11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(a) stays a lien foreclosure action against mortgage holders when the debtor owns the property and is an indispensable party to the action.

Diamond Hill Investment Co v. Shelden · filed 1989-01-13(a)

We conclude, therefore, that, since W.A.S., as owner, was an indispensable party to a foreclosure action against appellants as mortgage holders and since any action against W.A.S. was stayed by § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, appellee correctly determined he was stayed from filing his amended complaint joining appellants as party defendants until after dismissal of the bankruptcy proceedings involving W.A.S.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a proceeding based on postpetition conduct and debts that could not have been commenced before the petition, and § 362(a)(3) does not stay a proceeding that is not against estate property.

Matter of Creative Cuisine, Inc. · filed 1989-01-13(a)(1), (a)(3)

All relevant actions by Mr. Kaufman and the Debtor occurred post-petition and the debts that are subject to the attachment order are post-petition debts. Consequently, NAAT’s state court action could not have been commenced before the Debtor’s original Chapter 11 petition was filed in December, 1984. In addition, NAAT’s motion is for a rule to show cause, which is not a proceeding against the property of the Debtor’s estate. The automatic stay is therefore inapplicable to Mr. Kaufman and the Debtor insofar as NAAT’s motion for a rule to show cause is concerned.

Conversion from one bankruptcy chapter to another does not create a new automatic stay under § 362(a), and an earlier order modifying the stay remains effective after conversion.

In Re Greetis · filed 1989-03-17(a)

For the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that conversion of a case from one chapter to another does not give rise to a new automatic stay. To the extent the stay under section 362 was modified, annulled, conditioned or terminated during proceedings prior to conversion, the earlier order is unaffected by a subsequent conversion and “order for relief” under section 348.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not prevent a trustee from electing to continue a prepetition arbitration; that election waives the stay’s protection.

In Re Al-Cam Development Corp. · filed 1989-05-05

In such case, the trustee or debtor has waived the protection of the automatic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362 and is authorized under Bankruptcy Rule 6009 “to commence and prosecute any action or proceeding in behalf of the estate before any tribunal” without court approval.

Section 362(a)(1) bars a creditor from filing an adversary complaint against the debtor on a prepetition contract claim without relief from the automatic stay.

Healy/Mellon-Stuart Co. v. Coastal Group, Inc. (In Re Coastal Group, Inc.) · filed 1989-05-08(a)(1)

Section 362(a)(1) prohibits the commencement of any action to recover a claim against a debtor that arose before the filing of a bankruptcy case. ... Healy/Mellon-Stuart has a claim based on a state-law contract. Its complaint falls squarely within the category of cases which would be filed in state court had there been no bankruptcy. It is the typical case which cannot be filed subsequent to a bankruptcy filing absent relief from stay for cause.

Section 362(a) automatically stays only actions brought against a debtor in bankruptcy.

Home America, Inc. v. T & J Paving, Inc. · filed 1989-06-09(a)

That holding is in error because the automatic stay provisions of section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), apply only to actions brought against a debtor in bankruptcy.

Section 362(a)(1) and (2) stays enforcement of a prepetition eviction judgment against a debtor even when the debtor has no legal interest in the property.

In Re Clark · filed 1989-05-15(a)(1) and (2)

This Court agrees with the movant’s assertion in its Motion For Relief From Automatic Stay that debtor had no legal interest in said real estate and that same did not become property of the estate. However, the reach of the automatic stay is extremely broad and it did indeed thwart movant’s actions to cause the sheriff to forcibly remove debtor from the premises as set out in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) and (2).

Section 362 does not provide for reinstatement of the automatic stay after relief from the stay has been obtained.

MacDonald v. First Interstate Credit Alliance, Inc. (In Re MacDonald) · filed 1989-05-17(a)

There cannot be a “reinstatement” of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) inasmuch as there is no such provision within § 362.

Section 362 prevents a mortgagee from improving its position in postpetition rents or affecting the debtor’s rights under § 552 without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay.

In Re Harbour Town Associates, Ltd. · filed 1989-05-17

Any attempt by State Mutual to improve its position in rents would violate the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. V 1987). No exception to the stay would authorize State Mutual to take any action to affect the debtor’s rights under § 552 without first securing relief from the stay.

A creditor may assert a valid setoff right as a defense to an avoidance or turnover action even if it exercised that right without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay.

Kroh Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Barnett Bank of Southwest Florida (In Re Kroh Bros. Development Co.) · filed 1989-05-30

Regardless whether a creditor has sought relief from the automatic stay, it is entitled to assert as an affirmative defense to a trustee’s avoidance or turn over action its right of setoff.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay termination of an executory loan commitment that section 365(e)(2)(B) permits the lender to terminate after a bankruptcy filing.

In Re Watts · filed 1989-06-05(a)(3)

Because PHFA's commitment to provide mortgage assistance plainly constitutes an unassumable executory "contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor" under sections 365(c)(2) and 365(e)(2)(B) of the Code, and because the automatic stay provision of the Code is inapplicable to such a commitment, we hold that the automatic stay was not violated in this case.

Section 362(a) does not extend the automatic stay to actions against the debtor’s co-defendants in pending litigation.

Vogel v. Pardon · filed 1989-07-17(a)

In fact, it is now well-settled that the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) does not extend to actions against the debtor’s co-defendants in pending litigation.

Section 362 does not stay a suit brought by the debtor as plaintiff, and the debtor cannot invoke the stay against the defendant’s counterclaim or to extend the time to remove that suit.

Jandous Electric Construction Corp. v. City of New York (In Re Jandous Electric Construction Corp.) · filed 1989-10-16

In the instant case it is clear that the debtor’s initiation, as plaintiff, of a civil suit against the City, as defendant, does not implicate any automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362. A debtor may not use the automatic stay as a sword when the debtor is the plaintiff in a pending nonbankruptcy suit. The purpose of the stay is the protection of the debtor, but when the debtor is in the position of the assailant, rather than the defendant, it would be inequitable to invoke the stay against the defendant’s counterclaim, or to permit the debtor to use the stay as a basis for extending the time to remove the state court action to the bankruptcy court.

A state court hearing a proceeding claimed to be stayed has concurrent jurisdiction to decide whether the automatic stay applies to that proceeding.

In Re Bona · filed 1991-02-04

The New Jersey Court had concurrent jurisdiction with the bankruptcy court to determine the applicability of the automatic stay: “The court in which the litigation claimed to be stayed is pending has jurisdiction to determine not only its own jurisdiction but also the more precise question whether the proceeding pending before it is subject to the automatic stay.”

Section 362(a) does not prohibit issuing a vehicle title with a creditor’s lien noted when the estate had no interest in the vehicle beforehand and gains title subject to the lien.

Logan v. Chesrown Rapid Credit A/S (In re Weaver) · filed 1991-09-23(a)

Moreover, because the net result of Chesrown’s action was to transfer an interest in the car to the estate, and the estate had no interest in the car beforehand, the action did not violate the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a) permits a court hearing litigation subject to the automatic stay to determine the stay’s scope, although that court may defer to the bankruptcy court familiar with the bankruptcy case.

Island National Insurance v. Champlain Villas Ltd. Partnership · filed 1992-08-19(a)

Moreover, a non-bankruptcy forum may determine the reach and scope of an automatic stay. ... But principles of comity and sound judicial administration suggest that the court from which the original stay issued, which is also the court familiar with the details of the bankruptcy, is the tribunal better equipped to determine the reach and scope of the stay.

Section 362 gives the bankruptcy court exclusive authority to determine whether the automatic stay applies and to grant relief from it.

Reich v. Reich · filed 1993-01-12

We find the trial court did not have jurisdiction to determine whether 11 U.S.C. § 362 (the automatic stay) applied to these payments and grant relief from the stay. The Bankruptcy court- has sole jurisdiction to grant relief from the automatic stay and relief for what clearly are support, alimony, and maintenance payments is quickly granted.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings originally brought against the debtor, while § 362(a)(3) does not stay a defendant’s procedural appeal of a lawsuit brought by the debtor.

