home, and lockout of the debtor.

Lankford v. Advanced Equities Inc. (In Re Lankford) · filed 2004-01-20(a)(1), (a)(3)

After that date, Equities violated the stay by filing the forcible entry and detainer action on September 10, moving Debtors’ belongings out of the rental house on September 11 and 12, and locking Debtors out of the house on September 17, 2003.

When a lease remains effective at bankruptcy, a landlord’s failure to return the premises after notice of the filing is a willful automatic-stay violation that may warrant damages.

Alvarez v. McSwiggen (In Re Alvarez) · filed 2004-12-09(a)

Any failure to return that property to the Debt- or after notice of the bankruptcy is a willful violation of the automatic stay potentially warranting imposition of damages, attorneys fees, costs and punitive damages.

The automatic stay extends to a forcible detainer action against a non-bankrupt spouse when both spouses share a possessory interest protected by the bankruptcy estate, and a judgment entered in violation of the stay is void.

Lovall v. Chao · filed 2005-01-20(a)(1), (a)(3)

Furthermore, although only appellant—the non-bankrupt spouse—was named as a defendant in appellee’s forcible detainer action, the interests of appellant and her husband (as to the forcible detainer action) were such that the stay applied to both parties. Therefore, we conclude that the bankruptcy court’s automatic stay deprived the justice of the peace court of jurisdiction over appellee’s forcible detainer action. ... Thus, we hold that the county court’s judgment is void.

Section 362 requires a landlord to obtain relief from the automatic stay before seeking eviction for post-petition rent defaults when a rejected residential lease remains property of the estate.

Thompson-Mendez v. St. Charles at Olde Court Partnership, LLC (In Re Thompson-Mendez) · filed 2005-03-14(a)(3)

In this case, because Debtor’s interest in the lease was not deemed abandoned simply by rejection of the lease agreement, an action to recover possession of the premises was stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The stay continues until terminated by statute under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c), or by Court Order upon Creditor’s motion under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). Neither of these events has occurred. Accordingly, by filing the ejectment action, Creditor violated the automatic stay in seeking to obtain possession of property of the estate without a Court Order granting relief from stay.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a forcible detainer action commenced against a debtor after the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.

Kilpatrick v. Potoczniak · filed 2014-07-31(a)(1)

The forcible detainer action was filed in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay.

Section 362(b)(10) allows a landlord to continue eviction proceedings when a nonresidential lease terminated before the bankruptcy filing, despite the debtor’s continued possession.

Truong v. 325 Broadway Associates LLC (In re Truong) · filed 2016-08-30(b)(10)

In this case, the Lease was also terminated prepetition on March 31, 2016 by the Termination Notice so the same result obtains here: the eviction proceedings against the Debtor are not stayed, and the Debtor’s interest in the Lease and Leased Premises (if any) is not property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a landlord from terminating a debtor’s leasehold, retaking the leased property, or otherwise exercising nonconsensual control over it without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay.

Wilson v. Arbors of Central Park ICG, LLC · filed 2019-12-02(a)(3)

Therefore, section 362(a)(3) prevents any act by a debtor’s landlord to terminate the debtor’s leasehold interest, to regain possession of the leased property to the exclusion of the debtor, or to otherwise exercise non-consensual control over the leased property without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) bars a lessor from terminating a debtor’s lease after the petition when the lease deems a prepetition termination notice given after filing; the attempted termination is void.

Loves Furniture Inc. · filed 2021-03-31(a)

The result of this is that the action by the LCN Parties in terminating the Leases must be deemed to have been done on January 7, 2021, after the automatic stay had arisen, and therefore was a violation of the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1), 362(a)(3), 362(a)(6). As such, the action of the LCN Parties in terminating each of the Leases is invalid, void, and of no effect.

Section 362(b)(10) permits an eviction action concerning nonresidential property to proceed despite the automatic stay when the lease expired before the bankruptcy petition.

Batista v. Luis Márquez Sánchez Esw Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 2026-02-19(b)(10)

No obstante, la Ley de Quiebras dispone que la paralización automática de los procedimientos cobijados bajo dicha legislación no aplica en contra de aquellas acciones de desahucio que se realizan contra propiedades no residenciales cuando el contrato de arrendamiento ha vencido.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay the ministerial entry of a judgment the court rendered before the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Phillips v. Phillips · filed 2013-12-19(a)(1)

The ministerial act of entry of a judgment on June 22 does not constitute the continuation of judicial proceedings within the meaning of the bankruptcy stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), because the trial court determined and announced its judgment on the record on May 21 — before James filed his bankruptcy petition.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a clerk’s postpetition entry and docketing of a money judgment when the court fully adjudicated and directed entry of that judgment before the petition and the clerk had no discretion left to exercise.

