Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2101

Section 12-2101(A)(3) permits an appeal from a dismissal without prejudice only when the dismissal effectively determines the action and prevents a later judgment.

Rogut v. Surprise · filed 2024-08-13(A)(3)

“[A] dismissal without prejudice is only appealable if the dismissal results in finality.” Bank of New York Mellon v. Dodev, 246 Ariz. 1, 7, ¶ 19 (App. 2018); see also A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(3) (We have jurisdiction over an appeal “[f]rom any order affecting a substantial right made in any action when the order in effect determines the action and prevents judgment from which an appeal might be taken.”).

Section 12-2101(A)(3) permits an appeal from a dismissal without prejudice when the dismissal effectively determines the action and prevents a later appealable judgment.

Laney v. Springerville · filed 2023-11-07(A)(3)

There is one potential exception to the general rule: this Court has jurisdiction when a dismissal without prejudice “in effect determines the action and prevents judgment from which an appeal might be taken.” A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(3).

Section 12-2101(A)(3) permits an appeal from a dismissal without prejudice for lack of prosecution only when the action cannot be refiled.

Olewin v. Nobel · filed 2023-01-05(A)(3)

The dismissal at that point in the litigation does not “determine[] the action” or “prevent[] judgment from which an appeal may be taken[,]” A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(3), unless the action cannot be re-filed.

A dismissal without prejudice is not an appealable final judgment under § 12-2101(A)(1) when it leaves the litigant free to refile.

Hustrulid v. Stakebake · filed 2022-08-04(A)(1)

Under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1), a party may appeal a “final judgment.” ... A dismissal without prejudice is not a final judgment because it does not dispose of the case on its merits or bar a litigant from re-filing.

Section 12-2101(A)(1) permits an appeal from a dismissal without prejudice only when the dismissal results in finality.

Bank of Ny v. Dodev · filed 2018-11-20(A)(1)

However, appellate jurisdiction does not generally arise until a final appealable determination is rendered in the trial court. A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). Thus, a dismissal without prejudice is only appealable if the dismissal results in finality.

Section 12-2101(A)(1) does not permit an appeal from an order dismissing an action without prejudice.

Knochel v. Wygc · filed 2017-07-11(A)(1)

A final judgment dismissing an action with prejudice is appealable, but an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not.

Section 12-2101(A)(3) does not allow an appeal from a dismissal without prejudice when a claimed inability to refile is speculative and the order does not affect a substantial right.

Morgan v. Ali · filed 2017-07-25(A)(3)

Because Appellant’s contention that she will be barred from refiling her claim is speculative and insufficient to show that the family court’s dismissal without prejudice “affect[ed] a substantial right,” the family court’s order in this case is not an appealable order as contemplated by A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(3).

Section 12-2101(D) makes an order dismissing an action without prejudice for lack of prosecution appealable when it determines the action and prevents a final judgment from which an appeal could be taken.

Edgar v. Garrett · filed 1969-06-26(D)

The June 28, 1965, order of dismissal without prejudice ... for lack of prosecution was an appealable order since it in effect determined the action and prevented final judgment from which an appeal might be taken. ... A.R.S. § 12-2101 (D), as amended.

Section 12-2101(B) does not allow an appeal from a partial summary judgment when the parties dismiss unresolved claims without prejudice intending to refile them.

Grand v. Nacchio · filed 2006-11-24(B)

Thus, we conclude the parties’ dismissal of claims not yet adjudicated with the intent to refile the claims later does not constitute a final order appealable under § 12-2101.

Section 12-2101(B) does not permit an appeal from a partial judgment when the remaining claims were dismissed without prejudice with the intent to refile them later.

GRAND v. NACCHIO McMASTER And QWEST COMMUNICATIONS · filed 2006-12-15(B)

Thus, we conclude the parties’ dismissal of claims not yet adjudicated with the intent to refile the claims later does not constitute a final order appealable under § 12-2101.

Section 12-2101(D) permits an appeal from a dismissal without prejudice that grants savings-statute relief after the limitations period has expired, because the order affects the defendants’ right to a limitations bar and prevents a final judgment.

Short v. Dewald · filed 2010-12-28(D)

Thus, Judge Gaines’ ruling granting savings statute relief affected “a substantial right,” namely, the defendants’ right to enforce the statute of limitations as an absolute bar to the Shorts’ claims against them. Viewed in its entirety, Judge Gaines’ order dismissing the action without prejudice and granting relief under the savings statute prevented the entry of “a final judgment from which an appeal might be taken.” ... Therefore, the order granting the Shorts saving statute relief was appealable pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(D).

A dismissal without prejudice is not a final appealable judgment under § 12-2101(A)(1).

ades/butkivich v. Contreras · filed 2016-04-28(A)(1)

An appeal from a dismissal without prejudice does not constitute a final appealable judgment under § 12-2101(A)(1).

Section 12-2101 does not permit an appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss when no judgment of dismissal has been entered.

Butler v. Sant · filed 1961-10-04

First, the order of the court below is not an order enumerated in A.R.S. § 12-2101 upon which an appeal can be based. ... The court below by minute' order granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. It does not appear from the record that a judgment of dismissal was ever entered.

Section 12-2101(B) and (D) do not permit an appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside a clerk's entry of default before judgment is entered.

Rueda v. Galvez · filed 1963-05-29(B), (D)

With certain exceptions not here pertinent, the power of this Court to review judgments of the superior courts is limited by A.R.S. § 12-2101(B) to appeals "from a final judgment." Review of orders is limited by A.R.S. § 12-2101(D) to appeals from "any order affecting a substantial right made in any action when the order in effect determines the action and prevents judgment from which an appeal might be taken." After a motion to set aside entry of default has been denied it remains for the trial court to conduct hearings, when appropriate, to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment, and to enter judgment upon the default. Ariz.R.Civ.Proc. 55(b), 16 A.R.S. An order denying a motion to set aside default entered by the clerk of the superior court is in no sense a final judgment. Nor does such order determine the action so as to prevent entry of judgment upon the default. Therefore, the order is not appealable.

Section 12-2101(B) and (D) do not permit an appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside entry of default before judgment is entered on the default.

In re Tribble · filed 1963-06-05(B), (D)

With certain exceptions not here pertinent, the power of this Court to review judgments of the superior courts is limited by A.R.S. § 12-2101(B) to appeals “from a final judgment.” Review of orders is limited by A.R.S. § 12-2101(D) to appeals from “any order affecting a substantial right made in any action when the order in effect determines the action and prevents judgment from which an appeal might be taken.” ... An order denying a motion to set aside default entered by the clerk of the superior court is in no sense a final judgment. Nor does such order determine the action so as to prevent entry of judgment upon the default. Therefore, the order is not appealable.

Section 12-2101 does not allow an appeal from a summary judgment deciding liability alone while damages remain unresolved.

Tucson Telco Federal Credit Union v. Bowser · filed 1967-06-20

Additionally, certain interlocutory orders are designated as appealable, but the subject “judgment” does not fall into those categories. Rule 56(c), supra, clearly characterizes a summary judgment on the issue of liability as “interlocutory in character.” Unless the interlocutory adjudication of liability is made appealable by statute, no appeal will lie therefrom.

Section 12-2101(B) permits an appeal only from a final judgment; an order merely granting summary judgment without resolving against whom and as to what is not appealable.

Decker v. City of Tucson · filed 1966-10-20(B)

The appellate powers of this court are circumscribed by the provisions of A.R.S. § 12-2101, as amended, which permits appeals to this court from a final judgment entered in a superior court action or special proceeding. ... We hold, therefore, that the subject “judgment” is not final and, therefore, is not appealable.

