Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitation period on actions for injuries done to another person, including an assault-and-battery claim.

Skousen v. Nidy · filed 1961-11-29

The complaint states a good cause of action for assault and battery. The trial court was correct in applying the two year statute-of limitations in A.R.S. § 12-542 (1956J “for injuries done to the person of another.”

Section 12-542 requires an action for injury to another person to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Wetzel v. Commercial Chair Company · filed 1972-08-24

At this point then, the PBSW summary judgment is exactly like that of Commercial, and adopting the reasoning above, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of PBSW on the basis that the two-year personal injury statute of limitations, A.R.S. § 12-542, was properly applied.

Paragraph 5 requires an action for converting another's personal property to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Walker v. Walker · filed 1972-09-125

Appellant did not file his action for conversion until September 27, 1968, more than two years and seven months after that action had accrued. It therefore follows that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and the appellant was entitled to no relief based thereon.

Section 12-542(A) requires personal-injury actions to be commenced within two years after accrual and prosecuted with due diligence thereafter.

Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Maricopa County Superior Court · filed 1973-02-13A

We therefore hold, under the facts of this case, that the action was not commenced within the statute of limitations, and is now barred. ... Plaintiff has not met the requirement of due diligence in prosecuting her action after its commencement, as required by the statute of limitations, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted on this ground also.

Section 12-542(5) requires a conversion action to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, and the same period applies to an insurer pursuing the insured's converted-property claim by subrogation.

Gourdin v. Maryland Casualty Co. · filed 1973-11-19(5)

The insured’s cause of action against appellants was for conversion and fell within the two-year period prescribed by A.R.S. § 12-542(5). Having stepped into its insured’s shoes, appellee was also subject to the same period of limitations.

Section 12-542 requires an action for trespass causing injury to another's estate or property to be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Gittner-Louviere Engineering, Inc. v. Superior Court · filed 1977-06-093

Since the amended complaint was filed past the two-year statute of limitations, the motion for summary judgment should have been granted.

Section 12-542's personal-injury period begins running from the accident date.

Matter of Estate of Chase · filed 1980-01-24

This statute commenced to operate against appellee's claim from the date of the accident, July 9, 1973.

Section 12-542 requires a personal-injury action to be commenced within two years after accrual; the court applied that period from the accident date and treated the action as timely when filed exactly two years later, subject to the probate suspension rule in § 14-3802.

Chase v. White · filed 1980-01-24

This statute commenced to operate against appellee’s claim from the date of the accident, July 9, 1973.

Section 12-542 gives plaintiffs two years to bring actions for injuries to another's person, and a timely complaint naming a proper fictitious defendant may be served within one year of filing without being barred merely because service occurs after the two-year period.

Lane v. Elco Industries, Inc. · filed 1982-12-16

Elco also urged the trial court to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was barred by the two-year statute of limitations found in A.R.S. § 12-542. Although the Lanes filed their claim within the two-year period, they did not serve Elco with process until almost two-and-one-half years after the injury. ... In summary, we hold that where rule 10(f) is properly used to allege a claim against a fictitious defendant, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to comply with rule 15(c). Where so named in a complaint filed within the statute of limitations, such a defendant may be served within one year of the filing of the complaint by the use of an alias summons in which the true name is set forth.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitation period on personal-injury and property-damage actions, running from accrual; for a product-liability action based on negligence, the cause of action accrued when the injuries and property damage occurred.

Kellogg v. Willy's Motors, Inc. · filed 1984-04-03(1), (3)

If the action proceeds under the negligence theory, as plaintiffs have done in their amended complaint, the clear wording of the statute excludes it from the 12-year limitation and A.R.S. § 12-542 controls. ... Thus, the cause of action accrued on the date the injuries and property damage occurred.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for tort claims; it does not bar a legal-malpractice action pleaded and supported as breach of an oral contract.

Towns v. Frey · filed 1986-03-10

The trial court held that the action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims, A.R.S. § 12-542. Appellant contends this was error because she had an action against the appellee based on an oral contract which was not barred by the statute of limitations. We agree with appellant. ... Appellant subsequently filed this action for breach of contract within the three-year statute of limitations provided for contracts not in writing in A.R.S. § 12-543. ... The determinative issue here is whether appellant’s sole and exclusive claim against appellee was for negligence. ... Legal malpractice usually con^ sists of both a tort and a breach of contract.

Section 12-542(1) requires personal-injury actions, including medical-malpractice actions, to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, and the court applies that period to the plaintiffs’ emotional-distress/spoliation claim arising independently of medical treatment.

Patricia Langager and Leroy Langager, Husband and Wife v. Lake Havasu Community Hospital · filed 1986-09-16(1)

However, plaintiff is confronted with another statute of limitations problem if this approach is pursued. ARS § 12-542 creates a two year statute of limitation for claims for this type of tort. ... In the instant case, the plaintiffs clearly allege that the damages they seek are of a unique nature arising from an act totally independent of the medical treatment that was afforded to the plaintiff. ... The district court’s decision is affirmed in its entirety.

Section 12-542(1) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including the § 1983 claim at issue.

De Luna v. Farris · filed 1988-03-09(1)

Under the two-year personal injury limitations period set forth in A.R.S. § 12-542(1), De Luna had until June 7, 1985 to file his complaint. He failed to do so, and thus this action is time-barred.

Section 12-542(1) imposes a two-year limitations period on an insurer’s subrogation action for an insured’s personal-injury tort claim, running from the date of injury rather than from the insurer’s payment of benefits.

Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance v. Vargas · filed 1988-05-03(1)

However, the fact that the statute conditions an insurer’s, subrogation rights on its payment of the insured’s damages does not alter the fact that the claim the statute permits the insurer to pursue is the insured’s common law tort claim for personal injuries. That claim clearly accrues on the date the insured is injured, and the applicable two-year statute of limitations therefore commences to run at that time.

The statute imposes a two-year limitations period on personal-injury claims, and a post-expiration reassignment cannot retroactively defeat the limitations defense.

Moore v. Toshiba International Corp. · filed 1989-03-30

Rather, the action was filed some five days prior to the expiration of the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See A.R.S. § 12-542. At the time the action was filed, the claim had not been reassigned to plaintiff by the worker’s compensation insurance carrier as authorized by § 23-1023(B). Therefore, plaintiff lacked any interest in the claim and was not authorized to maintain the action against Toshiba. See Stephens v. Textron, Inc., 127 Ariz. 227, 619 P.2d 736 (1980); Dunn v. Progress Industries, Inc., 153 Ariz. 62, 734 P.2d 604 (App.1986); Hills v. Salt River Project Association, 144 Ariz. 421, 698 P.2d 216 (App.1985).

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for negligence actions.

Insurance Co. of North America v. Superior Court · filed 1990-01-09

Accordingly, because counts one and two of the complaint do not allege a cause of action based upon a liability created by statute, they are not subject to the one-year statute of limitations set forth in § 12-541(3), but are governed by the two-year limitation on negligence actions. A.R.S. § 12-542.

Section 12-542(1) provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including a claim characterized as deprivation of constitutional rights.

Dunlap v. City of Phoenix · filed 1990-12-27(1)

Dunlap’s complaint sounds in deprivation of his rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. This is an injury to the person and the statute of limitations is therefore two years under A.R.S. § 12-542(1) (Supp.1989).

Section 12-542(1) provides a two-year limitations period for a common-law cause of action seeking damages for personal injury.

Andrews v. Eddie's Place, Inc. · filed 2000-12-26(1)

We therefore conclude that the two-year statute of limitations in § 12-542(1) applies to appellant’s common law cause of action against appellee, rather than the one-year limitations period in § 12-541(5).

Section 12-542 bars personal-injury actions filed more than two years after accrual, including actions against minors without appointed guardians ad litem.

Montano v. Browning · filed 2002-06-20

Because Margaret filed her action against Montaño more than two years after it had accrued, her action and any derivative claim of her husband’s is time barred by § 12-542.

Section 12-542 requires an action for personal injuries to be commenced and prosecuted within two years after accrual, and an untimely complaint is barred absent applicable statutory or equitable tolling.

Porter v. Spader · filed 2010-09-21

Here, A.R.S. § 12-542 provides in pertinent part as follows: ... Except as provided in § 12-551 [the statute of limitations regarding product liability] there shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward, the following actions: ... 1. For injuries done to the person of another____ ... Accordingly, we conclude that the limitations period established by § 12-542 was not equitably suspended or tolled. Plaintiffs complaint was untimely filed as a matter of law.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims through Arizona's limitations law.

Holland v. City of Phoenix · filed 2012-11-19

The district court properly dismissed Holland’s claims as time-barred because all claims accrued more than two years before Holland filed his complaint. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821 (one-year statute of limitations for actions against any public entity or public employee); TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991-92 (for § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, which begin to accrue “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury”); see also Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (mere continuing impact from past violations not actionable).

Section 12-542(1) imposes a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims in federal court.

Houston v. Arizona State Board of Educati · filed 2014-06-18(1)

The district court properly dismissed Houston’s § 1983 claims as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (for § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and federal law for determining accrual; a § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of the action).

