Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1501

Section 23-1501 et seq. overruled Wagenseller and limited the grounds on which an employee could claim wrongful discharge, but the court treated the Act as inapplicable because it took effect after the suit was filed.

Chaboya v. American National Red Cross · filed 1999-04-16

The Court further finds that Plaintiff was not wrongfully discharged in violation of state law when he was terminated from his employment with the Red Cross on December 10,1993. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985) (recognizing the tort of wrongful discharge). Although the Arizona Employment Protection Act, A.R.S. § 23-1501 et seq., overruled Wagenseller and limited the grounds under which an employee could claim wrongful discharge, Wagenseller nevertheless applies here because the Employment Protection Act went into effect July 20, 1996, after Plaintiffs filing of the instant suit.

Section 23-1501 does not govern an employment agreement formed before the Employment Protection Act's enactment.

Greenwalt v. Sun West Fire District · filed 2000-02-10

Because Defendant hired Plaintiff in 1994, i.e., prior to the enactment of the EPA, the initial agreement between the parties is not governed by the statute.

Section 23-1501(3) does not provide a cause of action for negligent termination of employment.

Albers v. Edelson Technology Partners L.P. · filed 2001-09-04(3)

Nor does the Arizona Employment Protection Act provide for such an action. See A.R.S. § 23-1501(3) (Supp.2000). Accordingly, Appellants cannot state a claim for relief based upon negligent discharge.

Section 23-1501(A)(3) provides an Arizona Employment Protection Act retaliation claim for termination based on disclosing information or a reasonable belief that the employer violated Arizona law, but a demotion alone is not sufficient to trigger liability.

Craven v. Clay Springs-Pinedale Fire District · filed 2021-08-20(A)(3)

Given the statement that the AEPA was meant to address terminations of employment but not “other wrongful employment acts or omissions,” a demotion is not sufficient to trigger liability under the AEPA. ... Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on Craven’s AEPA claim.

Section 23-1501(3)(b) permits a wrongful-termination tort claim based on another statute’s public policy only when that statute provides no remedy for its violation; otherwise, that statute’s remedies, definitions, and restrictions control.

Taylor v. Graham County Chamber of Commerce · filed 2001-10-18(3)(b)

The so-called “residual provision” in the last sentence of subparagraph (3)(b), on which Taylor relies, authorizes “a tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy set forth in [another] statute” only if that other statute “does not provide a remedy to an employee for the violation of the [other] statute.” § 23-1501(3)(b). ACRA, however, does provide a remedy for its violation. In other words, if an employer violates ACRA, that statute provides a remedy to an employee for the violation. As noted above, GCCC is not subject to and, therefore, did not violate ACRA. The EPA does not provide a back door method of suing GCCC in tort for wrongful termination in violation of ACRA or its public policy.

Section 23-1501 limits state-law employment termination claims to specified statutory circumstances and bars claims based only on general or employer-specific public policy; the court extended that reasoning to contract nonrenewal.

Picht v. PEORIA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 11 OF MARICOPA COUNTY · filed 2009-07-16

Defendants are correct: the EPA limits employment termination claims under state law to four specific circumstances, thus excluding violations of public or other policies not set forth in a statute. Galati v. America West Airlines, Inc., 205 Ariz. 290, 69 P.3d 1011, 1013 (Ariz.App.2003). ... While the EPA only addresses termination of employment, Taylor v. Graham County Chamber of Commerce, 201 Ariz. 184, 33 P.3d 518, 521 (Ariz.App.2001), it is unreasonable to believe that the Arizona legislature intended to allow claims related to the non-renewal of an employment contract in circumstances where it bars claims related to the more serious act of outright termination of employment. It is clear that the Arizona legislature intended to bar claims related to non-renewal of employment contracts that are grounded only in a violation of school district policies or general “public policies.”

Section 23-1501 limits AEPA wrongful-termination remedies based on public policy to violations of the Arizona Constitution or Arizona statutes, not federal regulations.

Galati v. America West Airlines, Inc. · filed 2003-06-03(3)(b), (3)(e)(i), and (3)(c)(ii)

The language chosen by our legislature is unequivocal. Section 23-1501(3)(b) provides a remedy if “[t]he employer has terminated the employment relationship of an employee in violation of a statute of this state.” (Emphasis added). Section 23-1501(3)(e)(i) provides a remedy if the employee is terminated in retaliation for refusing to commit an act or omission “that would violate the Constitution of Arizona, or the statutes of this state.” (Emphasis added). Section 23-1501(3)(c)(ii) provides a remedy if the employee is terminated for disclosing to the employer, its representative, or an investigatory body a violation of “the Constitution of Arizona or the statutes of this state.” (Emphasis added). No mention is made of any federal provision, statute or regulation. As Galati acknowledges, the language plainly appears to contemplate only transgressions of Arizona law as violative of Arizona public policy.

Section 23-1501(3) limits wrongful-employment claims to statutory categories and does not authorize a wrongful-discharge claim based on common-law public policy.

Malnar v. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Incorporated · filed 2022-08-31(3)(a)

But the AEPA limits wrongful employment actions to three categories, none of which include violation of public policy established by common law. Thorpe, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 1143. Plaintiff’s argument that a court may treat a written contract—one of the three permissible grounds for a wrongful employment action under the AEPA—as if it were common law is beside the point. The AEPA does not permit wrongful discharge claims grounded in common law.

Section 23-1501(3)(b) requires a wrongful-termination plaintiff to show that the termination violated a state statute that provides no separate remedy for its violation.

Harris v. Maricopa County Superior Court · filed 2011-01-20(3)(b)

To prevail on a wrongful termination claim under Arizona law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an employment relationship was terminated in violation of a state statute that does not provide its own remedy for statutory violations. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1501(3)(b); Taylor v. Graham County Chamber of Commerce, 33 P.3d 518, 521-26 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).

Section 23-1501(3)(b) bars termination in violation of an Arizona statute, while § 23-1501(3)(c) bars retaliation for refusing to commit an act or omission that would violate the Arizona Constitution; the statute does not bar termination merely because it violates the Arizona Constitution.

McBurnie v. Prescott, City Of · filed 2013-03-13(3)(b), (3)(c)

Second, McBurnie did not establish a predicate for statutory wrongful discharge under Arizona Revised Statutes § 23-1501. McBurnie alleged that he was terminated in violation of the Arizona Constitution. While Arizona’s wrongful discharge statute bars termination “in violation of a statute of [Arizona],” A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(b), or “in *626retaliation for ... [t]he refusal by [an] employee to commit an act or omission that would violate the Constitution of Arizona,” id. § 23 — 1501(3)(c), it does not bar termination in violation of the Arizona Constitution.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(b) requires the predicate violation to be an Arizona statute; a claim based only on federal law does not satisfy that basis.

Miller v. United Parcel Service Incorporated · filed 2023-08-14(A)(3)(b)

an employee has a claim against an employer for termination if the employer has terminated the employment in violation of an Arizona statute.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(a) limits an employment-breach claim to contract remedies, while § 23-1501(A)(3)(b) permits a wrongful-termination tort claim only when termination violates a state statute that provides no remedy to the employee.

Goss v. United States of America · filed 2020-02-21(A)(3)(a), (A)(3)(b)

The Court has indicated that one possible claim would be breach of Plaintiff’s employment contract under A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(a). See Doc. 34 at 4 n.2. But the remedies under this section are limited to the remedies for a breach of contract. This is clearly not a tort within the FTCA. ... But this section provides that “[a]n employee has a claim against an employer for termination of employment” if “[t]he employer has terminated the employment relationship of [the] employee in violation of a statute of this state.” A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b). Plaintiff does not identify a state statute that was violated by his alleged constructive discharge. Section (A)(3)(b) further provides that “[i]f the statute provides a remedy to an employee for a violation of the statute, the remedies provided to an employee for a violation of the statute are the exclusive remedies for the violation of the statute or the public policy set forth in or arising out of the statute[.]” Id. ... The final sentence of the section – which Plaintiff quotes – states that “[i]f the statute does not provide a remedy to an employee for the violation of the statute, the employee shall have the right to bring a tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy set forth in the statute.” Id. But such a tort claim must still be based on violation of a state statute, and Plaintiff identifies none. Nor does he show that the violated statute does not provide a remedy, a showing required for him to assert a tort claim.

Section 23-1501(A)(3) defines the grounds and limits the remedies for a wrongful-termination claim, but it does not bar a declaratory judgment concerning an employee’s right to appeal to a commission.