A minute entry is not appealable under § 12-2101 unless it is written, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk as Rule 58(a) requires.

Reid v. Reid · filed 1973-07-03

The Arizona Supreme Court has stated that a minute entry is not an appealable order under A.R.S. § 12-2101 unless it complies with the procedural requirements of Rule 58(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., that it be in writing, signed by the judge and filed with the clerk of the court. State v. Birmingham, 96 Ariz. 109, 392 P.2d 775 (1964). For that reason alone the minute entry order in the instant case is not a final judgment in the sense that it is appealable.

Section 12-2101 treats an Arizona judgment as nonfinal while a motion for new trial awaits a written order of denial.

Kressly v. Kressly · filed 1978-07-17

The district court correctly found that the Arizona judgment was not final under Arizona law, because no written order denying Lloyd Kressly’s motion for new trial had been issued. Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-2101 (1956).

Section 12-2101 does not make a minute entry granting dismissal with leave to amend an appealable order.

Desmond v. J. W. Hancock Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1979-09-25

It is clear that the minute entry order of February 8, which was mailed February 10, was not an appealable order under any of the criteria of A.R.S. § 12-2101.

An unsigned, unfiled minute entry order is neither a final judgment nor an appealable order under § 12-2101.

Pima County v. Testin · filed 1992-05-14

An unsigned, unfiled minute entry order is not a final judgment or an appealable order for purposes of A.R.S. § 12-2101.

Section 12-2101(A)(1) allows appeals from final judgments; an order resolving ballot eligibility while attorney fees remain pending is not a final judgment under that provision.

McGee v. Syms · filed 2019-11-12(A)(1)

In this case, the superior court’s signed order enjoining Syms from appearing on the ballot did not constitute a “final judgment” for purposes of A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

Section 12-2101(A)(1) does not permit appellate review of a dismissed claim that was omitted from the final Rule 54(b) judgment.

Song He v. Coles Properties · filed 2018-10-23(A)(1)

Because the dismissal of those claims was not part of a final judgment, we have no jurisdiction to consider it. See A.R.S. § 12-2101(A) (describing when appeal may be taken).

Section 12-2101 does not permit an appeal from an order dismissing fewer than all defendants without the express determination and direction for final judgment required by Rule 54(b).

Pegler v. Sullivan · filed 1966-09-27

Since the subject order dismissing the action as to fewer than all the defendants did not contain an express determination that there was no just reason for delay and an express direction for entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), A.R.C.P., the order is not a final judgment within the meaning of A.R.S. § 12-2101 and is not appealable.

Section 12-2101(B) does not allow an appeal from a judgment resolving fewer than all parties unless the trial court makes the express determination and direction required by Rule 54(b).

Connolly v. Great Basin Insurance Company · filed 1967-02-10(B)

We find no such express “determination” and “direction” in the record before us and perforce conclude that the subject judgment is not final within the meaning of A.R.S. § 12-2101, hence not appealable.

Section 12-2101(B) permits an appeal from a final judgment; when claims remain pending, a judgment lacking a Rule 54(b) finality determination is not appealable under that subsection.

Pulaski v. Perkins · filed 1980-10-02(B)

A 54(b) deficiency, on the other hand, is a defect of substance because A.R.S. § 12-2101(B) makes appealable only “final” judgments and, unless the particular judgment in question is otherwise appealable, ... there would be no statutory basis for bringing the appeal.

Section 12-2101(B) does not permit an appeal from a partial judgment that eliminates only some legal theories supporting a single claim, even if the judgment contains Rule 54(b) language.

Musa v. C. K. Adrian, M. D. · filed 1981-10-06(B)

Because appellants have only a single claim for relief, that is, damages for what had occurred, Rule 54(b) language could not make the summary judgment which the court entered appealable under A.R.S. § 12-2101(B).

Section 12-2101(B) does not permit an appeal from a judgment resolving fewer than all claims when the court makes no Rule 54(b) determination of finality.

People of Faith, Inc. v. Arizona Department of Revenue · filed 1990-04-24(B)

The tax court’s opinion resolved only the second of these claims. It made no determination pursuant to Rule 54(b). Therefore, its judgment in this case is not “final” and not appealable under A.R.S. § 12-2101(B).

Section 12-2101(B) permits an appeal from a final judgment dismissing all claims against a defendant, even when the judgment also orders arbitration.

Dusold v. Porta-John Corp. · filed 1990-10-11(B)

Such a judgment of dismissal, under either Rule 12(b)(1) or (6), is a final, appealable order under A.R.S. § 12-2101(B).

Under § 12-2101(B), an order dismissing some claims becomes final and appealable after all claims are adjudicated and final judgment is entered.

Carrillo v. State · filed 1991-09-05(B)

The 1986 order dismissing Carrillo’s claims became final and appealable upon the trial court’s adjudication of all Carrillo’s claims and entry of final judgment. A.R.S. § 12-2101.B.

An order compelling arbitration is not appealable under § 12-2101(B) unless it is made a final judgment, such as through Rule 54(b) certification.

Southern California Edison Co. v. Peabody Western Coal Co. · filed 1999-05-19(B)

Because the order entered here was not a final judgment containing Rule 54(b) language, the Utilities do not have a right to appeal under § 12-2101(B).

Section 12-2101(A)(6) allows an appeal from a non-final judgment only when the superior court determines that an interlocutory appeal should lie and the amount of recovery is the sole remaining issue.

Heritage v. Weinberg · filed 2017-03-09(A)(6)

But for a non-final judgment to be appealable under subsection (A)(6), the superior court must determine that an interlocutory appeal "should lie" and "the only issue remaining is the amount of recovery." Bilke, 206 Ariz. at 467-68, ¶¶ 23, 28. The court made no such findings in this case.

Section 12-2101 permits appeals from an order confirming a judicial sale and an interlocutory judgment determining the parties’ rights and directing an accounting; failure to appeal either when appealable bars a later challenge.

Hurst v. Hurst · filed 1965-09-22(C), (E), and (G)

The order confirming the sale was a final order from which an appeal lies. ... This judgment was appealable as an interlocutory judgment which determined the rights of the parties and directed an accounting.

Subsection G does not allow an immediate appeal from an order deciding a condemning authority’s right to take property while compensation remains to be decided.

Cordova v. City of Tucson · filed 1971-10-12(G)

The city moved for summary judgment on the issue of its right to take the subject property and the court granted its motion for partial summary judgment. ... Furthermore, it does not qualify as an appealable “interlocutory judgment” as set forth in subsection G. Tucson Telco Federal Credit Union v. Bowser, 6 Ariz.App. 190, 431 P.2d 85 (1967). We hold, therefore, that this appeal is premature.

Section 12-2101(G) permits an interlocutory appeal from a signed summary judgment for the plaintiff on liability if the judgment expressly makes the liability determination final and leaves only the amount of recovery to be decided.

Cook v. Cook · filed 1976-03-18(G)

We hold therefore that, under the language of A.R.S. § 12-2101 (G), a summary judgment in favor of a plaintiff on a question of liability can be appealable. We further hold that the particular language of this statute requires that the interlocutory judgment, in order to be appealable, must in reality reflect a final “determination of the rights of the parties” with respect to liability, and a determination that the only question remaining to be resolved is the “amount of recovery.” To fulfill these requirements, the summary judgment appealed from must not only be signed by the judge, as required by Rule 58, Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, but must also contain some additional express language indicating finality.

Section 12-2101(G) allows an appeal from a partial summary judgment on liability only when the judgment expressly indicates finality and leaves only the amount of recovery unresolved.

