Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-533

The fifteen-month ground requires proof of fifteen months in out-of-home care, diligent reunification efforts, inability to remedy the circumstances, and a substantial likelihood of inability to parent effectively in the near future.

Rhett U v. Dcs · filed 2015-04-02(B)(8)(c)

To justify severance pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), the State is required to prove (1) the child has been in an out-of-home placement for fifteen months, (2) the State has made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services, (3) the parent is unable to remedy the circumstances of placement, and (4) there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will be unable to exercise proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. Id.

Unlike the nine-month ground, the fifteen-month ground requires only inability to remedy the circumstances causing placement, regardless of the parent's efforts.

Kimberly H. v. Dcs · filed 2015-04-14(B)(8)(c)

Unlike the nine-month ground under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), the fifteen-month ground under subsection (c) does not require that the juvenile court find the parent substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances causing the out-of-home placement. Rather, it requires only that the juvenile court find the parent was unable to remedy the circumstances causing the out-of-home placement, regardless of her efforts. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

When substance abuse prevents parenting under the fifteen-month ground, the court considers the parent's treatment history, sustained sobriety outside custody, and support system for maintaining sobriety.

Jaclyn R. v. Dcs · filed 2015-11-17(B)(8)(c)

“[I]n considering the impact of drug addiction, we must consider the treatment history of the parent” to determine whether “the parent has been unable to rise above the addiction and experience sustained sobriety in a noncustodial setting, and establish the essential support system to maintain sobriety….” Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 378, ¶ 25 (App. 2010), citing In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa App. 1998).

The fifteen-month ground examines the circumstances preventing effective parenting at the time of severance, not merely the circumstances at removal.

Renee P., Richard P. v. Dcs, A.P. · filed 2015-11-19(B)(8)(c)

The appropriate inquiry is whether there were circumstances at the time of severance that prevented Mother and Father from being able to exercise proper and effective parental care and control over Child. See Marina P. v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22 (App. 2007). The record sufficiently supports the juvenile court's conclusion that Mother and Father had not rectified the circumstances at the time of severance that led to Child’s out-of-home placement.

The circumstances a parent must remedy under the fifteen-month ground are those existing at severance, not merely those alleged in the initial dependency petition.

Tiana S. v. Dcs · filed 2016-01-26(B)(8)(c)

And we have said that the “circumstances which cause the child to be in out-of-home placement” means “those circumstances existing at the time of the severance rather than at the time of the initial dependency petition.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-8441, 175 Ariz. 463, 468, 857 P.2d 1317, 1322 (App. 1993) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Kent K., 210 Ariz. 279, 110 P.3d 1013.

A parent remains unable to remedy the circumstances causing placement when she fails to complete treatment or acquire the parenting skills needed for a special-needs child despite repeated services.

Barbara A. v. Dcs, J.W. · filed 2016-03-01(B)(8)(c)

Despite DCS’s diligent efforts, Mother did not test consistently, was not truthful with treatment providers regarding her substance use, and never completed any substance abuse treatment program.

For the fifteen-month time-in-care ground, the court considers the circumstances existing at severance that prevent appropriate parenting, and the parent's remedial efforts must be more than trivial or de minimis.

Alvin S. v. Dcs, S.M. · filed 2016-04-21(B)(8)(c)

We consider “those circumstances existing at the time of the severance that prevent a parent from being able to appropriately provide for his or her children.” Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22, 152 P.3d 1209, 1213 (App. 2007) (internal quotes and citation omitted). To avoid severance, the parent must make more than trivial or de minimus efforts at remediation.

For the fifteen-month time-in-care ground, the circumstances causing placement are those existing at the time of severance rather than those existing when the dependency petition was filed.

Michelle H. v. Dcs, J.S. · filed 2016-06-16(B)(8)(c)

The “circumstances” causing the child’s out-of-home placement are “those circumstances existing at the time of the severance” rather than at the time of the initial dependency petition. Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22 (App. 2007).

Participation in services does not remedy the circumstances causing placement when the parent still cannot maintain sobriety or provide a safe, drug-free home.

Victoria G. v. Dcs · filed 2016-05-03(B)(8)(c)

The court nonetheless concluded that “Mother has not been able to demonstrate that she can maintain sobriety in order to parent her children” or that she can “provide the children with a safe and drug-free environment,” and that there was a substantial likelihood she would be unable to exercise proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.

The fifteen-month time-in-care ground focuses on the parent’s success in remedying the circumstances causing placement, so recent progress is relevant but not dispositive.

Veronica E. v. Dcs · filed 2016-06-09(B)(8)(c)

When terminating parental rights under the 15 months’ time-in-care ground, the court focuses on the parent’s success in remedying the circumstances that led to the out-of-home placement. See, e.g., Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, 96, ¶¶ 17, 31 (App. 2009) (if DCS offered services “designed to improve the parent’s ability to care for the child,” evidence showing “a parent’s progress, or lack thereof,” is critical). Mother’s reported “significant progress in her sobriety” is relevant, but not dispositive.

A parent need not complete every service DCS recommends, but failure to finish some services can support termination despite completion of others.

Ryan W. v. Dcs, J.W. · filed 2016-11-03(B)(8)(c)

While there is no statutory requirement that a parent complete all of the reunification services DCS recommends, a parent’s failure to complete or finish some services, despite completing others, can support a court’s order of severance.

The circumstances causing out-of-home placement under Section 8-533(B)(8)(c) are those existing at severance, not only those existing when the dependency petition was filed.

Jesse O., Daniel W. v. Dcs · filed 2016-12-29(B)(8)(c)

The circumstances that cause the child's out-of-home placement are "those circumstances existing at the time of the severance rather than at the time of the initial dependency petition."

The remediation inquiry under the fifteen-month time-in-care ground examines the circumstances at the time of severance and must account for the reunification services DCS provided.

Jose S. v. Dcs · filed 2017-01-31(B)(8)(c)

The court considers the circumstances at the time of the severance trial in determining whether the conditions resulting in a child’s removal have been cured. Marina P. v. ADES, 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22 (App. 2007). The court must find the parent is “unable to remedy the circumstances that cause[d] the child to be in an out-of-home placement . . . .” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). As part of its analysis, the court must take into account the reunification services provided by DCS. See Jordan C. v. ADES, 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 17 (App. 2009).

For the fifteen-month time-in-care ground, the circumstances causing out-of-home placement are those existing at severance rather than those existing when the dependency petition was filed.

Thomas M. v. Dcs, E.M. · filed 2017-02-02(B)(8)(c)

For purposes of the statute, the circumstances that cause the child's out-of-home placement are “those circumstances existing at the time of the severance rather than at the time of the initial dependency petition.” Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-8441, 175 Ariz. 463, 468 (App. 1993).

Improvement from little or no participation to partial participation does not establish that a parent has remedied the circumstances causing out-of-home placement.

Billy K. v. Dcs · filed 2017-01-04(B)(8)(c)

The improvement from little or no participation to partial participation is insufficient to show that Father has “remed[ied] the circumstances that cause[d] the child[ren] to be in an out-of-home placement.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

Substantial recent progress does not establish remediation under the fifteen-month time-in-care ground when a longer period of sobriety and completion of therapy remain necessary for safe parenting.

Tiffany S. v. Dcs · filed 2017-01-19(B)(8)(c)

Although the superior court acknowledged that “[she] is close,” Mother had not yet remedied the issues, and without a longer period of sobriety and completion of therapy addressing domestic violence and trauma issues, had not yet demonstrated the stability necessary to safely parent in the near future.

Untreated mental-health and domestic-violence issues can support a finding that a parent will remain unable to parent effectively in the near future under the fifteen-month time-in-care ground.

Chastity S. v. Dcs · filed 2017-01-31(B)(8)(c)

This evidence supports the conclusion that mother would be unable to take the necessary steps to effectively parent the children in the near future. Accordingly, we hold that clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court’s order terminating mother’s parental rights on the fifteen-months out-of-home placement statutory ground.

The fifteen-month time-in-care ground examines the circumstances existing at severance and requires inability to remedy them plus a substantial likelihood that effective parenting will remain impossible in the near future.

Jason B. v. Dcs · filed 2017-02-07(B)(8)(c)

Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), a parent's rights may be terminated upon a finding that (1) the child has been in out-of-home placement for 15 months or longer; (2) the agency has made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services; (3) the parent is unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the placement; and (4) there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). In determining whether the parent has been able to remedy the circumstances causing placement, we consider the circumstances existing at the time of the severance rather than at the time of the initial dependency petition. Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-8441, 175 Ariz. 463, 468 (App. 1993).

The fifteen-month ground asks whether the parent actually remedied the circumstances and is likely to do so in the near future, not whether the parent made good-faith efforts.

Melissa C. v. Dcs · filed 2019-11-26(B)(8)(c)

However, A.R.S. § 8- 533(B)(8)(c) is concerned with whether the parent has been able to remedy the circumstances and whether the parent is likely to remedy the circumstances in the near future, not whether the parent has made good faith attempts to remedy the circumstances.

