Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-533

A murder conviction and life sentence may establish both felony-based parental unfitness and deprivation of a normal home for years.

In re the Appeal in Pima County, Juvenile Action No. S-1147 · filed 1983-01-03(B)(4)

Because we find the evidence was sufficient, we affirm.

A felony's nature proves future parental unfitness if its commission permits a rational inference of unfitness.

Jered W. v. Dcs, M.W. · filed 2018-01-30(B)(4)

“[a] felony proves unfitness if its commission permits a rational inference of unfitness.”

A felony whose nature proves parental unfitness creates a presumption of unfitness with no limitations period, but the parent may rebut it by showing actual fitness at the severance hearing.

C.D. v. Dcs · filed 2018-04-26(B)(4)

There is no limitations period restricting the court’s consideration of these past felony convictions. A parent, however, may rebut the presumption of unfitness that arises from a prior felony conviction “by showing actual fitness at the time of the hearing.” Id.

The nature of a felony may establish a parent's unfitness for future custody, but the parent may rebut that inference by showing actual fitness at the termination hearing.

Casha C. v. Dcs · filed 2019-04-11(B)(4)

One statutory ground on which the court relied in this case was the nature of Mother’s felony conviction: “the parent is deprived of civil liberties due to the conviction of a felony if the felony of which that parent was convicted is of such nature as to prove the unfitness of that parent to have future custody and control of the child.” ... A parent may rebut this inference of unfitness “by showing actual fitness at the time of the hearing.”

Section 8-533 does not expressly require DCS to provide reunification services when termination is based on the nature of the parent's felony conviction.

Abel v. v. Dcs · filed 2020-01-28(B)(4)

Father offers no legal authority for the proposition that § 8- 533 requires DCS to provide reunification services when it seeks termination of a parent's rights based on the nature of a felony conviction.

The nature of a felony and the length of its sentence are separate subsection (B)(4) grounds, each requiring adequate notice and directed findings.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.S. · filed 2025-12-16(B)(4)

Mother sought termination based on the length of Father’s felony sentence but did not seek termination based on the nature of his felony conviction, a different statutory ground than the length of a felony sentence.

Section 8-533(B)(4) permits termination when incarceration and the time needed to establish stability after release will deprive a child of a normal home for years.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to B.B. · filed 2023-12-28(B)(4)

Based on this finding, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that Father’s incarceration and ongoing obligations are of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of years.

Section 8-533(B)(4) permits termination when a parent's felony sentence will deprive the child of a normal home for a period of years.

Ricardo R. v. Lori C. · filed 2018-10-11(B)(4)

On this record, reasonable evidence supports the court’s conclusion that severance was warranted under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4).

Section 8-533(B)(4) sets no fixed sentence length for determining whether incarceration will deprive a child of a normal home for a period of years.

Michael Y. v. Dcs, C.Y. · filed 2016-11-15(B)(4)

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4) provides no bright line definition whether a sentence of incarceration is sufficiently long to deprive a child of a normal home for a period of years.

Certain crimes support a rational inference of parental unfitness, and proof of such a conviction creates a rebuttable presumption of unfitness.

In re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-983 · filed 1982-06-25(B)(4)

We pointed out that certain crimes support a rational inference of parental unfitness and proof of the conviction of such crimes creates a rebuttable presumption that the father is unfit to parent children.

A severance court need not await exhaustion of appeals from the parent's criminal conviction before proceeding.

In re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action No. S-2462 · filed 1989-07-18(B)(4)

There is nothing in A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4) which suggests that the juvenile court must wait for the parent convicted of a crime to exhaust all avenues of appeal before the court may proceed with a severance hearing.

Whether a prison sentence deprives a child of a normal home is determined from the totality of the child's and family's circumstances, not sentence length alone.

In re the Appeal in Maricopa County · filed 1995-06-06(B)(4)

We do not hold or believe that a natural parent’s prison sentence of 5.25 years would necessarily mandate such a result in every case. We only hold that the result was correct given the totality of the evidence in this case.

The sentence-length ground has no fixed durational threshold; whether incarceration deprives the child of a normal home is a fact-specific determination.

James S. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 1998-10-06(B)(4)

This section does not specify any certain amount of time for the ... sentence. Instead, the juvenile court must determine that the length is such “that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of years.” ... Whether a parent’s sentence for a felony conviction deprives a child of a normal home will vary depending on the facts of each case.

A prison term alone does not establish the sentence-length ground; the evidence must show that its length will significantly and detrimentally affect the child's home life.

Michael J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 1999-05-25(B)(4)

We hold that there must be some showing, beyond the mere fact of a prison term, that the sentence is of such length that it will significantly and detrimentally impact the child’s home life so that we should negate the parent’s fundamental interest in raising the child.

The sentence-length ground has no bright-line duration and requires consideration of all relevant circumstances affecting the parent-child relationship and normal home.

Michael J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2000-03-30(B)(4)

Section 8-533.B.4 sets out no "bright line" definition of when a sentence is sufficiently long to deprive a child of a normal home for a period of years, and we think the better approach is to consider each case on its particular facts.

Subsection (B)(4) does not require the department to provide reunification services to a parent before termination.

Arizona Department of Economic Security v. Matthew L. · filed 2010-03-02(B)(4)

Section 8-533(B)(4) does not require ADES to provide reunification services to a parent.

Sentence length alone is not dispositive under the incarceration ground; the juvenile court must consider the facts and circumstances specific to the case.

Robert P. v. Dcs, L.P. · filed 2014-07-08(B)(4)

The length of a parent’s felony sentence, by itself, is not dispositive; “[i]nstead, the juvenile court must consider the many facts and circumstances specific to each case.”

The prison-sentence inquiry is individualized and fact specific.

Christy C. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2007-03-20(B)(4)

It is an individualized, fact-specific inquiry.

The prison-sentence ground requires an individualized assessment.

Jason B. v. Dcs, S.B. · filed 2014-08-28(B)(4)

Here, we find the record contains reasonable evidence to support the juvenile court’s termination of Father’s parental rights to S.B.

Sentence length alone is not dispositive.

