Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-533

Section 8-533(B)(6) strictly requires compliance with the putative-fathers registry; substantial compliance is insufficient.

Frank R. v. Mother Goose Adoptions · filed 2016-02-10(B)(6)

This court has already held that the putative fathers registry statute must be strictly applied; substantial compliance is insufficient.

Failure to timely register with the putative-fathers registry is an independent severance ground that is not excused by filing a paternity action or contesting severance.

Frank R. v. Mother Goose Adoptions · filed 2017-10-02(B)(6)

Neither filing notice of a claim of paternity nor contesting the severance action excuses a putative father’s failure to register for purposes of § 8-533(B)(6).

A parent's consent to adoption supplies a statutory termination ground, but the court must separately find that severance benefits the child or avoids harm from continuing the relationship.

James H. v. Dcs, L.H. · filed 2018-04-03(B)(7), (B)

Father does not dispute the court’s finding that, based on his consent, a statutory ground existed to sever his parental rights. See A.R.S. 8-533(B)(7) (noting that one of the grounds that “justify the termination of the parent-child relationship” is that “the parents have relinquished their rights to a child to an agency or have consented to the adoption.”).

DCS makes reasonable reunification efforts by offering expert-recommended services suited to the parent's functioning, and need not keep remediation open indefinitely when participation remains inconsistent or nonexistent.

Chelsie H. v. Dcs, A.H. · filed 2020-08-25(B)(3), (B)(8), (B)(10)

Considering the record as a whole, reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s finding that DCS was diligent in providing appropriate reunification services. ... But Mother’s participation in these services ranged from inconsistent to nonexistent, and “DCS is not required to leave the window of opportunity for remediation open indefinitely.”

An expert's recommendation to prioritize services does not require DCS to provide them sequentially or permit a parent to disengage from all other services until the first priority is completed.

Tiffany L. v. Dcs, I.J. · filed 2020-09-22(B)(3), (B)(10)

As to sequencing, Dr. Martig recommended prioritizing; he did not mandate sequential services as Mother suggests. ... Dr. Martig did not recommend that Mother “completely disengage from all other services” while prioritizing parenting classes.

DCS need not provide a reunification service under § 8-533(B)(8)(c) when the measure would be futile or risk harming the children.

Valentyna S. v. Dcs · filed 2020-11-03(B)(8)(c)

The Department must provide services with a reasonable probability of success but is not required to undertake rehabilitative measures that are futile or would risk harm to the children. ... The record supports the court’s finding that the Department made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services with a reasonable probability of success.

A parent who defaults at the initial termination hearing and refuses offered services cannot defeat reasonable efforts under § 8-533(B)(3) or (B)(11)(b) by arguing that the resulting quick termination left insufficient time for services.

Sarah B. v. Dcs, K.J. · filed 2020-12-08(B)(3), (B)(11)(b)

However, Mother's failure to appear at the initial hearing truncated the time she had to participate in services. ... She was notified that “[f]ailure to participate in reunification services may result in the termination of [her] parental rights,” but made no effort to seek out or participate in services, especially those designed to address her substance abuse—the main issue preventing reunification.

A temporary disruption involving an assigned caseworker does not defeat reasonable efforts under § 8-533(B)(3) when the parent knew the unchanged case plan and DCS provided extensive services over the dependency.

Desiree v. v. Dcs · filed 2020-12-08(B)(3)

Even assuming Mother found it challenging to communicate with her caseworker for a few months, she fails to explain why that issue outweighs the otherwise undisputedly diligent efforts of DCS. Considering the vast array of services offered by DCS throughout the twenty months and the totality of circumstances in this case, we cannot say the juvenile court abused its discretion when it found that DCS made a diligent effort to reunify Mother with the Children.

DCS makes reasonable and diligent efforts under § 8-533(B)(3) and (B)(8)(b) when it offers varied schedules and transfers services to accommodate a parent’s work schedule, even if the parent still fails to participate.

Jeremy M. v. Dcs, B.P. · filed 2020-12-10(B)(3), (B)(8)(b)

While Father’s schedule may have been challenging, Terros provided a variety of schedules to meet Father’s specific needs. DCS demonstrated its willingness to accommodate when, at Father’s request, services were transferred to a different location for his convenience. Additionally, when Father failed to complete his case plan, DCS re-referred him for the same services.

DCS may satisfy reasonable efforts under § 8-533(B)(3) despite omitting an expert-recommended service when the parent’s refusal to participate in existing drug services shows the additional measure would be futile.

Brandi C., Jesse G. v. Dcs · filed 2020-12-15(B)(3)

The court found that because Father had refused to participate in the services DCS had offered, DCS’s efforts could be fairly characterized as reasonable despite its failure to provide Father with master’s level counseling. ... Based on the evidence in the record regarding Father’s failure to participate in drug testing and treatment, it was within the juvenile court’s discretion to conclude that DCS’s efforts were reasonable despite its inability to provide additional services.

DCS need not provide an additional psychiatric evaluation when the parent continues receiving psychiatric care but repeatedly refuses already-recommended mental-health treatment.

Shira H. v. Dcs · filed 2021-01-26(B)(8)(c)

There is no indication that an additional psychiatric evaluation would have allowed Mother to become an effective parent when she had repeatedly failed to meaningfully participate in or cooperate with already-recommended mental health treatment over the previous four years of the case. See Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 34 (App. 1999) (stating DCS is not required to take measures that are futile and need only “undertake measures with a reasonable prospect of success”). Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that DCS made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services.

DCS need not repeat a parent-aide program that produced no improvement when the evidence shows another round would be futile.