Participation in services does not defeat § 8-533(B)(8)(c) when the parent fails to make the behavioral changes needed to remedy the circumstances and safely parent.

Rodney L., Deana L. v. Dcs, J.L. · filed 2020-02-27(B)(8)(c)

The court expressly acknowledged that Father participated in other services. However, as DCS noted, “engagement is not the same as a behavioral change.” The court found that although Father “completed classes and counseling, he has no insight into his domestic violence.”

Positive steps after an earlier denied termination motion do not defeat § 8-533(B)(8)(c) when the parent still cannot provide stable employment and suitable housing after an additional eleven months.

Byron v. Dcs · filed 2020-04-07(B)(8)(c)

Father admittedly made positive steps from his situation at the first severance hearing. Those improvements, however, do not establish the superior court abused its discretion in concluding father would not be capable of providing effective parental care in the near future. ... The children’s best interests are not served by waiting indefinitely for father to become a capable and effective parent.

Completing services does not defeat § 8-533(B)(8)(c) when a parent’s recent safety-plan violations show an ongoing inability to protect the child from the other parent’s substance abuse.

Anna S., Michael T. v. Dcs, E.S.T. · filed 2020-04-30(B)(8)(c)

Although Father generally engaged in and completed services, the juvenile court gave great weight to Father’s decision to allow Mother access to the Child within weeks of Child being placed with Father. ... The court noted that “[Father] has shown that he will not act to protect [Child] from unsupervised contact with Mother or to protect [Child] from Mother’s substance abuse.”

A child’s refusal to see a parent may support the near-future-care finding when corroborated by professional opinions, behavioral records, fear of abuse, and the parent’s longstanding absence rather than subjective belief alone.

Morgan B. v. Dcs · filed 2020-05-19(B)(8)(c)

Accordingly, unlike Desiree S., here it was not the children’s subjective belief alone that presented a barrier to Father’s ability to reunite with the children. Such determination was supported by the opinions of the case manager and mental health professionals, the children’s extensive behavioral and mental health records, and by the longstanding record of ... Father’s lack of participation in the children’s lives. On this record, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding there is a substantial likelihood Father would not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.

Less than three months of sobriety achieved only in controlled settings does not require extending a two-year dependency when evidence shows six to twelve months are needed to demonstrate long-term sobriety.

Pamela J. v. Dcs · filed 2020-05-21(B)(8)(c)

We recognize Mother has demonstrated sobriety since she began her substance-abuse treatment in August 2019, but she has achieved sobriety only in controlled settings: residential centers and sober-living facilities. It is unclear whether Mother would be able to maintain her sobriety in an uncontrolled and unsupervised environment. Additionally, testimony at trial indicated that it would require six to twelve months for Mother to demonstrate long-term sobriety; she had only been able to demonstrate less than three months of sobriety at the time of trial, and only after Mother was convicted of a drug-related charge and the case plan changed to severance. The juvenile court did not clearly err in finding that Mother would be unable to exercise proper and effective parental care in the near future.

A parent's permanent intellectual limitations and inability to apply learned information to a special-needs child's care can establish failure to remedy and likely inability to parent effectively in the near future.

Jacob S. v. Dcs, A.F. · filed 2020-08-11(B)(8)(c)

Even if Father had participated in more services, Dr. Delatorre testified that Father’s intellectual disability render him unable to apply learned information effectively. ... Aligning with this testimony, the superior court noted in its termination ruling that “Father’s intellectual functioning is unlikely to improve—ever.”

A parent's recent entry into another treatment program does not defeat the fifteen-month ground when years of services show a recurring cycle of domestic violence, substance abuse, homelessness, and temporary improvement.

Melissa S. v. Dcs · filed 2020-08-13(B)(8)(c)

The juvenile court found that “Mother’s several year involvement with [DCS] ha[d] been a cycle of domestic violence, substance abuse, homelessness, and out-of-control behavior followed by improvement for a time, and then the cycle begins again” and was likely to repeat itself in the future. Substantial evidence supports the court’s findings and we find no error.

A parent's participation in services does not defeat the fifteen-month ground when an intellectual disability and continued involvement in dysfunctional relationships leave the parent unable to acquire protective parenting skills.

Dawn B. v. Dcs · filed 2020-08-20(B)(8)(c)

Dr. Thal opined that Mother lacked the capacity to acquire parenting skills, “maybe most especially in the area of protecting her children.” ... Because sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that severance was warranted pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), we need not consider Mother’s challenge to the alternate ground of chronic substance abuse.

The circumstances assessed under § 8-533(B)(8)(c) include conditions existing at severance, even when those conditions were not expressly alleged in the initial dependency petition.

Vernon H. v. Dcs, E.H. · filed 2020-10-27(B)(8)(c)

Although Father’s substance abuse or mental health issues were not explicitly referred to in the initial dependency petition, “circumstances” under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8) includes circumstances “existing at the time of the severance.”

Periods of sobriety achieved only in structured inpatient treatment do not necessarily remedy substance abuse or establish near-future parenting capacity under the fifteen-month ground.

Nelturiah S. v. Dcs · filed 2021-02-02(B)(8)(c)

When Mother was able to achieve periods of sobriety, it was while living in the structured environment of an in-patient treatment facility. However, there is little evidence she was able to maintain sobriety while receiving out-patient treatment. The court also noted a continued pattern of domestic violence, and inconsistent stable housing. And while the record does show Mother made some progress in her substance abuse treatment, including periods of sobriety, both of which the juvenile court acknowledged and commended, there is reasonable evidence to support the court’s conclusion that Mother had not remedied her substance abuse and that there existed a substantial likelihood she would be unable to do so in the near future.

The circumstances a parent must remedy are those preventing safe parenting at termination and include both the dependency’s original cause and causes arising during the case.

Janna G. v. Dcs · filed 2021-04-06(B)(8)(c)

In making a determination that a parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances causing the child to be in an out-of-home placement, we construe those circumstances to mean the circumstances existing at the time of the termination that prevented a parent from appropriately providing for the parent’s child. Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22 (App. 2007); see also Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 17, ¶ 26 (App. 2019) (court must consider “both the origin [of the dependency] and any cause arising during the dependency”).

The fifteen-month ground can be established even when a parent makes genuine efforts if the parent remains unable to demonstrate safe and appropriate parenting after extensive services.

Tawni A., Seth M. v. Dcs · filed 2021-05-04(B)(8)(c)

The court then found that “[despite two [p]arent [a]ide referrals, [F]ather was simply unable to demonstrate that he could safely and appropriately parent his son” but that “[h]is failure was certainly not due to a lack of effort.”

Lawful medical-marijuana use need not be eliminated for parental fitness, but daily use may be considered with unresolved protective-capacity, service, and housing problems in applying the fifteen-month ground.

Felisha S. v. Dcs · filed 2021-05-27(B)(8)(c)

In fact, the court went so far as to recognize that Mother was not required to eliminate use of marijuana to be a fit parent. Instead the court merely considered Mother’s current, daily marijuana use as one factor, in combination with her inability to protect the children and recognize safety concerns, engage in appropriate services, and provide a safe environment for her children to live.

A parent fails to remedy the circumstances causing placement when the parent denies a special-needs child's delays, repeatedly permits unsafe contact, and cannot articulate a viable plan for constant supervision.

Javier v. v. Dcs, J.V. · filed 2021-06-03(B)(8)(c)

Further, the court explained that Father had been unable to provide the child with appropriate care for nearly three years and there was nothing to indicate that circumstances were likely to change. Record evidence supports each of these findings and Father has failed to show that the court erred.

Repeated fentanyl use continuing through the termination hearing can establish a substantial likelihood that a parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective care in the near future.

Frank E. v. Dcs, C.E. · filed 2021-07-08(B)(8)(c)

As of the termination hearing, C.E. had been in an out-of-home placement for nearly two years, and Father had repeatedly tested positive for fentanyl, including just two days before the termination hearing.

A parent's continued relationship with a substance-abusing partner can support failure to remedy and near-future inability when the exposure threatens the parent's sobriety and the parent does not understand the danger to the child.

Brandi K., David C. v. Dcs, D.C. · filed 2021-07-08(B)(8)(c)

Teague explained her concerns about Mother’s ability to maintain her sobriety if exposed to Father’s substance abuse, and opined that Mother does not understand the impact of Father’s substance abuse on D.C.

Some improvement and service participation do not defeat the fifteen-month ground when parents remain unable to meet children's needs or arrange safe supervision for a parent with an intellectual disability.

Amber B., Jody B. v. Dcs · filed 2021-07-27(B)(8)(c)

The superior court found that Mother and Father had made some improvements, but ultimately found that their efforts were insufficient. ... Sufficient evidence supported the superior court’s determination that Mother and Father were unable to remedy the circumstances causing the children to be in an out-of-home placement for fifteen months or longer and that there was a substantial likelihood that they would not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.