In Re James N. PAPATONES, Debtor. Edward ELLIOTT, Et Al., Appellees, v. James N. PAPATONES, Appellant · filed 1998-05-13(a)(1)

Therefore, even though the oral direction for entry of judgment was not reduced to writing until the next day, neither that clerical act nor the mere ministerial notation of the judgment on the docket contravened the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a clerk’s ministerial entry of judgment after a bankruptcy filing when the judge directed entry and decided the merits before the filing.

Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann · filed 1994-04-07(a)(1)

Because the entry of a judgment on the court docket is not the continuation of a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 362(a)(1), the judgment entered in this case was not entered in violation of the automatic stay and, accordingly, is valid.

Section 362 does not bar the clerk’s ministerial filing and docket entry of a judgment signed before the debtor filed for bankruptcy.

Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n of America v. Butler · filed 1986-03-27

The filing of the signed judgment and entry upon the Court’s docket by the Clerk of the Court required no action on the part of Teachers in violation of the stay protecting One City Centre Associates, and was a purely ministerial act performed by the Clerk of the Court in compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 79.

Section 362(a)(2) does not relieve a sheriff of the duty to file a return on a writ of execution after the debtor files for bankruptcy; filing the return is a ministerial act that does not change the debtor’s position.

Lindsey Family Trust v. Cauthron · filed 1987-03-11(a)(2)

We hold that the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code does not relieve the sheriff of the statutory duty to file a return within 60 days. The filing of the return is a ministerial act and it does not change the debtor’s position.

Section 362(a) bars a creditor from filing a document after bankruptcy begins that creates a charging lien against estate property; such a filing is not a ministerial act.

Pryor v. Basvis Realty Corp. (In Re Madden) · filed 1994-11-22(a)(1)-(5)

But no definition for the term would include the filing by a party of a document after the commencement of a bankruptcy case, which gives that party a charging lien against estate property. ... Such an act by Carney would transform her rights in Jericho Partners from nonexistent to existent. This is plainly not a ministerial act.

Section 362 does not prohibit a state judge from signing a divorce judgment when signing it is a ministerial act.

In Re Taylor · filed 1998-01-05(a)(1)

While it is not clear that signing a judgment is always a ministerial function, I find that here, to the small extent that the proposed judgment might impinge on ground covered by the Automatic Stay, signing it is a ministerial function and not prohibited by the Stay.

Section 362(a)(1) does not prohibit a purely ministerial postpetition act, such as docketing a judgment already rendered.

Electric M & R, Inc. v. Aultman (In Re Aultman) · filed 1998-08-12(a)(1)

However, the debtors are incorrect because (a) in Pennsylvania, the mere entry of a judgment upon a state court docket by the state court protho-notary is a purely ministerial act, ... and (b) performance of a purely ministerial act post-petition will not constitute a continuation of a judicial action or proceeding against the debtors in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a) does not bar the purely ministerial post-petition entry of a formal judgment on a pre-petition state court order.

Litman v. Levine (In re Levine) · filed 1998-12-30(a)

The Court points out that a post-petition reduction to formal judgment of a state court order entered pre-petition does not even constitute a violation of the automatic stay because ... performance of a purely ministerial act post-petition will not constitute a continuation of a judicial action or proceeding against a debtor in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a) does not stay ministerial acts that involve no deliberation, discretion, or judicial involvement after a decision on the merits.

McCarthy, Johnson & Miller v. North Bay Plumbing, Inc. · filed 2000-07-06(a)

This exception stems from the common-sense principle that a judicial “proceeding” within the meaning of section 362(a) ends once a decision on the merits has been rendered. Ministerial acts or automatic occurrences that entail no deliberation, discretion, or judicial involvement do not constitute continuations of such a proceeding. We now adopt the ministerial act exception for this circuit and apply it to the case before us.

Section 362(a) does not stay ministerial acts that follow a completed judicial decision and require no deliberation, discretion, or judicial involvement.

In re Pettit · filed 2000-07-06(a)

This exception stems from the common-sense principle that a judicial "proceeding" within the meaning of section 362(a) ends once a decision on the merits has been rendered. Ministerial acts or automatic occurrences that entail no deliberation, discretion, or judicial involvement do not constitute continuations of such a proceeding. We now adopt the ministerial act exception for this circuit and apply it to the case before us.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not bar a court clerk from reissuing a summons as a ministerial act.

