Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-533

DCS can satisfy diligent efforts without paying for a noncontract provider selected by the parent when it offers comparable services through its own contractor and provides transportation.

Victor B., Elizabeth B. v. Dcs · filed 2017-09-28(B)(8)

Mother's caseworker, however, testified she had offered Mother and Father the same services they were receiving at Potter's House at a different counseling center with which DCS had a contract. The caseworker further testified she had told Mother and Father before they began services at Potter's House that they would need to pay for those services because DCS had no contract with Potter's House. DCS also offered the parents transportation to the services at the DCS contractor. This evidence reasonably supports the superior court's finding that DCS “made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services.” See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8).

DCS need not duplicate an individual-counseling service the parent already obtained independently, and need not provide a second parent-aide referral that would be futile.

Mary C. v. Dcs, J.S. · filed 2017-10-26(B)(8)

Thus, DCS was not required to duplicate this service for her. See Pima Cty. Severance Action No. S-2397, 161 Ariz. 574, 577 (App. 1989) (DCS is not required to provide services that were already offered). ... Additionally, J.S. was in an out-of-state placement until approximately three months before the termination proceeding. Thus, a second parent-aide referral would have been futile.

Completing reunification services does not by itself remedy the circumstances causing placement when the parent fails to apply the lessons needed to safely address the child's trauma.

Odin S. v. Dcs, A.S. · filed 2017-10-31(B)(8)(c)

The record confirms Father substantially completed all of the reunification services; however, that is not the only relevant factor in determining whether DCS met its burden of proof. Instead, we must look at all the circumstances of the case.

DCS makes diligent reunification efforts by promptly and repeatedly referring a parent to appropriate services, even when the parent remains out of contact or fails to participate.

Sergio v. Dcs · filed 2017-11-07(B)(8)(c)

DCS offered substantial evidence that it provided appropriate reunification services to Father over an extended period. DCS promptly referred Father to services after it took the children into care, but he failed to participate. When Father requested services in July 2015, DCS again made appropriate referrals.

A court may deny additional delay under the nine-month ground after years of uncompleted services and prior continuances, even when no permanent placement is secured.

Catrina K. v. Dcs · filed 2017-12-05(B)(8)(a)

Under these circumstances, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s motion to continue.

DCS may make diligent reunification efforts across state lines through testing and self-referrals when the parent sporadically participates and fails to document outside services.

Lisa W. v. Dcs, K.W. · filed 2017-12-14(B)(8)(c)

Contrary to Mother’s assertions, we conclude that reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s finding that DCS made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services.

The nine-month ground focuses on the parent's effort rather than success, but completing some services does not defeat substantial neglect when meaningful preparation to provide a stable home remains absent.

Nicholas T. v. Dcs, K.N. · filed 2017-12-19(B)(8)(a)

Despite this evidence, the record supports the superior court’s finding that Father’s effort was limited, and therefore he substantially neglected to remedy the specific circumstances causing the out-of-home placement.

DCS can satisfy diligent reunification efforts despite a language barrier by consistently providing interpreters during agency interactions, visits, and court proceedings.

Laura L. v. Dcs, J.L. · filed 2017-12-26(B)(8)(a)

As to the language barrier, the superior court found the case manager’s testimony credible that, in interacting with DCS, Mother either brought someone with her to serve as an interpreter or the case manager provided her with an interpreter. The court also determined that, despite having multiple case managers that did not speak Spanish, DCS “was credible in trying to reach out to [Mother],” and the translation services DCS provided both in and out of court were appropriate.

For a child under three, the legislature deems six months a reasonable period to remedy placement circumstances, and a parent's interstate moves do not excuse failure to participate in services.

Michael C. v. Dcs, X.B. · filed 2017-12-28(B)(8)(b)

For children under three years old, the Legislature has determined that six months is a reasonable amount of time for a parent to remedy the circumstances that caused the child to be in out-of-home care. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b). Here, 13 months had passed from the time X.B. was placed in out-of-home care to the date of the severance hearing. Father’s movement from state to state does not excuse his failure to participate in so many of the offered services over that 13 month period.

DCS satisfies its diligent-efforts duty by providing time and opportunity to participate in effective-parenting programs; it need not provide every conceivable service, ensure participation, or offer futile services.

Maria O. v. Dcs · filed 2018-01-04(B)(3), (B)(8)(c)

DCS fulfills its diligent-efforts obligation if it provides the parent “with the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help her become an effective parent.”

Proof that DCS satisfied ICWA’s active-efforts requirement also satisfies § 8-533(B)(8)’s less stringent diligent-efforts requirement.

Vanessa W. v. Dcs · filed 2018-05-10(B)(8)

When DCS proves it met the active efforts requirement, pursuant to ICWA, the diligent efforts requirement is also satisfied because ICWA's “active efforts” requirement is at least as stringent as the “diligent efforts” requirement in A.R.S. section 8-533(B)(8). Thus, the same analysis may support a finding that DCS provided both active and diligent efforts.

DCS satisfies its reasonable-services obligation by giving a parent time and opportunity to participate in effective-parenting programs and need not keep the remediation window open indefinitely.

Jessica M. v. Dcs · filed 2018-02-22(B)(3), (B)(8), (B)(11)

DCS’ obligation to provide reasonable services is satisfied when it provides services to the parent “with the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help [him or] her to become an effective parent.” Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 235, ¶ 14 (App. 2011) (citation omitted). DCS is not required, however, to leave the window of opportunity for remediation open indefinitely.

DCS makes diligent interstate reunification efforts when it identifies services where the out-of-state parent lives and promptly corrects access problems after receiving notice.

Hannah B. v. Dcs, M.T. · filed 2018-03-27(B)(8)(c)

After DCS was able to find out where Mother was living in Texas, DCS mailed her twice a month indicating where to participate in services. When informed there was a potential issue with Mother’s drug testing paperwork, DCS called the drug testing agency and made proper arrangements but she still did not engage in the service.

Delays in mental-health services do not defeat diligent efforts when the parent had ample time to complete them and cannot show the delays prevented achievement of parenting goals.

Linda B. v. Dcs · filed 2018-04-26(B)(8)(c)

Mother fails to demonstrate how the delays in mental health services prejudiced her. She does not suggest that DCS’s failures prevented her from achieving her parenting goals, or that she was not provided enough time to successfully complete the services offered. The record shows that Mother was afforded ample time to participate in and complete mental health services.

Section 8-533(B)(8)(c) requires diligent reunification efforts but does not require DCS to provide a housing subsidy to a parent who lacks the stable employment needed to maintain housing after the subsidy ends.

Larrissa P. v. Dcs, J.H. · filed 2018-08-28(B)(8)(c)

Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), termination of the parent-child relationship is appropriate when the child has been in an out-of-home placement for a period of fifteen months or longer, the agency responsible for the child has made diligent efforts to provide reunification services, the parent has been “unable to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement and there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.” ... As such, the court did not err in finding that DCS provided mother with reasonable services when terminating the parent-child relationship.

DCS satisfies § 8-533(B)(8) by making reasonable efforts to preserve the family and giving the parent time and opportunity to participate in promising programs; it need not provide every conceivable service.

Nicole L. v. Dcs, N.B. · filed 2018-09-20(B)(8)

To satisfy DCS's obligation to provide reunification services under § 8-533(B)(8), DCS must prove it “made a reasonable effort to preserve the family.” ... This requires DCS to “undertake measures with a reasonable prospect of success” and “provide a parent with the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to improve the parent's ability to care for the child.” ... It does not require DCS to provide “every conceivable service.”

Section 8-533(B)(3) requires a private petitioner alleging chronic substance abuse to prove that rehabilitative services were offered unsuccessfully or would be futile, but does not require the petitioner personally to provide those services.

Alyssa W. v. Justin G., J.G. · filed 2018-11-15(B)(3)

Instead, the private party need only show that the parent whose rights are to be severed has either already received or been offered the necessary rehabilitative services from some provider to no avail or that engaging the parent in rehabilitative services would be futile. Evidence of efforts by the private party to encourage or induce the parent to participate in services may be offered by the private party seeking severance, but it is not required.

DCS makes diligent reunification efforts when it repeatedly offers services throughout the case and the parent fails to use them, even if the parent later claims the agency stopped helping.

Sydnee J. v. Dcs, M.J. · filed 2018-11-29(B)(8)(a)

DCS made multiple attempts, as reflected in this record, to offer Mother services throughout the entirety of the case, but Mother failed to avail herself of the offered services. ... Based on this record, the superior court correctly found that DCS made diligent efforts toward reunification.

DCS need not provide every conceivable reunification service, undertake futile measures, or ensure participation; it must provide time and opportunity to use programs designed to improve parenting ability.

Mark M. v. Dcs, A.M. · filed 2019-01-15(B)(8)

But DCS is not required to provide every conceivable service, undertake futile rehabilitative measures, or ensure the parent’s participation. Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 187, 192-93, ¶¶ 1, 37, 42 (App. 1999); Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994) (citing Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-5209 & No. JS-4963, 143 Ariz. 178, 189 (App. 1984)). Rather, it must only “provide a parent with the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to improve the parent’s ability to care for the child.” Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192, ¶ 37 (citing JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 353).