Continuing positive methamphetamine tests during dependency and termination proceedings may establish a substantial likelihood that a parent will remain unable to parent in the near future under § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

Aimee H. v. Dcs · filed 2021-08-19(B)(8)(c)

Mother continued to test positive for methamphetamine throughout the dependency and termination proceedings. And while Mother generally points to “significant changes,” including a new support system, this court does not reweigh evidence on appeal. ... We find no error.

Unstable housing, unchanged parenting deficits, continued domestic violence, and remaining substance issues may support inability to exercise proper care in the near future under the fifteen-month ground.

Stacy R. v. Dcs · filed 2021-10-21(B)(8)(c)

For these reasons, the court was within its discretion to find a substantial likelihood Mother would not be capable of providing proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. Mother has shown no error.

Recent improvement does not defeat the fifteen-month ground when the parent remains inconsistent in services and visits, fails to make behavioral changes, and does not become a reliable caregiver during an extended placement.

Brooks H. v. Dcs, Z.H. · filed 2022-01-18(B)(8)(c)

On this record, Father has not shown that the court erred in considering this evidence and concluding DCS had met its burden to show the 15-months time-in-care statutory ground.

Minor shortcomings involving nutrition, naps, or diaper changes do not clearly and convincingly establish parental unfitness under the fifteen-month ground when current evidence shows the parent is becoming minimally adequate.

Clifford C. v. Dcs, B.H. · filed 2022-02-01(B)(8)(c)

But this evidence does not prove parental unfitness or justify termination of parental rights. ... By January 2021, case aides reported the visits “went well,” Father engaged the child with toys and books, his apartment was “very clean and in order,” and he brought cheese and crackers, juice, peanut butter and jelly sandwiches, pizza bites and bananas—all evidence that Father was becoming a minimally adequate parent.

Unlike the six- and nine-month grounds, the fifteen-month ground does not require proof that the parent substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances causing placement.

Sarah P., Michael M. v. Dcs, V.B. · filed 2022-02-10(B)(8)(c)

While the six-month ground requires the court to determine whether the parent has “substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances which caused the child to be in an out-of-home placement,” no such requirement is imposed on the fifteen-month ground.

Section 8-533(B)(8)(c) does not permit termination merely to regulate bad parenting; clear and convincing evidence must show the parent is incapable of proper and effective care and control.

Brionna J. v. Dcs, A.V. · filed 2022-05-24(B)(8)(c)

Severance is not a general-application tool that allows the state to regulate bad parenting. ... The draconian consequences of severance (for both parent and child) are appropriate under § 8-533(B)(8)(c) only when the child must be protected from a parent who is incapable of exercising proper and effective care and control.

A parent’s failure to engage in domestic-violence counseling after leaving an abusive relationship can support failure to remedy and inability to exercise proper care in the near future.

Kathryn L. v. Dcs, S.L. · filed 2022-06-28(B)(8)(c)

DCS asked Mother to complete domestic violence counseling on multiple occasions. By the time of trial, S.L. had been in out-of-home placement for nearly two years. Mother did not participate in counseling. Accordingly, Mother has failed to show where the superior court erred in finding she “substantially neglected to remedy the circumstances that cause[d] SL to be out of care.”

Safe housing may remain an unremedied circumstance when the available shelter itself presents a risk of harm the parent fails to recognize.

Keira A. v. Dcs, A.T. · filed 2022-08-09(B)(8)(c)

In other words, Mother’s housing issues are inextricably intertwined with DCS’s concerns about Grandmother. ... When asked, Mother could not articulate her own concerns about Grandmother. The court inferred from Mother’s testimony that she simply does not recognize the potential harm at issue.

A parent may fail to remedy substance abuse despite progress when unresolved co-occurring mental-health issues threaten sustained sobriety and safe parenting.

Emone B. v. Dcs, A.B. · filed 2022-08-18(B)(8)(c)

The record shows that Mother’s substance-abuse and mental-health issues were co-occurring, dependent conditions. Indeed, her evaluating psychologist opined that her sobriety was contingent on her ability to gain control over her mental health and past trauma. Mother commendably made great strides in therapy and even sought out additional forms of trauma treatment to compliment her individual therapy. Nevertheless, she was initially resistant to discussing her past trauma and substance abuse, which somewhat delayed her progress. At the time of trial, Mother had just begun to delve into her trauma.

The fifteen-month time-in-care ground does not require the court to conduct the permanent-guardianship or normal-home inquiry applicable to the lengthy-felony-sentence ground.

Levi R. v. Dcs, E.R. · filed 2022-09-27(B)(8)(c)

The plain language of the 15-month out-of-home placement ground does not require a Timothy B. inquiry. ... Those elements do not require the “normal home” analysis applicable to the lengthy-of-felony-sentence ground.

Completing some services and achieving brief sobriety do not remedy the circumstances causing placement when the parent remains with a partner whose domestic violence is unaddressed and has made minimal progress on the recommended trauma-focused treatment.

Sabrina C. v. Dcs · filed 2022-10-25(B)(8)(c)

On this record, the superior court could reasonably conclude Mother failed to fully address the presence of domestic violence in her relationship with Father and its impact on the children. ... Reasonable evidence thus supports the superior court’s finding that Mother failed to remedy her mental health concerns. ... Though Mother engaged in services and made some progress, reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that she failed remedy the circumstances causing her children’s out-of-home placement.

The fifteen-month ground evaluates a parent's actual ability to remedy the placement circumstances, not merely attempts to do so, and a move made more than four years into the dependency does not require DCS to start its assessment over.

Felicia S., Robert S. v. Dcs · filed 2022-10-27(B)(8)(c)

For 15-months’ time in care, the superior court does not evaluate a parent’s attempts at remedying circumstances causing the children to be in an out-of-home placement but instead evaluates the parent’s ability to remedy those circumstances. ... It did not, somehow, mean DCS had to start over. She moved more than four years into the dependency. Her move did not remedy any circumstances at issue.

Continued combined methadone and Xanax use despite medical warnings, unexplained impairment during visits, dependence on a substance-using partner, and unresolved domestic violence support finding that the placement circumstances remain unchanged and near-future parenting is unlikely.

Ashley S. v. Dcs, L.H. · filed 2022-11-01(B)(8)(c)

Regardless of Mother’s claim, it is undisputed that she takes methadone and Xanax, even after being advised by doctors of the dangers in combining those two drugs. ... Because the circumstances that led to L.H.’s removal from Mother’s care essentially remain unchanged and the record shows that Mother would not be able to effectively parent in the near future, the juvenile court did not err in terminating her parental rights.

Findings that a parent made no progress over two years of services and continued to demonstrate instability and aggression are sufficiently specific to support near-future inability under the fifteen-month ground.

Norchelle R. v. Dcs, L.N. · filed 2022-11-10(B)(8)(c)

The court’s findings establish that in over two years, Mother failed to progress in reunification services and demonstrated instability and aggression. These findings are more than sufficient to support its legal conclusion that there existed a substantial likelihood that she would be incapable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.

Services begun only after a termination trial starts are too little and too late under § 8-533(B)(8)(c) when the parent refused testing and repeatedly closed out of treatment throughout a two-year dependency.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to B.G. · filed 2023-01-24(B)(8)(c)

And though Mother highlights the substance-abuse intake (which she completed after the termination trial had begun), her voluntary enrollment in relapse prevention services, and the amelioration of her homelessness and depression, hers is a case of “too little, too late.”

Completion of services does not defeat § 8-533(B)(8)(c) when the parent fails to make the behavioral changes needed to recognize and protect children from domestic violence.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.F. · filed 2023-02-23(B)(8)(c)

The juvenile court fully acknowledged that “Mother has made significant progress in recognizing that the children do have both basic and special needs that she had previously failed to recognize.” But the court, nonetheless, found that “her ongoing relationship with Father continues to pose a substantial risk of harm and Mother has only minimally improved here.” ... Likewise, the case manager testified that although Mother engaged in services, she has not made the behavioral changes necessary to reunify with the children.

Completing services does not defeat the fifteen-month ground when they fail to produce behavioral change sufficient for safe placement and the parent relapses immediately before trial.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.H. · filed 2023-03-28(B)(8)(c)

Here, the superior court found that although DCS made diligent efforts to provide reunification services to Mother and Mother participated in most of those services, she was unable to remedy the circumstances causing L.H. to be in an out-of-home placement—her substance abuse and mental health issues. The court found that although Mother had “largely participated” in reunification services, those services had “been unsuccessful in changing her behavior to the degree that [L.H.] could be safely placed back in her care.”

Progress in overcoming substance addiction does not remedy the circumstances causing placement when the parent leaves domestic violence and mental-health issues untreated, lacks stable housing and employment, and remains unable to meet a special-needs child's medical and dietary requirements.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.T. · filed 2023-07-11(B)(8)(c)

During the dependency proceedings, Mother failed to address her mental health and domestic violence issues, which remain serious concerns. ... Evidence in the record supports the court’s determination that Mother is incapable of taking care of M.T.’s special needs. ... The record overwhelmingly shows that Mother has been unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the out-of-home placement and will not be capable of providing proper parental care for M.T. in the near future.

