Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-533

Section 8-533(B)(8)(a) permits consideration of a child's refusal of contact when deciding whether a parent substantially neglected to remedy the circumstances causing out-of-home placement.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to B.T. · filed 2024-08-06(B)(8)(a)

But the court's finding that Child refused to have contact and reunify with Father is relevant to whether he substantially neglected to remedy the circumstances that caused Child to be in out-of-home care. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a) (requiring DCS to prove that the parent has substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances that caused the child to be in an out-of-home placement).

Section 8-533(B)(8)(a) permits termination when a child has been in court-ordered out-of-home placement for at least nine months, the parent has substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances, and DCS has diligently offered appropriate reunification services.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to F.H. · filed 2024-06-06(B)(8)(a)

A court may terminate a parent’s rights when: (1) “[t]he child[ren] ha[ve] been in [] out-of-home placement[s] for a cumulative total period of nine months or longer pursuant to court order”; (2) “the parent has substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances that cause the child[ren] to be in [] out-of-home placement[s]”; and (3) DCS “made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a).

Section 8-533(B)(11) permits termination after a prior dependency when the parent is currently unable to discharge parental responsibilities; evidence of unresolved substance abuse and unstable housing can support that finding.

Willard E. v. Dcs · filed 2017-09-28(B)(11)

Father challenges the juvenile court’s finding that at the time of the severance hearing, he was not currently “capable of parenting his children” within the meaning of A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(11). ... Accordingly, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Father is currently unable to discharge his parental responsibilities.

Termination under Section 8-533 is not limited to dependent or neglected children because the statute also supplies grounds, such as abandonment or relinquishment, that do not require dependency or neglect.

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Actions Nos. J-86384 & JS-2605 · filed 1979-02-27(B)

While a finding of dependency or neglect under A.R.S. § 8-533 may result in a termination of a parent-child relationship, other grounds exist under the statute which are not embraced within the constitutional provisions so that termination cases cannot be said to be automatically included within the constitutional grant of authority. ... None of such acts have to result in the child being dependent or neglected.

Only the grounds specified in subsection (B) can justify terminating a parent-child relationship.

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JA 33794 · filed 1991-09-26(B)

Thus, the statute’s mandatory language, reinforced by prior judicial interpretation, indicates that only those grounds specified in section 8-533.B justify termination.

A parent's rights remain intact until a court determines that a statutory termination ground such as abandonment, neglect, abuse, mental illness, or unfitness exists.

Jds v. Superior Crt., Cnty. of Maricopa · filed 1994-06-22(B)

Before parental rights can be terminated, it must be determined that the child was either abandoned, neglected or wilfully abused by the parent, or that the parent suffers from mental illness, has been found to be an unfit parent, or has voluntarily relinquished his or her right to the child.

The list of persons and agencies authorized to petition for termination is nonexclusive, and a child may petition because the child has a legitimate interest in his or her own welfare.

In Re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action No. S-113432 · filed 1993-09-09(A)

Moreover, the list of persons or agencies in § 8-533 who may file a severance petition is not, by its terms, all-inclusive. A child clearly is a person with a legitimate interest in his or her own welfare.

Same cause means the factual cause of the prior termination, not the identical statutory ground.

Mary Lou C. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2004-01-27(B)(10)

We conclude that the juvenile court properly interpreted the “same cause” language in subsection (B)(10) as referring to the factual “cause” that led to the termination of Appellant’s parental rights to Mary, and not the statutory ground or grounds that supported that preceding severance.

A jury instruction need not include every correct appellate formulation if the instructions as a whole accurately communicate the statutory elements and proof standards.

Lashonda M. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2005-01-27(B)(8)(a)

Every correct statement of law from appellate decisions need not be included in an instruction so long as the instruction accurately communicates the law.

A termination petition under subsection (A) has no procedural prerequisites and may be filed while a dependency action is pending.

Kimu P. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2008-03-20(A)

While there are no procedural prerequisites to filing a termination petition under A.R.S. § 8-533, the alternative procedural mechanism by which a termination may be obtained only arises in the course of a dependency matter.

A private termination petition may be filed after a permanency hearing begins in a pending dependency, and reunification services are not required before termination for abandonment.

Bobby G. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2008-09-30(A), (B)(1)

The statute does not expressly prohibit the filing of a termination petition after a permanency planning hearing has begun in an ongoing dependency proceeding. ... Moreover, § 8-862(D)(l) incorporates the grounds for termination provided in § 8-533, and neither § 8-533 nor federal law requires that a parent be provided reunification services before the court may terminate the parent’s rights on the ground of abandonment.

A supported abandonment ground makes review of alternative grounds unnecessary.

Gavino C. v. Dcs · filed 2014-08-26(B)(1)

Because we conclude the evidence supports the juvenile court’s order granting severance on the basis of abandonment, we need not consider Father’s challenge to the other statutory basis found by the court.

A supported felony ground makes review of an abuse ground unnecessary.

Joseph F. v. Dcs, J.P. · filed 2014-10-30(B)(4)

Because we affirm the severance order based on § 8-533(B)(4), we need not, and expressly do not, address the additional ground found by the superior court under A.R.S. §§ 8-201(2) and -533(B)(2).

Only one statutory ground is required, so other grounds need not be reviewed.

Candra H. v. Dcs, C.H. · filed 2014-11-04(B)

We need not address Mother’s argument, because although multiple grounds may be alleged for severance, the juvenile court is only required to find proof of one statutory ground.

A supported fifteen-month ground makes review of an alternative mental-health ground unnecessary.

Delia G. v. Dcs · filed 2014-11-18(B)(8)(c)

Because we conclude the juvenile court properly found a statutory basis to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to A.R.S. § 8- 533(B)(8)(c) (fifteen month out-of-home placement), we need not address the court’s additional finding of a statutory basis to terminate parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) (mental health).

When clear and convincing evidence supports any one statutory termination ground, an appellate court need not address challenges to other grounds.

Jane B. v. Dcs, J.R. · filed 2014-12-11

“If clear and convincing evidence supports any one of the statutory grounds on which the juvenile court ordered severance, we need not address claims pertaining to the other grounds.”

A supported neglect ground makes review of alternative grounds unnecessary.

Veronica R. v. Dcs · filed 2014-12-23(B)(2)

Because we conclude the juvenile court properly found a statutory basis to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) (neglect), we need not address the court’s additional findings of statutory bases to terminate parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) (willful abuse) and A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) (fifteen months out-of-home placement).

Even when a parent fails to appear and is deemed to admit the alleged termination grounds, the court must still determine from the record and evidence whether the legal grounds are established.

Jessica E. v. Dcs · filed 2015-07-07(B)

Although Mother waived her rights by failing to appear without good cause shown and was deemed to have admitted the grounds alleged in the motion for termination, the juvenile court was still required to assess the record and evidence presented to determine whether the legal grounds for termination were established.

Ongoing substance abuse, unsafe housing, unemployment, and reliance on an unsuitable support person can establish that a parent is currently unable to discharge parental responsibilities after a prior removal.

Vanetta H. v. Dcs · filed 2015-10-22(B)(11)(d)

Furthermore, because Mother was unemployed, she had to rely on the grandmother’s social security income to support not only her basic needs, but the children’s as well. The DCS caseworker testified that Mother has not demonstrated behavioral changes to show she can safely parent the children. On this record, the evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Mother was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities under A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(11)(d).

The prior-termination ground applies when the same causes that led to an earlier termination within two years continue to prevent the parent from providing safe and dependable care.

Robert P. v. Dcs · filed 2015-11-17(B)(10)

The evidence supports the court’s findings and decision terminating Father’s rights to M. and R. He refused to end his dysfunctional relationship with Mother despite the violence and instability it generated. He failed to demonstrate that he could safely and dependably parent M. and R., and he failed to take advantage of the services offered to attempt to alleviate his chronic employment and housing instability that resulted in the termination of his rights to H. Consequently, we find no error.

After finding a statutory termination ground, the juvenile court is not required to consider a permanent guardianship or other alternatives to severance.

Suzanne S. v. Dcs, F.S. · filed 2016-03-29(B)

Mother does not cite any authority to support her contention that, after finding a statutory ground for severance, the juvenile court must consider alternatives to severance, and we are aware of none.

The prior-removal ground applies to the parent to whose legal custody the child was returned and from whose legal custody the child was again removed, not a different parent with only supervised parenting time.