Cassandra P. v. Dcs, J.P. · filed 2014-09-23(B)(4)

The length of a parent’s sentence alone is not dispositive.

The sentence-length ground has no bright-line duration and depends on the particular facts of each case.

Arizona Department of Economic Security v. Rocky J. · filed 2014-04-10(B)(4)

Section 8–533(B)(4) provides “no ‘bright line’ definition of when a sentence is sufficiently long to deprive a child of a normal home for a period of years,” and each case depends on its particular facts.

No threshold level for any single incarceration factor compels or forbids termination, so one factor favoring the parent does not prevent severance when the others support it.

Ashlyn H. v. Dcs, A.O. · filed 2015-03-05(B)(4)

Moreover, even assuming the second factor weighed in Mother’s favor, the evidence presented at trial provided a reasonable basis for the trial court to conclude the remaining factors, which Mother does not contest on appeal, weighed in favor of termination. See Christy C., 214 Ariz. at 450, ¶ 15, 153 P.3d at 1079 (“[T]here is no threshold level under each individual factor in Michael J. that either compels, or forbids, severance.”).

In applying the incarceration factors, the juvenile court need not make an explicit factual finding on every factor.

Julia P. v. Dcs · filed 2015-05-14(B)(4)

However, the juvenile court need not make explicit factual findings regarding each factor. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Rocky J., 234 Ariz. 437, 441, ¶ 14 (App. 2014).

The anticipated release date is relevant to the incarceration ground, and the court may also consider the maximum release date when assessing whether the sentence deprives the child of a normal home.

Nicholas P. v. Dcs, S.P. · filed 2016-01-21(B)(4)

Although the “anticipated release date is a relevant factor in determining whether a child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of years,” Arizona Dep’t of Economic Security v. Rocky J., 234 Ariz. 437, 441 ¶ 16 (App. 2014), Father has not shown the superior court erred by considering his maximum release date, see Arizona Dep’t of Economic Security v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 550 ¶ 15 (App. 2010) (“[a]s long as the juvenile court considers the length of sentence, we find no error for it to also consider the anticipated release date”); Rocky J., 234 Ariz. at 441 ¶ 17 (“nothing shows that the [superior] court failed to appreciate the original length of the sentence or the maximum release date”).

When applying the felony-incarceration ground, the court must consider the designated sentence and may consider possible early release, but need not presume early release will occur.

Jeffrey P. v. Department of Child Safety · filed 2016-03-01(B)(4)

No authority requires the court to presume an early release.

A child's birth during a parent's incarceration does not create a conclusive presumption of termination; the court must apply and weigh the incarceration factors on the case-specific evidence.

Michael R. v. Dcs, M.R. · filed 2016-05-05(B)(4)

Here, the court expressly enumerated, applied and weighed these factors based on the evidence presented and, after doing so, granted termination.

The length of a felony sentence is not dispositive under Section 8-533(B)(4); the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including the six Michael J. factors.

Andrew G. v. Dcs, S.G. · filed 2016-05-05(B)(4)

The length of a parent’s sentence is not dispositive by itself.

A felony sentence's length is not independently dispositive; the juvenile court must consider the facts and circumstances specific to the case.

Harley D. v. Amanda C., L.C. · filed 2016-05-24(B)(4)

In terminating a parent’s rights based on incarceration, “the length of a parent’s sentence is not dispositive”; rather, “the juvenile court must consider the many facts and circumstances specific to each case.”

The felony-incarceration inquiry focuses on the child's needs during incarceration, not only on whether the parent can continue the relationship after release.

Cristian R. v. Dcs · filed 2016-05-24(B)(4)

The focus of the court’s inquiry is “on the child’s needs during the incarceration and not solely on whether the parent would be able to continue the parent-child relationship after release.”

Whether a prison sentence will deprive a child of a normal home for years is an individualized, fact-specific inquiry with no single determinative factor or threshold that compels or forbids severance.

Mark T. v. Dcs · filed 2016-05-26(B)(4)

No one factor is determinative, and “there is no threshold level . . . that either compels, or forbids, severance.” Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 450, ¶ 15 (App. 2007). Rather, “[i]t is an individualized, fact-specific inquiry.” Id. (citing Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251, ¶ 29).

The incarceration ground's requirement that a sentence last a period of years necessarily means a sentence of at least two years.

Patrick F. v. Dcs, A.S. · filed 2016-09-20(B)(4)

The statute’s plain language requires that the sentence be for a term of “years,” which necessarily means at least two years.

The felony-incarceration ground requires the parent to remain deprived of civil liberties and thereby deprive the child of a normal home at the time of severance.

Trevor M. v. Dcs · filed 2016-12-06(B)(4)

There is no “bright line” definition of the length of time required to deprive a child of a normal home, Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251, ¶ 29 (2000); however, the utilization of present tense language in the statute requires a parent to be deprived of civil liberties, depriving the child of a normal home, at the time of severance.

No single incarceration factor by itself compels or forbids termination under Section 8-533(B)(4).

Pedro R. v. Dcs · filed 2016-12-06(B)(4)

No single factor compels or forbids severance.

The court must consider the designated sentence length but need not presume that the incarcerated parent will receive early release.

Corey C. v. Dcs, B.C. · filed 2017-03-14(B)(4)

The superior court must consider the designated length of the sentence, but "[n]o authority requires the court to presume an early release." Jeffrey P. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 212, 214, ¶ 8 (App. 2016).

No bright line defines how long a prison sentence must be to deprive a child of a normal home; each case turns on its particular facts and all relevant incarceration factors.

Thomas A. v. Samantha A. · filed 2017-05-11(B)(4)

There is no “bright line” defining how long a sentence must be to deprive a child of a normal home for a “period of years,” and each case must be determined based on its “particular facts.” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251, ¶ 29.

No particular prison term establishes the felony-incarceration ground per se; a long sentence may be insufficient in one case while a much shorter sentence may suffice in another.

Elijah H. v. Dcs · filed 2017-05-16(B)(4)

There is no term of imprisonment that will per se sever parental rights. Id. at 251, ¶ 29. That is, “a 20–year sentence might not provide sufficient basis for severing an incarcerated parent’s rights, while in another case a 3–year sentence could provide the needed basis.”