A parent's ability to care for a child without significant medical issues has little relevance to whether the parent can remedy the circumstances and safely care for other children who have substantial medical and feeding needs.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.T. · filed 2023-08-08(B)(8)(c)

But Father’s ability to parent a child without significant medical issues is of limited, if any, relevance in evaluating his ability to parent his children who have significant medical needs. ... Reasonable evidence supported the superior court’s findings that Father was unable to remedy the circumstances causing his children to be placed outside the home and that a substantial likelihood existed that he would be incapable of proper and effective care and control in the near future.

The fifteen-month ground is itself a proxy for parental unfitness, and its elements may be established with evidence of neglect, abuse, or mental illness without separately alleging those circumstances as termination grounds under subsections (B)(2) or (B)(3).

Brionna J. v. dcs/a.V. · filed 2023-08-08(B)(8)(c)

The elements of § 8-533(B)(8)(c) may be established with evidence of neglect, abuse, or mental illness without the necessity of alleging the grounds for severance under § 8-533(B)(2) or (3). ... Thus, to the extent that the court of appeals imposed an additional showing of parental unfitness outside § 8-533(B)(8)(c)’s elements, it misinterpreted the statute.

Parenting-class completion does not remedy the circumstances causing placement when the parent avoids required drug testing and treatment, denies methamphetamine use despite positive tests, continues living where the child's abuser is encountered, and lacks insight into the harm caused.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to B.B. · filed 2024-05-23(B)(8)(c)

DCS presented evidence that Mother failed to participate in the drug testing, substance abuse treatment, and trauma therapy provided by DCS. ... She still lives in the same apartment where she has encountered Bethany’s abuser. And Mother’s testimony that she was providing appropriate care for Bethany prior to DCS involvement demonstrated that Mother does not understand the harm she caused Bethany. ... The court did not err by finding that DCS established the fifteen months time-in-care ground by clear and convincing evidence.

Unlike the effort-focused six- and nine-month grounds, the fifteen-month ground turns on actual success or failure in remedying placement circumstances and near-future parenting capacity.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.C. · filed 2024-12-31(B)(8)(c)

In contrast, the fifteen-months-in-care ground hinges not on a parent’s effort but on the parent’s actual success or failure in remediating the circumstances causing the out-of-home placement. See id. at 329–30 ¶ 21. Because the superior court terminated mother’s parental rights on the fifteen-months-in-care ground, the focus moves from the level of the parent’s efforts to whether those efforts remedied the circumstances causing the child to be in an out-of-home placement and whether the evidence shows it is substantially likely the parent will be unable to exercise proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. See A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8.(c).

A parent’s concession that stable housing remains unavailable after fifteen months supports failure to remedy and near-future inability under the fifteen-month ground.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.A. · filed 2025-03-27(B)(8)(c)

Father testified he needed more time to demonstrate his ability to protect A.A. and conceded that “after about [fifteen] months or more, [he was] not in a position to provide stable housing.”

Recent sobriety, housing, and employment do not establish near-future parenting ability when a parent repeatedly achieves reunification and then regresses, lacks insight into the causes and effects of the dangerous behavior, and has a poor prognosis after years of services.

Term of Parental Rights as to G.A. and G.A. · filed 2025-05-20(B)(8)(c)

As the court found, Mother has a history spanning several years in which she shows sufficient improvement to reunify with her children, only to engage in behaviors that put the children in dangerous situations soon after. ... Mother’s failure to acknowledge her behaviors that led to the most recent dependency, much less the cause of such behaviors, supports the conclusion that she cannot exercise the care and control required under the statute.

Near-future parenting ability is child-specific; a parent's untreated delusions support the fifteen-month ground when they cause rejection of an autistic child's diagnosis and prescribed therapies and create a risk of withholding necessary care or pursuing unnecessary procedures.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to R.G. · filed 2025-07-22(B)(8)(c)

“Proper and effective parental care and control” is a context-specific term. ... The court must “consider the discrete and special needs of the particular child, both to protect the child’s best interest and meaningfully assess the parent’s willingness and ability to provide proper and effective parental care and control for that child.” ... Reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that Father is unable to properly and effectively exercise parental care and control.

A parent's participation and some clean tests do not defeat fifteen-month termination when dishonesty, resistance to treatment, relapse history, and failure to address the roots of substance abuse show the placement circumstances remain unremedied.

Term of Parental Rights as to K.D. · filed 2025-10-02(B)(8)(c)

Because record evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that mother had not remedied her substance-abuse issues and that there was a substantial likelihood she would be incapable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), mother has failed to show error.

Limited progress in highly controlled, coached visits may be insufficient to show that a parent will soon be capable of unsupervised, full-time parenting.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.B. and C.B. · filed 2025-10-22(B)(8)(c)

The court further noted that the progress the parents made had been in “highly controlled and supervised” environments; the court ... expressed doubt that the progress would continue if they resumed “24/7 parenting.” As the court observed, parenting a baby and a toddler for a few hours a week in the presence of a parenting coach, with the option of taking five-minute breaks in moments of stress, is wholly unlike parenting them on a full-time basis without professional support.

A safety barrier posed by a parent's partner is not remedied merely because the partner is temporarily incarcerated when the parent remains committed to and financially dependent on that partner.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.W. · filed 2025-10-22(B)(8)(c)

But DCS’s concern was only temporarily “remedied” at the time of trial because Tyler G. became incarcerated. Mother recently had a child with Tyler G., his name is on her current lease, she is still dependent, in part, on money from him for her basic living expenses, and their lengthy relationship shows Mother’s unwillingness to put Child before him.

The court evaluates placement circumstances at termination, but DCS need not leave remediation open indefinitely and successful efforts begun too late may still result in termination.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to R.M. and B.M. · filed 2025-11-28(B)(8)(c)

The court must base its fact-finding on “those circumstances existing at the time of the severance that prevent a parent from being able to appropriately provide for his or her children.” Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22 (App. 2007) (quotation omitted). But DCS need not keep the remediation opportunity open indefinitely, and efforts made too late may still result in severance. In re Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994).

Stopping services, sporadic visitation, continuing substance abuse, and unemployment support failure to remedy and near-future inability under the fifteen-month ground.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to G.W. · filed 2025-12-03(B)(8)(c)

On this record, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Father failed to remedy the circumstances causing out-of-home placement and that there was a substantial likelihood he would remain incapable of proper and effective parental control in the near future. See Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (“We do not reweigh the evidence.”).

An unresolved warrant, continued criminal drug activity, missing tests, and years of nonengagement support failure to remedy and near-future inability.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to D.J. · filed 2026-02-02(B)(8)(c)

Father had not addressed an outstanding warrant and continued to engage in criminal activity and drug use, which most recently resulted in a 2024 conviction for possession of methamphetamine. This evidence supports the court’s finding that Father would not soon remedy the circumstances causing the out-of-home placement.

Section 8-533(B)(8)(c) permits termination when a child has been in out-of-home care for at least fifteen months, the parent has not remedied the circumstances, and is unlikely to provide effective care soon.

Krystle M. v. Dcs · filed 2019-11-14(B)(8)(c)

When seeking termination based on fifteen-months time-in-care, DCS must prove that it “made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services” to the parent. ... DCS must also prove that (1) “the child has been in an out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer,” (2) “the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement, and [(3)] there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.”

Section 8-533(B)(8)(c) permits termination when a child has been out of the home for at least fifteen months, the parent has not remedied the causes of placement, and is unlikely to provide effective care soon.

Kayoma S. v. Dcs · filed 2017-03-07(B)(8)(c)

The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCS “made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services,” and: [t]he child has been in an out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer[,] . . . the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement and there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.”

Unlike the six- and nine-month grounds, the fifteen-month ground focuses on whether the parent actually remedied the circumstances and can parent effectively soon, regardless of the parent’s remedial efforts.

Tabatha T. v. Dcs · filed 2017-02-09(B)(8)(c)

However, the fifteen-month out-of-home placement ground does not require the juvenile court to consider a parent’s efforts at remedying the circumstances that have caused the ... children to be in an out-of-home placement; rather, it requires the court to consider whether the parent has failed to remedy the circumstances—regardless of her efforts to do so—and assess her ultimate ability to remedy those circumstances. Compare A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a) (“the parent has substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances”) and (b) (same) with (c) (“the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances” and “there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future”); see also Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-6520, 157 Ariz. 238, 243, 756 P.2d 335, 340 (App. 1988).

A child’s special needs may be considered in determining whether a parent remedied the circumstances causing out-of-home placement and can exercise effective parental care in the near future.

Jeremy M. v. Dcs, J.J. · filed 2017-02-09(B)(8)(c)

We did not find, as Father asserts, that evidence of a child’s special needs may only be considered as part of a best interests determination.

A parent cannot remedy the circumstances of out-of-home placement by merely claiming separation from a substance-abusing partner while remaining unable to detect the partner's drug use or protect the children.

Andres M., Robert M. v. Dcs · filed 2017-05-02(B)(8)(c)

The superior court concluded that Robert’s inability to detect Mother’s drug use, combined with his intent to allow her contact with the children, would place the children at risk if they were returned to his care. Reasonable evidence supports this determination.