Subsection (1) imposes a two-year limitations period on personal injury actions.

Johnny Woods, Jr. v. City of Chandler · filed 2015-05-26(1)

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Woods’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims because Woods did not raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he filed his complaint within Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); see also Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1048 (for § 1983 actions, federal courts apply the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations; federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues).

Section 12-542(1) requires personal-injury actions to be commenced within two years after accrual.

Bonelli v. Mulla · filed 2018-08-22(1)

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Bonelli filed his complaint more than two years after his action accrued on February 19, 2010. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1) (action for personal injury shall not be commenced more than two years after accrual); see also Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 871-72 (9th Cir. 2018) (state tolling and statute of limitations for personal injury claims apply to § 1983 claims, and federal law governs when a claim accrues, which is when a plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that forms the basis for his cause of action).

Section 12-542(1) requires an action alleging a personal injury claim to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Petramala v. City of Scottsdale · filed 2019-08-28(1)

The district court properly dismissed Petramala’s action as time-barred because Petramala filed his complaint more than two years after his action accrued in September 2004. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1) (action alleging personal injury claim shall be commenced within two years after cause of action accrues); Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2018) (state tolling and statute of limitations for personal injury claims apply to § 1983 action, and federal law governs when a claim accrues, which is when a plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that forms the basis for his cause of action).

Section 12-542 provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, which governs the timeliness of this § 1983 claim.

Carl Ball Caples v. City of Phoenix · filed 2020-03-09

The complaint was untimely under Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Section 12-542(1) provides a two-year statute of limitations for Arizona personal-injury actions.

Blomdahl v. Jones · filed 2020-08-13(1)

The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1).

Subsection (1) imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which applies to § 1983 and § 1985 claims.

Bitsui v. Rassas · filed 2021-04-01(1)

But there is no doubt that § 1983 and § 1985 claims have a statute of limitations, and such claims against Judge Sukenic based on events from 2015 and 2016 are time barred.

Section 12-542 requires actions for personal injury to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Blomdahl 340267 v. Jaffe · filed 2020-11-05

In Arizona, the limitations period for personal injury claims is two years. TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991; see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (providing that actions for personal injury must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues).

Section 12-542(1) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Miller v. Leahy · filed 2022-04-08(1)

The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions runs two years after the cause of actions’ accrual.

Section 12-542(1) sets a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Arizona.

Newson v. Arizona, State of · filed 2023-03-22(1)

The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1).

Section 12-542 provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions.

Stephens v. Arizona, State of · filed 2023-06-22

Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations. Instead, federal courts borrow the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Arizona’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. A.R.S. § 12-542.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Andrich v. Adel · filed 2023-10-11

Arizona imposes a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 12-542(1) provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims in Arizona.

Freeman 050101 v. Thornell · filed 2024-01-12(1)

The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1).

Section 12-542(1) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on personal-injury claims.

Begay v. Winslow, City Of · filed 2024-03-29(1)

The district court properly dismissed Begay’s action because his claim was barred by the statute of limitations and Begay did not allege facts sufficient to establish equitable tolling. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claim); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 394 (2007) (federal courts in § 1983 actions apply the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions and borrow applicable tolling provisions from state law); Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 964 (Ariz. 1998) (unsound mind equitable tolling may not be established by “conclusory averments such as assertions that one was unable to manage daily affairs or understand legal rights and liabilities” but rather requires plaintiff to provide “specific facts”).

Section 12-542(1) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, which supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims in Arizona.

Olmos 196384 v. Cunico · filed 2025-07-07(1)

To the extent Plaintiff raises a claim relating to the denial of free materials from 2013 to 2019, such a claim is untimely. The statute of limitations in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1).

Section 12-542 requires personal-injury actions in Arizona to be commenced within two years after the cause of action arises; that limitations period applies to § 1983 claims through federal borrowing of state personal-injury limitations periods.

Martinez v. Arizona, State of · filed 2025-07-11

Arizona plaintiffs must commence personal injury actions in Arizona courts within two years after the cause of action arises. See A.R.S. § 12-542; Marks v. Parra, 785 F.2d 1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying A.R.S. § 12-542 to a § 1983 claim). Martinez claims the events leading to this lawsuit occurred on March 17th, 2022, more than three years ago. (Doc. 1 at 4.) Martinez’ § 1983 claim is time barred.

Section 12-542(1) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on personal-injury actions, which applies to this § 1983 claim.

Atanasoff v. Town of Fountain Hills · filed 2002-04-16(1)

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Atanasoff s claims are time-barred. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-542(1); see also De Luna v. Farris, 841 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir.1988) (concluding that section 1983 action was barred by *965Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury).

Section 12-542's two-year limitation does not bar a reinstated action when the original complaint was timely filed and the reinstatement adds no new claim.

Depinto v. Provident Security Life Insurance Company · filed 1963-11-20

The next question presented is whether the action is barred by Arizona statutes of limitations. In this connection reliance is placed on A.R.S. 12-542, providing a two-year limitation, and upon A.R.S. 12-550, providing a four-year limitation. ... When an action is reinstated, the effect of the statute of limitations is to be determined by the date the complaint was originally filed, unless the result will be to inject a new claim. As indicated above no new claim was injected in the further proceedings on remand. We therefore hold that this action is not barred by the Arizona statutes of limitations.

Section 12-542(3) requires an action for trespass or injury to another's estate or property to be commenced within two years, applies that period to an action for a false return of service, and delays accrual until discovery or reasonable notice when the act is inherently concealed.

Marsh v. Hawkins · filed 1968-02-28(3)

At common law, an action for false return was considered an action in trespass on the case Whitaker v. Sumner, 7 Ackering 551, 19 Am.Dec. 298 (Mass.1829). Both our venue and limitation statutes have come to us from Texas. Pride v. Superior Court, 87 Ariz. 157, 161, 348 P.2d 924 (1960); Hagenauer v. Detroit Copper Mining Co., 14 Ariz. 74, 92, 124 P. 803 (1912). In connection with our venue statute, we have followed Texas decisions which have held that the word “trespass” includes action known at common law as trepass on the case. Pride v. Superior Court, supra, at 161, 348 P.2d 924. By analogy we reach the same result here. We hold that A.R.S. § 12-542 is the pertinent statute. ... We regard this act to be analogous to an “underground trespass,” and hold that the statute of limitations does not run until “the other party discovers or is put upon reasonable notice of the breach of the trust.” Taylor v. Betts, supra. This rule applies to all actions for false return.

Section 12-542 bars a medical-malpractice action after the limitations period expires, and a complaint that does not name a known defendant does not toll the statute as to that defendant.

Van Campen v. Upjohn Company · filed 1973-01-10

The May 1970 original complaint did not name Dr. Oliver as a defendant although his name and identity were known. The trial court properly concluded that the original complaint did not toll the running of the statute of limitations as to Dr. Oliver. Since the second amended complaint (filed May 1971) was the first complaint to name Dr. Oliver as a defendant and the cause of action accrued in 1968, we agree that A.R.S. § 12-542 bars the action against Dr. Oliver.

Section 12-542(2) supplies the two-year limitation for wrongful-death actions and controls instead of the limitation period for the underlying cause of action.

Rogers v. Smith Kline & French Laboratories · filed 1967-06-02(2)

Apparently the legislature intended that the predecessor of A.R.S. § 12-542, subsec. 2 would cover wrongful death actions and that two statutes of limitations covering the same thing was unnecessary. ... In view of the foregoing, we conclude that A.R.S. § 12-542, subsec. 2 is specifically directed to the wrongful death action, ... so that it controls rather than the limitation period of the underlying cause of action.

Section 12-542(1) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions for injury to a person.

Lynn v. Helitec Corp. · filed 1984-12-18(1)

The compensation fund then reassigned the claim to appellants Baker who filed the claim within the two year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. A.R.S. § 12-542(1), (2). ... In the case before us, the compensation fund’s reassignment to appellants Baker was valid and Baker’s claim was properly brought within the two year statute of limitations.

Section 12-542 requires personal-injury actions to be commenced and prosecuted within two years after accrual, but a complaint relating back to an earlier timely complaint is timely under Arizona law.

Quiles v. Heflin Steel Supply Co. · filed 1985-02-19

A.R.S. § 12-542 provides that an action for personal injuries must be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues. ... We hold that under Arizona law Quiles’ complaint in intervention related back to Commercial’s complaint. ... Here the event (Quiles’ injury) was the same and relation back applies. Quiles’ complaint was timely filed.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for tort actions, running from when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the defendant’s negligent conduct.

Angus Medical Co. v. Digital Equipment Corp. · filed 1992-03-31

The applicable statute of limitations, absent an enforceable agreement between the parties, is two years. Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. (hereafter cited as A.R.S.) § 12-542. ... Therefore, the tort action accrued no later than December 1984, whether it was governed by the two year statutory period or the eighteen-month contract limitation, and the complaint was untimely when filed in January, 1987.

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year limitations period for Arizona wrongful-termination claims, and a claim filed within two years is timely.