DCS makes diligent reunification efforts for a cognitively limited parent by providing the best available adapted parent-aide services, even if the aides lack specialized cognitive-delay training.

Juana C. v. Dcs, J.C. · filed 2019-02-21(B)(8)(c)

The court here specifically considered Mother’s arguments regarding purported deficiencies in the parent aide service but nonetheless found DCS had been diligent in providing Mother with the best available parent aide services. We will not second-guess the court’s assessment of the circumstances. Reasonable evidence supports its conclusion that DCS made diligent efforts to provide reunification services, and we find no error.

DCS can make reasonable reunification efforts without providing an initially recommended trauma therapy when later clinical evidence shows the parent is not stable enough for the treatment and it is unlikely to help.

Jeanna T. v. Dcs, A.I. · filed 2021-05-04(B)(3)

Although DCS did not refer Mother for EDMR or trauma therapy, evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that there were "reasonable grounds to believe that Mother was not stable enough for the same."

Minor inaccuracies in a caseworker's testimony do not defeat diligent efforts when the parent does not dispute that numerous services were offered or identify what more DCS should have done.

Anazi S. v. Dcs, L.S. · filed 2021-05-25(B)(8)

Even if the case worker was mistaken about some details, Father does not dispute that he was offered numerous services, nor does he suggest what more DCS should have done.

DCS makes diligent efforts for parents with cognitive and mental-health limitations when it repeatedly offers personalized help with required self-referrals but the parents miss meetings and thwart that assistance.

Adam O., Andrea C. v. Dcs · filed 2021-06-08(B)(3), (B)(8)

Overall, the parents thwarted DCS’s multiple attempts to assist them in the self-referral process and failed to engage in the services offered. Reasonable evidence supports the finding that DCS undertook diligent efforts to provide reunification services.

The prior-removal ground's reunification requirement may be satisfied by significant services during the earlier dependency and additional services before a later incarceration, even if in-person prison visits are not provided.

Kaleb P. v. Dcs · filed 2021-06-10(B)(11)

DCS provided significant reunification services during the initial dependencies. ... And Father’s argument does not account for the four months preceding his incarceration, during which DCS provided supervised visitation, drug testing, substance abuse treatment, and therapeutic services for V.P.

Court-ordered suspension of harmful visitation does not show inadequate reunification efforts when services remain available and the parent does not make the progress required for visits to resume.

Vanessa R. v. Dcs · filed 2021-06-29(B)(8)(c)

Mother’s argument does not acknowledge she rejected the superior court’s offer to reinstate visits if she engaged in services. ... By failing to engage in those services, mother passed up the opportunity to remedy the substance-abuse, mental-illness, and domestic-violence issues that caused her children’s out-of-home placement.

DCS provides adequate reunification services when it offers services throughout the dependency and informs an incarcerated parent about jail programs, but the parent's own misconduct makes participation impossible.

Jeffrey W. v. Dcs, J.W. · filed 2021-06-29(B)(3), (B)(8)(b)

Further, when Father was incarcerated, DCS made him aware of substance abuse classes in the jail. But his behavior (bringing fentanyl into the jail) rendered him unable to participate in those services.

DCS may satisfy active and diligent reunification duties by offering appropriate services and repeated help with self-referral when the parent declines assistance or claims to be receiving equivalent services independently.

Charles P., Starlene M. v. Dcs · filed 2021-07-22(B)(8)(c)

Given this history, the court’s finding that DCS made “diligent and active efforts by providing an array of reunification services” is supported by sufficient evidence.

A pandemic-related drug-testing interruption does not defeat reasonable efforts under § 8-533(B)(3) when the parent had other lengthy testing windows and could have used substance-abuse treatment to demonstrate sobriety.

Angel T. v. Dcs · filed 2021-09-09(B)(3)

Here, Mother had the opportunity to participate in drug testing from August 2019 to April 2020, and again from September 2020 to November 2020. This would have been more than enough time for Mother to prove her sobriety under DCS’ standards. Additionally, Mother could have taken advantage of other services while the drug testing was unavailable, like substance abuse treatment, to demonstrate to DCS she was sober. However, she failed to do so.

Section 8-533(B)(2) does not expressly require DCS to provide reunification services before terminating parental rights for abuse, and the failure to provide a court-ordered parent aide does not require denial absent a statutory or preserved constitutional services claim.

Byron H. v. Dcs, A.H. · filed 2022-01-13(B)(2)

The statute contains no express language requiring DCS to make reasonable efforts to provide reunification services before termination, and no Arizona court has previously required such services when termination is sought under that subsection. ... Thus, on this record, DCS was not required to provide reunification services.

DCS makes diligent efforts when it offers therapy, therapeutic visitation, and a bonding assessment, and an expert concludes further services are unlikely to overcome the children's refusal to pursue reunification.

Kansas H., Daniel Z. v. Dcs · filed 2022-02-03(B)(8)(c)

Dr. Bennett concluded that further services would be unlikely to “alter [the children’s] willingness to engage in reunification.” On this record, the superior court did not err in finding DCS made a diligent effort to provide Father appropriate reunification services.

DCS makes diligent efforts when a transient parent knows of the dependency but repeatedly moves, withholds a physical address, misses meetings, and thereby prevents timely service referrals.

Keyandia C. v. Dcs, C.C. · filed 2022-02-10(B)(8)(a)

Mother’s repeated moves and failure to remain in consistent contact with DCS hindered the case manager’s ability to refer her for substance-abuse services. ... Mother’s refusal to engage in the case for the first ten months ultimately caused the delays she points to on appeal.

DCS provides reasonable ADA accommodations to a disabled parent by adapting instruction to visual, repetitive, video, and hands-on learning methods consistent with the evaluating psychologist's recommendations.

Jurgen M., Ashley C. v. Dcs, E.M. · filed 2022-03-01(B)(3)

Mother received accommodations from the parent aide, including repetition of lessons, videos, and a hands-on teaching approach. These efforts aligned with the recommendations by Mother’s evaluating psychologist that she is a visual learner and could profit from demonstration, review of videos and “hands-on” interactions with E.M.

DCS’s cumulative provision of drug testing, treatment, transportation, and parent-aide services may satisfy reasonable and diligent efforts under § 8-533(B)(3) and (B)(8)(a) despite disputes over a specific testing referral.

Latoya P. v. Dcs, K.P. · filed 2022-03-08(B)(3), (B)(8)(a)

The superior court found that DCS had offered Mother drug testing, substance abuse assessment and treatment and transportation to participate in those services. ... The court found that the cumulative efforts of DCS were reasonable and diligent. Because reasonable evidence supports these findings, we do not disturb them.

DCS may delay a psychological evaluation under § 8-533(B)(8) until a parent demonstrates sustained sobriety because an evaluation without demonstrated sobriety may be futile or inaccurate.

Andrew P. v. Dcs · filed 2022-03-24(B)(8)

But a psychological evaluation of a parent who has not demonstrated sobriety is ... exactly the type of futile measure DCS need not undertake. ... Given the logistical challenges of ensuring a parent is sober at the time of the evaluation, a prolonged sobriety requirement is a reasonable way, as DCS’s case manager testified, to ensure the accuracy of the assessment.

DCS satisfies reunification obligations under § 8-533(B)(3) and (B)(8) when it offers substantial modifications for a parent’s suspected mental illness but lacks authority to force the parent to obtain an assessment or participate.

Angela W. v. Dcs · filed 2022-04-07(B)(3), (B)(8)

Quite apart from Mother’s failure to participate in a mental health assessment, DCS provided modifications in services to Mother, including transportation setup, insurance help and securing a safe space to leave her vehicle during the assessment. ... And DCS lacked the authority to physically make her comply with services and was not required to “ensure that a parent participates in each service it offers.”

DCS need not provide therapeutic visitation while contact would be futile because the parent is not sober and mentally healthy and the children are not ready; recent sobriety also does not establish near-future parenting ability when stable housing, employment, and the parent-child relationship remain unresolved.

Meagen G. v. Dcs · filed 2022-09-22(B)(8)(c)

Any form of live interaction—even therapeutic visitation or family counseling—would have been futile until Mother was sober and mentally healthy, and the girls were ready to see her. ... Because Mother had not yet done these things, the court found it substantially likely Mother would not be capable of properly parenting the girls in the near future.

Omission of domestic-violence services does not defeat diligent efforts when termination is independently warranted on unremedied circumstances that those services could not change; absent a prior statutory futility procedure, DCS must prove futility by clear and convincing evidence at the termination trial.

Malay'ja D. v. Dcs, Z.B. · filed 2022-11-17(B)(8)

If termination was appropriate without consideration of the domestic violence, then the court did not abuse its discretion when it implicitly found that providing domestic-violence services was futile because they would not have reunited the family. ... If DCS does not follow the § 8-846 procedure, it must prove by clear and convincing evidence at trial that additional rehabilitative services would have been futile.