Osorio v. Ross · filed 2021-07-08(A)(3)

Section 23-1501(A)(3) outlines the grounds upon which an employee may bring a wrongful termination claim and limits the employee’s potential remedies under this theory. Given this case’s current posture, those remedies are not pertinent; therefore, to the extent the court found that § 23-1501 bars Osorio from seeking a declaratory judgment on his right to appeal to the Commission, the court erred.

Section 23-1501 permits a wrongful-termination claim only when the discharge breaches an employment contract, violates an Arizona statute, or retaliates against the employee’s assertion of rights protected by state law.

Taylor · filed 2025-12-04

Under A.R.S. § 23-1501, a plaintiff can show wrongful termination if “(a) the discharge was in violation of an employment contract, (b) the discharge violated a statute of this state, or (c) the discharge was in retaliation for the employee’s assertion of certain rights protected by state law.”

Section 23-1501(3)(b) makes the remedies provided by a statute, including ACRA, the exclusive remedies for a wrongful-termination violation of that statute or its public policy.

Cronin v. Sheldon · filed 1999-12-17(3)(b)

The legislature has now filled the void identified by Broomfield with the exclusive remedies provision of the EPA which states, in the simplest terms, that since ACRA provides its own remedy for wrongful termination, such remedy becomes the exclusive remedy for an ACRA violation.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(b) recognizes a wrongful-termination claim based on the public policy underlying a statute.

Harper v. State · filed 2016-12-27(A)(3)(b)

the relevant public policy underlying a statute may also give rise to a wrongful termination claim.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(b) makes the remedy provided by another statute exclusive for a claim based on that statute's violation.

Goss v. United States · filed 2018-11-13(A)(3)(b)

To bring a claim for violation of A.R.S. § 41-1464, Plaintiff must bring a claim under the Arizona's Civil Rights Act. See A.R.S. § 41-1484 ; A.R.S. § 23-1501 (A)(b)(ii), (B) (if a statute provides a remedy to an employee for violation of the statute, that remedy is exclusive); Colvin v. Sheldon , 195 Ariz. 531, 991 P.2d 231, 236 (1999) ; see also Doc. 1 ¶ 54.

Section 23-1501(B) modifies and limits retaliation claims under subsection (A)(3)(c)(ii) when the source statute provides its own exclusive remedies.

Guernsey v. Elko Wire Rope Incorporated · filed 2023-08-21(B)

That this language is not in subsection (A)(3)(c) does not mean that it does not logically modify subsection (A)(3)(c), which substantively circumscribes the types of wrongful termination claims for retaliation that can be brought in Arizona.

Section 23-1501 limits wrongful-employment-action claims to specified statutory categories and provides the exclusive remedy for terminations violating public-policy statutes.

Thorp v. Home Health Agency—Arizona, Inc. · filed 2013-03-18(3)(a)-(c)

Team Select argues that Plaintiffs claim is barred by the Arizona Employment Protection Act (“AEPA”), A.R.S. § 23-1501. The AEPA limits claims for wrongful employment action to the following three categories: (1) claims for breach of a written employment contract; (2) claims that the employer terminated the employee in violation of an Arizona statute; and (3) claims that the employer terminated the employee because of the employees’ refusal to violate an Arizona statute or the Arizona Constitution or for providing information that the employer is violating an Arizona statute or the Arizona Constitution. A.R.S. § 23 — 1501(3)(a)—(c). ... More to the point, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that the AEPA is the exclusive remedy for employment terminations that violate public policy statutes. ... This Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently plead a claim for breach of contract of good faith and fair dealing and will dismiss that claim.

Section 23-1501(B)'s exclusive-remedy rule applies to statutes regulating the employee-employer relationship and does not bar an AEPA claim based on a non-employment statute such as the Open Meeting law.

Jackson v. Lake Mohave Ranchos Fire District · filed 2024-01-17(B)

“If the statute provides a remedy to an employee for a violation of the statute, the remedies provided to an employee for a violation of the statute are the exclusive remedies for the violation of the statute or the public policy set forth in or arising out of the statute.” ... This is true; however, the Open Meeting law does not regulate the “employee-employer relationship.” Moreover, if Plaintiff’s claim prevails, there will be no overlapping theories of recovery. ... Therefore, the exclusive-remedy provisions are not applicable here.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(b) makes a statute’s own remedies exclusive when available and otherwise permits a wrongful-termination tort claim based on the statute’s public policy.

Terry v. UPS · filed 2022-03-31(A)(3)(b)

In addressing a claim for being fired in violation of “a statute of this state,” the AEPA distinguishes between statutes that provide a remedy and statutes that do not.

When the underlying statute provides an employee a remedy, the EPA makes that remedy exclusive and does not allow the employee to recast the same violation as a retaliation claim.

Peterson v. Surprise · filed 2018-02-06(A)(3)(b), (A)(3)(c)(ii)

... The EPA strictly limits the claims available to an employee alleging wrongful termination. The statute allows suit by an employee who is terminated "in violation of a statute," specifically including a violation of the Arizona Civil Rights Act. A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b). But under the EPA, "if [such a] statute provides a remedy to an employee for a violation of the statute, the remedies provided to an employee for a violation of the statute are the exclusive remedies for the violation of the statute." Id. Because Peterson forfeited her exclusive remedy for sex discrimination under the Arizona Civil Rights Act by failing to file an administrative charge, the EPA does not permit her to refashion her discrimination claim into a retaliation claim under § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii).

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(b) makes the remedies provided by a statute exclusive when that statute provides an employee a remedy for the violation.

Archer v. Partners in Recovery LLC · filed 2019-07-19(A)(3)(b)

Stated plainly, the AEPA merely affirms that the ACRA provides the exclusive remedy for an ACRA violation. Id. (“The [A]EPA does not provide a back door method of suing [an employer] in tort for wrongful termination in violation of ACRA or its public policy.”). See also A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b) (“If the statute provides a remedy to an employee for a violation of the statute, the remedies provided to the employee . . . are the exclusive remedies for the violation of the statute . . . .”); ... The Court accordingly dismisses Count II to the extent Plaintiff asserts a separate ACRA-based AEPA claim, but it does not dismiss Plaintiff’s ACRA claim.

When another Arizona statute provides an employee a remedy for wrongful termination, § 23-1501(A)(3)(b) makes that statute’s remedies exclusive.

Kuramoto v. Heart and Vascular Center of Arizona PC · filed 2021-05-20(A)(3)(b)

Under the terms of the AEPA, this means that Plaintiff has been granted no statutory right to pursue an action for remedies other than those provided by the Fair Wages Act. A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b) (“If the statute provides a remedy to an employee...the remedies provided...are the exclusive remedies”). As such, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(b) requires an AEPA retaliation plaintiff to have complained about an Arizona-law violation that lacks its own remedial scheme.

Jett v. Maricopa, County of · filed 2022-02-04(A)(3)(b)

Among other things, a prima facie case under the AEPA requires a plaintiff to show that she complained about a violation of an Arizona law that lacks its own remedial scheme. A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b). Plaintiff testified that she complained about violations of wage and paid sick leave rights, which, she concedes, fall under A.R.S. § 23-352 and -374, respectively. (Doc. 62 at 8, 9.) But both laws have their own remedial schemes. See A.R.S. § 23-555, -556 (wages); A.R.S. § 23-364 (paid sick leave). Jett cannot make out a prima facie case of retaliation under A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b), and so her AEPA claim fails on this ground.

Section 23-1501(B) makes the remedies provided by a statute the exclusive remedies for a violation of that statute or the public policy arising from it when the statute provides an employee remedy.

Green v. BootUp PD Incorporated · filed 2024-10-25(B)

The Court declines to depart from this interpretation of the AEPA’s exclusive remedies provision. Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim is based on violations of the Arizona Wage Act, which provides its own remedies for violations thereof, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Count Two fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 23-1501 treats employment as contractual, permits retaliation claims for reasonable disclosures of suspected statutory violations, and makes the underlying statute's remedies exclusive when it provides a remedy for the violation.