Kelley v. City of Mesa · filed 1994-03-12

Defendants also claim that this count is barred by the one year statute of limitations for actions arising under statute. In Felton v. Unisource Corp., 940 F.2d 503 (9th Cir.1991), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s finding that wrongful termination claims in Arizona are barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in A.R.S. § 12-542. Plaintiff filed her complaint within two years of her termination and, thus, Count II is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 12-542 can bar an action against state employees as untimely.

Langley v. Fidel · filed 1996-07-18

Moreover, we agree with the district court that the judges and attorneys are immune from liability for damages, Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.1986) (en banc), and that the action against the state employees is time-barred by A.R.S. § 12-542.

Section 12-542(1) establishes a two-year statute of limitations applicable in Arizona.

MacCool v. Schriro · filed 2008-05-29(1)

To the extent that MacCool’s claims arise out of either his validation as a member of the Aryan Brotherhood on October 10, 1997, or his transfer to New Jersey on April 5, 1999, they are barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable in Arizona. A.R.S. § 12-542(1).

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.

Thompson v. Paul · filed 2009-06-30

A.R.S. § 12-542 prescribes a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims. “Arizona courts have concluded that the two-year limitations period found in A.R.S. § 12-542 applies to IIED claims.” ... As such, the statute of limitations began to run in February 2004. ... Therefore, Plaintiffs’ IIED claim was timely filed as of the original complaint.

Section 12-542(1) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Dodd v. Unknown Parties · filed 2012-04-26(1)

The district court properly dismissed Dodd’s claims as time-barred because the claims accrued more than four years before Dodd filed his complaint. See id. at 927 (for § 1983 claims, the courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions).

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, and that period applies to a § 1983 false-arrest claim through the forum state’s personal-injury limitations rule.

Lopez v. City of Phoenix · filed 2015-09-28

Lopez’s claim for false arrest was time-barred. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-94 (a district court has the power to stay a civil action while related criminal charges are pending); Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000) (standard of review); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387-90, 397 (for § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations, and the statute of limitations on a false arrest or false imprisonment claim “begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process”).

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for negligent misrepresentation claims.

Cavan v. Maron · filed 2016-04-26

In Arizona, the statute of limitations for fraud is three years, see A.R.S.. § 12-543(3), and for negligent misrepresentation is two years, Hullett v. Cousin, 204 Ariz. 292, 63 P.3d 1029, 1034 (2003) (citing A.R.S. § 12-542).

Section 12-542 governs general tort actions, including abuse-of-process claims, and provides a two-year statute of limitations.

Zeman v. Baumkirchner · filed 2016-06-07

Instead, § 12-542, which governs general tort actions, applies here; accordingly, the statute of limitations for abuse of process is two years.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and that limitations period applies to these § 1983 claims.

Marroquin v. Fernandez-Carr · filed 2016-11-23

The district court properly dismissed Marroquin’s deliberate indifference and retaliation claims against defendants Ward and Hudson because those claims are barred by the statute of limitations and Marroquin failed to plead facts demonstrating that any tolling should apply. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and tolling laws apply to § 1983 actions).

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on Arizona tort claims, and the period may be tolled under adverse domination until wrongdoing directors no longer control the corporation.

Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. Plattner, Schneidman, Schneider, Jeffries & Plattner, P.C. · filed 2017-06-07

In Arizona, tort claims such as plaintiffs have asserted here are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. ... This argument fails because “the doctrine of adverse domination ... act[s] to toll the statute of limitations.” ... The statute of limitations was tolled until Hartléy, the third-party CEO, was appointed in January 2013. Plaintiffs filed their claims in May 2013, which makes plaintiffs’ claims timely.

Section 12-542 requires negligence claims to be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues.

11333 Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's · filed 2017-06-13

The negligence claims are barred by section 12-542 of the Arizona Revised Statutes unless “commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues.”

Subsection (2) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions for injuries to another person when death results, including dram-shop actions.

Gallardo v. West Sand · filed 2018-11-15(2)

The intervening three-and-a-half years far surpassed the two-year limitation period following the death of the injured party prescribed by A.R.S. § 12-542(2), yet the complaint asserted no facts demonstrating why it was difficult for the Gallardos to detect the identities of McFadden’s and Sandbar or why it took three-and-a-half years to investigate and discover their identities.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on personal injury claims.

Tapia-Fierro v. Barr · filed 2019-02-25

The district court properly dismissed Tapia-Fierro’s action as time-barred because Tapia-Fierro filed this action more than two years after his claims accrued. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1991) (forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims applies in Bivens actions); see also W. Ctr. for Journalism v. Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000) (a Bivens claim accrues when the plaintiff knows, or should know, of the injury which is the basis of the action).

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on § 1983 actions brought in Arizona.

Johnathan Fields v. McQueen · filed 2019-04-26

The district court properly dismissed Fields’s Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure claim as time-barred because Fields filed this action after the applicable statute of limitations had run.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on personal-injury actions, running from accrual; for § 1983 claims, federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Ochoa 122052 v. Ryan · filed 2019-08-14

In Arizona, the limitations period for personal injury claims is two years. TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991; see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (providing that actions for personal injury must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues).

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period for negligence claims, subject to Arizona’s discovery rule and fraudulent-concealment tolling principles.

Kenneth Eisen and Associates LTD v. Coxcom Incorporated · filed 2020-02-04

The statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim in Arizona is 6 years after the cause of action accrues. A.R.S. § 12-548. The statute of limitations for a negligence claim in Arizona is 2 years after the cause of action accrues. A.R.S. § 12-542. Arizona recognizes the discovery rule, meaning that “a plaintiff’s cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know the facts underlying the cause.” Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 182 Ariz. 586, 588 (1995). The discovery rule applies to breach of contract claims and negligence claims. Id. at 591; Acton v. Morrison, 62 Ariz. 139, 144 (1945). If a defendant fraudulently conceals facts that would give rise to a cause of action, the statute of limitations is tolled “until such concealment is discovered, or reasonably should have been discovered.” Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, 319 ¶ 35 (2002). When discovery occurs and a cause of action accrues are questions of fact for the jury unless there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff possessed the minimum requisite knowledge. Walk, 202 Ariz. at 316, ¶ 23; Doe v. Roe, 191 Ariz. 313, 323 ¶ 32 (1998).

Section 12-542 requires personal-injury actions to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Finkle v. Ryan · filed 2016-03-30

In Arizona, the limitations period for personal injury claims is two years. TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991; see also A.R.S. § 12-542 (providing that actions for personal injury must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues). ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs claims for events occurring prior to June 17, 2012 are barred by the statute of limitations and will dismiss those claims.

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year limitations period for Arizona personal-injury claims; for this § 1983 action, the period was tolled during mandatory prison grievance proceedings.

Day 050715 v. Ryan · filed 2020-06-19

Because these alleged violations occurred, at least in part, while Plaintiff was pursuing the mandatory administrative grievance, during which time the Statute of Limitations was necessarily tolled, and the allegations in the Complaint permit a finding that Plaintiff then filed this action before the two-year limitations period elapsed, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Statute of Limitations and will deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.

Landau v. Jocque · filed 2020-11-16

In Arizona, the statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty (Count 4 of the Complaint) is two years under A.R.S. § 12-542, and three years for fraud (Count 5 of the Complaint) under A.R.S. § 12-543.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, running from the date the cause of action accrues.

Norgaard-Larsen v. Phoenix, City of · filed 2021-07-09

In Arizona, the relevant provision is A.R.S. § 12-542, which provides for a limitations period of two years from the date the cause of action accrues.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on IIED claims, so claims based on 2017 interactions are time-barred when filed in 2020.

Arimilli v. Rezendes · filed 2021-08-04

Plaintiff’s claims have the following statutes of limitations: one year for defamation, A.R.S. § 12-541; two years for IIED, A.R.S. § 12-542; and two years for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Martin v. Weed Inc., No. CV-18-00027-TUC-RM, 2018 WL 2431837, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 30, 2018). ... Plaintiff’s IIED claim is time barred in part. ... Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff’s IIED claim is based on her interactions with Defendant, it is time barred.

Section 12-542 requires personal injury actions to be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues, with accrual determined under Arizona’s discovery rule.

Thornton v. Ethicon Incorporated · filed 2021-09-28

Arizona law requires that personal injury actions be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-542 and -551. ... In sum, the Court concludes that there is a triable issue of fact on when Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued and the jury must determine at what point Plaintiff’s knowledge, understanding and acceptance in the aggregate provided sufficient facts for a cause of action to accrue. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on statute of limitations grounds (Count XVIII) will be denied.

Section 12-542(3) provides a two-year statute of limitations for the breach-of-covenant claim at issue.

Navajo Health Foundation - Sage Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Razaghi Development Company, LLC · filed 2022-03-30(3)

The statute of limitations for this claim is two years.8 A.R.S. § 12-542(3); see also Salcido v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, No. CV-14-02560-PHX-DGC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33399, at *11 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2015).

Section 12-542 requires many tort claims, including aiding-and-abetting claims, to be filed within two years after accrual, and the discovery rule governs when the claim accrues.

