Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-533

A parent's sobriety while incarcerated and stated willingness to enter treatment after release do not outweigh a child's interest in adoption when the parent repeatedly relapsed after reunification and has not maintained sobriety outside a controlled environment.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to K.C. · filed 2025-04-29(B)

The court commended Father for his sobriety while in custody, but added he “has not yet been able to maintain sobriety for a significant period of time outside an institutional environment.” ... Father has shown no error in the superior court’s best interests findings.

An adoptive placement that already adopted the child's sibling supports a best-interests benefit finding, while the parent's untreated, longstanding substance abuse independently supports a detriment finding.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.S. · filed 2025-07-15(B)

The court also found that M.S. is adoptable and her current placement, who has already adopted M.S.’ sibling, is willing to adopt her. ... The superior court further found that failure to terminate Father’s rights would be a detriment to M.S. because, if she was returned to Father’s care, she would be at risk of harm given his substance abuse issues.

A prospective stepparent adoption can support best interests when the evidence makes adoption a certain probability even though it is not guaranteed.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to K.P. · filed 2025-10-30(B)

The court also acknowledged that adoption was not guaranteed but likely enough to make Child adoptable. See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4–6, ¶¶ 12, 20–21. With fiancé having been in Child's life for six years, the court reasonably concluded it was a “certain probability” she would adopt Child once legally able to do so.

Once a statutory ground is established, a respondent parent's voluntary consent to termination is itself evidence that termination is in the children's best interests.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to V.M. and P.M. · filed 2025-11-21(B)

Thus, we hold that where grounds for termination have been established and a respondent parent has voluntarily signed a consent to terminate his parental rights, such a consent is itself evidence that termination is in the children’s best interests.

A testamentary wish that a relative care for a child if the custodial parent dies is too speculative to support best interests.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to K.C. · filed 2026-02-04(B)

Because the court erred in relying on speculative evidence in making its “best interests” determination, the termination order is vacated. The matter is remanded to the superior court to conduct a new best-interests evaluation consistent with this decision.

A termination best-interests conclusion must contain written ultimate factual findings and cannot rest merely on the existence of a statutory ground.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.V. · filed 2026-02-13(B)

The juvenile court’s analysis was inadequate as a matter of law. The juvenile court must support its best-interests conclusion with written factual findings detailing the ultimate facts upon which it relied. See Logan B., 244 Ariz. at 537 ¶ 15.

A court may deny termination on best interests when no adoption plan or nonspeculative harm is shown and an existing parenting plan limits the absent parent's contact.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.M. · filed 2026-04-17(B)

No evidence was presented on an adoption plan or Mother’s health. And although Mother testified that Father’s attempts at contacting the child were inconsistent, the court weighed that evidence against the parenting plan’s limitation on Father’s parenting time and found that this concern did not support termination. Mother testified that she would allow Father to see the child even if his rights were terminated. Mother fails to show the court abused its discretion in determining that termination of Father’s rights was not in the child’s best interests.

Stable housing, employment, and service compliance do not defeat best interests when unexplained severe abuse leaves the child at imminent risk and an adoptive placement meets all needs.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.C. · filed 2026-05-14(B)

The evidence supports the superior court’s finding that termination is in A.C.’s best interests. Accordingly, the court did not err by terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Under the former statutory scheme, a preponderance burden for proving a termination ground did not violate due process.

Hernandez v. ST. EX REL. ARIZ. DEPT. OF ECON. SEC. · filed 1975-01-15(B)

Comparing the social disutility of these two erroneous outcomes, we do not believe that one can make a fundamental value determination that the erroneous severance of parental rights, vis-a-vis the erroneous failure to sever, constitutionally requires a higher burden of proof.

Under the former statute, abandonment had to be proved clearly and convincingly, but the child's best interest and detriment from denial were not additional matters requiring clear-and-convincing proof.

In Re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action No. S-2710 · filed 1990-04-10(B)(1)

A.R.S. § 8-533 does not require, in addition to clear and convincing proof that the child was abandoned, clear and convincing proof that severance is in the child’s best interests and that denial of severance would be detrimental to the child.

Best interest is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, not clear and convincing evidence.

Kent K. v. Bobby M. · filed 2005-04-28(B)

we hold that the preponderance of the evidence standard adequately allocates the risk of error between these competing interests.

A parent's failure to appear does not relieve the court of its duty to decide from the record whether a statutory ground was proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Manuel M. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2008-04-11(B)

Finally, as discussed below, a parent’s failure to appear does not relieve the juvenile court of its obligation to assess the “record and evidence” presented and to determine whether the state has proven a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence — actions that could be enhanced by adversarial participation.

For an Indian child, state-law termination grounds remain subject to state proof burdens rather than ICWA's reasonable-doubt standard; the burdens apply separately.

Valerie M. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2008-10-28(B)

We conclude, therefore, that § 1912(f)’s reasonable-doubt standard does not preempt the state-imposed burdens of proof for establishing termination grounds and best interests findings.

A termination ground must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, while the child's best interests need only be proved by a preponderance.

Bennigno R. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2013-10-30(B)

Unlike statutory grounds for terminating a parent’s rights—which must be established by clear and convincing evidence—whether severance is in the child’s best interests must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Department did not prove neglect, chronic substance abuse, or nine-month time in care by clear and convincing evidence when it omitted recent drug-testing records, a parent's psychological evaluation, and recent visitation notes needed to assess the circumstances at severance.

Cindy A., Samuel S. v. Dcs · filed 2018-07-03(B)(2), (B)(3), and (B)(8)(a)

In sum, we acknowledge that Parents have struggled with meeting the case plan goals established for family reunification. As far as the record reveals, they missed a substantial number of drug tests and unnecessarily delayed in accomplishing many of the tasks they were expected to complete. However, Parents’ last three months of TASC testing records, Father’s psychological evaluation, and the last four months of Parents’ visitation notes are critical evidentiary pieces missing from this record. ... For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the superior court’s order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the children and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Section 8-533(B)(1) permits termination for abandonment when a parent fails to take steps to maintain a relationship with the child.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.F. and J.F. · filed 2023-02-28(B)(1)

Father’s failure to take steps to maintain a relationship with the children supports the juvenile court’s finding of abandonment.

A parent’s failure to seek available permission to contact a child can support an abandonment finding under § 8-533(B)(1), despite a no-contact order.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to W.G. · filed 2023-02-28(B)(1)

The court found Mother’s argument that “her probationary no contact order kept her from having contact with [W.G.]” unpersuasive because at one point Mother requested parenting time while that order was in effect. And the court noted Mother’s trial testimony that she knew she could request permission from APD to contact W.G. Mother also admitted her probation officer advised her to seek the family court’s permission to have contact with W.G., but she never did so. ... The court considered all relevant evidence when making its detailed abandonment findings, and we find no error.

Abandonment under § 8-533(B)(1) is assessed from the parent’s conduct in the circumstances of the case; a parent’s belief that a court order barred contact may support a finding of no abandonment.

Caterina W. v. Anthony R., S.R. · filed 2018-05-24(B)(1)

One statutory ground for termination is abandonment. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). ... We assess abandonment objectively based on the parent’s conduct, not subjective intent. ... Here, reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s finding that Father had not abandoned S.R. ... Because reasonable evidence supports the court’s determination, we find that the court did not err.

Section 8-533(B)(1) allows termination for abandonment when clear and convincing evidence establishes that ground.

William W. v. Brooke S., P.W. · filed 2014-03-04(B)(1)

Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B), parental rights may be terminated only upon a finding that at least one statutory ground for severance has been established by clear and convincing evidence. ... We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings and conclusions that Father abandoned P.W. within the meaning of A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B)(1) and -531(1).

When severance is sought for abandonment and no parent-child relationship exists, the parent is not entitled to reunification services.