A delay in paternity testing and visitation does not defeat diligent efforts when DCS consults a psychologist before paternity is confirmed and the parent then has nineteen months but fails to establish a consistent relationship with the child.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to X.K. · filed 2023-07-06(B)(8)(c)

Overall, and despite any delay in paternity testing, Father had nineteen months to establish a consistent relationship with X.K., and he failed to do so. ... The record shows that DCS completed a parent-locate search, made numerous telephone calls to Father, and contacted his community supervisor to no avail. ... On this record, we find no error.

Repeated referrals for domestic-violence counseling and parental education constitute diligent reunification efforts when referrals close because the parent does not contact providers, cannot focus on the work, or participates minimally and dishonestly.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to R.R. · filed 2023-07-20(B)(8)(c)

But the court found that the Department made four referrals for Mother for domestic violence counseling. At least two referrals closed because Mother never contacted the agency. ... When Mother eventually began domestic violence counseling, she attended less than half her sessions, and the therapist reported that the services were unlikely to succeed because Mother lied and put forth minimal effort. ... As the juvenile court found, these facts show that the Department appropriately tried to reunify the family.

DCS need not provide reunification services during a later dependency when a child previously removed for a parent's physical abuse was returned to that parent and removed again for physical abuse within eighteen months.

Sheena W. v. Dcs, B.W. · filed 2023-08-17(B)(11)

The statute exempts DCS from providing services when a child previously removed due to physical abuse is returned to that parent and removed again due to physical abuse within 18 months. ... The record and the court’s findings therefore demonstrate Mother was not entitled to services during the third and final dependency.

DCS makes diligent efforts despite not securing visitation for a newly incarcerated parent when the parent avoided DCS and all offered services for more than a year before incarceration, the older child then refused visits, and the lack of visitation did not undermine remediation efforts.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to T.G. · filed 2023-08-17(B)(8)

Only after Mother was taken into custody could DCS reliably contact and communicate with her. DCS also scheduled video visitation for Mother at that time with AG, but TG did not want to participate. ... Mother does not argue that DCS’s efforts or the timing of the efforts undermined her participation, and she does not connect the lack of visitation during the five-month period starting October 2021, to any efforts to remedy her circumstances and show parental fitness. ... We agree with DCS that the cumulative weight of service provision here demonstrates DCS made diligent efforts to provide her services.

Diligent reunification efforts require an opportunity to participate in effective-parenting programs, but not every conceivable or duplicative service, ensured participation, futile efforts, or an indefinite remediation period.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.S. and M.S. · filed 2023-10-03(B)(8)(c)

First, severance for time-in-care grounds under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) requires, among other things, that DCS “made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification efforts.” To satisfy its obligation to make diligent efforts, DCS must provide the parent with an opportunity to participate in programs designed to help her become an effective parent. In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). Even so, it need not “provide every conceivable service,” ensure the parent participates in services, provide duplicate services, or undertake reunification efforts that are futile. Id.; In re Pima Cnty. Severance Action No. S-2397, 161 Ariz. 574, 577 (App. 1989); Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 34 (App. 1999). Nor is it required to “[l]eav[e] the window of opportunity for remediation open indefinitely.” In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994).

Diligent reunification efforts require time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to make the parent effective, but not every conceivable service, ensured participation, or futile measures.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.C. and N.N. · filed 2023-10-05(B)(3), (B)(8)

To satisfy its obligation to make diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services, DCS must provide the parent with the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help her become an effective parent. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). DCS is not, however, required to “provide every conceivable service,” “ensure that a parent participates” in services, id., or “undertake rehabilitative measures that are futile,” see Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 34 (App. 1999).

Diligent reunification efforts are case-specific: DCS must identify the causes of out-of-home placement and offer services reasonably capable of correcting them, with reasonable disability accommodations when applicable.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.H. · filed 2023-11-07(B)(8)(c)

The determination of what constitutes diligent efforts by DCS is case-specific. DCS must identify the factors that led to the child’s out-of-home placement and subsequently offer services that hold a reasonable prospect of rectifying these conditions. Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 23 ¶ 50 (App. 2019). Moreover, when a parent is disabled, as Father claims he is, DCS must follow the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and make reasonable accommodations to accommodate the parent’s disability. Jessica P. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 34, 38 ¶ 14 (App. 2021).

A parent waives an appellate challenge to DCS's diligent reunification efforts by failing to make a timely, specific objection to the relevant services in juvenile court.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to R.S. · filed 2023-12-07(B)(8)

When DCS has been ordered to provide reunification services in furtherance of a case plan, and the juvenile court finds that DCS made reasonable and diligent efforts to provide such services, “a parent who does not object in the juvenile court is precluded from challenging that finding on appeal.” Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 179, ¶ 16 (App. 2014). ... We agree Father waived this argument because he failed to raise a timely, specific objection to DCS’s efforts to provide substance-abuse services before the termination hearing. See Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep’t Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, 349, ¶ 19 (App. 2013).

Intellectual limitations do not require more time when DCS provides thirty months of services, far beyond the evaluator’s recommended additional three to six months.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.W. · filed 2024-02-13(B)(8)(c)

The record does not support the notion that Mother’s intellectual challenges entitle her to more time than she already received to ... utilize reunification services. ... DCS provided nearly thirty months of services (August 2020 through February 2023). The legislature made the policy choice that termination should occur if a child is in out-of-home placement for more than fifteen months (and certain other conditions are present). See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

A brief interruption in medical-appointment notices does not violate the reunification duty when those appointments do not address the substance-abuse and domestic-violence conditions causing placement.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to K.T. · filed 2024-02-20(B)(3), (B)(8)

The central reason for K.T.’s out-of-home placement was Mother’s substance abuse and domestic violence. DCS’s obligation was thus to provide her with reunification services designed to resolve those conditions. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994) (explaining DCS must provide a parent with services to help them become an effective parent).

DCS reasonably facilitates an incarcerated parent’s relationship by locating the parent and offering to forward cards, letters, and pictures, despite repeated facility transfers complicating contact.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to R.W. · filed 2024-03-05(B)(4)

Because Father has not shown that DCS failed to meet its obligation to reasonably facilitate the type of contacts contemplated under Jessie D., we do not address Father’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that DCS had a constitutional obligation to provide services before terminating Father’s rights under the abandonment ground, § 8-533(B)(1).

A private petitioner seeking abuse-based termination need not provide reunification services, and subsection (B)(2) imposes no diligent-efforts finding on the court.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.B. and A.B. · filed 2024-03-07(B)(2)

But Jessie D. is inapplicable because it does not extend to private petitioners. See 251 Ariz. at 582, ¶ 21 (holding that DCS must make reasonable efforts to provide incarcerated parents services upon request, “providing the services will not endanger the child”). And Father cites no authority for the proposition that reunification services must be provided when the ground for termination is abuse, even when DCS is the petitioner (which is not the case here), nor are we aware of any such authority. Nothing in A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) requires the superior court to find DCS made diligent efforts to provide reunification services.

Visitation missed because of prison transfers, illness, correctional miscommunication, and standard waitlists is attributable to incarceration rather than a lack of diligent DCS efforts.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to E.R. · filed 2024-04-30(B)(8)

Mother’s incarceration situation was to blame for missed visits, not DCS’s lack of effort. We agree with the juvenile court: DCS provided “both reasonable and/or diligent efforts . . . to effectuate reunification of the family.”

Neither subsection (B)(2) nor due process requires DCS to provide reunification services before terminating parental rights for abuse or neglect when the parent is not incarcerated; courts may not add such a requirement to the statute.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to X.B. and D.B. · filed 2024-05-07(B)(2)

Nor has any Arizona court required such services when termination is sought under such ground. ... Mother cites no authority for the proposition that reunification services must be provided when the ground for termination is neglect or abuse. ... We cannot inject such a requirement into § 8-533(B)(2).

DCS need not extend the remediation period beyond twenty-six months when the parent completes some parenting services but minimally engages in substance-abuse treatment and completes only a handful of drug tests, all positive.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.P. · filed 2024-05-14(B)(3)

Mother had 26 months to participate in services but only minimally engaged—particularly in services to assist with her substance abuse issues. ... DCS was not required to give Mother an indeterminate amount of time to resolve her substance abuse issues. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence in the record supported the superior court’s findings that DCS provided reasonable reunification services to Mother.

Failure to complete a previously ordered psychological evaluation does not defeat the recurrent-removal ground when the first dependency was dismissed after successful reunification, implicitly rendering that evaluation unnecessary, and the court considers the services provided before the later removal.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.B. and D.M. · filed 2024-05-14(B)(11)

Because the court did not enforce that order, but instead dismissed the dependency, the court impliedly deemed the evaluation no longer necessary for the reunification of Mother and her children. ... But the court did so, concluding that DCS made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services. ... On this record, reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding.

DCS may satisfy diligent efforts despite improperly stopping visitation without a court order when it provides services directed at the removal cause, the parent substantially disengages for nearly a year, and DCS promptly renews parenting services once the parent reengages.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as E.C. · filed 2024-05-30(B)(8)(b)

The superior court admonished DCS for stopping visits without a court order but still found that DCS had made reasonable and diligent efforts to provide her with appropriate reunification services. ... For nearly a year, Mother substantially failed to engage with DCS and refused to participate in substance abuse treatment and testing. And when she finally engaged with DCS and provided several negative urinalysis tests in the weeks before the trial, DCS resubmitted the Nurturing Parenting Program referral. We find no error.