Empress Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Price · filed 1977-07-26(G)

While it is the general rule that the right of appeal is limited to final decisions or judgments, there are several statutory exceptions, including A.R.S. § 12-2101(G) which Empress contends is applicable here. ... The order of partial summary judgment in the present case contains neither Rule 54(b) language nor any other express determination indicating finality. It merely grants judgment in favor of Price on the conversion issue and leaves determination of his damages to future proceedings. We hold that absent the express language required by Cook, we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

An interlocutory judgment under subsection (G) must contain express language indicating finality to be appealable before the final judgment.

Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co. v. Romley · filed 1978-01-27(G)

The trial court’s order of July 30, 1975, contained no language which would indicate that this order was “final.” Under the rationale of Cook, the order was therefore not appealable.

Section 12-2101(G) permits an appeal from an interlocutory judgment that finally resolves liability and leaves only the amount of recovery to be determined.

Salerno v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance · filed 2000-07-06(G)

This exception applies if the judgment finally resolves the parties’ rights as to liability, and the only unresolved question is the amount of recovery.

Section 12-2101(G) permits an interlocutory appeal when the trial judge expressly determines that the parties’ rights are finally resolved and only the amount of recovery remains; the remaining proceeding need not be equitable.

Bilke v. State · filed 2003-12-04(G)

We hold that interlocutory judgments can be appealed under § 12-2101(G) when the trial judge has signed an order that contains language indicating that the judgment is a final determination of the rights of the parties and the only remaining issue is the amount of recovery. We also hold that appeals under § 12-2101(G) are not limited to cases in which an accounting or similar equitable proceeding has been ordered to determine the amount of recovery.

Section 12-2101(A)(6) does not permit an interlocutory appeal from an order of immediate possession in a condemnation action.

Catalina Foothills Unified School District No. 16 v. La Paloma Property Owners Ass'n · filed 2012-05-30(A)(6)

Thus, although Bilke may have application beyond its specific facts, we find controlling the express holding in Rogers that an order of immediate possession “ ‘does not qualify as an appealable interlocutory judgment’ ” under § 12-2101(A)(6).

Section 12-2101(A)(6) permits an appeal from an interlocutory judgment only when the superior court expressly directs that the amount of recovery is the sole remaining issue.

Fields v. Oates · filed 2012-09-11(A)(6)

This subsection does not fit the fact pattern here and, in any event, for an interlocutory judgment to be appealable under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(6), the superior court must expressly direct “that the only issue remaining is the amount of recovery.” ... The court made no such express direction here, and A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(6) is not applicable.

Subsection G allows an appeal from an interlocutory judgment only if it determines the parties’ rights.

Tucson Telco Federal Credit Union v. Bowser · filed 1967-08-17(G)

However, the interlocutory judgment must be one which determines the rights of the parties.

Section 12-2101(G) permits an appeal from an interlocutory judgment that determines the parties’ rights while leaving the amount of recovery for later proceedings.

Frank v. Green · filed 2009-01-20(G)

Thus, the judgment is appealable pursuant to § 12-2101(G), which allows appeal “[f]rom an interlocutory judgment which determines the rights of the parties and it directs an accounting or other proceeding to determine the amount of the recovery.”

Section 12-2101(A)(3) permits an appeal from an order affecting a substantial right and determining the action only when the order also prevents entry of an appealable final judgment.

Sipolt Marketing v. Non Profit Patient Center Inc · filed 2020-12-29(A)(3)

Assuming the Settlement Order affects a substantial right and effectively determines the action, Non-Profit does not demonstrate that the Settlement Order prevents a final judgment from being entered.

Section 12-2101 permits an appeal from an order removing a trustee and directing an accounting because the order affects substantial rights and determines the parties’ rights.

Miller v. Superior Court · filed 1960-11-17(E), (G)

Guided by the language of the statute, and consistent with the bulk of authority elsewhere, we hold that the order of July 1, 1960, removing Ashland Corporation as trustee, was appealable.

Section 12-2101(D) does not allow an immediate appeal from an order denying impleader because the order neither determines the action nor prevents an appealable judgment.

Moynahan v. Fritz · filed 1961-11-29(D)

Plainly, an order denying a motion to implead does not determine the action. No final judgment of any kind has been entered nor does the order prevent judgment from which an appeal may be taken.

Section 12-2101(D) makes an order dismissing a case for want of prosecution appealable when it determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken.

Campbell v. Deddens · filed 1963-03-28(D)

Since an order dismissing a case for want of prosecution under Rule V (d) of the Rules of Practice “determines the action and prevents judgment from which an appeal might be taken” it is an appeal-able order, A.R.S. § 12-2101, subd. D.

Section 12-2101 permits appeals from superior court orders and judgments that finally dispose of litigants’ rights, rather than intermediate decisions.

State v. Birmingham · filed 1964-06-04

The legislature has used in A.R.S. § 12-2101 the words “order” and “judgment” as cognates, that is, closely allied in meaning in the sense of a final disposition of a litigant’s rights and not as a command, directive or decision on an intermediate point which does not dispose of the principal issue or issues in the cause.

Section 12-2101(D) does not permit an appeal from an order granting a mistrial because the order neither determines the action nor prevents a later appealable judgment.

Yaeger v. Vance · filed 1973-09-06(D)

Such an order neither “determines the action” nor “prevents judgment from which an appeal might be taken.” We hold that an order granting a mistrial is not an appealable order under A.R.S. § 12-2101.

Section 12-2101 permits a civil appeal from an order denying return of seized property when the order finally disposes of the cause.

Greehling v. State · filed 1982-11-09

The order denying the motion for return of property was a final judgment. A.R.S. § 12-2101. It was a judgment or decree disposing of the cause on the merits, leaving no question remaining for judicial determination.

Section 12-2101(A)(4) permits an appeal from a final order affecting a substantial right in a special proceeding without requiring that the order be entered after judgment.

McA Financial Group, Ltd. v. Enterprise Bank & Trust · filed 2014-12-30(A)(4)

A plain reading of the statute would suggest that subsection (A)(4) pertains to two separate types of final orders: (1) one “affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding”; and (2) a final order made “on a summary application in an action after judgment.” ... We conclude we have jurisdiction over MCA’s appeal under § 12-2101(A)(4), and we have amended the caption to accurately reflect the proper parties to this appeal.

Section 12-2101(E) does not allow an appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside an execution sale when the movant’s asserted rights remain to be decided in a pending intervention claim.

Kemble v. Porter · filed 1960-12-01(E)

The denial of the motion did not operate as a final adjudication of any of Kemble’s rights, because every right which he asserted in making the motion remained to be determined at that trial. The denial of the motion was in many important respects like the denial of a motion for summary judgment; it did not adjudicate substantial rights, but merely postponed an adjudication until after a trial on the merits. Like the denial of a motion for summary judgment, Renck v. Superior Court, 66 Ariz. 320, 187 P.2d 656, it was a mere interlocutory order. Lacking the finality required by A.R.S. § 12-2101, subd. E, the order denying the motion to set aside the execution sale in this case was not appealable.

Section 12-2101(D) does not permit an appeal from an interlocutory order allowing an action to proceed as a class action.

Eaton v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Pima Cty. · filed 1979-02-21(D)

Appellants do not explain how such reasoning could be applicable to an order that rather than denying class certification, allows an action to be maintained as a class action. We do not perceive any logical basis for applying A.R.S. § 12-2101 D to the kind of order now before this Court.

Section 12-2101(B) permits an appeal from a final judgment dismissing class claims even if the class has not been certified under Rule 23.

Evans v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections · filed 1983-12-08(B)

First, the dismissal of appellants' class action, even though not certified under rule 23, is a final judgment from which appellants may appeal. A.R.S. § 12-2101(B); Reader v. Magma-Superior Copper Co., 108 Ariz. 186, 494 P.2d 708 (1972).