Polello v. Knapp · filed 1993-02-23(a)(1), (a)(3)

Section 362(a)(1) applies only to the continuation of an action or proceeding against the debtor. Here, although the debtor is the respondent on review, the action was originally brought by the debtor, not against the debtor. ... As to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), Mr. Knapp's defense of the lawsuit and his appeal on procedural grounds is not an attempt to exercise control over property of the estate.

Section 362 stays a landlord from terminating a bankrupt tenant’s right to possess leased real estate and a secured creditor from enforcing its lien against the tenant’s goods until relief from the stay is granted.

Allocca v. Rockland Trust Co. · filed 1993-04-05(a)(3), (a)(4)

The stay provisions prevented plaintiff from terminating tenant’s right to possession of the real estate prior to the relief from the stay, and also prevented defendant from enforcement of its lien against tenant’s goods prior to the relief from the bankruptcy stay.

The automatic stay under § 362(a)(1) and (a)(3) does not bar a party litigating against a debtor from filing an affidavit that preserves only its own service mark registration and neither continues its claim against the debtor nor controls estate property.

Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks · filed 1995-04-21(a)(1), (a)(3)

We therefore reject Checkers’s contention that the filing required by section 8 of the Lanham Act in this case would have constituted either the “continuation” of an “action or proceeding against the debtor” within the meaning of subsection 362(a)(1), or an act “to exercise control over property of the estate” within the meaning of subsection 362(a)(3).

A district court has concurrent jurisdiction to decide whether Section 362’s automatic stay applies to litigation before it, including claims against nondebtor defendants, and a bankruptcy court cannot enjoin that determination.

Royer v. Dow Corning · filed 1995-11-01

While it is not entirely clear what the bankruptcy court's temporary restraining order was actually intended to do, it is, as discussed, quite clear that a bankruptcy court cannot by preemptive injunction either directly or indirectly deprive a district court of its concurrent jurisdiction to determine the extent to which the automatic stay provisions of § 362 might affect litigation pending before that district court.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with bankruptcy courts to determine whether § 362’s automatic stay applies.

Jeffries v. Bar J. Forest Products, Inc. (In Re Jeffries) · filed 1995-11-15

While there may be a split of authority as to whether state courts have jurisdiction to determine applicability of the automatic stay, this court finds that the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with bankruptcy courts to determine applicability of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a) does not stay a severable proceeding against a nondebtor to transfer a creditor’s own claim when the proceeding neither seeks relief against the debtor nor control over estate property.

McDaniel v. Park Place Care Center, Inc. · filed 1996-01-23(a)(1), (a)(3)

The automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy code did not stay the trial court from ruling on SBT’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The proceeding was not an action against the debtor and was not an act to obtain possession of or exercise control over property of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(a) bars suit and judgment enforcement against the debtor but does not prevent the debtor from appearing as a witness or responding to non-party discovery.

Cashman v. Montefiore Medical Center · filed 1996-01-25(a)

The section 362(a) stay against Dow Coming merely prohibits a party from suing it or enforcing a judgment against it, it does not preclude Dow Corning from being summoned as a witness or responding to non-party discovery.

State courts may make binding determinations of whether Section 362’s automatic stay applies to an action before them.

Pope v. Wagner (In Re Pope) · filed 1997-06-16

In dealing with matters before them, state courts may make a valid and binding determination of section 362's applicability.

Section 362(a) does not apply to a motion to amend a complaint under the particular circumstances of this case, even if parties acted as though the stay applied.

Oliver v. Baum, No. Cv90 027 74 70 S (Jan. 16, 1998) · filed 1998-01-16(a)

The court is persuaded that under the particular facts of this case the automatic stay afforded under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) is inapplicable. Gershman v. Kiam , 40 Conn. Sup. 327 , 330 (1985). The fact that one or more parties may have acted as if the stay applied is unavailing to the plaintiff.

State courts may make valid and binding determinations of whether § 362’s automatic stay applies to matters before them.

In Re Glass · filed 1999-10-25

State courts may make a valid and binding determination of the applicability of § 362 when dealing with matters before them.

A state administrative judge’s ruling on the scope of the automatic stay does not preclude a bankruptcy court from independently deciding its scope.

Contractors' State License Board of California v. Dunbar · filed 2001-04-04

We are asked to decide whether the decision of a state administrative law judge (“ALJ”) regarding the scope of the automatic stay in bankruptcy precludes consideration of the issue by the federal bankruptcy court. We hold that pursuant to Gruntz v. County of Los Angeles (In re Chintz), 202 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc), the decision of the state ALJ does not preclude the bankruptcy court’s independent review.

A state court has concurrent jurisdiction to decide whether a proceeding before it is subject to the automatic stay.

In re Jones · filed 2002-01-11

While Beneficial could have sought the intervention of the Bankruptcy Court in the initial instance, the Cattaraugus County Court also enjoyed concurrent jurisdiction to decide that creditor’s objections relative to application of the automatic stay.

State courts may determine whether an action is stayed but should consider deferring close questions about automatic-stay exceptions to the bankruptcy court.

Mariner Health Care, Inc. v. Nevonnia Turner · filed 2004-02-18(b)

While the courts of this state have jurisdiction to determine whether a pending action is stayed by a ruling of the bankruptcy court, we recognize that state courts “should consider deferring close questions involving the applicability of exceptions to the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) to the bankruptcy court.” ... We therefore decline to interpret the bankruptcy stipulation and leave this determination to the bankruptcy court.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with bankruptcy courts to determine the scope and applicability of the automatic stay.

In Re Ivani · filed 2004-03-03

As a consequence, Catherine Ivani and Rose Ann Branda, Esq. were not in contempt of this Court, because the Supreme Court had concurrent jurisdiction to make decisions regarding the scope of the automatic stay.

Section 362’s automatic stay may be enforced by a state trial court, which must give effect to the stay on behalf of a debtor who has filed for bankruptcy protection.

In re Consolidated return of Real Estate Tax Sale Held September 10 · filed 2004-09-29

In any case, we do not agree with Sposi-to’s claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the automatic stay on behalf of a debtor that has filed for protection against creditors pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code. Indeed, it was the obligation of the trial court to give effect to the automatic stay.

State courts may determine whether an action is stayed, but should defer close questions about automatic-stay exceptions and the scope of bankruptcy-court-authorized stay relief to the bankruptcy court.

Mariner Health Care v. Estate of Edwards · filed 2007-09-13

While the courts of this state have jurisdiction to determine whether a pending action is stayed by a ruling of the bankruptcy court, we recognize that state courts "should consider deferring close questions involving the applicability of exceptions to the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) to the bankruptcy court." Overbey v. Murray, 569 So.2d 303, 308 (Miss.1990). In the present case, the bankruptcy stipulation was negotiated in and authorized by the bankruptcy court. Questions regarding the scope of the stipulation and the possibility of recovery under the plan are ultimately matters more properly considered by the bankruptcy court. We therefore decline to interpret the bankruptcy stipulation and leave this determination to the bankruptcy court.

Section 362's automatic stay does not apply merely because a defendant is out of business when the defendant is not a debtor in bankruptcy.

Chapman, Michael Joe v. Air Leaf Publ Book S · filed 2008-08-28

Although Airleaf is out of business, it does not appear to be a debtor in bankruptcy, so the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. §362, does not affect this litigation.

A district court may decide whether the automatic stay applies without a prior determination by the bankruptcy court.

United States v. Delfasco, Inc. · filed 2009-07-15

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the applicability of the automatic stay need not be resolved by the Bankruptcy Court in the first instance.

A district court may determine whether the automatic stay under § 362(a) applies to claims pending before it.

Flores v. Emerich & Fike · filed 2010-06-29(a)

The district court acted within its authority in lifting its own stay, as well as in determining the scope of the automatic stay.

When disputed property interests determine whether the automatic stay applies, the parties should have an opportunity to develop a record and obtain a trial court ruling before an appellate court resolves the issue.