Cindy M. v. Dcs · filed 2021-02-02(B)(8)(c)

DCS is not obliged “to undertake rehabilitative measures that are futile.” Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192, ¶ 34. Mother was offered parent-aide services, completed that program, and still failed to remedy the situation that caused the dependency. Mother fails to show why completing one more parenting-aide program would lead to a different result. See supra ¶ 5. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court's finding that DCS provided reasonable reunification services.

DCS’s diligent-efforts duty requires identifying placement conditions, providing responsive services with a reasonable prospect of success, maintaining consistent contact, and assisting where compliance is difficult.

Shane D., Kassandra D. v. Dcs, T.D. · filed 2021-03-16(B)(8)

To meet its obligation, DCS must “identify the conditions causing the child’s out-of-home placement, provide services that have a reasonable prospect of success to remedy the circumstances as they arise throughout the time-in-care period, maintain consistent contact with the parent, and make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult.” Donald W. v. DCS, 247 Ariz. 9, 23, ¶ 50 (App. 2019).

Under § 8-533(B)(1), a parent who restricts the other parent’s contact with their child cannot prove abandonment from that parent’s limited involvement.

Calvin B. v. Brittany B. · filed 2013-06-20(B)(1)

A parent may not restrict the other parent from interacting with their child and then petition to terminate the latter’s rights for abandonment. For this reason, we conclude the record in this unusual case lacks evidence sufficient for the court to conclude that Brittany proved by clear and convincing evidence that Calvin abandoned his son.

A parent may abandon children despite suspended in-person visitation when the parent makes only minimal efforts and fails to maintain the relationship through cards, gifts, letters, or support.

Leticia P. v. Dcs · filed 2020-09-22(B)(1)

The “burden to act as a parent rests with the parent,” id. at 251, ¶ 25, and where the parent makes “only minimal efforts to communicate with the child[ren],” the court may find that the parent has abandoned them, Kenneth B. v. Tina B., 226 Ariz. 33, 37, ¶ 18 (App. 2010).

Occasional failures by one parent to respond do not establish an interference defense to abandonment when the other parent has enforceable custody rights but fails to follow the parenting schedule, provide support, or vigorously pursue the relationship.

Aaron B. v. Ashley H. · filed 2020-09-29(B)(1)

And, while the record demonstrates that Mother occasionally did not respond to Father’s messages seeking information about the Children, Mother’s actions do not rise to the level of interference required to establish a defense to abandonment. Father had an obligation to act and a duty to vigorously pursue a relationship with his Children, which he did not do.

Section 8-533(B)(1) does not distinguish among contact initiated by the child, parent, or a third party when deciding whether a parent maintained sufficient contact to avoid abandonment.

Gordon O., Karrie O. v. Kiley O. · filed 2020-12-31(B)(1)

The statute does not distinguish between contact initiated by a child, parent, or third party, when determining whether the parent maintained requisite contact to avoid an abandonment finding. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1).

A parent cannot blame others for frustrating a relationship without first making meaningful bonding efforts and promptly and persistently asserting parental rights.

Jesse M. v. Dcs, G.S. · filed 2021-03-04(B)(1)

But unlike the father in Calvin B., who “actively sought more involvement with [his] son than [his ex-wife] would allow,” Id. at 297 ¶ 22, Father has shown no efforts to meaningfully bond with G.S. and thus cannot claim that any such efforts were frustrated. See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251 ¶ 25 (“The burden to act as a parent rests with the parent, who should assert his legal rights at the first and every opportunity.”); Pima Cnty. Juv. Severance Action No. S–114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 99 (1994) (affirming termination where the parent “failed to promptly and persistently grasp the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child or assert his legal rights”).

A parent cannot attribute the absence of a bond to DCS restrictions when the parent willfully refuses available means of providing support and maintaining contact.

Juan P. v. Dcs, S.P. · filed 2021-04-27(B)(1)

But here, the record shows father’s willful refusal “to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with [S.P.]” caused the lack of a parent-child bond. See A.R.S. § 8-531(1).

A parent who lives near the child but goes years without contact or voluntary support and never seeks judicial enforcement of visitation may be found to have abandoned the child.

Luis C. v. Nicole T., A.C. · filed 2021-06-03(B)(1)

Father continued to live near Anne for much of her life. However, he never sought court intervention to enforce his right to see his child.

Post-petition efforts to establish contact do not automatically rebut prima facie abandonment arising from the parent's earlier failure to maintain a normal parental relationship for six months.

Matthew B., Amanda R. v. Dcs, J.B. · filed 2021-07-27(B)(1)

Although Mother remained in contact with DCS after she was released from jail in June 2020, this progress came only after DCS had already moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights. ... Thus, we affirm the superior court’s abandonment finding regarding Mother.

Abandonment under § 8-533(B)(1) is measured by parental conduct, and a parent facing obstacles to traditional bonding must persistently establish the relationship and vigorously assert legal rights.

Antonio R. v. Dcs, A.V. · filed 2021-08-03(B)(1)

We measure abandonment based on conduct and not a parent’s subjective intent. ... When circumstances prevent the parent from “exercising traditional methods of bonding with his child, ... he must act persistently to establish the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert his legal rights to the extent necessary.”

DCS satisfies reunification obligations under § 8-533(B)(3) and (B)(8)(c) by offering time and opportunity to participate, and need not ensure participation in a specific counseling method when the parent is unresponsive and fails to preserve the objection.

Abelina L. v. Dcs, R.M. · filed 2021-09-09(B)(3), (B)(8)(c)

Though Mother did not participate in the DBT counseling approach recommended by Dr. Mirkin, the record shows Mother did not respond when DCS attempted to provide the same. ... Regardless of the type of service Mother believed she was entitled to, DCS is not required to provide every conceivable service or ensure Mother participates in each service it offers.

DCS need not provide mental-health services under § 8-533(B)(3) and (B)(8)(c) when the parent never requests them, termination is not sought on mental-health grounds, and the parent never demonstrates the sobriety required for further assessment.