Adrian E. v. Department of Child Safety · filed 2016-04-05(B)(11)

We agree with appellants that, based on its language and structure, § 8-533(B)(11) does not apply to Adrian.

For § 8-533(B)(10), the two-year period runs from the first child’s termination to the filing of the petition concerning the second child, while current inability is determined at the second termination hearing.

Tanya K. v. Department of Child Safety · filed 2016-06-14(B)(10)

Thus, under the plain language of the statute, the clock stops when the interested party files the petition to terminate parental rights to the second child. ... Although the end date for “within the preceding two years” is the filing date of a petition to terminate, the juvenile court must still determine whether, at the time of the termination hearing, the parent is then “currently unable to discharge parental responsibilities due to the same cause.”

Private and state-initiated proceedings use the same best-interest standard: the petitioner must prove either a benefit from severance or detriment from continuing the relationship, without focusing solely on changes to daily living arrangements.

E.O. v. Michael M., Katie A. · filed 2016-08-16(B)

Regardless of the identity of the petitioner, and depending on the circumstances, adoption can provide a benefit supporting a best-interests finding. Id. at 4–5, ¶¶ 16–17, 365 P.3d at 356–57. Further, in most cases, the existence of a proven statutory ground for severance will likely have had a negative effect on the child. Id. at 4, ¶ 15, 365 P.3d at 356. The supreme court, however, indicated the juvenile court should not automatically conclude severance will be in the child’s best interests just because the child is adoptable or assume the child will benefit from severance simply because abandonment was found. Id. at ¶ 14. The standard for finding best interests remains the same: whether the petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that severance is in the child’s best interests by demonstrating either the existence of a benefit from severance or a detriment to the child from a continued parental relationship. Id. at 4–5, ¶ 16, 365 P.3d at 356–57; Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 288, ¶ 41, 110 P.3d at 1022.

Findings that termination frees children for adoption and provides security and stability are sufficient to support the statutory best-interest determination.

Marianne N. v. Department of Child Safety · filed 2016-10-04(B)

Within that document, the court found “[t]ermination of parental rights would free the children for adoption with a family who would be able to provide them with security and stability in their lives . . . [and] further the plan of adoption.” These findings are sufficient to support the best interests determination. See Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 19 (holding evidence “that the child is adoptable . . . [and] in appropriate foster care/adoption placement” is sufficient to support a best interests finding in a termination order); Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352 (App. 1994) (finding a child benefits from severance if it would free the child for an adoption or if the child “would benefit psychologically from the stability an adoption would provide”).

The prior-dependency ground cannot support severance of parental rights to a child who was not the subject of the prior dependency.

Jhamika B. v. Dcs · filed 2017-01-17(B)(11)

Although the order terminating Mother’s rights to E.B. could be read to rely on the prior dependency ground alleged for the other children, E.B. was not the subject of a prior dependency, making that ground inapplicable. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(11). Accordingly, the order is modified to clarify that severance of Mother’s rights to E.B. is based solely on 15-months time-in-care. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

A child's adoptability, need for stability, and improvement in a therapeutic placement can support the statutory best-interest finding without an identified adoptive placement.

Emily S. v. Dcs, G.J. · filed 2017-03-23(B)

And the court properly credited expert testimony that G.J.’s behaviors had improved since being taken into care and that his continuing need for various therapies is based on trauma experienced in Mother’s care. On this record, Mother has not shown that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that severance was in the G.J.’s best interests. See Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 50 ¶ 21.

Abandonment does not require an additional finding that the parent cannot parent or meet special needs, and credible adoptability evidence can satisfy best interests.

James P. v. Dcs, J.M. · filed 2017-04-04(B)(1), (B)

The statute does not require such a finding to justify termination. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). Similarly, Father’s argument that the court failed to consider the factors in Lawrence R. fails. Lawrence R. does not provide mandatory factors for consideration. Instead, it clarifies that although “a determination that the child is adoptable alone does not require the fact finder to conclude that severance is in the child’s best interests,” DCS “may satisfy the best interest requirement if it presents credible evidence that the child is adoptable.” Lawrence R., 217 Ariz. at 587, ¶ 8 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

Best interests may be established without identifying a specific adoptive placement when severance frees the child from neglect risk posed by an unfit parent.

Joel M. v. Dcs · filed 2017-05-04(B)

This benefit exists regardless of whether a specific adoptive placement has been identified because it frees the child from the risk of neglect from an unfit parent.

When a court bases best interests on multiple factors including an unsupported adoptive-placement finding, remand is required unless the record clearly shows the same result without that error.

Ellesse J. v. Dcs · filed 2017-12-14(B)

Here, we apply the same rule for the same reason, because we cannot discern from the record whether the superior court would have reached the same conclusion about the children's best interests, absent its erroneous finding about Grandfather as a permanent placement.

The same-cause requirement in Section 8-533(B)(10) refers to the factual cause of the prior termination, not the statutory ground supporting it.

Mychel E. v. Dcs, A.S. · filed 2018-01-16(B)(10)

The “same cause” language in subsection (B)(10) “refer[s] to the factual ‘cause’ that led to the termination . . . and not the statutory ground or grounds that supported the preceding [termination].”

The 'same cause' requirement in subsection (B)(10) refers to the factual cause of the prior termination, not the statutory ground supporting that termination.

Johnny D., Theresa H. v. Dcs, D.D. · filed 2018-06-21(B)(10)

“Same cause,” as interpreted under the statute refers not to the same statutory ground that supported the prior termination, but “refer[s] to the factual ‘cause’ that led to the [previous] termination of Appellant’s parental rights.” ... On this record, reasonable evidence supports termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(10).

Section 8-533(B)’s statutory-ground and best-interests inquiries must be resolved in a single hearing after all evidence, including required ICWA evidence, has been presented.

James S. v. Dcs · filed 2019-02-14(B)

Our Supreme Court explained in Kent K., that our juvenile court procedures are different than other states’ procedures because “Arizona does not explicitly bifurcate its termination proceedings.” Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 32. Instead, Arizona “considers the separate inquiries required under section 8-533.B in a single hearing.” Id. Following Kent K., if we are to afford parents of both native and non-native children the same procedural due process under the law, the fact-finding stage in a termination adjudication hearing must be conducted after the presentation of all the evidence—including ICWA.

A termination petition need allege evidence supporting only one statutory ground, not every possible ground, and a prior unsuccessful termination proceeding does not necessarily preclude a later petition based on changed circumstances or different evidence.

Lawrence T. v. Dcs, M.T. · filed 2019-02-28(A), (B)

The statute’s language unambiguously provides that a request to terminate parental rights need only allege evidence supporting at least one of the statutory grounds, and we will not expand that requirement.

A permanent guardian with a legitimate interest in a child’s welfare may petition for termination without first revoking the guardianship.

Michael M. v. Anita P., M.M. · filed 2019-09-24(A)

But under A.R.S. § 8-533(A), “[a]ny person or agency that has a legitimate interest in the welfare of a child, including, but not limited to, a relative . . . may file a petition for the termination of the parent-child relationship.” (emphasis added). The statute does not exclude permanent guardians. Appellee is both the maternal grandmother and the permanent guardian of M.M. Appellee has played the role of caregiver for almost the entirety of M.M.’s life, even while Mother was alive. As such, Appellee has a legitimate interest in the welfare of the child, and nothing precluded her from filing a severance petition.

Prior termination for chronic substance abuse does not establish the prior-termination ground without evidence that substance abuse currently prevents the parent from discharging parental responsibilities at the later termination hearing.

Shaquita H. v. Dcs, A.B. · filed 2019-12-17(B)(10)

Although Mother has a long history of substance abuse, that history does not prove Mother was currently unable to discharge her parental responsibilities without any evidence of current, continuing substance abuse. DCS provided insufficient evidence to support termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(10).

A parent’s appreciable good-faith efforts may defeat the nine-month substantial-neglect element, but neglect and substance-abuse grounds do not require an appreciable-efforts finding.

Emily B., Andrew D. v. Dcs · filed 2020-06-02(B)(2), (B)(3)

Here, however, the juvenile court did not terminate Mother’s rights pursuant to the nine-months’ time in care ground, but instead found two other grounds for termination, neglect and substance abuse. These grounds do not require the court to consider a parent’s “appreciable efforts.” See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), (3). Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err by failing to make such findings.

Subsections (B)(3) and (B)(8) satisfy due process because each requires an individualized finding of parental unfitness at the time of termination.