Incarceration for a period of years is not a per se severance ground; the court must evaluate the non-exhaustive factors governing whether the sentence will deprive the child of a normal home.

Elaine Z. v. Dcs · filed 2017-09-19(B)(4)

Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4), incarceration for a period of years is not a per se ground for termination. Id. at 250, ¶ 22, 995 P.2d at 686. Instead, the court must consider a non-exhaustive list of factors as provided by our supreme court to determine whether termination is appropriate. Id.

The lengthy-incarceration ground focuses on the child’s deprivation of a normal home, not on the incarcerated parent’s efforts at self-improvement.

Jesus R. v. Dcs, J.R. · filed 2017-09-28(B)(4)

But while such actions are laudable, the relevant focus under the statute is on the child and whether he will be “deprived of a normal home for a period of years.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4).

A near early-release date does not bar termination under the incarceration ground because anticipated release is only one factor and need not be presumed.

Jessica S. v. Dcs, T.F. · filed 2017-11-16(B)(4)

An anticipated release date is only one of the relevant factors a court considers in light of the unique facts present in each individual case. Here, the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated Mother's parental rights despite the possibility of Mother's early release. Jeffrey P. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 212, 214, ¶ 8 (App. 2016) ("No authority requires the court to presume an early release.").

A court may consider a parent’s potential early release yet still terminate when the parent will have spent a substantial portion of the child’s life incarcerated.

Augustin C. v. Dcs, E.C. · filed 2018-05-08(B)(4)

Additionally, here, the court considered Father’s potential release date of April 2018, before severing his parental rights. The court specifically found that even if Father were to be released from prison in April 2018, he would have, at that time, been incarcerated for about two years, one-half of E.C.’s life. The record, viewed as a whole, fully supports the court’s severance of Father’s parental rights.

A 2.5-year sentence can support termination under § 8-533(B)(4) when the child’s developmental period and the parent’s historical and particular circumstances show deprivation of a normal home.

Charles v. v. Dcs · filed 2020-10-06(B)(4)

Father also contends that 2.5 years is a “relatively short” prison sentence. ... But a prison term of 2.5 years can support termination based on length of felony sentence. ... Our decision also must account for historical facts and particular circumstances, including Father’s sporadic and traumatic presence in the children’s lives.

A court applying § 8-533(B)(4) must consider all relevant circumstances and the non-exclusive incarceration factors, but it need not list a factual finding for every factor.

Juan F. v. Erica C. · filed 2021-08-19(B)(4)

The court should also consider all other relevant factors as part of the termination inquiry. ... But the court is not required to list its factual findings as to each factor on the record.

Under § 8-533(B)(4), the relevant period is the parent’s entire incarceration rather than only the time remaining after termination, and the court may but need not consider possible early release.

Carl P. v. Dcs, C.P. · filed 2021-09-09(B)(4)

Though a court addressing the incarceration ground for severance must consider the designated length of the sentence, it is not mandatory to consider the possibility of early release. ... Father’s calculation fails to consider that the “relevant period is the entire period of incarceration, not solely the time after entry of the termination order.”

No threshold level under any single incarceration factor compels or forbids termination, and not every factor must support severance.

Bernardino v. Dcs, J.P. · filed 2021-10-26(B)(4)

It is not necessary for all factors to support terminating parental rights, nor is there any “threshold level” under each individual factor that either compels, or forbids, severance. Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 450, ¶ 15 (App. 2007).

A normal home under the length-of-sentence ground is a stable, long-term family environment outside foster care where another parent or permanent guardian raises the child and the incarcerated parent maintains a relationship that contributes to that stability.

Timothy B. v. dcs/h.B. · filed 2022-03-07(B)(4)

For these reasons, we define “normal home” in § 8-533(B) as a stable and long-term family environment outside a foster care placement, where another parent or a permanent guardian resides and parents the child, and where the incarcerated parent affirmatively acts to maintain a relationship with the child that contributes to rather than detracts from the child’s stable, family environment.

A normal home under subsection (B)(4) may include a stable family environment with a permanent guardian when the incarcerated parent affirmatively maintains a relationship that contributes to that stability.

Ygnacio F. v. Dcs, M.E. · filed 2022-07-14(B)(4)

A “normal home” is a “stable and long-term family environment outside a foster care placement, where another parent or a permanent guardian resides and parents the child, and where the incarcerated parent affirmatively acts to maintain a relationship with the child that contributes to rather than detracts from the child’s stable, family environment.” Timothy B. v. DCS, 252 Ariz. 470, 477, ¶ 27 (2022); see Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 579, ¶ 9.

DCS's obligation to provide an incarcerated parent with visitation or other relationship-preserving services arises when the parent requests those services, not before the request.

Justin K., Morgan B. v. Dcs, L.K. · filed 2022-11-10(B)(4)

But this requirement arises only if “an incarcerated parent requests reunification services, such as visitation.” ... DCS’s obligation to make reasonable efforts to provide services began when Father requested them. ... We therefore reject his argument that DCS should have engaged in more strenuous efforts before he requested services.

Before terminating under § 8-533(B)(4), the court must consider whether a willing permanent guardian exists and, if so, whether the incarcerated parent can contribute to the guardian’s stable family environment.

Bisono E. v. Dcs, I.W. · filed 2023-03-07(B)(4)

In Timothy B., our supreme court held that before terminating a parent’s rights on length-of-incarceration grounds, the superior court must first consider whether another adult is willing to serve as the child’s permanent guardian during the parent’s incarceration. ... If a viable guardian exists, the court must then consider “whether the incarcerated parent [can] contribute to rather than detract from the stable, family environment provided by the permanent guardian during incarceration.”

An incarcerated parent’s successfully maintained relationship does not bar termination when the remaining individualized factors, including the child’s age, total absence, postrelease needs, and lack of a viable guardian, favor severance.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to B.H. · filed 2023-06-06(B)(4)

The record shows Father has developed a relationship with the twins while incarcerated. ... On balance, this factor weighs against termination. ... On this record, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated Father’s parental rights on the length-of-incarceration ground.