Schafer v. Wachovia Bank of Georgia, N.A. · filed 2001-03-06(a)(1)

In any event, the reissuance of summons of process by the clerk constituted a ministerial act, which was not stayed.

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar ministerial acts taken after a bankruptcy petition, even within a judicial proceeding.

Chase Manhattan Bank Ex Rel. IMC Home Equity Trust 1997-6 v. Pulcini (In Re Pulcini) · filed 2001-05-07(a)(1)

Ministerial acts, even if undertaken post-petition within the context of a judicial or other court proceeding do not violate the automatic stay, in particular § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar a court clerk’s ministerial entry of a judgment after the bankruptcy filing.

In Re Mr. Movies, Inc. · filed 2002-12-23(a)(1)

The ministerial act of the entry of a judgment by the court clerk did not constitute the continuation of a judicial proceeding under 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(1) and, therefore, was not a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay the ministerial delivery of a foreclosure deed after a prepetition auction extinguished the debtor’s property interests, even if the debtor retained limited incidents of ownership.

In Re: Sandralee Rodgers, Debtor, Sandralee Rodgers v. County of Monroe, William M. Lissow, and George M. Reiber · filed 2003-06-16(a)(3)

Although Rodgers may have retained some “incidents of ownership,” (Jan. 10, 2002 Order at 10), between the time of the sale and the delivery of the deed — for example, a limited right of possession — the delivery of the deed was a ministerial act that did not impair any property interest retained by Rodgers and, thus, was not subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362's automatic stay does not preclude a court from merely signing a judgment after the case has been tried and submitted.

Lousteau v. K-Mart Corp. · filed 2004-03-30

Additionally, the filing of the Notice of Bankruptcy did not preclude the court from merely signing the judgment. 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a) stays decisions vacating a judgment or awarding attorneys’ fees in a debt-collection action after a bankruptcy filing because those decisions are not merely ministerial acts.

United States v. Vilus · filed 2005-09-08(a)

A decision vacating a judgment or awarding attorneys' fees is not a mere ministerial act, which may under some circumstances proceed post-petition, despite the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar ministerial entry of a matrimonial judgment after a bankruptcy filing when the court rendered its decision on the merits before the filing.

Musso v. Ostashko (In Re Ostashko) · filed 2005-11-16(a)(1)

In the present case, a “decision on the merits” was certainly “rendered” when the court in the Matrimonial Action issued its Decision After Inquest on October 23, 2003 awarding Appellant 100% of the Marital Assets. The judgment therefore did not violate the automatic stay and is valid, pursuant to the Court’s holding in Rex-nord.

Section 362(a)(1) bars entry of a default judgment requiring a determination of the sufficiency of the proof because that determination is not a ministerial act exempt from the automatic stay.

Asset Data Corp. v. Massaro · filed 2006-04-21(a)(1)

The entry of a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215 is not a ministerial act exempt from the automatic stay provision as it requires a determination based on the sufficiency of the proof submitted to the clerk or the court.

Postpetition execution and judicial approval of a civil forfeiture stipulation are not ministerial acts exempt from the automatic stay when the property remained estate property at filing.

Kirschenbaum v. Nassau County District Attorney (In Re Vitta) · filed 2009-03-02(a)(1)

Because the Court finds that the Property was property of the estate as of the Petition Date, the Defendants’ argument that the post-petition act of signing the Stipulation by the Defendant and the “so-ordering” of the Stipulation by Justice Galasso was a ministerial act fails as a matter of law. It is well settled that acts taken in violation of the automatic stay are void and of no effect.

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar ministerial entry of an arbitration award when adjudication concluded before the bankruptcy petition.

In Re Heaviside · filed 2010-08-30(a)(1)

Here, as all deliberations, adjudication and determinations in the Arbitration Hearing had concluded at the time that Debtors filed their bankruptcy petition, there was no continuation of a proceeding to which the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) would apply. Entry of the Arbitration Award does not violate the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a) does not bar a ministerial amendment of a judgment to incorporate attorney’s fees already awarded by an appellate court.

Cusano v. Klein · filed 2012-06-14(a)

The district court’s February 2008 order amending the September 2003 judgment to incorporate the attorney’s fees awarded by the Ninth Circuit was a ministerial act and therefore did not violate the automatic bankruptcy stay.

Section 362(a) does not bar the mandatory, ministerial execution of tax sale deeds after the debtor’s redemption period expires.