Section 12-2101(D) permits an appeal from an order denying intervention.

McGough v. Ins. Co. of North America · filed 1984-11-20(D)

Thus, an order denying intervention is an appealable order and, if the order is reversed, the entire judgment will be reversed.

Section 12-2101(D) does not allow an appeal as of right from an order denying class certification because that order does not legally determine the action or prevent an appealable judgment.

Garza v. Swift Transportation Co. · filed 2009-08-24(D)

Unlike an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice after the statute of limitations has run, an order denying class certification does not, as a legal matter, “in effect determine[] the action and prevent[] judgment from which an appeal [may] be taken.”

Section 12-2101(D) does not permit an immediate appeal from an order denying class certification when the plaintiff continues the suit to final judgment.

Markiewicz v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n · filed 1978-01-24(D)

It does not appear to fall within the narrow confines of A.R.S. § 12-2101 D. The order did not “in effect” determine the action, nor did it prevent “judgment from which an appeal might be taken”, since appellants proceeded in their individual capacities to a final resolution of this litigation.

An order appointing a receiver must be appealed within thirty days, and an untimely appeal cannot later challenge that order.

Imh v. Maniatis · filed 2021-04-08(A)(5)(b)

The time to appeal the Receivership Order from 2014 has long passed. See A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b) (court order appointing a receiver must be appealed within thirty days); see also Sato v. First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 12 Ariz. App. 263, 266 (App. 1970) (failure to appeal order appointing a receiver precludes a party from later raising issue on appeal from final judgment). We therefore lack jurisdiction to address challenges to the Receivership Order.

Section 12-2101(F)(2) permits an immediate appeal from an order appointing a receiver, and failure to take that appeal precludes challenging the appointment on appeal from the final judgment.

Sato v. First National Bank of Arizona · filed 1970-05-28(F)(2)

We therefore hold that the order appointing a receiver without notice was not void, but is appealable, and the failure to so appeal precludes the raising of the issue on an appeal from the final judgment.

Section 12-2101(F)(2) permits immediate review of an order appointing a receiver, but does not give appellate jurisdiction at that stage to evaluate the receiver’s performance.

Gravel Resources of Arizona v. Hills · filed 2007-11-06(F)(2)

At this stage in the proceedings, the statute only gives us jurisdiction to review the appointment of the receiver. A.R.S. § 12-2101(A), (F)(2) (“An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the superior court ... [f]rom an order: ... appointing a receiver.”). We have no jurisdiction at this time to evaluate the receiver’s performance.

A civil contempt order is appealable under § 12-2101 only when its substance or effect independently makes it appealable; an order awarding only attorneys’ fees and costs does not qualify.

Sanchez v. Jaime · filed 2021-04-29

A civil contempt order is not appealable unless its substance or effect, beyond including a finding of contempt, renders it appealable pursuant to § 12-2101. ... The contempt order in this case does not fall within the Green exception because it only awarded Mother reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

A vexatious litigant order is appealable under § 12-2101(A)(5)(b) as an order granting injunctive relief.

Gainey Ranch v. Kraft · filed 2019-03-28(A)(5)(b)

Because a vexatious litigant order is in effect a grant of injunctive relief, we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b).

Section 12-2101 permits an appeal from a contempt-based order when the order’s substance or effect qualifies it as appealable under the statute.

Green v. Lisa Frank, Inc. · filed 2009-01-20

The most harmonious way to read these statutes is to conclude that contempt orders are unappealable unless the substance or effect of the order in question— ... — qualifies the order as one of those made appealable pursuant to § 12-2101.

Section 12-2101(A) does not permit an independent appeal from rulings requiring a preliminary expert opinion affidavit when no appealable judgment has been entered as to those claims.

Bade v. Powar · filed 2022-02-01(A)

The underlying rulings themselves are not independently appealable. See A.R.S. § 12-2101(A).

Section 12-2101(A) does not allow an appeal from the denial of a request for emergency legal decision-making authority or a petition for a temporary order for legal decision-making authority.

Price v. Slayden · filed 2020-02-20(A)

Slayden also contends that Price was required to appeal the superior court’s denial of her request for emergency legal decision-making authority and petition for a temporary order for legal decision-making authority but failed to do so. But those denials were non-appealable orders under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A).

Section 12-2101(A)(1), (3), and (6) does not permit an appeal from a superior court order extending a deadline.

Ibeabuchi v. Penzone · filed 2018-09-18(A)(1), (3), (6)

Here, the superior court retained jurisdiction to rule on the motion to dismiss because Ibeabuchi’s pending Appeal was indisputably invalid: superior court orders extending deadlines are non-appealable. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1), (3), (6) (an appeal may be taken from a final judgment, an order effectively determining the action, or an interlocutory judgment that determines the rights of the parties).

Section 12-2101(A)(3) does not permit an immediate appeal from a dismissal ruling that does not prevent entry of a final, appealable judgment.

Powell v. Pac. Specialty Ins. Co. · filed 2018-02-27(A)(3)

Moreover, we reject Homeowners' contention that the ruling granting dismissal was immediately appealable under § 12-2101(A)(3); that ruling was ultimately followed by a judgment with Rule 54(c) finality language and so did not prevent entry of an appealable judgment.

Section 12-2101(A)(3) does not authorize an immediate appeal from a dismissal order when a later final judgment can be entered.

Workman v. Verde Wellness Center, Inc. · filed 2016-10-18(A)(3)

But as we have said, here, the court ultimately granted summary judgment, thus the dismissal order clearly did not “prevent[ a] judgment from which an appeal might be taken” so § 12-2101(A)(3) does not apply.

Section 12-2101 does not allow an immediate appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss; appellate review must await final judgment.

Industrial Commission v. Superior Court in and for County of Pima · filed 1967-02-03

An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory non-appealable order, A.R.S. § 12-2101 as amended; Bloch v. Bentfield, 1 Ariz.App. 412, 415, 403 P.2d 559 (1965); therefore, petitioners must await a final judgment in the case to achieve review by an appeal of the trial court’s ruling on the subject motions.

Section 12-2101 does not allow an appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside a verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Associates Finance Corporation v. Scott · filed 1966-02-25

An order denying a motion to set aside a verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not an appealable order.

Section 12-2101 does not allow a direct appeal from an order substituting a real property bond for a surety bond and exonerating the surety bond.

Cushman v. National Surety Corp. of New York · filed 1966-08-03

The order of June 25, 1958, for substitution of a real property bond and exoneration of appellee’s bond, was not an appeal-able order under any provision of A.R.S. § 12-2101.

Section 12-2101(B) does not permit an appeal from an order denying summary judgment.

Burke v. Gottfried · filed 1968-01-24B

We agree with the learned trial court’s ruling that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not an order from which an appeal may be taken.

Section 12-2101 does not permit an appeal from an order denying a petition for custody of an estate.

Mann v. Platt · filed 1971-01-12

Question number 6 cannot be considered because it is not an appealable order. 4 A.R.S. § 12-2101.

Section 12-2101 does not permit an appeal from an order setting aside the entry of default when no judgment has been entered.

Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Globe Electric, Inc. · filed 1973-06-20

No judgment has been entered and under the provisions of A.R.S. § 12-2101, as amended, an order setting aside the entry of default is not appealable.

Section 12-2101(B) generally allows appeals only from final judgments, and an order requiring further judicial action is not final despite being labeled a judgment.

Properties Investment Enterprises, Ltd. v. Foundation for Airborne Relief, Inc. · filed 1977-01-31(B)

With certain exceptions, only final judgments are appealable, A.R.S. § 12-2101(B), and the December 10 order was not final, even though it was denominated “judgment.”