Jerry P. v. Dcs, A.P. · filed 2015-04-28(B)(1)

Moreover, in the absence of an existing parent–child relationship, a parent is not entitled to reunification services when severance is sought based on abandonment. See Toni W. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 61, 64, 66, ¶¶ 9, 15, 993 P.2d 462, 465, 467 (App. 1999).

Failure to maintain regular contact with the children or DCS, a six-month absence from court, and inconsistent participation in services can support abandonment.

Cherlle S. v. Dcs · filed 2015-06-02(B)(1)

Testimony by the DCS case manager and exhibits admitted at the hearing established that the children had been in DCS care for close to 9 months. Mother did not have regular contact with them or maintain contact with DCS throughout the case, she had not appeared for a hearing regarding the children for six months, and she failed to consistently participate in services.

Failure to maintain a parental relationship supports termination whether treated as a distinct statutory ground or as a specification of abandonment.

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JS-734 · filed 1975-12-09(1)

It makes no difference whether this statutory basis for termination is considered as a ground separate and apart from abandonment, as it evidently was considered by the trial judge, or as a further specification of what constitutes abandonment, as is argued by appellant’s counsel.

The statutory presumption of abandonment may be rebutted by evidence of the parent's efforts to maintain the parent-child relationship.

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JS-3594 · filed 1982-09-21(B)(1)

Even assuming such a presumption can be inferred, however, it has clearly been rebutted by evidence presented at the severance hearing of the appellant’s efforts to maintain a parent-child relationship with his two children.

A single rebuffed telephone call over eight years did not overcome abandonment where the parent had avenues to locate and contact the child but made no further effort.

In re the Appeal in Yuma County Juvenile Court Action Number J-87-119 · filed 1989-06-06(B)(1)

The most salient point is that the father’s failure to do anything except make one telephone call is powerful evidence of his intent.

Statutory abandonment alone does not permit termination; severance must also serve the child's best interests.

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-500274 · filed 1990-09-18(B)(1)

Nonetheless, a finding of the statutory grounds of abandonment standing alone does not permit termination of parental rights. A severance must also be in the best interests of the child.

Abandonment by an unwed father who never established a parental relationship is judged by conduct rather than subjective intent, and he must act persistently and promptly to establish that relationship.

Matter of Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action · filed 1994-06-23(B)(1)

Therefore, when determining whether an unwed father who has never had a relationship with his child has protected his rights, we judge abandonment by conduct, not by subjective intent. ... Implicit in this is the requirement that the father act, and act quickly, for those needs include a reasonably prompt determination of where and by whom the child is to be raised and nurtured.

The juvenile court need not make a reunification-services finding when severance is based solely on abandonment.

Toni W. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 1999-04-13(B)(1)

Therefore, the juvenile court was not statutorily required to make this determination in a severance based solely on grounds of abandonment pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(l).

Neither a dependency proceeding nor reunification services are prerequisites to a private termination petition based on abandonment.

Bobby G. v. Ades & Allison G. · filed 2008-09-30(B)(1)

Moreover, § 8-862(D)(1) incorporates the grounds for termination provided in § 8-533, and neither § 8-533 nor federal law requires that a parent be provided reunification services before the court may terminate the parent’s rights on the ground of abandonment.

An unwed father who cannot use traditional bonding methods must act quickly and persistently to establish parental rights.

Father in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-114487 v. Adam · filed 1994-06-23(B)(1)

Implicit in this is the requirement that the father act, and act quickly, for those needs include a reasonably prompt determination of where and by whom the child is to be raised and nurtured.

In deciding abandonment, the court may consider whether the child's needs have been met, including which caregivers historically met them.

Matter of Juvenile Action No. JS-8490 · filed 1994-06-30(B)(1)

Furthermore, when determining severance, the termination statute permits the trial court to consider evidence of whether the needs of the child are being met.

Section 8-533(B)(1) permits termination of parental rights based on abandonment when the statutory requirements are met.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to D.H. · filed 2025-04-15(B)(1)

As DCS correctly asserts, only one statutory ground for termination is required. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B) (requiring evidence of “any one of the” statutory grounds enumerated).

Abandonment exists when a parent fails to provide reasonable support and maintain regular contact and a normal parental relationship, rather than turning on subjective intent.

Kenneth B. v. Tina B. · filed 2010-11-18(B)(1)

Instead, as that case and the amended statute make clear, abandonment exists when a parent has failed to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact and a normal parental relationship with the child.

Abandonment is measured by parental conduct rather than subjective intent.

Jose M. v. Eleanor J. · filed 2014-01-14(B)(1)

Abandonment is measured by a parent’s conduct, not subjective intent.

The agency has no duty to notify a parent of reunification services before seeking abandonment termination when no parent-child relationship exists.

Nicholas S. v. Ades · filed 2014-05-22(B)(1)

ADES, however, has no duty to notify a parent of available reunification services before seeking termination of parental rights when, as here, there is no parent-child relationship and the statutory ground for termination is abandonment.

Failure to maintain contact or reasonable support for more than six months may establish abandonment.

Manuel T. v. Dcs · filed 2014-08-19(B)(1)

The record shows Father failed to maintain contact or provide reasonable support for his children for more than six months.

Abandonment is measured by parental conduct rather than subjective intent, including reasonable support, regular contact, more than minimal efforts, and maintenance of a normal parental relationship.

Paige S. v. Dcs, G.B. · filed 2014-12-23(B)(1)

[A]bandonment is measured not by a parent’s subjective intent, but by the parent’s conduct: the statute asks whether a parent has provided reasonable support, maintained regular contact, made more than minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child, and maintained a normal parental relationship.

Abandonment under Section 8-533(B)(1) is measured by a parent's conduct rather than subjective intent.

Amanda W. v. Donovan F. · filed 2015-06-30(B)(1)

“[A]bandonment is measured not by a parent’s subjective intent, but by the parent’s conduct: the statute asks whether a parent has provided reasonable support, maintained regular contact, made more than minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child, and maintained a normal parental relationship.”

A parent's current ability to parent is not relevant to the statutory ground of abandonment, which is assessed objectively from the parent's conduct.

Robert O. v. Mary B., A.B. · filed 2019-03-05(B)(1)

We assess abandonment objectively based on the parent’s conduct, not subjective intent. ... Father’s ability to parent, however, is not relevant to the statutory ground of abandonment.

A parent living abroad may be found to have abandoned children when the parent has not seen them for years, communicates only sporadically, and provides only a handful of small support payments.

Silvino L. v. Dcs · filed 2020-01-07(B)(1)

Father had not seen the Children since 2013 and had spoken to them only sporadically. Father sent support payments ranging between twenty-five dollars and fifty dollars to Mother approximately five or six times in the preceding five years. ... Given the evidence in the record, the juvenile court's findings of fact supported the court's abandonment conclusion.

Successful participation in services after a prolonged absence does not preclude a finding of abandonment under § 8-533(B)(1).

Jose v. Dcs · filed 2020-03-24(B)(1)

This argument ignores over a year and a half where Father had no contact with the Children and provided no financial or emotional support. While it is true that Father successfully participated in services, that engagement did not preclude a finding of abandonment.

A parent's subjective fear of the other parent does not excuse abandonment when the parent does not persistently seek contact, comply with conditions for parenting time, pay support, or seek court modification over more than a decade.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.N. · filed 2025-04-29(B)(1)

We reject Mother’s assertion that A.R.S. § 8-531(1) requires courts to consider the subjective reasons for a parent’s failure to maintain a normal parental relationship. ... Even assuming the truth of Mother’s testimony, as well as the other evidence she offered about Father’s abusive behavior, the court did not err in concluding she abandoned S.N.

A court-ordered restriction on contact can supply just cause defeating abandonment when the parent takes reasonable steps available within the restriction to maintain or restore the relationship.

Sara R. v. Jeremy R., C.R. · filed 2016-02-09(B)(1)

Given the significant limitations imposed on Mother, and the high standard of proof required to terminate her rights, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Mother failed to maintain a normal parental relationship with C.R. without just cause.

