Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-533

Evidence that a parent continued using illegal substances, could not discharge parental responsibilities because of that use, and failed to engage in offered treatment supports termination for chronic substance abuse likely to continue indefinitely.

Pete G. v. Dcs · filed 2016-05-26(B)(3)

The findings of fact on this record are sufficient to support the conclusion that Father was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities due to substance abuse, and that this condition will continue for an indeterminate period.

Episodic abstinence does not outweigh a significant history of substance abuse or an inability to abstain.

Carrie M. v. Dcs · filed 2016-06-02(B)(3)

Episodic abstinence from drugs and alcohol, however, does not outweigh a parent’s significant history of abuse or inability to abstain. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 29, 231 P.3d 377, 383 (App. 2010).

A short period of recent sobriety does not negate a long history of chronic substance abuse and repeated relapse, especially when the parent's addiction has persisted despite prior services and the threatened loss of children.

Lachelle J. v. Dcs · filed 2020-01-09(B)(3)

Although we commend Mother’s recent efforts, they do not negate her long history of substance abuse and relapse.

A short period of abstinence while incarcerated does not outweigh a significant history of drug abuse or establish an ability to maintain sobriety in a noncustodial setting.

Shad C. v. Dcs, J.C. · filed 2020-01-14(B)(3)

Father’s short period of abstinence while incarcerated does not outweigh his significant history of drug abuse or demonstrated inability to remain sober outside of a custodial setting.

Years of highly addictive drug use, repeated failed sobriety attempts and relapses, and failure to engage in treatment support finding that a parent’s inability to parent will continue indefinitely.

John O. v. Dcs, A.O. · filed 2020-05-07(B)(3)

Father’s years of substance abuse of many highly addicting drugs, multiple failed attempts to maintain sobriety, multiple relapses—including one week before the termination hearing—and failure to commit to substance abuse treatment when recommended, are reasonable grounds to find that Father’s inability to parent would continue for a prolonged indefinite period.

For chronic substance abuse, the key is not the numerical balance of positive and negative tests but the parent’s consistent failure to abstain.

Tiffany L., Gregory C. v. Dcs, P.C. · filed 2020-05-19(B)(3)

In determining whether sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings on this requirement of A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), “[i]t is not the number of times that [Mother] has tested positive or negative for drug abuse that is key, but rather, it is the fact that [she] has consistently failed to abstain from drugs.” Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 379, ¶ 29.

Repeated relapse and inability to maintain sobriety outside a structured setting support finding that chronic substance abuse will continue indefinitely.

Lindy S. v. Dcs · filed 2020-06-30(B)(3)

Mother has abused various substances since the age of 19. She attempted over the course of the dependency to remain sober but relapsed several times for extended periods. The COO of Scottsdale Recovery Center admitted that before entering the Center’s “firm boundaries,” Mother could not achieve sobriety. Her latest month-long relapse occurred just three months before the termination hearing. While the COO disagreed with the DCS case manager on the likelihood of relapse in the near future, Mother’s history provided reasonable evidence for the juvenile court’s finding. See Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 378, ¶ 29 (finding reasonable belief that chronic drug abuse would continue where parent “had been unable to rise above his addiction in a non-custodial and unstructured setting”) (emphasis added).

Chronic drug abuse means long-lasting abuse, not necessarily constant abuse, and temporary abstinence does not outweigh a significant history or consistent inability to abstain.

Richard R. v. Daisy A., I.R. · filed 2020-07-28(B)(3)

As used in subsection 8-533.B, chronic means “lasting a long time, long-continued, lingering, and inveterate.” See Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t. of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 377, ¶ 16 (App. 2010). Drug abuse need not be constant to be considered chronic. Id.

A prior finding that a parent remedied circumstances does not bar termination under § 8-533(B)(3) when a later substance-abuse incident supplies new evidence that the condition remains unresolved.

Emerald M. v. Dcs · filed 2020-10-06(B)(3)

Mother contends the superior court erroneously terminated her parental rights on substance abuse grounds because the court had dismissed the earlier dependency action and found that Mother “remedied the circumstances that caused the children to come into care.” The court’s earlier finding, however, predated the later incident, which precipitated and supported the termination findings.

A court may find chronic substance abuse likely to continue from the parent’s drug history and failure to engage in or complete offered services.

Jose F. v. Dcs, A.C. · filed 2021-01-28(B)(3)

The superior court may find a parent’s substance abuse issue will continue based upon such evidence as the parent’s history of drug use and the parent’s failure to complete or engage in offered services. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 378–79, ¶ 26 (App. 2010). A parent’s failure to abstain from substances despite a pending severance is “evidence [the parent] has not overcome [the] dependence on drugs and alcohol.” Id. at ¶ 29.

A brief period resembling sobriety does not overcome a long treatment history marked by relapse, missed tests, diluted samples, poor insight, and inconsistent service participation.

Monice C. v. Dcs · filed 2021-05-13(B)(3)

Given Mother’s long-standing failure to maintain sobriety, lack of progress, and minimal engagement in services, we conclude reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe Mother’s chronic substance abuse would continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

A court may infer continuing substance abuse from a parent's consistent refusal to submit to testing, and the parent may rebut that inference by complying with tests and demonstrating sobriety.

Kara B. v. Dcs, A.B. · filed 2021-06-15(B)(3)

In the present dependency/severance action, the court could reasonably infer Mother had continuing substance abuse issues based on her consistent refusal to submit to drug testing during the pendency of the case, even when ordered to do so by the court. ... Mother could have rebutted that negative inference by complying with requested drug tests and demonstrating sobriety, but she was unwilling to do so.

A court may require more than one year of sobriety under § 8-533(B)(3) when the parent has a long substance-abuse history and relapsed after completing multiple treatment programs.

Jacoree D. v. Dcs · filed 2021-09-02(B)(3)

On this record, Father has not shown the court erred in concluding he needed to maintain sobriety for more than a year, particularly since he relapsed after completing multiple treatment programs.

Temporary abstinence does not outweigh a significant drug-abuse history or a largely consistent inability to abstain when deciding whether chronic substance abuse will continue.

Melinda C. v. Dcs · filed 2021-09-28(B)(3)

However, a parent’s “temporary abstinence from drugs” does not, as a matter of law, outweigh a significant history of drug abuse or her largely consistent inability to abstain from drugs during her case. See id. at ¶ 17.

A parent’s failure to remedy substance abuse while facing imminent loss of a child is evidence that the dependence has not been overcome.

Candace G. v. Dcs · filed 2021-10-19(B)(3)

A parent’s failure to remedy her substance-abuse issues when faced with the imminent loss of a child is evidence that she has not overcome her dependence on the substance. See Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 379, ¶ 29.

Three weeks of sobriety, denial of a substance problem, and lack of candor after long-term use support finding that chronic substance abuse will continue indefinitely.

Bonnie S. v. Dcs · filed 2021-11-16(B)(3)

Mother’s demonstrated sobriety began three weeks before the termination hearing, and she “has been unable to rise above [her] addiction in a non-custodial and unstructured setting.” Id. at 379, ¶ 29. Additionally, during trial, Mother denied having a substance-abuse problem, and she was not forthcoming about her drug abuse, testifying she had only used fentanyl and heroin once or twice as a teenager. Mother’s long history of substance abuse and her failure to be forthcoming throughout the dependency and termination proceedings raises concerns about her ability to overcome her drug addiction and appropriately parent her children.

A termination order's findings adequately support chronic substance abuse when they detail ongoing use, positive and missed tests, failed treatment, and the record clearly demonstrates inability to discharge parental responsibilities because of that abuse.

Martha C. v. Dcs, T.F. · filed 2022-01-11(B)(3)

The record clearly demonstrates Mother was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities because of substance abuse, and the superior court’s remaining findings sufficiently support termination on the ground of substance abuse.

Completing treatment that addresses only alcohol does not remedy chronic methamphetamine abuse when the parent conceals methamphetamine use and continues to test positive during the program.

Christina H. v. Dcs · filed 2022-01-18(B)(3)

While Mother successfully completed the program, she failed to disclose to the clinicians that she used methamphetamine and continued to test positive for the substance. The nature of Mother’s treatment focused solely on Mother’s issues with alcohol, not controlled substances like methamphetamine.

Brief and belated abstinence does not negate a long substance-abuse history when coupled with missed testing and continued denial.

Jamie R. v. Dcs, J.R. · filed 2022-07-21(B)(3)

Like the superior court, we commend Mother for her recent efforts, but her brief and belated abstinence cannot negate a long history of substance abuse when coupled with her missed drug tests and history of denial. Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 379, ¶ 29 (“[A] temporary abstinence from drugs and alcohol does not outweigh [a parent’s] significant history of abuse or [a] consistent inability to abstain.”).

A medical-marijuana card and completed treatment do not defeat chronic-substance-abuse termination when inconsistent testing prevents DCS from assessing sobriety and other drug evidence remains.

Angel L. v. Dcs, A.L. · filed 2022-09-15(B)(3)

Father’s argument ignores other evidence of his drug use, including positive hair follicle test results. It also fails to acknowledge the court’s key finding, that “Father [was] inconsistent with his testing,” and thus rendered DCS “unable to fully assess Father’s sobriety,” which Father was required to demonstrate to show his ability to “maintain a safe, stable, sober, and sanitary home for himself and his child.”