Robb Evans, Receiver for Mediacopy Texas, Inc., et al. v. Unit 82 Joint Venture · filed 2012-08-31(a)(3), (a)(4)

But any limitations the automatic stay may have imposed on these proceedings cannot simply be hypothesized by the court of appeals sua sponte. The parties should have had an opportunity to develop a record to support their positions and seek a ruling from the trial court, even if it should turn out that only the bankruptcy court can finally decide the issue.

When the applicability of Section 362’s automatic stay depends on unresolved facts, the appellate court should abate the appeal so the trial court can determine applicability in the first instance.

Evans v. Unit 82 Joint Venture · filed 2012-08-31

That court should have abated the appeal to allow the application of the automatic stay to be determined by the trial court in the first instance.

Section 362, as applied through PROMESA, stays a claim for monetary damages against a Puerto Rico government department during the Commonwealth’s Title III case.

Osuji v. de la Familia · filed 2022-07-18

The automatic stay applies to this case regarding Plaintiffs’ request for monetary damages. The case is thus stayed pursuant to 48 U.S.C. §2161 and 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 and 922.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not apply by operation or analogy to a state-court stay of a professional-license revocation outside bankruptcy.

Gardner v. Schumacher · filed 2023-08-21

The automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 simply has no application to this case, either by operation or analogy.

A court hearing a case against nonbankrupt co-defendants may determine whether the automatic stay applies to them.

Julian St. Rose Virginie George Raymond Alleyne Edgar Barrios and Others v. Virgin Islands Industrial Maintenance Corpor · filed 2023-11-22(a)

The Superior Court of the Virgin Islands has, and indeed must have, the authority to determine whether the automatic stay applies to any non-bankrupt co-defendants.

Section 362(a) automatically stays pending claims against a debtor after a bankruptcy petition is filed.

Rock Island Auction Company v. Dean, Jr. · filed 2024-06-21(a)

The Court ORDERS that, because the Rock Island’s claims in this case are subject to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)’s automatic stay protections and, in an exercise of the Court’s sound discretion, the case should be stayed, subject to this stay being lifted upon the motion of any party once the 11 U.S.C. § 362 automatic stay is lifted or otherwise no longer in effect and that all pending, unexpired deadlines are terminated.

Section 362(a) does not support compelling third parties to release funds when the debtor has not established that the automatic stay is implicated.

Jung Ae Rodgers · filed 2025-10-10(a)

The Debtor has not established that the Proceeds are property of his bankruptcy estate, nor has he established that DoorDash or Stripe are creditors, or that the automatic stay is implicated.

Section 362(a) does not stay IRS summonses directed to third-party banks to gather information about a debtor’s tax obligations, though it stays collection of prepetition tax liabilities.

In Re Greene · filed 1985-07-10(a)

Accordingly, while the IRS is subject to the automatic stay with respect to all collection matters for prepetition tax liabilities of the debtors during the pendency of their bankruptcy case, unless relief is obtained under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), such stay and the previous order of this court do not enjoin the issuance and compliance with IRS third-party reeordkeeper summonses directed to banks for purposes of gathering information concerning the tax obligations of the debtors.

Section 362(a)(1) stays the IRS from issuing and serving a third-party summons for a debtor’s bank records as process connected with a prepetition administrative proceeding against the debtor.

In Re Spencer · filed 1991-01-18(a)(1)

Section 362(a)(1) expressly includes within its prohibition the issuance or employment of process in connection with an administrative proceeding against the debtor that could have been commenced before the bankruptcy case was filed. The issuance and service of the Spencer Summons falls within this description.

Section 362(b)(9)(A) excepts an IRS summons issued to audit compliance with the internal revenue laws from the automatic stay, assuming the stay otherwise applies to enforcement of a third-party summons.

Xĕlan, Inc. v. United States · filed 2005-02-07(b)(9)(A)

The Court agrees with the government that assuming enforcement of a third-party summons is subject to the automatic stay provisions in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (a doubtful proposition) issuance of the summons pursuant to the IRS’s attempt to audit the compliance of xélan, Inc. with the internal revenue laws would appear to be excepted from the stay by 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(9)(A).

Section 362(b)(9)(A) permits an IRS summons enforcement proceeding to continue despite the debtor’s pending bankruptcy proceeding.

Xelan, Inc. v. United States · filed 2005-03-14(b)(9)(A)

This Court reads 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(9)(A) to allow this proceeding to continue, notwithstanding the concurrent proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California.

Section 362(b)(9)(A)'s tax-audit exception permits an IRS summons-enforcement proceeding to continue despite the taxpayer's pending bankruptcy proceeding.

Xélan, Inc. v. United States · filed 2005-03-14(b)(9)(A)

This Court reads 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(9)(A) to allow this proceeding to continue, notwithstanding the concurrent proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California.

Rebutting the presumption of bad faith for a repeat filing prevents that presumption from justifying relief from the automatic stay.

Southern Motors of Savannah, Inc. v. Crosby (In re Crosby) · filed 2015-08-14(c)(3)(C)

As a result of the Crosbys’ rebuttal of the presumption that their filing is not in good faith, relief from the automatic stay on this basis is not warranted.

A debtor may not file a bankruptcy petition primarily to reimpose the automatic stay after a court has granted stay relief in a prior case between the parties.

In Re Kinney · filed 1985-07-30

While a debtor may lawfully avail himself of the protections of the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362, he is barred from filing bankruptcy petitions for the predominant purpose of reimposing the automatic stay after a motion for relief from automatic stay has been granted in a prior case between the parties.

Section 362(a) does not protect a debtor who files a bankruptcy petition in bad faith solely to delay foreclosure after a prior order permitted it.

Williams v. Gerstenfeld · filed 1986-09-10(a)

But even if the consent order had no effect under the Bankruptcy Act after May 1, the automatic stay afforded a debtor who files a petition in bankruptcy would not be effective if the petition is filed in bad faith.

A debtor’s bad faith abuse of the bankruptcy process can estop her from invoking the automatic stay on appeal even when the trial court violated the stay.

Corto v. National Scenery Studios, Inc. · filed 1997-09-22(a)

Therefore, even though Corto also correctly asserts that the trial court violated the automatic stay, Corto’s bad faith abuse of the bankruptcy process estops her from asserting on appeal the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay may be denied to specified property for 360 days in future bankruptcy filings as in rem relief for abusive serial filings.

In Re Price · filed 2004-01-20(a)

(2) The filing of a future bankruptcy petition by any individual or entity will not extend the protection of the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) to the property located at 796 Edgewood, Richmond Heights, OH 44143 for a period of three hundred and sixty (360) days from the date of this order.

Section 362(d), supplemented by § 105(a), permits prospective in rem stay relief when abusive serial bankruptcy filings demonstrate that ordinary stay relief cannot effectively protect a secured lender’s rights.

Aurora Loan Services, Inc. v. Amey (In Re Amey) · filed 2004-09-23(d)

Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a bankruptcy court to grant in rem relief in connection with granting relief from the stay under § 362(d) in extraordinary circumstances where an ordinary relief from stay order will not be effective to protect a secured lender’s rights, as demonstrated by the prior history of the parties and the property. The remedy is granted when there has been an abuse of the bankruptcy laws and of the automatic stay resulting from the filings of multiple bankruptcy cases; abuse is shown when the improper or unsuccessful prosecution of a series of cases (or the failure to prosecute them at all) demonstrates either a clear inability to obtain confirmation of, and to make required payments under, a feasible chapter 13 plan that provides lawful treatment of the secured lender’s claim or the lack of a good faith intent to do so.

Multiple bankruptcy filings within a year can establish bad faith under § 362 and support withholding the automatic stay from later petitions until the court rules otherwise.

In re Real Veba Trust · filed 2015-04-23(c)(3)(C)

Because that is exactly what occurred here, the Court is left with no choice but to find that the instant petitions were filed in bad faith. The Court therefore holds that the automatic stay that is generally applied to such petitions will not apply to the Pennsylvania Debtors until this Court holds otherwise.

Section 362(c)(4) keeps the automatic stay from taking effect in a third consumer case after two dismissed cases within the previous year and presumes the third filing was not in good faith, subject to rebuttal.