When termination is sought for abandonment, DCS need not provide reunification services before seeking severance.

Carlos O. v. Dcs, C.B. · filed 2016-05-03(B)(1)

Because the Department was seeking to terminate his rights for abandonment, the Department did not need to provide any reunification services.

Abandonment is measured by parental conduct rather than subjective intent, including support, regular contact, more than minimal efforts to support and communicate, and maintenance of a normal parental relationship.

Jodie F. v. Kyle Y. · filed 2016-06-07(B)(1)

As a result, “abandonment is measured not by a parent’s subjective intent, but by the parent’s conduct: the statute asks whether a parent has provided reasonable support, maintained regular contact, made more than minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child, and maintained a normal parental relationship.” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249-50 ¶ 18.

Minimal communication coupled with no financial support or normal supervision over most of a child’s life supports severance for abandonment.

Summer P. v. Shirley M. · filed 2016-06-09(B)(1)

The record is clear that Summer made only minimal efforts to communicate with K.H. and made no effort at all to support her or provide normal supervision for the vast majority of K.H.’s life.

Abandonment turns on parental conduct rather than subjective intent, and reasonable support may include gifts, clothes, cards, food, or financial contributions.

Chantelle L. v. Dcs, C.W. · filed 2016-06-16(B)(1)

A court determines whether abandonment has occurred based on a parent’s conduct, not the parent’s subjective intent. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 18 (2000). “What constitutes reasonable support, regular contact, and normal supervision varies from case to case.” Id. at 250, ¶ 20. A court may find abandonment when evidence shows the parent “has made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child.” Kenneth B. v. Tina B., 226 Ariz. 33, 37, ¶ 18 (App. 2010). Reasonable support may be evidenced by “gifts, clothes, cards, and food,” as well as funds contributed to support the child’s upbringing. Id. at ¶ 20.

Abandonment is measured objectively by the parent’s conduct, including reasonable support, regular contact, more than minimal efforts to support and communicate, and maintenance of a normal parental relationship.

Dixie J. v. John S., A.J. · filed 2016-06-16(B)(1)

Abandonment is measured by objective considerations, based on the parent’s conduct, not her subjective intent. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249–50, ¶ 18 (2000). The key criterion is whether the parent, under the unique circumstances of the case, “has provided reasonable support, maintained regular contact, made more than minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child, and maintained a normal parental relationship.” Id. at 249–50, ¶¶ 18, 20; see also A.R.S. § 8–531(1).

When circumstances prevent traditional bonding, a parent must persistently establish the relationship by available means and vigorously assert legal rights.

Diego G. v. Dcs, N.G. · filed 2016-07-26(B)(1)

When circumstances prevent a parent “from exercising traditional methods of bonding with his child, he must act persistently to establish the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert his legal rights to the extent necessary.”

Post-petition efforts to reestablish a parental relationship do not automatically rebut a prima facie case of abandonment.

Heather R. v. Dcs · filed 2017-01-24(B)(1)

“[A] prima facie case of abandonment cannot automatically be considered rebutted merely by post-petition attempts to reestablish a parental relationship. Such an automatic rule would virtually eliminate any possibility of success for a petition in a contested termination action.” Maricopa Cnty Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 8 (1990).

Paternity confirmation is not required before a putative father must investigate possible paternity and assert parental rights to avoid abandonment.

Joshua W. v. Dcs, F.T. · filed 2017-03-28(B)(1)

Confirmation of paternity through testing is not required before a parent is obligated to assert his rights as a parent to avoid losing those rights. See id. (“[I]f a man has reasonable grounds to know that he might have fathered a child, he must protect his parental rights by investigating the possibility and acting appropriately on the information he uncovers.”). Moreover, even if DCS does not provide paternity testing, the obligation falls upon the putative parent to follow through with such testing. See id.

Abandonment is measured by conduct rather than intent, and a parent unable to use traditional bonding methods must persistently establish the relationship however possible and vigorously assert legal rights.

Amber D. v. Dcs, C.E. · filed 2017-10-24(B)(1)

Abandonment is measured by a parent’s conduct rather than the parent’s intent, and “[w]hat constitutes reasonable support, regular contact, and normal supervision varies from case to case.” Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 250, ¶¶ 18, 20 (2000) (citation omitted). When circumstances prevent a parent from exercising traditional methods of bonding with a child, the parent “must act persistently to establish the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert [his or her] legal rights to the extent necessary.” Pima Cty. Juv. Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 98 (1994).

A parent's subjective intent not to abandon is insufficient when the parent's conduct shows an intentional cessation of all contact for more than six months without just cause.

Shontal K. v. Dcs · filed 2017-11-14(B)(1)

The court did not abuse its discretion in finding this evidence was insufficient to overcome the other evidence that Mother intentionally ceased all contact with her children.

Post-petition efforts to restore a relationship do not automatically rebut prima facie abandonment established by six months without a normal parental relationship.

Jerome H. v. Dcs, J.H. · filed 2017-12-07(B)(1)

“Failure to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child without just cause for a period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of abandonment,” A.R.S. § 8-531(1), which is not “automatically . . . rebutted merely by post-petition attempts to reestablish a parental relationship,” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 8 (1990).

A protective order and relocation do not supply just cause for abandonment when the parent fails to persistently pursue lawful contact and support through available legal channels.

Salvatore D. v. Whitney D., S.D. · filed 2017-12-21(B)(1)

Aside from his own testimony, Father produced nothing to support his assertions that he made a credible effort to continue supporting S.D. and maintaining a relationship with her.

Abandonment turns on a parent's conduct rather than subjective intent, and a lack of support and only minimal contact over a lengthy dependency can establish the ground.

Jessica C., Joel A. v. Dcs, J.Z. · filed 2018-05-29(B)(1)

A finding of abandonment is premised on the parent’s conduct, not the parent’s subjective intent. ... Father did not provide any support for J.Z. throughout the dependency and did not send any gifts until a few weeks before the severance hearing.

A parent may be found to have abandoned children despite claiming the other parent interfered when the parent goes years without contact, does not pursue visitation, and provides no financial or material support.

Gloria M. v. Dcs · filed 2018-06-19(B)(1)

Here, Mother had no contact with the Children for approximately four years before communicating with DCS in February 2017, one month after the filing of the termination petition. She also did not initiate family court proceedings with respect to establishing visitation with the Children. ... Finally, the case manager testified that since DCS opened the case, Mother had not provided financial support, cards, gifts, or letters to the Children during the pendency of the case. ... Sufficient evidence supports the court’s finding of abandonment.

A parent may be found to have abandoned a child when the parent refuses services required for therapeutic visitation, provides no support, sends no gifts or correspondence, and lacks a normal parent-child relationship.

Demetric L. v. Dcs, A.M. · filed 2018-07-19(B)(1)

Despite being informed of the requisites for therapeutic visits, Father failed to participate in services. He also failed to provide support for A.M., and he did not send her gifts, cards, or letters. The DCS case manager testified that Father did not have a normal parent-child relationship with A.M. as evidenced by her negative behaviors after her visits with him. Sufficient evidence supports the court's finding of abandonment.

Probation restrictions on contact do not establish just cause for failing to maintain a parent-child relationship when the parent makes only minimal efforts to complete the requirements for lifting those restrictions.

Vincent G. v. Dcs · filed 2018-08-23(B)(1)

Father’s initial probation terms prevented him from contacting his Child, but Father was aware that this restriction could be lifted if he completed certain items of treatment and assessments, supra ¶ 2. Father, however, neither acted persistently to complete these requirements nor vigorously asserted his legal rights to Child; rather, Father made only minimal efforts to alter the terms of his probation so that he could communicate with his Child. ... Reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s finding that Father abandoned his Child, and we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1).

When circumstances prevent traditional parent-child bonding, a parent opposing abandonment under § 8-533(B)(1) must persistently establish the relationship and vigorously assert available legal rights.