The lengthy-incarceration inquiry considers the entire incarceration rather than only the time remaining after termination, and the court may consider an anticipated release date.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to G.B. · filed 2023-10-03(B)(4)

The “relevant period is the entire period of incarceration, not solely the time after entry of the termination order,” Jeffrey P., 239 Ariz. at 214, ¶ 9, and the court may consider a parent’s anticipated release date, Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 550, ¶ 15 (App. 2010).

All incarceration factors need not support termination, and no threshold under any one factor compels or forbids severance.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.F. · filed 2024-03-07(B)(4)

All factors need not support terminating parental rights, nor is there any “threshold level” under each factor that either compels or forbids severance. Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 450, ¶ 15 (App. 2007).

The lengthy-incarceration analysis considers the parent's total absence, including post-release supervision and the time needed to complete services and establish housing and employment, rather than incarceration alone.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to X.M. · filed 2025-11-06(B)(4)

The fourth factor requires courts to consider the “total length of time the parent is absent from the family,” not just the period of incarceration. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 281, ¶ 8 (App. 2002). This includes conditions of release and time “needed to complete parenting classes, counseling, and other services.” Jeffrey P. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 212, 214, ¶ 10 (App. 2016).

Limited weekly prison visitation may be insufficient to sustain a relationship when the pre-incarceration bond was weak and the sentence lasts beyond the child’s minority.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.P. · filed 2025-12-09(B)(4)

The juvenile court did not make a presumption that incarceration resulted in termination. Rather, it found the Father’s limited visitation time was insufficient given the lack of a strong existing relationship and the Father’s lengthy incarceration.

Physical absence alone does not deprive a child of a normal home; the court must assess whether the incarcerated parent contributes to or detracts from the stable environment another parent provides.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.G. · filed 2026-02-04(B)(4)

The parent’s physical absence does not itself deprive the child of a “normal home.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 476-77, ¶¶ 24-26 (2022). A “normal home” can consist of “a stable and long-term family environment . . . where another parent or a permanent guardian resides and parents the child, and where the incarcerated parent affirmatively acts to maintain a relationship with the child that contributes to rather than detracts from the child’s stable, family environment.” Id. at 477, ¶ 27.

When another parent provides a stable home, the incarceration analysis also asks whether the incarcerated parent detracts from that environment.

Term of Parental Rights as to T.C. · filed 2026-02-10(B)(4)

When another parent is available to provide a stable home, the court should also consider whether the incarcerated parent detracts from that stable environment. Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 477, ¶ 27 (2022).

The ability to nurture a relationship during incarceration requires an individualized inquiry beyond limitations inherent in prison and must consider contact through visits, calls, letters, pictures, and gifts.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to E.M. and D.M. · filed 2026-04-16(B)(4)

As our supreme court has explained, the second Michael J. factor cannot be applied in a way that “renders it self-fulfilling” by “impl[ying] that incarcerated parents could never adequately maintain a parent–child relationship with their young children.” Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 581, ¶ 17 (2021). That is, the second factor must address something beyond the limitations common to all incarcerated individuals, limitations like the fact that an incarcerated parent would necessarily be “unable to interact with the children in more traditional settings (i.e., home, school, and recreational).” Id. at ¶ 16. Instead, the pertinent inquiry considers the parent’s specific circumstances to assess ... “‘how and whether’ a parental relationship can be maintained” and the parent–child bond nurtured “in other ways, such as through visits, phone calls, letters, pictures, and gifts.” Id. at ¶¶ 16–17 (citation omitted).

Section 8-533(B)(4) allows termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent convicted of a felony is deprived of civil liberties and the sentence is long enough to deprive the child of a normal home for years.

Jessie D. v. Dcs · filed 2019-11-14(B)(4)

To terminate Father’s rights under this ground, DCS was required to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Father “is deprived of civil liberties due to the conviction of a felony” and Father’s sentence “is of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of years.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4); see also Michael J. v. ADES, 196 Ariz. 246, 251, ¶ 28 (2000). ... Accordingly, we conclude the court did not err by finding that Father’s sentence is of such a length that the children will be deprived of a normal home life for a period of years.

The lengthy-incarceration ground looks to the parent’s total absence from the family and the child’s needs during incarceration, not merely the time remaining before release or the years available to parent afterward.

Chase M. v. Dcs, J.M. · filed 2018-05-22(B)(4)

But under this ground, “[w]hat matters to a dependent child is the total length of time the parent is absent from the family, not the . . . time that may elapse between the conclusion of legal proceedings for severance and the parent’s release from prison.” Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 281, ¶ 8. ... Section 8-533(B)(4) “focuses on the child’s needs during the incarceration and not solely on whether the parent would be able to continue the parent-child relationship after release.” Jeffrey P., 239 Ariz. at 215, ¶ 14.

Under subsection (B)(4), the relevant period for deciding whether a felony sentence deprives a child of a normal home is the parent's entire incarceration, not merely whether the parent could form a substantial relationship after release.

Juan C. v. Dcs · filed 2018-07-03(B)(4)

The relevant period in determining whether the length of a sentence will deprive a child of a normal home for a period of years is the entire period of incarceration.

Subsection (B)(4) has no fixed sentence-length threshold; its fact-specific inquiry may consider the parent's incarceration to date and post-release requirements that would further delay reunification.

Donald O. v. Dcs, C.O. · filed 2018-08-16(B)(4)

The statute does not define “a period of years” and Arizona courts have not identified a definitive milepost at which “a sentence is sufficiently long to deprive a child of a normal home for a period of years.” ... C.O. was 58 months old when Father entered prison and will be 98 months old when Father is released, meaning Father will have been imprisoned for over 40 percent of C.O.’s lifetime. ... Father’s myopic focus on his impending release is not persuasive because it ignores the past (that is, his 40-month absence from C.O.’s life) while misreading the future (that is, any post-release requirements that further delay reunification).

When applying the lengthy-incarceration ground in § 8-533(B)(4), the court considers the parent’s entire period of incarceration and absence from the home, not merely the sentence remaining at the severance hearing.