Steven Hyde Gordon · filed 2023-04-10(c)(4)

Further, if the debtor filed two (2) consumer cases within the previous year that were dismissed, the automatic stay does not go into effect in the third case. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A). Either under Section 362(c)(3) or (4), the latter case is presumptively not filed in good faith. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(c)(3)(C), (c)(4)(D). Debtors may rebut that presumption and show that the subsequent filings were in good faith. See In re Hedo, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 138, at *6 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009). Here, each of the current cases were presumptively not filed in good faith.

Under § 362(c)(3)(C)(i)(III), the absence of a substantial change in a repeat debtor’s financial or personal affairs raises a presumption that the later case was not filed in good faith.

Erika Olivia Stevens · filed 2026-06-09(c)(3)(C)(i)(III)

Debtor’s financial or personal affairs have not changed substantially since the dismissal of her prior case raising the presumption that the case was not filed in good faith under § 362(c)(3)(C)(i)(III).

Section 362(c)(4) prevents the automatic stay from taking effect when two or more of the debtor’s cases were pending and dismissed in the preceding year; it does not end the separate co-debtor stay.

Kwadwo Oppong · filed 2023-12-22(c)(4)

Where a debtor has had two or more cases pending but dismissed in the preceding one-year period, “the stay under subsection (a) shall not go into effect upon the filing of the later case.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i). These subsections specifically speak to “the stay under subsection (a),” meaning § 362(a), but make no mention of the co-debtor stay under § 1301.

Sections 362(c)(3) and (4) presumed the debtors’ repeat bankruptcy filings were not made in good faith.

John William Panin · filed 2023-04-10(c)(3)(C), (c)(4)(D)

Either under Section 362(c)(3) or (4), the latter case is presumptively not filed in good faith. ... Here, each of the current cases were presumptively not filed in good faith.

Section 362(a) tolls a Michigan land contract purchaser’s judicially established redemption period when the purchaser files for bankruptcy before that period expires.

In Re Carr · filed 1985-08-14(a)

In the case at bar, we hold that since the debtor filed his Chapter 13 petition before the 90th day of his redemption period was over, various provisions of § 362(a) tolled the expiration of that redemption period.

Section 362(a) does not toll a land contract redemption period merely because the debtor reacquires the property during bankruptcy.

In Re Northern Acres, Inc. · filed 1985-09-13(a)

However, we also find that, even though the property came back into the estate and under the operation of the stay, the redemption period was not tolled by § 362(a).

Section 362(a) does not stay the expiration of an Illinois tax-sale redemption period because its expiration is not an affirmative act.

Tabor Enterprises, Inc. v. Illinois (In Re Tabor Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 1986-07-14(a)

Second, the expiration of the Illinois redemption period, which extinguished Tabor’s interest in the property, is not the type of affirmative act proscribed by § 362(a).

Section 362(a) does not toll a judicially decreed redemption period when the debtor’s rights expire automatically without an affirmative act.

Heikkila v. Carver (In re Carver) · filed 1987-09-08(a)

Our conclusion that section 362(a) does not toll a judicially decreed redemption period is bolstered by the language of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 108(b).

Section 362(a) does not stay the running of a statutory period to cure cancellation of a contract for deed; section 108(b) temporarily extends that period.

In Re Maanum · filed 1987-11-25(a)

We hold that the running of this statutory time period is not automatically stayed under section 362(a), but rather is temporarily stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 108(b) (Supp. II 1984).

A creditor’s asserted forfeiture of a land contract does not establish cause for relief from the stay under § 362(d)(1) when the contract has not actually been forfeited.

In Re Frank Kunik Farms, Inc. · filed 1988-06-20(d)(1)

The Trust’s filing of a summary proceedings action was not an act which clearly and unequivocally manifested its belief that it now had full legal title. Therefore, we hold that the Trust’s land contract was not forfeited in the true sense of the term. ... For these reasons we will overrule the Trust’s objection to confirmation of the plan and deny its § 362(d)(1) motions for relief from the stay.

Section 362(a) stays acts by creditors but does not suspend the running of a foreclosure redemption period.

United States v. Thom, Inc. (In Re Thom, Inc.) · filed 1989-02-01(a)

This code section does not stay the running of any time period. ... The effect of § 362 is to stay an entity from doing that which such entity has the power to do.

Section 362(a) does not indefinitely toll a debtor’s equity of redemption period when the timing provisions of § 108(b) apply.

Merchants Bank v. Frazer · filed 2000-08-08(a)

Without contrary direction from either statutory language or legislative history, this Court declines to depart from the direction offered by the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, and holds that the indefinite stay provided for in § 362(a) is superceded by the timing provisions of § 108(b).

Section 362(a) does not toll the expiration of Iowa’s statutory tax redemption period.

Tax 58 v. Froehle (In Re Froehle) · filed 2002-12-06(a)

Because we conclude that the expiration of Iowa’s statutory tax redemption period was not tolled by the automatic stay, the Order of the Bankruptcy Court refusing to lift the stay and permitting the Debtor to pay the redemption amount through her Chapter 13 plan is hereby reversed and remanded for further proceedings in light of this decision.

Section 362(a) does not toll the period for redeeming delinquent property taxes.

Smith v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity · filed 2002-12-18(a)

Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the automatic stay provision which states that creditors may not pursue satisfaction of claims or liens while a bankruptcy case is pending, does not toll the running of the redemption period.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay does not toll a foreclosure redemption period because it prohibits affirmative acts, not events occurring by operation of law.

In Re Brooks · filed 2005-03-30(a)

Both parties to this dispute appear to assume that the automatic stay of creditor activities found in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), including judgment and lien enforcement against the debtor and his property, tolled the running of the redemption period in the foreclosure action. The law has been otherwise for quite some time. ... The stay prohibits only the affirmative acts and words of people, not events occurring by operation of law.

The automatic stay temporarily bars a vendee’s action to enjoin cancellation of a contract for deed when the vendor files for bankruptcy, but the stay ends when the trustee abandons the property.

Sitek v. Striker · filed 2009-04-28(a)(1), (c)(1)

When the bankruptcy petition was filed on October 14, 2005, Sitek’s ability to commence an action to enjoin cancellation of the contract for deed was temporarily stayed. ... But this stay continued only as long as the property was part of the bankruptcy estate. When the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the property on March 9, 2006, the stay was lifted and the period of limitations resumed.

The automatic stay does not suspend the running of a tax-sale redemption period; § 108(b) governs its extension.

Suzanne M. Christiano · filed 2019-08-02(a)

Here, the Court follows Canney in the context of a tax sale pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-157 and concludes the Debtor’s right to redeem was not stayed by the filing of the bankruptcy petition, although it was extended until sixty (60) days after the Petition Date.

Section 362(a) does not stay the transfer of property that results from expiration of a redemption period.

U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Boykin (In Re Boykin) · filed 2010-09-24(a)

The Eighth Circuit has clearly stated that transfer of property upon expiration of a period of redemption does not constitute an act, proceeding or enforcement of a right within the meaning of Section 362(a).

Section 362’s automatic stay does not extend a debtor’s redemption period.

NNN Cypresswood Drive 25, LLC v. WBCMT 2007-C33 Office 9729, LLC · filed 2013-12-16

Courts do not allow debtors to exploit the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 in order to extend their redemption rights.

Section 362(a)’s automatic stay does not toll the redemption period for pawned property.

Cash America Pawn, L.P. v. Murph · filed 1997-05-29(a)

We adopt the majority position that § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, the automatic stay provision, does not toll the running of the redemption period.

Section 362(a)(1) bars an arbitration panel from continuing a stayed proceeding to decide whether the automatic stay applies.

In Re Edwin A. Epstein, Jr. Operating Co., Inc. · filed 2004-05-27(a)(1)

As applied to the facts of this case, the arbitration panel’s decision to make a determination regarding the applicability of the automatic stay was itself a “continuation of a proceeding” as prohibited by § 362(a)(1) that was subject to the automatic stay as discussed supra.