Bivins v. ICON PLC · filed 2025-06-10(A)(1), (B), (A)(3)(c)(ii)

“The employment relationship is contractual in nature.” A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(1). ... The statute permits wrongful termination claims when (1) a discharge is in violation of an employment contract; (2) a discharge violates an Arizona statute; or (3) a discharge is in retaliation for the employee's assertion of certain rights protected by state law. ... See A.R.S § 23-1501(B) (“[i]f the statute provides a remedy to an employee for a violation of the statute, the remedies provided to an employee for a violation of the statute are the exclusive remedies for the violation of the statute or the public policy prescribed in or arising out of the statute.”) ... Independently, the AEPA allows a claim to proceed when: (ii) The disclosure by the employee in a reasonable manner that the employee has information or a reasonable belief that the employer, or an employee of the employer, has violated, is violating or will violate the Constitution of Arizona or the statutes of this state to either the employer or a representative of the employer who the employee reasonably believes is in a managerial or supervisory position and has the authority to investigate the information provided by the employee and to take action to prevent further violations of the Constitution of Arizona or statutes of this state or an employee of a public body or political subdivision of this state or any agency of a public body or political subdivision. A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii).

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(b) makes another statute’s remedy exclusive when that statute provides a remedy for the violation.

Fraser v. State of Arizona · filed 2025-11-21(A)(3)(b)

Under Section 23-1501(A)(3)(b), if an employee is terminated in violation of a statute and that statute provides a remedy for its violation, no other remedy is available.

Section 23-1501(B) makes the underlying statute’s remedy exclusive for retaliation claims based on reporting discriminatory conduct when that conduct is separately actionable under ACRA.

Dominik Stone v. Charles Schwab & Company Incorporated · filed 2026-03-05(B)

The Court’s previous Order should have recognized that the ACRA is also the exclusive remedy for claims of retaliation with respect to an employee reporting allegedly discriminatory conduct.

Section 23-1501(2) requires a signed written employment contract to specify the duration of the employment relationship or expressly restrict either party’s right to terminate it before the statute’s qualifying-contract protection applies.

Johnson v. Hispanic Broadcasters of Tucson, Inc. · filed 2000-01-27(2)

Section 23-1501, therefore, changes our inquiry from whether the employment agreement is enforceable at common law to whether the employment agreement satisfies the statutory requirements. ... If the employment agreement is reasonably susceptible of the interpretation Johnson suggests, extrinsic evidence is admissible to interpret its terms, ... but not to supply a required element. ... The word “expressly” means “in direct or unmistakable terms[;] ... ‘directly and distinctly stated; expressed, not merely implied or left to inference.’” ... The trial court properly concluded that the agreement, even considering the extrinsic evidence Johnson offered, concerned salary and could not reasonably be interpreted as an express restriction of Hispanic Broadcasters’ right to terminate the employment relationship.

Section 23-1501(A)(2) preserves at-will employment unless the parties satisfy specified writing and signature requirements for a contract restricting termination, including a contract for a specified duration.

Lozoya v. National Mobility Eldercare Incorporated · filed 2023-08-15(A)(2)

Under Arizona law: The employment relationship is severable at the pleasure of either the employee or the employer unless both the employee and the employer have signed a written contract to the contrary setting forth that the employment relationship shall remain in effect for a specified duration of time or otherwise expressly restricting the right of either party to terminate the employment relationship. Both the employee and the employer must sign this written contract, or this written contract must be set forth in the employment handbook or manual or any similar document distributed to the employee, if that document expresses the intent that it is a contract of employment, or this written contract must be set forth in a writing signed by the party to be charged. Partial performance of employment shall not be deemed sufficient to eliminate the[se] requirements[.] A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(2). ... But Ms. Lozoya has alleged enough information to make it plausible that she and National Mobility entered into a binding employment contract for a specified duration.

Section 23-1501 excepts terminations that violate an Arizona statute from the general rule of at-will employment; § 23-364(B) falls within that exception.

Rightsell v. Concentric Healthcare Solutions LLC · filed 2022-03-09(A)(3)

Arizona’s public policy of at-will employment, however, is not absolute; Title 23 clearly exempts certain types of employment from being “severable at the pleasure of either the employee or the employer.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1501(A)(2). These include when there is a contract to the contrary or when the employer’s termination “violat[es] a statute of this state.” Id. § 23-1501(A)(3). Section 364(B) falls into the latter category, and in the circumstances, the statutory mandate is not absurd.

Section 23-1501 preserves at-will employment, limits wrongful-termination claims to specified statutory or contractual grounds, and makes the statutory remedies exclusive for terminations violating public policy statutes.

Fallar v. Compuware Corp. · filed 2002-03-30(1), (2), and (3)(b)

The EPA states that, though contractual in nature, the employment relationship is terminable at-will by either the employer or the employee. See A.R.S. § 23-1501(1), (2). Under the EPA, an employee may only bring a claim for wrongful termination against the employer if: (a) the employer breaches a written contract that modified the at-will status of the relationship; (b) the employer violates a statute of the state in terminating the employee; (c) the employer terminates the relationship in retaliation for certain enumerated employee actions (e.g., “whistleblowing”); or (d) the employer violates the continued employment rights of a public employee. Id. The EPA is the exclusive remedy for terminations that violate public policy statutes, and a plaintiff is therefore limited to the remedies provided under statute. A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(b); see Cronin, 991 P.2d at 236.

Section 23-1501 makes employment severable at either party’s pleasure absent a contrary signed written contract, but does not permit termination that violates public policy; an employee who cannot establish a public-policy violation cannot maintain breach-of-contract or wrongful-termination claims.

Lopez v. Country Insurance & Financial Services · filed 2007-10-23(2), (3)(b)

Lopez’s breach of contract and wrongful discharge claims are governed by Arizona statutory authority, namely the Employment Protection Act, ARS § 23-1501. See Cronin v. Sheldon, 195 Ariz. 531, 991 P.2d 231, 235 (1999). ARS § 23-1501(2) provides, “The employment relationship is severable at the pleasure of either the employee or the employer unless both the employee and the employer have signed a written contract to the contrary. ...” There was no signed written contract to the contrary. Thus, CIFS was free to terminate Lopez at anytime so long as that termination did not violate public policy. See ARS § 23-1501. Lopez also signed the Trainee Agent Agreement with CIFS that specifically stated that his employment was at will. Because he did not establish that his termination violated public policy, his claims for breach of contract and for wrongful termination fail. See ARS § 23-1501(3)(b).

Section 23-1501(2) presumes Arizona employment is at will, rebuttable only by a written contract meeting specified-duration or express-termination-restriction requirements and one of the statute’s signing or handbook formalities; under § 23-1501(3)(a), a qualifying breach supports only breach-of-contract remedies.

White v. AKDHC, LLC · filed 2009-10-02(2) (3)(a)

According to A.R.S. § 23 — 1501(3)(a), one of the few circumstances in which a terminated employee may assert a claim against an employer is if “[t]he employer has terminated the employment relationship of an employee in breach of an employment contract, as set forth in paragraph 2 of this section, in which case the remedies for the breach are limited to the remedies for a breach of contract.” ... The general rule, then, is simply that employment relationships in Arizona are presumptively severable by either party at any time, or, in other words, presumptively at will. ... Therefore, to prevail on his breach of contract claim, White bears the burden of showing that there is a written contract that meets one of the two substantive requirements and one of the three formalities outlined in A.R.S. § 23-1501(2).

Section 23-1501(A)(2) presumes employment is at will unless both parties sign a written contract to the contrary.

Chandler v. Rancho · filed 2015-02-12(A)(2)

In Arizona, the AEPA provides that employment relationships are presumptively at-will; meaning that “[t]he employment relationship is severable at the pleasure of either the employee or the employer unless both the employee and the employer have signed a written contract to the contrary. . . .”

Section 23-1501(3)(b) does not permit an AEPA claim when the underlying statute already provides a remedy for its violation.

Baron V. State of Arizona · filed 2008-03-21(3)(b)

Because ACRA provides a remedy for sex discrimination, Baron cannot bring this claim under the AEPA.

Section 23-1501(A)(1) treats the employment relationship as contractual in nature, including for at-will employees.

Aubuchon v. Maricopa · filed 2020-11-24(A)(1)

In Arizona, an “employment relationship is contractual in nature,” even for at-will employees like Aubuchon. See A.R.S. § 23-1501.A.1. Accordingly, Aubuchon and Pestalozzi have met the first element.

Section 23-1501(A)(2) generally limits employment-contract wrongful-termination and implied-covenant claims to written contracts specifying a duration or restricting termination, while § 23-1501(A)(3)(c) protects employees who refuse requested unlawful acts or reasonably disclose suspected violations; general concerns about internal policies or unethical conduct are not enough.