Kunasek v. Johnson · filed 2022-09-22

Many tort claims—including a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty as alleged here—must be filed “within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward.” A.R.S. § 12-542; CDT, Inc. v. Addison, Roberts & Ludwig, C.P.A., 198 Ariz. 173, 175, ¶ 6 (App. 2000). Under the discovery rule, which applies here, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or by exercise of reasonable diligence should have known the requisite facts underlying the claim. Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 182 Ariz. 586, 588 (1995). ... Thus, unless his aiding-and-abetting claim accrued before March 24, 2013, his complaint was timely. See A.R.S. § 12-542. ... But because the facts bearing on when Kunasek acquired the requisite knowledge were disputed, the statute of limitations issue was properly presented to the jury, which found he did not have the requisite knowledge before March 24, 2013.

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Arizona, running from the date of accrual.

ABC Sand and Rock Company Incorporated v. Maricopa, County of · filed 2023-08-24

The statute of limitations for claims brought under § 1983 in Arizona is two years from the date of accrual.

Section 12-542(1) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, which supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims in Arizona.

Rand · filed 2025-12-11(1)

The applicable statute of limitations in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1). ... Thus, to be timely, Plaintiff’s claims must have accrued no more than two years before his Complaint was filed in this case on November 26, 2025. ... Any claims with respect to Defendants’ conduct in Hunter v. Pulicicchio are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 equal-protection claims, running from accrual; later consequences such as recurring monthly bills do not restart or toll the period.

Ellis v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District · filed 2020-01-10

Arizona’s statute of limitations governs Plaintiffs’ federal equal protection claims. ... Arizona’s personal injury statute of limitations is “two years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward.” A.R.S. § 12-542. ... The “operative decision” is the Board’s approval of the SEPPs on February 26, 2015. ... Plaintiffs’ statute of limitations does not sit idle until they decide to install solar panel systems after the SEPPs were adopted. ... Similarly, recurring monthly bills are inevitable consequences of the initial “operative decision” and do not toll the statute of limitations. ... Thus, Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims are untimely.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims.

Foley v. Lewis · filed 1996-03-04

We have applied Arizona's two-year statute of limitation for personal injury actions to section 1983 claims. See id. (citing Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-542 (1990)); cf. Vega v. Morris, 905 P.2d 535, 537 (Ariz.Ct.App.1995) (applying two-year statute of limitations to prisoner tort action against prison officials), aff'd, 1996 WL 26945 (Ariz.1996).

Section 12-542(1) establishes a two-year statute of limitations that bars claims brought more than two years after the underlying denial of admission.

Smith v. Department of Education · filed 2005-12-13(1)

The district court properly dismissed Smith’s claims naming Terence Langendoen, Thomas Bever, and Thomas Hixon, because those claims relate to Smith’s 1998 and 1999 denial of admission to the University of Arizona’s linguistic program and therefore are time-barred. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-542(1) (establishing two year statute of limitations); De Luna v. Farris, 841 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir.1988).

Section 12-542 provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions in Arizona.

Montgomery v. Kingman Airport Authority, Inc. · filed 2009-09-04

Because section 1983 contains no statute of limitations, we apply the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims in the state in which the claim accrued. ... The Montgomerys’ claims accrued in Arizona, which applies a two-year statute of limitations to personal injury actions. Ariz.Rev. Stat. § 12-542.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims in Arizona.

Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. William · filed 2004-09-01

The applicable statute of limitations for personal injury claims in Arizona is two years.

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims because those claims borrow Arizona’s personal-injury limitations period.

McKee v. Peoria Unified School District · filed 2013-08-05

Because § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, courts borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279-80, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). In Arizona, that time period is two years. Ariz. Rev.Stat. § 12-542; see TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991.

The two-year limitations period for a forcible-detainer claim begins when the party holding a trustee’s deed makes a written demand for possession, not when the trustee’s sale occurs.

Bucks Financial v. Overley · filed 2023-08-29(6)

Yet, according to statute, the starting point is “the commencement of the forcible entry or detainer.” A.R.S. § 12-542(6). And that occurs when “a person . . . retains possession of . . . real property after [s]he receives written demand of possession” that “the property has been sold through a trustee’s sale under a deed of trust[.]” A.R.S. § 12-1173.01(A)(2). Put more succinctly, the statute of limitations starts when the party with a trustee’s deed makes written demand for possession.

The two-year limitations period applies to forcible detainer actions, and the period is not a defense when the relevant rent-payment or possession-demand events occurred within two years before filing.

Fenter v. Homestead Development and Trust Co. · filed 1966-04-266

In Reeves, this Court recognized the the applicability of the two year statute of limitations in relation to forcible detainer actions, being A.R.S. § 12-542, subsec. 6. In Reeves, the initial possession was wrongful whereas in the case at bar, the Fenters went into possession with the permission of the owner. The defendants urge that since no rent had been paid for more than two years next prior to the filing of the action, the defense of the statute of limitations was a valid defense. This is not true. The plaintiff points out that the next rent was not required to be paid until the time of the sale of the stock, namely the fall of 1962 and further urges that there was no right of action for possession until after the demand had been made and that with reference to both of these events they were well within the two year period next preceding the filing of the action. We are not called upon to decide which of the two approaches urged by. the plaintiff is the proper approach since both are within the two year statutory period.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for the negligence claim, accruing when the insurance claim was denied.

Don Kelland Materials, Inc. v. Langel · filed 1977-02-04

The fraud count is barred by the three-year statute of limitations, A.R.S. § 12-543, and the negligence count by the two-year statute, A.R.S. § 12-542. Like the claim , for breach of contract and warranty, these causes of action accrued when appellant’s claim under the policy was denied.

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period applies to a damages action for breach of trust based on conversion, even when the claim also relates to breach of fiduciary duty.

Crook v. Anderson · filed 1977-05-10

We find nothing in those cases suggesting that where, as here, an action for damages arises from a breach of trust, the statute of limitations should not apply. Indeed, our Supreme Court has held that in an action for breach of trust based on conversion, the conversion statute of limitations does apply. Jack Waite Mining Company v. West, 55 Ariz. 301, 101 P.2d 202 (1940). We similarly reject appellant’s contention that because the action has some relation to breach of fiduciary duty, it is transformed from a tort action to some other sort of action covered by our catch-all statute of limitations, A.R.S. § 12-550, providing a four-year statute of limitations. Jack Waite Mining Company v. West, supra.

Section 12-542 requires legal-malpractice clients to sue within two years after the client is injured by the alleged malpractice.

Amfac Distribution Corp. v. Miller · filed 1983-11-17

We find this argument to be without merit because all persons are affected equally and uniformly by the application of A.R.S. § 12-542. All legal malpractice plaintiff-clients must sue, and all defendant-attorneys must be sued, within two years of the date the client is injured by the alleged malpractice.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on product-liability actions defined by § 12-681, including qualifying property-damage claims regardless of whether pleaded in tort or contract.

Gates v. LaBelle's Distribution of Arizona, Inc. · filed 1985-10-08

By its terms A.R.S. § 12-681 labels as a “product liability action,” any claim which is: (1) brought against a manufacturer or seller of a product, (2) for damages for bodily injury, death, or property damage, (3) caused by or resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, etc. The limitation provided by the above statute does not distinguish between actions based upon differing legal theories,2 but rather focuses on the nature of the damages sought. All actions which satisfy the three elements delineated in A.R.S. § 12-681 are subject to the two year statute of limitations contained in A.R.S. § 12-542, regardless of whether they are otherwise couched in tort or contract language.

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period governs tort claims, including claims for breach of professional duties, even when the pleaded conduct is not equivalent to an action specifically listed in the statute.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Blasdell · filed 1994-09-15(3)

The Sato decision clearly implies that tort claims are governed by section 12-542, regardless of whether the specific actions pled in the complaint are equivalent to the actions described in section 12-542.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year period to sue for the insured’s personal-injury claim, and a timely filing relates back when the insured is later joined as a co-claimant.

Safeway Insurance v. Collins · filed 1998-07-23

Safeway’s insured had two years from the date of the accident to sue the tortfeasors. A.R.S. § 12-542 (1992). ... When we consider these factors in the particular circumstances of this ease, we conclude justice requires that Safeway’s addition of the insured as co-claimant relate back to the filing of Safeway’s original suit. Because this filing occurred within the two-year statute of limitations, the insured’s claim would not be barred.

Section 12-542 requires a negligence action to be commenced within two years after accrual, and a document satisfying Arizona's notice-pleading requirements may qualify as the complaint for that limitations purpose.

Rowland v. Kellogg Brown and Root, Inc. · filed 2005-06-20

Section 12-542 requires a plaintiff to commence an “action” for negligence within two years “after the cause of action accrues.” Rule 3, Ariz. R. Civ. P., 16 A.R.S., Pt. 1, provides that an “action” is commenced by the filing of a “complaint.” Failure to do so within the time limit generally bars a negligence action. ... Rowland’s letter conforms to the standard of Rule 8(e)(1), and construing it as a complaint for purposes of the statute of limitations provides Rowland an opportunity to have his claim determined on its merits. ... In light of our determination that Rowland’s letter was sufficient to serve as a complaint under the applicable rules, it is deemed to have been constructively filed before the limitations period had elapsed.