Jeremy E. v. Dcs, J.E. · filed 2018-08-28(B)(4)

To terminate parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4), a court must find that “the sentence of [the] parent is of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of years.” The time frame encompassed is the entire period of the parent’s incarceration and absence from the home, rather than the sentence which remained at the time of the severance proceedings.

Section 8-533(B)(4) sets no specific incarceration length that automatically justifies termination; courts must decide each case from all relevant circumstances.

Ryan D. v. Dcs, L.D. · filed 2018-09-20(B)(4)

The statute does not define a specific length of incarceration justifying termination; rather, courts must consider the facts and circumstances of the particular case according to all relevant factors.

The length-of-incarceration ground requires an individualized, fact-specific inquiry; the sentence length alone is not dispositive.

Ray M. v. Dcs, L.M. · filed 2019-01-24(B)(4)

Parental rights may be terminated if a parent has been convicted of a felony and will be incarcerated for a length of time that would deprive the child of a normal home with that parent for a period of years. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). There is no “bright line” that determines when a parent’s rights should be severed due to the length of their incarceration, Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246 (2000), but “[b]y itself, the length of a parent’s sentence is not dispositive,” Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 281, ¶ 9. The Arizona Supreme Court outlined six relevant factors in Michael J. to assist the juvenile court in conducting an individualized, fact-specific inquiry when faced with a termination petition based on A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251-52, ¶ 29.

Under the length-of-incarceration ground, a lack of visits may weigh against the parent when incarceration and the child’s fragile medical condition prevent safe prison visitation.

Fatuma H. v. Dcs, P.L. · filed 2019-02-05(B)(4)

A parent’s rights may be terminated if the “parent is deprived of civil liberties due to the conviction of a felony if . . . the sentence of that parent is of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of years.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). ... In sum, reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that P.L.’s fragile “medical condition and Mother’s limited visitation options” prevented visits between Mother and P.L.

The length-of-incarceration ground focuses on whether the child’s needs are met during incarceration, not whether the parent could resume the relationship after release.

Trung N. v. Dcs, J.C. · filed 2019-10-17(B)(4)

The focus is on whether the “child’s needs during the incarceration” are met, not on “whether the parent would be able to continue the parent-child relationship after release.” Jeffrey P. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 212, 215 ¶ 14 (App. 2016).

A relatively short sentence may deprive a very young child of a normal home for years when it spans most of the child's life, and the inquiry focuses on the parent's total absence rather than only the time remaining before release.

Jessi N., Ryan J. v. Dcs · filed 2020-02-04(B)(4)

Though father’s sentence was only 2.25 years, that length amounts to most of S.J.’s life. Despite father’s pending release, the issue is how long he has been absent, not how long he has until his release.

Incarceration does not support termination merely because the child is young when uncontroverted evidence shows the parent persistently maintained a recognizable parent-child relationship within prison constraints.

Matthew C. v. Dcs, M.C. · filed 2020-05-12(B)(4)

We cannot find reasonable evidence in this record to support the juvenile court's conclusion that Father had not maintained the parent-child relationship, even within the constraints imposed by the prison system. A prison sentence will not always support severance of a parental relationship with a young child. See Matthew L., 223 Ariz. at 552, ¶ 26 (Portley, J., specially concurring) (noting that “no Arizona appellate court has ever opined that any specific prison term is, as a matter of law, a sufficient basis to terminate parental rights”). Although the juvenile court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004), the uncontroverted evidence here shows that the Child recognized Father as his parent and Father acted “persistently to establish the [parent-child] relationship however possible.” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250, ¶ 22.

Whether a felony sentence deprives a child of a normal home is a fact-specific inquiry based on all relevant evidence, including the six Michael J. factors.

Logan M. v. Dcs, J.M. · filed 2020-07-16(B)(4)

Because Father does not dispute that he is incarcerated due to a felony conviction, we only address whether reasonable evidence supports a finding that Father’s sentence is of such a length that Son will be deprived of a normal home life for a period of years. This is a fact-specific inquiry based on consideration of all relevant evidence. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251–52, ¶ 29 (2000).

The incarceration inquiry considers the parent’s total absence from the family, not merely the time remaining between termination proceedings and release.

Sam H. v. Dcs · filed 2020-08-06(B)(4)

Fourth, as to the length of the incarceration, “[w]hat matters to a dependent child is the total length of time the parent is absent from the family, not the more random time that may elapse between the conclusion of legal proceedings for severance and the parent’s release from prison.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 281 ¶ 8 (App. 2002).

Section 8-533(B)(8)(b) may permit severance even when a parent begins a successful recovery before the severance hearing.

Jessica H. v. Dcs, X.H. · filed 2015-06-11(B)(8)(b)

Severance may be appropriate even when a parent “eventually begins a successful recovery before the severance hearing[.]”

Section 8-533(B)(8)(a) requires clear and convincing proof of diligent reunification efforts, at least nine cumulative months in court-ordered out-of-home placement, and the parent’s failure to remedy the circumstances causing that placement.

Jessica H. v. Dcs, C.H. · filed 2015-09-01(B)(8)(a)

To terminate parental rights pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the agency responsible for the care of the child has made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services; (2) the child has been in an out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of nine months or longer; and (3) the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the child to be in an out-of-home placement.

Section 8-533(B)(8)(b) requires clear and convincing proof that a child under age three has spent at least six months in court-ordered out-of-home placement, DCS made diligent reunification efforts, and the parent substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the causal circumstances.

Tamarra P. v. Dcs, M.B. · filed 2015-09-10(B)(8)(b)

Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b), DCS was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that M.B. was under three years old, had been in out-of-home placement for six months or longer pursuant to court order, that DCS had made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services to Mother, and that Mother had substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances that caused M.B. to be in out-of-home placement, including refusal to participate in reunification services. The evidence was sufficient to satisfy this burden of proof.

The six-month time-in-care ground focuses on the parent’s level of effort to cure the causal circumstances rather than the parent’s success in doing so.

Jon D., Kristie W. v. Dcs, C.W. · filed 2015-10-22(B)(8)(b)

Termination based on six months’ time in care “focuses on the level of the parent's effort to cure the circumstances rather than the parent's success in actually doing so.”