Murar v. AutoNation Incorporated · filed 2021-09-01(A)(2), (A)(3)(c)(i), (A)(3)(c)(ii)

A wrongful termination claim based on the breach of an employment contract is generally only available if there is a written contract “setting forth . . . a specified duration of time or otherwise expressly restricting the right of either party to terminate the employment relationship.” ... Thus, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing only applies in the employment context where there is a written contract evidencing that the employment is not at-will. ... Because Murar could not have refused to do something he was never asked to do, he did not engage in protected activity for purposes of A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(i). ... The AEPA prohibits retaliation for disclosing violations of Arizona law not an employer’s internal policies or actions that are simply unethical or immoral. A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii).

Section 23-1501(1) recognizes that the employment relationship is contractual, so ordinary employment contracts may not be unilaterally modified.

Proksa v. STATE SCHOOLS FOR DEAF AND BLIND · filed 2003-08-21(1)

Plaintiffs begin from the premise that, under Arizona law, the "employment relationship is contractual in nature," A.R.S. § 23-1501(1) (Supp.2002), and that an employer may not unilaterally modify an employment contract without an offer, assent or acceptance, and consideration. ... We do not quarrel with the premise that the employment relationship is contractual, and that employment contracts, like others, may not be unilaterally modified.

Section 23-1501(A)(1) provides that the employment relationship is contractual in nature.

Orca Communications Unlimited, LLC v. Noder · filed 2013-10-17(A)(1)

While the Agreement’s covenants are unenforceable, Orca’s covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim was not based on that Agreement. Indeed, the Agreement specifically stated that it pertains only to the four covenants and was not intended to create any additional employment contract or relationship. Instead, Orca’s claim was based on the implied contractual employment relationship between Noder and Orea. AR.S. § 23-1501(A)(l) (“The employment relationship is contractual in nature.”). In such a relationship, Noder owed her employer a fiduciary duty of loyalty that prohibited her from competing against her employer and soliciting co-workers to join her competing business while still working at Orea. Sec. Title Agency, Inc. v. Pope, 219 Ariz. 480, 492 ¶¶ 53, 55, 200 P.3d 977, 989 (App.2008). Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing Orca’s claim for a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because Orea could still maintain this claim outside of the Agreement.

Section 23-1501(A)(1) provides that an employment relationship is contractual in nature.

Marciniak v. Veritas Technologies LLC · filed 2023-01-26(A)(1)

“The employment relationship is contractual in nature.” A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(1).

Section 23-1501(A)(1) treats the employment relationship as contractual in nature.

Rajasundaram v. Maricopa County Community College District · filed 2021-03-24(A)(1)

The employment relationship is contractual in nature.

Section 23-1501(A)(2) permits a written, signed agreement, or one authorized by a collective bargaining agreement, that restricts an at-will employee's ability to terminate employment.

Mesa Airlines v. Condron · filed 2017-10-17(A)(2)

Even assuming the Note somehow restricted Condron’s ability to unilaterally terminate the employment, the very statute Condron relies on—A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(2)—expressly allows for such an agreement, if that agreement is in writing, signed by the party to be charged and/or is authorized by a collective bargaining agreement. All of the required conditions exist here.

Section 23-1501 makes Arizona employment at-will unless a signed contract specifies a duration or expressly restricts termination; an employee handbook can limit severability if it expresses intent to be a contract of employment.

Fuentes v. Santa Cruz, County of · filed 2023-03-15

In Arizona it is public policy that “the employment relationship is contractual in nature,” with only a specific type of employment contract being sufficient to limit severability. The contract must be signed, expressly restrict the right to terminate employment, or specify a duration. A.R.S. § 23-1501. Absent such a contract, employment in Arizona is at-will. Id. Neither party proffers a signed employment contract to support their respective assertions of at-will or protected merit-status employment. Under A.R.S. § 23-1501 an employee handbook may be sufficient to limit severability “if that document expresses the intent that it is a contract of employment.” Because there is no assertion otherwise, the Court assumes the Santa Cruz Personnel Policy is such an employee handbook.

Absent a written employment contract, the employment relationship is severable at the pleasure of either the employee or the employer, subject to overcoming the at-will employment presumption.

Zuniga v. Gowan Milling Company LLC · filed 2023-09-26(A)(2)

Arizona codifies its public policy favoring at-will employment; absent a written employment contract, "[t]he employment relationship is severable at the pleasure of either the employee or the employer." A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(2). ... Zuniga, however, provides no evidence to overcome the at-will employment presumption. The Court finds Zuniga was an at-will employee.

A written employment contract stating a specific or minimum duration is not at-will, need not use the statute’s exact wording, and may support a breach action when signed by the party to be charged.

Antonson v. Red Mtn · filed 2015-06-11(A)(2)

The EPA establishes that except under certain statutory provisions not applicable here, an employment relationship is at-will and severable by either party unless the parties “have signed a written contract to the contrary setting forth that the employment relationship shall remain in effect for a specified duration of time.” A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(2). ... Taken as a whole, the contract here specified a duration under A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(2). ... The statute thus establishes a black-letter rule requiring the contract to state “a specified duration of time.” Id. The agreed-upon emails by the parties in this case established a 90-day period, which satisfies the requirement of the statute. ... The clear language of the statute is that if a contract states a specific duration, or a specific minimum duration, it is not at-will. ... The legislature did not suggest that a contract would have to mimic the language of the statute, and accepting Red Mountain’s argument would place form over substance. ... Section 23-1501(A)(2), while not a model of clarity, does not require both parties to sign the agreement. Rather, a breach of contract action can be brought if all parties signed or if “this written contract . . . [is] signed by the party to be charged.” A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(2).

Section 23-1501 provides no contractual remedy for an at-will employee who lacks an express or implied employment contract terminable for good cause.

Harris v. Superior Court · filed 2008-05-08(1)–(2)

Harris was an at-will employee, see A.R.S. § 12-213 (2007); see also McLeod v. Chilton, 132 Ariz. 9, 643 P.2d 712, 720 (Ariz.Ct.App.1981), without an express or implied employment contract terminable for good cause, see A.R.S. § 23-1501(1) — (2) (2007), and, thus, his contractual rights were not violated.

Subsection (3)(c)(viii) allows a wrongful-termination claim when an employer fires an employee for refusing extortionate demands for fees, gratuities, commissions, kickbacks, property, or other remuneration as a condition of employment.

Logan v. Forever Living Products International, Inc. · filed 2002-07-25(3)(c)(viii)

The AEPA, which became law in 1996, allows, inter alia, wrongful discharge claims against employers who terminate employees in retaliation for “[t]he exercise of the right to be free from the extortion of fees or gratuities as a condition of employment as protected by § 23-202.” A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(c)(viii). This language clearly was adopted to preserve an employee’s right not to be victimized by an employer’s extortion. Where an employee is terminated by an employer for refusal to accept extortionate demands by the employer, in violation of A.R.S. § 23-202, the employee has a wrongful termination cause of action under the AEPA.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(i) permits an employee to claim retaliatory termination for refusing to commit an act or omission that would violate the Arizona Constitution or state statutes.

Smith v. American Red Cross · filed 2020-08-20(A)(3)(c)(i)

The plaintiff states that she was terminated out of “retaliation” but she does not state that she “refus[ed] . . . to commit an act or omission that would violate the Constitution of Arizona or the statutes of this state.” See A.R.S.§ 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(i).

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(i) protects an employee from discharge for refusing an instruction to do something illegal.

Czarny v. Hyatt · filed 2018-03-08(A)(3)(c)(i)

did Thomson’s statement specify that he was instructed—and refused—to do something illegal as required for a claim under § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(i).

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(i) permits a wrongful-termination claim when an employee is discharged in retaliation for refusing to commit an act or omission that would violate Arizona's Constitution or statutes.

Smith v. Pile · filed 2024-02-20(A)(3)(c)(i)

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(i) allows a wrongful termination claim if the discharge was in retaliation for “[t]he refusal by the employee to commit an act or omission that would violate the Constitution of Arizona or the statues of this state.” Plaintiff has not explained how an employer asking her do something she believes violates GAAP equates to asking her to do something that violates Arizona law. Therefore, the Court will dismiss, without prejudice, Count III because Smith has not adequately pled a claim for wrongful termination.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c) does not permit an AEPA retaliation claim based on an alleged wage-law violation when that wage law supplies its own remedies.

Daniels v. Maximus Federal Services Incorporated · filed 2024-08-12(A)(3)(c)

To prevail, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing either that the employer terminated his employment because he refused to violate Arizona law, or because he reasonably believed the employer violated Arizona law and reported it. ... The Court continues to agree with this interpretation of AEPA’ exclusive remedies provision. Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s AEPA claim is based on a statute with its own remedies, the Court finds it is barred as a matter of law.