Subsections C and E permit appeals from after judgment orders made by a superior court acting as a trial court, but not from its fact finding order assisting an appellate court in deciding its own jurisdiction.

Todd v. Todd · filed 1983-10-18(C), (E)

Both subsections C and E deal with after judgment action by the trial court acting as a trial court. Both subsections affect rights of parties before the trial court, prior to appellate intervention. ... It follows that an order entered by the trial court, when acting in this limited capacity, is, in essence, in the nature of an appellate master’s report and therefore is not “appealable” under A.R.S. § 12-2101 as an order of the superior court.

Section 12-2101 does not permit an appeal from an order denying an objection to a judgment and a motion to amend the pleadings.

James v. State · filed 2007-05-31

Finally, although Burkhamer timely filed his notice of appeal within thirty days after the trial court's May 22 order denying his objection to the judgment and his motion to amend the pleadings, that order is not appealable.

Section 12-2101 does not permit an appeal from an order denying an objection to a judgment and a motion to amend the pleadings.

Burkhamer v. State of Arizona · filed 2007-05-31

Finally, although Burkhamer timely filed his notice of appeal within thirty days after the trial court’s May 22 order denying his objection to the judgment and his motion to amend the pleadings, that order is not appealable.

Section 12-2101 generally does not allow an appeal or post-judgment review of an order denying summary judgment because that order is not final.

Deepwater v. Wells Fargo · filed 2015-06-30

However, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a “final order” under A.R.S. § 12-2101 and therefore is generally not appealable or subject to review after judgment.

Section 12-2101 does not authorize a direct appeal from an order dissolving or refusing to dissolve replevin.

Aea v. T&K · filed 2015-12-01

Under A.R.S. § 12-2101 (the main statute governing appeals in civil actions), appeals are permitted from a final judgment, any special order made after final judgment, an order granting or refusing a new trial, and an order dissolving or refusing to dissolve an attachment or garnishment, among other things. Notably, the legislature has not made ... orders dissolving or refusing to dissolve replevin directly appealable.

Under subsection (A)(2), a post-decree order becomes appealable once all issues in that petition are resolved, including a pending request for attorney’s fees.

Van Camp v. Van Camp · filed 2021-10-14(A)(2)

Applying these principles, the order dismissing Father’s petition to modify spousal maintenance became appealable in July 2020, when the family court entered a sum-certain fee award to Mother.

Section 12-2101(A)(2) permits an appeal from a post-decree order only after the family court fully resolves all issues raised in the post-decree motion or petition.

Shaw v. Bergeron · filed 2021-10-26(A)(2)

And generally, an appeal may only be taken from a post-decree order once the family court has “fully resolved all issues raised in a post-decree motion or petition.” Yee v. Yee, 251 Ariz. 71, 76, ¶ 14 (App. 2021); see also A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2) (jurisdiction for appeals from “any special order made after final judgment”).

Section 12-2101(A)(2) permits an appeal from a family court order that fully resolves a post-decree motion or petition without requiring a Rule 78 statement of finality.

Yee v. Yee · filed 2021-03-25(A)(2)

Although a special order made after final judgment in family court does not require a Rule 78 statement of finality to be appealable, the family court must have fully resolved all issues raised in a post-decree motion or petition before an appeal can be taken under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2).

Section 12-2101(C) permits an appeal from a postjudgment domestic relations order that makes an earlier, nonfinal order final and appealable.

Marriage of Boncoskey v. Boncoskey · filed 2007-09-25(C)

Thus, once the court issued the DRO, the DRO became a final appealable order incorporating the earlier July 2005 order.

Section 12-2101(C) permits an appeal from a superior court order resolving grandparent visitation after final judgment as a special order made after final judgment.

Sheehan v. Flower · filed 2007-11-13(C)

The superior court’s order is a “special order made after final judgment” within the meaning of A.R.S. § 12-2101(C).

An approved and entered domestic relations order is appealable as a special order after final judgment under § 12-2101(A)(2).

Sessions v. Sessions · filed 2016-10-25(A)(2)

Once the superior court approved and entered the DRO, it became a final appealable order. A.R.S. § 12-2101.A.2; Boncoskey v. Bonkoskey, 216 Ariz. 448, 451, ¶ 12 (App. 2007) (recognizing the right to appeal from a qualified DRO as a special order after final judgment).

A QDRO implementing a dissolution decree that substantively divides a retirement account is a special order entered after final judgment for appeal purposes.

Walker v. Walker · filed 2023-10-03(A)(2)

Thus, if a dissolution decree resolves the substantive division of a retirement account, a QDRO should be treated as a special order entered after the final judgment under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2) for appeal purposes.

Section 12-2101(C) permits an appeal from an order setting aside a default judgment as a special order made after final judgment.

Bateman v. McDonald · filed 1963-09-18(C)

We hold that such an order is appealable as a “special order made after final judgment.”

Section 12-2101(C) permits an appeal from an order vacating a final summary judgment as a special order made after judgment.

Engineers v. Sharpe · filed 1977-12-21(C)

We agree that because there was, strictly speaking, no trial below, it would strain statutory construction to find that appellant’s basis for appeal rests on A.R.S. § 12-2101(F). However, we believe that A.R.S. § 12-2101(C), which provides for an appeal from any special order made after final judgment is broad enough to encompass the appeal in this case.

Section 12-2101(D) permits an appeal from an order vacating a dismissal.

Tucson Electric Power Co. v. Industrial Commission · filed 1983-10-27(D)

The latter argument fails because it incorrectly assumes that an interlocutory order vacating a dismissal is nonappealable. A.R.S. § 12-2101(D) permits an appeal from an order vacating a dismissal.

Section 12-2101(C) permits an appeal from an order setting aside a default judgment as a special order made after judgment.

Sanders v. Cobble · filed 1987-10-01(C)

We agree with petitioner that an order setting aside a default judgment is appealable as a special order made after judgment.

Section 12-2101(C) permits an appeal from an order setting aside or refusing to set aside a default judgment as a special order made after judgment.

Sullivan & Brugnatelli Advertising Co. v. Century Capital Corp. · filed 1986-12-04(C)

An order setting aside, or refusing to set aside a default judgment, is appealable as a special order made after a judgment under A.R.S. § 12-2101(C).

Section 12-2101(A)(2) permits an appeal from a postjudgment money judgment, but an order denying a motion to amend is not appealable as a special order after judgment when it raises the same issues as an appeal from the judgment.

Lally v. Lally · filed 2011-11-17(A)(2)

The August 2007 order imposed a money judgment and was appealable. See A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2). ... But the order denying the motion to amend was not itself appealable. ... “To be appealable, a special order after judgment must raise different issues than those that would be raised by appealing the underlying judgment.” ... Thus, the denial of the motion to amend the August 2007 order is not an appealable special order after judgment.

Section 12-2101(A)(2) does not permit a separate appeal from an unsigned order setting aside a default judgment that does not concern all parties.

Wyckoff v. Mogollon Health Alliance · filed 2013-08-22(A)(2)

However, the order setting aside the default judgment in this case was not signed and did not concern all parties, and it was therefore not appealable under § 12-2101(A)(2).

Section 12-2101(A)(2) permits an appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to set aside a judgment under ARFLP 85(C), even when the appeal raises issues from an earlier appeal dismissed before a decision on the merits.

Olade v. Olade · filed 2014-10-09(A)(2)

But the right to appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to set aside a judgment under ARFLP 85(C) is unqualified. ... The denial of this motion was appealable. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2), and we are not precluded from considering issues previously argued in Husband’s dismissed appeal because we did not decide that appeal on its merits.