Rachel C. v. Dcs, A.C. · filed 2021-09-14(B)(3), (B)(8)(c)

Moreover, DCS did not seek termination based on Mother’s mental health, and she does not explain how mental health services would have helped in addressing her prolonged substance abuse. ... Before DCS would assess whether she needed additional services, including mental health treatment, Mother was told she needed to demonstrate sobriety, which did not happen.

Communication lapses do not defeat reasonable efforts under § 8-533(B)(3) and (B)(10) when services remain continuously available and some communication failures are attributable to the parent.

Claudia D. v. Dcs, A.B. · filed 2021-09-21(B)(3), (B)(10)

Mother’s participation in services was inconsistent, ... but even so, her substance abuse and drug testing services were still in place at the time of the termination adjudication hearing and had never been interrupted or discontinued, despite the ongoing case manager’s admitted failure to consistently communicate with Mother. Further, the record shows that some of the communication issues between Mother and DCS were attributable to Mother, who failed to provide DCS with updated contact information and failed to timely respond to the case manager by email after the case manager obtained Mother’s email address.

A brief lapse in one service does not defeat reasonable efforts under § 8-533(B)(3) when the totality of the dependency shows lengthy drug testing, counseling, and domestic-violence services.

Walter C. v. Dcs, J.C. · filed 2021-09-21(B)(3)

Moreover, the few weeks that Father was unable to participate in drug testing in December 2020 are inconsequential when compared to the 18 months of drug testing and counseling services DCS provided. ... And contrary to Sandoval’s testimony at trial, the documentation admitted at the termination hearing shows DCS did assist Father in obtaining domestic-violence counseling.

DCS may condition a third parent-aide referral under § 8-533(B)(8)(c) on completing eight consecutive supervised visits after the parent unsuccessfully closes two earlier referrals.

Paul B. v. Dcs, D.D. · filed 2021-09-21(B)(8)(c)

Because he had unsuccessfully closed out of the two earlier referrals, DCS required him to attend eight consecutive supervised visits with D.D. before it would make a third parent-aide referral. Father never completed that requirement. Accordingly, the record supports the court’s finding that DCS made reasonable efforts to provide reunification services.

DCS makes diligent efforts under § 8-533(B)(8)(c) by repeatedly informing a parent of required counseling; the parent’s own seventeen-month delay does not require DCS to leave the remediation window open indefinitely.

Melaney L. v. Dcs · filed 2021-09-23(B)(8)(c)

Mother had a year and a half to participate in services. ... Unfortunately, as the court found, Mother’s own delay prevented her from making substantial progress in therapy by the time of the termination hearing. ... “Leaving the window of opportunity for remediation open indefinitely is not necessary, nor” is it in the children’s best interests.

Reasonable reunification efforts include disability accommodations, but DCS need not provide trauma counseling before the parent completes prerequisite substance-abuse treatment.

Easter D. v. Dcs, S.T. · filed 2021-09-28(B)(3)

But the record reveals DCS made numerous attempts to accommodate Mother. See Vanessa H. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 215 Ariz. 252, 256, ¶ 20 (App. 2007) (viewing “reasonable accommodations as a component of making 'reasonable efforts'”). DCS's efforts included attempting to reschedule sessions and providing transportation. When Mother told DCS her limited mobility made riding the bus difficult, DCS provided Mother taxi services.

When an incarcerated parent requests relationship-preserving services and they will not endanger the child, DCS must make reasonable efforts to provide them despite subsection (B)(4)’s lack of an express services duty.

Jessie D. v. dcs/f v. m.D./m.D./c.D. · filed 2021-10-08(B)(4)

If DCS seeks to terminate parental rights under § 8-533(B)(4)’s provision addressing the parent’s length of felony sentence, and an incarcerated parent requests reunification services, such as visitation, and providing the services will not endanger the child, DCS must make reasonable efforts to provide these services. DCS’s obligation to provide services to an incarcerated parent is not without limits. It must, however, initiate measures designed to address an incarcerated parent’s desire to maintain a parent-child relationship.

DCS may require a capable insured parent to self-refer for counseling and need not provide a particular out-of-network counselor or ensure participation.

Leigh C. v. Dcs, L.C. · filed 2021-10-19(B)(8)

Nevertheless, DCS was not required to provide Mother with a specific counselor of her choosing, and one who was not covered under her insurance plan, to meet its obligations. DCS is also not required to ensure a parent actually participates in the services it offers. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). DCS made diligent efforts to provide Mother with multiple options for counselors, and Mother failed to take advantage of any of those options.

DCS need not provide every conceivable housing service or ensure participation when it gives housing-resource coaching and current referrals over the dependency.

Naomi G. v. Dcs, A.L. · filed 2021-10-21(B)(8)

DCS must provide Mother with “the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help her become an effective parent,” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994), but DCS need not provide every conceivable service or ensure Mother participates in each service it offers, id. The record shows a parent-aide representative coached Mother about housing resources as early as her first referral. At trial, the DCS caseworker testified that housing resources were provided as recently as January 2021, just two months before the termination trial.

DCS makes diligent substance-abuse reunification efforts by repeatedly offering treatment, testing, parenting services, counseling, visitation, and transportation even when the parent completes none and declines counseling.

Tuesday B., Adrian T. v. Dcs · filed 2021-10-26(B)(3)

The record includes reasonable evidence to support a finding of diligent efforts on the ground of substance abuse. DCS offered appropriate reunification services for Mother to address her substance-abuse issues. Mother received four separate referrals for substance-abuse treatment but completed none. And when the substance-abuse treatment provider offered her mental-health services, she declined. DCS referred Mother for random and regular drug testing from November 2018 until January 2021. She often missed the tests and failed the rest for marijuana.