Jessica P. v. Dcs, H.P. · filed 2020-07-28(B)(3), (B)(8)

The Arizona Supreme Court has held that Arizona’s severance statute satisfies due process because the statutory grounds are “synonymous with parental unfitness.” Alma S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶ 9 (2018) (“If a statutory ground were not synonymous with unfitness, a contested severance based on such a ground would be constitutionally infirm.”); see also JS-7359, 159 Ariz. at 236 (prior version of Arizona’s severance statute satisfied strict scrutiny because it incorporated a concept of parental unfitness). ... Both A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B)(3) and (B)(8) require a finding of parental unfitness at the time of termination.

Due process prohibits adding the fifteen-month time-in-care ground after all evidence and argument have concluded because the parent lacks advance notice and an opportunity to defend against it.

Yvette L. v. Dcs · filed 2020-08-11(B)(8)(c)

Because the juvenile court violated Mother’s due process rights by granting the amendment at the conclusion of trial, we vacate the court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights based upon fifteen months in an out-of-home placement.

Due process prohibits adding the fifteen-month time-in-care ground after all evidence and argument have concluded because the parent lacks advance notice and an opportunity to defend against it.

Yvette L. v. Dcs · filed 2020-08-25(B)(8)(c)

Because the juvenile court violated Mother’s due process rights by granting the amendment at the conclusion of trial, we vacate the court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights based upon fifteen months in an out-of-home placement.

Even when a parent fails to appear and thereby admits a termination petition’s allegations, § 8-533(B) still requires clear and convincing evidence supporting the alleged statutory grounds.

Aprilleann H. v. Dcs · filed 2020-10-15(B)

Thus, underlying our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is the presumption that by failing to appear, Mother admitted the allegations of the motion for termination. ... Nonetheless, DCS was still required to present clear and convincing evidence supporting the alleged grounds.

Section 8-533(A) authorizes any person with a legitimate interest in a child’s welfare, including a parent, to petition for termination.

Cindy M. v. Claudio H., C.H. · filed 2020-10-29(A)

But Father was statutorily authorized to seek termination pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(A) (“Any person or agency that has a legitimate interest in the welfare of a child, including, but not limited to, a relative . . . may file a petition for the termination of the parent-child relationship . . . .”). The superior court did not err in entertaining the petition to terminate Mother’s parental relationship or in finding Mother abandoned C.H.

Before terminating under § 8-533(B)(8), the juvenile court must identify the circumstances the parent failed to remedy so an appellate court can assess both inability to remedy and the appropriateness of reunification services.

Kristina J. v. Dcs, K.H. · filed 2020-12-08(B)(8)(a), (B)(8)(c)

On the merits, the juvenile court did not identify the “circumstances” that Mother failed to remedy. Without that information, this court cannot assess whether DCS offered appropriate reunification circumstances. ... Beyond that, “[a] denied ICPC alone does not preclude a parent from gaining custody of the child.” ... The juvenile court must still “determine if the parent is unfit based on the evidence.”

A termination order under § 8-533(B)(8)(c) need not list every relied-upon fact, but it must state the essential and determinative facts and at least one factual finding supporting each legal conclusion.

Leslie C. v. Dcs, J.B. · filed 2021-09-23(B)(8)(c)

The court “is not required to list each and every fact relied upon in making its findings,” but must include “the essential and determinative facts on which the conclusion was reached.” ... The court also found that the evidence supported that “[t]here is a substantial likelihood that Mother will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.” These findings are sufficiently specific, and we conclude that reasonable evidence supports them.

Written findings support the nine-month ground when they identify missed and positive drug tests, unsuccessful treatment and parent-aide closures, and cessation of visitation as the facts establishing substantial neglect.

Grace P. v. Dcs, V.X. · filed 2022-02-24(B)(8)(a)

Mother did not complete her substance-abuse treatment and “was closed out of TERROS for lack of participation.” She left her inpatient substance-abuse program against medical advice and without completing the program. She closed out of a second treatment program for lack of engagement.

A juvenile court may draw a negative inference under § 8-533(B)(8)(c) when a parent declines to testify about present ability to safely parent.

John K. v. Dcs, C.Z. · filed 2022-03-29(B)(8)(c)

It would not be reasonable to “permit a parent to forego, without consequence, testifying” as to the parent’s ability to parent. ... Therefore, “[a superior] court’s drawing a negative inference when a parent fails to testify at a severance hearing is particularly appropriate.”

The permanent-guardianship consideration required by subsection (B)(4)’s normal-home language does not automatically extend to substance-abuse and fifteen-month grounds, which contain no such language.

Adam C., Kalynn R. v. Dcs · filed 2022-09-15(B)(3), (B)(8)(c)

But here the superior court terminated father’s parental rights under the substance-abuse and fifteen-month out-of-home placement grounds. Unlike the length-of-incarceration ground in Timothy B., the normal-home language does not appear in the substance-abuse and out-of-home placement grounds. Compare A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(c) and § 8-533.B.3 with § 8-533.B.4; see also Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 320, 323, ¶ 11 (App. 2017) (this court first looks “to the statute’s plain language as the best indicator of [legislative] intent[,]” and if the language is clear and unambiguous, this court “must give effect to that language without employing other rules of statutory construction”); Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 17, ¶ 25 (App. 2019) (discussing the elements required to establish the out-of-home placement ground).

A court need not make findings about a permanent-guardianship plan before termination when no guardianship petition or record evidence identifies a willing potential guardian.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to B.B. · filed 2023-04-20(B)

Without a guardianship petition or some indicia in the record raising the issue, the superior court need not make findings about a permanent-guardian case plan. See generally Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353(h).

DCS may add a termination ground learned during dependency so long as the parent receives adequate notice and an opportunity to defend against it.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.M. · filed 2023-05-04(B)(3)

Father’s suggestion that DCS cannot allege grounds for termination other than those alleged in the initial petition finds support in neither logic nor the law. During the course of a dependency case, DCS may (and often does) learn of additional grounds for termination that were not apparent, and may not have even existed, at the outset of the dependency case. ... When a new ground for termination is alleged during the pendency of a dependency case, fundamental fairness will be found as long as the parent is given “adequate notice” of, and “an ... opportunity to defend against,” the new allegations. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 355.

A permanent guardian may be an appropriate alternative, but guardianship is not a prerequisite to termination when no ready, willing, and able potential guardian is identified.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.C. and A.B. · filed 2023-05-30(B)

When applicable, a permanent guardian may be an appropriate (and preferred) alternative to termination of parental rights; a permanent guardian is not, however, a prerequisite to termination, particularly where no ready, willing and able potential guardian has been identified. See Timothy B., 252 Ariz. at 477 ¶ 28; A.R.S. § 8-533.

Parental consent is a statutory termination ground, and termination after proof of a statutory ground, including consent, satisfies constitutional parental-unfitness requirements when fundamentally fair procedures are provided.

Robertson v. Bacolas · filed 2023-11-21(B)(7)

Further, for a parent’s rights to be terminated, he or she must be provided with “fundamentally fair procedures that satisfy due process requirements.” Jessie D. v. Dep’t Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 579 ¶ 8 (2021) (quotations omitted). Arizona’s termination statute satisfies due process because the statutory grounds for termination are “synonymous with parental unfitness” and if at least one of the grounds set out in the statute is found, including consent, parental termination is justified and constitutional. Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 579 ¶ 8. Thus, Robertson did not validly plead that the Bacolas violated his parental or due process rights, or any other federal right.

A court errs by finding chronic substance abuse as a termination ground against a parent when DCS did not allege that ground against that parent.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to F.S. · filed 2023-12-12(B)(3)

Father argues the superior court erred because it found DCS proved the substance abuse ground when DCS did not allege that ground against Father. DCS concedes that the court erred. We accept DCS’s concession.

An untimely addition of the fifteen-month ground is harmless when termination is properly supported by a chronic-substance-abuse ground of which the parent had adequate notice and an opportunity to defend.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.M. · filed 2023-12-28(B)(3), (B)(8)(c)

Father also had sufficient notice of this ground. DCS alleged this ground in its initial petition, months before the termination hearing and his counsel confirmed that she reviewed the allegations with Father through an interpreter. Moreover, Father’s testimony made clear he understood that his continued substance abuse led to the dependency and termination proceedings. The superior court thus properly terminated Father’s parental rights under the chronic substance abuse ground and any error allowing DCS to proceed on the fifteen months’ time-in-care ground was harmless. See JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 355–56 (finding any error in an untimely amendment harmless when the court properly terminated the parent’s rights on other grounds).