Section 362(a)(1) stays arbitration proceedings against a debtor, and an arbitration demand filed during the stay is void.

Rachel Uchitel · filed 2022-08-04(a)(1)

Holtz violated the automatic stay when it sent the Arbitration Demand Letter to Debtor’s counsel and when it filed the Initial Arbitration Demand with JAMS commencing the Arbitration. As such, those actions are void and of no effect.

Section 362’s automatic stay applies to arbitrations against a debtor.

Cunard Steamship Company Limited v. Salen Reefer Services Ab, United Brands Company, Garnishee · filed 1985-09-19(a)

Indeed, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act makes clear that arbitrations are subject to the automatic stay provisions of section 362.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a court to modify the automatic stay to allow arbitration when a balance of competing interests favors arbitration.

Edgerton v. Shearson Lehman Bros. (In Re Edgerton) · filed 1989-03-27(d)(1)

The Court’s determination that the stay should be modified to allow arbitration to go forward and to stay the adversary proceeding pending arbitration is based upon a balance of the competing interests. ... Accordingly, the Court will modify the automatic stay to allow Shearson to arbitrate its claims and it will stay the adversary proceeding pending arbitration.

Section 362(a)(1) bars an arbitration board from issuing an award against the debtor after the bankruptcy petition is filed, and an award issued in violation of the stay is void.

Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. (In Re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.) · filed 1989-09-11(a)(1)

Thus, the issuance of the award was in violation of the automatic stay and is consequently null and void.

Section 362(a)(1) bars a proceeding to compel arbitration against the debtor when the debtor has not instituted an action against the party seeking arbitration.

Safety National Casualty Corp. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. (In Re Kaiser Aluminum Corp.) · filed 2003-12-18(a)(1)

In this case, the Bankruptcy Court made a determination that Kaiser, despite its draft amended complaint and withdrawn discovery requests, did not institute an action against Safety. The Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court’s determination was not erroneous. The Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that Safety’s action was a proceeding barred by the automatic stay is supported by the record evidence and is in accordance with the applicable law.

The automatic stay does not bar arbitration required by a collective bargaining agreement when staying arbitration would permit unilateral modification prohibited by § 1113(f), but stay modification permits only the fixing of any monetary award, whose payment must proceed through the claims resolution process.

In Re Fulton Bellows & Components, Inc. · filed 2004-03-11(a)(1), (a)(6)

For these reasons, the court finds that the automatic stay sufficiently interferes with operation of the Agreement, which may not be altered absent rejection or amendment pursuant to § 1113. This has not occurred, and thus, the Debtor’s attempt to forego arbitration of its disputes with the Union is, in actuality, the unilateral modification of the Agreement and, as such, is expressly prohibited by § 1113(f). ... Any monetary award would not be subject to enforcement by the Union, but would necessitate the amendment of its proof of claim, thus bringing into play the Bankruptcy Code’s claims resolution process. In accordance with the above, the court holds that in the event that arbitration of these prepetition disputes should allow the fixing of a monetary award against the Debtor, the automatic stay will be modified to allow the arbitrator to determine the amount of such award, but no further.

Section 362(a)(1) requires a debtor-initiated arbitration to halt once the submissions support an award that could diminish the estate, and Section 362(a)(3) bars an award terminating the debtor’s insurance coverage.

Acands Inc v. Travelers Cslty · filed 2006-01-19(a)(1), (a)(3)

To avoid interfering with the broad purposes served by the automatic stay, it was necessary for the arbitration proceeding to halt as soon as the scope of the parties’ submissions supported an award that could diminish ACandS’s estate. By continuing beyond this point, the proceeding violated § 362(a)(1), and the panel’s deliberations and the resulting award are therefore void. ... Similarly, because the grant of affirmative relief to Travelers had the effect of terminating ACandS’s coverage, we hold that it violated the automatic stay.

Section 362 requires debtor-initiated arbitration to halt once the submissions support an award diminishing the estate, bars affirmative awards terminating the debtor’s insurance coverage, and renders awards violating the stay void.

Acands, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Company · filed 2006-01-19(a)(1), (a)(3)

To avoid interfering with the broad purposes served by the automatic stay, it was necessary for the arbitration proceeding to halt as soon as the scope of the parties’ submissions supported an award that could diminish ACandS’s estate. By continuing beyond this point, the proceeding violated § 362(a)(1), and the panel’s deliberations and the resulting award are therefore void. ... Similarly, because the grant of affirmative relief to Travelers had the effect of terminating ACandS’s coverage, we hold that it violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(h) claims are core proceedings but must be arbitrated under an applicable agreement when the estate is fully administered, the debtor has been discharged, and arbitration of the putative class claim would neither affect the estate nor jeopardize the automatic stay’s purposes.

Mbna America Bank, N.A. v. Hill · filed 2006-01-25(h)

Although we reach the same conclusion as the lower courts that Hill’s § 362(h) claim is a core proceeding, we hold that arbitration of her claim would not seriously jeopardize the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code because: (1) Hill’s estate has now been fully administered and her debts have been discharged, so she no longer requires protection of the automatic stay and resolution of the claim would have no effect on her bankruptcy estate; (2) as a purported class action, Hill’s claims lack the direct connection to her own bankruptcy case that would weigh in favor of refusing to compel arbitration; and (3) a stay is not so closely related to an injunction that the bankruptcy court is uniquely able to interpret and enforce its provisions.

A bankruptcy court may refuse to compel arbitration of an automatic-stay damages claim where the estate remains under administration and arbitration would conflict with the stay’s fundamental protection of debtors.

Merrill v. MBNA America Bank, N.A. (In Re Merrill) · filed 2006-06-16(a), (h)

I conclude that ordering arbitration of Merrill’s stay violation claim would conflict with this court’s duty to safeguard the automatic stay’s fundamental protection for debtors. I will exercise my discretion to deny the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration of Count I of the complaint.

A creditor-trust trustee pursuing an assigned, Code-created claim for violation of the automatic stay is not bound by the debtor’s prepetition arbitration agreement.

Cohen Ex Rel. Friedman's Creditor Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP (In Re Friedman's, Inc.) · filed 2007-05-24

Having been assigned that cause of action by the debtors in possession, the Trustee is not precluded from bringing the stay violation claim. While these actions may also implicate a breach of contract claim, they arguably triggered a purely Code-created cause of action, which is not merely a debtor-derived claim masquerading as an independent claim. As a result, I conclude that the Trustee as representative of the Friedman’s Creditor Trust is not a party to any arbitration agreement ... and his ninth cause of action is nonarbitrable.

Section 362(k) stay-violation claims may remain in bankruptcy court despite an arbitration agreement when arbitration would inherently conflict with the Bankruptcy Code’s purposes, including centralized enforcement of the stay.

Goldman Sachs Bank USA v. Rhea Brown · filed 2026-03-18(k)

Granting Goldman Sachs’ motion to arbitrate the plaintiffs’ § 362(k) claim — a claim that has no independent grounding outside of the Bankruptcy Code — would thus undermine the needed centralization of claims and effectively allow Goldman Sachs, after allegedly violating the stay, to assert the primacy of a private contractual right over the collective interests of all other creditors.

Section 362 tolls a zoning ordinance’s six-month period for resuming a nonconforming use while the automatic stay is in effect.

Bogey's Emporium, Inc. v. City of White Plains · filed 1985-10-07

The six-month period provided for by White Plains Zoning Ordinance § 4.3.2.S, within which any nonconforming use must resume or be deemed discontinued, was tolled until April 12, 1984, the date on which a bankruptcy court ordered a trustee in bankruptcy to deliver a lease to petitioner, by operation of the automatic stay provision of 11 USC § 362 (see, Matter of IDH Realty v Incorporated Vil. of Mineóla, 16 Bankr 55).

Section 362’s automatic stay tolls the one-year deadline for a motion under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(1), (2), or (3).

In Re the Marriage of Beardslee · filed 1996-08-16

The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994) tolls the 1-year time limitation.