In re Rugroden · filed 2012-09-25(a)

The act of executing the deeds was ministerial and therefore did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit a tax collector from recording deeds after a bankruptcy filing when the tax sales occurred before the filing and recording the deeds is a ministerial act.

Tracht Gut, LLC v. County of Los Angeles Treasurer & Tax Collector (In Re Tracht Gut, LLC) · filed 2014-01-03(a)

On this record, we conclude that the County’s recording of the tax deeds was a ministerial act, and the bankruptcy court did not err in ruling that the recordings did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) bars entry of a foreclosure judgment after a bankruptcy petition when the judge must exercise discretion before signing or approving it, even if the judge orally granted summary judgment before the petition.

In re Fontaine · filed 2019-05-14(a)(1)

Under these circumstances, the entry of the Foreclosure Judgment did not constitute a mere ministerial act. The entry of the Foreclosure Judgment violated the automatic stay. It is void ab initio.

Filing an affidavit of service for a notice served before the automatic stay began is a ministerial act that does not violate the stay.

In Re: Jsang Kei Lau · filed 2021-02-26(a)(1)

The filing of the Affidavit of Service is a “ministerial act” and is not a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 does not stay the ministerial processing of a tax deed after the redemption period expires.

Corotoman Inc. · filed 2021-03-31

Courts have been clear that the processing of a tax deed following the expiration of the redemption period is a “ministerial act” which is not stayed by § 362.

Section 362(a) does not bar delivery of a sheriff’s deed after a completed prepetition execution sale when the estate has no interest in the property and delivery is a ministerial act.

Karlene Sandra Parker · filed 2021-06-07(a)

By delivering the deed – a statutory, ministerial act over which the sheriff had no discretion – neither Sheriff Tony nor Patrick’s Custom Painting nor FARC violated the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a court-ordered motion for clerk’s default or the clerk’s entry of default when those acts are ministerial and do not commence or continue proceedings.

MAK, LLC v. VUOZZO · filed 2021-12-21(a)(1)

Rather, Plaintiff’s filing and the Clerk’s entry of Default constitute ministerial actions not subject to the stay.

Section 362 does not stay ministerial execution of a deed pursuant to a court order entered years before the bankruptcy petition.

Kipps v. Stincavage-Kipps · filed 2023-06-26

The Bankruptcy Court agreed with the state court’s reliance on In re Rugroden, 481 B.R. 69, 78 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2012), in finding that the automatic stay does not apply to ministerial acts like execution of a deed pursuant to a court order from years prior. This finding was not legal error; thus, the Bankruptcy Court did not err in denying reconsideration on this ground.

Section 362(a) does not stay a debtor’s own lawsuit or prevent a defendant from defending it when the defendant asserts no counterclaim against the debtor.

Van Damme v. U.S. Bank N.A., as Trustee · filed 2024-11-26(a)

But the Ninth Circuit has made clear that the stay provided for by § 362 “does not prevent a plaintiff/debtor from continuing to prosecute its own claims nor does it prevent a defendant from protecting its interests against claims brought by the debtor.”

Section 362(a) stays actions against a debtor, but does not stay lawsuits brought by the debtor or toll the limitations period for those lawsuits.

Phillips v. World Publishing Co. · filed 2011-10-14(a)

Plaintiff also contends that the Washington statute of limitations was tolled by the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) during his bankruptcy proceedings. However, such stay applies only to actions against the debtor, not to lawsuits brought by the debtor.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a lawsuit brought by the debtor, and § 362(a)(3) does not prevent dismissal or defense of that lawsuit as an act to control estate property.

Riviera Drilling & Exploration v. Gunnison Energy Corporation · filed 2011-01-05(a)(1), (a)(3)

Because the lawsuit was brought by the debtor Riviera, not against it, § 362(a)(1) is inapplicable. A debtor can continue to pursue its claims against another party even after filing for bankruptcy protection. And § 362(a)(3) is also inapplicable, because an attempt to dismiss or defeat a debtor’s lawsuit is not an act to obtain possession or exercise control over property of the debtor’s estate.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a trustee’s prosecution of affirmative claims, including counterclaims in arbitration.

Kittay v. Landegger (In Re Hagerstown Fiber Ltd. Partnership) · filed 2002-04-26(a)(1)

The automatic stay does not restrain the prosecution of the trustee’s claims for affirmative relief, either in this Court or another court, or by way of counterclaim in the arbitration.

Section 362(a)(1) does not require a debtor to obtain relief from the automatic stay before bringing its own claim.