When termination rests on chronic substance abuse, omission of expert-recommended specialized therapy or hands-on parenting instruction does not defeat reasonable efforts absent a showing that those services would have helped the parent overcome substance abuse, particularly where substance-abuse services were offered but not successfully used.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to Z.A. · filed 2023-07-25(B)(3)

Father does not explain how more specialized individual therapy or “hands on” parenting instructions would have made a difference in overcoming his chronic substance abuse, particularly when he was provided with other services designed to address this issue. ... The record supports the court’s finding that DCS made reasonable efforts to provide Father with reunification services.

DCS need not provide a psychological consultation when its psychologist requires thirty days of demonstrated sobriety and the parent never satisfies that prerequisite, especially when other providers offer mental-health services and DCS repeatedly offers substance-abuse treatment.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to I.C. · filed 2026-03-09(B)(3)

DCS’s failure to provide Mother a psychological consultation was not unreasonable, even if, as Mother contends, it was a service contemplated by the court and DCS’s internal policies. ... The DCS case manager explained that its psychologist required Mother to show thirty days of sobriety before meeting. ... On this record, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding DCS’s efforts sufficient to support termination under either A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) or A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b).

An alleged father lacks good cause for failing to establish paternity when DCS explains the importance and walk-in procedure, makes a testing referral, and offers transportation, but the father fails to appear for testing.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.C. · filed 2023-09-14(F)

DCS gave Father an adequate opportunity to establish paternity by referring him to PSI and providing transportation.

A parent claiming interference must show active efforts to maintain the relationship; knowing the child’s location yet failing to visit or pursue legal parenting time supports abandonment.

David A. v. Anayza M., D.A. · filed 2021-10-14(B)(1)

So, on this record, we conclude mother’s actions did not rise to the level of interference excusing father’s failure to maintain contact with D.A. See Calvin, 232 Ariz. at 296–97, ¶¶ 21–25 (when mother denied or frustrated father’s repeated efforts to contact child, father asked the superior court for relief). Thus, we affirm the order terminating father’s parental rights to D.A.

A claimed interference defense does not defeat abandonment when the court credits evidence that access was not restricted and the parent never sought enforceable parenting-time orders.

James S. v. Karina R. · filed 2022-01-04(B)(1)

Father acknowledged at trial that he never pursued family court orders to establish and enforce the parenting time he now argues Mother was withholding. ... The superior court was responsible for resolving what were, at times, “sharply disputed” evidentiary conflicts, and we do not reweigh the evidence on appeal.

Even when relatives are less than forthcoming about a child's location, a parent does not vigorously assert parental rights by failing to pursue paternity, parenting-time, or other legal remedies.

Gabriel G. v. Dcs, E.L. · filed 2022-01-13(B)(1)

Moreover, even assuming Mother’s relatives were less than forthcoming with information about E.L., Father did little else to “vigorously assert” his parental rights. ... As he acknowledged at trial, he never followed through with filing a family court case to establish paternity and parenting time, and he never sought outside assistance to recover his child.

Sporadic telephone contact, no recent in-person contact, inconsistent support, and no normal supervision can establish abandonment even when the parent once had enforceable joint custody and parenting time.

Michael B. v. Maria S., G.B. · filed 2022-01-25(B)(1)

In support of its finding, the court cited the sporadic contact between Father and the child, including a complete lack of in-person contact since 2019; Father’s failure to provide consistent support; Father’s failure “to provide any normal parental supervision” or significantly engage with the child; and a lack of development of a parent-child relationship that should exist between Father and the child.

Limited caregiver interference does not defeat abandonment under § 8-533(B)(1) when the parent does not persistently seek involvement or vigorously enforce parenting rights.

Kiara D. v. Rudy N., R.N. · filed 2022-05-10(B)(1)

The superior court found that Father’s actions did “not rise to the level of interference required to establish a defense to abandonment.” ... The record supports a finding that this irregular contact has been the result of Mother’s inaction and not the result of Father’s conduct.

A parent may not rely on the other parent's limited involvement to prove abandonment when the petitioning parent persistently violates parenting orders and substantially interferes with contact; in the face of such opposition, the other parent's efforts need not be perfect to establish just cause.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.L. · filed 2023-07-20(B)(1)

Because we hold a parent may not rely on their own violations of court orders to establish another parent’s abandonment, and for other following reasons, we affirm. ... True, Mother might have continued her efforts to contact M.L. during the two-year period of estrangement, but in the face of continual and active opposition, a parent’s efforts need not be perfect. ... Considering Father’s active, substantial, and persistent interference with Mother’s parenting time and of her other efforts to maintain a relationship with M.L., we find no error in the juvenile court’s determination that Father failed to prove abandonment by clear and convincing evidence.

Reasonable efforts under § 8-533(B)(3) and (B)(8)(c) satisfy the ADA accommodation standard and do not require every conceivably beneficial specialist service.

Kimberly R. v. Dcs, R.R. · filed 2022-05-31(B)(3), (B)(8)(c)

In Jessica P., however, this court held that “Arizona’s statutory requirement that DCS make reasonable efforts to provide reunification services satisfies the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement.” ... Although the DCS case manager testified that having such a parent aide would be “beneficial,” DCS was not required to provide one.

Section 8-533(B)(2) does not statutorily require reunification services before termination for abuse, and DCS may offer a more promising individual-counseling service instead of duplicating an unsuccessful parent-aide program.

Adrienne D. v. Dcs · filed 2022-06-14(B)(2)

Regardless, reunification services are not statutorily required when terminating parental rights for abuse, see § 8-533(B)(2), and no Arizona court has held that DCS is constitutionally required to do so. ... Thus, we cannot say that DCS’s decision to offer individual counseling instead of a second parent aide was unreasonable.