A parent’s actions and inaction concerning services directed at causal issues may show substantial neglect to remedy the circumstances underlying out-of-home placement.

Precious B. v. Dcs, J.E. · filed 2015-11-05(B)(8)(a)

The superior court properly could consider Mother’s actions and inaction as indicating she substantially neglected to remedy the circumstances causing J.E.’s out-of-home placement.

Reasonable reunification efforts coupled with a parent’s willful refusal to participate in offered services can support severance under the nine-month time-in-care ground.

Sara J. v. Dcs, J.J. · filed 2015-11-10(B)(8)(a)

Based on this evidence, the juvenile court found DCS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, but Mother had willfully refused to participate in the services DCS offered, and severance was therefore appropriate under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a). The evidence amply supports this finding.

Termination is not justified for chronic drug abuse or nine-month placement when the parent used every available service, remained sober in prison, and the evidence did not establish prolonged inability or substantial neglect to remedy.

Steven K. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2005-06-23(B)(3), (B)(8)(a)

Under these circumstances, insufficient evidence exists to justify severance on either ground urged by ADES.

Nine-month placement termination is inappropriate when a parent makes appreciable, good-faith remedial efforts, but may be appropriate when efforts are only sporadic, aborted, trivial, or de minimis.

Donald W. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2007-05-24(B)(8)(a)

Severance under section 8-533(B)(8)(a) is not appropriate when a parent has made “appreciable, good faith efforts to comply with remedial programs outlined by ADES,” but may be appropriate in cases where the parent “disappears for months at a time and makes only sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy,” the circumstances during the nine-month period. ... At minimum, to avoid severance the parent should have demonstrated “something more than trivial or de minimus efforts at remediation.”

The circumstances to be remedied are those existing at severance that prevent appropriate parental care.

Marina P. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2007-02-20(B)(8)(a)

In making a determination that a parent has “substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances which cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement” as section 8-533(B)(8)(a) requires, we construe those circumstances, as we have in similar contexts, “to mean those circumstances existing at the time of the severance” that prevent a parent from being able to appropriately provide for his or her children.

Termination was proper where evidence established diligent services, more than nine months of placement, substantial neglect or refusal to remedy, and best interest.

Adrian E. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2007-05-18(B)(8)(a)

Accordingly, the juvenile court properly found a statutory ground for termination under § 8-533(B)(8)(a) had been established.

The nine-month time-in-care ground must be established by the termination hearing; later passage of time before the ruling cannot cure a shortfall.

Anna T. v. Ades, J.T. · filed 2014-03-20(B)(8)(a)

Such grounds were not established here because J.T. had not been in care for nine months at the time of the severance hearing. We decline to take judicial notice of facts (the subsequent passage of time in care) that did not exist at the time of the hearing.

The six-month time-in-care ground is not limited to parents who completely neglect remedial services.

Amber W. v. Ades, B.W. · filed 2014-04-22(B)(8)(b)

Severance under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(b) is not reserved for only those parents who completely neglect remedial services.

A parent who makes appreciable, good-faith efforts to comply with services has not substantially neglected remediation, but sporadic, aborted attempts and de minimis compliance support termination.

Veronica M. v. Dcs · filed 2015-02-19(B)(8)(a)

A parent will not be found to have substantially neglected to remedy the circumstances causing an out-of-home placement if she makes an appreciable, good faith effort to comply with services, even if she cannot completely overcome her difficulties. Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 576, 869 P.2d 1224, 1229 (App. 1994). However, if a parent makes only “sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy” the circumstances, termination is appropriate. Id. Compliance requires more than de minimis effort. Id. at 576 n.1, 869 P.2d at 1229 n.1.

A parent's attempt to engage in services only in the months before termination may be insufficient to avoid the nine-month out-of-home ground.

Robert D. v. Dcs · filed 2015-02-26(B)(8)(a)

Under these circumstances, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that DCS made diligent efforts to provide Father with reunification services and that Father neglected to remedy the circumstances that caused the children to be in out-of-home placements. Although Father began complying with case plan requirements in 2012, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that his “attempt to engage in the necessary services in the months preceding the termination hearing is insufficient to exempt him from termination of his rights to his children pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a).”

Sporadic attempts to remedy the circumstances causing out-of-home care can establish both substantial neglect or willful refusal and a substantial likelihood that the parent cannot effectively parent in the near future.

Juan P. v. Dcs · filed 2015-03-10(B)(8)(a), (c)

The record shows that Father’s attempts to remedy the circumstances causing his children to be in care were sporadic at best. See JS-501568, 177 Ariz. at 576, 869 P.2d at 1229. More importantly, the record supports the conclusion that Father substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances causing the children to be in care; that he has been unable to remedy those circumstances and that there was a substantial likelihood Father would not be capable of effectively parenting the children in the near future. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), (c).

Caseworker testimony based on personal knowledge can independently support the nine-month out-of-home ground even if challenged reports are excluded.

Alice M. v. Department of Child Safety · filed 2015-03-10(B)(8)(a)

It is uncontested that Child was in an out of home placement for longer than nine months, and two DCS caseworkers testified that Mother, despite being provided reunification services, neglected to remedy the circumstances causing Child’s removal.

The nine-month ground does not apply when a parent makes appreciable, good-faith remedial efforts, but the parent must do more than make trivial or de minimis efforts.

Andrew R. v. Dcs · filed 2015-03-24(B)(8)(a)

Severance under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a) is not appropriate when a parent has made “appreciable, good faith efforts to comply with remedial programs outlined by [DCS].” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 576, 869 P.2d 1224, 1229 (App. 1994). The parent must, at a minimum, demonstrate “something more than trivial or de minimus efforts at remediation.” Id. at n.1.

Late service participation may be too little and too late to defeat the nine-month ground when the parent has not completed services, achieved required sobriety, or shown an ability to meet the child's needs.

Justin C. v. Dcs, S.C. · filed 2015-12-01(B)(8)(a)

The evidence was sufficient to support the severance order under A.R.S. § 8-533(8)(a). While Justin made some efforts to comply with the caseplan, those efforts were “too little, too late.”