An order need not separately label the effect of drug use on parenting when findings of daily use, admitted sobriety barriers, and failure to alleviate placement concerns support that conclusion.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.S. · filed 2024-04-02(B)(3)

Mother’s admission of daily illicit drug-use and it being a barrier to her parenting supports the court’s conclusion that her drug-use affects her ability to parent A.S. And nothing in A.R.S. § 8-533 or Rule 353 requires the court to specifically make a finding regarding the effect of a parent’s drug use on parental ability.

Failure to register as a putative father cannot support termination once the mother identifies the man as a potential father entitled to notice and an opportunity to establish paternity.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.N. · filed 2024-04-30(B)(6)

Reading these statutes together, once Mother identified Father as a “potential father” the question of whether he filed a notice of claim of paternity became moot and A.R.S. § 8-106.01(E) and A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(6) were no longer applicable.

A parent's failure to appear after adequate warnings is itself a waiver without a separate voluntariness inquiry, and the court may accelerate the termination adjudication if DCS still proves the statutory grounds and best interests by the required evidence.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.G. · filed 2024-05-21(B)

A parent’s failure to appear at a dependency hearing is a de facto finding of waiver; the court need not engage in a voluntariness inquiry. ... DCS is still required to prove its case for termination by presenting sufficient evidence. ... Once the statutory grounds and best interests of the child are adequately proven by the proper evidentiary standards, the court may both accelerate the termination adjudication and terminate the absent parent’s rights.

Claim preclusion does not bar a second termination petition based on abandonment when the prior petition alleged substance abuse and mental illness and the later proceeding depends on new evidence of prolonged non-support and lack of contact.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to N.C. and E.C. · filed 2024-06-27(B)(1)

However, the application of claim preclusion is limited in proceedings to terminate parental rights because constraining our courts for the sake of judicial economy must not imperil a child’s best interests. ... Here, the court relied substantially on evidence not presented in the prior proceeding to determine abandonment. ... Thus, the claims here are not identical to Father’s previous petition and claim preclusion does not apply.

A man who claims paternity but neither has established it nor is identified by the mother’s affidavit is a putative father subject to subsection (B)(6)’s thirty-day registry deadline.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.D. · filed 2025-04-10(B)(6)

The juvenile court correctly considered Clayton a putative father because he claimed to be Claire’s father and his paternity had not been established. See In re M.N., 563 P.3d at 140, ¶ 22. He was thus required to timely file a notice with the putative fathers registry to establish paternity. See A.R.S. § 8-106.01(B). Because he failed to do so within the 30-day “bright-line deadline,” Frank R., 243 Ariz. at 116, ¶ 24, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(6).

Section 8-533(B) requires a sequential two-step analysis: the court must first decide whether a statutory ground exists and only then decide whether termination is in the child's best interests, even when denying termination.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to E.C. · filed 2025-10-03(B)

Under A.R.S. § 8-533.B, the superior court must conduct a two-step analysis when determining whether to terminate a parent’s rights: (1) does a statutory ground for termination exist and (2) is termination in the child’s best interests. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 149 ¶ 8 (reaffirming Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 15 (2016)); see also Sandra R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 224, 227 ¶ 12 (2020). The two-step distinction between (1) the statutory ground and (2) the child’s best interests comes from section 8-533.B. Subsection B says: “in considering any of the following grounds, the court shall also consider the best interests of the child.”

The absence of a genetic relationship is not among § 8-533(B)'s termination grounds and cannot be used by DCS as a shortcut around the statutory termination process.

In Re Dependency as to H.H. · filed 2025-10-10(B)

That raised the specter that § 25-814(C) was being used as a shortcut to severance—a means to wholly circumvent the process required to terminate parental rights under § 8-533(B). Lack of a genetic link is not, after all, a ground for termination of parental rights. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1)–(12).

A termination order must state the ultimate facts necessary to resolve a disputed statutory element but need not include every subsidiary evidentiary fact.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.A. · filed 2025-10-27(B)(3)

But this does not mean the court must include “every fact upon which [the court’s] findings are based.” Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 452 ¶ 19 (App. 2007) (citation omitted). Rather, the court must “make findings of only ultimate facts and is not required to bolster them by subsidiary findings on evidentiary matters upon which such ultimate facts are based.” Id. (quoting Gilliland v. Rodriquez, 77 Ariz. 163, 167 (1954)). Ultimate facts are “those necessary to resolve the disputed issues.” Elliott v. Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128, 132 (App. 1990) (citation omitted).

Timothy B.’s guardianship requirement for the incarceration ground does not require sua sponte guardianship consideration under the fifteen-month ground.

In RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E v. · filed 2026-02-04(B)(8)(c)

Timothy B. does not require a court to sua sponte consider guardianship when determining a termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) and Mother points to no other support for this contention.

A potential father who misses the thirty-day paternity-action deadline after notice cannot invoke the putative-father impossibility exception and may be excluded from the termination hearing.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.C. · filed 2026-02-18(B)(5)

The court properly precluded Father from participating in the termination proceedings despite his alleged difficulties in meeting the 30-day deadline.

A parent seeking to set aside an accelerated termination must show both good cause for nonappearance and a meritorious defense; voluntarily entering inpatient treatment despite notice of the hearing and its consequences does not establish good cause.

In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to A.S. · filed 2026-02-27(B)

“[A] parent seeking to set aside a severance judgment entered after failing to appear at a final severance hearing . . . must show good cause for the nonappearance and a meritorious defense.” ... The court acted within its discretion in finding Mother’s absence was without good cause. ... Finally, Mother has not made any meaningful argument, either in the juvenile court or on appeal, that she has a meritorious defense to the court’s termination finding.

Section 8-533(B) permits termination when evidence sufficiently supports any one of its statutory grounds.

Crystal E. v. Department of Child Safety · filed 2017-03-07(B)

As DCS correctly asserts, only one statutory ground for severance is required. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B) (requiring “[ejvidence sufficient to justify the termination of the parent-child relationship” of “any one of the” statutory grounds enumerated).

Section 8-533(B)(3) permits termination for chronic substance abuse meeting its stated conditions, while subsection (B)(5) requires timely paternity proceedings after compliant notice.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to I.N. and N.N. · filed 2025-04-15(B)(3), (B)(5)

First, to establish termination under the prolonged and chronic substance abuse grounds, the court must determine, by clear and convincing evidence, “[t]hat the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibility because of . . . a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled substances or alcohol and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) (emphasis added). ... Second, to establish termination on grounds of failure to timely file a paternity action, the court must find that “the potential father failed to file a paternity action within thirty days of completion of service of notice as prescribed in § 8-106, subsection G.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(5). ... Because DCS concedes that Father was not served a compliant notice as required by the statute, we vacate the termination order regarding N.N. and remand the case to the court for further proceedings as to N.N.

A parent-child relationship cannot be terminated merely because termination would be in the child's best interests; a specified statutory ground must exist.

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action Nos. A-23498 & JS-2201 · filed 1978-07-11

Nowhere does the statute authorize the parent-child relationship to be terminated merely because such a termination may be “in the best interests” of the child.

Best interest does not require the state to rule out biological-relative placements or compare which placement is better.

Audra v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 1998-04-23(B)

To establish that severance is in the best interests of the child, the state is not required to rule out possible placements with biological relatives before considering other placements. Nor does the juvenile court weigh alternative placement possibilities to determine which might be better.

Best interest requires proof that children would affirmatively benefit from termination or suffer detriment from continuation.

Arizona Department of Economic Security v. Oscar O. · filed 2004-11-30(B)

To establish that terminating Oscar’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests, ADES was required to show that the girls would derive an affirmative benefit from termination or incur a detriment by continuing in the relationship.

The best-interest determination is separate from and preliminary to the post-severance choice among placements.

Antonio M. v. Ades and Daniel M. · filed 2009-07-29(B)

Thus, the court’s duty to “also consider the best interests of the child” when it considers grounds for termination, see § 8-533(B), is separate from and preliminary to its determination of placement after severance.

The best-interest inquiry focuses primarily on the child's interests as distinct from the parent's interests.

Kimberly P. v. Ades, T.P. · filed 2014-04-24(B)

As Mother acknowledges, however, “the best interests inquiry focuses primarily upon the interests of the child, as distinct from those of the parent.”

Best interest requires proof of how the child would benefit from severance or be harmed by continuation of the relationship.

Shaylene E. v. Ades, B.E. · filed 2014-04-24(B)

The court must make “a finding as to how the [child] would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship.”