Nathan B. v. Lana T., J.B. · filed 2018-10-18(B)(1)

When, as in the present case, circumstances prevent the . . . father from exercising traditional methods of bonding with his child, he must act persistently to establish the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert his legal rights to the extent necessary. ... Father's efforts to exercise parental rights were neither persistent nor vigorous.

Abandonment under Section 8-533(B)(1) turns on a parent’s actual efforts to maintain the relationship, not the parent’s subjective intent or desire.

A.L. v. J.B. G.L. · filed 2018-12-27(B)(1)

Abandonment is thus measured by the parent’s actual lack of efforts to maintain the parent-child relationship, and not their subjective intent or desire to abandon the child. Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 18.

A brief period living with children does not cure abandonment when the parent was absent for most of their lives, provided little support, failed to assert parental rights, and made only minimal contact during incarceration.

Anthony L. v. Dcs · filed 2019-03-19(B)(1)

The record reasonably reflects that under the definition of “abandonment” in A.R.S. § 8-531(1), Father abandoned his children: he was absent for most of the children’s lives; he did little to provide any consistent support to the children throughout their lives; he failed to assert his parental rights vigorously and maintain a normal parental relationship; he had not established a strong existing bond with the children by the time of his most recent incarceration; and he did little to communicate with the children during the more than year-long period the dependency was pending. Therefore, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Father abandoned the children.

A parent does not manufacture abandonment under § 8-533(B)(1) by ending calls when a family-court order authorizes termination of calls containing disrespectful or case-related remarks.

Michael F. v. Ashley B., O.F. · filed 2019-06-27(B)(1)

As Father contends, “[a] parent may not restrict the other parent from interacting with their child and then petition to terminate the latter's rights for abandonment.” ... Here, however, the evidence before the court did not show that Mother had impermissibly restricted Father's telephone access to the child. ... Mother offered evidence sufficient to prove she acted within her rights in terminating the FaceTime calls under that order.

A parent invoking obstacles to traditional bonding under § 8-533(B)(1) must persistently establish the relationship however possible and assert parental rights at every opportunity.

Troy C. v. Dcs, J.A. · filed 2020-02-13(B)(1)

When circumstances prevent a parent “from exercising traditional methods of bonding with his child, [the parent] must act persistently to establish the relationship however possible.” ... Furthermore, “[t]he burden to act as a parent rests with the parent, who should assert his legal rights at the first and every opportunity.”

More-than-minimal efforts made amid restrictions and caregiver interference can defeat abandonment under § 8-533(B)(1), even when the parent could have done more.

Michaela F., Brian F. v. Benjamin A., T.A. · filed 2020-04-07(B)(1)

In concluding Father did not abandon the child, the court recognized “Father could have done more” but made “more than minimal efforts” by participating in the home visit, the TDM, ultimately cooperating with DCS, signing the 90-day voluntary agreement, “reaching out to Petitioners and filing documents with family court.” ... Reasonable evidence in the record supports these findings.

A court and DCS do not interfere with parental contact for purposes of § 8-533(B)(1) by requiring cards and letters before visitation when gradual reintroduction is recommended to avoid traumatizing a child after a long absence.

Morgan F. v. Dcs, D.F. · filed 2020-04-21(B)(1)

The recommendation, which was followed by both DCS and the juvenile court, required that Mother begin her reintroduction into Child’s life first through cards and letters before visitation could occur. Mother was made aware of this requirement at two separate court hearings, but failed to comply. ... The opportunity for Mother to participate in visitation with Child was not lost due to DCS’ or the juvenile court’s failure as Mother claims, but due to Mother’s failure to act.

Abandonment is measured by conduct rather than subjective intent, and a parent prevented from traditional bonding must persistently establish the relationship and vigorously assert legal rights.

Jasmine H. v. Brian H., B.H. · filed 2020-07-09(B)(1)

While reasonable support, regular contact, and normal supervision may vary from case to case, we measure abandonment by a parent’s conduct and not her subjective intent. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249–50, ¶¶ 18, 20 (2000). When circumstances prevent the parent from “exercising traditional methods of bonding with [her] child, [she] must act ... persistently to establish the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert [her] legal rights to the extent necessary.” Id. at ¶ 22.

Just cause is an exception to abandonment and exists when a parent reasonably and fairly believes circumstances prevent traditional parenting methods and relies on that belief in good faith; rebuttal evidence dissolves the six-month presumption, but the petitioner always retains the burden of persuasion.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to B.W. · filed 2025-07-17(B)(1)

Thus, a presumption of abandonment established under § 8-531(1) can be defeated if the parent demonstrates “just cause” for failing to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child. ... The burden of persuasion, however, never shifts from the parent seeking termination. ... We conclude that parents have “just cause” when they had a reasonable and fair justification for not maintaining a normal parental relationship with the child and relied on that justification in good faith.

Deportation may make some parenting steps unreasonably difficult but does not establish just cause for abandonment when the parent never asks DCS about contact, ignores DCS outreach, and makes no attempt to send gifts, cards, supplies, or financial support.

In RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO V.M. · filed 2026-03-30(B)(1)

Nor does B.W. justify Father’s inaction. ... Because sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Father did not act persistently to assert his parental rights, and because he provided no evidence he had just cause for his inaction, we cannot say the court clearly erred in finding abandonment. ... Rather, we affirm based on those actions Father could have done, or at the least attempted, but failed to do.

A prima facie abandonment showing under § 8-533(B)(1) creates a rebuttable presumption rather than compelling termination, but post-petition attempts alone cannot rebut it.

Dcs v. Deshannon B., D.B. · filed 2020-04-30(B)(1)

To the contrary, when a prima facie case of abandonment is presented, it only creates a presumption in favor of the moving party; the burden then shifts to the parent to rebut the presumption of abandonment. ... Nevertheless, “once th[e] presumption [of abandonment] has attached,” it may not be rebutted “merely by post-petition attempts to reestablish a parental relationship.”

Post-petition attempts to reestablish a parental relationship do not automatically rebut a prima facie case of abandonment.

Anthony A. v. Dcs · filed 2020-07-30(B)(1)

“[A] prima facie case of abandonment cannot automatically be considered rebutted merely by post-petition attempts to re-establish a parental relationship. Such an automatic rule would virtually eliminate any possibility of success for a petition in a contested termination action.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 8 (1990).

Just cause may rebut the six-month prima facie presumption of abandonment, but it is not an affirmative defense that defeats additional evidence proving failure to support, contact, or supervise a child.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.W. · filed 2024-05-28(B)(1)

But rebutting prima facie evidence is not the same as establishing an affirmative defense. ... Rather, when more is presented beyond the prima facie evidence of abandonment—that is, a parent’s failure to maintain a normal parental relationship for six months—that parent’s “just cause” explaining their failure may rebut the prima facie showing, but it will not defeat a finding based on the additional affirmative evidence establishing abandonment.

Incarceration alone does not justify a parent's failure to make more than minimal efforts to support and communicate with a child for purposes of abandonment.

Erbey B. v. Dcs · filed 2016-05-03(B)(1)

Incarceration alone does not justify a failure to make more than minimal efforts to support and communicate with a child, Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250, ¶ 21, and Father does not provide any other explanation for his failure to act.

Imprisonment is neither a complete defense to abandonment nor automatic grounds for termination, but is one factor in assessing the parent's ability to perform parental obligations.

Jesus S. v. Dcs, B.S. · filed 2016-05-05(B)(1)

In an abandonment claim, imprisonment provides neither a per se defense nor justification for termination. Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250, ¶ 22 (quoting In re Pima Cty. Juvenile Action No. S-624, 126 Ariz. 488, 490 (App. 1980)). It is “merely one factor to be considered in evaluating the father’s ability to perform parental obligations.”

Incarceration neither establishes nor defeats abandonment; an incarcerated parent must persistently maintain the relationship and vigorously assert legal rights by concrete action.