DCS may satisfy § 8-533(B)(8)(a)’s reunification requirement without unavailable programs when it provides a broad array of alternative services and the parent fails to participate or communicate.

Davonna T. v. Dcs · filed 2022-06-21(B)(8)(a)

Moreover, DCS provided Mother access to a wide array of services, including referrals for psychological evaluations, parenting services and a parent aide, and substance abuse and treatment services. Reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that the services offered and provided to Mother by DCS were adequate.

DCS need not overcome participation obstacles the parent does not timely disclose or explain, particularly when nonparticipation largely occurs outside periods of hospitalization.

Anthony D. v. Dcs, A.D. · filed 2022-07-05(B)(3), (B)(8)

Father argues DCS should have helped him overcome these obstacles or find alternative providers. The case manager testified, however, that Father failed to regularly notify DCS about his hospitalizations until shortly before the termination trial. Nevertheless, Father does not explain how else DCS could have helped him overcome his health issues, particularly when much of his lack of contact with service providers was during times he was not hospitalized. Moreover, even though Father’s medical conditions required regular care, one of his medical providers noted that he was “non-compliant” and failed to attend his follow-up appointments, causing Father to utilize the emergency room. Nor does Father suggest how DCS could have assisted him after the loss of his cell phone or how finding him alternative providers would have helped him engage in services. On this record, Father has shown no error.

Failure to provide an ordered service is not reversible when that service was unrelated to the circumstances on which termination rested and DCS otherwise made reasonable and diligent efforts.

Brittany M. v. Dcs · filed 2022-08-04(B)(8)(c)

The court’s termination ruling was not based on Mothers drug testing, drug use or lack of sobriety. Therefore, Mothers primary argument regarding DCS’ failure to provide in-home drug testing does not suggest reversible error.

DCS need not offer family counseling that treating professionals deem emotionally inappropriate and futile for the child, even when the child refuses contact.

Martin J. v. Dcs, M.J. · filed 2022-08-25(B)(8)(c)

The therapist opined, however, that family counseling would not have been helpful because the child was not emotionally ready for it. Nonetheless, DCS is not required “to undertake rehabilitative measures that are futile,” Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192, ¶ 34. Nor is it required to duplicate a service the parent receives elsewhere. See Pima Cnty. Severance Action No. S-2397, 161 Ariz. 574, 577 (App. 1989). The record shows that DCS pursued family counseling, regardless of Mary’s personal feelings on the matter, but that it was not therapeutically appropriate.

DCS need not duplicate a service already received elsewhere or undertake futile rehabilitation when providing reasonable services for chronic substance abuse.

Veronica M. v. Dcs, J.M. · filed 2022-09-13(B)(3)

Nonetheless, DCS is not required “to undertake rehabilitative measures that are futile,” Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192, ¶ 34, nor is it required to duplicate a service the parent receives elsewhere, see Pima Cnty. Severance Action No. S-2397, 161 Ariz. 574, 577 (App. 1989).

A Title 14 guardianship neither bars a legitimate-interest guardian from petitioning for termination nor gives the parents indefinite immunity from abandonment findings.

Jessica S., Bret S. v. Brandy R. · filed 2022-07-14(A), (B)(1)

But under A.R.S. § 8-533(A), “[a]ny person or agency that has a legitimate interest in the welfare of a child, including a relative, . . . may file a petition for the termination of the parent-child relationship.” (Emphasis added.) ... The appellants’ suggestion that transferring their parental duties via a guardianship somehow provides indefinite immunity from a judicial finding of abandonment is neither accurate nor persuasive.

Protective orders and conditioned visitation do not excuse abandonment when the parent fails to challenge the orders, satisfy available visitation conditions, or maintain other contact and support.

Alexander N. v. Angela N. · filed 2022-08-23(B)(1)

Father did not see the Children for 11 months before the 2019 no-contact order was issued, nor did he send them cards, letters, or gifts. He did not exercise his right to challenge any of the three protective orders. He did not comply with the requirements of the divorce decree. He has also failed to meet his child support obligations. Given Father’s lack of involvement before and after the 2019 no-contact order, we cannot say the superior court erred in finding he had abandoned the Children.

A parent cannot attribute lack of contact to the other parent's interference when parenting time was conditioned by agreement on proof of sobriety, the parent refused required drug testing, and the other parent repeatedly offered contact upon compliance.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to H.K. · filed 2026-02-25(B)(1)

That agreement specifically provided that Father could only exercise parenting time if he drug tested to prove sobriety—which he did not do. Mother testified she repeatedly told Father he could see H.K. if he submitted to drug testing, yet Father refused to do so. Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Father abandoned H.K.

DCS need not provide reunification services before seeking termination for abandonment when the parent never had a normal parent-child relationship with the child.

Adam E. v. Dcs, A.E. · filed 2022-09-22(B)(1)

The record supports the court’s finding that Father never had a normal parent-child relationship with Child. DCS therefore was not obligated to provide reunification services when it sought termination on the abandonment ground.

A parent's desire or subjective intent to communicate does not preserve the parent-child relationship; abandonment turns on persistent conduct establishing the relationship and vigorously asserting parental rights.

Jesse R. v. Dcs · filed 2022-10-25(B)(1)

But when “circumstances prevent the unwed father from exercising traditional methods of bonding with his child, he must act persistently to establish the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert his legal rights to the extent necessary.” ... Father’s intent to communicate is not enough to preserve the parent-child relationship.

A voluntary guardianship and modest scheduling limits do not excuse minimal contact as interference when the parent neither uses available opportunities nor revokes the guardianship.

Maggie T. v. Sally T. · filed 2022-10-27(B)(1)

But mother voluntarily agreed to the guardianship and never revoked it, as she had the right to do. ... Still, the evidence shows grandparents placed few restrictions on—and in fact facilitated—mother’s contact with P.T. ... The trial record does not support finding grandparents persistently and substantially restricted mother’s ability to interact with P.T. and mother did not revoke the guardianship as was her right.