A child's best interests are paramount in severance proceedings and inform whether the child should be called as a witness.

Department of Child Safety v. Beene · filed 2014-07-24(B)

In dependency and severance proceedings, “the child’s best interests are paramount.”

Best interest is supported when adoptable children are in a willing placement and need permanence and stability.

Johnny L. v. Dcs · filed 2015-01-15(B)

Based on the evidence presented at the termination hearing, the juvenile court’s best interests finding is supported by the record.

Best interest turns on whether the child benefits from severance or is harmed by continuation.

Alicia M. v. Dcs · filed 2015-01-22(B)

To determine whether severance is in the best interests of the child, the juvenile court must consider whether “the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship.”

The best-interests showing requires proof that the children would receive an affirmative benefit from termination or suffer a detriment from continuing the relationship.

Catherine B. v. Dcs · filed 2015-09-01(B)

To show that termination is in the best interest of the children, DCS needed to prove that the children “would derive an affirmative benefit from termination or incur a detriment by continuing in the relationship.”

Severance may serve a child's best interests even without a current adoption plan or present adoptability because adoption is only one factor in balancing severance's benefits against continued harm.

Johanna K. v. Dcs, R.H. · filed 2015-12-22(B)

even if an adoption plan is not currently in place for a child or the child is not adoptable, severing parental rights of the child’s parent can still serve the best interest of the child because the availability of adoption is only one of the factors to consider in the process of weighing the benefits of severance against the detriments from continuation of the parent-child relationship. Pima Cty. Juv. Action No. S-2460, 162 Ariz. 156, 157–58, 781 P.2d 634, 635–36 (App. 1989).

Private and state-initiated severance proceedings use the same best-interest standard, and there is no legal basis to weigh adoption benefits differently based on who petitions.

Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F./d.L. · filed 2016-01-12(A), (B)

But we find no principled reason for creating an additional hurdle in private severance actions, particularly when the governing statute does not support that distinction or require the unspecified something “more” that Jose M. apparently calls for. 234 Ariz. at 18 ¶ 23, 316 P.3d at 607; see A.R.S. § 8-533(A), (B) (permitting “[a]ny person or agency that has a legitimate interest in the welfare of a child” to petition for severance and requiring the court to “consider the best interests of the child,” without distinguishing between state-initiated and private termination proceedings). There is no legal basis for placing more or less weight on the benefits from adoption depending on the identity of the petitioning party. Rather, juvenile courts must assess the relevant facts in determining on a case-by-case basis whether a preponderance of the evidence supports a best-interests finding.

A child's adoptability is enough to support best interests even without an identified adoptive placement, especially when the current placement meets the child's needs.

Roberto A. v. Dcs · filed 2016-01-26(B)

“Adoptable” status is enough of an objective benefit to legally support the “best interest” prong of the severance statute. See Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 352, 884 P.2d at 238 (stating the government did not need to show an adoption plan existed, but did need to show the child is adoptable).

The comparative suitability of potential placements does not determine whether termination itself is in the child's best interests.

Erik T. v. Dcs, S.T. · filed 2016-01-28(B)

Once severance has occurred, subsequent placement of an Indian child in accordance with the ICWA preferences presumptively may be in the best interests of the child. See Navajo Nation v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 339, 345, ¶¶ 18-21 (App. 2012). But the issue of which potential placement best serves the child's interests does not bear on whether termination of the parent's rights is in the child's best interests.

In determining best interests under Section 8-533(B), the juvenile court does not compare alternative placements to decide which is better.

Michael M., Sr. v. Dcs, M.M. · filed 2016-02-16(B)

However, the juvenile court does not “weigh alternative placement possibilities to determine which might be better.”

The petitioner must establish best interests by showing either that severance benefits the child or that denying severance harms the child.

Sandra T. v. Trevor A., H.T. · filed 2016-07-05(B)

Rather, the party moving for severance must show either that severance provides a benefit to the child or that the denial of severance will harm the child. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19 (App. 2004).

A bond between a biological parent and child is relevant but not dispositive of best interests; the court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances.

Dominique M. v. Department of Child Safety · filed 2016-07-12(B)

The existence and effect of a bonded relationship between a biological parent and a child, although a factor to consider, is not dispositive in addressing best interests. Bennigno R., 233 Ariz. at 351, ¶ 30, 312 P.3d at 867. Even in the face of such a bond, the juvenile court is required to evaluate the totality of circumstances and determine whether severance is in the best interests of the children. Id. at 351-52, ¶ 31, 312 P.3d at 867-68 (citing cases).

A revocable guardianship may fail to provide the stability and permanency required by the best-interests analysis.

Rebekah G. v. Katy C. · filed 2017-07-20(B)

Moreover, the record supports a finding that the Children would be harmed by a permanent guardianship because the guardianship is subject to revocation.

Prospective adoption alone does not establish best interests when no additional benefit from severance or detriment from continuing the relationship is shown.

Titus S. v. Dep't of Child Safety · filed 2018-04-09(B)

In concluding the juvenile court's termination order must be reversed, we again emphasize that we are influenced by the specific circumstances in this case, including the court's reliance on prospective adoption alone, without any finding of an additional benefit from severance or a detriment to the children from continuation of the relationship.

A proven severance ground does not itself establish best interests; termination must affirmatively benefit the child or eliminate a detriment from the parental relationship.

Tzsiah E. v. Dcs · filed 2018-04-26(B)

Though severance grounds usually have a negative impact on the child, the existence of a ground is not itself a basis for an adverse best-interests finding—something more is required. See Maricopa Cty. Juvenile Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990). Severance must affirmatively benefit the child or eliminate a detriment of the parental relationship. Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98, ¶ 8 (App. 2016).

Separating bonded siblings is one factor in the best-interests analysis, not a dispositive bar to termination.

Gabriella L v. Dcs · filed 2018-05-29(B)

Second, as discussed, the separation of bonded siblings is only one factor that the juvenile court may consider in rendering its best interests determination— it is not dispositive.

The best-interests inquiry under § 8-533(B) requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances at the time of severance, including the child’s adoptability and the parent’s rehabilitation.

Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety · filed 2018-09-14(B)

This case concerns the inquiry juvenile courts must make to determine whether parental severance is in the “best interests of the child” for purposes of A.R.S. § 8-533(B). We hold that courts must consider the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination, including the child’s adoptability and the parent’s rehabilitation.

After a statutory termination ground is proved, the best-interests inquiry focuses on the child’s stability and security and requires either a benefit from termination or harm from continuing the parental relationship.

Raquel C. v. Dcs · filed 2018-12-06(B)

When a statutory ground for termination has been proven, “the focus shifts to the interests of the child as distinct from those of the parent,” Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 285 ¶ 31, and “’[t]he child’s interest in stability and security’ must be the court’s primary concern.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 12 (2018) (citation omitted). ... “To establish that severance of a parent’s rights would be in a child’s best interests, ‘the court must find either that the child will benefit from termination of the relationship or that the child would be harmed by continuation of the parental relationship.’” Mario G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 282, 288 ¶ 26 (App. 2011) (citation omitted).

Proof of a statutory ground does not create a presumption that termination serves the child's best interests, and the totality analysis may consider the parent's rehabilitation, fitness, bond with the child, and adoptability while keeping the child's interests paramount.

A.R. v. Dcs, Jessica S. · filed 2019-04-02(B)

And yet, the fact of a proven statutory ground does not create the presumption that severance would be in the best interests of the child. ... Alma S. does not require the court, when determining a child’s best interests, to ignore all consideration of Mother’s efforts toward reunification, the bond between parent and child, or fitness to parent. ... As long as A.R.’s interests remained paramount to Mother’s, it was within the court’s discretion to consider all factors under a totality of the circumstances test, including evidence of Mother’s reunification efforts, issues surrounding adoptability, Mother’s fitness to parent, and the bond between Mother and A.R.

Because § 8-533(B)’s best-interests test is disjunctive, an express finding that termination will benefit the child is sufficient even without an adequate finding of detriment from denying termination.

Richard M. v. Dcs, T.M. · filed 2019-05-02(B)

The best-interests test is notably disjunctive; therefore, even if Father’s argument was true—that the court inadequately explained how severance would be detrimental to T.M.—the court’s explicit determination that T.M. would benefit from severance of Father’s rights would nevertheless be sufficient.

A parent's bond and prior successful reunification are relevant but do not control best interests, and the court must not subordinate the children's safety and stability after the parent has been found unfit.