Yankton Ethanol, Inc. v. Vironment, Inc. · filed 1999-04-07(a)(1)

Vironment, as debtor, need not receive relief from the automatic stay to initiate its claim.

Section 362(a)(1) stays actions filed against a debtor, but does not stay actions brought by the debtor.

Taraska v. Carmel · filed 1998-04-27(a)(1)

Because the automatic stay only applies to actions filed against a debtor and not actions brought by a debtor, ... the instant action is not subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) stays claims against a bankruptcy debtor, but does not bar adjudication of the debtor’s counterclaim.

Transamerica Consumer Receivable Funding, Inc. v. Warhawk Investments, Inc. · filed 1994-01-26(a)(1)

The automatic stay, however, does not prevent the court from addressing defendants’ counterclaim as this claim is not “against the debtor”.

Section 362(a) automatically stays actions brought against a debtor, but does not stay actions brought by the debtor.

Tohono O'Odham Nation v. Schwartz · filed 1993-09-16(a)

Further, the circuit courts which have addressed this question have held that the automatic stay applies only to actions brought against the bankrupt, not to those brought by the bankrupt. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that this action need not be stayed because of Canyon’s bankruptcy.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against a debtor, but does not stay claims brought by the debtor before bankruptcy for the benefit of the estate.

Merchants & Farmers Bank of Dumas, Ark. v. Hill · filed 1990-12-21(a)(1)

However, the provision of the automatic stay, as well as its underlying rationale, is inapplicable to suits by a debtor.

Section 362(a) does not stay a suit brought by a debtor or prevent the defendant in that suit from seeking dismissal.

Kuntz v. Lake Placid Olympic Organizing Committee of 1980, Inc. · filed 1990-10-03(a)

Contrary to plaintiffs’ position, the automatic stay imposed by 11 USC § 362 (a) is inapplicable to suits by a bankrupt or debtor ... and does not bar a defendant in a debtor’s suit from seeking dismissal of that suit (Martin-Trigona v Champion Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., supra).

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay an administrative proceeding initiated by the debtor or lawful participation by parties entitled to be heard in that proceeding.

Wengert Transportation, Inc. v. Crouse Cartage Co. (In Re Wengert Transportation, Inc.) · filed 1986-03-31(a)(1)

In the matter sub judice the character of the proceeding as “debtor initiated” was fixed when the debtor applied for its permit. The automatic stay is therefore wholly inapplicable either to the proceeding itself or to the lawful actions of parties having a statutory right to be heard therein.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay an appeal when the debtor initiated the underlying proceeding, because whether a proceeding is against the debtor depends on its posture at the outset.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 71,481 Claude Freeman and Carol Freeman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue · filed 1986-09-22(a)(1)

If the initial proceeding is not against the debtor, subsequent appellate proceedings are also not against the debtor within the meaning of the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Since the prior appellate proceeding before this Court was not against the debtor, it was not stayed pursuant to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) prohibits filing a third-party complaint against a debtor while the automatic stay is in effect.

In Re NWFX, Inc. · filed 1987-10-15(a)(1)

The Court finds that Nanjer’s action of filing a third party complaint against NWFX constituted a violation of the automatic stay under § 362(a)(1), which prohibits the commencement of judicial proceedings against a debt- or.

Section 362 automatically stays proceedings against a debtor upon a bankruptcy filing, but does not stay the debtor’s prosecution of its own lawsuit.

Danielson v. ITT Industrial Credit Co. · filed 1988-03-14

The Bankruptcy Act provides that the commencement or continuation of any legal proceeding against the debtor is automatically stayed by the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, until adjudication or dismissal of the petition. (11 U.S.C. § 362.) ... The prosecution of this action was not stayed.

Section 362(a)(1) stays the continuation of a judicial proceeding against a defendant in bankruptcy, including proceedings on pending motions, until the stay is lifted.

Redmond v. Alexander · filed 1989-03-24(a)(1)

Stemm is now in bankruptcy, and thus, "the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding," is stayed as to him. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). Accordingly, the court hereby reserves ruling on that defendant’s motions until such time as the automatic stay is lifted.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against a bankruptcy debtor, including proceedings requiring issuance of process, so a lien claimant need not join the debtor before the stay is lifted.

J&W Allen Construction Co. v. Kramer · filed 1989-04-19(a)(1)

Claimants were not bound to join the general contractor, Three Star Construction, when their complaints for accounting were filed in the Williamson County Circuit Court for the reason that Federal law mandated the stay of all proceedings against Three Star Construction, which included any proceedings upon which process would be required to issue. Upon the lifting of the automatic stay, Claimants joined Three Star Construction in the complaint for an accounting with due diligence.