Relapse, irregular drug testing, and failure to complete multiple inpatient programs support finding that chronic substance abuse will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period, notwithstanding explanations for missed treatment and tests.

Jackson G., Elizabeth S. v. Dcs, J.G. · filed 2022-10-20(B)(3)

Throughout the dependency, Mother failed to submit to regular drug testing. Her available test results contain a positive drug test for methamphetamine, and she admitted to relapsing. She enrolled in multiple inpatient treatment programs but could not complete a program. Even if Mother stopped treatment and missed drug tests because of “emotional complications” and transportation issues, as she asserts, the facts are still enough to support the juvenile court’s finding that her substance abuse would continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

A month of treatment and negative tests does not outweigh a substantial history of methamphetamine abuse and inability to maintain sobriety throughout the dependency.

Jolene F. v. Dcs, C.C. · filed 2022-11-08(B)(3)

Though Mother entered substance abuse treatment and tested negative for substances the month before the hearing, this brief sobriety period does not outweigh her significant history of substance abuse and her inability to achieve sobriety throughout the dependency.

Cheating on drug tests and failing to complete testing or treatment may support termination under § 8-533(B)(3) despite periods of recovery maintenance.

Stella H. v. Dcs · filed 2022-12-06(B)(3)

As recently as January ... 2022, Mother submitted a urine sample that was not human urine, showing her continued battle with substance abuse. ... Clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that Mother has a history of substance abuse, the substance abuse prevents her from parenting effectively, and there is a reasonable belief that Mother’s substance abuse challenges will continue.

Temporary abstinence does not overcome § 8-533(B)(3) when years of treatment are followed by relapse, use of new illicit substances, and only partial compliance with testing.

Casey G. v. Dcs · filed 2022-12-13(B)(3)

Father participated in substance-abuse treatment for at least six years yet began abusing new illicit substances and has shown an inability to maintain his sobriety. Although Father testified he has not relapsed since completing his most recent treatment, temporary abstinence ... does not outweigh a parent’s “significant history of abuse” or the parent’s “consistent inability to abstain” from substances.

Failure to engage in substance-abuse testing or treatment may support a finding under § 8-533(B)(3) that chronic abuse will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to E v. · filed 2023-02-07(B)(3)

Father’s failure to engage in substance-abuse testing or treatment suggests his chronic substance abuse will continue. ... Given Father’s failure to engage in substance-abuse treatment or testing, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the court’s ... finding that Father is unable to discharge his parental responsibilities because of his history of chronic substance abuse.

A court must find current inability to parent under subsection (B)(3), but extensive alcohol abuse, recent relapse, missed tests, and lack of sustained sobriety can support that finding despite contradictory language elsewhere in the order.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to D.C. · filed 2023-03-28(B)(3)

To terminate on the substance abuse ground, the juvenile court must find that Father is unable to parent due to substance abuse at the time of the termination hearing. See Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 377, ¶ 15 (“parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of his chronic abuse of controlled substances or alcohol”) (citing A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3)). ... Father’s extended history of alcohol abuse, recent relapse, missed tests before and after the relapse, and lack of extended sobriety are sufficient to sustain the termination.

Written findings of prolonged drug use, denial, refusal to cooperate, and failure to address substance abuse sufficiently support inability to parent and likely continuation under subsection (B)(3).

In Re Term of Partental Rights as to O.N. · filed 2023-04-13(B)(3)

Mother’s prolonged history of substance use, her failure to address ... the problem despite using drugs in six prior pregnancies, and her disregard for services and refusal to cooperate with the DCS caseworker all support the court’s conclusion that Mother could not safely parent her child. The order satisfied due process.

Missed testing does not support likely continuing substance abuse when required testing is logistically near-impossible, DCS does not assist despite notice, and purported positive alcohol tests were actually diluted samples.

In Re Term of Parental Rights of K.L. · filed 2023-04-18(B)(3)

Additionally, in light of the questionable value of any inference based on Mother’s failure to test consistently and the fact that Mother did not test “positive for alcohol” at any point in the dependency, the Department concedes that reasonable evidence does not support the court’s findings that Mother’s substance abuse would likely continue for “a prolonged indeterminate period” and that she would not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control “in the near future.” ... Having considered the appellate briefing and relevant portions of the record, we accept DCS’s concession of error.

Continued positive testing and refusal to enter available treatment support chronic substance abuse, inability to keep a child safe, and likely continuation despite completing other services.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.K. · filed 2023-05-30(B)(3)

Mother’s history of domestic violence concurrent with her alcohol and substance use supports a reasonable inference that Mother was unable to discharge her parental responsibility to keep M.K. safe due to her chronic substance abuse. And Mother’s unwillingness and inability to demonstrate sobriety, particularly when her parental relationship with M.K. was at stake, provided reasonable grounds for the superior court to believe her substance abuse would continue.

Likely continuing substance abuse turns on consistent failure to abstain rather than the numerical balance of positive and negative tests.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to B.V. · filed 2023-06-27(B)(3)

“It is not the number of times that [a parent] has tested positive or negative for drug abuse that is key, but rather, it is the fact that [the parent] has consistently failed to abstain from drugs.” Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 379, ¶ 29.

Completion of substance-abuse classes and self-reported weeks of sobriety do not overcome a lengthy history of methamphetamine abuse when the parent avoided testing during the classes, tested positive upon discharge, and again stopped testing before trial.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to N.M. · filed 2023-08-08(B)(3)

Even accepting Mother’s self-reported weeks of sobriety preceding the termination hearing, reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s substance abuse is chronic and will likely continue for a prolonged indeterminate period. ... Mother failed to test for drugs while attending SAGE classes and tested positive for methamphetamine just after she was discharged from the SAGE program.

The mental-illness, mental-deficiency, and chronic-substance-abuse bases in subsection (B)(3) are alternatives, so a court terminating for chronic substance abuse need not also make a termination finding based on the parent's mental-health problems.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.S. · filed 2023-08-17(B)(3)

Thus, under the text of the statute, the juvenile court is only required to make a termination finding on one of the grounds described therein.

A court may draw a negative inference from a parent's refusal to drug test, and even six months of claimed abstinence does not outweigh a significant history of abuse and repeated relapse.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.D. · filed 2023-08-29(B)(3)

But Father refused to participate in testing through DCS after May 2022, and the superior court properly drew a negative inference. ... Even if Father had “gone more than six months free from illegal or improper substances,” temporary abstinence does not outweigh a parent’s “significant history of abuse” or the parent’s “consistent inability to abstain” from substances.

A lack of visitation does not excuse a parent from drug testing and substance-abuse treatment when chronic substance abuse is alleged.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to B.A. · filed 2023-09-19(B)(3)

But Father's lack of visitation with Child does not absolve him of participating in drug testing and substance-abuse treatment, as Child "should not be forced to wait for [her] parent to grow up" and her "interest in permanency must prevail over [her] parent's uncertain battle with drugs." Jennifer S., 240 Ariz. at 287, ¶ 17 (quoting Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 378, ¶ 25).

Temporary abstinence does not bar termination for chronic substance abuse when a parent's significant history, relapses, and inability to abstain support reasonable grounds that the condition will continue.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A v. · filed 2023-10-19(B)(3)

Even if we were to accept as true Father’s claim of months of sobriety, that premise would not foreclose the juvenile court’s considered finding of “reasonable grounds to believe that [Father’s chronic substance abuse] will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period,” under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). Because “[c]hronic substance abuse is long-lasting but not necessarily constant substance abuse,” we have previously upheld the termination of parental rights under § 8-533(B)(3) despite a parent’s periods of sobriety. Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287 ¶ 17 (App. 2016) (quoting Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 377 ¶ 16 (App. 2010)). In Raymond F., upon which the juvenile court relied, we explained that “temporary abstinence . . . does not outweigh [a parent’s] significant history of abuse or [a] consistent inability to abstain” throughout the case. 224 Ariz. at 379 ¶ 29. These precedents and their logic apply with equal force here.

Chronic substance abuse may be likely to continue when a parent largely avoids testing and then tests positive after termination proceedings begin, despite offered sobriety and parenting services.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to R.F. · filed 2023-12-28(B)(3)

Here, the record ... shows Mother failed to test for drugs throughout the dependency and made no good-faith effort to establish sobriety, despite DCS providing services to help her overcome her substance use and parenting deficits. After testing positive for THC at the beginning of the case, Mother failed to participate in any other substance testing until February 2023, shortly after DCS moved to terminate her parental rights. When she did test from February to April 2023, the tests were consistently positive for THC, and her April 2023 collection was positive for fentanyl and methamphetamine. Thus, reasonable evidence shows she was unable to discharge parental responsibilities due to her substance abuse, and that her abuse would continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3); see also Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 378–79, ¶¶ 24–29. And as a matter of law, we conclude one could reasonably find the evidence presented on this issue to be clear and convincing. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 479, ¶ 31. The superior court did not err in terminating Mother’s rights to the children based on the statutory ground of chronic substance abuse.

Positive methamphetamine tests, avoided testing, inconsistent treatment, and admitted allegations can establish chronic substance abuse by clear and convincing evidence even when testimony is mostly leading.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.G. · filed 2024-02-08(B)(3)

One could reasonably find those admissions and the other evidence presented during the termination hearing sufficient to satisfy A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) by clear and convincing evidence. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at ___ ¶ 31.