The statute protects an employee fired for refusing to violate Arizona law or for reasonably believing and reporting an employer’s violation, when the protected conduct substantially or motivationally contributed to the firing, subject to the employer’s same-action defense.

Efezokhae v. Rocket Mortgage LLC · filed 2025-01-15(A)(3)(c)(ii)

To prevail on a AEPA claim under § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing either that the employer terminated his employment because he refused to violate Arizona law, or because he reasonably believed the employer violated Arizona law and reported it. ... Even so, to sustain the claim, an employee must prove the conduct was protected and that it was a substantial or motivating factor in the termination, and if so, the employer can escape liability by showing it would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected conduct. ... As previously discussed, Rocket Mortgage has made a showing that it terminated Efezokhae for insubordination, not based on discriminatory motives. Thus, Rocket Mortgage is entitled to summary judgement.

For a classified public employee subject to a merit-system procedure, a claim under § 23-1501 may be brought in superior court only after the employee exhausts the available administrative remedies, although claims not resolved or precluded by that process may still be asserted.

Mullenaux v. Graham County · filed 2004-01-06(3)

A classified public employee who has a claim that is subject to a merit system administrative procedure must pursue the claim through that procedure. ... However, the employee could still file an action in superior court asserting any claims under § 23-1501 and § 38-532 that were neither completely resolved in nor precluded by the administrative process. ... We conclude, then, that a classified public employee must exhaust his or her administrative remedies available under the system provided by §§ 11-351 through 11-356 before filing an action in superior court under § 23-1501 or § 38-532. Although Mullenaux’s failure to cite either § 23-1501 or § 38-532 in his complaint to support his allegations neither invalidates nor precludes his statutory cause of action for wrongful discharge, because he failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies provided by the County’s grievance procedures, his action for wrongful discharge and breach of contract was premature.

Section 23-1501 provides a statutory wrongful-termination right independent of collective-bargaining remedies, and the claim is available upon termination.

Haggerty v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2004-06-28

His right to sue under the AEPA is a statutory right independent of his contractual rights under the collective bargaining agreement; his claims under the AEPA were fully available to him upon termination.

Section 23-1501(3)(c)(ii) applies the Mt. Healthy mixed-motive framework to retaliatory-termination claims, so an employer prevails if the employee would have been terminated anyway for a legitimate reason.

Gerberry v. Maricopa County · filed 2006-03-28(3)(c)(ii)

As for the claim under A.R.S. § 23-1501, we conclude that the Mt. Healthy mixed-motive analysis should apply there, as well. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s factual finding that Gerberry would have been terminated anyway requires entry of a judgment in favor of the defendants for the A.R.S. § 23-1501 claim, as well.

Section 23-1501(3)(e) permits a wrongful-termination claim against an individual supervisor who wrongfully terminates an employee, not just against the corporate employer.

Higgins v. Assmann Electronics, Inc. · filed 2007-12-13(3)(e)

Under the Arizona Employment Protection Act, A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(e)(Supp.2006) (AEPA), an employee may bring a claim for wrongful termination if the employer terminated the employment relationship in violation of public policy. ... Contrary to Meyer’s assertion, these cases do not hold that an employee cannot bring a wrongful termination claim against the individual supervisor who wrongfully terminated her. ... Thus, both Meyer and Assmann were liable for Meyer’s acts in violation of AEPA.

Section 23-1501(3)(c)(ii) requires an employee claiming retaliation under the AEPA to have an objective, good-faith belief that the employer’s conduct violated the law.

Gray v. Motorola, Inc. · filed 2010-12-22(3)(c)(ii)

Even assuming she subjectively believed Motorola had some ethical obligation to immediately inform the contracting party that a forgery had occurred, she lacked an objective, good faith belief that Motorola’s conduct violated the law. ... The district court correctly concluded that Gray could not establish an action under the AEPA or any vital public policy interest implicated by her complaints to the company.2 See A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(c)(ii); Murcott v. Best Western Int’l, Inc., 9 P.3d 1088, 1095-99 (Ariz. App. 2000).

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) does not require proof that the employer actually violated the law for a claim to accrue; the employee need only have the required reasonable belief and disclosure.

Scorzo v. Az med/state · filed 2017-01-26(A)(3)(c)(ii)

Verification of the employer’s wrongdoing is not required for accrual of a claim under subsection (3)(c)(ii).

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) protects an employee from retaliatory termination for reasonably disclosing to an appropriate employer representative information or a reasonable belief that the employer violated, is violating, or will violate Arizona's Constitution or statutes; the disclosure must occur before the discharge.

Harris v. godaddy.com · filed 2015-01-22(A)(3)(c)(ii)

As an initial matter, the disclosure of a possible violation of state law must occur before the employee’s discharge in order for the discharge to be retaliatory. See A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii). ... AEPA is expressly limited to disclosures of state law violations; a purported violation of federal law is insufficient.

Section 23-1501(3)(c) protects an employee from retaliatory termination for reasonably disclosing information or a reasonable belief that the employer is violating Arizona constitutional or statutory law.

Williams v. Alhambra School District No. 68 · filed 2017-02-13(3)(c)

Subsection (3)(c) prohibits termination in retaliation for the employee’s reasonable disclosure of “information or reasonable belief’ that the employer is violating the Constitution or laws of Arizona.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c) permits an employee to claim relief for retaliatory termination when the employee reasonably discloses a suspected violation of the Arizona Constitution or a state statute to an authorized employer representative.

Ferren v. Westmed Incorporated · filed 2021-03-01(A)(3)(c)

The AEPA provides that it is “[t]he public policy of this state [] that . . . [a]n employee has a claim against an employer for termination of employment only if one or more of the following circumstances have occurred,” A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3), including “[t]he employer has terminated the employment relationship of an employee in retaliation for any of the following: . . (ii) The disclosure by the employee in a reasonable manner that the employee has information or a reasonable belief that the employer, or an employee of the employer, has violated, is violating or will violate the Constitution of Arizona or the statutes of this state to either the employer or a representative of the employer who the employee reasonably believes is in a managerial or supervisory position and has the authority to investigate the information provided by the employee and to take action to prevent further violations of the Constitution of Arizona or statutes of this state or an employee of a public body or political subdivision of this state or any agency of a public body or political subdivision.” A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c). ... The alleged federal rules, regulations, and law violations will not support the AEPA claim. ... In short, “[t]he [A]EPA limits the potential claims of an employee who has been terminated, whether directly or through constructive discharge,” and “allows a former employee to sue for a discharge that violates a state statute or that is in retaliation for reporting a violation of the Arizona Constitution or a state statute.” Id. (citing A.R.S. § 23–1501(A)(3)(b), (c)).

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(iii) makes it public policy that an employee may bring a wrongful-termination claim when an employer retaliates for exercising workers' compensation rights; the prima facie case requires protected activity, an adverse employment action, and causation.

Whitmire v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. · filed 2019-02-07(A)(3)(c)(iii)

Rather, the AEPA states that a wrongful termination claim can be brought against an employer "in retaliation for" the "exercise of rights under the workers' compensation statutes prescribed in chapter 6 of this title." A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(iii) ; see id. at § 23-901 et seq . ... Here, Plaintiff exercised her right to receive compensation under the workers' compensation statutes by reporting her "accident and the injury resulting from the accident" to her employer on May 21, 2016 in accordance with A.R.S. § 23-908(E). ... As Plaintiff exercised her rights under § 23-1021 of the workers' compensation statutes, the Court finds that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity. Therefore, Plaintiff has met the first element of her prima facie case.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) protects an employee from retaliation for reasonably disclosing that an employer or coworker violated, is violating, or will violate Arizona law, but a belief in only a federal violation is insufficient.

Nelson v. Newmark Knight Frank · filed 2019-12-17(A)(3)(c)(ii)

By its plain language, Plaintiff only has an AEPA claim if he had information or reasonable belief that he, the Company, and/or another employee violated Arizona law. Nelson v. Millennium Laboratories, Inc., No. 12-CV-01301-SLG, 2014 WL 11514329, at *8 (D. Ariz. Jun. 5, 2014). ... Notably, information or reasonable belief of a federal violation cannot serve as a predicate violation under the AEPA. Galati v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 205 Ariz. 290, 292-94 ¶¶ 5-15 (App. 2003). ... Based on these deposition admissions, no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Plaintiff reasonably believed Arizona law was violated when he explicitly admits that he thought federal law was violated.