DCS is not required to provide a housing subsidy when it repeatedly discusses housing, offers extensive other services, and the parents' spending and personal choices limit their available housing options; failure to contemporaneously request the subsidy also waives the objection.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to R.C. · filed 2024-06-18(B)(3)

Thus, the Parents waived their deficient services argument. ... The Parents made choices that impacted their ability to afford housing or limited available housing options. ... A psychologist confirmed, however, that there were no additional services to offer either of the Parents to prevent termination. Reasonable evidence supports the court’s conclusion that DCS provided the Parents with diligent reunification services.

Neither the Constitution nor § 8-533 requires DCS to provide reunification services before parental rights are terminated for abandonment, particularly in a private termination proceeding.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to K.C. · filed 2024-06-27(B)(1)

Nor does anything in our statutes require the provision of services by DCS before terminating parental rights based on abandonment, especially in a private termination proceeding. Compare A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8), (11)(b) with § 8-533(B)(1). Accordingly, the court was not required to find that Mother was provided reunification services before terminating her rights based on abandonment.

DCS may satisfy the diligent-efforts requirement for an incarcerated parent despite missed virtual visits when it arranged the visits and the missed sessions resulted from illness, prison-system access problems, the parent's trial, or the parent's choice.

In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to A.L. · filed 2024-07-23(B)(8)(c)

The record shows visits that did not occur were cancelled for reasons not ascribable to any lack of diligence by DCS, including: (1) one visit being cancelled because Alexis was sick; (2) two missed visits because the case manager could not log into the prison’s video conferencing system; (3) Father missing a visit to appear at the termination trial; and (4) Father choosing not to attend at least one visit. The record reasonably supports the superior court’s implicit conclusion that Father’s incarceration, and not DCS, created any inconsistency in visits.

Diligent reunification efforts require consideration of the totality of circumstances and, at minimum, identification of the placement causes, potentially successful services, consistent parental contact, and reasonable help where compliance is difficult.

In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to V.C. · filed 2024-07-23(B)(8)(c)

The court must “consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether DCS has made diligent efforts.” Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 23 ¶ 49 (App. 2019). At a minimum, DCS must “identify the conditions causing the child’s out-of-home placement, provide services that have a reasonable prospect of success to remedy the circumstances as they arise throughout the time-in-care period, maintain consistent contact with the parent, and make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult.” Id. at 23 ¶ 50 (citation omitted).

Although visitation is an important reunification service, it may be restricted when visitation would endanger the child.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to G.B. · filed 2024-07-30(B)(8)(a)

Reasonable or diligent efforts have been made if DCS provides the parent “the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help [him] to become an effective parent.” Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 235, ¶ 14 (App. 2011) (citation omitted). While visitation is an important reunification service, it may be restricted if visitation would endanger the child. Michael M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 198, 200-01, ¶¶ 9, 11 (App. 2002).

For time-in-care termination, DCS must provide services reasonably capable of correcting the placement causes, maintain consistent parental contact, help with difficult compliance, and initiate safe measures such as visitation for an incarcerated parent.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.C. · filed 2024-07-30(B)(8)(c)

Though the efforts required vary depending on the circumstances of each case, DCS must, at a minimum, identify the conditions causing the child’s out-of-home placement, provide services that have a reasonable prospect of success to remedy the circumstances as they arise throughout the time-in-care period, maintain consistent contact with the parent, and make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult. Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 23, ¶ 50 (App. 2019) (emphasis omitted). A parent’s incarceration does not relieve DCS of its obligation to ... provide reunification services. Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 582, ¶ 21 (2021). On the contrary, DCS must “initiate measures designed to address an incarcerated parent’s desire to maintain a parent-child relationship,” “such as visitation,” if “providing the services will not endanger the child.” Id.

For mental-illness and same-cause prior-termination grounds, DCS bears the burden to provide current, appropriate mental-health services and cannot shift that burden to the parent by arguing that the parent failed to request an updated evaluation.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.H. · filed 2024-08-01(B)(3), (B)(10)

The psychologist who previously evaluated Mother in 2020 testified that Mother could have benefited from an updated psychological evaluation before DCS pursued termination. DCS argues, however, that “Mother never requested an updated psychological evaluation.” That argument misses the mark. The onus was on DCS to provide appropriate mental-health services, not on Mother to request them. See id. at 186 ¶ 1 (“It is well established that the State, before acting to terminate parental rights, has an affirmative duty to make all reasonable efforts to preserve the family relationship.”).

Isolated transportation failures and visitation-provider shortages do not defeat diligent efforts when the parent causes much of the lost visitation through no-shows, cancellations, shortened visits, and failure to keep contact information current, and cannot show resulting prejudice.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to K.M. · filed 2025-04-17(B)(8)(c)

Although DCS’s transportation service failed to pick her up on at least one occasion, Mother concedes her absenteeism was partly due to her own failure to show up or arrive on time for transportation. ... But it was incumbent on Mother to keep her contact information up to date with DCS, as DCS advised her from the start of the dependency. ... The superior court did not err in finding that DCS made a diligent effort to provide Mother with reunification services.

DCS diligently provides reunification services when a parent's inconsistent contact and delayed compliance prevent a home study, family therapy, and assessment of the child's special needs; DCS is not responsible for the parent's failure to engage with offered programs.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.B. · filed 2025-05-13(B)(8)(c)

The record shows DCS made diligent efforts to provide Father with appropriate reunification services but that he did not make the required good faith effort to engage in those services. ... Finally, when DCS was considering whether to start family therapy, Father “was not maintaining contact with [DCS] and there would be weeks to months in between contact[,]” so DCS could not initiate family therapy. ... But DCS cannot be held at fault for Father’s failure to participate in programs offered to him.

The constitutional reunification-service requirement is satisfied when appropriate services are actually provided, regardless of whether DCS, the juvenile court, or another available source arranged them.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.B. and N.N. · filed 2025-07-15(B)(8)

These constitutional requirements are satisfied if appropriate reunification services are provided, regardless of ... how or by whom they are provided. ... Because Mother does not dispute that a community resource coordinator was appointed, she is entitled to no relief on her complaint that the appointment was made by the court rather than DCS.

DCS's statutory and constitutional duty to make reasonable reunification efforts does not create a fiduciary relationship with the parent and therefore cannot, without more, support constructive fraud to set aside a termination order.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to D.T. · filed 2025-08-05(B)(8)

To begin, father is correct when he says DCS has a duty to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family. That duty arises from 2 sources. First, it arises from statute. ... Unlike an adoption agency’s relationship with potential adoptive parents, DCS’s duty does not arise out of any fiduciary relationship. ... Based on Lorenz, DCS does not owe father a fiduciary duty. For that reason alone, father cannot establish his claim for constructive fraud.

Although visitation is ordinarily an essential reunification service, the court may restrict it when visits would seriously endanger or adversely affect the child.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.L. and Y.L. · filed 2025-10-02(B)(8)(c)

Visitation between parent and child “is perhaps the most basic and essential of these services” and should be denied “only under extraordinary circumstances.” Michael M. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 198, 200, ¶ 9 (App. 2002); Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JD-5312, 178 Ariz. 372, 375 (App. 1994). Nevertheless, the superior court retains discretion to restrict visitation if visits would seriously endanger or adversely affect the child. Michael M., 202 Ariz. at 201, ¶ 11; JD-5312, 178 Ariz. at 376.

Diligent reunification efforts require DCS to identify the placement causes, offer services reasonably capable of correcting them, maintain consistent contact, and reasonably help when compliance is difficult, but not to provide every conceivable service.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.F. · filed 2025-11-20(B)(8)(c)

A diligent effort “requires—at the least—DCS to identify the conditions causing the child’s out-of-home placement, provide services that have a reasonable prospect of success to remedy the circumstances as they arise throughout the time-in-care period, maintain consistent contact with the parent, and make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult.” Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 23, ¶ 50 (App. 2019) (citation and emphasis omitted). DCS is not required “to provide every conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates in each service it offers.” Maricopa County Juv. Act. No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994).

The recurrent-removal ground does not require DCS to provide additional services in the current dependency when it diligently provided services in a recent dependency and the family's reunification needs have not significantly changed.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to F.G. · filed 2026-02-27(B)(11)

In short, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(11) does not require DCS to provide additional reunification services in a current dependency provided that it made diligent efforts to provide those services in a recent dependency and the reunification needs have not significantly changed. The record here shows that DCS made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services in the prior dependencies, which resulted in dismissal of those dependencies after F.G. was returned to Mother’s care.

DCS diligently serves an incarcerated parent by providing case management, meetings, service letters, visitation, and encouragement to use prison programs when the parent's own misconduct restricts prison-program eligibility and a brief release ends in immediate drug use and reincarceration.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to G.M. and I.M. · filed 2026-03-13(B)(8)(c)

Here, father limited his access to services in the Department of Corrections because of his own behavior. And father did not contact DCS when he was released. If he had, DCS could have provided more services. ... That said, DCS provided the services it could, including case management, regular safety meetings, team decision-making meetings, service letters, and encouraging father to engage while incarcerated at the Department of Corrections.