Samantha J. v. Dcs · filed 2019-11-26(B)

But once a parent has been determined unfit under A.R.S. § 8-533(B), courts “must not . . . subordinate the interests of the child to those of the parent.”

A court may consider how incarceration has delayed and will continue to delay reunification as one part of the totality of circumstances, while also considering rehabilitation efforts and the parent-child bond.

Jerica S. v. Dcs, J.B. · filed 2020-09-10(B)

Although Mother asserts that the superior court focused too heavily on her incarceration, the court reasonably considered, as one facet of the totality of the circumstances, how Mother’s incarceration had already and would continue to delay reunification.

A prospective adoptive parent is only one way to prove an affirmative benefit from termination; best interests may instead rest on protecting children from continuing emotional harm and providing stability.

Andri K. v. Russell J. · filed 2022-09-27(B)

Evidence that a child has a prospective adoptive parent or parents is only one way of showing an affirmative benefit, and the lack of that circumstance in this case is not a relevant consideration here, as Mother suggests. ... The evidence presented showed that denying termination would subject the children to a risk of continued emotional harm, and granting termination would provide the children with stability.

A private petitioner’s allegedly retaliatory motive is irrelevant to best interests, which focuses on the child’s stability and security rather than the parent’s interest.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.R. · filed 2024-10-22(B)

Even if, however, we assume the petition was retaliatory, Father cites no statute or caselaw requiring courts to consider a petitioner’s subjective motives during the best interests inquiry. Nor does he explain how Mother’s subjective motives are relevant to whether termination is in Child’s best interests.

The availability of a willing permanent guardian is relevant but not dispositive of best interests; the court must choose between guardianship and termination under the case's unique circumstances and may prefer adoption where a time-limited guardianship would create renewed litigation and uncertainty.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.H. · filed 2025-07-24(B)

Potential for a permanent guardianship as an alternative to termination is certainly a relevant consideration—one that the superior court here addressed directly. But availability of a potential guardian, while relevant, is not dispositive; instead, the court must assess which path, guardianship or termination, would be in the child’s best interests under the unique circumstances of each case. ... Child would then face the disruption and uncertainty of renewed litigation seeking severance if Mother was not then able to parent, rather than the security and stability of an adoption by Grandmother.

A child’s prospective adoption by a caregiver who has met the child’s needs throughout life can support the best interests finding required for termination.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to E.W. · filed 2024-04-18

The court’s finding that the child would benefit from termination because she could be adopted by the person who has cared for her and met her needs for her entire life supports the court’s “best interests” determination.

Section 8-533(B) requires the court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.

Landell M. v. Dcs, N.M. · filed 2017-10-26(B)

In addition, the court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Mario G. v. Ariz. Dep’t. of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 282, 285, ¶ 11 (App. 2011).

A juvenile court may deny termination as contrary to the child's best interests even when a statutory ground exists; best interests alone cannot support granting termination but may support denying it.

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-6831 · filed 1988-01-07(B)

We therefore hold that where a juvenile court determines that despite the presence of statutory ground it is not in the best interests of the child to terminate, he may deny termination. Although the best interests of the child alone are not sufficient to grant termination, they may be sufficient to deny termination.

If clear and convincing evidence supports one statutory termination ground, an appellate court need not address challenges to alternative grounds, though best interest must still be considered.

Jesus M. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2002-09-05(B)

Under any of the grounds enumerated in § 8-533(B), the court must also consider the best interests of the child. ... If clear and convincing evidence supports any one of the statutory grounds on which the juvenile court ordered severance, we need not address claims pertaining to the other grounds.

The best-interest determination does not compare alternative placements, though the court may consider adoptive availability or whether the existing placement meets the child's needs.

Antonio M. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2009-05-14(B)

As we have previously noted, the court does not “weigh alternative placement possibilities to determine” if severance is in the child’s best interests, although it may consider “the immediate availability of an adoptive placement” or “whether an existing placement is meeting the needs of the child.”

Termination requires one statutory ground plus a finding that severance is in the child's best interests.

Christopher L. v. Ades, A.W. · filed 2014-04-17(B)

Under A.R.S. § 8-533, the juvenile court may terminate the parent-child relationship if it finds that any one of the statutory grounds exist and that severance is in the child’s best interests.

Best-interest findings may identify harm from continuation and how current placement meets the children's needs.

Rachel H. v. Dcs · filed 2014-09-02(B)

We conclude the juvenile court’s best interests findings are sufficient. The findings specify the harm the children would likely suffer from continuing their relationship with Mother, and also note how their current placement is meeting their needs.

A best-interests finding must identify how termination would benefit the child or prevent harm; a bare statement that the burden was met is insufficient for appellate review.

Stephanie M. v. Dcs, A.M. · filed 2015-07-28(B)

Here, the general statement that DCS met its burden of proof, without any indication of the conclusions drawn by the juvenile court about how terminating Mother’s parental rights would benefit Child or prevent further harm, is insufficient to allow this court to review whether the law was correctly applied.

A juvenile court may draw a negative inference when a parent does not testify at a severance hearing about parenting ability or other circumstances relevant to best interests.

Melissa W. v. Department of Child Safety · filed 2015-08-13(B)

A juvenile court’s drawing a negative inference when a parent fails to testify at a severance hearing is particularly appropriate. A central issue at such hearings is whether severance of parental rights is in the child’s best interests. See § 8-533(B). The answer to that question hinges to a large degree on the parent’s present ability to successfully and safely parent the child.

Findings that a child is thriving in an adoptive foster home and that adoption will provide permanency and continued stability sufficiently support the best-interests requirement.

Lali v. v. Dcs, A.C. · filed 2016-07-12(B)

The juvenile court then found that Child is thriving in her placement and that adoption “would afford [Child] permanency and continued stability.” See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 179-80, ¶ 21 (App. 2014) (finding that stability and permanency support a best interests finding). We therefore find that the juvenile court made sufficient findings.

After finding a parent unfit, the best-interests analysis balances the parent's diminished interest against the child's independent interest in a safe and stable home.

Jean K. v. Jeremy M., J.K. · filed 2016-12-01(B)

Once a juvenile court finds that a parent is unfit, the focus shifts to the child’s best interests and the court must balance the unfit parent’s diluted interest “against the independent and often adverse interests of the child in a safe and stable home life.”

DCS is not required to conduct a bonding assessment before parental rights may be terminated.

Mandy P. v. Dcs · filed 2016-12-08(B)

DCS, however, is not required to conduct a bonding assessment before a parent’s rights are terminated.

A finding that termination of only one parent’s rights serves the child’s best interests permits termination of that parent even when the other parent retains parental rights.

Roger W. v. Dcs · filed 2017-01-24(B)

And, as relevant here, a juvenile court’s finding that termination of only one parent’s parental rights is in the best interests of a child does not preclude it from terminating that parent’s rights. Cf. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 5-6, ¶¶ 20-22, 365 P.3d 353, 357-58 (2016) (affirming termination of father’s parental rights to child living with mother and stepfather; reasonable evidence supported juvenile court’s finding of affirmative benefit due to stepfather’s plan to adopt child).

A court may find it contrary to a child’s best interests to give a parent an indeterminate additional period to resolve substance-abuse issues.

Michelle M. v. Dcs, H.N. · filed 2017-08-31(B)

Moreover, the court properly could conclude that affording Mother an indeterminate amount of additional time to address her substance abuse issues was not in H.N.’s best interests. Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994).

A court generally must hear competent, potentially significant evidence bearing on the child's best interests and may not exclude an outcome-determinative bonding assessment merely as a disclosure sanction.

James A. v. Dep't of Child Safety · filed 2018-03-29(B)

A court generally must hear any competent and potentially significant evidence that bears on the best interests of the child.

A child’s prospective adoption is a benefit that may support a best-interests finding, and adoptability alone may suffice even though it does not compel that finding.

Monica v. v. Dcs · filed 2018-05-03(B)

“It is well established in state-initiated cases that the child’s prospective adoption is a benefit that can support a best-interests finding.” Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 16. “A child may . . . reap benefits from adoption, warranting a best-interests finding primarily on that basis.” Id. at 5, ¶ 16; see also Lawrence R. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 585, 588, ¶ 11 (App. 2008) (explaining that a fact finder “may find that severance is in a child’s best interests if the child is found to be adoptable,” but is not required to do so); Mary Lou C. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19 (App. 2004) (“The best interest requirement may be met if . . . the petitioner proves that . . . the child is adoptable.”).