The fifteen-month ground measures the parent's ultimate ability to remedy the circumstances causing placement, not the parent's efforts; its standard is inability rather than substantial neglect or willful refusal.

Paul v. Dana B. v. Dcs · filed 2017-06-06(B)(8)(c)

The statute requires only that the court assess a parent’s ultimate ability or inability to remedy those circumstances—apart from the parent’s efforts.

Progress and active participation in services do not defeat the fifteen-month ground when the parent continues unsafe relationships and has not shown an ability to parent consistently and safely.

Joel D. v. Dcs, A.D. · filed 2017-06-27(B)(8)(c)

Although Father had made progress and actively participated in various services, Father had a pattern of dishonesty with service providers and continued to engage in unhealthy domestic relationships.

A parent’s halfhearted participation in selected services does not satisfy the fifteen-month ground when the parent fails to engage in a way that actually remedies the circumstances causing removal.

Jessica H. v. Dcs · filed 2017-08-08(B)(8)(c)

The superior court stressed to Mother the need to remedy the circumstances that led to the Children’s removal, “and not just halfheartedly engage in some of the services of their choosing, and refuse or fail to engage in others.” However, Mother continued to believe that she did nothing wrong, and despite being “offered ample time to remedy the circumstances that caused the out-of-home removal, [she] did not do so.”

Under the fifteen-month ground, the strength of a parent’s remedial efforts is immaterial because the inquiry focuses on the end result and the circumstances existing at severance.

Ryan H. v. Dcs, B.H. · filed 2017-09-14(B)(8)(c)

But under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), the strength of Father’s efforts was immaterial — the inquiry under that subsection of the statute focuses solely on the end result of any efforts. The relevant question is whether the circumstances at the time of the severance are such that the parent cannot appropriately provide for his or her child. See Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22 (App. 2007).

Some parenting improvement does not require a finding that the parent will be capable of effective parenting in the near future under the fifteen-month ground.

Christopher H., Arxit B. v. Dcs · filed 2017-10-10(B)(8)(c)

But some improvement by a parent does not require the court to find that the parent will be effective in the near future. See Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994) (upholding severance where parent's successful efforts to overcome drug addiction were “too little, too late”).

Completing a case plan does not establish remediation when participation produces no progress in safely parenting or protecting children from a dangerous partner.

Neville T. v. Dcs · filed 2017-12-14(B)(8)(c)

The superior court found that although Father participated in a number of services, "[p]articipation does not equate to progress." The court found Father failed to demonstrate he was able to safely and appropriately parent the children and concluded Father was not credible when he testified he would not allow the girlfriend back into his home.

Recent substantial progress in services is not the only consideration under the fifteen-month ground; the court must examine all circumstances of the case.

Candelaria P. v. Dcs, C.D. · filed 2018-01-23(B)(8)(c)

The record confirms Mother recently made substantial progress in the reunification services offered; however, that is not the only relevant factor in determining whether DCS met its burden of proof. Instead, we must look at all the circumstances of the case.

Obtaining housing shortly before the severance hearing does not necessarily remedy an extended history of housing instability under the fifteen-month ground.

Wayne W., Patricia B. v. Dcs · filed 2018-03-20(B)(8)(c)

Although Father and Mother did eventually sign a 12-month lease on their own, this was a recent development and did not negate the previous 20 months of housing instability.

Failure to obtain stable housing and to understand and meet a child’s special medical and developmental needs can establish inability to remedy the circumstances and likely inability to parent in the near future.

Sean M., Mary K. v. Dcs, M.M. · filed 2018-05-22(B)(8)(c)

This evidence is sufficient to support the superior court’s findings that Mother was unable to remedy the circumstances causing M.M. to come into care and that there was a substantial likelihood Mother would not be capable of exercising proper effective parental care and control in the future.

Unlike the chronic-substance-abuse and fifteen-month grounds, the nine-month ground does not require a finding that the parent cannot discharge parental responsibilities.

Donetrius W. v. Dcs, P.W. · filed 2018-03-29(B)(8)(a)

That statutory ground does not require the court to find that a parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities.

Completing most reunification services does not establish near-future parenting capability when the parent cannot successfully care for the children during overnight visits.

Albert D. v. Dcs · filed 2018-05-22(B)(8)(c)

On this record, reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s determination that a substantial likelihood existed that Father would not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. Although he completed most of the services, Father did not complete a second psychological evaluation or successfully care for the children during overnight visitations.

Under subsection (B)(8)(c), a parent's lack of meaningful participation in reunification services can support findings that the parent has not remedied the circumstances causing placement and likely cannot provide proper parental care in the near future.

Zachary W. v. Dcs, M.W. · filed 2018-05-29(B)(8)(c)

Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), the superior court may terminate parental rights based on 15 months’ time in care if: (1) the child has been in an out-of-home placement for at least 15 months, (2) “[DCS] has made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services,” (3) “the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances” necessitating the out-of-home placement, and (4) “there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.” ... Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Father had not remedied the circumstances underlying the out-of-home placement and that there was a substantial likelihood that he would not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.

Continued substance abuse, drug-related incapacitation, and unsafe and unpredictable parenting can establish that a parent has not remedied the circumstances causing placement and likely cannot provide proper care in the near future under subsection (B)(8)(c).

Tara M. v. Dcs · filed 2018-07-10(B)(8)(c)

DCS needed to prove (1) the Children were in out-of-home placement for at least fifteen months, (2) Mother “has been unable to remedy the circumstances” that necessitated removal, and (3) a “substantial likelihood” that Mother will remain incapable of providing appropriate “parental care and control in the near future.” ... The superior court received substantial evidence to support termination. DCS removed the Children from Mother’s home because she could not safely parent them and abused drugs and alcohol. Those obstacles remain in place. ... At bottom, the record reasonably indicated that Mother’s “parenting skills and behavior remain unpredictable.”

The fifteen-month ground in § 8-533(B)(8)(c) focuses on the parent’s ultimate ability to remedy the circumstances existing at severance, not merely the parent’s efforts to do so.

Justin M., Stephanie R. v. Dcs · filed 2018-10-09(B)(8)(c)

Relevant circumstances are those existing at the time of the severance that prevent a parent from being able to appropriately provide for his or her children. ... The fifteen-month ground does not focus on ... a parent’s efforts to cure the circumstances, but rather his or her ultimate ability to do so.

Under § 8-533(B)(8)(c), the circumstances preventing proper parenting are assessed at severance, and continued inability to manage prescribed medication may establish both failure to remedy and likely near-future incapacity.

Tina v. v. Dcs · filed 2018-10-25(B)(8)(c)

The circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement are those “‘existing at the time of the severance’ that prevent a parent from being able to appropriately provide for his or her children.” ... Mother’s continued inability to manage her prescription drug use was by itself sufficient to show that she had been unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the Children to be in out-of-home placements, and that it was substantially likely she would be incapable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.

Sporadic, aborted efforts begun only after the statutory period and a termination motion do not establish that a parent remedied the circumstances under § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

Quinton v. v. Dcs, A.V. · filed 2018-11-01(B)(8)(c)

The record reflects Father made only “sporadic, aborted attempts” to remedy those concerns. Although Father participated in several assessments at the time of removal, he did not commit to addressing DCS’s concerns until Child had been in an out-of-home placement for nearly eighteen months — after the statutory period had passed and a motion to terminate was filed.

The fifteen-month time-in-care ground is satisfied when years of inconsistent services, continued drug abuse, and expert evidence support a substantial likelihood that the parent cannot exercise proper and effective care in the near future.

Jacklyn D. v. Dcs · filed 2018-12-18(B)(8)(c)

Based on the facts contained in the record, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude by clear and convincing evidence that there was a substantial likelihood that Mother would not be able to properly and effectively parent the Children in the near future.

A parent's continued inability to meet children's significant special needs, including refusal of specialized parenting and mental-health services, can establish likely inability to provide proper care in the near future.

Andray L. v. Dcs · filed 2019-03-07(B)(8)(c)

The court recognized that 36 months had already passed without successful reunification, finding it substantially unlikely Father would be capable of providing proper and effective parental care in the near future. This finding is consistent with the opinions of the medical professionals who evaluated Father; and supported by evidence of Father’s resistance to treating his own mental health and refusal to participate in parenting classes focused on X.L. and M.L.’s special needs.

Continued substance use despite recommendations for sobriety, together with unsuccessful parent-aide services and diminished protective capacities, can establish likely inability to exercise proper parental care in the near future.

Sarah R. v. Dcs, Z.L. · filed 2019-03-12(B)(8)(c)

Mother does not deny she has a significant history of marijuana use or that she continued to use marijuana at the time of termination, despite repeated recommendations to maintain sobriety. Her most recent parent aide continued to report diminished protective capacities, and Mother’s failure to complete the service successfully. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by finding Mother was unlikely to be able to exercise proper and effective parental care and control over Zyonna.