DCS reasonably stops forcing visitation when the child reports feeling unsafe, becomes dysregulated after visits, and a consulting psychologist warns that continued contact may retraumatize the child, after DCS first encourages renewed in-person and virtual visits.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to D.S. · filed 2026-03-25(B)(8)(c)

On the advice of a DCS psychologist, the case manager recommended virtual visits to continue contact between Child and Mother, and those visits occurred until Child asked to discontinue them. ... The superior court’s finding that DCS made reasonable efforts to support visitation and acted reasonably in relying on the psychologist’s recommendation that Child not be forced to continue visiting Mother is supported by the record.

DCS may satisfy reasonable reunification efforts despite limited prison services when the parent declined pre-incarceration services and the prison offered no substance-abuse treatment.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to Z.B. · filed 2026-04-22(B)(3), (B)(10)

Moreover, once Father was incarcerated, the prison did not offer substance-abuse services and only minimal visits were possible. The court thus did not err in finding that, although DCS made a less diligent effort at providing reunification services for Father than it did for Mother, the lack of services was due in large part to Father's actions and his incarceration. See Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 451, ¶ 17 (App. 2007) (observing that "incarceration will as a practical matter typically preclude all but minimal visits"); see also Jaime G. v. Dep't of Child Safety, No. 2 CA-JV 2018-0091, 2018 WL 6583985, at *4, ¶ 17 (Ariz. App. Dec. 12, 2018) (mem. decision) ("To the extent [the father's] incarceration . . . made it more difficult to provide him with services, the fault lies with [the father], not DCS.").

A short lack of services during incarceration does not defeat reasonable and diligent efforts when DCS offered services for months before incarceration, the parent failed to participate, later received virtual visits, and requested no additional service.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to Y.W. · filed 2026-05-13(B)(3), (B)(8)(b)

DCS actively offered Father reunification services between October 2024 and May 2025, but Father failed to engage with those services in any meaningful way. And after his incarceration, DCS offered parenting time, and Father never requested additional services. Nor does he now identify services that DCS should have provided for that three-month incarceration period.

DCS need not complete family counseling tied to a failed return-home transition when new criminal conduct ends unsupervised contact, though it still must reasonably attempt appropriate services.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.T. · filed 2026-06-05(B)(8)(c)

Shortly thereafter, Mother was arrested for assaulting her neighbor, and DCS stopped all unsupervised contact between Mother and Child, ending the transition plan and obviating the need for family therapy. ... Even then, DCS still attempted to provide family counseling.

A delay in prison visitation may still constitute reasonable efforts when DCS must investigate contact restrictions, the parent fails to disclose records, and the child lacks a prior bond and becomes dysregulated.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to T.C. · filed 2026-06-11(B)(4)

While we acknowledge a delay in providing visitation to Father, the factual circumstances here, including the nature of Father’s conviction, the limited nature of his relationship with Child before his incarceration, and Father’s own failure to disclose the necessary criminal records, support the court’s conclusion that DCS made reasonable and diligent efforts to provide visitation to Father while prioritizing Child’s well-being.

Section 8-533(B)(8) requires the Department to make diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services before terminating parental rights.

Cindy L., David L. v. Dcs · filed 2014-11-25(B)(8)

Before terminating a parent’s rights under § 8-533(B)(8), the Department must make a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services.

Section 8-533(B)(8) requires DCS to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services before terminating parental rights on relevant out-of-home-placement grounds.

Jose P. v. Dcs, J.P. · filed 2021-04-27(B)(8)

As relevant here, to terminate a parent’s rights under the relevant out-of-home-placement grounds, DCS must prove by clear and convincing evidence it made “a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services.” A.R.S § 8-533.B.8; Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 190, ¶ 25 (App. 1999). This obligation requires DCS to “identify the conditions causing the child’s out-of-home placement, provide services that have a reasonable prospect of success to remedy the circumstances as they arise throughout the time-in-care period, maintain consistent contact with the parent, and make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult.”

DCS can satisfy its diligent-efforts duty for a parent living abroad by requesting available services from the foreign agency when DCS cannot directly provide or control those services.

Ramiro A. v. Dcs, J.W. · filed 2019-03-07(B)(8)(c)

Given that DCS could not control the specific services provided to Father, the superior court did not err by finding DCS did what it could under the circumstances.

DCS makes reasonable reunification efforts when it tailors parent-aide instruction to the parent's learning needs, and it need not provide additional services that would be futile.

Delcia F. v. Dcs, Z.M. · filed 2019-03-14(B)(8)

Thus, contrary to mother’s assertions, the parent aide did tailor the services to mother’s needs. ... Thus, any additional services would have been futile.

DCS satisfies the diligent-efforts requirement by giving a parent time and opportunities to learn and demonstrate knowledge of children's specialized medical and behavioral needs, even if the parent does not take full advantage of them.

Marsha M. v. Dcs · filed 2019-03-19(B)(8)

Considering this record, reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that DCS gave Mother the time and opportunity to learn about and demonstrate her knowledge of the children’s special needs.

DCS need not offer reunification services that cannot ameliorate an incarcerated parent's physical separation from the child and therefore would be futile.

Kathryn v. Dcs, A.S. · filed 2019-04-25(B)(8)(c)

DCS could not do more because it could provide no services to ameliorate Mother’s incarceration—the reason Anatolii is in out-of-home care. ... Therefore, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by finding DCS did not need to provide reunification services because they would be futile.

DCS has no constitutional duty to provide reunification services before termination for abandonment because requiring services for a parent who has abandoned the child would be futile.

Edan A. v. Dcs, A.A. · filed 2019-04-25(B)(1)

However, the court also terminated Father’s parental rights based on abandonment, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), and this court has held that there is no constitutional requirement to provide reunification services when a parent has abandoned the child.

For termination under § 8-533(B)(3), DCS must provide time and opportunity to participate in parenting programs with a reasonable prospect of success, but it need not provide futile or duplicative services.

Tiffani G. v. Dcs · filed 2019-05-14(B)(3)

To terminate based on A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), DCS must prove it provided the parent “with the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help her become an effective parent.” ... DCS need not provide services that are futile; it need only “undertake measures with a reasonable prospect of success.” ... DCS is not required to provide duplicate services that the parent receives elsewhere.

Diligent efforts under § 8-533(B)(8)(c) require DCS to identify the conditions causing placement, offer promising services as circumstances arise, maintain consistent parental contact, and reasonably assist when compliance is difficult.

Donald W. v. Dcs, M.D. · filed 2019-05-21(B)(8)(c)

Although what constitutes a diligent effort will vary by case based on the family’s unique circumstances, a diligent effort requires—at ... the least—DCS to identify the conditions causing the child’s out-of-home placement, provide services that have a reasonable prospect of success to remedy the circumstances as they arise throughout the time-in-care period, maintain consistent contact with the parent, and make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult.

DCS may satisfy the reunification requirement under § 8-533(B)(3) and (B)(8)(c) with services that assist the parent similarly to those an expert recommended, and it need not ensure the parent participates.

Sara K. v. Dcs, N.K. · filed 2019-06-20(B)(3), (B)(8)(c)

Holmes testified at the hearing that, as far as improving her ability to parent, the services offered through ABI and Desert Edge would assist Mother in a similar way as those he first recommended. ... But DCS “is not required to . . . ensure that a parent participates in each service it offers.”

DCS satisfies § 8-533(B)(8)(c) by providing services and an opportunity to engage; it need not ensure completion or wait indefinitely before seeking termination.

Michelle H. v. Dcs · filed 2019-07-11(B)(8)(c)

DCS must provide services and give the parent an opportunity to engage in the services. ... But DCS is not required to ensure parents participate in or complete any service, ... nor is it required to wait an indefinite period before moving for termination.

DCS cannot terminate under § 8-533(B)(8)(c) based on new concerns raised late in the case without giving the parent time and services to address them or proving that such efforts would be futile.

Paule C. v. Dcs, J.H. · filed 2019-08-01(B)(8)(c)

Here, DCS did not allow Father the time and opportunity to remedy the circumstances necessitating the placement. Nor did DCS demonstrate that such efforts would be futile. ... Thus, Father was denied the “fundamentally fair procedure” that due process requires.

A parent waives a challenge to DCS’s diligent efforts under § 8-533(B)(8)(c) by failing to promptly raise service deficiencies in time for the juvenile court to address them.

Amber M. v. Dcs · filed 2019-08-08(B)(8)(c)

But this objection, made at the very end of the hearing and raised approximately two years after her self-referred counseling was discontinued, cannot be reasonably construed as a timely objection because it did not give the court a reasonable opportunity to address the matter. ... Thus, Mother has waived the issue of whether DCS made diligent efforts to provide appropriate counseling based on the nine-month gap that occurred in 2017 due to DCS’s failure to timely submit a referral.

DCS makes reasonable reunification efforts when it provides ample time and services but the parent’s own lack of effort prevents meaningful participation and proof of ability to parent.

Vincent S. v. Dcs · filed 2019-08-29(B)(8)

Based upon the record before us, reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s finding that DCS made reasonable efforts to provide Father with reunification services. It was not a lack of time for services, but rather a lack of effort from Father, that prevented Father from proving his willingness and ability to parent.