Section 362's automatic stay does not toll Missouri's deadline to revive a judgment from a dischargeability action exempt from the stay.

Guy v. Danzig · filed 2000-06-20

Although the Guys argue otherwise, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (the automatic stay) did not toll the time for filing their petition for a writ of scire facias under Missouri law, because their petition was merely a continuation of their original section 523(c) action, which was expressly exempted from the automatic-stay protections.

Section 362(a)(1)'s automatic stay does not itself toll the time to file a notice of appeal because the running of a statutory period is not the commencement or continuation of a judicial proceeding.

ECC Construction, Inc. v. Oak Park Calabasas Homeowners Ass'n · filed 2004-06-09(a)(1)

Thus, under section 362(a)(1), the filing of the bankruptcy petition and the imposition of the automatic stay did not toll the running of the period of time in which defendant was required to file its notice of appeal.

Section 362(k) gives the Chapter 7 trustee, rather than the debtor, the claim for damages when an alleged stay violation concerns property of the estate.

Barry v. Perkins · filed 2022-03-31(k)

As such, any claim for a violation of the stay as to the property of the estate, including a claim for damages under 11 U.S.C § 362(k), belongs to the Chapter 7 Trustee, not the debtor.

A debtor has standing to seek redress for a § 362 stay violation involving estate property she may claim as exempt or conduct covered by the debtor protections in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2).

Leak v. Turner · filed 2019-08-20(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)

For the following reasons, | will deny dismissal for lack of standing. First, a debtor can claim property of the estate as exempt, and a seizure of property of the estate in violation of the automatic stay can interfere with a debtor’s ability to claim that property as exempt. Also, the stays in subsection (a)(1) and (2) expressly protects the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (staying the continuation of an action or proceeding “against the debtor” that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case) and (a)(2) (staying “the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case”). If either applies here, the debtor would clearly have standing to seek redress for a violation. For these reasons, Zaina has standing as to these subsections. | do not now rule that Zaina has stated a claim under any one of these subsections, only that the pleaded count does not fail for lack of standing.

Section 362(k)(1) provides a private cause of action for a willful stay violation, but a claimant must independently establish standing to seek sanctions.

Cook v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2013-04-02(k)(1)

Finally, Cook contends that 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) confers standing. He is mistaken. This provision merely provides a private cause of action for “any willful violation of a stay.” § 362(k)(1). Cook must still identify a proper basis for his standing to seek sanctions in the chapter 7 case for alleged stay violations.

Section 362(a)(3) protects property of the bankruptcy estate, and a Chapter 7 debtor lacks standing to assert a violation of that protection on the estate’s behalf.

Zavala v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In Re Zavala) · filed 2011-02-07(a)(3)

While a debtor may seek recovery of damages when the automatic stay is violated as to that debtor, such a remedy does not grant the debtor “co-trustee” like powers to control property of the estate. The Debtors may not assert rights of the bankruptcy estate against third-parties, such as the alleged claim for violating the automatic stay as it applies to property of the estate. The Debtors do not have standing to assert the violation of the automatic stay alleged in the Complaint.

Section 362(a)(3)'s automatic stay benefits the debtor estate and does not give a Chapter 13 debtor's family members standing to challenge a stay violation based on their interest in the debtor's possessions.

Schneider v. San Bernardino County · filed 1994-08-15(a)(3)

We therefore agree with the district court that the appellants lack standing to attack a violation of the automatic stay imposed pursuant to Sec. 362 in accordance with Paula Marshall's second personal petition for bankruptcy.

Section 362(h) limits relief for a willful stay violation to debtors and their creditors; a guarantor who is neither cannot claim it.

Pemstein v. Stimpson · filed 1994-03-28(h)

Aside from how Stimpson may claim damages after having given up all his counterclaims, he faces the additional difficulty that relief under § 362(h) is confined to debtors and their creditors.

Section 362(h) does not provide a corporate debtor relief for a violation of the automatic stay.

In Re Jove Engineering, Inc. · filed 1994-04-13(h)

This court has concluded that § 362(h) has no application to this case. Lile was an individual.

Section 362(a) permits debtors and trustees, but not individual creditors, to challenge violations of the automatic stay.

In re Franck · filed 1994-03-23(a)

Because the plain language of Sec. 362(a) does not implicate the interests of creditors or any other party, only debtors and trustees are permitted to challenge violations of the automatic stay.

Section 362(h) gives a debtor standing to seek relief for a violation of the automatic stay.

Schwartz v. Pitman-Moore, Inc. (In Re Schwartz) · filed 1985-10-08(h)

The debtor Jerome Schwartz has standing to bring this adversary proceeding under section 362(h) and also pursuant to the debtor’s avoidance and recovery powers under section 522(h) and (i).

Section 362(h) allows an injured nondebtor to seek damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Beverly Plaza Associates v. Saul (In Re Kroh Bros. Development Co.) · filed 1988-09-02(h)

The debtor in whose case the violation of stay occurred is not the only party who can seek damages under § 362(h). The statute states “an individual” injured by willful violation of the stay may seek damages.

Section 362 does not give a creditor independent standing to appeal an adverse decision concerning a violation of the automatic stay.

Tilley v. Vucurevich · filed 1991-12-16

We therefore hold that a creditor has no independent standing to appeal an adverse decision regarding a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 gives a creditor no independent standing to appeal an adverse ruling on a violation of the automatic stay when the trustee does not appeal.

Tilley v. Vucurevich (In re Pecan Groves) · filed 1991-12-16

We therefore hold that a creditor has no independent standing to appeal an adverse decision regarding a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(h) does not allow a corporate debtor to recover damages because a corporation is not an “individual” under that subsection.

In Re United States Abatement Corp. · filed 1993-02-05(h)

The Court finds that a corporation is not included within the term “individual” under Section 362(h).

Section 362(h) does not allow a corporation to recover damages for a violation of the automatic stay.

Little Pat, Inc. v. Conter (In Re Soll) · filed 1995-02-22(h)

This Court believes those cases which prohibit a corporation from recovering under Section 362(h) are correctly reasoned.

Section 362(h) does not allow a Chapter 7 trustee to recover attorney’s fees as damages for a willful stay violation because the trustee is not an “individual” within that subsection.

In Re Jeri L. Pace, Debtor. John E. Havelock John R. Strachan v. Harold S. Taxel, Trustee · filed 1995-06-08(h)

In light of the above, we conclude that a Chapter 7 trustee is not an “individual” for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) entitled to recover attorney’s fees as damages.

Section 362(h) does not allow a Chapter 7 trustee to recover attorney’s fees as damages because the trustee is not an “individual” within that provision.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 76,680 in Re Jeri L. Pace, Debtor. John E. Havelock John R. Strachan v. Harold S. Taxel, Trustee · filed 1995-10-11(h)

In light of the above, we conclude that a Chapter 7 trustee is not an “individual” for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) entitled to recover attorney’s fees as damages.

Section 362(h) permits creditors injured by a willful automatic-stay violation to seek damages.

In Re International Forex of California, Inc. · filed 2000-04-06(h)

Based on the weight of authority on this issue, this Court finds that the Creditors have standing under § 362(h) to seek damages for alleged stay violations.

Section 362(h) gives a corporate secured creditor standing to seek damages for a willful stay violation that injures its interest in property of the estate.

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hemsley (In Re Bennett) · filed 2004-11-12(h)

Because Plaintiff is a person to whom the stay was intended to protect, and because Plaintiff asserts an injury that is precisely the type of injury the stay was meant to prevent, Plaintiff has constitutional and statutory standing to pursue this action.

Under former Section 362(h), a Chapter 7 debtor lacks standing to seek damages for a stay violation that injures only the estate; the trustee has standing to pursue the estate’s claim.

In Re Walker · filed 2006-06-20(h)

Lundborg’s violation of the stay did not implicate Debtor’s fresh start and therefore could not have damaged Debtor. If there had been any damage as a consequence of a stay violation against estate property, it would necessarily have been damage to the estate reflected in additional attorneys’ fees incurred by the estate. As the individual charged with protection of the estate for the benefit of creditors, the Chapter 7 trustee is the party with standing to seek damages for violation of the automatic stay against property of the estate.