The fifteen-month ground assesses a parent's ultimate ability or inability to remedy the circumstances causing placement, not the amount of effort the parent expended trying to remedy them.

Jesus R., Deanna C. v. Dcs · filed 2019-03-19(B)(8)(c)

The fifteen-months out-of-home placement termination ground does not require the superior court to measure the parent’s efforts at remedying those circumstances, but rather to assess the parent’s ultimate ability or inability to cure them.

Failure to obtain appropriate housing or develop insight into domestic violence and children's resulting fears can establish that a parent likely will not provide proper care in the near future, especially after nearly twice the statutory period.

Maria D. v. Dcs · filed 2019-03-19(B)(8)(c)

The court noted that she had nearly double the fifteen-month statutory period to address these issues and failed to make necessary changes to suggest she would be able to exercise proper and effective parental care in the future.

Completing reunification services does not defeat § 8-533(B)(8)(c) when the parent fails to make the behavioral changes necessary to protect the children.

Daniel S. v. Dcs · filed 2019-07-23(B)(8)(c)

Despite ... his completion of services, the court found Father was unable to place the children’s needs above his dysfunctional relationship with Mother. ... Although Father testified that he would not allow Mother to be around the children when she was drinking or on drugs, it was reasonable for the court to find that his actions throughout the dependency contradicted his testimony.

The fifteen-month time-in-care ground focuses on whether the parent ultimately remedied the circumstances causing placement, not merely whether the parent participated in the case plan.

Mario G. v. Dcs, E.G. · filed 2019-08-15(B)(8)(c)

Under the 15-month ground, however, the focus is not on whether a parent participates in the case plan, but on whether he is ultimately able to remedy the circumstances causing the child’s out-of-home placement. Compare A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a) with 8-533(B)(8)(c). Here, reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that Father was unable to do so.

Section 8-533(B)(8)(c) requires the child, not the parent, to have experienced fifteen months of out-of-home placement and imposes no minimum period during which DCS must provide services.

Desiree A., Donovan J. v. Dcs, D.A. · filed 2019-08-20(B)(8)(c)

By its text, the statute requires only that “[t]he child has been in an out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer,” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) (emphasis added), and does not dictate a minimum time period over which DCS must provide services. Instead, DCS must provide parents “with the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to improve the parent’s ability to care for the child.” Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192 ¶ 37; see also A.R.S. § 8-533(D) (directing the court to “consider the availability of reunification services to the parent” when considering termination based on 15-months time-in-care).

Participation in offered services does not defeat the fifteen-month ground when the parent fails to resolve the critical substance-abuse and domestic-violence barriers to safe parenting.

Norman S. v. Dcs, N.S. · filed 2019-08-29(B)(8)(c)

Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings that despite given the opportunity, Father did not fully engage in the services offered, he did not demonstrate he can maintain sobriety in order to parent the child, and he failed to show he can “provide the child a violence-free environment” in the near future. Because clear and convincing evidence supports the termination of Father’s parental rights based on fifteen months out-of-home-placement, we do not address his arguments relating to the other grounds. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002).

A serious lapse in judgment late in a lengthy dependency can support the finding that a parent will remain unable to exercise proper and effective care in the near future.

Amber H. v. Dcs, E Al. · filed 2019-09-12(B)(8)(c)

As the juvenile court noted, Mother’s decision to allow Father back into the home, as well as her complicity in lying to the DCS case manager who came to her home, represented a “critical failure [in] judgment late in the case,” which further supports the court’s finding of a substantial likelihood that Mother will not be capable of exercising proper and effective care of her children in the near future.

Stable housing and employment do not establish adequate remedial effort under the nine-month ground when the parent fails to complete parenting and domestic-violence programs and voluntarily stops visiting because supervised visitation was reinstated.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.G. · filed 2024-05-14(B)(8)(a)

Whether a parent substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances causing the child’s removal “focuses on the level of the parent’s effort to cure the circumstances rather than the parent’s success in actually doing so.” ... Finally, Father testified he stopped visiting J.G. in March 2023 because he was “upset” with DCS for reinstating supervised visitation. Father’s response to DCS’s requirements is unacceptable for a parent.

When considering a time-in-care ground, the court must consider the availability of reunification services and the parent's participation, but DCS need not provide every conceivable service or ensure participation.

Karli B. v. Dcs · filed 2015-07-23(D)

“In considering the grounds for termination prescribed in [A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8], the court shall consider the availability of reunification services to the parent and the participation of the parent in these services.” A.R.S. § 8-533.D. However, DCS is not required to “provide every conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates in each service it offers.”

The out-of-home-placement ground was designed to free children for adoption, not to sever rights when the court knows the children are unadoptable merely to relieve the agency of working with the parent.

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-6520 · filed 1988-02-18(B)(6)

The stated purpose of the amendment is to “free children for adoption” not to free DES from the responsibility of working with recalcitrant or uncooperative parents.

The extended-out-of-home-placement ground incorporates parental unfitness through the parent's failure or inability to remedy the circumstances causing placement after diligent reunification efforts.

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-7359 · filed 1988-09-29(B)(6)

What the appellant overlooks is that our statutes incorporate a concept of parental unfitness. ... The appellant’s refusal to remedy the situation that made out-of-home placement necessary is a reflection on her fitness as a parent.

Termination under the out-of-home-placement ground requires evidence that the children are adoptable and clear and convincing proof of diligent remedial services, unless reunification efforts would be futile.

In re the Appeal in Yavapai County Juvenile Action No. J-9956 · filed 1991-02-21(B)(6)

As a threshold matter, in order to terminate parental rights pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(6), there must be evidence on the record that the children are adoptable. ... However, the trial court must also find by clear and convincing evidence that DES “has made a diligent effort to provide appropriate remedial services.” ... Arizona courts have long held that DES has no such obligation if efforts to reunify the family would be futile.

For the out-of-home-placement ground, the circumstances causing placement are those existing at severance, not only those alleged in the initial dependency petition.

In re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-8441 · filed 1993-05-25(B)(6)

In light of this stated purpose, we construe the “circumstances which cause the child to be in out-of-home placement,” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(6), to mean those circumstances existing at the time of the severance rather than at the time of the initial dependency petition.

Good-faith participation in remedial programs is not substantial neglect merely because the parent cannot completely overcome the problem within one year, but sporadic and aborted efforts may be.

In re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-501568 · filed 1994-03-08(B)(6)(a)

Under section 8-533(B)(6)(a), parents who make appreciable, good faith efforts to comply with remedial programs outlined by ADES will not be found to have substantially neglected to remedy the circumstances that caused out-of-home placement, even if they cannot completely overcome their difficulties (in this case, addiction) within one year after their children are placed in the custody of the State. However, when a party, like appellant, disappears for months at a time and makes only sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy her addiction in that first year, a trial court is well within its discretion in finding substantial neglect and terminating parental rights on that basis.

An immediate adoption plan is not a prerequisite to termination under the extended-out-of-home-placement ground when unremedied parental unfitness detrimentally affects the child.

In Re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-2460 · filed 1989-10-19(B)(6)(b)

While we accept the conclusion that the primary purpose of subsection (B)(6) is to facilitate adoption of children in foster care in appropriate circumstances, we reject the argument that the subsection precludes severance where there is no immediate plan for adoption. Had the legislature intended this to be a prerequisite to severance, it would have said so directly. Moreover, as this case demonstrates, where there is clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness which has not been remedied notwithstanding the provision of services by DES and which detrimentally affects the child’s well-being, severance may be warranted and appropriate even in the absence of a plan for adoption.

Termination under the out-of-home-placement ground requires the court to determine that the child is adoptable.

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-8287 · filed 1991-12-06(B)(6)

Furthermore, under subsection B(6), the court must ascertain that the child is adoptable.

Before terminating for continued out-of-home placement, the department must make a diligent effort to provide appropriate remedial services.

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-501904 · filed 1994-07-19(B)(6)

Under A.R.S. section 8-533.B.6, DES must show that it has made a “diligent” effort to provide appropriate remedial services before it can sever a parent-child relationship based on the child’s continuing out-of-home placement.

When sufficient evidence supports termination, the juvenile court is presumed to have made the necessary diligent-efforts finding even without an explicit reasonable-efforts analysis.

Raquel D. v. Dcs · filed 2014-07-03(B)(8)

Most importantly, however, when sufficient evidence exists to support a termination order, we presume the juvenile court made the necessary findings even though the juvenile court did not explicitly engage in reasonable efforts analysis under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8).

When termination is sought on a time-in-care ground, DCS must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it diligently provided appropriate reunification services.

Erin R. v. Dcs, M.R. · filed 2014-12-09(B)(8)

When DCS seeks to terminate a parent-child relationship based on time in care, it must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that it “made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services.”

A court may consider unstable housing under the time-in-care grounds when dependence on others prevents the parent from ensuring a safe home and housing stress can trigger serious mental-health symptoms.