Section 12-542(1) requires covered civil actions, including trespass claims, to be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Merrick v. Hurley · filed 2015-05-12(1)

A civil cause of action for conversion, trespass, civil conspiracy, negligent misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation, intentional interference with business relationships, and intentional infliction of emotional distress must be brought within two years. See A.R.S. § 12-542(1), (3), (5) (2003).

For a forcible-detainer action, § 12-542(6) imposes a two-year limitations period that begins when the forcible entry or detainer commences, which here was the written demand for possession.

Carrington Mortgage Services LLC v. Woods · filed 2017-06-22(6)

By the plain language of both AR.S. § 12-1173.01(A)(2) (person can be removed through an action for forcible detainer “after he [or she] receives written demand of possession”) (emphasis added), and A.R.S. § 12-542(6) (action accrues “at the commencement of the forcible entry or detainer”), Carrington’s action for forcible detainer did not accrue until it served written demand of possession on the Woodses in March 2016.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, measured from the date the cause of action accrues.

Myers v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System · filed 1996-11-26

For actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Federal courts apply the statute of limitations for personal injury áctions of the state in which the claim arises. Krug v. Imbordino, 896 F.2d 395, 396-97 (9th Cir. 1990). In Arizona, the applicable statute provides for a limitations period of two years from the date the cause of action accrues. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-542.

Section 12-542(1) bars the claims at issue when more than two years elapsed after they accrued before the plaintiff filed the action in which she properly served the defendant.

Doe v. Arizona · filed 2007-09-06(1)

The district court did not err when it dismissed the claims against Dr. Gathof because he was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity when he performed court-ordered evaluations, see Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir.1970) (per curiam), and any other claims against him were time-barred because they accrued in November 2000, see Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 761-62 (9th Cir.1991), and more than two years elapsed before Doe filed the action in which she properly served him, see Ariz. Rev.Stat. § 12-542(1).

Section 12-542 leaves a negligent third party exposed to liability for two years, even when the workers’ compensation carrier acquires the claim after one year.

Henshaw v. Mays · filed 1973-07-24

To hold, as contended by the defendant, that A.R.S. § 23-1023 imposes a one year absolute statute of limitations on an injured workman’s cause of action while the general statute of limitations is two years (A.R. S. § 12-542) is to confer on the alleged tortfeasor a benefit not logically within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and is directly contrary to what, in our opinion, the 1969 amendment intended to remedy.

Section 12-542(1) gives a plaintiff two years to bring civil rights and negligence claims for personal injury; the period begins after an imprisonment disability ends.

Zuck v. State · filed 1988-11-15(1)

Therefore, plaintiff was obligated to file his civil rights and negligence claims within the two-year period of A.R.S. § 12-542(1) and to file his breach of statutory duty claim within the one-year period of A.R.S. § 12-541(3), from the time after the effective date of the amendment that he discovered or with reasonable diligence should have discovered his right to bring those claims. Because his civil rights and negligence claims were filed on February 3, 1986, within the applicable two years of the effective date of the amendment, they were not time barred, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on that basis.

Section 12-542(1) gives a claimant two years after accrual to bring a personal injury action; the court held that Doe’s claims had expired under that period before her bankruptcies.

JANE HM DOE v. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF THE DIOCESE OF PHOENIX · filed 2023-02-03(1)

Under the statute of limitations initially applicable to her claims, Doe was required to ... “commenc[e] and prosecut[e] [the claims] within two years after the cause[s] of action accrue[d], and not afterward.” § 12-542(1). ... The claims being time-barred, her legal right was extinguished in 1992, see Cox, 251 Ariz. 302, ¶ 14, and she had no legal or equitable interest in the claims at the commencement of her bankruptcies in 1993 and 2004, see § 541(a)(1).

Section 12-542 requires a negligence action to be brought within two years after it accrues.

Gibbons v. Badger Mutual Insurance Company · filed 1970-03-04

Plaintiff’s second cause of action is one in negligence. He contends Mr. Pruitt’s failure to transfer coverage and his misrepresentations constitute actionable negligence. Despite the interesting issues raised by this claim, we must agree with the trial court’s apparent determination that it too is barred by the Arizona statute of limitations on negligence, A.R.S. § 12-542. We believe the action here began to run in March, 1963, when the insurance company officially notified plaintiff that it would acknowledge no coverage for the fire loss.

Subsection 2 requires a wrongful-death action for injuries causing death to be commenced within two years, with the cause of action accruing at the injured person's death.

Gomez v. Leverton · filed 1973-05-142

The two-year limitations period of A.R.S. § 12-542 applies to wrongful death actions and commences to run at the date of the decedent’s death.

Section 12-542(A)(2) imposes a two-year limitations period on wrongful-death claims.

Engle Bros. v. SUPERIOR CT., IN & FOR CTY. OF PIMA · filed 1975-04-03(A)(2)

Examination of the subject complaint reveals that it was filed more than five years after the death of Mrs. Barragan and more than three and one-half years after the death of Mr. Barragan. Thus the two years’ limitation of A.R.S. § 12-542 (A) (2) had run.

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period for tort claims bars a legal-malpractice action when the client knew or should have known of the negligence and sustained appreciable, ascertainable injury more than two years before filing.

Arizona Management Corp. v. Kallof · filed 1984-09-04

The parties agree that in Arizona, legal malpractice actions are subject to the two year statute of limitations for tort claims as set forth in A.R.S. § 12-542. ... A claim for legal malpractice does not accrue until the plaintiff-client has sustained some injury or damaging effect from the malpractice; negligence alone is not actionable. ... We hold that in this case, the injury or damaging effect occurred on the date the settlement agreement was entered into between appellant and the Maloufs, June 6, 1968. ... We hold that the agreed facts show that appellant sustained damage based on the alleged negligent drafting of the settlement agreement substantially prior to two years before the filing of its malpractice complaint in 1981. Therefore the trial court correctly ruled that the claim was barred by A.R.S. § 12-542.

Section 12-542 requires legal-malpractice actions to be commenced within two years after the claim accrues.

Hayenga v. Gilbert · filed 2015-02-12

Legal malpractice actions are subject to AR.S. § 12-542, which provides that an action must be commenced within two years after the claim accrues.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on negligence and legal-malpractice claims in Arizona.

Vigil v. Miller · filed 2001-08-28

The statute of limitations bars this action. The limitations period for negligence and legal malpractice claims in Arizona is two years. Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-542; Kiley v. Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, 187 Ariz. 136, 927 P.2d 796, 799 (Ariz. Ct.App.1996). Appellants had actual knowledge of the facts underlying the negligence and malpractice claims no later than 1996, when they filed a bar complaint against defendants on the same facts.

Section 12-542 requires an action to be commenced within two years after accrual and then prosecuted with reasonable diligence; it does not require the case to be concluded within two years.

Taylor v. SUPERIOR COURT IN & FOR CTY. OF MARICOPA · filed 1970-09-03

“Commenced and prosecuted within two years” does not mean that the case must be brought to a conclusion in two years, rather it means that the action must be commenced within two years, and must thereafter be prosecuted with reasonable diligence. McCarrell v. Turbeville, 51 Ariz. 166, 75 P.2d 361 (1938); W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Spencer, 58 Ariz. 182, 118 P.2d 674 (1941); Cooper v. Odom, 6 Ariz.App. 466, 433 P.2d 646 (1967).

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period for actions for injuries to another's person, but a later-pleaded informed-consent battery claim is not barred when it relates back to the original complaint under Rule 15(c).

Neeriemer v. Superior Court of Maricopa County · filed 1970-12-16

The basis of this motion was that the latter allegations were barred by the terms of A.R.S. § 12-542, which provides a two year statute of limitations for actions for injuries done to the person of another. ... We thus conclude that whatever the theoretical distinction between negligence and technical battery in a medical malpractice context, the distinction is not of itself sufficient to prevent relation back of a later-pleaded claim. ... It follows that the order of the trial judge dismissing petitioner’s battery claim contained in his second amended complaint should be, as it has been, vacated and reversed.

For a medical-malpractice claim, the limitations period accrues when the patient knew or, through reasonable diligence, should have known of the alleged malpractice; manifestation of injury is not necessarily determinative.

Abernethy v. Smith · filed 1972-06-13(B)

The only conclusion which we reach, in reviewing the language in Mayer, supra, is that the point in time when the plaintiff’s injuries became manifest may be important, but is not necessarily the determining factor. After carefully reviewing the facts-, in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we cannot, as a matter of law, find that the plaintiffs knew or by exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the alleged misconduct of the defendants prior to September 1969. The record indicates only that the plaintiff was in the care of the defendants for a continuous period of time. The fact that corrective surgery and repeated consultations were required does not, in and of itself, show that the plaintiffs failed to exercise reasonable diligence in discovering the alleged negligent acts.

For malpractice claims, § 12-542's two-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the defendants' conduct.