The six-month ground focuses on the parent's effort to cure the circumstances existing at severance, and sporadic or aborted attempts to use offered services are insufficient.

Daniel R. v. Dcs, D.R. · filed 2015-12-10(B)(8)(b)

When a parent has failed to remedy the circumstances leading to removal, we focus on his or her “‘effort to cure the circumstances . . . .’”. E.R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 56, 60, ¶ 17 (App. 2015) (quoting Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 329, ¶ 22 (App. 2007)). Additionally, we focus on the “circumstances existing at the time of the severance” rather than the initial dependency petition.” Marina P., 214 Ariz. at 329, ¶ 22. A parent’s sporadic or aborted attempts to comply with offered services are insufficient to avoid severance. Donald W., 215 Ariz. at 205, ¶ 16.

For a child under three, the six-month ground applies when DCS provides appropriate reunification services and the parent substantially neglects or willfully refuses to remedy the circumstances, including by refusing services.

Shanna M. v. Dcs, P.M. · filed 2015-12-15(B)(8)(b)

Here, at the time of the severance trial, P.M. was under three years old and had been in an out-of-home placement for 11 months. As described above, DCS set up a variety of reunification services, but Mother failed to participate. Because this ground supports severance, regardless of the merits of Mother’s challenge to the chronic substance abuse ground, we affirm the superior court’s severance ruling.

The nine-month ground may support termination despite a parent's successful recovery before trial because remediation need not remain available indefinitely after the statutory period passes.

Laura G., Manuel A. v. Dcs · filed 2016-01-28(B)(8)(a)

In JS-501568, we rejected a similar argument “that termination was unfair in light of [the parent’s] successful efforts at rehabilitation in the eight months prior to the severance hearing,” holding instead that severance is proper “even though the parent eventually begins a successful recovery before the severance hearing.” 177 Ariz. at 577. The statute sets a reasonable time period for parents to assume their parental responsibilities and is intended to prevent children from “being shuttled from one foster family to the next for as long as it takes their biological parents to assume their responsibilities and take positive steps toward recovery” and reunification. Id. Thus, “[l]eaving the window of opportunity for remediation open indefinitely is not necessary, nor do we think that it is in the child’s or the parent’s best interests.” Id. When those efforts do not occur within the statutory period, they may be “too little, too late” for purposes of severance. Id.

The six-month time-in-care ground focuses on the parent’s level of effort rather than success and requires appreciable, good-faith efforts to comply with remedial programs.

Michelle G., De'von J. v. Dcs, S.J. · filed 2016-06-14(B)(8)(b)

Termination based on six months’ time-in-care “focuses on the level of the parent’s effort to cure the circumstances rather than the parent’s success in actually doing so.” Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 329, ¶ 20 (App. 2007). However, “[t]ermination is not limited to those who have completely neglected or willfully refused to remedy such circumstances.” Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS–501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 576 (App. 1994) (construing A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(6)(a), the predecessor to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b)) (emphasis in original). Parents are required to “make appreciable, good faith efforts to comply with remedial programs outlined by [DCS]” to remedy the circumstances that caused the out-of-home placement. Id.

The nine-month time-in-care ground requires diligent reunification efforts, substantial neglect or willful refusal to remedy the causal circumstances, and consideration of the child’s best interests.

Danica F. v. Dcs, G.Y. · filed 2016-06-14(B)(8)(a)

Additionally, sufficient evidence supported the severance under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), which allows a court to terminate a parent's rights to a child when the child has been placed in an out-of-home placement for nine months or longer and the parent has “substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement.” Section 8-533(B)(8) also requires DCS to make “a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services,” and that the court consider the best interests of the child before severance.

Section 8-533(B)(8)(a) permits a finding of substantial neglect when a parent makes only sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy an addiction during the first year of out-of-home placement.

Brenda B. v. Dcs · filed 2016-11-01(B)(8)(a)

“However, when a party . . . makes only sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy her addiction in that first year, a trial court is well within its discretion in finding substantial neglect and terminating parental rights on that basis.”

The six-month ground is not limited to complete neglect or refusal; sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy circumstances may constitute substantial neglect.

Maurice N. v. Dcs, M.N. · filed 2017-04-27(B)(8)(b)

Termination under this ground, however, “is not limited to those who have completely neglected or willfully refused to remedy such circumstances.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 576, 869 P.2d 1224, 1229 (App. 1994). When a parent makes only sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy such circumstances, the court “is well within its discretion in finding substantial neglect and terminating parental rights on that basis.” Id.; see also Donald W. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 215 Ariz. 199, 205-06, ¶ 21, 159 P.3d 65, 71-72 (App. 2007) (concluding that failing to maintain contact with DCS and participate in visitation supported a “substantial neglect or willful refusal” finding).

The sixty-day safe harbor in Section 8-533(E) is unavailable when the parent did not voluntarily place the child with DCS under Section 8-806.

Keosha C. v. Dcs · filed 2017-06-01(E)

At no point in the severance hearing did Mother offer facts that would allow the court to conclude that she had voluntarily placed either child with DCS.

Under the six-month time-in-care ground, the relevant circumstances are those existing at severance rather than when the dependency petition was filed.

Susan J. v. Dcs, S.J. · filed 2017-06-08(B)(8)(b)

It refers to the “circumstances” existing at the time of the severance rather than the initial dependency petition.

Sporadic, aborted remedial attempts permit termination under the nine-month ground.

Joshua H. v. Dcs · filed 2017-12-19(B)(8)(a)

However, if a parent “makes only sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy” the circumstances, the superior court may terminate the parent’s rights. Id.

A parent substantially neglects or willfully refuses to remedy the circumstances causing out-of-home placement when efforts to comply remain too little and too late after prolonged instability and nonparticipation in substance-abuse services.

Breyana M. v. Dcs, J.V. · filed 2018-07-03(B)(8)(a)

Based upon all of the evidence, the juvenile court concluded that J.V. had been cared for in an out-of-home placement for more than nine months and that mother substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances causing J.V. to remain in care. The evidence was sufficient to support the severance order under A.R.S. § 8-533(8)(a). While mother made some efforts to comply with the case plan, those efforts were “too little, too late.”