Phyllicia C. v. Dcs, M.R. · filed 2017-02-09(B)(8)

Although Mother suggests the court committed legal error in considering her lack of independent, stable housing, Mother’s inability to ensure safe housing for the child—combined with the fact that stress caused by a lack of housing can serve as a trigger for Mother’s serious bipolar symptoms—supports the court’s findings.

For prior-removal termination, DCS may establish diligent efforts through services provided in both the earlier and current dependencies, and need not provide unlimited time or repeat services that proved futile.

Denisse P. v. Dcs · filed 2019-02-14(B)(11)

Her participation during the time before she was detained by ICE was, at best, sporadic, indicating further services would likely have been futile. Moreover, by the time of the severance hearing, the children had been in out-of-home care for a total of approximately thirty-six of the previous forty-one months. As the juvenile court recognized, “[t]he one thing Mother needs to reunify with the Children is to establish consistent sobriety and [DCS] has provided ample services to help Mother do that.” In this case, DCS provided Mother with appropriate reunification services and more than ample time and opportunity for her to participate in those services, and reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that DCS made diligent reunification efforts.

The parental-responsibilities inquiry under § 8-533(B)(11)(d) is flexible and permits consideration of the unique circumstances rather than an exclusive list of duties or factors.

Lisa S., Brian W. v. Dcs · filed 2019-05-02(B)(11)(d)

This court has previously recognized “parental responsibilities” as “capable of being understood by persons of ... ordinary intelligence as referring to those duties or obligations which a parent has with regard to his child,” ... furthermore, “[t]he term is not intended to encompass any exclusive set of factors but rather to establish a standard which permits a trial judge flexibility in considering the unique circumstances of each termination case before determining the parent’s ability to discharge his or her parental responsibilities.”

The “same cause” in § 8-533(B)(10) refers to the factual cause of the prior termination, not the statutory ground that supported it.

State v. Bergen · filed 2019-07-23(B)(10)

The “same cause” language in subsection (B)(10) “refer[s] to the factual ‘cause’ that led to the termination . . . and not the statutory ground or grounds that supported that preceding [termination].”

The “same cause” requirement for a prior termination within two years refers to the factual cause of the earlier termination, not necessarily the same statutory ground.

Marcellina D. v. Dcs, A.D. · filed 2019-09-05(B)(10)

Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(10), parental rights may be terminated when “the parent has had parental rights to another child terminated within the preceding two years for the same cause and is currently unable to discharge parental responsibilities due to the same cause.” The “same cause” is the factual cause that led to the prior termination, not necessarily the statutory ground on which it was based. See Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 48, ¶ 11.

The “same cause” in § 8-533(B)(10) means the same underlying factual cause that led to the prior termination.

Lara S. v. Dcs · filed 2020-12-03(B)(10)

The “same cause” requirement refers to the same underlying factual cause that led to the prior termination.

Under § 8-533(B)(10), “same cause” means the factual cause of the prior termination rather than its statutory grounds, and DCS must provide reasonable rehabilitative efforts or show futility.

Sarah D. v. Dcs · filed 2021-08-10(B)(10)

“[S]ame cause” refers to the factual cause that resulted in the termination, not the statutory grounds. ... DCS must “prove by clear and convincing evidence that it had made a reasonable effort to provide [the parent] with rehabilitative services or that such an effort would be futile.”

Failure to participate in services, maintain contact, secure stable housing, and attend visits may support termination under both § 8-533(B)(8)(b) and (c), particularly when a parent moves away shortly before trial.

Shukura J., X'zavier F. v. Dcs · filed 2022-03-08(B)(8)(b), (B)(8)(c)

Further, the record supports the court’s finding that Parents substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances that caused out-of-home placement. ... One month before trial, they made the “stunning decision” to move to Chicago, rendering them unable to complete services or attend in person visits with their children.

The prior-removal ground can apply to a father who establishes paternity after a dependency begins when the court then adjudicates dependency and immediately curtails his newly vested custody rights.

Michael D., Turquoise P. v. Dcs, N.P. · filed 2022-07-28(B)(11)

But the court removed Amy from Father’s legal custody after he established paternity, satisfying A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(11)’s requirements. ... When Father established paternity, his rights, including the “right to have physical possession of” and duties to Amy vested. ... The court therefore immediately curtailed Father’s rights, effectively removing Amy from his custody, and ordered the child “committed to the care, custody and control of” DCS. Father’s argument is unpersuasive.

Prior-removal findings need not recite every supporting fact when they identify court-ordered placement, return to the parent’s legal custody, and removal again, and the evidence supports those findings.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to E.P. · filed 2023-04-20(B)(11)

Although not effusive, the severance order does just that. And particularly given the statutory ground on which severance was sought, the severance order properly allows this court “to determine exactly which issues were decided” and whether the superior court “correctly applied the law.” See Ruben M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 236, 240 ¶ 24 (App. 2012).

The “same cause” in subsection (B)(10) is the factual cause of the earlier termination, not necessarily the same statutory ground.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to W.M. · filed 2024-04-30(B)(10)

“[S]ame cause” refers to the factual cause that resulted in the termination, not the statutory grounds. Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 48, ¶ 11.

Section 8-533(B)(8)’s diligent efforts requirement can be satisfied by providing an array of reunification services.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to H.H. and R.H. · filed 2026-01-26(B)(8)

The court did not err in finding that DCS “made diligent efforts by providing an array of reunification services.” See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8).

After arranging access to a recommended reunification service, DCS is not required to ensure that the parent participates in it.

Manuel W. v. Dcs, M.W. · filed 2015-06-11(B)(8)(b)

It is not required to ensure his participation.

DCS need not continue visitation as a reunification service when the children refuse contact and a therapeutic visit has failed.

Lester L. v. Dcs · filed 2015-08-11(B)(8)(c)

The record in this case contains sufficient evidence to support the superior court's implicit decision to decline to require DCS to provide visits after the children said they no longer wanted to see or talk to Father and after the failure of the June 2014 therapeutic visit.

DCS can satisfy the diligent-efforts requirement by offering relevant testing, treatment, transportation, counseling, visitation, and inpatient and outpatient services even when the parent does not meaningfully engage.

Enrico G. v. Dcs · filed 2015-09-24(B)(8)(a)

DCS presented testimony from Father’s caseworker indicating Father had been offered a myriad of relevant services - including substance testing and treatment services, transportation, domestic violence counseling, and visitation, as well as the opportunity for both outpatient and inpatient services - but did not exhibit any meaningful engagement.

Failure to provide reunification services does not violate section 8-533 when the evidence shows that reunification efforts would be futile.

In Re the Appeal in Pima County Severance Action No. S-2397 · filed 1989-06-21(B)(3), (B)(6)(b)

Where the evidence shows that efforts to reunite the family would be futile, failure to make such efforts does not violate the parent’s due process rights nor is it in contravention of A.R.S. § 8-533.

The diligent-efforts requirement demands concerted, diligent reunification work rather than indefinable best efforts, and no further efforts are required when reunification would be futile.

In Re the Appeal in Yuma County J-88-201, J-88-202, J-88-203 · filed 1992-07-07(B)(6)

We have held that termination pursuant to section 8-533(B)(6) should be granted only if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that DES has made a concerted and diligent effort to preserve the family relationship. ... However, it is by now well-established that “DES has no such obligation if efforts to reunify the family would be futile.” ... The court found that DES had not made its “best” efforts, whereas the statute speaks in terms of “diligent” efforts. We believe that a “best efforts” standard would be impossible to define and equally impossible to fulfill.

Substantial evidence may establish diligent reunification efforts despite disagreement over the placement services offered.

Lashonda M. v. Ades, Elijah M. · filed 2005-03-02(B)(8)(a)

Because conflicts in the evidence are for the fact-finder to resolve and because substantial evidence in the record supports its resolution in this case, we defer to the jury’s finding and reject Lashonda’s argument.

The state must make diligent reunification efforts and may not withhold services merely because it plans successive reunifications.

Jordan C. , Jesse C., Kailynn C., Michele C. v. Ades · filed 2009-11-10(B)(8)(c)

The record does not support the juvenile court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that ADES made a diligent effort to reunify this family.

For mental-illness termination, the state must clearly and convincingly prove that it made reasonable rehabilitative efforts with a reasonable prospect of success or that providing further services would be futile.

Vanessa H. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2007-06-12(B)(3)

If the State is obligated to undertake rehabilitative measures, however, it must "undertake measures with a reasonable prospect of success." ... In sum, the State must "prove by clear and convincing evidence that it ha[s] made a reasonable effort to provide [the parent] with rehabilitative services or that such an effort would be futile."

The mere passage of time in care is not itself a termination ground and cannot substitute for the independent findings of diligent reunification efforts and likely inability to parent in the near future.

Jordan C. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2009-11-10(B)(8)(c)

The mere passage of time during which a child is in care, without more, is not a ground for terminating the parent’s rights under § 8-533(B)(8)(c). And we do not believe additional time in care may be considered a proxy for the independent findings the statute requires.

A parent who does not object when the juvenile court finds diligent reunification efforts is precluded from challenging that finding on appeal.