Mayer v. Good Samaritan Hospital · filed 1971-03-17

Suffice it to say, from our examination of the numerous authorities, we conclude the legislature intended that a cause of action in a malpractice case accrues when the plaintiff knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the defendants’ conduct and therefore the statute of limitations does not begin to run until that time.

Section 12-542 requires a medical-malpractice action to be commenced and prosecuted within two years after accrual, and obtaining an attorney’s expert opinion does not toll that period.

Kowske v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc. · filed 1993-05-26

A.R.S. § 12-542 bars a medical malpractice action which is not “commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues____” ... Counsel’s opinion that a cause of action is meritorious is not determinative of when it accrues. ... Under such circumstances, it was barred by A.R.S. § 12-542 and summary judgment was properly granted.

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period for attorney-negligence claims begins when the client sustains appreciable, non-speculative harm and knows or should reasonably know that the harm was caused by the attorney's negligence.

Commercial Union Insurance v. Lewis & Roca · filed 1995-02-21

The statute of limitations for attorney negligence begins to run when a cause of action accrues. A.R.S. § 12-542. ... Accordingly, the limitations period does not commence until actionable negligence exists, that is, negligence that results in appreciable, non-speculative harm to the client. ... Furthermore, a cause of action does not accrue until a “plaintiff discovers or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered that he or she has been injured by [the] defendant’s negligent conduct.” ... Thus, unless the client knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, that he has sustained actual and appreciable harm from the attorney’s conduct, a cause of action for malpractice cannot accrue.

Section 12-542(A)(1) starts the two-year limitations period when a professional-negligence claim accrues, requiring knowledge sufficient to put a reasonable patient on notice to investigate whether the injury may be attributable to negligence; an adverse result alone is not always enough.

Walk v. Ring · filed 2002-04-24(A)(1)

The statute governing the present case provides that negligence actions must be filed within two years from the date of “accrual,” specifically “including medical malpractice actions.” A.R.S. § 12-542(A)(1). ... At the very least, we interpret the “what” broadly enough to require the knowledge that would put a reasonable patient or client on notice to investigate whether the injury may be attributable to negligence of a professional or fiduciary. Given the facts of the present case, one cannot say as a matter of law that Plaintiff slept on her rights or was dilatory in failing to investigate or file. The issue of discovery and consequent accrual is for the jury.

For legal-malpractice claims arising from criminal litigation, the two-year period begins when the criminal proceeding ends and the claimant's damages become ascertainable rather than speculative.

Glaze v. Larsen · filed 2002-10-17

The requirement in § 12-542 that a tort action “shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues” applies to legal malpractice actions. ... Because the alleged legal malpractice here occurred during litigation, the Am-fac cases require us to find that Glaze’s malpractice claim did not accrue until the criminal proceedings against him were resolved. ... Accordingly, we conclude that Glaze’s claim for legal malpractice accrued on the date Judge Donfeld dismissed the criminal charge against him with prejudice. See Day. Glaze’s damages were uncertain before that date because he could have been convicted after retrial even had the jury received an instruction on lack of sexual motivation. Because Glaze commenced his legal malpractice action within two years of the date his claim accrued, the trial court erred in granting Larsen’s motion to dismiss the complaint. See § 12-542.

Section 12-542 gives a legal-malpractice plaintiff two years to sue, and the claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the malpractice and the damages were certain; when the underlying case settled, whether a binding settlement fixed the damages was a fact question.

Althaus v. Cornelio · filed 2002-12-12

We therefore agree in principle with Althaus that Amfac’s final judgment rule does not necessarily control a malpractice case such as this in which the underlying case has been settled. That conclusion, however, does not fully resolve the statute of limitations issue here. In our view, the dis-positive issue is whether, more than two years before Penn-America filed its malpractice action against Althaus, Penn-America and the Wolfes had reached a binding, enforceable settlement in the wrongful death case, notwithstanding the need to formalize and finalize the settlement. On this record, that issue cannot be determined as a matter of law.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period for personal injuries, including malpractice, generally running when actionable harm is known, with litigation-malpractice accrual delayed until appellate review ends or is waived.

Cecala v. Newman · filed 2007-05-02

Section 12-542, Arizona Revised Statutes, prescribes a two-year limitations period “for injuries done to the person of another including causes of action for ... malpractice.” “The determination of when a cause of action accrues on a claim for legal malpractice is governed by the discovery rule.” ... Under that rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until a plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge that she has suffered an “actionable wrong,” defined as a “tort that results in appreciable non-speculative harm.” ... “Commencement of the statute of limitations will not be put off until one learns the full extent of his damages. Rather, the statute commences to run when the plaintiff incurs some injury or damaging effect from the malpractice.” ... In the litigation context, “the injury or damaging effect on the unsuccessful party [in an action for litigation legal malpractice] is not ascertainable until the appellate process is completed or is waived by failure to appeal.” ... a cause of action for malpractice in the litigation context does not accrue until judicial review is exhausted or waived.

Section 12-542(1) imposes a two-year limitations period on negligence claims, including medical-malpractice claims; accrual occurs when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the defendant’s injurious conduct.

Shafer v. McCombs · filed 2018-04-12(1)

In Arizona, a two-year statute of limitations applies to negligence cases, including causes of action for medical malpractice.

Section 12-542(1) requires personal-injury and medical-malpractice actions to be commenced within two years after accrual, which occurs when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the malpractice and resulting injury.

Thomas v. DNC · filed 2024-07-01(1)

Under Arizona law “there shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward . . . injuries done to the person of another including causes of action for medical malpractice . . . .” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1). A cause of action begins accruing when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that the malpractice and subsequent injury occurred.

Section 12-542(1) requires personal-injury and medical-malpractice actions to be commenced within two years after accrual, which occurs when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know both the injury and the defendant’s causal conduct.

Thomas v. DNC · filed 2024-08-22(1)

Under Arizona law “there shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward . . . injuries done to the person of another including causes of action for medical malpractice.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1). A cause of action begins accruing when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that the malpractice and subsequent injury occurred. See Lawhon v. L.B.J. Institutional Supply, Inc., 765 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (“[A] cause of action ‘accrues’ when the plaintiff discovers or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered that he or she has been injured by a particular defendant’s negligent conduct.”). Essentially, the period begins running once a plaintiff “knows or should have known of both the what and who elements of causation.” Id. Plaintiff need not know about the full extent of injuries for the clock to start ticking. See Kaufman v. Jesser, 884 F. Supp. 2d 943, 957 (D. Ariz. 2012).

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period for negligence claims, which begins when the plaintiff sustains actual damage or injury and is able to sue.

Manzanita Park, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America · filed 1988-09-13

The applicable statutes of limitations are two years for the negligence claim, Ariz. Rev.Stat. § 12-542 (1982), and three years for the misrepresentation claim, Ariz.Rev. Stat. § 12-543 (1982). The sole issue is when the statutes began to run. ... We need not analogize from Amfac and Kallof to determine the occurrence of damages in Manzanita’s action for insurance agent malpractice. These attorney malpractice cases do not negate basic principles governing statutes of limitations in negligence and misrepresentation actions. A plaintiff must still have suffered “actual damage or injury” that often does not occur until certain issues are litigated and finally determined. Jordan’s conduct with regard to Zeeman did not injure Manzanita until INA denied coverage, which happened only after the jury found Zeeman was an employee. Had the jury decided the other way, INA would have covered the loss and Manzanita would have had no claim against the Jordan defendants.

Section 12-542 gives a client two years to bring a legal malpractice tort claim, with the discovery rule applying to when that period begins.

Long v. Buckley · filed 1981-04-02

In Arizona, legal malpractice actions are subject to the two year statute of limitations for tort claims. ... As in Yazzie, since the trial court here erroneously concluded that the discovery rule did not apply to a legal malpractice case, it did not reach the question of whether there was a material factual dispute as to when the appellants knew or should have known of the alleged malpractice by appellees.

Section 12-542 gives a plaintiff two years to bring a negligent-performance claim, beginning when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know the facts underlying it.

Andrich v. Navient Solutions Incorporated · filed 2020-03-30

Both Plaintiff and Defendants agree a two-year statute of limitations applies. See Rowland v. Kellogg Brown and Root, Inc., 210 Ariz. 586, 588, 898 P.2d 964 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (applying A.R.S. § 12-542). ... The Court agrees the claim is likely time-barred. ... Thus, by November 23, 2016—the earliest date by which Defendants allegedly reported Plaintiff’s default—Plaintiff had sufficient knowledge to appreciate the risk of impending default and, “in the exercise of ... reasonable diligence, should [have] know[n] the facts underlying the cause.” Gust, 182 Ariz. at 588.

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period for personal injury actions does not govern an uninsured-motorist insurance claim; the six-year period for written agreements applies instead.