A parent abandons a child by providing no meaningful support, contact, or supervision during the dependency, and belated reengagement after more than eighteen months does not undo that objective conduct.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to D.C. · filed 2022-11-17(B)(1)

Indeed, nothing in the record suggests father made even “minimal efforts to support and communicate with” D.C. ... The superior court also found father did not attempt to visit D.C. after her June 2020 removal until his belated efforts in early 2022—more than 18 months later. ... But the superior court considered this belated participation “too little, too late,” especially considering the evaluator believed father was not forthcoming.

Abandonment under § 8-533(B)(1) is not justified by alleged interference when the parent makes no effort to seek parenting time, ask for contact information, or communicate through available relatives.

Samuel P. v. Mindy D., A.P. · filed 2022-12-01(B)(1)

Moreover, Father did not seek out parenting time through the courts, or additional time through Mother, because he felt the arrangement with paternal grandparents “was working.” And although Mother never shared her address with Father, he did not ask her for it. Nor did he ever attempt to contact Mother through his parents. Father has not shown that Mother restricted Father’s ability to interact with A.P.

An out-of-state parent cannot avoid abandonment under § 8-533(B)(1) by blaming DCS when the parent demands but never completes paternity testing and ignores offered virtual visits and parenting classes.

Kaelyn W. v. Dcs, A.W. · filed 2023-02-02(B)(1)

DCS referred him for an out-of-state paternity test—but Father never completed this testing. ... DCS offered Father virtual visitation and requested that he seek parenting classes. Father did neither. ... The burden to act as a parent rests with the parent, who should assert his legal rights at the first and every opportunity.

Uncertainty about paternity does not justify abandonment under § 8-533(B)(1) when a man has reasonable grounds to believe he may be the father but fails to investigate or assert parental rights.

Roland T. v. Jessica D. · filed 2023-02-07(B)(1)

But Father’s uncertainty about his paternity does not justify abandonment. ... Despite knowing of this possibility, Father never pursued his parental rights through Mother or ... family court. Thus, reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that Father abandoned R.H.

Diligent efforts under § 8-533(B)(3) and (B)(8)(c) are assessed over the entire dependency, so only four months of the highest-level counseling does not defeat years of other services.

In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to C.K. · filed 2023-03-02(B)(3), (B)(8)(c)

Mother stresses that she received only four months of Ph.D.-level counseling before termination, but we examine the services Mother received over the entire dependency. ... Beyond that, Mother was often erratic during those counseling sessions and refused to acknowledge her mental health issues. The Ph.D. therapist testified that Mother did not show progress.

A private petitioner has no Jessie D. duty to provide reunification services or maintain the familial bond before seeking termination under § 8-533(B)(4).

Timothy C., Judy C. v. Natalie S. · filed 2023-03-28(B)(4)

However, Jessie D.’s holding specifically applies to situations in which the State is a petitioner; it does not apply to a private petitioner. ... It therefore erred in finding Guardians had a duty to “maintain the familial bond while [Mother] was incarcerated.”

Additional services need not be provided when they would not address the reasons for termination and the parent’s own refusal to take reasonable steps makes them futile.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to K.L. · filed 2023-04-25(B)(3), (B)(8)

In any event, the services that Mother identifies as lacking would not, for the most part, address the multiple reasons why the superior court severed Mother’s parental rights—prolonged substance abuse (see A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3)) and length of time in out-of-home placement (see A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)) due to Mother’s abuse of marijuana and alcohol, failure to address her mental health issues, and inability to recognize and meet Child’s special needs. DCS is not “required to provide every conceivable service . . . .” See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994).

DCS provides diligent services to an incarcerated parent when it preserves regular visitation through relatives and need not duplicate services the parent already receives from other sources.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.M. · filed 2023-05-09(B)(8)

Because DCS is not required to duplicate services a parent receives from other sources, Father’s regular contact with A.M., whether arranged by DCS or by relatives, refute any suggestion that Father was denied an opportunity to participate in visitation with A.M. during the dependency proceedings.

DCS’s reasonable-efforts duty encompasses ADA accommodations, but it need not add transportation or housing-navigation help absent evidence that the parent required it.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to N.S. · filed 2023-05-23(B)(3), (B)(8)

DCS’s reasonable efforts requirement is consistent with and encompasses the Americans with Disabilities Act’s reasonable accommodation requirement. Jessica P. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 34, 39, ¶ 15 (App. 2021). ... Mother cites to nothing in the record indicating she needed additional help navigating housing resources.

A parent fails the abandonment standard by passively accepting an uncle-like role, providing occasional gifts, and not seeking court-ordered parenting time, and § 8-533(C) permits consideration of substantiated abuse or neglect from another jurisdiction.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.W. · filed 2023-03-14(B)(1), (C)

The court concluded that Father's failure to “vigorously” pursue his legal rights and remedies by seeking a normal parental relationship with Child—as opposed to passively accepting a role in Child's life equivalent to that of an “uncle or godfather”—strongly supported a finding that Father abandoned Child.

Knowing of a child’s birth but delaying paternity, maintaining only intermittent agency contact, and providing minimal visits and support can establish abandonment.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to N.C. · filed 2023-03-28(B)(1)

The superior court therefore found that Father had taken only minimal steps to establish a relationship with N.C., and reasonable evidence supports that finding. Kenneth B. v. Tina B., 226 Ariz. 33, 37, ¶ 18 (App. 2010) (If a parent makes “only minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child,” such minimal conduct can support finding the parent has abandoned the child.).