Shawanee S. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2014-02-25(B)(8)

Accordingly, we hold that when the juvenile court record reflects that ADES has been ordered to provide specific services in furtherance of the case plan, and the court finds that ADES has made reasonable efforts to provide such services (including a finding that ADES made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)), a parent who does not object in the juvenile court is precluded from challenging that finding on appeal.

The agency must diligently provide reunification services by undertaking rehabilitative measures offering a reasonable possibility of success, though it need not offer every service or ensure participation.

Rigoberto O. v. Ades · filed 2014-05-13(B)(8)

Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8), the agency responsible for the child’s care must have made a “diligent effort” to provide reunification services. The State is not required to offer every possible service or “to ensure that a parent participates in each service it offers.” ... However, the State is obligated to undertake rehabilitative measures offering a reasonable possibility of success.

The department need not provide every conceivable reunification service or ensure participation, and need not provide futile services; it need only undertake measures with a reasonable prospect of success.

Christina G. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2011-05-10(B)(3), (B)(8)

ADES is not required, however, “to provide every conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates in each service it offers.” ... It is not required to provide services that are futile, ... and need only “undertake measures with a reasonable prospect of success.”

The state need not provide every conceivable service but must provide time and opportunity to participate.

Megan M., Dustin J. v. Dcs · filed 2014-11-25(B)(8)(b)

While DCS is not required to provide “every conceivable service,” it is required to provide parents with the time and opportunity to participate in services.

Reasonable efforts do not require every conceivable service or guaranteed participation, but must give the parent services plus time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to make the parent effective.

Desirae M. v. Ades, L.M. · filed 2014-03-25(B)(11)

However, ADES is not required “to provide every conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates in each service it offers.” ... Rather, ADES must provide the parent with services as well as “the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help her to become an effective parent.”

DCS may satisfy its diligent-effort duty without providing family therapy when the parent's inconsistent participation prevented the family from becoming ready for that therapy.

Stephanie Z., David S. v. Dcs · filed 2015-03-12(B)(8)(c)

Reasonable evidence thus supports the juvenile court’s finding that DCS made a diligent effort to provide appropriate services designed to reunify the family, and Mother’s “lack of consistent engagement in services,” and not the absence of family therapy, prevented reunification.

A parent waives an appellate challenge to the adequacy of reunification services by failing to object when the asserted deficiency could have been raised in the juvenile court.

Jessica N. v. Dcs · filed 2016-03-22(B)(3), (B)(8)(c)

Accordingly, she has waived her right to argue for the first time on appeal that DCS failed to offer appropriate services.

DCS can satisfy the diligent-efforts requirement despite a gap in visitation services when it provided extensive other services and the parent’s noncompliance, moves, and positive drug tests hampered service delivery.

Stacey M. v. Dcs · filed 2016-07-05(B)(8)(c)

The evidence also showed Stacey had hampered DCS’ ability to provide visitation services. For example, parent aide services had previously assisted in setting up visitation, but Stacey stopped being “compliant” with parent aide services in May 2015 and the services closed at the end of June. Stacey also moved several times, which required DCS “to rearrange service providers and transportation” and she tested positive for methamphetamine seven times in April through June of 2015. Given this evidence, DCS met its burden of proving it had made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services to Stacey.

The diligent-efforts requirement does not obligate DCS to provide additional or duplicative psychiatric and visitation services that would be futile.

Philip P., Katherine J. v. Dcs, V.P. · filed 2017-03-07(B)(8)

Considering the totality of the circumstances and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s order, it is apparent additional or duplicative psychiatric services and/or visitation would have been futile. The record supports the finding of diligent efforts, and we find no error.

Before deeming reunification interventions futile, DCS should timely provide all recommended and court-ordered services after the parent's release from jail, but the parent must promptly seek relief for failures to do so.

Willie W. v. Dcs · filed 2016-09-13(B)(8)(c)

We cannot say based on the record here whether Father would have benefited from more intervention, but the Department should have timely referred Father for all recommended and ordered services after his release from jail before concluding that such interventions were futile.

A parent remains unable to remedy circumstances under the fifteen-month ground when a dependent relationship continues to prevent protecting the children after years of services.

Kimberlee D., Kevin M. v. Dcs · filed 2016-09-29(B)(8)(c)

Similarly, Dr. Thal testified that Mother had not made any significant progress since her 2012 evaluation. In 2015, Dr. Thal diagnosed Mother with dependent personality disorder, finding that her desire to maintain her relationship with Father would interfere with her ability to protect herself and her children. Dr. Thal also testified that Mother’s 2012 and 2015 evaluations were essentially the same; in spite of the facts showing neglect and abuse, Mother did not recognize these issues as valid concerns.

Additional reunification services are futile when a parent refuses training for a child's documented special needs because the parent denies those needs exist.

Arthur B. v. Dcs, J.T. · filed 2016-10-27(B)(8)(c)

Moreover, the superior court reasonably concluded that additional services would be futile. Despite J.T.’s well-documented medical conditions, Father continued to maintain (even through the severance hearing) that he did not think J.T. had any special needs. This, in combination with Father’s failure to attend medical trainings and doctor’s appointments, provided a reasonable basis for the court’s conclusion that Father would not attend training to learn about special needs he did not believe J.T. had.

DCS makes diligent reunification efforts by repeatedly offering appropriate services even when the parent rarely participates and delays the evaluation needed to tailor additional services.

Jamie T. v. Dcs, A.F. · filed 2017-03-16(B)(3), (B)(8)(a)

Here, on the other hand, DCS provided ample opportunities and services to Mother for reunification, including referrals and services for transportation, substance abuse treatment, drug testing, counseling, a parent aide, a psychological evaluation and a psychiatric evaluation. Mother either failed to attend these services, or rarely participated when she did attend. Despite Mother’s lack of efforts, DCS continued to refer her to services and Mother continued to miss appointments and ignore referrals. In short, Mother failed to remedy her situation despite diligent efforts by DCS.

Persistent failure to participate in mental-health services, combined with professional evidence of impaired parenting, supports inability to remedy and likely inability to parent in the near future.

Janice J. v. Dcs · filed 2017-05-04(B)(8)(c)

Mother's failure to diligently participate in mental-health services, along with the professional reports and records before the court, demonstrated that she had been unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the Children's placement, and likewise demonstrated a substantial likelihood that she would not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.

DCS must provide reunification measures with a reasonable prospect of success, but need not provide every conceivable service, ensure participation, undertake futile measures, or keep remediation open indefinitely.

Justin G. v. Dcs · filed 2017-06-20(B)(8)(c)

It must “undertake measures with a reasonable prospect of success in reuniting the family,” id., but it need not provide every conceivable service, ensure the parent participates in each service it offers, undertake rehabilitative measures that are futile, or leave the window of opportunity for remediation open indefinitely, Tanya K. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, P.K., 240 Ariz. 154, 157, ¶ 11, 377 P.3d 351, 354 (App. 2016).

A delay in counseling does not defeat diligent reunification efforts when DCS does not deny counseling when the parent requests it.

Taborsha W. v. Dcs, N.W. · filed 2017-08-03(B)(8)(c)

Mother also conceded that at no time when she asked for counseling services did DCS fail to provide the requested services.

A delay in recommended therapy does not defeat diligent efforts when the parent’s lack of candor prevents that therapy from addressing the issues necessary for safe parenting.

Lynda H. v. Dcs, J.S. · filed 2017-10-24(B)(8)

[A]ny delay with DBT for Mother did not delay reunification, because . . . Mother has not been forthcoming with Dr. Capps-Conkle. Mother’s lack of candor with her therapist has undermined the ability of the treatment to deal with the issues that Mother must address to safely parent [J.S.]. If DBT had started earlier, Mother’s denials about her role in domestic violence simply would have started earlier (and continued during treatment, as noted above).

A temporary counseling lapse does not defeat diligent efforts when benefit restrictions limit DCS’s referrals, the agency coordinates with the authorized provider, and extensive other reunification services are available.

Amber S. v. Dcs, L.C. · filed 2017-09-14(B)(8)(c)

Over nearly two years, Mother was provided with a parent aide, case aide, supervised visits, psychological evaluation, transportation, and coordination with Partners in Recovery. The lapse in her counseling was four months (May 2016 through August 2016). DCS made a diligent effort to provide Mother with appropriate reunification services. And given Mother’s SSI benefits and the resulting limitation placed on DCS, we agree with the superior court’s finding that DCS “acted reasonably in relying on the service providers providing care and services for Mother through her SSI disability status.”

A parent waives an appellate challenge to the adequacy of reunification services by failing to timely object when the alleged deficiency could have been addressed during the dependency.

Jessica M. v. Dcs, A.B. · filed 2017-09-19(B)(8)

DCS’s obligation to provide services, however, “does not free a parent from the need to raise a timely objection if the parent believes services are inadequate.” Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178, ¶ 13 (App. 2014). A parent must object, at that time, to any perceived failure by DCS to provide required services. Id. Should the parent fail to raise a timely objection, he or she is precluded from doing so on appeal. Id. at 179, ¶ 16.