Purchasers of property from individuals who later file for bankruptcy lack standing to pursue an independent action based on an alleged violation of the automatic stay.

Morgal v. Northwest Title Agency, Inc. · filed 2006-09-14

We reject the Morgals’ contention that they have standing to pursue an independent action based on Northwest’s alleged violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay.

Under pre-BAPCPA § 362(h), an individual Chapter 7 trustee representing individual consumer debtors has standing to seek damages against the debtors for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Moser v. Mullican (In Re Mullican) · filed 2008-09-30(h)

Although there is a split of authority ... the Chapter 7 trustee in this case is an individual representing the estate of individual, consumer debtors and has standing to bring an action against the Debtors for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not give a Chapter 7 debtor standing to challenge a bank’s temporary hold on estate funds before a claimed exemption is allowed when the debtor has no right to use the funds and the hold does not jeopardize the exemption.

Bucchino v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In Re Bucchino) · filed 2010-09-29(a)(3)

Consequently, this Court concludes that the Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue a claim of stay violation under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) based on Wells Fargo’s action in barring the Plaintiffs from obtaining funds from the Bank Accounts during the period prior to the allowance of Plaintiffs’ claimed exemption.

A damages claim for violating the automatic stay can survive dismissal without an express allegation that the creditor acted after receiving effective notice if the alleged violation is plausible.

Roberts v. American Bank & Trust Co. · filed 2011-12-21(k)

Although Plaintiff has not specifically stated that such violative conduct occurred after the notice was served upon the Defendants, the Court finds that there is more than a “sheer possibility” that the conduct may have violated the stay, and that discovery is warranted in order to determine if this is the case. As a result, the Court must deny the motion to dismiss the claim for violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(k) permits an individual injured by an automatic stay violation, including a chapter 7 debtor without a right to use the affected estate property, to seek damages for injury to an interest the stay protects.

In re Trujillo · filed 2012-09-27(k)

“Individual” is broad enough to encompass debtors, creditors, trustees, and other parties in interest. The test for standing, therefore, should be tethered only to the type of legal interests intended to be protected by the automatic stay. As long as those interests have been injured, any individual harmed by the violation has standing to assert a claim.

Only the debtor or the bankruptcy estate, represented by its trustee, has standing to allege a violation of the automatic stay.

DeCaprio v. Rockridge Properties CA1/2 · filed 2015-07-16(a)

The only parties that have standing to allege a violation of the automatic stay are the debtor and the bankruptcy estate, represented by its trustee.

Section 362(a) does not give plaintiffs standing to claim an automatic stay violation when they were not parties to any bankruptcy proceeding during the foreclosure and eviction proceedings.

Lounsbury v. Credit Suisse (USA) Inc. · filed 2020-03-12(a)

Further, as the Bank Defendants point out, Plaintiffs were not parties to any bankruptcy proceeding during the pendency of the foreclosure and eviction proceedings and therefore cannot have standing to raise a claim for violation of any automatic stay.

An allegation that the automatic stay was violated must be brought in the bankruptcy case of the debtor protected by that stay, not in an adversary proceeding connected to another debtor’s case.

Young v. Eric D. Houser, A Law Corporation · filed 2021-10-26

Any allegation of violation of the automatic stay must have been brought in Ms. DeFranco’s Chapter 13 case and is not properly before this Court in this Adversary Proceeding filed in connection with Mr. Young’s bankruptcy case.

Section 362(k) allows a debtor to bring a claim for violation of the automatic stay without reopening the underlying Chapter 7 case.

LaShon Rene Coleman · filed 2026-03-18(k)

But even if the case had been closed, a debtor is not required to open an underlying Chapter 7 case before bringing claims for violation of the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)..

Section 362(h) refers to § 521(a)(2), which addresses property subject to a secured claim rather than leased property.

In Re Farley · filed 2011-04-06(h)

However, Section 362(h) refers to Section 521(a)(2), which is not addressed to leased property, but to property of the estate against which there is a secured claim.

Section 362(a) stays proceedings and similar acts against the debtor but does not toll a lease’s stated expiration date.

Consolidated Energy Corp. v. O'Brien (In Re Compass Development, Inc.) · filed 1985-11-22(a)

It is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that § 362[a] was not intended to act as a toll on leases, contracts and the like, but only as a stay on actual proceedings and similar acts against the debtor. The Court agrees with the above cited precedents that a lease is subject to expiration at its stated term, notwithstanding the protection of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not stay enforcement of rights in a lease terminated before bankruptcy when the leasehold is no longer property of the estate.

In Re Cohoes Industrial Terminal, Inc. · filed 1986-06-12(a)

The state court order which confirmed the termination of the debtor’s leasehold interest in the apartment complex in question before the filing of the debtor’s Chapter 11 petition precludes the debtor from claiming that such terminated leasehold interest constitutes property of the estate within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541. Therefore, the automatic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) does not operate to enjoin Latham Sparrowbush Associates and the state court post-judgment receiver from enforcing any rights which they may claim with respect to such leased property.

Section 362(a)(3) does not protect a debtor’s interest in a lease that terminated under its own terms when the debtor lacks any equitable possessory interest.

In Re West Pine Construction Co. · filed 1987-12-09(a)(3)

We find that debtor lacks any equitable possessory interest sufficient to invoke the stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when a lease terminated before the bankruptcy petition and the debtor has no interest in the leased property.

In Re Purity Ice Cream Co., Inc. · filed 1988-06-17(d)(1)

The debtor, therefore, has no interest in the equipment. As a result, adequate cause exists under § 362(d)(1) to grant relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay for cause when the debtor cannot assume the lease and franchise at issue.

In Re Memphis-Friday's Associates · filed 1988-07-13(d)(1)

The franchisor is entitled to and is granted relief from the stay for “cause” under Section 362(d)(1) because of the Debtor’s inability to assume the lease and franchise.

Section 362 does not stay efforts to obtain possession of leased property when the debtor’s leasehold interest was terminated before the bankruptcy petition was filed.

White v. Indiana Realty Associates, II · filed 1988-11-23(a)(3)

In the present case there was no leasehold interest which the automatic stay provision could protect at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

Section 362(a) does not protect a lease that was terminated before the debtor filed for bankruptcy, and a court may lift any possible stay for cause to clear uncertainty over the property.

In Re Jarman · filed 1989-03-01(a)

Because this court has found that the lease was terminated prior to the debtor’s filing, it was not protected by the automatic stay. Nevertheless, in order to remove any cloud which may exist on this property as a result of the debtor’s filing the petition for relief, this court orders that any stay under § 362(a) should be lifted for cause.

The automatic stay protects a commercial lease when the landlord’s purported prepetition termination is invalid because the tenant lawfully withheld rent in response to the landlord’s failure to repair.

In Re Tiny's Cafe, Inc. · filed 2005-01-12(b)(10)

Under Sections 362 and 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, a lease that has been terminated prior to the filing of bankruptcy is not property of the estate, and is thus not protected by the automatic stay. ... Because Debtor’s withholding of rent was lawful, Cranska’s purported termination of the Lease pre-petition is invalid. ... For the reason stated above, Debtor’s Motion to Suspend Rent is GRANTED in accordance with the accompanying order and Stephen Cranska’s Motion for Relief from Stay is DENIED.

Effective termination of a residential lease upon expiration of its term and proper written notice leaves no assumable leasehold interest and constitutes cause for relief from the automatic stay.

In Re Burch · filed 2008-10-23(d)(1)

In summary, I conclude that termination of Debtor’s Lease by reason of the expiration of its term and the provision of proper written notice was effective and precludes her from having any leasehold interest to be assumed under a Chapter 13 plan. As such, there is cause for relief under § 362(d)(1).

Section 362(a)(1) and (a)(3) bar an insurer from unilaterally cancelling a debtor’s insurance policy because cancellation is a proceeding against the debtor and an act to control estate property.