Section 23-1501(3)(c)(ii) protects an employee from termination for reporting suspected statutory violations, but the employee must disclose information or a reasonable belief of unlawful activity to an appropriate managerial or supervisory representative; a request for clarification about compensation is insufficient.

Secord v. Marketo Incorporated · filed 2020-03-03(3)(c)(ii)

To succeed on a claim for retaliation under the Arizona Employment Protection Act (AEPA), A.R.S. § 23-1501, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he had information or a reasonable belief that his employer or another employee violated an Arizona statute or constitutional provision; (2) that he disclosed the information or belief to an employer or a representative of the employer whom he reasonably believed was in a managerial or supervisory position and had the authority to investigate the information and take action to prevent further violations of the Arizona constitution or statutes; and (3) that he was terminated because of the first two steps. ... Here, Plaintiff did not disclose belief that a violation had occurred. ... Emails requesting clarification do not constitute disclosure of suspected unlawful activity. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant on the retaliation claim.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) protects an employee from termination for reasonably disclosing information or a reasonable belief that the employer violated, is violating, or will violate Arizona law, requiring proof of the employee's information or belief, disclosure to an appropriate recipient, and termination because of that disclosure.

Baron v. Honorhealth · filed 2020-09-22(A)(3)(c)(ii)

To prove a claim under § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii), Baron must demonstrate HonorHealth terminated his employment in retaliation for “[t]he disclosure by [Baron] in a reasonable manner that [Baron had] information or a reasonable belief that the employer, or an employee of the employer, has violated, is violating or will violate . . . the statutes of this state.” This requires proof of three elements: (1) Baron had information or a reasonable belief that HonorHealth was violating Arizona law; (2) Baron disclosed the alleged violations to HonorHealth or one of its employees who were in a position to investigate and/or stop the violations, or Baron disclosed the information to an agency with the authority to investigate; and (3) Baron was terminated due to the first and second elements.

Subsection (A)(3)(c)(ii) protects an employee from termination in retaliation for reasonably disclosing to an appropriate employer representative information or a reasonable belief that the employer violated, is violating, or will violate Arizona’s Constitution or state statutes, not merely federal law.

McDonald v. White Cap LP · filed 2022-03-16(A)(3)(c)(ii)

Count Five fails to state a claim under § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) because Plaintiff does not allege that he had a reasonable belief that his employer “has violated, is violating or will violate the Constitution of Arizona or the statutes of this state.” ... The AEPA expressly requires an allegation that the employee believed the violation at issue was of “the Constitution of Arizona or the statutes of this state.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii). The statute’s limiting language leads to the corollary that reporting violations of federal law is not protected under the AEPA.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) protects an employee who reports a reasonable, even mistaken, belief that the employer violated a state statute or constitutional provision, but an administrative-rule violation qualifies only when a specific statute makes it a statutory offense.

Pitcher v. Banner Health · filed 2023-03-21(A)(3)(c)(ii)

The AEPA protects an employee who is terminated for reporting a reasonable belief (even if mistaken) that her employer has violated a state statute or constitutional provision. A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii). ... Administrative rules are not statutes. Reporting a perceived violation of an administrative rule could fall within the scope of the AEPA if a violation of that rule also would constitute a violation of a specific state statute. ... In sum, Pitcher’s reports of perceived JCAHO standard violations do not constitute protected activity under the AEPA because those JCAHO standards, even if adopted by the state health director as administrative rules, are not state constitution provisions or state statutes, and Pitcher has not identified in her first amended complaint a specific Arizona statute that makes a violation of those administrative rules a statutory offense.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) provides a wrongful-termination claim when an employer terminates an employee in retaliation for the employee's reasonable disclosure of the employer's actual or prospective violations of Arizona law to an authorized investigator or decision-maker; constructive discharge supplies the termination element but is not independently actionable.

Udd v. Phoenix, City of · filed 2021-02-12(A)(3)(c)(ii)

One of those circumstances, specified in subdivision (A)(3)(c)(ii), is when “[t]he employer has terminated the employment relationship of an employee in retaliation for . . . [t]he disclosure by the employee in a reasonable manner that the employee has information or a reasonable belief that the employer . . . has violated, is violating or will violate the Constitution of Arizona or the statutes of this state.” The disclosure must be made “to either the employer or a representative . . . [who] has the authority to investigate the information provided by the employee and to take action to prevent further violations.” Id. The upshot of these provisions is that, under § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii), an employee may assert a claim for wrongful termination if he was terminated in retaliation for disclosing state-law violations being committed by his employer—that is, for acting as a whistleblower. See, e.g., Walters v. Maricopa County, 990 P.2d 677, 682 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (“This . . . section allows an employee who is discharged to file a civil action for wrongful discharge if whistle-blowing is alleged.”) ... Put another way, a constructive discharge under § 1502 isn’t, standing alone, an actionable tort—instead, a constructive discharge simply “transforms a resignation into a discharge,” which in turn “satisfies the termination element of a wrongful termination claim” under § 1501. McNicol v. DMB Sports Clubs LP, 2020 WL 1323143, *6 (D. Ariz. 2020). ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are precluded, as a discovery sanction under Rule 37(c)(1), from pursuing a state-law constructive discharge claim at trial premised on a whistleblowing theory under § 1501(A)(3)(c)(ii).

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) provides a wrongful-termination claim when an employer retaliates against an employee for disclosing violations of the Arizona Constitution or state statutes, requiring protected activity, an adverse employment decision, causation, and proof that stated non-retaliatory reasons were pretextual.

Matthews v. Tempe, City of · filed 2023-10-18(A)(3)(c)(ii)

The AEPA provides a claim for wrongful termination against an employer where the employer has terminated the employment relationship in retaliation for the disclosure by the employee of violations of the Arizona Constitution, or state statutes. A.R.S. § 23–1501(A)(3)(c)(ii). To prove retaliation under the AEPA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer subjected him to an adverse employment decision, and (3) there exists a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). An employer’s articulation of non-retaliatory reasons shifts the burden to the employee to show that the employer’s reasons for an adverse employment action were a pretext for retaliation. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998). ... Thus, Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie case under the AEPA. Summary judgment is granted to Defendants for Plaintiff’s claim arising under A.R.S § 23-1501.

Section 23-1501(3)(c)(ii) protects an employee who reasonably discloses to qualified management information or a reasonable belief that the employer violated, is violating or will violate Arizona law, and an actual violation need not have occurred for the wrongful-termination claim.

Ferren v. Westmed Incorporated · filed 2021-05-20(3)(c)(ii)

Here, the Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully terminated for reporting violations of Arizona law under subsection (c)(ii), which provides: “The disclosure by the employee in a reasonable manner that the employee has information or a reasonable belief that the employer, or an employee of the employer, has violated, is violating or will violate the Constitution of Arizona or the statutes of this state to either the employer or a representative of the employer who the employee reasonably believes is in a managerial or supervisory position and has the authority to investigate the information provided by the employee and to take action to prevent further violations of the Constitution of Arizona or statutes of this state or an employee of a public body or political subdivision of this state or any agency of a public body or political subdivision.” ... If Defendants are arguing that the Plaintiff must allege an actual violation of Arizona law, they are wrong. An actual statutory violation need not occur; “a discharge for refusing to violate a statute or the relevant public policy underlying a statute may also give rise to a wrongful termination claim.”

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(vii) permits an employee terminated because of armed-forces service to bring a public-policy wrongful-termination tort claim, analyzed under the same motivating-factor and same-decision framework as USERRA.

Daubenspeck v. Textron Aviation Incorporated · filed 2021-10-13(A)(3)(c)(vii)

The Arizona Employment Protection Act (AEPA) provides that employees terminated as a result of their service in the armed forces have the right to bring a tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(vii).

The AEPA whistleblower provision requires a plaintiff to show a reasonable belief that an Arizona statute or constitutional provision was violated, disclosure to an authorized managerial or supervisory representative, and termination because of those disclosures; the plaintiff generally must identify the underlying Arizona law or plead facts sufficiently detailed to establish a triggering violation.

Foster v. Pinnacle Health Facilities XXI LP · filed 2021-10-18(3)(c)(ii)

To prevail on an AEPA claim, a plaintiff “must establish: (1) she had information or a reasonable belief that her employer or another employee had violated an Arizona statute or constitutional provision; (2) she disclosed the information or belief to an employer or a representative of the employer whom she reasonably believed was in a managerial or supervisory position and had the authority to investigate the information and take action to prevent further violations of the Arizona constitution or statutes; and (3) she was terminated because of the first two step.” ... First, they are deficient because they are vague as to the precise nature of the reported misconduct. ... Foster’s failure to identify, in either her complaint or response brief, the Arizona statute that she reasonably believed Pinnacle Health had violated.