Section 12-2101(A)(2) does not allow a separate appeal from an order denying a Rule 15 motion to set aside an eviction judgment when the motion repeats challenges to the judgment’s merits.

Sotomayor v. Sotomayor-Munoz · filed 2016-03-28(A)(2)

Under A.R.S. § 12-2101, however, we have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a final judgment or “[f]rom any special order made after final judgment.” ... To determine whether a ruling on a motion under Rule 15 is appealable as a special order after judgment we must consider 1) whether the issues raised by the appeal from the order are different from those that would arise from an appeal, and 2) whether the order affects the judgment or relates to its execution. ... We therefore conclude that the order at issue here fails the first part of the test for determining whether an order qualifies as an appealable, special order made after final judgment. ... Thus, the trial court’s ruling on Muñoz’s Rule 15 motion was not appealable, and this court lacks jurisdiction to consider her appeal of that ruling.

Section 12-2101(A)(2) permits a timely appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to correct a clerical error under Rule 85(A) as a special order made after final judgment.

Vincent v. Shanovich · filed 2017-12-06(A)(2)

Because rulings on Rule 85(A) motions are special orders after judgment under § 12-2101(A)(2), the court of appeals has jurisdiction to decide a timely appeal from the family court’s denial of a Rule 85(A) motion to correct a clerical error.

Section 12-2101(A)(2) and (A)(4) do not permit an appeal from an order denying a motion to clarify a final judgment when the order leaves the judgment intact, raises no different issues, and affects no substantial right.

Lozano v. Pacco · filed 2020-10-15(A)(2), (A)(4)

Applying these considerations here, we are unconvinced that the order denying the motion to clarify the March 2019 judgment falls within either A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2) or (A)(4). Nor have we identified any other relevant provision from which we might acquire jurisdiction. Because the court denied the motion and, therefore, left the March 2019 judgment precisely as entered, the order neither raised questions different from those that would have arisen from an appeal from the judgment itself nor affected a substantial right of the Appellants.

Section 12-2101(A)(2) permits an appeal from a post-judgment order only when it raises issues different from an appeal of the judgment and affects, enforces, or stays that judgment.

Rice v. Rulnick · filed 2024-05-16(A)(2)

That said, to be appealable, a post-judgment order must (1) raise issues different from the issues that would arise from an appeal from the decree and (2) “’affect the judgment or relate to it by enforcing it or staying its execution.’” ... Thus, the order is not appealable under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2).

Section 12-2101(C) does not permit an appeal from an order after judgment when the appeal presents the same question that an appeal from the judgment would present.

Reidy v. O'Malley Lumber Company · filed 1962-10-03(C)

An order made after judgment is not appealable if the appeal presents the same question as would be presented on an appeal from the judgment.

Section 12-2101(C) does not permit an appeal from an order made after judgment when the appeal raises the same questions as an appeal from the judgment.

State v. Lerma · filed 1981-11-25(C)

The only arguable statutory authorization for appealing this “amended order” would be A.R.S. § 12-2101(C) which allows an appeal from any special order made after final judgment. This appeal from the amended order presents the same questions as would be presented on an appeal from the judgment. “An order made after judgment is not appealable if the appeal presents the same question as would be presented on an appeal from the judgment.”

Section 12-2101’s provision for appeals from special orders entered after final judgment does not apply in juvenile proceedings.

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-57445 · filed 1984-11-23

As we have previously indicated, the provisions of A.R.S. § 12-2101 relating to the appealability of special orders entered after final judgment are not applicable in juvenile proceedings.

Section 12-2101(C) does not allow a direct appeal from a postjudgment order that merely prepares for a later ruling that might affect the judgment or its enforcement.

Arvizu v. Fernandez · filed 1995-08-29(C)

But an order that is merely “preparatory” to a later proceeding that might affect the judgment or its enforcement is not appealable.

Section 12-2101(C) permits an appeal from a special order made after final judgment only if a final judgment was entered; an earlier appealable order that resolved no claim does not suffice.

Ruesga v. Kindred Nursing Centers West, L.L.C. · filed 2007-07-18(C)

Thus, because the trial court did not enter any final judgment, we reject the parties’ position that the court’s later order granting Rule 60(c) relief was a special order made after final judgment for jurisdiction purposes under § 12-2101(C).

Section 12-2101(C) permits an appeal from a special order made after final judgment only when a final judgment preceded that order; an earlier appealable order alone does not suffice.

Ruesga v. Kindred Nursing Centers West, L.L.C. · filed 2007-07-18(C)

That an order is statutorily appealable and qualifies as a “judgment” for purposes of Rule 54(a), however, does not necessarily make it a “final judgment” for purposes of § 12-2101.

A post-judgment order is appealable only if it raises an issue distinct from those available on appeal from the underlying judgment; an order that repeats those issues is not appealable.

Engel v. Landman · filed 2009-04-30(C)

Applying the first requirement here, we conclude that the appeal from the November order does not raise any issue that could not have been raised in an appeal from the September order. ... Therefore, we conclude that the November order is not an appealable post-judgment order, and we lack jurisdiction over Mother’s direct appeal.

Under subsection (D), refusal to enter a detention order is not appealable when the hearing can proceed and a judgment remains possible.

SOROKIN v. Arnold · filed 2009-10-27(D)

I.T. counters the order is appealable pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(D) (2003) because it is an order “affecting a substantial right” and “in effect determines the action and prevents judgment from which an appeal might be taken.” We disagree with I.T. A detention order is not necessary for a hearing to proceed on court-ordered treatment. See A.R.S. § 36-529. Thus, the court’s refusal to enter one did not prevent judgment from which an appeal may be taken.

Section 12-2101(C) permits an appeal from a postjudgment order that resolves a distinct issue and immediately affects a party’s rights, even if other petitions remain pending.

Williams v. Williams · filed 2011-10-06(C)

A post-judgment order is appealable when the order involves an issue distinct from the underlying judgment and immediately affected a party’s rights. ... The inclusion of a finality requirement in some subsections but not subsection (C) supports our conclusion that total finality, i.e., the resolution of all pending claims for relief presented in all pending petitions, is not required.

Section 12-2101(A)(2) permits an appeal from a postjudgment order only when it raises issues different from those that could be raised on appeal from the underlying judgment.

Rodriguez v. Steddom · filed 2014-05-06(A)(2)

To be appealable under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2), an order must raise issues different from those that would arise from an appeal of the underlying judgment.

An order after final judgment qualifies as an appealable special order only if it raises issues different from those available in an appeal of the underlying judgment; a motion that attacks that judgment’s merits does not qualify.

Vincent v. Shanovich · filed 2017-03-30(A)(2)

To qualify as a “special order” within the context of A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2), the order “must raise different issues than those that would be raised by appealing the underlying judgment.” In re Marriage of Dorman, 198 Ariz. 298, 300, ¶ 3 (App. 2000) (citing Arvizu v. Fernandez, 183 Ariz. 224, 226–27 (App. 1995)) (emphasis added). ... In his motion to set aside, Husband attacked the merits of the QDRO and thus failed to assert any issues that could not have been raised in a timely appeal.

Section 12-2101(A)(2) does not authorize an appeal from post-judgment transcript orders that do not affect the judgment, relate to its enforcement, or stay its enforcement.

Blaser v. Kaiser · filed 2018-06-28(A)(2)

Blaser suggests the transcript orders qualify as special orders after a final judgment, appealable pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2). To qualify as such, the orders must: (1) raise an issue “different from those that could have been raised on appeal from the underlying judgment,” and (2) “either affect the judgment or relate to its enforcement.” Vincent v. Shanovich, 243 Ariz. 269, 271, ¶ 9 (2017) (citing Reidy v. O’Malley Lumber Co., 92 Ariz. 130, 136 (1962), and Arvizu v. Fernandez, 183 Ariz. 224, 226-27 (App. 1995)). The transcript orders do not affect the judgment, relate to its execution, or stay its enforcement, and their appeal is not otherwise authorized by statute. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the transcript orders and dismiss the appeal to the extent Blaser challenges them.