Negative tests immediately after release from a controlled prison setting do not outweigh an eight-year substance-abuse history and consistent inability to abstain when the parent has never completed treatment and refused available prison and DCS programs.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.V. · filed 2025-08-12(B)(3)

She refused to engage in treatment, including during her incarceration. ... The superior court did not err in terminating her parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).

Sobriety achieved in custody does not negate chronic substance abuse when the parent has repeatedly failed to remain drug-free in a noncustodial setting like the one in which parenting must occur.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.C. · filed 2025-10-01(B)(3)

But evidence of Father’s custodial sobriety does not negate the substantial evidence of his history of chronic substance abuse. And that evidence demonstrates that he was “unable to rise above his addiction in a non-custodial and unstructured setting, similar to that in which a father would be expected to raise his children.” Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 29 (App. 2010).

Repeated positive tests, hundreds of missed tests, continued use after a termination motion, and use shortly before trial support chronic substance abuse likely to continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.v, Jr. · filed 2025-10-23(B)(3)

Since this third dependency began, Mother missed hundreds of scheduled drug tests. See Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 21 (App. 2016) (demonstrating that an appellate court considers a parent’s refusal “to take most of her required drug tests” as evidence to support a finding of chronic substance abuse). Moreover, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl nearly 50 times during this dependency. Even after DCS moved to terminate her parental rights, Mother continued to test positive for methamphetamine and ... fentanyl, including a positive result two weeks before the termination adjudication hearing.

Recent treatment attempts and claimed sobriety do not outweigh repeated failed tests, uncompleted treatment, intoxicated parenting contact, and a long relapse history.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to N.R. · filed 2025-12-05(B)(3)

Mother points to her recent attempts at treatment and sobriety, but the superior court found her not credible, pointing to drug tests before the hearing and long history of substance abuse and relapse. See id. (Parent’s “temporary abstinence from drugs and alcohol does not outweigh [a] significant history of abuse or [a] consistent inability to abstain.”). We discern no error.

Recent positive testing, acknowledged regular drug use, failure to understand safety risks, and refusal of treatment support chronic substance abuse likely to continue.

In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to O.L. · filed 2026-01-06(B)(3)

Taking all inferences from this evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the court’s order, Matthew L., 223 Ariz. at 549 ¶ 7, these facts establish reasonable evidence supporting the court’s finding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Father’s chronic substance abuse will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

Six months of recent sobriety need not outweigh repeated overdoses, positive tests, failed rehabilitation, minimization, and inconsistent testing.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to E.P. and H.Z. · filed 2026-01-22(B)(3)

And while Mother’s efforts beginning two months before the start of the termination trial are laudable, her temporary abstinence did not necessarily outweigh her significant history of abuse and her consistent inability to abstain throughout the rest of the dependency period. See Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 379, ¶ 29.

A factual basis for chronic substance abuse exists when the parent has a decade-long history, loses rights to other children partly for substance abuse, fails drug testing throughout the dependency, and supplies no documentation for claimed treatment or sobriety.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.G. · filed 2026-03-10(B)(3)

Here, the record shows Mother failed to test for drugs throughout the dependency. ... Although Mother’s counsel asserted Mother had self-referred to a substance abuse program and “ha[d] many days of sobriety under her belt,” the DCS case manager testified Mother provided no documentation to support these claims. ... Thus, reasonable evidence shows Mother was unable to discharge parental responsibilities due to her substance abuse, and that her abuse would continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.

Missed court-ordered drug tests may support an inference that a parent tested selectively to avoid positive results, and continued denial despite positive tests supports likely continued substance abuse.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to O.L. and K.L. · filed 2026-04-23(B)(3)

Based on these missed tests, the juvenile court reasonably inferred that Mother underwent drug testing “when she want[ed] and not when requested” because she knew “she would test positive[.]” See Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287–88 ¶¶ 18, 21, 25 (App. 2016) (citing the mother’s history of drug use, including during dependency proceedings, and refusal to take drug tests when affirming termination based on substance abuse); see also Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379 ¶¶ 27–29 (App. 2010) (relying on the father’s history of drug use, positive tests, and a two-month period when he did not test to affirm termination based on substance abuse).

A court may infer continuing substance abuse from extensive pre-incarceration missed testing when the parent controlled participation, even if incarceration later prevented testing.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.B. · filed 2026-06-03(B)(3)

But Mother missed 85 drug tests between the start of the in-home safety plan in September 2024 and her arrest in August 2025—evidence that adequately supports the juvenile court’s findings. And the court only considered her pre-arrest failure to test, observing Mother “failed to meaningfully engage in services aimed at remedying her substance abuse” during “the ten months prior to Mother’s current incarceration.”

No bright-line duration defines chronic substance abuse; fourteen years of marijuana use and inability to abstain until the final two months of a lengthy dependency may qualify.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to D.T. · filed 2026-06-23(B)(3)

Further, there is no bright-line rule as to how long a parent must have used drugs for substance abuse to be considered “chronic.” Mother’s consistent inability to abstain from substances until the last two months of a nearly two-year dependency period supports the court’s finding that Mother had a history of chronic substance abuse. See id. at 379, ¶ 29 (father’s failure to remedy substance abuse despite pending termination is evidence he has not overcome his dependence on drugs and alcohol).

Section 8-533(B)(3) permits termination when chronic substance abuse prevents a parent from discharging parental responsibilities and there are reasonable grounds to believe the condition will continue for a prolonged indefinite period.

Steven P., Ashley P. v. Dcs, A.P. · filed 2020-10-15(B)(3)

The juvenile court may terminate parental rights based on chronic substance abuse when “the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of … a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled substances, or alcohol and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indefinite period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). ... As detailed above, sufficient evidence presented to the juvenile court supports these findings as to both Parents on the chronic substance abuse ground.

Section 8-533(B)(3) permits termination when chronic substance abuse prevents a parent from discharging parental responsibilities and there are reasonable grounds to believe the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.J. and A.B. · filed 2024-03-28(B)(3)

Based on the foregoing reasons, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s termination of Father’s parental rights due to substance abuse.

Section 8-533(B)(3) allows termination when chronic substance abuse prevents a parent from discharging parental responsibilities and is reasonably expected to continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to I.C. and L.R · filed 2025-09-30(B)(3)

Section 8-533(B)(3) allows a court to terminate a parent-child relationship if “the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of . . . a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled substances . . . and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” ... The court was in the best position to weigh the evidence, so we cannot say it erred by finding L.R.’s Father had a history of chronic substance abuse and that DCS proved that ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence.

To determine inability to discharge parental responsibilities under Section 8-533(B)(3), the court must consider how the parent's substance abuse hinders effective parenting.

Alysia M. v. Dcs, R.M. · filed 2016-11-01(B)(3)

When determining whether a parent can discharge parental responsibilities, the court must consider how the substance abuse hinders the parent’s ability to effectively parent.

Substance abuse need not be constant to qualify as chronic under Section 8-533(B)(3).

Jennifer M. v. Dcs · filed 2016-11-29(B)(3)

Alcohol abuse “need not be constant to be considered chronic.”

A finding that substance abuse prevents discharge of parental responsibilities requires consideration of how the abuse hinders the parent's ability to parent effectively.

Colene P. v. Dcs, D.T. · filed 2016-12-08(B)(3)

When determining whether a parent can discharge parental responsibilities, the court must consider how the substance abuse hinders the parent’s ability to effectively parent.

Marijuana use supports termination for chronic substance abuse only when the evidence shows it prevents the parent from adequately parenting the child.

Franswa C. v. Dcs, J.C. · filed 2016-12-22(B)(3)

The key question here, however, is whether, based on the evidence presented to the juvenile court, Father’s marijuana use prevents him from adequately parenting his son.

Temporary abstinence from drugs and alcohol does not outweigh a significant history of substance abuse under Section 8-533(B)(3).

Arianne B. v. Dcs, A.B. · filed 2016-12-29(B)(3)

Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) “temporary abstinence from drugs and alcohol does not outweigh [a parent’s] significant history of abuse.”

A temporary period of abstinence does not necessarily overcome a parent's years-long history of consistent substance abuse.

Kristi S. v. Dcs, A.T. · filed 2017-01-03(B)(3)

While Mother’s efforts to seek treatment are noteworthy, a temporary abstinence from drugs does not necessarily overcome a parent’s history of consistent abuse over a period of years.

A parent who continues using marijuana without a valid medical-marijuana card cannot invoke the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act to avoid severance for chronic substance abuse.

Darren G. v. Dcs · filed 2017-01-10(B)(3)

Here, however, if Father ever had a medical marijuana card it is undisputed that he did not have one at the time of the contested severance hearing but continued to use marijuana. Accordingly, he cannot rely on A.R.S. § 36-2813(D) to protect his parental rights from severance under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).

In deciding whether chronic substance abuse will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period, a court may consider the abuse’s length, frequency, and substances, along with prior sobriety efforts and relapses.

Guthrie S. v. Dcs, A.S. · filed 2017-01-24(B)(3)

Additionally, as the trier of fact, the juvenile court could properly consider the evidence of Father’s prior substance abuse when evaluating whether reasonable grounds exist to conclude an inability to discharge parental responsibilities would continue for a prolonged and indeterminate period. Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 283, 288, ¶ 20 (App. 2016). That evidence includes the length and frequency of Father’s substance abuse, the types of substances abused, prior efforts to maintain sobriety, and prior relapses. Id. (internal quotations omitted).