Tony J. v. Dcs, A.J. · filed 2017-04-27(B)(1)

A parent’s incarceration, standing alone, does not provide a legal defense to a claim of abandonment or justify severance on the grounds of abandonment. Id. at 250, ¶ 22, 995 P.2d at 686. Instead, incarceration is merely one factor that the juvenile court may consider in evaluating whether a parent can perform parental obligations. Id. When circumstances such as incarceration prevent a parent from exercising traditional methods of bonding, the parent “must act persistently to establish the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert his legal rights to the extent necessary.” Id. (quoting Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 97, 876 P.2d 1121, 1132 (1994)).

Incarceration neither supplies a defense to abandonment nor alone proves it; a parent unable to bond traditionally must persistently establish the relationship however possible and vigorously assert legal rights.

Michael M. v. Katie A., E.O. · filed 2017-08-15(B)(1)

Incarceration “neither provide[s] a legal defense to a claim of abandonment nor alone justifies severance on the grounds of abandonment.” Id. at 250, ¶ 22, 995 P.2d at 686 (internal quotations and citation omitted). It is but one factor to consider in evaluating a parent’s ability to perform his parental obligations. Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, nonpayment of child support alone is not enough to establish abandonment. In re Yuma Cty. Juv. Court Action No. J-87-119, 161 Ariz. 537, 539, 779 P.2d 1276, 1278 (App. 1989). When circumstances prevent a parent from “exercising traditional methods of bonding with his child, he must act persistently to establish the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert his legal rights to the extent necessary.” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250, ¶ 22, 995 P.2d at 686 (citation and internal quotations omitted).

Incarceration is neither a defense to abandonment nor alone sufficient to establish it; a constrained parent still must persistently maintain the relationship and vigorously assert parental rights.

Rene T. v. Cynthia C. · filed 2020-02-11(B)(1)

Incarceration provides neither a legal defense to abandonment nor alone justifies termination based on abandonment, but it is one factor to consider in evaluating parents’ ability to perform their parental obligations.

Incarceration neither establishes nor excuses abandonment under § 8-533(B)(1); it is one circumstance considered in evaluating whether the parent fulfilled parental obligations.

Latoya L. v. Dcs, T.L., J.L. · filed 2020-05-05(B)(1)

Incarceration alone does not demonstrate nor excuse a finding of abandonment; instead, it is a factor to consider in evaluating a parent’s performance of their parental obligations.

Self-improvement efforts during incarceration do not substitute for the regular contact, normal supervision, and support required to avoid abandonment.

Matthew F. v. Gabrielle N., R.F. · filed 2019-12-10(B)(1)

While in prison, Father sent one letter to Mother and R.F. To his credit, he also completed several self-improvement classes and worked to obtain a college degree. These efforts, however, are not a substitute for “regular contact, and normal supervision.”

An incarcerated parent may abandon a child by rejecting offered photos, failing to request visits, providing no support, and making only minimal written and telephone contact rather than persistently maintaining the relationship.

Demetrice H. v. Dcs, D.H. · filed 2021-05-27(B)(1)

Rather than “act[ing] persistently to establish the relationship however possible,” S-114487, 179 Ariz. at 97, Father rejected DCS’s offer to send him photos of Damien before May 2019, did not request visitation with Damien between February and August of 2019, and only wrote to Damien one time after securing a job at the prison.

Incarceration does not excuse abandonment when the parent provides no support and neither uses the contact method authorized by the parenting order nor seeks to modify that order; the other parent's refusal to answer unauthorized calls does not establish interference.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to E.F. · filed 2023-07-06(B)(1)

Father failed to contact the counselor despite Grandmother obtaining the counselor’s information and speaking with Father at least once a week. ... Although Father was incarcerated, he neither sought to increase contact with his children nor maintained contact with them to the extent he was permitted. He provided them no support. Reasonable evidence thus supported the superior court’s finding of abandonment.

A single request to see a child and claimed cards or calls through a relative are merely minimal efforts that do not overcome otherwise overwhelming evidence of abandonment during incarceration; limited interference does not excuse failing to use available contact channels.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to I.M. · filed 2023-09-14(B)(1)

Although this Court agrees with Father that he made some efforts to contact Child, those efforts, viewed in the light most favorable to Father, were minimal and do not overcome the otherwise overwhelming evidence of abandonment. ... The court weighed these actions against Father’s inaction: although he had access to communicate with Child through maternal grandmother, he made no efforts to contact Child during the year that the order of protection was in place and Father made minimal efforts to contact Child through available channels thereafter. ... The superior court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that “Mother’s actions do not rise to the level of interference required to establish a defense to abandonment.”

Incarceration is neither a defense to abandonment nor alone sufficient to prove it; an incarcerated parent must persistently maintain the relationship by available means and vigorously assert legal rights.

In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.L. · filed 2024-08-15(B)(1)

Incarceration provides neither a legal defense to abandonment, nor alone justifies termination based on abandonment, but it is one factor for the court to consider in evaluating a parent’s ability to perform his or her parental obligations. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 250 ¶ 22 (2000). When a parent cannot exercise traditional methods to bond with his child, “he must act persistently to establish the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert his legal rights to the extent necessary.” Id. (quoting In re Pima Cnty. Juv. Sev. Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 97 (1994)).

The factors used to decide whether an incarceration sentence is long enough to deprive a child of a normal home apply only to subsection (B)(4), not to determining abandonment under subsection (B)(1).

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.R. and B.R. · filed 2025-05-06(B)(1)

The court need not consider those factors when determining whether a parent abandoned the child.

Section 8-533(B)(3) requires the State to show that reasonable rehabilitative services could not restore a mentally ill parent’s ability to care for a child within a reasonable time.

Mary Ellen C. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 1999-01-19(B)(3)

It is inherent within this requirement that the condition be proven not to be amenable to rehabilitative services that could restore a mentally ill parent’s ability to care for a child within a reasonable time.

Termination for mental illness or deficiency requires proof that the condition prevents the parent from discharging parental responsibilities and is reasonably likely to continue for a prolonged and indeterminate period.

Mary B., Christopher W. v. Dcs · filed 2015-07-09(B)(3)

Under A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(3), DCS was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities because of mental illness or mental deficiency, and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged and indeterminate period. The record must show that Mother’s mental illness “deprives [her] of the ability to effectively care for the [C]hild[ren].”

The prolonged-indeterminate-period element for mental illness cannot rest on unsupported inference when the medical evidence does not establish it.

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JS-378 · filed 1974-01-10(3)

However, the severance of the natural ties of birth should not be undertaken upon mere inferences which are not reasonably supported by the evidence. In our opinion, the record before this court in this case shows a complete lack of evidence to support the statutory prerequisite imposed by A.R.S. § 8-533(3) for the termination of the parent-child relationship.

Mental illness under subsection (B)(3) means a substantial mental condition that prevents discharge of parental responsibilities and is likely to continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

In the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-5209 & No. JS-4963 · filed 1984-10-23(B)(3)

We therefore hold that the term “mental illness” under the statute is defined as “a substantial mental condition which renders the person unable to discharge parental responsibilities and which condition is likely to continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.”

A finding that a parent cannot provide any parental guidance or control supports a finding that the parent cannot discharge parental responsibilities.

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action Nos. JS 1308 & JS 1412 · filed 1976-09-30(3)

We believe that a reasonable interpretation of the statute would warrant a finding that when a parent is unable to provide any parental guidance or control that such a parent is unable to discharge the parental responsibilities.

The parental-responsibilities standard is not confined to an exclusive list of duties and gives the trial judge flexibility to consider each termination case's unique circumstances.

Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County · filed 1985-05-07(B)(3)

The term is not intended to encompass any exclusive set of factors but rather to establish a standard which permits a trial judge flexibility in considering the unique circumstances of each termination case before determining the parent’s ability to discharge his or her parental responsibilities.