A post-judgment order is appealable under subsection (A)(2) if it relates to the judgment or its enforcement and the appeal raises an issue different from one available on appeal of the judgment.

Ghb Construction v. Solomon · filed 2020-03-12(A)(2)

We have jurisdiction over the appeal if the January 2019 Order is a special order after judgment under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2). Post-judgment orders are appealable if the order relates to the judgment or enforcement of the underlying judgment, and if the issue raised on appeal from the order is different from those that would arise from appeal of the judgment.

Section 12-2101(A)(2) covers supplemental orders entered to enforce a final judgment, including orders awarding costs incurred to enforce it.

Avalon Hills v. Lang · filed 2022-07-28(A)(2)

As such, both were entered to enforce the Original Judgment and are “special order[s] made after final judgment” under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2).

Section 12-2101(C) permits an appeal from a special order made after final judgment, including a later order specifying taxable costs.

Johnston v. University Hospital · filed 1986-05-08(C)

The May 14th order with respect to costs, filed after the April 4th judgment, was a special order made after final judgment and therefore appellants’ appeal with respect to the taxable costs in favor of appel-lees was timely filed.

Section 12-2101(A)(5)(a) allows an appeal from an order granting or refusing a new trial but sets no deadline for filing the notice of appeal.

Doe v. Roman Catholic Church · filed 2023-06-29(A)(5)(a)

Section 12-2101(A)(5)(a) does not, however, establish any deadline for filing a notice of appeal, much less a deadline “different” from the deadline created by ARCAP 9(a).

An order granting a new trial is appealable under § 12-2101(F)(1).

Bass v. Renaud · filed 1965-02-11(F)(1)

Accordingly, this court construes the cross-appeal to be as to the order granting a new trial, which is an appealable order. A.R.S. § 12-2101, subsec. F(l).

An order denying a motion for new trial must be in writing to be appealable under § 12-2101(F)(1); a minute entry denial is not appealable.

Gabriel Ex Rel. Gabriel v. Murphy · filed 1966-12-14(F)(1)

Before a party may appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial, as permitted by A.R.S. § 12-2101, subsec. F, par. 1, that order must be in writing: ... Rule 54(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure specifies that since an order denying a motion for new trial is an appealable order, it is a specie of judgment subject to Rule 58(a). Plaintiffs’ attempted appeal from the minute entry order in relation to their motion for new trial is premature. We do not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the minute entry order relative to the motion for new trial.

Section 12-2101(F)(1) makes an order granting a new trial appealable, and a party who does not appeal that order waives the right to challenge it later.

Wells v. Tanner Brothers Contracting Company · filed 1968-04-03(F)(1)

It is quite clear that under this provision an order granting a new trial is substantively an appealable order. ... Therefore we hold that an order granting a new trial must be appealed or the right to challenge it will be deemed waived.

Section 12-2101(F)(1) does not permit an appeal from an order denying post-judgment motions that are not designated as motions for new trial.

Matter of Estate of Balcomb · filed 1977-03-15(F)(1)

From this we infer that only a motion designated “Motion for New Trial” can be considered a Rule 59(a) motion. The post-judgment motions filed in the instant case are therefore not Rule 59(a) new trial motions and the order denying them is not an appealable order under A.R.S. § 12-2101 F(l) or any other section.

Section 12-2101(F)(1) does not allow an appeal from an order vacating summary judgment under Rule 59 when no trial occurred.

Engineers v. Sharpe · filed 1977-05-19(F)(1)

However, that does not mean that the order granting the motion operates as an order for a “new trial” within the meaning of A.R.S. § 12-2101(F). Clearly the order did not grant a new trial since there had been no original trial.

Section 12-2101(F)(1) does not permit an appeal from the denial of a new trial motion directed at a non-final partial summary judgment.

Santa Maria v. Najera · filed 2009-07-21(F)(1)

Nevertheless, A.R.S. § 12-2101(F)(1) does not grant appellate jurisdiction over the denial of a motion for new trial directed at a non-final partial summary judgment.

An appeal from an order denying a new trial under subsection (A)(5)(a) limits review to issues raised in the new trial motion unless the final judgment is separately appealed.

Sandretto v. Payson Healthcare Management, Inc. · filed 2014-03-11(A)(5)(a)

Further, PHM properly invokes this court’s jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(a). The notice does not appeal from the final judgment as permitted by A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). In its briefs, however, PHM raises arguments not made in its motion for a new trial. Because PHM did not appeal separately the underlying judgment, we must limit our review to issues raised in the Rule 59, Ariz. R. Civ. P., motion.

Section 12-2101(A)(5)(a) permits an appeal from an order granting a new trial without Rule 54(b) or 54(c) certification.

Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, LLC · filed 2016-07-28(A)(5)(a)

The express statutory language provides that the specified orders and non-final judgments may be appealed, notwithstanding their interlocutory nature. Moreover, given their character, the superior court could not properly state that such orders and non-final judgments were “final judgments” under Rule 54(b) or 54(c). Thus, compliance with Rule 54(b) or 54(e) is not required for the rulings specified in A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(3), (4), (5)(a)-(d), (10) and (11) to be appealable.

Section 12-2101(A)(5)(a) permits an appeal from an order granting a new trial after a jury trial, even though the order is interlocutory.

Luyet v. Mariposa Landscape · filed 2022-11-10(A)(5)(a)

But here, an order for a new trial—coming after the completion of a jury trial—is an appealable interlocutory order under the plain text of Section 12-2101(A)(5)(a).

Section 12-2101(F)(1) permits an appeal from an order granting a new trial.

Copper State Bank v. Saggio · filed 1983-12-08(F)(1)

A.R.S. § 12-2101 specifically provides that an appeal may be taken from an order granting a new trial, § 12-2101(F)(1). ... The time for appeal on these issues has passed and those judgments are res judicata.

Section 12-2101(F)(1) contemplates an appealable new trial order after a factual or legal determination that would ordinarily support a judgment.

Watterson v. Superior Court · filed 1962-02-07(F)(1)

Section 12-2101(F) (1), on the contrary contemplates a situation where there has been a determination of facts or a final determination of the cause on a point of law which would ordinarily result in a judgment, then the dissatisfied party or parties may move for a new trial.

Section 12-2101(F)(1) allows an appeal from a signed order granting a new trial under Rule 49(h).

Hall Family Properties, Ltd. v. Gosnell Development Corp. · filed 1995-10-24(F)(1)

A signed order granting a new trial pursuant to Rule 49(h) is appealable pursuant to A.R.S. section 12-2101(F)(1).

Section 12-2101(A)(5)(b) permits an appeal from an order of protection as an injunction, whether or not the order restricts firearms.

Moreno v. Beltran · filed 2020-12-15(A)(5)(b)

Accordingly, we conclude that an order of protection is an injunction appealable under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b), without regard to whether it involves a firearms prohibition.

Section 12-2101(A)(5)(b) permits an appeal from a stay order that effectively denies a pending preliminary injunction request.

Apache Produce Imports, LLC v. Malena Produce, Inc. · filed 2019-08-12(A)(5)(b)

We therefore conclude jurisdiction exists under § 12-2101(A)(5)(b) to review the stay order as an effective denial of Apache's preliminary injunction request.

Section 12-2101(A)(5)(b) permits an immediate appeal from an order denying a preliminary injunction.