DCS satisfies its reunification duty when it offers the expert-recommended treatment but the parent repeatedly avoids or abandons it, making further rehabilitative measures futile.

Christopher H. v. Dcs, M.H. · filed 2019-08-29(B)(3), (B)(8)

Despite numerous opportunities to participate in such treatments recommended by Dr. Levitan, Father consistently avoided or dropped out of the programs. Father testified and emphasized throughout the three-year dependency that he did not believe he needed substance-abuse treatment, nor did he acknowledge how his cognitive impairments could affect his ability to parent. See J-9956, 169 Ariz. at 180 (explaining DCS need not undertake futile rehabilitative measures). Based upon the record, there is substantial evidence the superior court did not err. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.

DCS need not provide expert-recommended counseling that is contingent on six months of sobriety when the parent never establishes lasting sobriety.

Jaime Q. v. Dcs · filed 2019-09-26(B)(8)

Dr. Silberman’s recommendation, however, was contingent upon Mother demonstrating six months of sobriety. He emphasized that sobriety should precede counseling, testifying that “the major [issue] is the methamphetamines, which makes people upset, angry, irritable, irrational.” Yet Mother never demonstrated lasting sobriety. Mother was twice sober for two months during the dependency -- in July and August 2017 and again from March to May 2018 -- and while she completed substance-abuse treatment programs, she soon relapsed.

DCS need not provide a recommended medical or mental-health service when the evidence shows that service has no reasonable prospect of enabling reunification.

Lucia D. v. Dcs, R.L. · filed 2019-10-10(B)(3)

For these reasons, the evidence supports the conclusion that a referral to a neurologist or provision of SMI services would have had no “reasonable prospect of” successfully reunifying Mother and Child. See Christina G., 227 Ariz. at 235, ¶ 15 (quoting Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192, ¶ 34).

Isolated service-referral errors do not defeat diligent efforts when they are inconsequential in light of the parent's prolonged avoidance, inconsistent participation, and failure to use the services offered.

Leah M. v. Dcs, K.M. · filed 2019-11-26(B)(8)

DCS gave Mother adequate and reasonable opportunity to participate in services, and Mother failed to take advantage. ... The record thus supports the court’s finding that DCS made diligent efforts to provide Mother with appropriate reunification services.

A parent waives a challenge to the adequacy of reunification services by failing to raise it below, and incarceration may practically limit DCS to encouraging prison services and minimal visitation.

Selina Z. v. Dcs, D.Z. · filed 2019-12-26(B)(8)

But Mother did not raise this issue below, and she has thus waived it. ... Accordingly, the record supports the superior court’s finding the DCS made diligent efforts to provide reunification services to Mother.

DCS makes diligent reunification efforts when it provides services addressing the underlying causes of placement, even if family therapy is clinically inappropriate and a desired specialized program is unavailable.

Shawna N., John N. v. Dcs, H.N. · filed 2020-01-14(B)(8)(c)

This record reasonably supports the court's finding that although DCS was not able to offer the parents "every conceivable service," it made a diligent effort to provide the family with services designed to address the underlying issues causing H.N.'s out-of-home placement.

DCS satisfies the diligent-efforts requirement by offering a series of appropriate mental-health and parenting services, even when the parent participates only sporadically or refuses recommended treatment.

Dawn S. v. Dcs · filed 2020-01-23(B)(8)(c)

As the DCS caseworker testified, Mother was offered a series of mental health services intended to help her become an effective parent, but Mother only participated sporadically, if at all. Mother chose not to take full advantage of the services made available to her. Therefore, reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s diligent-efforts finding.

DCS does not move the reunification finish line by declining to provide a family-reunification team when successful completion of parent-aide services is a prerequisite and the parent never completes that service.

Octavio G. v. Dcs · filed 2020-02-11(B)(8)(c)

Father, however, never successfully completed any parent aide service, a predicate for a family reunification team. The record does not reflect that Father completed “the objectives requested,” let alone that any relevant “finish line” kept changing.

Drug testing located about an hour from the parent's home remains an appropriate reunification service when DCS offers transportation and the parent rarely uses it and tests positive when she does test.

Iin Re Term of Parental Rights as to T.C. · filed 2023-08-17(B)(8)(b)

However, DCS offered Mother transportation to and from the testing facility. Mother rarely used DCS’ transportation, and when she did test, she routinely tested positive for methamphetamine. On this record, Mother has not shown the superior court abused its discretion in finding DCS “made diligent effort[s] to provide appropriate reunification services.”

DCS need not arrange a taxi for a particular intake appointment when it makes taxis available, the parent knows how to request them, and the parent never asks for transportation to that appointment.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to N.N.H. · filed 2024-05-23(B)(8)(b)

He further explained that she never asked him for transportation to Terros, so he never put it in place. Because DCS made taxis available to her, the superior court did not err in finding DCS provided Mother with adequate services.

DCS need not provide in-person services in another state when a parent repeatedly refuses to disclose a location or address, especially where the parent already received more than fifteen months of services and the needed hands-on medical training could not occur virtually.

In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to S.F. · filed 2024-06-06(B)(8)(c)

Even if the Department knew or believed she were living in California, it could not reasonably offer in-person services to her if it did not know her location. ... It is unclear how Mother believes she could have received this training through virtual visits from California. ... Thus, even assuming the Department’s reunification efforts became inadequate in September 2022, Mother had received more than 15 months of reunification services. It was within the juvenile court’s discretion to determine that the Department’s efforts were diligent and to consider Mother’s non-cooperation as the cause of any lack of services.

DCS makes diligent efforts to facilitate drug testing when it repeatedly arranges transportation and even offers a personal ride; the court may infer that a parent who prioritizes other matters and anticipates a positive result avoided testing because of substance use, not unreliable transportation.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.S. · filed 2026-03-12(B)(8)

In addition, the case manager testified she offered to drive Mother to the testing site herself. ... From this testimony, the juvenile court could reasonably infer Mother did not drug test because she was abusing substances, not because she lacked transportation. ... Reasonable evidence therefore supports the court’s finding that the Department provided diligent reunification services, including transportation to drug testing.

A parent waives a challenge to diligent reunification efforts under § 8-533(B)(8)(c) by failing to request additional services or contest service adequacy in the juvenile court.

Faith P. v. Dcs, L.E. · filed 2020-02-13(B)(8)(c)

However, Mother never requested additional services or challenged the adequacy of the services DCS provided. On this record, Mother waived her opportunity to challenge the diligence of DCS’s reunification efforts by failing to raise the issue with the juvenile court.

Delay in providing an expert-recommended service does not defeat diligent efforts under § 8-533(B)(8)(c) when the parent caused the delay by postponing evaluation, moving, and failing to assist with an out-of-state referral.

Gladesa A. v. Dcs, N.A. · filed 2020-02-18(B)(8)(c)

But this argument fails to acknowledge Mother’s own causal role in the delay. ... The superior court had a reasonable evidentiary basis for finding DCS made diligent efforts, despite the delay.

A parent waives a challenge to the adequacy of reunification services under § 8-533(B)(8)(a) by failing to raise it at available hearings and waiting until trial.

Richard P. v. Dcs · filed 2020-02-25(B)(8)(a)

Those arguments fail because, as the superior court found, Father waived any challenge to the adequacy of the services DCS provided him. ... The superior court held nine hearings at which Father could have raised the inadequacy of the services provided by DCS, including at least three after Father moved to California in October or November 2018.

Diligent efforts under § 8-533(B)(8)(c) require DCS to identify the cause of placement, offer appropriate services, maintain contact, and assist with difficult compliance, but the parent must eventually make a good-faith effort to reunify.

Susette G. v. Dcs · filed 2020-02-25(B)(8)(c)

A diligent effort to provide reunification services requires DCS to identify the circumstance causing out-of-home placement, provide appropriate services to the parent to remedy the circumstance, maintain consistent contact with the parent, and make reasonable efforts to assist the parent where compliance proves difficult. ... However, DCS’s responsibility is “not without limits and at some point the [parent] [i]s required to make a good faith effort to reunite the family.”

A parent waives a challenge to diligent reunification efforts supporting termination under § 8-533(B)(3) by failing to object to service adequacy in the juvenile court.

Salynda H., Paul T. v. Dcs · filed 2020-03-17(B)(3)

However, if a parent does not believe the reunification efforts are appropriate, it is “incumbent on [the parent] to promptly bring those concerns to the attention of the juvenile court, thereby giving that court a reasonable opportunity to address the matter.” ... “[A] parent who does not object in the juvenile court is precluded from challenging that finding on appeal.”

DCS need not continue counseling that prior intensive services and professional evidence show will not produce the behavioral changes necessary for reunification.

Cristina G., Estevanico P. v. Dcs · filed 2020-05-19(B)(8)(c)

The record also shows serious concerns about whether more counseling could even be effective. Despite prior intensive services, Mother still denied that she and Father had domestic violence issues and minimized Father’s abusive behavior, showing that Mother had not learned from the prior reunification services. Dr. Thal shared the concern, finding that Mother had failed to address the root causes of domestic violence and would be unable to do so in the near term. The court also heard from two DCS case managers who echoed the prognosis, stating that Mother had not and would not benefit from more services. See Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, 350, ¶ 20 (App. 2013) (DCS “diligently provided appropriate and reasonable reunification services” where record showed that a parent “had not benefitted from the services and additional services would have been futile.”).