Once sufficient evidence establishes the mental-illness termination ground, the court has no discretion to deny the termination petition.

In Re the Appeal in Pinal County, Juvenile Action No. S-389 · filed 1986-08-15(B)(3)

Under that statute, where grounds for termination are found to exist, termination is mandatory. Thus, as in this case, once a court is presented evidence sufficient to find grounds for termination under § 8-533(B)(3), the court has no discretion to deny the petition for termination.

Seeking termination for mental illness under subsection (B)(3) does not automatically require appointment of a guardian ad litem for the parent.

Kelly R. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2006-06-27(B)(3)

We hold the parental rights termination statutes do not automatically require the juvenile court to appoint a GAL for a parent when ADES seeks termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).

Parental responsibilities are contextual duties and are not limited to any exclusive set of factors.

Denise R. v. Ades, Draven R. and Larsen R. · filed 2009-05-26(B)(3)

Although Denise argues ADES presented no evidence that Draven and Larsen were “dirty, unfed, poorly clothed, [or] sick,” we have never held the parental responsibilities addressed in § 8-533(B)(3) are limited to any exclusive set of factors; rather, they refer to “‘those duties or obligations . . . a parent has with regard to his child,’” which may depend upon context.

Title 8 does not require restoring a mentally incompetent parent to competency before a severance hearing proceeds.

Cecilia A. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2012-04-12(B)(3)

In contrast, Title 8, A.R.S., which governs termination of parental rights, does not require that a mentally incompetent parent be restored to competency before the court proceeds with a severance hearing.

Parental responsibilities include food, shelter, medical attention, physical care, emotional security, guidance, and control.

Lloyd B., Tina M. v. Ades, L.B. · filed 2014-06-03(B)(3)

Parental responsibilities under § 8-533(B)(3) include providing a child with “food, shelter, and medical attention,” as well as with good physical care, emotional security, guidance, and control.

Parental responsibilities are a flexible standard encompassing the duties and obligations a parent has toward the child, not an exclusive list of factors.

Jarrid W. v. Dcs, E.W. · filed 2015-11-24(B)(3)

“[T]he term ‘parental responsibilities’ is capable of being understood by persons of ordinary intelligence as referring to those duties or obligations which a parent has with regard to his child.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-5894, 145 Ariz. 405, 408–09 (App. 1985) (citing Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action JS-5209, JS-4963, 143 Ariz. 178, 185 (App. 1984)). “Parental responsibilities” does not refer to an exclusive set of factors but instead “establish[es] a standard which permits a trial judge flexibility in considering the unique circumstances of each termination case before determining the parent’s ability to discharge his or her parental responsibilities.” See id. at 409.

A parent's appropriate behavior during some supervised visits does not defeat the mental-deficiency ground when expert and case-manager evidence shows the parent cannot safely meet the child's needs.

Kimberlee K. v. Dcs, I.K. · filed 2015-12-01(B)(3)

At the severance hearing, Dr. Bluth testified that mother was unemployed, had a mood disorder not otherwise specified (NOS), and had mild mental retardation. Dr. Bluth stated that providing for the needs of child was “well beyond [mother’s] capacity” and he did not believe mother had the ability to parent in the foreseeable future. The DCS case manager testified that mother had continued anger management problems throughout the dependency, made inappropriate statements to child, and did not complete the offered rehabilitative services.

Further rehabilitative services may be deemed futile under the mental-illness ground when the parent refuses offered treatment.

Hallie D. v. Dcs, J.D. · filed 2016-07-21(B)(3)

Moreover, the evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that further rehabilitative services would be futile.

Repeated positive tests, noncompliance with treatment, and failure to address underlying drug-use issues can establish inability to parent and likely continuation of chronic substance abuse.

Danielle J. v. Dcs · filed 2016-07-21(B)(3)

On this record, Mother has not shown the superior court abused its discretion in finding Mother is unable to discharge her parental duties due to her history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs and that there are reasonable grounds to believe the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

A parent's history of substance use and failure to complete or engage in offered services can establish that the abuse will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

Leah R. v. Dcs · filed 2016-08-04(B)(3)

Evidence sufficient to support a finding that a substance abuse issue will continue may include the parent’s history of drug use and failure to complete or engage in offered services. Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 378-79, ¶¶ 26-29. A parent’s failure to abstain from substances despite a pending severance is “evidence [the parent] has not overcome [the] dependence on drugs and alcohol.” Id. at 379, ¶ 29.

Temporary abstinence generally does not outweigh a significant substance-abuse history and consistent inability to abstain during the case.

Jennifer S. v. Department of Child Safety · filed 2016-08-09(B)(3)

Generally, a parent’s “temporary abstinence from drugs and alcohol does not outweigh [her] significant history of abuse or [her] consistent inability to abstain during [the] case.”

Failure to demonstrate abstinence, together with missed drug tests and abuse of another person's prescription drugs, supports the chronic-substance-abuse ground.

Juan v. v. Dcs · filed 2016-09-13(B)(3)

Under the circumstances, Father's failure to demonstrate that he could and had abstained from drug use, combined with the evidence recounted above, supports the court's finding of the statutory ground for severance based on clear and convincing evidence. See Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 29 (App. 2010).

Parental responsibilities encompass a wide range of obligations, and Section 8-533(B)(3) does not require proof that mental illness prevents the parent from discharging every responsibility.

Cassandra W., Michael S. v. Dcs · filed 2016-12-27(B)(3)

“Parental responsibilities” include a wide range of obligations and the statute does not require a showing that the parent is unable to discharge any responsibilities.

DCS may withhold visitation while a parent fails to complete court-ordered prerequisites such as establishing paternity and undergoing a psychological evaluation.

Earl S. v. Dcs · filed 2017-03-09(B)(3)

While visitation is a necessary step in the process of reunification, DCS is not required to provide, or attempt to provide visitation before a severance can take place. See Christina G., 227 Ariz. at 235, ¶ 15 (DCS does not need to ensure that a parent participates in every service offered). If a parent is not participating in the court ordered services, it is within their discretion to withhold visitation with the child until those important steps are completed.

Substance abuse is likely to continue for a prolonged indeterminate period when it coincides with homelessness, domestic violence, unmet child needs, and refusal to seek treatment or demonstrate sobriety.

Floyd R. v. Dcs, S.R. · filed 2017-03-28(B)(3)

Given these facts, coupled with Father’s refusal to participate in substance abuse treatment or demonstrate sobriety, sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Father’s substance abuse will continue for a prolonged and indeterminate period.

Substance-abuse history and failure to complete or engage in offered services can establish that chronic abuse will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

Darci v. v. Dcs, M.V. · filed 2017-04-06(B)(3)

Evidence sufficient to support a finding that Mother’s substance abuse will continue may include her abuse history and failure to complete or engage in offered services. Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 378–79, ¶ 26. A parent’s failure to abstain from substances despite a pending severance is “evidence [the parent] has not overcome [his or her] dependence on drugs.” Id. at 379, ¶ 29.

The mental-deficiency ground asks whether clear and convincing evidence shows the deficiency prevents discharge of parental responsibilities; it does not merely ask whether the parent is minimally adequate.

Mayra T. v. Dcs, C.L. · filed 2017-04-11(B)(3)

However, Vanessa H. does not set out a standard that a parent need only be “minimally adequate.” The test, under the statute, asks the court to decide if there is clear and convincing evidence Mother was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities due to a mental deficiency. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).

A short period of sobriety does not overcome a long history of substance abuse and relapse, particularly after a prior failed reunification and drug-related harm to the child at birth.

Charna F. v. Dcs, C.M. · filed 2017-04-18(B)(3)

But the court reasonably weighed Mother’s drug and alcohol history in its entirety, including the previous severance. Parents must be given an opportunity to reunify with their children, but they are not entitled to attempt indefinitely to rectify the circumstances leading to the Department’s intervention. In re Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994).