Pester Refining Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America (In Re Pester Refining Co.) · filed 1985-11-22(a)(1), (a)(3)

As such, INA’s action in cancelling the instant contract constituted a proceeding against Pester in contravention of Section 362(a)(1). ... INA’s action to cancel Pester’s insurance contract constituted an attempt to exercise control over property of the estate. Such action violated Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code and is, therefore, without effect.

Section 362(a)(3) prevents a party from terminating a debtor’s insurance agreement because of a prepetition default after the debtor files for bankruptcy.

In Re Gamma Fishing Co., Inc. · filed 1987-03-13(a)(3)

When the debtor filed its petition, the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) served to prevent Cutri from terminating the agreement even though the debtor was in default.

Section 362(a) does not toll a life insurance policy grace period when the policyholder files for bankruptcy; section 108(b) extends the period for 60 days from the filing.

Counties Contracting & Construction Co. v. Constitution Life Insurance · filed 1987-12-18(a)

Although the district court is not technically bound by dicta in an appellate court opinion, I am persuaded by Roach and by the rationale of the many eases which have held that section 108(b), and not section 362(a), should be applied to the running of a statutory redemption period. I am persuaded that the same rationale should apply to the present case. ... Therefore, I hold that the statutory and policy grace period was extended for 60 days from the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, or until June 10, 1984.

Section 362(a)(3) does not suspend the running of a statutory grace period for payment of an insurance premium beyond the extension provided by § 108(b).

Counties Contracting and Construction Company, Debtor-In-Possession v. Constitution Life Insurance Company · filed 1988-08-31(a)(3)

Specifically, we conclude that when a bankruptcy petition is filed before the expiration of a statutory grace period, if need be § 108(b) can extend the grace period for 60 days from the date of the filing of the petition. Conversely, § 362 is inoperable to further stay the running of the period.

Section 362(a)(3) stays postpetition cancellation of insurance policies that are property of the bankruptcy estate.

Scrima v. John Devries Agency, Inc. · filed 1989-05-31(a)(3)

Thus, § 362(a)(3) stays postpetition cancellation of insurance policies that are property of the estate.

Section 362(a) stays an insurer’s termination of a debtor’s insurance policy after the filing date, making a termination notice sent in violation of the stay void.

Federal Insurance Co. v. Sheldon · filed 1993-02-04(a)

Federal’s termination notice, dispatched on August 1, came after the “filing date” and, accordingly, was subject to the provisions of the automatic stay. Because Federal’s termination notice was void ab initio, notice of potential claims under the policy was timely if received prior to September 23, 1985.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay claims to D&O insurance proceeds that are not estate property, even when the policy itself belongs to the estate.

Ochs v. Lipson (In Re First Central Financial Corp.) · filed 1999-09-03(a)(3)

For the reasons that follow, we hold that the proceeds here in question are not estate property, and hence not subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) requires insureds to seek relief from the automatic stay before drawing on D&O policy proceeds that are property of the estate.

In Re Adelphia Communications Corp. v. Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services (In Re Adelphia Communications Corp. · filed 2002-11-15(a)(3)

Under the facts of these cases, then, the proceeds of the D & O Policies are, like the policies themselves, property of the estate, and requests by insureds to draw down on policy proceeds do indeed require motions for relief from the stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not prevent an insurance policy from terminating after a bankruptcy petition under its own terms when required premium payments are not made.

Nicholls v. Zurich American Insurance Group · filed 2003-02-07(a)(3)

That the D&O Liability Policy cancelled post-petition is irrelevant because the court is powerless to rewrite the terms of the D&O Liability Policy to prevent its termination by its own terms.

Section 362(a)(3) requires an insurer to obtain relief from the automatic stay before acting to terminate a debtor’s insurance policy based on an insolvency clause after the bankruptcy filing.

LaMonica v. North of England Protecting & Indemnity Ass'n (In Re Probulk Inc.) · filed 2009-07-07(a)(3)

The fact that § 362(a)(3) and the automatic stay are applicable means that any effort on the part of the Clubs to terminate the insurance policies would require a motion on their part for relief from the stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay an insurer’s payment of defense costs from policy proceeds when the debtor’s estate has no demonstrated interest in those proceeds.

In re Mountain Express Oil Company · filed 2025-10-29(a)(3)

Therefore, the automatic stay under § 362 does not apply to prevent the Insurer from evaluating coverage and applying Proceeds of the Policies towards defense costs to Movants.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a postpetition attempt to cancel an insurance policy that is property of the estate.

J & L Transport, Inc. v. Canal Insurance (In Re J & L Transport, Inc.) · filed 1985-01-14(a)(3)

Canal’s attempt to cancel J & L’s insurance policy subsequent to J & L’s filing was in violation of the stay.

Section 362(b)(10) allows a lessor to proceed with eviction when a nonresidential lease expired before the bankruptcy filing, even if the debtor remains in possession.

New Dragon Toy Wholesale, Inc. · filed 2024-04-26(b)(10)

The facts of the Debtor’s case, like Portofindough, fall squarely under the exception to the automatic stay afforded by 362(b)(10).

Section 362(b)(10) leaves the automatic stay in place against a landlord’s action to recover possession when the nonresidential lease had not expired by its stated term before bankruptcy.

Wichita Hoops, LLC · filed 2023-07-24(b)(10)

Thus, any act by Webb to obtain possession of the leased property, including continuation of its prepetition state court forcible detainer action, is stayed.

Section 362(b)(10) excepts leases terminated according to their terms from the automatic stay, but the stay applies when a prepetition injunction tolled the cure period and the lease remained in effect at filing.

New York Classic Motors, LLC · filed 2021-06-04(b)(10)

The Movants argue that section 362(b)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code applies. That subsection provides an exception to the automatic stay for leases that terminate in accordance with their terms. However, as of the Petition Date, the Concession Agreement was, and continues to be, in full force and effect.

Section 362(b)(10) does not stay a lessor from regaining possession of nonresidential real property when the lease terminated before the bankruptcy filing.

Staffmark Investment LLC v. Foote (In Re Foote) · filed 2002-04-03(b)(10)

The Court finds that the Sublease is excluded from the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(2), the Sublease is not subject to the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(10), and that Debtor has no authority to assume or reject the Sublease under 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(3).

Section 362(b)(10) excepts a lessor’s effort to regain possession of nonresidential real property from the automatic stay when the lease expires by its stated term during bankruptcy.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,757 Erick Ray Erickson, Gwendolyn Erickson v. Robert Polk Farmers National Company · filed 1990-12-24(b)(10)

Clearly, 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(10) provides an exception to the automatic stay for nonresidential leases.

Section 362(b)(10) lets a landlord regain possession under state law without seeking relief from the automatic stay when a nonresidential lease has expired by its stated term.

In Re Neville · filed 1990-08-24(b)(10)

The language of Section 362(b)(10) clearly indicates that it is not necessary for a landlord to move in the Bankruptcy Court to vacate the automatic stay when the Debtor is operating under a lease of nonresidential real property that has terminated by the expiration of the stated term of the lease before the commencement of or during a case under this title. The landlord may do whatever is necessary and appropriate under state law to obtain possession of such property.

Section 362(b)(10) does not except a lessor’s effort to regain nonresidential property from the automatic stay when the lessor affirmatively terminated the lease for unpaid rent rather than the lease ending by expiration of its stated term.

In Re Nexus Communications, Inc. · filed 1985-12-05(b)(10)

The lease at issue is a nonresidential lease of real property, but Special Markets does not contend that the lease was terminated by the “expiration” of its “stated term.” If there was a termination of the lease, it did not happen automatically — it was the result of the affirmative act by Special Markets in terminating for failure to make rent payments.

Section 362(b)(9) excludes an expired lease of nonresidential real property from the automatic stay, including when the lease term expires during bankruptcy.

Town of Islip, New York v. Northeastern International Airways, Inc. (In Re Northeastern International Airways, Inc.) · filed 1986-01-07(b)(9)

Both § 541(b)(2) and § 362(b)(9) exclude expired leases from the estate of the debtor and from the automatic stay provisions of § 362(a)(3).