Transnational Insurance Company v. Simmons · filed 1973-03-15

Appellant claims the trial court erred in not ruling that appellee’s claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations, A.R.S. § 12-542, which applies to personal injury actions, since appellee did not file a petition for an order directing arbitration until two and one-half years after the accident occurred. ... The purpose of our uninsured motorist statute, A.R.S. § 20-259.01, is to afford protection to insureds when they become the innocent victims of the negligence of uninsured motorists. ... Without the policy provision there would be no claim against the company and it is apparent that the limitation applicable should be that pertaining to written agreements. ... Under A.R.S. § 12-548, as amended, a cause of action for debt, evidenced or founded upon a written agreement must be brought within six years after the cause of action accrues. Appellee’s claim was well within that period.

Section 12-542 does not bar an insurer's intervention on a subrogated claim when the insured timely filed an action seeking the full property loss before the limitations period expired.

United Pacific/Reliance Insurance v. Kelley · filed 1980-09-30

The appellant, United Pacific/Reliance Insurance Company has appealed the denial of its Motion to Intervene as barred by the limitation of action set forth in A.R.S. § 12-542. We have determined that intervention should have been granted and therefore reverse.

Section 12-542(5) supplies a two-year limitations period for embezzlement claims, which the court applied to bar the claims because suit was filed more than two years after the alleged thefts.

Estate of Kirschenbaum v. Kirschenbaum · filed 1989-12-14(5)

The two causes of action for embezzlement have a two-year statute of limitations. A.R.S. § 12-542(5). According to Annette’s answers to interrogatories, the alleged thefts occurred at the time of Sam’s funeral in January 1981 when Irving told Roberta that Sam had nothing left in Tucson.

Section 12-542(1) supplies a two-year limitations period for personal-injury-based § 1983 claims, while federal law governs when those claims accrue.

Girdler v. Dale · filed 1994-07-25(1)

The applicable statute of limitations for claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the state limitations statute corresponding to personal injury claims. ... Arizona has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. A.R.S. § 12-542(1). ... Federal law governs when a cause of action accrues. ... Regardless of whether the plaintiff in the instant case has alleged one claim for malicious prosecution or several claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, Heck provides that all of these claims accrued on December 18, 1991, when the charges against Girdler were dismissed.

Section 12-542(3) imposes a two-year limitations period on negligence claims.

ELM RETIREMENT CENTER, LP v. Callaway · filed 2010-11-02(3)

The tort claims in the complaint are subject to two-or three-year limitations periods. See A.R.S. § 12-542(3) (2003) (negligence; two years); A.R.S. § 12-543(3) (2003) (fraud; three years). Elm filed the complaint nearly four years after the transaction, well beyond the applicable limitations periods.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on bad-faith insurance claims.

Fall v. First Mercury Insurance Co. · filed 2016-12-02

Arizona law establishes a two-year limitations period for such claims. A.R.S. § 12-542; Manterola v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 200 Ariz. 572, 30 P.3d 639, 643 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on negligent supervision claims.

Isip v. World Financial Group · filed 2019-08-08

Negligent Supervision claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitation.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on dram-shop claims, subject to tolling under the discovery rule when applicable.

Fitz v. Colton Group · filed 2020-02-13

The statute of limitations on a dram-shop claim is two years.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on negligence causes of action.

Reid v. Salomon Smith Barney Incorporated · filed 2023-09-13

The statute of limitations period for the negligence causes of action is also two years. See A.R.S. § 12-542; Coulter, 388 P.3d at 838.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for Rehabilitation Act claims, with accrual determined under federal law.

Uchikura v. Willis Towers Watson Call Center · filed 2022-12-09

Section 12-542 provides that a claim must be brought within “two years after the cause of action accrues.” Id. “Although the limitations period is adopted from state law, a claim under the Rehabilitation Act accrues according to federal law.” Ervine, 753 F.3d at 869. “Because each and every discrete discriminatory act causes a new claim to accrue under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,” id. at 871, any discriminatory acts that Defendants took within two years of when Plaintiff initiated this action (i.e., after January 3, 2020) are actionable. “All prior discrete discriminatory acts, however, are untimely filed and no longer actionable.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Here, construing the FAC in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the latest alleged act of discrimination occurred on November 27, 2019. (Doc. 12 at 4.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim is time-barred unless he can show the statute of limitations should be tolled. For reasons stated elsewhere in this order, the FAC does not plead facts sufficient to establish an entitlement to equitable tolling. Thus, Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim is dismissed.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year statute of limitations for abuse-of-process claims because it governs general tort actions.

Sherrill v. Bressor · filed 2024-04-16

The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded the failure to mention abuse of process claims indicated an intentional choice. Therefore, A.R.S. § 12-542, the statute of limitations that “governs general tort actions,” was deemed applicable to abuse of process claims. ... The Court has not located any Arizona authority disagreeing with the interpretation of Arizona law in Zeman. Moreover, this Court previously relied on Zeman to conclude “[t]he statute of limitations for an abuse of process claim in Arizona is two years.” ... Based on available authority, the Arizona Supreme Court would apply a two-year limitations period to an abuse of process claim.

Section 12-542 gives negligence claims a two-year limitations period, which begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know the facts underlying the cause of action, with accrual generally a question for the jury.

Kapusta v. Dr. Bryce Bennett, Oasis Psychological Services, Bianca Boling · filed 2026-01-30

The statute of limitations for a negligence claim is two years. A.R.S. § 12-542. The statute begins to run when “the plaintiff knows or with reasonable diligence should know the facts underlying the cause.” Doe v. Roe, 191 Ariz. 313, ¶ 29 (1998). “A plaintiff need not know all the facts underlying a cause of action” but “must at least possess a minimum requisite of knowledge sufficient to identify that a wrong occurred and caused injury.” Id. ¶ 32. Generally, when a claim accrued is a question of fact for the jury. Satamian v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 257 Ariz. 163, ¶ 14 (2024).

Section 12-542 bars an action when its limitations period has expired and the defense is pleaded, but expiration of the period does not determine the defendant's liability.

Hovatter v. Shell Oil Company · filed 1974-12-13

A statute of limitations is not a determination of liability; it merely prevents the bringing of an action when pled as an affirmative defense.

Section 12-542(B) measures the malpractice limitation period from the initial negligent act and tolls it when reasonable diligence during follow-up treatment would have revealed the malpractice but the health provider failed to disclose it.

Landgraff v. Wagner · filed 1976-03-10(B)

First, the words “date of injury” imply a single date in time, not multiple dates. ... The “date of injury” then is the date the claimed negligent conduct first was imposed upon the patient. The time is not measured from the point at which damages resulting from the “injury” either appear or disappear. ... Since it does not appear that the legislature intended the tolling provision to be contingent upon this alone, we must assume that the test of reasonable diligence is applied to the follow-up treatment given the patient after the act of malpractice has occurred. Thus, in the course of events which follow the malpractice, the health provider will lose the protection of the statute of limitations if reasonable diligence would have made the malpractice apparent and it is not thereafter disclosed.

Section 12-542 requires an action for wrongful attachment in Arizona to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Schuldes v. National Surety Corporation · filed 1976-10-19

Therefore, applying the principles of statutory construction enunciated above, we hold that actions for wrongful attachment in Arizona are governed by the two-year statute of limitation of A.R.S. § 12-542.

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period applies to Arizona wrongful-termination claims.

Felton v. Unisource Corp. · filed 1991-07-31

The Feltons assert that the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims found in A.R.S. § 12-542 should apply to wrongful termination claims. The district court accepted this contention and, absent any evidence to the contrary, we affirm its finding that wrongful termination claims in Arizona are governed by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in A.R.S. § 12-542.

Section 12-542(1)'s limitations period is extended to the next non-weekend, non-holiday day under Rule 6(a) when the computed last day falls on a Saturday.

Salzman v. Morentin · filed 1977-05-12(1)

Under the applicable statute of limitations, A.R.S. § 12-542(1), the last day for filing the action fell on Saturday. ... The majority rule and the better rule is that Rule 6 may apply to a statute of limitations. ... The application of Rule 6(a) here does not result in the modification of the prescribed statutory period. It is merely a judicial interpretation of how an action is to be brought after the legislature has specified “what” actions may be brought.

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period for accountant malpractice-related claims accrues under a fact-based discovery rule when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the injury and improper advice, rather than automatically when the IRS issued a notice of deficiency.

Coulter v. Grant Thornton, LLP · filed 2017-01-03

Applying that approach here, we conclude that the superior court erred by finding that the limitations period necessarily commenced upon the IRS’s issuance of a notice of deficiency. Instead, there remains a fact question regarding whether Appellants reasonably continued to rely on Stover’s reassurances, and when they discovered (or should have discovered) that the accounting advice was improper and the IRS’s position would be upheld on appeal. We thus reverse the superior court’s dismissal of Appellants’ claims for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and negligent misrepresentation on statute of limitations grounds, and we remand to allow a jury to determine the appropriate accrual date for Appellants’ claims.

Section 12-542 sets a two-year limit for personal-injury and wrongful-death claims, subject to discovery-rule tolling when the plaintiff could not reasonably detect the injury or the act causing it.