DCS need not provide every conceivable substance-abuse service when the parent declines available residential treatment, fails to engage offered treatment, and receives support finding alternatives.

Gabriel A., Heather M. v. Dcs, G.A. · filed 2020-08-06(B)(3)

But “[DCS] is not required to provide every conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates in each service it offers.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 353. The record indicates that Mother failed to fully engage the services offered and failed to appear at a scheduled meeting with a different rehabilitation facility of her own choosing. Mother's inability to complete her treatment does not mean that DCS's efforts were unreasonable. ... By Mother's own admission, DCS supported her attempt to find alternative substance-abuse treatment. Still, Mother argues that this was not enough. We disagree. Given the resources provided to Mother, there is reasonable evidence to support the juvenile court's determination that DCS made reasonable and diligent efforts to provide Mother with rehabilitation services.

A stable placement that meets the child's needs and is committed to adoption can support the best-interests requirement for termination.

Jason H. v. Dcs, A.H. · filed 2015-06-11(B)

The court found that severance would benefit A.H. by providing her “with permanence and stability.” It further found that A.H.’s placement with J.N. was consistent with the child’s needs and that J.N. was “committed to adopting her.” The record supports these findings.

The immediate availability of an adoptive placement is a proper factor weighing in favor of a best-interests finding.

Gilberto R. v. Maria B., E.R. · filed 2015-08-11(B)

Stepfather has either already adopted the child or is now in a position to move forward with the process of adopting the child, providing the child with further stability and permanency. “One factor the court may properly consider in favor of severance is the immediate availability of an adoptive placement.”

In assessing best interests, a court may consider whether an adoptive placement is immediately available, whether the existing placement meets the child’s needs, and whether the child is adoptable.

Angela E. v. Dcs, R.M. · filed 2015-10-27(B)

In determining whether severance is in a child’s best interests, the juvenile court may consider whether: “1) an adoptive placement is immediately available; 2) the existing placement is meeting the needs of the child; and 3) the [child] [is] adoptable.” Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t. of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 30 (App. 2010) (citations omitted).

A specific adoption plan is not required to establish best interests when evidence shows the child is adoptable and the existing placement meets the child's needs.

Angelique B. v. Dcs · filed 2015-07-30(B)

A “specific adoption plan” is not, however, a prerequisite to termination; the juvenile court may rely on evidence that a child is adoptable and the existing placement is meeting the child’s needs.

A child’s adoptable status is itself an objective benefit sufficient to support the best-interests requirement even when no adoptive plan is currently in place.

Dominique M. v. Dcs · filed 2015-10-14(B)

Mother, however, does not deny that J.M. is adoptable, and it is well established that “adoptable” status is enough of an objective benefit to legally support the “best interest” prong of the severance statute.

Evidence that a child is adoptable can satisfy the best-interest requirement, but adoptability alone does not compel a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.

Lawrence R. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2008-02-26(B)

ADES may satisfy the best interest requirement if it presents credible evidence that the child is adoptable. ... But a determination that the child is adoptable alone does not require the fact finder to conclude that severance is in the child’s best interests.

A stable, permanent relative placement that meets all of a child’s needs, including special needs, can establish that termination benefits the child.

Shawn B. v. Dcs, S.B. · filed 2016-06-09(B)

Here, the juvenile court found that Child would benefit from the termination of Father’s parental rights because Child is currently in a loving, stable, permanent home that is a relative placement. The record supports these findings. Ms. Gevers testified that Child has bonded to the placement and the placement is meeting all of Child’s needs, including special needs such as trauma therapy. Ms. Gevers also testified that the placement provides permanency for Child.

An existing adoptive plan is sufficient evidence that termination will benefit the children for purposes of the best-interests requirement.

Rudy P. v. Dcs · filed 2016-07-19(B)

A court’s best interests determination must consider whether the children would benefit from termination or, in the alternative, whether continuation of the parent-child relationship would be harmful. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19 (App. 2004). Existence of an adoptive plan is sufficient evidence that termination would result in a benefit to the children. Id. (citation omitted).

An adoption plan is relevant but not dispositive in the best-interests analysis; termination may rest on evidence that continued sporadic parental contact would traumatize the children.

Nicole R. v. Dean C. · filed 2016-12-20(B)

Although an adoptive plan is relevant to the best interests analysis, it is not dispositive.

In a private severance proceeding, a proposed adoption may benefit the child and support the best-interests requirement just as in a state-initiated proceeding.

Justin M. v. April M. · filed 2017-05-23(B)

“[I]n a private proceeding to sever parental rights, just as in state-initiated proceedings, a juvenile court may conclude that a proposed adoption benefits the child and supports a finding that severance is in the child’s best interests.”

A child's best interests may be established by an adoption plan, adoptability, or evidence that the existing placement meets the child's needs.

Jimmie G., Sally G. v. Dcs · filed 2017-06-01(B)

Factors that support a finding that a child would benefit from termination of parental rights include evidence of an adoption plan or that a child is adoptable, or that the existing placement is meeting the child's needs.

Freedom to be adopted into a stable and nurturing home is an intended benefit supporting the best-interests requirement.

Jena H. v. Todd H. · filed 2017-06-08(B)

“The benefit of severance to the child is that which the legislature intended: freedom to be adopted into a stable and nurturing home.”

A current adoption plan, or even evidence that the child is adoptable, may satisfy the best-interests requirement.

Ricardo R. v. Maria A. · filed 2017-07-11(B)

The best interests requirement may be met if, for example, Mother proves that a current adoptive plan exists for the child, or even that the child is adoptable.

The best-interests requirement may be satisfied by evidence that the child is adoptable or that the existing placement is meeting the child’s needs.

Jason W. v. Dcs, C.W. · filed 2017-10-03(B)

The best interests consideration requires a court to assess “how the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship.” Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19 (App. 2004) (citation omitted). The best interests requirement may be met if the child is adoptable or the existing placement is meeting the child’s needs. Id.

A likely adoption by a placement meeting the child’s needs can support best interests, but adoptability does not automatically require severance when other circumstances make it a worse option.

Brittany P., Andres G. v. Dcs, N.G. · filed 2018-05-10(B)

“When a current placement meets the child's needs and the child's prospective adoption is otherwise legally possible and likely, a juvenile court may find that termination of parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child's best interests.” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 12 (2016); see Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19 (App. 2004) (finding that the best interests requirement may be satisfied if there is credible evidence of an adoptive plan or the child is adoptable). “Of course, a court need not automatically conclude that severance is in a child's best interests just because the child is adoptable; there may be other circumstances indicating that severance is not the best option.” Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 14.

A statutory ground plus an immediately available suitable adoptive placement frequently suffices to establish best interests despite evidence of a loving parent-child bond.

Jennifer P. v. Dcs, D.D. · filed 2018-06-26(B)

The substantial evidence of a suitable adoptive placement, coupled with Mother's chronic substance abuse, sufficiently supports the finding that severance was in her child's best interests.

Best interests do not require an immediate adoption plan when the children are adoptable and their current placement meets their needs.

Cesar S. v. Dcs · filed 2018-07-10(B)

Second, the best-interests analysis does not require DCS to have an immediate adoption plan in place at the time of severance when the child is “adoptable.”

A child’s adoptability can support a best-interests finding under § 8-533(B) even when the child is not in an adoptive placement at the time of the termination hearing.

Timothy W. v. Dcs, T.W. · filed 2018-09-25(B)

Evidence that an adoptive placement is immediately available or that a child is otherwise adoptable can provide a basis (improved permanency and stability) for determining that the child will benefit from termination. ... But the court found that regardless of the child’s current placement, another adoptive placement could be located. This finding is supported by testimony from the DCS case manager that the boy is adoptable.

After termination is found to serve the child’s best interests, the parent lacks standing to challenge placement and the court does not compare alternative placements in its best-interests analysis.

Jason O. v. Dcs · filed 2019-02-26(B)

Once a court determines termination is in a child’s best interests and the parent’s rights are terminated, the parent no longer has standing to challenge placement. Antonio M. v. ADES, 222 Ariz. 369, 370–71, ... ¶ 2 (App. 2009); Sands v. Sands, 157 Ariz. 322, 324 (App. 1988) (“[O]nce the order of severance was issued, the father’s standing as a parent terminated.”); see also Audra T. v. ADES, 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 5 (App. 1998) (juvenile court does not “weigh alternative placement possibilities” in the best-interests analysis).

The best-interests requirement under § 8-533(B) does not demand an immediate adoption when the evidence shows that the child is adoptable.

Shoshawna S. v. Dcs, K.S. · filed 2019-05-23(B)

But the best-interests prong does not require an immediate adoption for an “adoptable” child, ... and the DCS case manager testified that K.S. remained adoptable.

An adoption plan or replacement parent is not a prerequisite to finding termination in a child’s best interests under § 8-533(B).