A late attempt at sobriety, including completion of a short inpatient program, need not outweigh a significant drug-abuse history and consistent inability to abstain during the case.

Lilian G. v. Dcs · filed 2017-01-26(B)(3)

Although Mother argues the juvenile court should have weighed the evidence of her completion of Community Bridges’ thirty-day, inpatient treatment program approximately one month before the termination adjudication hearing more heavily in her favor, we find no error in the weight that the court gave to Mother’s late attempt at sobriety, especially given Mother’s refusal to follow up her treatment in the TLC Center’s aftercare group home and her subsequent refusal to stay in contact with her caseworker. See, e.g., Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 29, 231 P.3d 377, 383 (App. 2010) (recognizing that a parent’s “temporary abstinence from drugs and alcohol does not outweigh [her] significant history of abuse or [her] consistent inability to abstain during [the] case”).

For chronic-substance-abuse termination, DCS need not provide every conceivable service and must provide only services with a reasonable prospect of success.

Tasha T. v. Dcs · filed 2017-05-18(B)(3)

DCS is not required to provide every conceivable service, but must provide services that have a “reasonable prospect of success.”

Repeated positive tests followed by refusal to participate in testing can support findings that substance abuse impairs parenting and will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

Vanessa P. v. Dcs, A.P. · filed 2017-06-13(B)(3)

Furthermore, Mother understood and acknowledged that she needed to provide urine samples to prove she was drug free, however, she still refused to participate in drug testing. As such, the juvenile court did not err when it found Mother was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities and that the condition will continue for an indeterminate period of time.

Temporary abstinence and last-minute treatment do not outweigh a significant substance-abuse history and a consistent inability to abstain during the dependency.

Miguel D. v. Dcs, M.D. · filed 2017-08-08(B)(3)

Moreover, “drug abuse need not be constant to be considered chronic.” Id. at 377, ¶ 16. A parent’s “temporary abstinence from drugs and alcohol does not outweigh [a] significant history of abuse or [a] consistent inability to abstain during th[e] [dependency and termination proceedings].” Id. at 379, ¶ 29.

Continued positive drug tests, failure to attend treatment, and refusal of an available residential bed can support chronic-substance-abuse termination.

Tasha T. v. Dcs, E.T. · filed 2017-08-01(B)(3)

Throughout 2016, Mother continued to test positive for drugs. Mother indicated she wanted to enter a residential treatment facility; however, when a bed was approved for her, she did not go.

Temporary abstinence does not outweigh a significant history of substance abuse, and the child's interest in permanency prevails over the parent's uncertain battle with addiction.

Matthew D. v. Dcs, L.D. · filed 2018-01-30(B)(3)

Periods of temporary abstinence from drugs are insufficient to outweigh a parent’s significant history of abuse. Id. at 379, ¶ 29. Further, a child’s interest in permanency prevails over a parent’s uncertain battle with addiction.

A relapse during termination proceedings supports a reasonable belief that chronic drug abuse will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.

Eric R. v. Dcs · filed 2018-04-03(B)(3)

Because Father relapsed during a termination proceeding, there is a reasonable belief that Father will abuse drugs for a prolonged and indeterminate period. See Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 378-79, ¶¶ 25, 29 (following a statutory timeline is required because “children should not be forced to wait for their parent to grow up” when a parent consistently fails to abstain from drugs and alcohol) (quoting In Interest of N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998)).

Abstinence while incarcerated does not outweigh a longstanding inability to overcome addiction in the noncustodial, unstructured setting where parenting would occur.

Angelina D. v. Dcs, D.B. · filed 2018-04-19(B)(3)

Here, reasonable evidence supports the superior court's finding that Mother's abstinence from drugs while in prison did not outweigh her demonstrated longstanding inability to “rise above” her addiction in an unstructured setting. We will not disturb that finding. See Jennifer S., 240 Ariz. at 286-87, ¶ 16.

A parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities when substance abuse prevents appropriate decisions, protection from harm, or provision of a safe home.

Jeuda K. v. Dcs · filed 2018-04-26(B)(3)

This Court has held, however, that a parent is incapable of discharging parental responsibilities if she cannot make appropriate decisions for a child, fails to protect the child from harm, or demonstrates an inability to provide a safe home for the child. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22; cf. JS-5894, 145 Ariz. at 408 (finding that “establishment of a personal relationship with one’s child is necessarily a parental responsibility” but that achievement alone was insufficient to defeat severance under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3)).

Five months of sobriety do not outweigh a long substance-abuse history when sobriety was maintained for only ten nonconsecutive months during a twenty-month dependency and severance proceeding.

Joseph C. v. Dcs, J.C. · filed 2018-05-08(B)(3)

Although Father maintained sobriety for five months before the final severance hearing, overall Father was only able to maintain sobriety for a nonconsecutive ten-month period during the twenty-month dependency and severance proceedings.

Section 8-533(B)(3) permits termination when chronic drug abuse prevents a parent from discharging parental responsibilities and is reasonably likely to continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.

Summyr K. v. Dcs · filed 2018-08-28(B)(3)

The court may terminate a parent’s rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) if it finds by clear and convincing evidence “the parent is unable to discharge [their] parental responsibilities because of . . . a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs [or] controlled substances . . . and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” ... For the foregoing reasons, termination pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) is supported.

Chronic substance abuse under § 8-533(B)(3) need not be constant, and temporary abstinence does not outweigh a significant history of abuse and a consistent inability to abstain.

Stephanie M. v. Dcs · filed 2018-09-13(B)(3)

Although long-lasting, chronic substance abuse “need not be constant to be considered chronic.” ... A “temporary abstinence from drugs and alcohol does not outweigh [a parent’s] significant history of abuse or h[er] consistent inability to abstain during th[e] case.”

A recent period of apparent sobriety and incomplete treatment records do not outweigh a parent’s long drug history and failure to complete services when deciding whether chronic substance abuse will continue.

Eryca L. v. Dcs, R.P. · filed 2019-02-12(B)(3)

Though the Department did not have four months’ worth of records regarding Mother’s activities and attempts at sobriety, those four months would not outweigh Mother’s history with drugs or her inability to complete services fully. See Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 379, ¶ 29. Therefore, the superior court did not err when it terminated Mother’s parental rights on the basis of chronic substance abuse.

Expert testimony is not categorically required to prove chronic substance abuse under subsection (B)(3); the elements may be established by other clear and convincing evidence.

Lessie N., James D. v. Dcs · filed 2019-02-26(B)(3)

Father provides no authority for his assertion that “expert testimony is required to show a nexus between an illness, deficiency, or chronic abuse and an inability to parent.” ... Furthermore, even absent expert testimony, the court reasonably could find DCS proved each element of the substance abuse ground by clear and convincing evidence.

A court may infer continuing chronic substance abuse from a parent's refusal to test and other circumstantial evidence, and relying on that inference without rebutting clean tests does not shift the burden of proof.

Amanda B. v. Dcs · filed 2019-03-26(B)(3)

Although Mother could have rebutted that evidence by submitting clean substance-abuse tests and cooperating with DCS’s attempts to provide reunification services, she chose not to do so. The juvenile court’s reliance on circumstantial evidence of drug use in the absence of rebutting evidence was well within the court’s authority to weigh the evidence and draw reasonable inferences from that evidence, see Jordan C., 223 Ariz. at 93, ¶ 18, and did not shift the burden of proof.

A short period of recent abstinence does not necessarily outweigh a long history of substance abuse, failed treatment, lack of insight, and expert evidence of a high relapse risk.

Joe T. v. Dcs · filed 2019-04-25(B)(3)

The superior court was in the best position to determine whether Father's relatively recent abstinence outweighed his significant history of abuse, Jennifer S., 240 Ariz. at 287, ¶ 17, and we must defer to those findings, Jordan C., 223 Ariz. at 93, ¶ 18.

Chronic substance abuse under § 8-533(B)(3) need not be constant, and a current period of sobriety may be outweighed by a history of brief sobriety followed by relapse.

Breige H. v. Dcs, A.W. · filed 2019-05-14(B)(3)

Chronic substance abuse is not necessarily constant substance abuse, and temporary abstinence must be balanced against a parent’s significant history of drug abuse and relapse. ... As the trier of fact, the superior court properly considered evidence of Mother’s prior substance abuse, prior efforts at sobriety, and prior relapses in determining whether reasonable grounds existed to believe Mother’s substance abuse would continue, notwithstanding a current period of sobriety.

Termination for chronic substance abuse under § 8-533(B)(3) requires reasonable reunification efforts or futility and proof that the abuse is not amenable to rehabilitative services.

Neil B. v. Dcs, C.B. · filed 2019-05-16(B)(3)

Additionally, DCS must show it made “reasonable efforts to reunify the family or that such efforts would have been futile,” ... and that the parent's substance abuse “be proven not to be amenable to rehabilitative services.”

Expert testimony is not required to establish chronic substance abuse under § 8-533(B)(3) because substance abuse can be tested for and readily observed.

Kristin B. v. Dcs · filed 2019-05-21(B)(3)

Expert testimony is not required to determine whether a parent’s substance abuse causes them to be unable to discharge their parental responsibilities. ... Although mother argues that under the same statute there must be expert testimony to sever based on mental illness, chronic substance abuse does not require testimony from an expert because substance abuse may be tested for and easily observed.