Temporary abstinence does not outweigh significant substance-abuse history or consistent inability to abstain during the case, because the child's need for permanency prevails over uncertain recovery.

Jayna S. v. Dcs, X.R. · filed 2017-05-04(B)(3)

Generally, a parent’s “temporary abstinence from drugs and alcohol does not outweigh [her] significant history of abuse or [her] consistent inability to abstain during [the] case.” Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 29 (App. 2010). Furthermore, “children should not be forced to wait for their parent to grow up.” Id. at 378, ¶ 25. Consequently, “a child’s interest in permanency must prevail over a parent’s uncertain battle with drugs.” Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 17 (App. 2016) (citation omitted).

Mental-illness termination does not require proof that the parent is incapable of exercising every parental responsibility; the court may consider the case's unique circumstances.

Tovah K. v. Dcs · filed 2017-06-22(B)(3)

Terminating parental rights based on mental illness does not require proof that the parent is incapable of exercising any parental responsibilities.

Mental-illness termination requires reasonable reunification efforts or proof that such efforts would not restore the parent's ability to care for the child within a reasonable time.

Jason v. v. Dcs, J.V. · filed 2017-06-22(B)(3)

To sever on this ground, there must also be evidence and a finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunify the family, or that such efforts would not restore the parent’s ability to care for a child within a reasonable time.

The chronic-substance-abuse ground does not require inability to discharge every parental responsibility and permits a flexible, case-specific assessment of parenting ability.

Consuelo v. Dcs · filed 2017-11-28(B)(3)

Termination under A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(3) “does not require that the parent be found unable to discharge any parental responsibilities . . . but rather establish[es] a standard which permits a trial judge flexibility in considering the unique circumstances of each termination case before determining the parent’s ability to discharge his or her parental responsibilities.” Maricopa Cty. Juvenile Action No. JS–5894, 145 Ariz. 405, 408–09 (App. 1985).

DCS may condition complementary counseling and evaluations on thirty days of sobriety when evidence shows those services otherwise lack a reasonable chance of success.

Sarah R. v. Dcs · filed 2017-12-12(B)(3)

The DCS program supervisor testified that, in order for these complementary services to have a reasonable chance of success, the parent recipient of the services must first have demonstrated at least thirty days’ sobriety. Mother did not contest that evidence below, and on appeal cites no statistical data, expert opinion or cogent argument to the contrary.

Prior substance-abuse history, including length, frequency, substances, sobriety attempts, and relapses, may establish that inability to parent will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

Stella H. v. Dcs, J.H. · filed 2017-12-14(B)(3)

“As the trier of fact, the juvenile court could properly consider the evidence of Mother’s prior substance abuse when evaluating whether reasonable grounds existed to conclude her inability to discharge parental responsibilities would continue for a prolonged and indeterminate period.” Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 20 (App. 2016). That evidence may include “the length and frequency of Mother’s substance abuse, the types of substances abused, . . . prior efforts to maintain sobriety, and prior relapses.” Id.

Termination for substance abuse implicitly requires proof that the condition is not amenable to rehabilitative services that could restore parenting ability within a reasonable time.

Anthony W. v. Dcs · filed 2017-12-28(B)(3)

As a part of DCS’ obligation to make reasonable reunification efforts, this court recognized in Jennifer G. an “implicit requirement” that termination based on substance abuse requires that “the condition from which the parent suffers be proven not to be amenable to rehabilitative services.” Id. at 453 n.3, ¶ 12 (internal quotation omitted). In so holding, we adopted the analysis of Mary Ellen C. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security, 193 Ariz. 185 (App. 1999), which further requires that DCS provide such rehabilitative services if the services “could restore [the] parent’s ability to care for a child within a reasonable time.” Id. at 191, ¶ 31.

Mental illness alone does not support termination under Section 8-533(B)(3).

Penny G. v. Dcs · filed 2018-02-15(B)(3)

A showing of mental illness, by itself, is not enough.

Years of untreated depression and trauma and the need for substantial trauma work can support a finding that mental illness preventing adequate parenting will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

Chelsea R. v. Dcs, H.R. · filed 2020-08-27(B)(3)

But this finding is directly supported by the psychologist’s report finding it unlikely Mother will be able to parent appropriately until she completes “trauma work to help modify the dysfunctional belief systems and thought patterns” occasioned by “years of untreated depression and trauma.”

Intellectual disability alone cannot support termination under § 8-533(B)(3); DCS must prove the disability makes the parent incapable of discharging parental responsibilities through actual or likely harm to the child.

Toni T. v. Dcs, E.T. · filed 2021-08-31(B)(3)

Likewise, the state cannot terminate disabled parents’ rights to their children based only on unfounded speculation that their disabilities make them incapable of being a fit parent. ... Instead, DCS must show by clear and convincing evidence that a parent’s disability renders them incapable of discharging their “parental responsibilities” by providing “proof of actual or likely harm to the child.”

A specific diagnostic label is not dispositive under the mental-illness ground when substantial evidence shows persistent psychotic, erratic, and unsafe behavior that prevents parenting and will not resolve untreated.

Tava R. v. Dcs, T.R. · filed 2022-02-17(B)(3)

Moreover, regardless of Mother’s specific diagnosis, the record is replete with examples of her erratic and unstable behaviors, which were observed by numerous individuals throughout the dependency.

A parent cannot defeat the mental-illness ground by arguing that the evidence is outdated when the parent's own refusal to participate in an updated psychological evaluation prevented the court from obtaining current information.

Kyle R., Dawna-Jo H. v. Dcs · filed 2022-10-11(B)(3)

Father faults the court for relying on mental health reports that were at least four years old, but his own refusal to participate in mental health services during this case, including an updated psychological evaluation, prevented the court from relying on more current information. ... Nevertheless, reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that Father suffers from mental illness that renders him unable to discharge his parental responsibilities and that his condition will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.

Five months of improved engagement and medication management do not defeat the mental-illness ground when the parent still experiences suicidal ideation, unstable relationships and substance use, and continued difficulty managing medication.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.G. · filed 2023-08-24(B)(3)

Although there is some evidence that Mother more regularly engaged in mental-health treatment in the five months before the trial, as of June 2022, her provider noted Mother’s “[i]nsight is impaired by illness,” she has “ongoing struggles with med[ication] management,” and had questioned her housing stability. Moreover, in July 2022, Mother again reported experiencing suicidal ideations. ... Reasonable and adequate evidence supports the court’s finding that “Mother’s inability to safely parent the children due to her mental illness will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.”

A delusional disorder that distorts reality, exacerbates aggression, and affects parenting supports the mental-illness ground when the parent denies having mental-health problems or needing treatment and the record indicates the condition will persist.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to N.Y. · filed 2024-05-07(B)(3)

In making its determination, the court relied on Mother’s mental health diagnoses, Mother’s criminal history, Mother’s claim that DCS kidnapped Child, and Mother’s denial that she has mental health issues or needs treatment. The record supports the court’s conclusion that DCS satisfied § 8-533(B)(3).

Medical-marijuana use may support termination when contrary to medical advice and part of broader noncompliance that leaves epilepsy and mental illness unmanaged and parenting unsafe.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to K.C. · filed 2025-03-18(B)(3)

Even accepting Father’s premise that his substance use was limited to medical marijuana, such use was contrary to his health providers’ advice. And although Father had begun testing clean by the time of trial, the court found that Father’s marijuana use was part of a pattern of noncompliance with his seizure and mental-health medications. With his epilepsy and mental illnesses continuing to go unmanaged, Father was unable to demonstrate the necessary sobriety and stability to parent.

Severance for chronic substance abuse requires DCS to make reasonable reunification efforts unless those efforts would be futile, and the measures undertaken must have a reasonable prospect of success.