DCS is not statutorily required to provide reunification services before termination for abandonment.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.K. and A.K. · filed 2023-05-30(B)(1)

DCS is not statutorily required to provide reunification services when the parental rights are terminated on grounds of abandonment under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). See Bobby G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 506, 510, ¶ 11 (App. 2008) (“[N]either [A.R.S.] § 8-533 nor federal law requires that a parent be provided reunification services before the court may terminate the parent’s rights on grounds of abandonment.”).

DCS has no obligation to provide reunification services before termination for abandonment, even when the absent parent seeks additional time for services after being located and incarcerated shortly before trial.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.O. · filed 2024-06-25(B)(1)

As for the abandonment ground, DCS was not obligated to provide Mother with reunification services. ... The juvenile court’s unchallenged finding of abandonment is, alone, a sufficient statutory ground for termination.

Section 8-533(B)(1) allows a defense to abandonment based on interference with a parent’s efforts to establish a relationship, but the mother’s actions here did not amount to such interference.

Harry W. v. Dcs, L.M. · filed 2021-10-05(B)(1)

The court did not err in determining that “Mother’s actions do not rise to the level of interference required to establish a defense to abandonment.”

A parent's restriction of the other parent's access defeats an abandonment claim only when the restriction is wrongful.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.R. and A.R. · filed 2023-09-19(B)(1)

The well-established principle that “a parent who has persistently and substantially restricted the other parent’s interaction with their child” may not then rely on the other parent’s “limited involvement with the child” to “prove abandonment,” Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 293, ¶ 1 (App. 2013), applies only if the parent wrongfully restricts the other parent’s access to the child.

A parent must persistently maintain the parent-child relationship and vigorously assert legal rights despite obstacles, including by using available contacts or seeking parenting time.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.M. · filed 2023-10-24(B)(1)

In any case, even if Mother could be said to have interfered with Father’s relationship with A.M., a parent “must act persistently” to foster and maintain the parent-child relationship despite obstacles that may arise. See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250, ¶ 22. Irrespective of Mother’s conduct, Father had an obligation to act persistently to maintain his relationship with A.M. and “vigorously assert his legal rights to the extent necessary.” See id. (citation omitted).

A parent may petition to terminate the other parent's rights for abandonment, and six months without a normal parental relationship creates a rebuttable presumption that requires the other parent to show just cause.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.C. · filed 2024-01-18(A), (B)(1)

A parent may petition to terminate the parental rights of another parent who has abandoned their child in common. A.R.S. § 8-533(A), (B)(1). The petitioning parent must prove the other parent failed to “provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child, including providing normal supervision.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1). A parent’s failure to maintain a “normal parental relationship with the child without just cause” for six months creates a rebuttable presumption of abandonment. Id.

A parent's delay in establishing paternity and beginning visitation may support an abandonment finding.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.C. · filed 2024-02-06(B)(1)

When determining whether a parent abandoned a child, the superior court may consider the parent’s level and type of support, the parent’s participation in visitation, the parent’s engagement in services, and the parent’s delay in completing a paternity test. See, e.g., Kenneth B. v. Tina B., 226 Ariz. 33, 37 ¶ 20 (App. 2010) (noting evidence of regular visitation, gifts, clothes, cards, and food would factor into whether mother provided reasonable support); Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352–53 (App. 1994) (considering mother’s failure to participate in services as a factor favoring termination); Pima Cnty. Juv. Sev. Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 98 (1994) (considering delay in establishing paternity to decide whether father promptly asserted his legal rights). Here, the superior court found father’s delay in paternity testing and starting visitation evidenced abandonment.

A parent claiming court-ordered contact restrictions as just cause must pursue lawful remedies and satisfy available conditions rather than remain inactive.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.F. · filed 2024-03-12(B)(1)

More importantly, Mother could have unilaterally eliminated the requirement for supervised visitation by submitting to weekly drug tests, which she failed to do for over two years. Nor did she seek any relief from the court regarding weekly drug tests.

Just cause is a rebuttal to the six-month presumption of abandonment, not a separate exception, and following criminal counsel’s advice does not excuse six years of parental inaction.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to B.W. · filed 2024-03-19(B)(1)

To the extent Father believes he presented a “just cause” showing as an exception to abandonment, he is mistaken—by the terms of the statute, a “just cause” showing is merely a rebuttal to a time-based presumption of abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8-531(1).

Steady efforts to secure therapeutic intervention, communicate, give gifts, and inquire about the child may defeat abandonment despite prolonged lack of direct contact.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.A. · filed 2024-04-25(B)(1)

Further, Father demonstrated a consistent effort to communicate with C.A. by texting Mother repeatedly, requesting to drop off gifts, and inquiring about C.A.'s wellbeing. See Pima Cnty. Juv. Severance Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 97 (1994) (noting that when circumstances prevent a parent “from exercising traditional methods of bonding . . . he must act persistently to establish the relationship however possible”).

A parent who claims the other parent interfered with contact must vigorously assert legal rights, including seeking enforcement or modification of visitation orders, to avoid abandonment.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to B.T. · filed 2024-07-16(B)(1)

Most importantly, the father in Calvin B. “‘vigorously assert[ed] his legal rights’ to see his son” by petitioning the court to enforce the standing visitation orders and for modification several times. See Calvin B., 232 Ariz. at 294-95, 298, ¶¶ 3, 5, 9, 29 (quoting Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250, ¶ 22). By contrast, here, in the years of her incarceration, Mother did not once ask the court to enforce visitation under the stipulated orders.