Continued Suboxone use may support termination under § 8-533(B)(3) when the prescribed program was temporary detoxification, the parent refused recommended detoxification or tapering, and the continued use impaired parenting.

Megan E. v. Dcs, H.E. · filed 2019-06-13(B)(3)

Mother has a significant history of using heroin and Suboxone. Nevertheless, she refused to undergo detoxification from Suboxone as TERROS recommended. Instead, she engaged in medication-assisted Suboxone treatments off and on for more than a year, even though the treatment was supposed to be temporary and was designed to allow her to taper off all medication.

Parental responsibilities under subsection (B)(3) are flexible and include making appropriate decisions, protecting the child from harm, and providing a safe home.

Wiley A. v. Dcs, K.A. · filed 2019-09-05(B)(3)

The term “parental responsibilities” in A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) refers to “those duties or obligations which a parent has with regard to his child.” Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 378, ¶ 20 (citations omitted). “The term is not intended to encompass any exclusive set of factors but rather to establish a standard which permits a trial judge flexibility in considering the unique circumstances of each termination case.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-5894, 145 Ariz. 405, 409 (App. 1985). This Court has held, however, that a parent is incapable of discharging parental responsibilities if he cannot make appropriate decisions for a child, fails to protect the child from harm, or demonstrates an inability to provide a safe home for the child. Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 378, ¶¶ 21-22; cf. JS-5894, 145 Ariz. at 408 (finding that “establishment of a personal relationship with one’s child is necessarily a parental responsibility” but that achievement alone was insufficient to defeat severance based upon chronic substance abuse).

Chronic substance abuse need not be constant, and courts may consider its duration, frequency, associated behavior, sobriety efforts, and relapses when deciding whether it will continue.

Samantha D. v. Dcs · filed 2019-09-24(B)(3)

Chronic substance abuse need not be constant, only long-lasting. Jennifer S., 240 Ariz. at 287, ¶ 17. The court may consider “the length and frequency of Mother’s substance abuse, the types of substances abused, behaviors associated with the substance abuse, prior efforts to maintain sobriety, and prior relapses.” Id. at 287, ¶ 20. A parent’s “temporary abstinence from drugs and alcohol does not outweigh [a] significant history of abuse or [the] consistent inability to abstain during [the] case.” Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 29 (App. 2010).

A court may discount favorable sobriety prognoses based on a parent’s inaccurate self-reporting and rely on the actual record to find chronic substance abuse likely to continue.

Darrell S. v. Dcs · filed 2019-10-24(B)(3)

Those opinions, however, were based on Father’s unreliable and inaccurate self-reporting. ... Ms. Jouas’ opinion was based on Father’s statement that he was compliant with his drug testing, which the record shows he was not. Also, Dr. Jones’ evaluation was based on Father’s statement that he had been drug free for ten months, and that the hallucination incident was not caused by drug use but exhaustion. The record shows both those statements are not true.

Findings of daily fentanyl use during pregnancy, a newborn's resulting hospitalization for withdrawal, and failure to complete treatment or consistently drug test sufficiently support the conclusion that substance abuse prevents the parent from discharging parental responsibilities.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.O. · filed 2024-06-13(B)(3)

The court’s multiple findings in its termination order detailed Mother’s chronic and daily fentanyl use while pregnant with J.O., including use while she was in the hospital about to deliver J.O. ... These findings support the court’s conclusion that Mother was unable to discharge parental responsibilities due to her substance abuse.

Section 8-533(B)(2) permits termination for willful abuse proved by clear and convincing evidence, including when a parent knew or reasonably should have known that someone was abusing a child.

Rosabelle P., Artem D. v. Dcs · filed 2015-07-21(B)(2)

To terminate parental rights based on willful abuse under § 8-533(B)(2), DCS was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mother and Father “willfully abused a child.” See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(C). Willful abuse includes serious physical injury or “situations in which the parent knew or reasonably should have known that a person was abusing . . . a child.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2).

For termination based on neglect under § 8-533(B)(2), an instruction using the current statutory definition of neglect must convey that the parent's inability or unwillingness to provide care causes a substantial risk of harm to the child.

Lashonda M. v. Arizona Dept. of Economic SEC. · filed 2005-03-01(B)(2)

Second, Lashonda contends the court did not properly instruct the jury on the meaning of neglect for purposes of § 8-533(B)(2). ... Incorporating the language of § 8-201(21) nearly verbatim, the juvenile court properly instructed the jury that "neglected" meant Lashonda "was unable or unwilling to provide the child with supervision, food, clothing, shelter and medical care, and that this caused a substantial risk of harm to the child's health or welfare."

Termination for neglect or willful abuse was proper after extensive rehabilitation efforts failed and preserving the relationship was no longer feasible.

Hernandez v. State ex rel. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 1975-01-15(B)(2)

Efforts were undertaken to preserve the parent-child relationship but failed, not because of any fault on the part of the juvenile court or Pima County Welfare, but because of the behavior of the mother, her husband and the other siblings toward this child. In some cases there comes a time when failure to restore the parent-child relationship has to be recognized and it is in the best interest of the child to terminate this relationship and give the child the opportunity to be nurtured in the warmth and security of a loving home.

Past abuse may support termination when current evidence shows the abuse is likely to recur and the parent remains incapable of preventing it.

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action Nos. JS-4118/JD-529 · filed 1982-12-07(B)(2)

Here, there was ample evidence that the acts were likely to recur and that the mother would be incapable of preventing them.

For the abuse ground, a statutory child does not include a fetus, so a mother's prenatal alcohol use cannot itself constitute abuse under subsection (B)(2).

In Re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action No. S-120171 · filed 1995-11-21(B)(2)

Although the statute does not define "person," we do not believe the legislature intended it to include a fetus for purposes of the severance statute. Consequently, the mother's ingestion of alcohol during pregnancy cannot be the basis for a finding of abuse under § 8-533(B)(2).

Abuse or neglect of one child can support terminating parental rights to another child even without evidence that the other child was abused or neglected.

LINDA v. v. ARIZONA DEPT. OF ECONOMIC SEC. · filed 2005-08-09(B)(2)

Accordingly, based on the statutory language and context we hold that § 8-533(B)(2) can mean that parents who abuse or neglect their children, or who permit another person to abuse or neglect their children, can have their parental rights to their other children terminated even though there is no evidence that the other children were abused or neglected.

Prior abuse of a different child may support terminating rights to a child born after the abuse if an adequate nexus connects the conduct to a risk of future abuse.

Mario G. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2011-05-17(B)(2)

For the following reasons, we hold that parental rights may be severed as to a child born after the abuse occurs, regardless of whether that child was subjected to any abuse, provided that an adequate nexus exists between the prior conduct and the risk of future abusive behavior by the parent.

The neglect ground does not require proof of reunification services.

Marta C. v. Dcs, J.O. · filed 2014-09-25(B)(2)

Nor has our case law interpreted the neglect ground to require proof of reunification services.

Termination based on abuse of another child requires a constitutional nexus between the prior abuse and the risk of future abuse to the child at issue.

Tina T. v. Department of Child Safety · filed 2014-12-11(B)(2)

When the grounds for termination of a parent’s rights to one child are based on abuse of another child, DCS must show a constitutional nexus between the prior abuse and the risk of future abuse to the child at issue.

Section 8-533(B)(2) permits termination for neglect or willful abuse, and abuse includes inflicting or allowing physical injury, impairment of bodily function, or disfigurement.

James W. v. Dcs · filed 2015-02-24(B)(2)

Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), parental rights can be terminated when “the parent has neglected or willfully abused a child.” “Abuse” is defined in title 8, in pertinent part, as “the infliction or allowing of physical injury, impairment of bodily function or disfigurement[.]” A.R.S. § 8–201(2).

Termination for abuse or neglect does not require serious physical or emotional injury or a diagnosis by a physician or psychologist.

E.R. v. Department of Child Safety · filed 2015-03-05(B)(2)

We conclude that severance based on neglect or abuse under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) does not require (1) a showing of serious physical or emotional injury or (2) the diagnosis of a medical doctor or psychologist.

Terminating rights to a child who was not abused based on abuse of another child requires a constitutional nexus between the prior abuse and the risk of future abuse.

Manuel M. v. Dcs · filed 2015-04-09(B)(2)

Under the standard set forth in Mario G., we agree with the juvenile court that a sufficient constitutional nexus is present in this case. Sexual molestation is a severe injury and the two incidents involving E.H. occurred over a one-year period when E.H. was 12 years old. The juvenile court found that Father treated E.H. as his own child and, because of the incidents involving E.H., all of Father’s biological children, now 10, 9, and 3 years old, are at an ongoing risk of abuse. The evidence of abuse to an unrelated child in this case is sufficient to support the termination of parental rights to Father’s biological children.

When termination is based on abuse of another child, DCS must establish a constitutional nexus between the prior abuse and the risk of future abuse to the child at issue.

Ronda J. v. Dcs · filed 2015-12-22(B)(2)

When a severance order is based on abuse of another child, “DCS must show a constitutional nexus between the prior abuse and the risk of future abuse to the child at issue.” Tina T. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 236 Ariz. 295, 299, ¶ 17 (App. 2014).

Willful abuse may be proved without a criminal conviction, and abuse of one child may support termination of rights to other children.