Section 362 automatically stays proceedings against a debtor in bankruptcy, so joining the debtor in a state court action before obtaining stay relief violates the section.

Chilton Private Bank v. Norsec-Cook, Inc. · filed 1989-05-11

Thus, the joinder of Creative Cuisine clearly violated 11 U.S.C. § 362, which automatically stays proceedings against debtors in bankruptcy.

Section 362(a)(1) and (a)(3) do not stay a defendant's efforts to defend against a suit brought by the debtor, even when the debtor's cause of action is estate property.

Martin-Trigona v. Champion Federal Savings And Loan Association · filed 1989-12-26(a)(1), (a)(3)

There is, in contrast, no policy of preventing persons whom the bankrupt has sued from protecting their legal rights. True, the bankrupt's cause of action is an asset of the estate; but as the defendant in the bankrupt's suit is not, by opposing that suit, seeking to take possession of it, subsection (a)(3) is no more applicable than (a)(1) is.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay an appeal in an action brought by the debtor against another party where no counterclaim or cross-claim was asserted.

Carley Capital Group v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company · filed 1989-12-29(a)(1)

In these circumstances, we hold that the automatic stay provision had no proper role respecting this disposition, and that the mandate should now issue forthwith.

Section 362(a) stays an appeal in a proceeding originally brought against the debtor, even when the debtor seeks relief from the judgment and brings the appeal.

Binek v. Ziebarth · filed 1990-03-01(a)

It is immaterial that the debtor has attempted to utilize the procedural aspects of Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., and Rule 3.2, N.D.R.O.C. This is clearly an action against the debtor at the initial proceeding and is consequently stayed by 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against a debtor, but does not stay a proceeding brought by the debtor against a third party.

151-69 Nagle Avenue Associates v. Jiminez · filed 1990-05-24(a)(1)

The language of section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code is explicit that the automatic stay provision applies only to the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding against the debtor. The statute does not stay a debtor from the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding against a third party.

Section 362(a) stays further proceedings against a defendant that has filed for bankruptcy.

Gutenkauf v. Mills-Jennings Co. · filed 1990-08-27(a)

Under the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), further proceedings in this case must be stayed so far as they concern that defendant.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a creditor’s pending motion to disburse a supersedeas deposit on a prepetition judgment against the debtor regardless of whether the deposit is estate property.

In re the Berlyn Corp. · filed 1991-02-07(a)(1)

The automatic stay bars Kalman from pursuing his disbursement motion in the district court, but not because the su-persedeas deposit is property of the bankruptcy estate as contended by the Debtor. Section 362(a)(1) bars the “commencement or continuation ... of a judicial ... proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.” Kalman’s pending disbursement motion clearly comes within the sweep of this prohibition. Thus it makes no difference whether the super-sedeas deposit is “property of the estate” within the meaning of other subsections of § 362(a) which effect a stay against acts to obtain, or enforce a lien against, “property of the estate.”

Section 362(a)(1) stays an appeal over a proof of claim to which the debtor objects because the claim is a proceeding against the debtor, even when the debtor filed the earlier bankruptcy case.

In the Matter of Continental Airlines, Debtors. Joseph E. O'Neill v. Continental Airlines, Inc. · filed 1991-03-21(a)(1)

While it may be true that this appeal is linked to the 1983 bankruptcy proceedings, filed by Continental, proofs of claim to which the debtor objects, including this one, are undoubtedly “against the debtor” in the context of § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a) automatically stays judicial proceedings against a bankruptcy debtor until applicable relief from the stay permits them to proceed.

Zogbi v. Federated Department Store · filed 1991-06-05(a)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 362(a), all judicial proceedings against Federated were automatically stayed. ... Therefore, the court will stay this action unless and until such relief from the bankruptcy stay is granted or plaintiff demonstrates that he is within the limited relief previously granted by the bankruptcy court.

Section 362(a) stays prepetition litigation against a debtor, but does not stay an action brought by the debtor as plaintiff.

Wills Motors, Inc. v. Volvo North America Corp. · filed 1991-07-19(a)

Initially it should be noted that the automatic stay does not apply in this case because 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) enjoins the commencement or continuation of all litigation against a debtor based on prepetition claims. In the instant case the action was brought by the debtor as the plaintiff against the defendant Volvo.