Renee C. v. Daniel D. · filed 2019-07-23(B)

But she offers no authority for the argument that termination of a mother’s parental rights is not in a child’s best interests unless the mother is replaced. ... “It is inconceivable that the legislature intended that a plan for adoption be a prerequisite to severance . . . .”

Section 8-533 creates no preference for placing a child with a relative rather than a nonrelative when termination is sought.

Matthew J. v. Dcs · filed 2019-08-29

More importantly, A.R.S. § 8- ... expresses no preference for placing children with a relative over a non- ... relative.

An adoptive placement alone may establish the benefit required by § 8-533(B)’s best-interests inquiry; separate proof of detriment from continuing parental rights is unnecessary.

Michael A. v. Elizabeth G., M.A. · filed 2020-03-26(B)

An adoptive placement alone could be sufficient to make such a finding, but the court found additional facts, noted above, to support its conclusion. ... A best-interests finding can be based on a finding of either benefit to the child or harm to the child.

Prospective adoption can support best interests in a private severance action, and the adoption need not be certain before termination is granted.

Brian H. v. MacArena H., I.H. · filed 2020-08-06(B)

Mother testified that her husband wanted to adopt I.S., and that I.S. “sees [him] as her father and [] family.” See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4-5 ¶ 16 (stating a “child’s prospective adoption is a benefit that can support a best-interests finding . . . even in a private severance action”). Although Father argues such adoption plans are too indefinite to constitute a benefit, he cites no authority that requires an adoption be certain, particularly before severance is granted. Because I.S.’ “stability and security” are the primary concerns, id. at 4 ¶ 15, the record ... supports the court’s finding that termination of Father’s parental rights would benefit I.S.

A merely hypothetical adoption does not establish a best-interests benefit, and termination may be denied when it would eliminate beneficial financial support without a real adoption prospect.

Ashley C. v. Joseph B., H.B. · filed 2020-08-13(B)

Mother does not argue that this finding was factually erroneous, and we agree with the juvenile court that this hypothetical benefit to the Child is purely speculative and unsupported by the evidence. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting adoptability as a basis to support termination.

DCS need not identify a specific adoption plan before termination when it proves the children are adoptable.

Tara R. v. Dcs · filed 2020-12-22(B)

However, DCS “need not show that it has a specific adoption plan before terminating a parent’s rights; [DCS] must show that the children are adoptable.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352 (App. 1994). Although only one placement expressed an interest in adoption, DCS presented evidence that all three children are adoptable. Id. Because reasonable evidence supports the finding of adoptability, the court did not err in determining termination would further the plan of adoption.

Best interests may support separate adoptive placements for siblings when stability, security, health, and safety are served and sibling relationships will be maintained.

Linsay A. v. Dcs · filed 2021-10-28(B)

Though placing siblings together is an important consideration, other factors such as stability, security, health, and safety are paramount. See Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 15 (2016); see also Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 36.

A specific adoption plan is not required for best interests under § 8-533(B) when reasonable evidence shows the child is adoptable and adoption is legally possible and likely.

Ernest v. Carylee W. v. Dcs · filed 2022-05-05(B)

This court, however, has already held that DCS “need not show that it has a specific adoption plan before ... terminating a parent’s rights.” ... Thus, while the children did not have a specific adoption plan, reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that the children’s adoption is legally possible and likely, making them adoptable.

A child’s adoption may support best interests under § 8-533(B) despite unresolved proceedings against the other parent when adoption remains legally possible and likely rather than merely speculative.

Casey H. v. Dcs, M.H. · filed 2022-06-02(B)

Although M.H.’s adoption would not be immediate, on this record the court did not err by implicitly concluding that M.H.’s adoption was both legally possible and likely. ... DCS is not required to present evidence guaranteeing that termination will lead to the child’s adoption.

Adoptability alone can support a best-interests finding when the child is bonded to a prospective adoptive stepparent and adoption will provide stability and permanency.

Roarke T. v. Sara K., M.T. · filed 2022-07-14(B)

We hold that Child’s adoptability alone is sufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s best-interests finding in the termination order. Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 3, ¶ 9.

Adoptability alone does not automatically establish best interests, particularly when continued contact with the parent benefits the child and poses no threat to stability.

Bonna D. v. Chelsea M., P.D. · filed 2022-08-30(B)

Adoptability alone, however, does not automatically mean termination is in the child’s best interests. Id. at 4, ¶ 14. ... The court acted within its discretion in finding that continuing P.D.’s relationship with Mother did not present a threat to his stability and security.

A proposed stepparent adoption is not speculative merely because the parent and prospective adopter are not yet married; where they function as a committed family unit and the prospective adopter intends to adopt as soon as legally possible, adoption may be found likely.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to K.R. · filed 2022-11-22(B)

But one need not be married to adopt. ... Even so, reasonable evidence in the record supports the court’s finding that the proposed adoption was “more than a potential, hypothetical” benefit. ... Considering these facts, the court did not err by determining that the children’s adoption by her fiancé was not only possible but also likely.

A child need not already be adopted or placed in a prospective adoptive home for adoption to support best interests; the controlling issue is whether the child is adoptable.

In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to K.L. · filed 2024-06-04(B)

But whether the child has yet been adopted does not control the analysis – the child’s adoptability does. ... Thus, there is reasonable evidence that adoption is in K.L.’s best interest.

Testimony that children are adoptable, live in adoptive placements, and have a placement willing to adopt them together permits a reasonable inference that adoption is legally possible and likely, even if separate adoptions become necessary.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to N.R. · filed 2024-06-13(B)

The DCS case manager testified the children are adoptable, that they are in adoptive placements, and that one of the placements is willing to adopt all three children. ... From this testimony the court could reasonably infer that the proposed adoption, or adoptions, were legally possible and likely to occur if the parent-child relationships were terminated.

Adoptability must be likely and assessed for the particular child; theoretical adoptability makes the best-interests inquiry impermissibly perfunctory.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.S. and A.S. · filed 2025-03-04(B)

But evidence of an adoption plan or adoptability must show that adoption “is not only possible, but likely.” Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365, 370, ¶ 22 (App. 2018). The adoption showing must be specific to the child—“[i]f theoretical adoptability is sufficient to establish best interests, the inquiry becomes perfunctory.” Id. at 370, ¶ 19.

A child with special needs need not have a current prospective adoptive placement for adoption to support best interests when testimony about the child's age, positive traits, and ability to thrive with structure reasonably establishes adoptability.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to T.A. and J.A. · filed 2025-04-29(B)

Although J.A. is not in an adoptive placement currently, the case manager testified he is adoptable because he is only nine years old, loving, sweet, charming and behaves well when his emotions are regulated. ... On this record, Father has failed to show the court abused its discretion by concluding termination was in the best interests of the children.

Adoptability turns on whether adoption by someone is more probable than not after termination, not on whether a particular adult can immediately adopt or whether some unspecified person might someday adopt.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.L. · filed 2025-11-19(B)

Adoptability focuses on the child at issue. It does not turn narrowly on whether a particular adult can adopt a particular child. Nor ... does it turn broadly on whether “someone, somewhere, would be willing to adopt the child[.]” Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365, 370 ¶ 19 (App. 2018). Instead, adoptability turns on whether it is more probable than not a child will be adopted by someone upon termination. See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 3–4 ¶ 12; Pima Cnty. Juv. Action No. S-2460, 162 Ariz. 156, 158 (App. 1989) (explaining “the improbability of adoption, absent other factors, weighs against” termination); Titus S., 244 Ariz. at 371 ¶ 22 (reversing a termination order because adoption was “more improbable than likely”).

Separate sibling placements weigh against termination but do not control best interests when joint contact causes behavioral regression and separate placements provide stability.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.G. and D.G. · filed 2026-02-17(B)

Finally, the juvenile court appropriately acknowledged the children’s separate placements weighed against termination. But children’s separate placements were the result of Mother’s fictitious reports of their medical fragility. Moreover, DCS reported that both placements, while open to accommodating the children living together, “expressed concerns that both siblings show regression in behaviors they have otherwise improved with when they are together.”

The failure of a child's paternal relatives to obtain a visitation order should not bar a best-interests finding that would allow stability and permanence through adoption.

E.O. v. Michael M., Katie A. · filed 2015-08-06(B)

The paternal relatives’ failure to seek a visitation order should not serve as a bar to stability and permanence for the Child through adoption.

Even in an adoption proceeding without a formal termination petition, parental rights cannot be terminated without consent until parental unfitness is proven under the section 8-533 standard.

Matter of Appeal in Pima County Etc. · filed 1978-01-13

Parental rights cannot terminate without consent until the unfitness of the parent is proven.

When parental consent to adoption is waived under the former adoption statute rather than through a formal termination proceeding, the trial court may apply the same standard Section 8-533 would require.

Clark v. Curran · filed 1978-01-13(B)(2)

In the instant case the trial judge applied the same standard as would have been required for a termination of parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533.

A voluntary relinquishment cannot substitute for the statutory severance procedure when the child objects and the statutory grounds are not adjudicated.

In re the Appeal in Cochise County Juvenile Dependency Action Nos. SV89-00023 and DP8900018 · filed 1990-05-31

We vacate the court’s order accepting the stipulation.