Jose N. v. Dcs · filed 2016-01-26(B)(2)

Based on the record, there was sufficient evidence for the court to conclude that Father willfully abused Daughter. And because Arizona law does not require a conviction to prove abuse, see Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action No. S-2462, 162 Ariz. 536, 539, 785 P.2d 56, 59 (App. 1989), the court did not abuse its discretion by finding there was sufficient evidence to terminate Father’s parental rights.

Willful abuse under Section 8-533(B)(2) includes sexual conduct with or exploitation of a minor and child molestation.

Glen S. v. Dcs, P.S. · filed 2016-03-17(B)(2)

Parental rights may be terminated on willful abuse grounds if the juvenile court finds “[t]hat the parent has . . . willfully abused a child.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). Abuse includes sexual conduct with or exploitation of a minor, and molestation of a child.

Abuse of one child supports termination of parental rights to other children even without evidence that the other children were abused.

Mohammad K. v. Dcs · filed 2016-07-28(B)(2)

Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), severance may be justified if “the parent has neglected or wilfully abused a child.” The statute expressly includes “situations in which the parent knew or reasonably should have known that a person was abusing or neglecting a child.” Id. “Abuse” includes causing or allowing either physical or serious emotional injury. A.R.S. §§ 8-201(2), -533(B)(2). Abuse of one child supports termination of parental rights to other children, even absent evidence that the other children were abused. Linda V. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 76, 79, ¶ 14 (App. 2005).

A child may suffer serious emotional abuse under the statute by witnessing severe physical abuse of a sibling.

Angel B., Osanna B. v. Dcs · filed 2016-08-25(B)(2)

The record shows that A.B. suffered severe emotional harm caused by the abusive environment in the parents’ home. Dr. Moe diagnosed A.B. with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which he described as “a discord that is created when an individual is exposed to significant trauma.” He opined that A.B.’s PTSD was related to his anxiety regarding the abuse R.B. suffered. Dr. Moe concluded that Father’s and Mother’s treatment of R.B. constituted emotional abuse of A.B..

Neglect based on inadequate supervision must clearly and convincingly show an inability or unwillingness that renders the parent unfit; a single isolated lapse rarely suffices.

Jade K. v. Loraine K. and A.K. · filed 2016-09-16(B)(2)

But in the context of neglect alleged in a termination petition, a parent’s inability or unwillingness to provide supervision must be such that it can fairly be shown, by clear and convincing evidence, to render him “unfit to be a parent,” M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 121.

Circumstantial evidence has the same probative value as direct evidence when proving abuse or a parent's knowledge of abuse.

Cynthia G. v. Dcs · filed 2016-10-13(B)(2)

Circumstantial evidence establishes that Mother either was the abuser or Mother knew Father was the abuser and Mother failed to protect M.G. from Father. Throughout the dependency and severance proceedings Mother continued to deny that either she or Father was responsible for M.G.’s fractures. However, both parents maintained that they were the only caregivers for the children, and that neither of the children had been left alone with another individual other than for medical procedures. As the sole caregivers of the children, Mother and Father should be able to identify the abuser; yet, Mother continues to deny that she or Father did anything to hurt M.G.

A parent abuses or neglects children by seeking drastic and unnecessary medical treatment, interfering with prescribed care, and manufacturing or exaggerating symptoms.

Melissa D. v. Dcs · filed 2016-12-27(B)(2)

The superior court found that Mother interfered with the children’s medical care, did not follow advice from medical providers, and coached the children to act in certain ways in order to receive additional medical care. The superior court concluded the children were “dramatically” healthier in the Department’s custody, and we see ample evidence in the record to support its conclusion.

A parent neglects a child under § 8-533(B)(2) by failing to protect the child from another parent’s abuse when that failure causes physical harm.

Sampson K., Victoria Y. v. Dcs, F.K. · filed 2017-02-16(B)(2)

Regarding Mother, the superior court found that she neglected F.K. by her failure to protect him from Father’s abusive conduct. By failing to remove F.K. from this environment, Mother demonstrated her unwillingness to properly supervise F.K. Mother’s inability to protect her son caused F.K. to suffer physical harm at the hands of Father. Reasonable evidence in the record supports the superior court’s finding that Mother neglected F.K.

A parent fails to protect a child from abuse by returning the child to a known abuser after observing injuries and knowing the caregiver's abusive history.

Jurnee H. v. Dcs, N.M. · filed 2017-03-28(B)(2)

Moreover, despite knowing that the child had been in David’s care, the child had noticeable bruising, and David had an abusive history, Mother nonetheless took the child to David’s house again Tuesday morning and left her in his care while Mother went to a convenience store. The DCS caseworker opined that the child remained at risk of future abuse if placed back in Mother’s care because Mother did not show remorse for or appear to understand the severity of her decisions.

A parent neglects children by failing to protect them from another caregiver's repeated inadequate supervision when the parent knew or should have known of the danger.

Donovan L. v. Dcs · filed 2017-04-13(B)(2)

Reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that Father failed to protect his children from neglect, including by leaving them in Mother’s care. Father’s statement to the court suggested that the incidents of neglect during which Mother failed to adequately supervise the children were “bad luck.” And he blamed his father-in-law for at least one of these instances. But the court could reasonably conclude that Father knew or should have known that M.L. and D.L. were being neglected, and that he was unable or unwilling to prevent future harm to his children. See A.R.S. §§ 8-201(25)(a), -533(B)(2).

A court may evaluate the totality of parental behavior when deciding whether DCS proved neglect or willful abuse rather than assess each event in isolation.

Amal A., Abdulsalam T. v. Dcs · filed 2017-08-31(B)(2)

In substance, much of the parents’ argument is that the superior court improperly weighed the evidence and that specific events, taken in isolation, do not constitute abuse or neglect. But this court does not reweigh the evidence on appeal. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282 ¶ 12 (App. 2002) (citing cases). It is for the superior court at trial, not this court on appeal, to weigh and assess conflicting evidence. Moreover, the parents cite no authority for the proposition that the superior court could not evaluate the totality of their behavior in assessing whether DCS had proven neglect or willful abuse of a child.

When severance concerning one child rests on abuse of another child, § 8-533(B)(2) requires a nexus between the prior abuse and the risk of future abuse to the child at issue.

Gabrielle F. v. Dcs · filed 2017-09-12(B)(2)

Under § 8-533(B)(2), parents who permit another person to abuse or neglect their children can have their parental rights to their other children terminated even absent evidence that the other children were abused or neglected. Tina T. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 236 Ariz. 295, 299, ¶ 17 (App. 2014). “When the grounds for termination of a parent’s rights to one child are based on abuse of another child,” there must be a “nexus between the prior abuse and the risk of future abuse to the child at issue.” Id.

Section 8-533(B)(2) includes serious physical or emotional injury and situations in which the parent knew or reasonably should have known another person was abusing or neglecting the child.

Janine E. v. Dcs · filed 2017-08-01(B)(2)

A parent’s rights may be terminated when “the parent has neglected or willfully abused a child.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). “This abuse includes serious physical or emotional injury or situations in which the parent knew or reasonably should have known that a person was abusing or neglecting a child.”

Abuse or neglect of one child may support termination as to other children if DCS establishes a constitutional nexus between the prior abuse and their risk of future abuse.

Tabitha S. v. Dcs · filed 2018-01-11(B)(2)

"[P]arents who abuse or neglect their children, or who permit another person to abuse or neglect their children, can have their parental rights to their other children terminated even though there is no evidence that the other children were abused or neglected."

Section 8-533(B)(2) includes serious physical or emotional injury and situations in which the parent knew or reasonably should have known another person was abusing or neglecting the child.

Elizabeth v. Dcs · filed 2018-01-18(B)(2)

Abuse “includes serious physical or emotional injury or situations in which the parent knew or reasonably should have known that a person was abusing or neglecting a child.”

Section 8-533(B)(2) supports termination when a parent knows or reasonably should know another parent poses a risk of harm yet fails to protect the child from that abuse.

Mongco T., Jack v. v. Dcs, J.V. · filed 2018-01-25(B)(2)

Father was aware of the allegations against Mother, and knew or reasonably should have known that Mother not only posed a risk of harm to J.V., but that Mother was in fact harming J.V.

Neglect under subsection (B)(2) is supported when a parent exposes children to hazardous living conditions and an unsafe caregiver, misleads medical personnel to protect that caregiver, and fails to accept responsibility after services.

Samantha D. v. Dcs · filed 2018-05-31(B)(2)

The juvenile court was presented with substantial evidence to find neglect. ... Mother also misled the hospital staff and law enforcement about the genesis of A.D.’s injuries in order to protect Father. In doing so, she firmly placed Father’s interests above A.D.’s well-being. Even after months of services, she never accepted responsibility for A.D.’s injuries or the severity of her decision to leave the children with an inappropriate caregiver. ... The court did not err by terminating Mother’s parental rights based on neglect.

The phrase “a child” in § 8-533(B)(2) unambiguously includes a child who has no familial relationship with the parent whose rights are being terminated.

Seth M. v. Arienne M. · filed 2018-09-06(B)(2)

It is a matter of first impression whether a court can terminate parental rights under § 8-533(B)(2) when the parent has abused a child with whom the parent has no familial relationship. ... We hold that Stepdaughter, twelve years old at the time of the offense, is “a child” within the unambiguous, plain terms of § 8-533(B)(2), which is sufficient to support termination of Father’s rights to Children.

A parent's prolonged failure to obtain specialist care, consistent therapy, and adequate nutrition for a medically fragile child can constitute neglect by creating an unreasonable risk of harm.