Six months without contact, reasonable support, normal supervision, or a normal parental relationship may establish abandonment even when supervised visitation was offered.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.D. · filed 2024-07-23(B)(1)

At the termination hearing, a Department specialist testified Aaron D. had last had contact with the child six months before the termination adjudication, despite being offered “[n]umerous supervised visitation referrals.” The specialist also testified Aaron D. did not support the child and did not maintain a normal parental relationship with the child. The superior court found Aaron D., without just cause, failed to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child, failed to provide the child reasonable support, failed to maintain regular contact with the child, and failed to provide the child normal supervision. See id. Even if the superior court had not found Aaron D.—through his absence—had admitted the allegations of abandonment in the termination motion, the evidence was sufficient for the superior court’s findings.

Reunification services must offer a reasonable prospect of success and a chance to become a safe parent, but DCS need not provide every conceivable or futile service.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.S. · filed 2024-08-22(B)(3), (B)(8)(b)-(c)

To fulfill this obligation, DCS must provide services with a “reasonable prospect of success” to afford the parent the time and opportunity to become, if possible, a safe and effective parent. See Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 34 (App. 1999). But DCS need not offer “every ... conceivable service” or those that would prove futile. See id. at ¶ 37; Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS–501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). In assessing the adequacy of reunification services, the court considers the totality of the circumstances, including the services DCS offered throughout the dependency and the parent’s participation in those services. Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 22–23, ¶¶ 48, 49 (App. 2019).

A parent's disagreement with a child's choices is not itself abandonment, but termination may rest on the parent's failure to develop a normal relationship or provide emotional and financial support.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to E.M. · filed 2024-09-26(B)(1)

But the court did not terminate Father’s rights based on his opinions alone. The court found that Father’s “positions on these issues are not what this case is about.” Father failed to develop a parental relationship with his child, support his child emotionally or financially, and then wanted to exercise parental control over her decisions.

Physical distance and modest contact must be assessed in context, and continuing efforts to communicate may defeat abandonment despite no in-person visits.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.S. · filed 2024-11-26(B)(1)

Considering Father lived in Washington and the children lived in Arizona, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Father, despite his lack of in-person contact, had not abandoned the children.

A parent cannot prove abandonment from limited involvement that the petitioner persistently and substantially restricted.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.C. · filed 2025-01-14(B)(1)

But “a parent who has persistently and substantially restricted the other parent’s interaction with their child may not prove abandonment based on evidence that the other has had only limited involvement with the child.” Calvin B. v. Brittney B., 232 Ariz. 292, 293–94 ¶ 1 (App. 2013).

Reunification services are not required before termination for abandonment.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.P. · filed 2025-04-01(B)(1)

But reunification services are not required before finding abandonment, so we need not address Daniel’s argument. See Bobby G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 506, 510 ¶ 11 (App. 2008) (“[N]either § 8-533 nor federal law requires that a parent be provided reunification services before the court may terminate the parent’s rights on ground of abandonment.”).

Filing a paternity petition after twenty-nine months of no contact does not preclude abandonment when the six-month presumption already attached and no just cause explains the absence.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to R.E. and M.E. · filed 2025-04-01(B)(1)

But as of February 2023, Father had already failed to maintain a normal parental relationship with the Children for 29 months. See A.R.S. § 8-531(1) (failure to maintain a normal parent-child relationship without just cause for six months is prima facie evidence of abandonment). And Father provides no “just cause” to explain his failure to maintain a relationship with the Children.

Sporadic efforts to establish a relationship after DCS takes custody do not negate a preceding extended period in which the parent did not perform parental responsibilities.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to K.B. · filed 2025-11-03(B)(1)

In sum, Mother’s sporadic efforts to establish a relationship with K.B. from Ohio after May 2023 do not negate the extended period of inaction supporting the abandonment finding. See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 8 (1990).

Reasonable support, regular contact, and normal supervision are factors in determining abandonment rather than separate elements that the petitioner must independently prove.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.N. and A.N. · filed 2025-11-25(B)(1)

Likewise, this Court’s prior opinions have described “reasonable support,” “regular contact” and “normal supervision” not as elements the petitioner must prove, but as factors the juvenile court must consider in determining whether a parent has abandoned his or her child. Kenneth B. v. Tina B., 226 Ariz. 33, 37, ¶ 18 (App. 2010) (quoting A.R.S. § 8-531(1)); see also Steven M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 254 Ariz. 426, 430, ¶ 12 (App. 2023). Because the concept of abandonment and terms like “reasonable support” or “normal parental relationship” are imprecise and elastic, these are questions of fact left to the juvenile court to resolve. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-4283, 133 Ariz. 598, 601 (App. 1982).

Post-motion efforts to reestablish a parent-child relationship do not erase an earlier extended failure to maintain regular contact.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to W.M. · filed 2026-04-08(B)(1)

Though commendable, Mother’s post-motion efforts to re-establish a relationship with W.M. do not absolve her failure to maintain regular contact with W.M. for almost a year. Cf. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS–500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 8 (1990).

A parent may defeat abandonment by showing unreasonable interference with the opportunity to develop a normal relationship, without proving criminal access interference.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to D.A. · filed 2026-05-15(B)(1)

On the contrary, a parent may defeat a claim of abandonment by showing that the other parent unreasonably interfered with his or her “opportunity and ability to develop a normal parental relationship[.]” Calvin B., 232 Ariz. at 297, ¶ 21.

Section 8-533(B)(1) permits a court to consider conduct before paternity was established when deciding whether a parent abandoned a child; unestablished paternity is not an automatic defense.

In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to H.B. · filed 2026-06-16(B)(1)

These subsections make clear that the absence of established paternity is not an automatic defense to the termination of parental rights.

A nineteen-month absence establishes prima facie abandonment, and two or three visits after the termination petition do not automatically rebut it.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.S. · filed 2026-06-19(B)(1)

The 19-month gap is prima facie evidence of abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8-531(1). Mother did arrange two or three visits following Father’s petition; however, the presumption is not “rebutted merely by post-petition attempts to reestablish a parental relationship.” See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 8 (1990).