A child's adoptability and need for stability can support best interests even before an adoptive home is identified, and a pending criminal trial need not delay termination.

Craig M. v. Dcs, S.M. · filed 2018-05-29(B)

To postpone termination until after Father’s criminal trial would only further delay S.M.’s path to stability and permanency.

Adoptability and a placement meeting children's needs support best interests when additional evidence shows the parent cannot safely parent and the children can remain together.

Alan C. v. Dcs · filed 2018-05-31(B)

First, Dr. Thal testified Father’s prospects of “parenting children in the foreseeable future were worrisome.” Second, Father failed to continue his relationship with the Children while incarcerated. Finally, the Children are placed together and will, most likely, remain together once adopted by the maternal great-grandmother.

Eliminating the risk of continued parental abuse is an affirmative benefit sufficient to support the statutory best-interests requirement.

Francisco v. v. Dcs · filed 2018-07-24(B)

The superior court found that severance would benefit the Children and was in their best interests because it would eliminate the risk of continued abuse from Father.

A best-interests finding under § 8-533 may rest on harm from continuing the parental relationship even when no prospective adoptive parent is available.

Daphne N. v. Michael B., A.B. · filed 2018-08-28(B)

Availability of a likely adoptive parent is one potential benefit relevant to a best interests assessment, and absent other considerations, improbability of adoption weighs against severance. ... Moreover, the record supports the superior court’s conclusion that maintaining the parent–child relationship risked harm to A.B.

A parent-child bond is relevant but not dispositive of best interests under § 8-533(B), particularly when continued parental custody would risk harm and the child needs permanency.

Martina M. v. Dcs, A.M. · filed 2018-10-02(B)

Although the record is clear that mother has a bond with A.M., the existence and effect of a bonded relationship between a biological parent and a child, although a factor to consider, is not dispositive in addressing best interests. ... Moreover, Dr. Mastikian’s opinion that a child would be at risk of harm in mother’s unsupervised care supports the trial court’s conclusion that maintaining the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to A.M., who the trial court believed was “in dire need of permanency” after having been in care for over four years.

Either a benefit from termination or harm from denying termination independently satisfies the best-interests requirement under § 8-533(B).

Aleise H. v. Dcs · filed 2018-11-08(B)

The superior court found that the children would benefit by termination because they were placed with a familial, potentially adoptive placement that was meeting their needs and would provide permanence and stability they were lacking. The court also properly found that the children would be harmed if termination was denied, because the children would remain in care for an indefinite period. Each finding would support best interests independently, and both are supported by the trial evidence.

A child older than twelve who presently declines to consent to an available adoption may still benefit from termination when the totality of circumstances shows termination will provide stability, security, and permanency.

David P. v. Dcs · filed 2019-03-12(B)

Termination would likely leave Children in their Wyoming placement for the foreseeable future. This reasonably supports the court’s conclusion that termination will provide the Children stability, security, and permanency—things sorely lacking in their lives since their mother's death. On this record we cannot say the court abused its discretion in finding that the Children would benefit from termination in the totality of circumstances.

A best-interests order need not expressly find that separately placed siblings will maintain their relationship when the trial evidence supports the court's stated findings.

Amberlayne S. v. Dcs · filed 2019-03-21(B)

The juvenile court was not required to expressly find that the Children would be able to maintain their sibling relationship.

Best interests may be established when an adoptive placement meets the children’s special needs in a safe, stable environment and the parent cannot meet those needs.

Damone H. v. Dcs · filed 2019-08-22(B)

Nor did the court focus only on Father’s alcohol abuse. The court properly considered the benefits of termination and detriments of a continued parental relationship, finding that termination was in the children’s best interest because the current adoptive placement met their special needs in a safe and stable environment, and Father could not meet their special needs.

The best-interests inquiry does not require the court to weigh alternative placements, and separate adoptive placements do not preclude termination when siblings maintain regular contact.

Samantha A. v. Dcs · filed 2019-12-26(B)

But “the court does not ‘weigh alternative placement possibilities to determine’ if severance is in the child’s best interests.” ... Moreover, here the children have maintained contact with each other and have visited each other regularly despite the separate placements.

Avoiding further exposure to domestic violence and allowing a child to move forward without intervention from a long-absent parent can satisfy § 8-533(B)’s best-interests requirement.

Julian D. v. McKenzi W., M.D. · filed 2020-03-17(B)

Terminating father’s parental relationship with M would benefit M because father will not have the opportunity to continue exposing M to the ill effects, both direct and indirect, of domestic violence. It also allows M to move forward without concern father will seek to intervene in M’s life after having no relationship with M for so long.

An immediately available adoptive family and the harm associated with a parent's active substance abuse can support the statutory best-interests finding even when the child is placed outside ICWA preferences for good cause.

Pearson Y. v. Dcs · filed 2020-09-01(B)

In determining that severance was in L.Y.’s best interests, the court noted the presence of a statutory ground for severance had a negative effect on the child and that the immediate availability of an adoptive family for L.Y. favored severance. ... Accordingly, reasonable evidence supports the best interests finding.

No temporal rule bars DCS from filing a second termination motion after an earlier best-interests denial when changed circumstances supply new evidence.

Tasha R. v. Dcs · filed 2021-04-08(B)

Mother cites no case law, and this court has found none, that imposes a temporal limitation on when DCS may file a second motion for termination. A child’s environment is constantly ... evolving, and it would go against a child’s best interests to bar re-litigation of the best interests issue based on new evidence. See Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, 349 ¶¶ 16–17 (App. 2013). DCS addressed the court’s concerns about permanency and T.S.’s stability and, on that different record, the court granted the motion to terminate.

A best-interests finding under § 8-533(B) is supported when an adoptive placement resolves the child’s failure-to-thrive issues and there is no reasonable possibility the parent will ever safely parent.

Tiffany W. v. Dcs, K.H. · filed 2021-09-21(B)

Since July 2019, K.H. had been placed with her current foster parents, who diligently provided for all K.H.’s needs such that her “failure to thrive issues” disappeared. ... The court also found that not terminating Mother’s parental rights would be detrimental to K.H., since it had concluded there was “no reasonable possibility” that Mother would ever be able to safely parent K.H.

An erroneous adoptability finding does not require reversal when other accurate findings independently establish that termination serves the children’s best interests.

Brandon K., Delia B. v. Dcs · filed 2021-11-02(B)

The issue is whether accurate factual findings in the record sufficiently support the best-interests determination. Here, the superior court made other valid findings supporting its best-interests determination. See supra ¶ 29 (finding the children “would benefit from termination because they would have stable homes free from substance abuse and domestic violence” and placement with their paternal great aunt and uncle would “allow the children to maintain relationships with [their] extended family . . .”). These additional findings independently support the superior court’s decision to terminate mother’s and father’s parental rights.

A parent-child bond does not defeat best interests when the child needs permanency and stability and the parent's continuing sobriety problems prevent safe and effective parenting.

Erin S. v. Dcs, J.L. · filed 2022-02-17(B)

The record in this case supports the juvenile court’s findings that termination is in J.L.’s best interests, including that J.L. needed permanency and stability and that Mother’s ongoing struggles with sobriety made it impossible for her to safely and effectively parent.

A parent-child bond is not dispositive of best interests under § 8-533(B); the court must evaluate the totality, including the children’s diagnoses, preferences, safety, and adoptability.

Shelly W. v. Dcs · filed 2022-05-26(B)

And although the children had a bonded relationship with Mother, the existence of a bond is not dispositive. ... Here, the superior court considered the totality of the circumstances, which included the children’s diagnoses and their bond with Mother before making its best-interests determination.

The best-interests inquiry under § 8-533(B) is separate from and preliminary to post-severance placement, and a parent generally lacks standing to challenge placement after termination.

Danny G. v. Dcs, J.G. · filed 2022-06-02(B)

The superior court’s best interests analysis “is separate from and preliminary to its determination of placement after severance.” ... Once a parent’s rights are terminated, a parent does not have standing to challenge a child’s placement, unless the court’s placement determination is “inextricably intertwined with the issue of [the child’s] best interests to terminate [the parent’s] rights.”

The best-interests analysis may account for the negative effect of a continuing statutory termination ground, and its fact-intensive nature does not permit a bright-line adoptability formula.

Margaret P. v. Dcs, V.D. · filed 2022-10-13(B)

A best interests assessment, however, properly includes “the negative effect on a child of the continued presence of a statutory severance ground.” ... The relevant inquiry, however, necessarily involves a fact-intensive analysis.