Angelica B. v. Dcs, J.W. · filed 2020-08-20(B)(2)

Mother’s failure to timely obtain needed medical intervention and properly feed John placed his health at an unreasonable risk of harm.

The neglect ground may rest on a parent's past inability or unwillingness to provide necessities; current willingness or ability at the termination hearing does not erase prior neglect.

Cassie F., Warren M. v. Dcs · filed 2020-09-10(B)(2)

This is consistent with A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), which states that termination is justified if a parent "has neglected" a child. The past-tense verb "neglected" shows that it is a previous unwillingness or inability to provide for a child that justifies termination, not current circumstances.

Abuse of one child may support terminating rights to an uninjured sibling when clear and convincing evidence establishes a risk of harm, particularly where both children are vulnerable infants and the parents deny the abuse.

Brianna R., Jordan M. v. Dcs · filed 2020-09-22(B)(2)

However, the superior court can terminate parental rights to children who exhibit no evidence of abuse if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is a risk of harm to those children. ... The superior court did not err in finding there existed a risk of harm to P.M. due to K.M.’s injuries, and thus the court did not err in terminating the parental relationship to P.M.

Termination based on abuse or neglect of another child requires a demonstrable connection between that ground and the harm or risk of harm to the child who is the subject of termination.

Jessica L. v. Dcs, J.L. · filed 2020-10-06(B)(2)

However, in determining that a parent is unfit to parent a child based on the abuse or neglect of another child, “[i]nherent . . . is a demonstrable connection between the ground for termination and the harm or risk of harm to a child.” ... The statute requires “the juvenile court to explicitly find[] that a parent’s neglect or abuse of any child demonstrates that the parent is similarly unfit to parent the child at issue.”

Credible testimony may establish abuse under § 8-533(B)(2) even without physical evidence, medical records, photographs, police reports, or criminal charges.

Riquelmer M. v. Dcs, S.M. · filed 2020-10-29(B)(2)

Absent physical evidence and reports, the court still needed to determine the credibility of conflicting testimony. ... We will not second-guess the court’s decision to believe testimony of abuse over Father’s denial of the same, and thus cannot say there is no reasonable evidence for the juvenile court to conclude that abuse occurred.

A parent’s inability to protect children from another caregiver’s significant mental-health and cognitive deficits may constitute neglect under § 8-533(B)(2) when it creates an unreasonable risk of harm.

Harold B. v. Dcs · filed 2020-11-19(B)(2)

Reasonable trial evidence supports the court’s finding that Father is unable to provide the children with proper supervision and housing, causing unreasonable risk of harm to their health or welfare.

The statutory definition of abuse is not limited to events within a particular period, so the court may consider the parent’s longer history when applying subsection (B)(2).

Victor K. v. Dcs · filed 2021-02-04(B)(2)

We agree the court misstated the law, which does not limit the definition of “abuse” to events in a particular period, A.R.S. § 8-201(2), but the error was not prejudicial. Father’s history with DCS would not have helped his case.

Termination based on abuse of another child requires clear and convincing evidence of abuse or neglect plus an extrapolated ongoing risk of harm to the child whose rights are at issue.

Jessica S. v. Dcs, A.R. · filed 2021-03-18(B)(2)

The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights to a child that has not yet suffered abuse or neglect if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that a parent: (1) abused or neglected another child, and (2) through an “extrapolation of unfitness,” there is a “risk of harm” to the unabused child. Sandra R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 224, 229, ¶ 24 (2020). Here, the court already found that Mother had either willfully abused another child or failed to protect that child from abuse. Given this finding, DCS only needed to prove an ongoing risk of harm to Ally stemming from the circumstances giving rise to the prior abuse. See id. The juvenile court found that DCS had proven such an ongoing risk of harm to Ally.

A parent’s inability to recognize and provide a child’s basic needs due to cognitive limitations may constitute neglect under § 8-533(B)(2) when it causes an unreasonable risk of harm.

Thomas K. v. Dcs, A.K. · filed 2021-08-12(B)(2)

This finding is supported by the testimony of the Case Manager, who said that Father had been unable to maintain safe and appropriate housing, had struggled during supervised visits to “recognize when his daughter needed support regarding her basic needs for food [and] changing,” and remains unable to drive, read, or take himself to the doctor to refill prescription medications. Thus, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that Father neglected the Child.

Terminating rights to a child not shown to have been abused requires clear and convincing evidence during the unfitness inquiry that prior abuse creates a risk of harm to that child.

Georgina L. v. Lynda R. · filed 2021-09-28(B)(2)

To terminate parental rights under § 8-533(B)(2) over “children who exhibit no evidence of neglect or abuse,” the court must find clear and convincing evidence “during the parental unfitness inquiry . . . that there is a risk of harm to those children.” Sandra R., 248 Ariz. at 228, ¶ 17.

Abuse under subsection (B)(2) is not limited to serious physical or emotional injury and can include inflicting or allowing ordinary physical injury.

Fiona T. v. Dcs, S.K. · filed 2021-11-09(B)(2)

However, “abuse” is not limited to serious physical or emotional injury, but can also include, for example, inflicting or allowing another to inflict physical injury. E.R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 56, 59, ¶¶ 12-15 (App. 2015) (citing A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2)) (the word “includes” enlarges the meaning, and evidence of serious physical or emotional injury is not required under the statute).

DCS need not prove precisely how or why a child was injured to establish abuse when circumstantial evidence shows the child was healthy before the parent’s care and life-threatening injuries followed.

Joshua W. v. Dcs, E.W. · filed 2021-11-18(B)(2)

The law, however, does not require DCS to prove precisely how or why J.W. was injured while in Father’s care. The trial evidence amply supports the finding that Father abused the child.

A court need not identify which parent physically abused a child when each parent either committed the abuse, knew of it, or reasonably should have known, and the resulting unfitness may extend to a non-abused vulnerable child at risk.

Steven H., Tatum S. v. Dcs, M.H. · filed 2021-12-02(B)(2)

The juvenile court need not definitively decide which of two parents physically abused a child when the evidence shows that “each parent either abused [the child], knew that [the child] had been abused, or reasonably should have known that the other parent abused [the child].”

Abuse under § 8-533(B)(2) is not limited to serious physical or emotional injury and need not be established by a medical doctor’s or psychologist’s diagnosis.

Nathan L. v. Dcs · filed 2022-03-22(B)(2)

However, abuse is not limited to serious physical or emotional injury and termination based on abuse does not require “a showing of serious physical or emotional injury” or “the diagnosis of a medical doctor or psychologist.”

Failure to feed a child, leaving the child alone, and resulting malnourishment and failure to thrive support neglect based on substantial risk to health and welfare.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.J. · filed 2023-04-11(B)(2)

The facts presented at trial and contained in the written findings reasonably support the juvenile court’s determination that Mother had neglected J.J., causing a substantial risk of harm to his health and wellbeing. See A.R.S. §§ 8-201(25)(a), -533(B)(2).

Subsection (B)(2) does not require abuse to be serious, but the petitioner still must prove abuse is highly probable or reasonably certain rather than merely likely.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.F. · filed 2024-02-27(B)(2)

Although the court quoted Ms. Anderson’s opinion that the “biting” incident was “an isolated incident and not ‘serious abuse,’” the court did not hold that Section 8-533(B)(2) requires a showing of “serious” abuse. Instead, the court found that, although “it is likely that Father bit [A.F.],” “other explanations are possible” and Mother “failed to prove” the allegation “by clear and convincing evidence.”

Section 8-533(B)(2) does not require proof that a parent abused or neglected every child; abuse of one child may establish a risk of abuse to other children.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.K. and M.K. · filed 2024-07-11(B)(2)

The ... juvenile court acted within its discretion in finding grounds for termination of Father’s rights to Mary and Mia based on Father’s conduct, of which he stands convicted, in victimizing other children. See Sandra R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 224, 226-27, 231, ¶¶ 8, 13, 31 (2020) (affirming termination, under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), of parents’ rights to three children based on physical abuse of one of them, reasoning that the “statute’s plain language does not require a showing that the parent neglected or abused each child in the proceeding” and that injuries to one child established a “risk of abuse” to the other two) (emphasis added); see also In re Juv. No. J-2255, 126 Ariz. 144, 146-47 (App. 1980) (finding that a parent’s “prior convictions for molesting young girls provided a rational inference of his unfitness as a parent” under A.R.S. § 8-533(4)).

Abuse of one child supports termination as to a non-abused child only when clear and convincing evidence establishes a demonstrable connection between the abuse and the risk of harm to that child.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to D.L. and A.L. · filed 2024-07-30(B)(2)

But finding parental unfitness requires “a demonstrable connection between the ground for termination and the harm or risk of harm to a child.” Id. at 229, ¶ 24. So, the “court may terminate a parent’s rights to non-abused children under [A.R.S.] § 8-533(B)(2) only if the extrapolation of unfitness—the risk of harm to such children—is proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.

Written findings expressly connecting abuse to non-abused children are encouraged but not required when the record contains clear and convincing evidence of comparable risk.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to E.R. and J.R. · filed 2025-03-04(B)(2)

But Sandra R. does not require written findings of a risk of harm. Id. at 230 ¶ 27. Although it encourages the court to make express findings, it requires only that the record contain clear and convincing evidence of a risk of harm to the non-abused child. Id.