Under § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii), an employee may claim wrongful termination for reasonably disclosing a belief that the employer violated Arizona's Constitution or statutes to an authorized managerial or supervisory representative, and the employee must identify the underlying state law specifically at the pleading stage; under § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(i), the employee must have refused to commit such a state-law violation and been terminated because of that refusal.

Chen v. Cozzoli LLC · filed 2022-03-22(A)(3)(c)(ii), (A)(3)(c)(i)

To the extent it is necessary to wade into the debate here, the Court is persuaded by the decisions concluding that an AEPA plaintiff must identify the underlying Arizona statute or constitutional provision with specificity at the pleading stage. A plaintiff asserting an unlawful termination claim under § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) of AEPA does not need to go through the discovery process to determine why she chose to report illegal conduct to her employer—that is historical information uniquely within the plaintiff’s possession. If the plaintiff cannot articulate, at the pleading stage of the case, a theory as to why the report was potentially actionable under § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii), there is no point in allowing the case to proceed—as the Ninth Circuit has recognized, a court may dismiss a complaint at the pleading stage due to “a lack of a cognizable theory.” ... Under A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(i), “[a]n employee has a claim against an employer for termination of employment” if the “employer has terminated the employment relationship of an employee in retaliation for . . . [t]he refusal by the employee to commit an act or omission that would violate the Constitution of Arizona or the statutes of this state.” Thus, to prevail on a claim under this provision of AEPA (which gives rise to Plaintiff’s claim in Count Two), Plaintiff must establish that she refused to commit a violation of an Arizona statute or constitutional provision and was terminated due to that refusal.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) protects an employee from retaliation for reporting a suspected Arizona-law violation based on a reasonable belief, even if no actual violation occurred.

Gonzalez v. US Human Rights Network · filed 2022-07-29(A)(3)(c)(ii)

It is irrelevant, for purposes of whistleblower liability under § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii), that her misclassification complaint in August 2019 may have been groundless from a legal perspective in light of her rejection of the June 2019 offer—all that matters is that she made the complaint, she reasonably believed it to be true, and she was terminated in short succession afterward.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(vii) prohibits an employer from terminating an employment relationship in retaliation for service in the national guard or armed forces as protected by sections 26-167 and 26-168, and its protections are coextensive with USERRA.

Mustafa v. Yuma Regional Medical Center · filed 2023-01-11(A)(3)(c)(vii)

Plaintiff claims Defendants violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(vii), which prohibits an employer from terminating an employment relationship in retaliation for “service in the national guard or armed forces as protected by sections 26-167 and 26-168.” ... “The protections of USERRA and AEPA are thus coextensive and the analysis is identical.” ... Accordingly, for the same reasons explained above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the AEPA claim is granted.

Claims under § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) are evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Berkman v. Danley · filed 2023-08-08(A)(3)(c)(ii)

As Defendants point out, no published opinion in Arizona has adopted the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for wrongful termination claims under A.R.S. § 23-1501. But unpublished memorandum decisions from this court have concluded the McDonnell Douglas standard applies to claims under A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii). See Baron v. HonorHealth, 1 CA-CV 19-0391, 2020 WL 5638539, at *2, ¶ 13 (Ariz. App. Sept. 22, 2020) (mem. decision); Czarny v. Hyatt Residential Mktg. Corp., 1 CA-CV 16-0577, 2018 WL 1190051, at *2, ¶¶ 12–13 (Ariz. App. Mar. 8, 2018) (mem. decision). Much like those decisions, we apply McDonnell Douglas here.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) protects an employee who reasonably discloses to an appropriate supervisor information or a reasonable belief that the employer or its employee violated or will violate Arizona law, and requires a causal link between that disclosure and an adverse employment action.

Casaceli v. Liberty Healthcare Corporation · filed 2023-08-17(A)(3)(c)(ii)

Thus, to make out a prima facie claim, she must show that (1) she engaged in a protected activity, meaning she disclosed to an appropriate supervisor “in a reasonable manner” that she had “information or a reasonable belief” that LHC or one of its employees had or would violate Arizona law; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. ... Nonetheless, the Court agrees that an employee does not necessarily need to use the words “fraud” or “illegal” to reasonably communicate a violation of the law. ... In appropriate contexts, communications like these may reasonably indicate that the employee believes the employer or one of its employees is engaging in an illegal activity like fraud, even without explicitly so stating. Here, the Court finds Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence for a jury to find that she made such protected disclosures to her supervisors.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) permits an AEPA retaliation claim when an employee is terminated after reasonably disclosing to an authorized manager a reasonable belief that the employer or its employee violated an Arizona statute or constitutional provision; a regulatory violation alone is insufficient unless enforceable by statute and tied to related statutes.

Green v. Pacifica Senior Living LLC · filed 2023-09-07(A)(3)(c)(ii)

Thus, to prevail on a claim under this provision of AEPA (which gives rise to Plaintiff’s claim in Count Two), Plaintiff “must establish: (1) [he] had information or a reasonable belief that [his] employer or another employee had violated an Arizona statute or constitutional provision; (2) [he] disclosed the information or belief to an employer or a representative of the employer whom [he] reasonably believed was in a managerial or supervisory position and had the authority to investigate the information and take action to prevent further violations of the Arizona constitution or statutes; and (3) [he] was terminated because of the first two steps.”

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c) protects an employee terminated for refusing to violate Arizona law or for reasonably reporting an employer’s actual or anticipated violation of Arizona law, requiring a reasonable belief, reasonable disclosure to an authorized supervisor, and a causal connection to the termination.

Gower v. Yuma Senior Living LLC · filed 2023-12-06(A)(3)(c)

To meet this burden, a plaintiff must show (1) that he had a reasonable belief that the employer violated, or will violate the law; (2) that he disclosed this belief to the employer in a reasonable manner; (3) that this belief was disclosed to someone in a supervisory position who has power to prevent or act on these violations and; (4) that he was terminated because he disclosed this belief. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(i)–(ii.).

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) authorizes a wrongful-termination claim when an employer retaliates against an employee for disclosing that the employer or its employees violated Arizona’s Constitution or statutes.

FULLER v. SCOTTSDALE · filed 2026-01-15(A)(3)(c)(ii)

The Act authorizes a cause of action if an employer terminates an employee in retaliation for the employee’s disclosure that the employer or its employees have violated Arizona’s Constitution or statutes.

Section 23-1501(3)(c)(ii) requires an employee alleging retaliatory discharge to show that the reported conduct violated or would violate the Arizona Constitution or a state statute.

Roberts v. Computer Sciences Corp. · filed 2005-12-13(3)(c)(ii)

The district court properly dismissed the Roberts’ claim under the Arizona Employment Protection Act because they did not allege that Raymond Roberts was fired in retaliation for reporting that his employer violated or was going to violate the Constitution of Arizona or a state statute. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 23-1501(3)(c)(ii). Lax security policies about which Raymond Roberts complained were not a violation of Arizona law.

Section 23-1501(3)(c)(i)–(ii) requires termination for an AEPA wrongful-termination claim, and termination may be express or constructive, with constructive discharge satisfying the termination element.

McNicol v. DMB Sports Clubs LP · filed 2020-03-20(3)(c)(i), (ii)

Termination of the employment relationship is required for a wrongful termination claim under the AEPA. A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(c)(i), (ii). Termination may be express or constructive. Peterson v. City of Surprise, 244 Ariz. 247, 250 (App. 2018). Constructive discharge transforms a resignation into a discharge, which satisfies the termination element of a wrongful termination claim under the AEPA.

Section 23-1501(3)(c)(ii) requires a retaliation claimant to show that the employer terminated the employment relationship.

Pearlmutter v. Coconino, County of · filed 2022-06-16(3)(c)(ii)

Because there is no genuine dispute that Pearlmutter voluntarily resigned, all of his claims fail. His first AEPA claim for retaliation requires that an employer “has terminated the employment relationship . . . .” A.R.S. § 22-1501(3)(c)(ii).

Section 23-1501 governs employee claims arising when the employer terminates the employment relationship.

Worldwide Jet v. Christian · filed 2023-03-09

By the AEPA’s plain language, A.R.S. § 23-1501 addresses employees’ claims against an employer when the employer terminates the employment relationship, and § 23-1502 addresses employees’ claims against an employer when constructive discharge occurs—i.e., when the employee is allegedly compelled to terminate the employment relationship.