Guy N. v. Dcs, B.N. · filed 2015-06-16(B)(3)

Severance under § 8-533(B)(3) also requires that DCS make reasonable efforts to reunify the family, unless such efforts would be futile. See Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 191–92, ¶¶ 31–34, 971 P.2d 1046, 1052–53 (App. 1999). DCS must undertake reunification measures that have “a reasonable prospect of success.”

Section 8-533(B)(3) permits severance when clear and convincing evidence shows that chronic drug abuse prevents a parent from discharging parental responsibilities and reasonably will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.

Ashlee W. v. Dcs, E.S. · filed 2015-09-22(B)(3)

A juvenile court may sever parental rights if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of . . . a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled substances or alcohol and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3); see also Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 12.

Completing drug court or most recommended services does not defeat the chronic-substance-abuse ground when a parent’s long drug history and continuing opioid misuse support prolonged inability to parent.

David H. v. Dcs, T.H. · filed 2015-10-27(B)(3)

Although completion of drug court is significant, it does not negate Father’s long history of chronic abuse of drugs, controlled substances, and alcohol, nor his continued abuse of opioids. And, despite his participation in “most” of the recommended services, Father continued to exhibit concerning behaviors more than two years after Child was removed from his care; he participated in “doctor shopping,” tested positive for heroin, and exhibited behaviors indicative of misuse or abuse of prescribed opioids.

A parent’s good-faith effort to participate in services does not itself bar termination for chronic substance abuse because that ground differs materially from the effort-focused time-in-care ground.

Derek M. v. Dcs, M.M., D.M. · filed 2015-10-29(B)(3)

Unlike the time-in-care provision, a good faith effort to participate in services — by itself — does not bar severance under § 8-533(B)(3). The severance requirements of § 8-533(B)(3) are materially different from those relating to the time-in-care ground. Compare A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) (parent must be unable to discharge parental responsibilities due to substance abuse and “the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period”) with A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b) (parent must have “substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances”).

Termination for chronic substance abuse requires reasonable reunification efforts or proof that such efforts would be futile.

Jennifer G. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2005-11-29(B)(3)

To order severance on this ground, the juvenile court must also have found that ADES had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family or that such efforts would have been futile.

Conflicting evidence concerning chronic substance abuse and services precludes summary judgment terminating parental rights.

Margaret H. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2006-12-21(B)(3)

In conclusion, we find little to distinguish this case from Jennifer G. in terms of the quantum of evidence we found sufficient there to defeat ADES’s motion for summary judgment and the improper weighing of evidence. Therefore, as we did there, we reverse the juvenile court’s order granting ADES’s motion and terminating Margaret’s parental rights to Dasanee.

Drug abuse need not be constant to be chronic; it is enough that it is long-lasting or lingering.

Raymond F. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2010-05-20(B)(3)

Thus, contrary to Father’s contention, drug abuse need not be constant to be considered chronic.

The substance-abuse ground requires inability to discharge parental responsibilities due to chronic drug abuse and reasonable grounds to believe the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

Raegina M. v. Dcs · filed 2014-07-03(B)(3)

To support severance on the substance abuse ground, the juvenile court needed to find that Raegina was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities because of a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs or controlled substances, and that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the condition would continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

A period of negative drug tests does not defeat chronic-substance-abuse termination when the parent's history, relapses, and incomplete treatment support prolonged future abuse.

Tonya C. v. Ades, D.C. · filed 2014-04-15(B)(3)

We conclude that ample evidence supported the superior court’s finding that severance was warranted based on substance abuse under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).

Mental illness or chronic substance abuse must be expected to continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

Chaine M. v. Pamela R. · filed 2014-10-07(B)(3)

the juvenile court, as the fact finder, must determine not only whether past mental illness or substance abuse exists, but also whether the evidence establishes “reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.”

Drug abuse need not be constant to be chronic.

Victoria F. v. Dcs · filed 2014-11-18(B)(3)

drug abuse need not be constant to be considered chronic.

A parent's lengthy failure to participate in services, coupled with no evidence beyond recent negative screens, supports finding that chronic drug abuse prevents effective care.

Jaimee S. v. Dcs · filed 2014-12-18(B)(3)

Mother’s lack of participation in the services offered by ADES over the course of two years, coupled with her failure to point to any evidence other than her negative drug screenings “since November 2013,” further support the juvenile court’s finding that Mother’s drug abuse deprives her of the ability to effectively care for the children.

Chronic substance abuse need not be constant; it is enough that the use has existed or continued for a long time.

Kelly B. v. Dcs · filed 2015-03-05(B)(3)

There is clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that Mother has a history of chronic substance abuse. A finding of “chronic” use does not require “constant” use, but rather use that has existed or continued for a long time. Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 377, ¶ 16, 231 P.3d at 381.

After more than two years in care, incomplete treatment and a methamphetamine relapse shortly before trial support a finding that substance abuse will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

Dania E. v. Dcs, C.M. · filed 2015-04-09(B)(3)

Mother argues A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) does not require that she be ready, “on the very day of trial,” to “resume normal parenting duties,” and that she would have been sober and ready to parent “six weeks to two months” after trial. By the time of trial, however, C.M. had been in DCS’ care for more than two years. During that time, and notwithstanding a substantial history of substance abuse, Mother had failed to complete substance abuse services and had relapsed with methamphetamine just months before trial. This evidence supports the superior court’s ruling.

A parent's failure to remedy substance abuse despite knowing that loss of the children is imminent is evidence that the parent has not overcome drug dependence.

Heather D. v. Dcs · filed 2015-05-21(B)(3)

Under § 8-533(B)(3), the juvenile court may grant a motion to terminate parental rights if it finds the parent “is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of . . . a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled substances or alcohol and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” A parent’s failure to remedy substance abuse “despite knowing the loss of [her] children was imminent, is evidence [she] has not overcome [her] dependence on drugs.” Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 29, 231 P.3d 377, 383 (App. 2010).

Chronic drug abuse need not be constant, and termination on that ground requires diligent reunification efforts or futility plus clear proof that the abuse prevents effective parenting in the near future.

Trevor H., Jamie W. v. Dcs, L.H. · filed 2016-01-21(B)(3)

In addition to proving that the substance abuse will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period, the court must also find that the Department made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services or that such efforts would have been futile. Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, 453, ¶ 12, 123 P.3d 186, 189 (App. 2005). Chronic drug abuse “need not be constant to be considered chronic,” but can be a “condition that has existed or continued for a long time,” see Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 377, ¶ 16, 231 P.3d 377, 381 (App. 2010) (citations omitted), and the Department bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a parent’s chronic drug abuse prevents them from parenting, and would make them incapable of “parenting effectively in the near future.” See Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 97, ¶ 33, 219 P.3d 296, 307 (App. 2009).

Repeated outpatient referrals can satisfy reasonable reunification efforts absent credible evidence that inpatient substance-abuse treatment or preliminary mental-health services were necessary.

Kathy S. v. Dcs · filed 2016-01-21(B)(3)

These findings are supported by the record, which reflects Mother was offered a panoply of services over the course of nearly two years which were designed to address the primary impediment to reunification — Mother’s persistent use of and admitted addiction to methamphetamine. Mother was offered substance abuse testing, substance abuse treatment, parent aide services, supervised visitation, and a psychological evaluation. DCS re-submitted referrals for these services multiple times despite Mother’s lack of commitment, consistency, and participation.

In deciding whether chronic substance abuse will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period, the court may consider the length, frequency, and type of prior substance abuse, associated behavior, past sobriety efforts, and relapses.

Jennifer S. v. Dcs, Z.S. · filed 2016-05-03(B)(3)

As the trier of fact, the juvenile court could consider the evidence of Mother’s prior substance abuse in evaluating whether reasonable grounds existed to conclude her inability to discharge parental responsibilities would continue for a prolonged indeterminate period. This evidence included the length and frequency of Mother’s substance abuse, the types of substances abused, behaviors associated with the substance abuse, prior efforts to maintain sobriety, and prior relapses.