When DCS seeks termination solely for neglect while simultaneously offering services under a court-ordered family-reunification plan, the court must consider the parent's performance in and benefit from those services as part of the clear-and-convincing parental-unfitness determination.

In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to M.P. · filed 2025-06-03(B)(2)

We simply conclude that when DCS seeks to terminate a parent’s rights based solely on neglect while also offering services as part of a court-ordered family reunification plan, the parent’s performance in and benefit from those services must be considered as part of the court’s determination of parental unfitness. We therefore vacate the court’s termination ruling and remand for the court to reconsider whether DCS established by clear and convincing evidence the statutory ground for termination.

A parent's prolonged failure to maintain housing, employment, court-required therapy, or any support for the child may establish neglect warranting termination.

In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to S.M. · filed 2025-11-14(B)(2)

The record shows that for a period of two years during which S.M. was in the Department’s custody, Mother did not maintain consistent housing, employment or attend therapy ... mandated by the reunification plan. Even though Mother was out of state during most of this period, the Department provided referrals for services to support reunification both in Arizona and out of state. Mother did not provide for S.M. at all during this period. The record supports the juvenile court’s findings.

Medical neglect does not require permanent injury; a parent's unwillingness to provide care need only create a substantial risk of harm to the child's health or welfare.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.L. · filed 2025-11-21(B)(2)

But a neglect finding does not require permanent harm to the child; all that is required is that a parent’s unwillingness to provide medical care “causes substantial risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare[.]” A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a).

Abuse under subsection (B)(2) is not limited to serious injury and can include inflicting or permitting other physical injury.

In RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.L. · filed 2025-12-10(B)(2)

Abuse is not limited to serious physical or emotional injury. See E.R., 237 Ariz. at 59 ¶ 12. It also can include inflicting or allowing another to inflict physical injury. Id. at 59 ¶ 12–15 (citing A.R.S. § 8-533.B.2).

A termination order sufficiently supports abuse of a non-abused child when it identifies abuse of a sibling, failure to protect, continued unsafe exposure, and resulting risk to the child.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to H.B. · filed 2026-05-26(B)(2)

As to the statutory ground under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), the court found that Sibling was abused and neglected while in Mother’s care, including exposure to multiple unsafe caregivers resulting in significant injuries and ultimately in Sibling’s death. It also found that Mother failed to protect Sibling and that H.B. was at risk of abuse if placed in Mother’s care.

Section 8-533(B)(2) permits termination for abuse when a parent should have recognized signs of physical abuse and failed to protect the children.

Brittany M. v. Dcs · filed 2022-09-13(B)(2)

The evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that “[b]ased on the chronic and acute nature of the injuries, [DCS] has proven that Mother failed to identify threats, and failed to protect the children from physical abuse.”

Under § 8-533(B)(2), abuse of one child may support termination as to another child who was not abused when the evidence establishes a risk of abuse to that child.

Nicholios N. v. Dcs · filed 2018-11-08(B)(2)

If a parent abuses or neglects a child, the court may terminate that parent’s rights to other children on this basis, even if there is no evidence that the other children ... were abused. ... The evidence reasonably supports a finding that due to Father’s abuse of the three older children, there is a risk of abuse to L.Y.J.

When termination as to one child rests on abuse of another, the statutory-ground stage asks only whether subsection (B)(2) proves parental unfitness; the connection to future risk for the other child is considered at best interests.

Sandra R,, Sergio C. v. Dcs · filed 2019-01-29(B)(2)

Alma S. thus makes clear that, at the statutory-grounds stage, the juvenile court should only determine whether the party seeking termination has met its burden of proving a parent unfit under one of the grounds for termination. ... Considerations outside the scope of A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2)—such as whether a connection exists between a parent’s abuse of one of their children and the risk of abuse to their other children—are left to the best-interests inquiry.

Section 8-533(B)(2) permits termination when a parent knew or reasonably should have known another person was abusing or neglecting the child.

Sharece N. v. Dcs · filed 2019-06-11(B)(2)

Section 8-533(B)(2) allows the juvenile court to terminate parental rights upon a finding of abuse or neglect by the parent. This includes “situations in which the parent knew or reasonably should have known that a person was abusing or neglecting a child.”

A parent neglects a child by knowingly exposing the child to an unreasonable risk of harm from the other parent, and DCS need not disprove collateral trauma from removing the dangerous parent.

Nathan T. v. Dcs, J.T. · filed 2019-11-14(B)(2)

The juvenile court may terminate parental rights under the neglect ground if DCS proves “[t]hat the parent has neglected . . . a child.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). Neglect is defined as “[t]he inability or unwillingness of a parent, guardian or custodian of a child to provide that child with supervision, food, clothing, shelter or medical care if that inability or unwillingness causes unreasonable risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare.” A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a). ... Despite knowing Mother was a danger to the children and that she was again abusing alcohol, Father allowed her to live in the home for several months and care for the children unsupervised. Furthermore, he actively hid Mother’s presence from DCS and instructed the children to lie so she could remain in the home. ... More than reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s neglect findings.

To terminate rights to a non-abused child under § 8-533(B)(2), the court must find a risk of harm to that child by clear and convincing evidence during the statutory-unfitness inquiry, not the best-interests inquiry.

Sandra R./sergio C. v. dcs/m.R./f.M./j.M. · filed 2020-03-11(B)(2)

Thus, to allay confusion, we disavow use of the “constitutional nexus” phraseology. Instead, we clarify the due process requirement embodied in the “constitutional nexus” concept: to terminate parental rights to children who exhibit no evidence of neglect or abuse, under § 8-533(B)(2), the juvenile court must find during the parental unfitness inquiry, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is a risk of harm to those children.

Neglect under subsection (B)(2) turns on circumstances showing a parent’s inability or unwillingness to provide necessities without unreasonably risking the child’s health or welfare.

Harmony F. v. Dcs · filed 2020-05-28(B)(2)

The parent-child relationship may be terminated if the juvenile court determines “the parent has neglected . . . a child.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). “Neglect” is defined as “[t]he inability or unwillingness” of a parent to provide their child with “supervision, food, clothing, shelter or medical care if that inability or unwillingness causes unreasonable risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare.” A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a). The juvenile court looks to the circumstances of the parent’s conduct to determine whether that conduct reflects an “inability or unwillingness” to provide such necessities to their child so as to render the parent unfit. Jade K. v. Loraine K., 240 Ariz. 414, 417-18, ¶¶ 12, 16 (App. 2016).

Terminating rights to an uninjured child based on abuse of other children requires clear and convincing evidence during the unfitness inquiry that the uninjured child faces a risk of harm.

Bradley H. v. Dcs, L.H. · filed 2020-06-09(B)(2)

The superior court may “terminate parental rights to children who exhibit no evidence of neglect or abuse, under § 8-533(B)(2), [if it finds] during the parental unfitness inquiry, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is a risk of harm to those children.” Sandra R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 224, 228, ¶ 17 (2020). Here, the superior court found by clear and convincing evidence that L.H. was at risk of harm. The allegations of sexual abuse perpetrated upon Jazmin, Jayla, and Father’s sister, together with Father’s refusal to engage in a psychosexual evaluation, and any recommended treatment, support the superior court’s finding of risk of harm to L.H.

Abuse-based termination under subsection (B)(2) does not require a diagnosis by a medical doctor or psychologist.

Jennifer B., Jonathan B. v. Dcs · filed 2020-07-28(B)(2)

However, severance based upon abuse under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) does not require diagnosis by a medical doctor or psychologist. E.R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 56, 59, ¶ 15 (App. 2015).

A parent's violent sexual and physical abuse of stepchildren supports termination as to biological children who were not sexually abused when the evidence demonstrates a comparable risk of escalated physical violence and thus a sufficient connection between the prior abuse and risk to those children.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A v. · filed 2023-08-17(B)(2)

Given these undisputed facts, there is reasonable evidence that the violent abuse of the Stepchildren placed the Children “at a high risk for escalated physical violence.” ... Applying the standard of review to the facts of record, there is “a demonstrable connection” that “inherently places” the Children at a risk of harm comparable to that of the Stepchildren sufficient to “impute[] the risk of harm” to the Children and extrapolate by clear and convincing evidence Father’s unfitness to parent them.

The felony-conviction ground always requires deprivation of civil liberties and additionally requires either a felony proving future unfitness or a sentence depriving the child of a normal home for years.

Matter of Juvenile No. J-2255 · filed 1980-04-24(4)

To satisfy A.R.S. § 8-533(4), in all cases the parent must be deprived of his civil liberties because of a felony conviction.

A felony can establish parental unfitness regardless of whether the child was born when the crime was committed, and proof of the conviction creates a rebuttable presumption of unfitness.

In re the Appeal in Pima County, Juvenile Action Nos. S-826 & J-59015 · filed 1982-02-26(B)(4)

It is not relevant that the child in question was not born at the time of the crime. The person becomes unfit under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4) because of the commission of the crime regardless of whether he is a parent at that time. The proof of the conviction creates a rebuttable presumption that the father is unfit to parent children.

Felony convictions for attempted kidnapping and sexual offenses supported parental unfitness without reaching the alternative sentence-length ground.

In re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-949 · filed 1982-10-19(B)(4)

Since we have agreed that appellant’s felony convictions were of such nature as to prove his parental unfitness, we need not determine whether his sentences were of such length that the child would be deprived of a normal home for a period of years.