Section 23-1501(B) makes statutory remedies exclusive for employment-rights violations, including discriminatory failure to hire.

De Silva v. Pima County Government · filed 2024-11-12(B)

Section B of the Employment Protection Act (EPA) uses the term “the statute” without further elaboration, but this court finds based on the statutory wording that it refers to those statutes that generally describe employee rights such as the Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA). ... The court concludes, based on the wording of the entire statute, that Section 23-1501(B) applies to all statutory employment rights violations including discriminatory failure to hire.

The AEPA makes the remedy under an underlying statute exclusive when that statute supplies a remedy and presumes at-will employment unless both parties sign a written contract establishing a definite term or expressly restricting termination rights.

Vargas · filed 2026-01-26(A)(3)(b), (A)(2), (3)(a)

Although the AEPA permits claims for termination in violation of an Arizona statute, it also provides that when the underlying statute supplies a remedy, that remedy is exclusive. A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b). ... Under the AEPA, employment is presumed at will unless both parties sign a written contract that establishes a definite term or expressly restricts termination rights. A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(2). “Taken in conjunction with A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(a), A.R.S. § 23-1501(2) dictates that to prevail on a breach of contract claim against an employer, an employee must show that the employer breached a contract that meets the requirements of A.R.S. § 23-1501(2).”

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(b) makes statutory remedies exclusive for a statutory violation or public policy arising from that statute, but does not bar unrelated common-law tort claims; the court treated Peterson's application as limited to an AEPA retaliation claim.

Adams · filed 2026-02-19(A)(3)(b)

While the AEPA allows an employee to bring suit for termination in violation of a statute, “[i]f the statute provides a remedy to an employee for a violation of the statute, the remedies provided to an employee for a violation of the statute are the exclusive remedies for the violation of the statute or the public policy prescribed in or arising out of the statute.” Id. at 1025 (citing A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b)). Based on this provision and the plaintiff’s forfeiture of her exclusive remedy for sex discrimination under the ACRA, the court held that “the EPA does not permit her to refashion her discrimination claim into a retaliation claim[.]” Id. In short, the holding in Peterson turned on the specific provisions of the AEPA and was solely in regard to an AEPA retaliation claim. See also Bodett v. CoxCom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2004) (employee waived claim for retaliation under what is now § 23-1501(A)(3)(c) by failing to exhaust administrative remedies under the Arizona Civil Rights Act). The Court, accordingly, will not dismiss Plaintiff’s common law tort claims based on Peterson.

Section 23-1501(A)(2) permits an implied employment contract in a handbook, manual, or similar document only when the document expresses an intent that it is a contract of employment.

Hampton v. Tempe, City of · filed 2025-03-14(A)(2)

The AEPA permits an actionable implied contract to “be set forth in the employment handbook or manual or any similar document distributed to the employee,” but only if “that document expresses the intent that it is a contract of employment[.]” A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(2). ... Hampton does not contend that the personnel rules or MOUs expressed an intent to constitute a contract and she alleges no facts that would support such an argument. ... This failure to establish that the personnel rules or MOUs “expresse[d] the intent that [they are a] contract of employment[ ]” dooms her implied contract claim. § 23-1501(2).

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) requires an employee alleging retaliatory termination for reporting a violation to identify the underlying constitutional or statutory provision, while subsection (A)(3)(c)(i) requires identifying the unlawful conduct the employee refused to perform and alleging that the employee was asked to participate in it.

Ruggles v. Arizona, State of · filed 2025-06-24(A)(3)(c)(ii), (A)(3)(c)(i)

Count One fails to state a claim under A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) because it does not identify the constitutional or statutory provision(s) Plaintiff believed Defendants were violating or would violate. ... The portion of Count One based on A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(i) fails to state a claim for similar reasons. Although the FAC correctly notes that this provision “prohibits terminating an employee for refusing to engage in the unlawful conduct/practice” (Doc. 19 ¶ 78), the FAC does not identify the “conduct/practice” that Plaintiff refused to perform, much less identify the provision of Arizona law that this unspecified “conduct/practice” may have violated. ... The FAC also fails to allege that Plaintiff was asked to participate in some unspecified and unlawful “conduct/practice.”

Section 23-1501 permits a retaliation claim when an employee reports an alleged Arizona statutory violation to a supervisor and is fired for reporting it.

Farsakian v. Kent · filed 2020-10-29(A)(3)(c)(ii)

She has accordingly stated a claim for retaliation under the AEPA.

Section 23-1501(c) permits an employee to bring a tort claim for wrongful termination in specified circumstances, including refusing to commit an act that would violate Arizona law.

Cook v. Chagollan · filed 2025-08-19(c)(1)

Section 23-1501(c) applies to retaliatory termination. It states that an employee has the right to bring a tort claim for wrongful termination in several instances, such as a termination following “[t]he refusal by the employee to commit an act or omission that would violate the Constitution of Arizona or the statutes of this state.” A.R.S. § 23-1501(c)(1). ... Thus, Plaintiff has failed to allege a claim for retaliation under the AEPA. See A.R.S. § 23-1501; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127.

Section 23-1501 provides no greater protection for retaliation claims than federal law.

Fouladi v. City of Tucson · filed 2004-03-23

By the same token, Fouladi’s claim under Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 23-1501 fails. State law offers no greater protection than federal law as far as the retaliation claim is concerned.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(b) permits an AEPA wrongful-termination claim based on violation of a state statute only when that statute provides no remedy, while subsection (A)(3)(c)(ii) protects an employee who reasonably discloses a suspected or actual violation of Arizona law to an authorized managerial or supervisory representative.

Stone v. Charles Schwab & Company Incorporated · filed 2025-10-06(A)(3)(b), (A)(3)(c)(ii)

Under the AEPA, an employee may bring a claim for wrongful termination for three reasons: (1) “the discharge was in violation of an employment contract”; (2) “the discharge violated a statute of this state”; or (3) “the discharge was in retaliation for the employee’s assertion of certain rights protected by state law.” ... The AEPA permits a plaintiff to bring a wrongful termination claim if the discharge violated a state statute. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b). However, if that state statute provides its own remedies for a violation thereof, then the plaintiff is precluded from bringing an AEPA claim for violation of that statute. ... The second protected activity, as pertinent here, relates to an employee’s disclosure of a potential violation of state law. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii). Specifically, this provision protects: ... Therefore, under the AEPA, an employee can bring a retaliatory termination claim if they believe they were terminated for disclosing, for example, an employee’s potential violation of state law. Plaintiff plausibly pleads such a claim.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) protects an employee from termination in retaliation for disclosing that the employer or an employee violated state law, and a claim requires employee status, identification of the allegedly violated statute, and a causal link to the adverse action.

Amirault · filed 2026-03-27(A)(3)(c)(ii)

First, the plain text of AEPA is clear that the statute applies only to “employees”; a plaintiff must have been in an employment relationship in order to state a claim for a violation of the statute. ... Moreover, in order to state a claim for relief under A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii), a complaint must identify which Arizona statute the alleged employee believed to be violated. ... Finally, a prima facie case of retaliation under A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) requires that there be a “causal link” between the alleged employee’s decision to disclose his belief that a law had been violated and any subsequent adverse action against him.

Section 23-1501 cannot retroactively divest an employee of vested contractual job-security rights.

Greenawalt v. Sun City West Fire District · filed 2001-10-11

To the extent Greenawalt alleged he had an employment arrangement under which he could only be fired for cause, his right to job security vested with the promulgation of the District’s Statement of Policy (“Policy”), which occurred within a year of his move from Rural Metro to the District in 1994. The EPA was enacted in 1996, after any rights created by the Poli*652cy had vested. Accordingly, the District cannot rely on the EPA to divest Greenawalt of these rights retroactively.

Section 23-1501(3)(d) provides no wrongful discharge relief against a private employer.

Evelyn Bodett, Wife David Bodett, Husband v. Coxcom, Inc., a Delaware Corporation · filed 2004-04-26(3)(d)

Finally, relief under § 23 — 1501(3)(d) is precluded by Cox’s status as a private employer.

Section 23-1501(A)(3)(c) applies to employees, not independent contractors.

Mustafa v. Yuma Regional Medical Center · filed 2024-05-28(A)(3)(c)

Because the protections provided under USERRA and the AEPA do not extend to independent contractors, summary judgment for Defendants on those claims was proper.