A court may find termination and adoption in an older child's best interests despite the child's opposition to adoption and desire to retain family ties, when adoption offers greater permanency and stability than guardianship.

Nina v. v. Dcs · filed 2022-10-20(B)

The court could choose to weigh the opportunity for adoption, permanency, and stability provided by termination, over T.R.'s desires or the impermanency provided by a guardianship. ... Reasonable evidence in the record supports the children's adoptability and we find no error in how the court weighed the factors.

Separating siblings into different adoptive placements is not necessarily a detriment under § 8-533(B)’s best-interests inquiry when stability, security, health, and safety favor termination.

Lisa R. v. Dcs, A.H., W.R. · filed 2023-01-05(B)

Though placing siblings together is an ... important consideration, other factors such as stability, security, health, and safety are paramount. ... In short, though placing the siblings together can be a benefit, the converse—separately placing siblings—is not necessarily a detriment. Both types of placements can be in the children’s best interests.

A best-interests finding under § 8-533(B) may rest on the harm of disrupting a stable placement to reintroduce a long-absent parent who has never consistently supported or cared for the child.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to D.S. · filed 2023-03-23(B)

The court concluded that Child “deserves to have the stability afforded by Mother,” and “[i]t would be a detriment to the child to disrupt that stability by reintroducing a parent who has never made a consistent effort to be a part of his life.”

Best interests may rest on harm from continuing the relationship when the parent’s unresolved mental health and conduct caused significant trauma and instability.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.Z. · filed 2023-06-15(B)

Because reasonable evidence in the record shows Child would be harmed if the parent-child relationship continued, a factual basis exists to support the termination of Mother's parental rights. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353(e)(3); Tina T. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 236 Ariz. 295, 299, ¶ 16 (App. 2014) (stating that we review whether “the juvenile court record includes evidence that, if believed, would establish the statutory grounds for termination of Mother's parental rights”), abrogated on other grounds by Sandra R. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 224 (2020).

Expert psychological testimony is not required to find termination in children's best interests despite a close parental bond; the court may weigh that bond against the stability and permanency adoption will provide.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.E. · filed 2023-07-25(B)

First, Arizona law does not require expert testimony in a best- interests determination. ... The existence and effect of a bonded relationship between a biological parent and a child, although a factor to consider, is not dispositive in addressing best interests.

In a private termination proceeding, a proposed adoption may benefit the child and support best interests even without separate proof that denying termination would cause harm.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to N.H. · filed 2023-09-26(B)

Termination is in the child’s best interests if the child will either benefit from termination or be harmed if it is denied. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 13. Whether a severance proceeding is initiated privately or by the State, the juvenile court “may conclude that a proposed adoption benefits the child and supports a finding that severance is in the child’s best interests.” Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 2, ¶ 1.

Best interests do not require an adoption plan when the child’s existing stable family meets all needs and introducing an absent stranger-parent would cause disruption and harm.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to H.V. · filed 2024-03-19(B)

The anticipated adoption of a child is but one factor for the court to consider when determining whether termination is in a child’s best interests. Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 5 (App. 1998). “Another is whether an existing placement is meeting the needs of the child.” Id.

A parent's recent sobriety, stable employment and housing, consistent positive visits, and bond with the child may be outweighed by a history of incomplete services and the child's interest in the stability of adoption.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.C. · filed 2024-05-07(B)

Far from disregarding Mother’s rehabilitation efforts, the court closely reviewed them and found them insufficient to outweigh L.C.’s interest in the stability that termination and adoption would provide her. Such a determination was within the court’s discretion. ... The court expressly recognized that Mother regularly exercised her supervised parenting time but further found that she did not engage in the other services DCS offered to her “to address the behaviors” that created “an unsafe environment” for the child in the first place.

A parent's recent engagement in rehabilitation does not outweigh adoptive placements and the children's need for permanency when the court finds the parent's claimed sobriety unreliable and continued abstinence uncertain.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to E.C. and C.C. · filed 2024-06-27(B)

Despite that, ample evidence supports the court’s contrary finding that termination would provide E.C. and C.C. with permanency and stability, which is the court’s primary concern when determining a child’s best interests in this context. ... The record supports the court’s implicit conclusion that Mother’s efforts to overcome her substance abuse were not sufficient to make remaining with her in either child’s best interests.

Best interests may be established by showing that termination will benefit the child or that continuing the relationship will cause harm, and adoptability or an adoptive placement may establish the benefit.

In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to H.F. · filed 2024-07-09(B)

When considering the child’s best interests, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances, which includes the child’s stability and security. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶¶ 12-13 (2018). It is in a child’s best interests to terminate parental rights if the child would either be benefitted by terminating the relationship or harmed by its continuation. Id. at 150 ¶ 13. The State may show termination is in a child’s best interest by showing either that they are adoptable or in an adoptive placement. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 12 (2016).

A parent-child bond does not outweigh best-interests evidence that the parents' unresolved substance abuse prevents safe parenting and that termination will provide stability and prevent further trauma.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.P. · filed 2024-08-20(B)

Considering the parent-child bond, the court acknowledged that the children and the parents all love one another. But it found the bond insufficient to offset its finding that the parents’ failure to address their long-standing substance abuse has rendered them unable to safely parent the children. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 12 (“The child’s interest in stability and security must be the court’s primary concern.” (cleaned up)).

Best interests may be supported when the child is adoptable, the prospective placement can meet special needs and keep siblings together, and the parent cannot yet provide a safe, stable home outside treatment.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.D. · filed 2024-08-29(B)

The DCS case manager testified that A.D. was adoptable and was placed with his maternal grandmother, who planned to adopt him and his older siblings. A.D.’s grandmother was capable of meeting all of his needs, including his special medical needs. The case manager testified that if Mother’s parental rights were not terminated, A.D. would be left in limbo for an indeterminate time period because Mother still needed to show she could remain sober outside of the residential treatment context and needed to acquire a safe and stable home for A.D.

Children's opposition to adoption does not defeat a best-interests benefit finding when evidence supports that they are adoptable, their placements intend to adopt, and the proposed adoptions are legally possible and likely.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to E.D. · filed 2024-09-03(B)

The case manager testified that the children are adoptable, their foster parents are adoptive placements, and the foster parents are meeting the children’s special needs. In addition, the record contains several progress reports DCS submitted describing the children’s special needs and detailing how the foster parents were successfully meeting those needs. From this evidence, the court could reasonably infer that the proposed adoptions were legally possible and likely to occur if the parent-child relationship were terminated. See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 3 ¶ 9 (“Because the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess witness credibility, we accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact if reasonable evidence and inferences support them[.]”). Therefore, the juvenile court’s finding that the children will benefit from termination because “all three children are adoptable” and in “a potential adoptive placement” is supported by evidence from trial and is not legal error.

A best-interests finding requires ultimate facts beyond those establishing abandonment because a court cannot presume termination benefits a child merely from abandonment.

In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to M.L. · filed 2024-10-01(B)

Because abandonment is a fact that by itself is insufficient to establish what is in a child’s best interests, the court’s best-interests analysis must be informed by factual findings that go beyond what is necessary to show abandonment.

A parent’s death during appeal does not moot the termination appeal when termination and later adoption may affect the child’s inheritance, support, or benefit rights and thus alter best interests.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to G.L. · filed 2025-04-01(B)

Although a deceased parent’s appeal will no longer affect their personal parental rights, it could affect a child’s property interests. And that, in turn, may alter the best-interests analysis—the “paramount” consideration in termination cases. See, e.g., Dep’t of Child Safety v. Beene, 235 Ariz. 300, 304 ¶ 9 (App. 2014).

A court may deny termination despite proven abuse when evidence supports a beneficial future relationship after rehabilitation and the child would be harmed by permanently losing that possibility.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.P. · filed 2025-04-15(B)

Because sufficient evidence and inferences adduced through trial support the court’s best-interests finding, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was not in the Children’s best interests. Thus, we discern no error.

A best-interests order need not expressly list every relevant fact, including the parent's age and bond with the child; ultimate findings that an adoptive placement meets the child's needs and intends to adopt are sufficient.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to K.H. · filed 2025-04-22(B)

But the superior court is not required to explicitly list every fact upon which best interests findings are based. ... Here, the court made express findings that K.H. would benefit from being adopted by Grandmother and that Grandmother intended to adopt the child. These findings are supported by the evidence and are sufficient to support the court’s best interests determination.