Barkley v. Icep · filed 2018-12-27(A)(5)(b)

Thus, the denial of a preliminary injunction may be immediately appealed under this section.

Section 12-2101(A)(5)(b) allows an appeal from an order refusing to dissolve an injunction against harassment without Rule 54(c) finality language.

Wood v. Abril · filed 2018-04-20(A)(5)(b)

And, an order refusing to dissolve ... an injunction against harassment is expressly appealable under § 12-2101(A)(5)(b). Rule 54(c) therefore does not apply.

Section 12-2101(A)(5)(b) does not allow a party to appeal an order granting its request to dissolve an injunction because that party is not aggrieved by the order.

Aea Federal v. Yuma Funding · filed 2016-12-22(A)(5)(b)

Stated simply, Yuma Funding requested the dissolution of the injunctions and the superior court granted that request, meaning Yuma Funding has not been aggrieved by an order appealable under A.R.S. § 12- 2101(A)(5)(b).

Section 12-2101(F)(2) permits an appeal from an order granting an injunction even when the trial court has not entered a signed written judgment.

State v. Birmingham · filed 1964-04-14(F)(2)

By subsection B it may be taken from a final judgment entered in an action or special proceeding commenced in a superior court and by subsection F par. 2, from an order granting or dissolving an injunction. The right to appeal is substantive. The rules promulgated by this Court can only effect procedural matters and may not diminish or augment substantive rights. Under these circumstances, the statute must control. Appellants may appeal from an order granting an injunction even if it be considered that appellees action is a “special proceeding” within the meaning of subsection B.

Section 12-2101(F)(2) permits an appeal from an order granting or refusing an injunction at any stage of the case, without a Rule 54(b) determination and direction.

Bulova Watch Co. v. Super City Department Stores of Arizona, Inc. · filed 1967-01-05(F)(2)

However, an interlocutory order which is made appealable by statute does not require the express “determination and direction.” ... An appeal may be taken from an order granting or refusing to grant an injunction at any stage of the case in which application for the injunction is made.

Section 12-2101(F)(2) permits an appeal from an order that refuses to dissolve a temporary restraining order and effectively denies a preliminary injunction.

Transport Workers Union, Local 502 v. Tucson Airport Authority, Inc. · filed 1970-01-19(F)(2)

Here the order appealed from not only denied the Union’s motion to quash and dissolve the temporary restraining order, but also in effect denied the preliminary injunction. ... It would appear that on the reasoning of the above cases that an appeal may be taken in this case.

Section 12-2101(A)(5)(b) gives a party the right to appeal an injunction, and exercising that right cannot be treated as a violation of the injunction.

TP Racing, L.L.L.P. v. Simms · filed 2013-07-25(A)(5)(b)

The right to appeal an injunction is provided by statute. AR.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b). We can conceive of no circumstances in which a party’s exercise of its right to appellate review could ever be considered an injunction violation punishable under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 65(j).

Section 12-2101(A)(5)(b) makes an order granting a preliminary injunction immediately appealable without Rule 54(b) certification.

Signs v. Merziotis · filed 2015-02-24(A)(5)(b)

Because this type of non-final, interlocutory order is specifically made appealable by statute, it is appealable without the need for any express directive by the court pursuant to Rule 54(b).

Section 12-2101(A)(5)(b) allows an appeal from an order appointing a receiver, but not from an order refusing to set aside the appointment or from other receivership orders.

AEA Federal Credit Union v. Yuma Funding, Inc. · filed 2015-03-31(A)(5)(b)

We therefore hold the plain language of A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b) does not grant jurisdiction of Yuma Funding’s appeal from an order refusing to set aside an order appointing a receiver. Rather, A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b) grants the right to appeal in three circumstances: (1) from an order “granting or dissolving an injunction,” (2) from an order “refusing to grant or dissolve an injunction,” and (3) from an order “appointing a receiver.” ... Section 12-2101(A)(5)(b) deals only with the appointment of a receiver, and does not provide appellate jurisdiction to review other types of receivership orders.

Section 12-2101(A)(5)(b) permits an appeal from a stay order that effectively denies a request for a preliminary injunction.

Dkc Group v. Fortiline · filed 2025-09-25(A)(5)(b)

This Court has jurisdiction over an appeal from an order “refusing to grant . . . an injunction.” A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b). Under Arizona law, a court’s issuance of a stay that effectively denies a preliminary injunction is appealable.

Section 12-2101(A)(5)(b) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a preliminary injunction.

Magnotta v. Serra · filed 2018-02-22(A)(5)(b)

We do, however, have jurisdiction to consider the portion of the November Order granting a preliminary injunction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12–2101(A)(5)(b).

Section 12-2101(A)(9) permits an appeal from an order establishing a guardianship or conservatorship after a formal probate proceeding, but the order must contain Rule 54(c) finality language.

In Re the Guardianship and Conservatorship Of: Robert Sommer · filed 2016-12-12(A)(9)

In this case, because the probate court’s order concluded a formal probate proceeding and is therefore substantively appealable under § 12-2101(A)(9), it constitutes a judgment under Rule 54(a). Thus, for the order to be procedurally appealable, the trial court must certify that “no further matters remain pending” with regard to the guardianship and conservatorship petitions. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(c).

Subsection J limits appeals from probate proceedings to the orders it lists and does not allow an appeal from an order assigning future liability for expenses of indeterminate amount.

In Matter of Estates of Garcia · filed 1968-01-22(J)

Since proceedings in probate are solely a creature of statute, Leiby v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 101 Ariz. 517, 421 P.2d 874 (1966), we are inclined to adopt the California view that appeal of probate orders is limited to the orders set forth in subsection J of A.R.S. § 12-2101, as amended. ... We do not believe, and so hold, that an order determining who is to bear, in futuro, the burden of payment of certain indeterminate amounts is appealable.

Section 12-2101(J)(5) permits an appeal from a signed and filed order specifically directing a personal representative to pay a claim.

In re the Estate of Ferriss · filed 1965-06-15(J)(5)

We hold that where an order of the Superior Court is signed and filed in which said court specifically directs the personal representative to pay a claim, said order is appealable pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101 J s.

Section 12-2101(J)(1) permits an appeal from an order granting or refusing letters of administration, but a minute entry cannot support an appeal unless the order is effective.

O'Brien v. Superior Court in and for Maricopa Co. · filed 1967-12-13(J)(1)

4 A.R.S. § 12-2101, subsec. J (1) makes a judgment or order granting or refusing Letters of Administration appeal-able. However, since the minute entry' in the instant case did not meet the requirements set out in Birmingham, supra, it was not effective, and consequently no appeal could have been perfected.

Section 12-2101(J) permits an appeal from a probate order only when the order is similar to a final judgment or decree in a formal Title 14 proceeding.

Ivancovich v. Meier · filed 1979-03-27(J)

An “order” pursuant to this section means an order similar to a final judgment or decree entered in any formal proceedings under title 14.

Section 12-2101(J) permits an appeal from an order determining heirs entered in a formal probate proceeding.

Horton v. Shea · filed 1983-04-13(J)

There can be no doubt that the order determining heirs which was entered here and which was subject to appeal prior to 1974, is the type of order which is appealable under A.R.S. § 12-2101(J).

Section 12-2101(J) permits an appeal from an order admitting a will to formal probate, but a summary judgment dismissing objections to probate is not independently appealable without a Rule 54(b) determination.

Matter of Estate of Kerr · filed 1983-08-09(J)

Although the summary judgment is not an appealable order under A.R.S. § 12-2101(J) absent a rule 54(b) determination, we hold that the order admitting the will to probate, filed January 27, 1981, is an appealable order.