Herrera v. Western Express Incorporated · filed 2021-05-25

A complaint for personal injury or wrongful death must be filed within two years after the cause of action “accrues.” A.R.S. § 12-542. ... The “discovery rule” can be applied to toll the accrual of an action where the “injury or the act causing the injury, or both, have been difficult for the plaintiff to detect.”

Section 12-542 requires medical-negligence and wrongful-death claims to be commenced within two years after accrual, but the discovery rule may toll accrual when a factual dispute exists about when the plaintiff was put on notice to investigate.

Sohler v. Benjo · filed 2022-09-27

Defendants reason that summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations set forth in A.R.S. § 12-542, which states that medical negligence and wrongful death claims “shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues.” ... The Court finds that there is, at the very least, a genuine issue of material fact as to when Plaintiff was put on notice to investigate her husband’s death. ... Likewise, even if a jury finds that no fraudulent concealment took place, it could nonetheless find that the discovery rule tolled the accrual of Plaintiff’s cause of action. ... Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied.

Section 12-542 imposes a two-year limitations period on products-liability actions, subject to tolling under the discovery rule when the plaintiff did not and could not reasonably have known the facts underlying the claim.

Martin v. General Motors LLC · filed 2022-11-16

In Arizona, the statute of limitations for products liability actions and breach of warranty actions associated with product liability is two years. ... Thus, to invoke the discovery rule, Plaintiff needs to demonstrate that she filed her claim within two years of when she learned, or could have learned with reasonable diligence, the facts underpinning her claim.

Section 12-542(2)'s two-year limitations period begins when wrongful-death plaintiffs have enough knowledge to recognize that a wrong caused the injury, triggering a duty to investigate diligently even if they have not yet identified the defendant.

McCarville v. Carlton · filed 2023-06-06(2)

From the time the Parents became aware that a combination of methadone and alcohol caused Rachel’s death in September 2016, they possessed the minimum requisite knowledge to begin the statutory limitations period in § 12-542(2) and trigger their duty to investigate with due diligence.

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period begins when the cause of action accrues, which is when the claimant has the legal right to sue; for an interspousal tort barred by immunity, accrual occurs upon dissolution of the marriage.

Griesmer v. Griesmer · filed 1977-07-27

A cause of action accrues whenever one person may sue another. The statute of limitations then begins to run. Norton v. Steinfeld, 36 Ariz. 536, 288 P. 3 (1930). At the time of the acts alleged in the complaint, appellant was precluded from suing appellee by the doctrine of interspousal immunity. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968); Windauer v. O’Connor, 107 Ariz. 267, 485 P.2d 1157 (1971).

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period for legal-malpractice claims begins when the client knew or should reasonably have known of the malpractice and the resulting damages were certain rather than contingent on an appeal.

Amfac Distribution Corp. v. Miller · filed 1983-07-06

For the reasons explained below, the complaint was timely filed. We hold that a cause of action for legal malpractice occurring in the course of litigation accrues when the plaintiff knew or should reasonably have known of the malpractice and when the plaintiff’s damages are certain and not contingent upon the outcome of an appeal.

Section 12-542's two-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know the facts of the injury and its causation, even without knowing the defendant's negligence, breach of duty, or product defect.

Doe v. Miles Inc. · filed 1997-11-14

Section 12-542 required that plaintiffs’ actions be “commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrue[d], and not afterward.” Under the common law “discovery rule,” a cause of action accrues “when the plaintiff knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the defendants’ conduct and therefore the statute of limitations does not begin to run until that time.” ... In other words, “the claim is barred two years from when the plaintiff knew or should have known facts giving rise to the claim.” ... Those discovery elements existed here more than two years before plaintiffs filed suit in these cases. They knew by 1987 of the injury (HIV), what caused the injury (factor concentrate) and who allegedly caused the injury (various fractionators which produced and distributed the factor concentrate and various healthcare providers who prescribed, provided or recommended factor concentrate for A. and B. or who evaluated its use). That plaintiffs did not subjectively know or have reason to know of defendants’ alleged negligence, breach of duty or product defectiveness until 1992 did not postpone accrual of their claims.

Section 12-542 requires a third-party bad-faith action to be filed within two years after accrual; accrual occurs when the underlying judgment becomes final and non-appealable, even if related coverage litigation remains pending.

Manterola v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 2001-08-28

It is undisputed that § 12-542, which requires that certain actions be “commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward,” applies to third-party bad faith claims. ... Nonetheless, application of Taylor’s “final judgment accrual rule” to this case is both logical and reasonable, such that the statute of limitations commenced when the underlying PI action against the Eliases became “final and non-appealable.” 185 Ariz. at 179, 913 P.2d at 1097.

Section 12-542 bars a claim filed 34 months after the accident when the statute-of-limitations defense is asserted in the answer.

Trujillo v. Brasfield · filed 1978-02-17

As to the complaint filed by the State Compensation Fund 34 months after the accident, there is no question that the motion to dismiss should have been granted since the petitioners did assert the statute of limitations in their answer to that complaint.

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year limitations period for third-party personal-injury claims, and filing a defectively commenced complaint does not toll that period.

Peters v. M & O Construction, Inc. · filed 1978-05-11

We reject plaintiff’s argument that § 12-510 was the proper statute to apply in the present case. In Henshaw v. Mays and Russell v. Beck, 22 Ariz.App. 436, 528 P.2d 187 (1974), this court, in interpreting ARS § 23-1023, held that recipients of workmen’s compensation benefits may maintain actions against third parties when the actions were brought more than one year after an industrial injury but within two years if the approval of the insurance carrier was obtained. While the applicable statute of limitations was not the precise issue presented in those cases, the court rulings assumed the application of § 12-542. We believe that assumption is sound. Had the legislature intended to provide a special limitation period for third party personal injuries it could have done so. Since it did not, we can conceive of no reason for this court to do so. ... We reject this contention and hold that the filing of the original complaint did not toll the statute of limitations. If a complaint is dismissed without prejudice, the general rule is that the situation is the same as if the suit had never been brought, unless there is a statute to the contrary. ... Arizona has no such statute and therefore the defective commencement of the action does not toll the statute. The legislature has provided conditions which do toll the statute but defective service is not such a condition.

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, and a proper-party amendment that relates back to a timely original complaint defeats the limitations bar.

Grim v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. · filed 1987-03-12

Grim’s suit was filed just within the two-year limitations period provided by A.R.S. § 12-542 for personal injury claims. ... Under Stephens a reassignment obtained after the two-year limitations period has run does not operate retroactively. ... We hold that the denial of joinder was error. The joinder of the Industrial Commission should have been allowed as it would relate back to the original complaint which was filed within the two-year statute of limitations; therefore, the action would not be time-barred.

Section 12-542(1) provides a two-year limitation period for personal-injury claims, including an employee’s claim for work-related injuries.

Brandler v. Manuel Trevizo Hay Co. · filed 1987-06-25(1)

In Arizona, the general two-year statute of limitation for personal injury, A.R.S. § 12-542(1), governs a claim based on an employee’s workrelated injuries.

Subsection (1) gives § 1983 claims a two-year limitations period, accruing when the claimant knows or has reason to know of the claim.

Owens v. City of Phoenix · filed 1994-11-15(1)

Section 1983 claims are subject to our state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, A.R.S. § 12-542(1). Zuck, 159 Ariz. at 40, 764 P.2d at 775. Again, Owens’ claim accrued only when he knew or had reason to know of the claim. Id. Owens’ § 1983 claim arises out of the City’s denial of his relocation benefits and the City’s alleged failure to follow the requirements of the Relocation Acts, including the appellate procedures. As with the Relocation Act claims, this claim did not accrue until February 1990, when Owens knew or should have known of the City’s unwillingness to provide him with any relocation assistance or further pursue the matter through its appellate procedures. Therefore, the trial court should not have held that this claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 12-542 supplies a two-year limitations period for a third-party bad-faith failure-to-settle claim, which accrues when the underlying judgment becomes final and non-appealable.

Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1996-04-11

Because Taylor’s injury resulted from State Farm’s failure to give equal consideration to his interests when refusing to settle with Rivers—a breach of State Farm’s implied duty of good faith—it is more appropriate that Taylor’s third-party claim for bad faith failure to settle be governed by the tort statute of limitations. Thus, the two-year period from accrual, specified in A.R.S. § 12-542, applies. ... Thus, we hold that a third-party bad faith failure-to-settle claim accrues at the time the underlying action becomes final and non-appealable.

Section 12-542(1) provides a two-year personal-injury limitations period that applies to the plaintiffs' civil-rights claim.

Hamco, Inc. v. Banc One Corp. · filed 1997-04-09(1)

Thus, their discriminatory lending claim is barred by the federal two-year statute of limitations contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1691(f), and their civil rights claim is barred by Arizona's two-year personal injury statute of limitations contained in A.R.S. § 12-542(1).

Section 12-542 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims against private persons or entities, including an individual public employee whose conduct was outside the scope of employment.

McCloud v. STATE, DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY · filed 2007-11-09

A personal injury claim against a private person or entity, however, is governed by the two-year statute of limitations. See § 12-542. ... Thus, McCloud’s claim against Kimbro is timely only if Kimbro was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.