A parent substantially neglects or willfully refuses to remedy the circumstances under § 8-533(B)(8)(a) when persistent nonparticipation in drug testing and treatment outweighs otherwise appropriate visits and a bond with the children.

Shanna A. v. Dcs · filed 2018-09-20(B)(8)(a)

The evidence recited above supports the superior court's findings that Mother substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances that caused her children to remain in the care of the State. Although she participated in visits and is bonded with the children, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that evidence did not outweigh evidence that she persistently disregarded the opportunities she had to attend drug-abuse counseling and to participate in drug testing.

A parent’s lawful medical-marijuana use does not preclude termination under the six-month time-in-care ground when the child remains exposed and the parent fails to remedy that circumstance.

Lionel M. v. Dcs, L.M. · filed 2018-12-13(B)(8)(b)

The record, however, indicates that termination of Father’s parental rights was not due to his use of marijuana, but rather to L.J.’s continued exposure to marijuana while in Father’s custody, the very reason that brought L.J. into care. Notably, the basis for removal is not solely whether a drug is legal or illegal under state law but rather the impact of the drug’s use on the child.

A parent’s failure to participate diligently in services or establish sobriety can demonstrate substantial neglect or willful refusal to remedy the circumstances causing a young child’s out-of-home placement.

Alissa M. v. Dcs, B.B. · filed 2018-12-18(B)(8)(b)

The evidence presented at the termination hearing was sufficient to support the termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b). Mother’s failure to diligently participate in services or to establish sobriety demonstrate that she substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances that caused B.B.’s out-of-home placement. While Mother made some efforts to comply with the services offered, those efforts were, as described by the superior court, “too little, too late.” See Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994).

A parent substantially neglects or willfully refuses to remedy the circumstances causing placement when persistent domestic-violence and substance-abuse concerns remain unresolved despite some participation in services.

Monique H. v. Dcs, Et El. · filed 2019-03-05(B)(8)(a)

In sum, based on the record, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding that DCS had proved under § 8-533(B)(8)(a) that Mother substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances that caused her children to remain in care of the State.

A parent substantially neglects or willfully refuses to remedy the circumstances causing placement by refusing all but minimal services and failing to participate in approved drug testing and substance-abuse treatment.

Rick R. v. Dcs, H.R. · filed 2019-03-28(B)(8)(b)

Up to that point, Father had refused to participate in services other than supervised visitation and a single parenting class. He failed to participate in DCS-approved drug testing and was closed out of substance-abuse treatment unsuccessfully in October 2017. ... Because substantial evidence supports the court's decision to sever Father's rights under § 8-533(B)(8)(b), we need not address Father's arguments relating to the other grounds for severance.

A parent does not avoid substantial neglect or willful refusal under § 8-533(B)(8)(b) by participating in some services while steadfastly refusing to accept and address the factual circumstances underlying the dependency.

Haley W., Gary W. v. Dcs · filed 2019-06-06(B)(8)(b)

Mother’s actions here were not the “appreciable, good faith efforts” contemplated by A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b). ... Mother ... cannot defeat severance by simply refusing to accept the factual circumstances underlying the dependency.

The nine- and fifteen-month time-in-care grounds are independent: uncertainty about future parenting capacity under the fifteen-month ground does not defeat proof of past substantial neglect under the nine-month ground.

Felisha L. v. Dcs, D.C. · filed 2019-10-10(B)(8)(a), (B)(8)(c)

Although both grounds hinge on a child’s time in DCS custody, the nine-month and fifteen-month grounds are independent bases for termination with distinct requirements. Termination is permitted on nine-months if “the parent has substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances that cause . . . an out-of-home placement,” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), while termination is permitted on fifteen-months if the parent has not “remed[ied] the circumstances” and is substantially likely to remain “[in]capable of exercising proper parental care in the near future,” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). As applied here, the court found that Mother had not remedied the circumstances that caused D.C.’s removal, but could not find clear and convincing evidence that Mother would be unable to parent in the near future based on her testimony and post-release engagement in services. Simply put, the court’s lack of certainty about Mother’s parenting prospects in the near future under the fifteen-month ground does not defeat its finding under the nine-month ground that Mother “substantially neglected to remedy the circumstances” in the past.

Failure to remedy the circumstances causing out-of-home placement is itself a proxy for parental unfitness under the six- and nine-month grounds, so no additional unfitness proof is required.

Rachael A. v. Dcs · filed 2019-10-17(B)(8)(a), (B)(8)(b)

Mother argues that the time-in-care grounds “required a finding of parental unfitness to parent,” but the failure of a parent to remedy the circumstances causing the children to be in an out-of-home placement is a proxy for parental unfitness. Alma S. v. DCS, 245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶ 10 (2018). The time-in-care ground is “synonymous with unfitness,” and additional evidence of parental unfitness is not required. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 9.

A parent substantially neglects the circumstances causing placement when participation in services and contact with the children remain sporadic rather than appreciable and in good faith.

Miriam F. v. Dcs · filed 2019-11-21(B)(8)(a)

On this record, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding Mother substantially neglected to remedy the circumstances that cause the children to be in an out-of-home placement by refusing to participate in services with DCS.

Some progress toward reunification does not defeat the nine-month ground when the parent's participation is not the appreciable, good-faith effort the statute requires.

Yessica R., Efrain R. v. Dcs · filed 2020-01-16(B)(8)(a)

Although Mother did make some progress toward reunification, her actions were not the “appreciable, good faith efforts” contemplated by A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a).

A parent's efforts are insufficient under the nine-month ground when the parent fails to participate in substance-abuse testing and therapy in good faith and continues using shortly before trial.

Jimmy F. v. Dcs · filed 2020-02-11(B)(8)(a)

While Father made some efforts to comply with the case plan, those efforts were insufficient to overcome his failure to participate in good faith in substance abuse testing and therapy.

A parent substantially neglects or willfully refuses to remedy the circumstances causing placement by attending only an intake for counseling directed at the critical abuse issue and failing related parent-aide and visitation services.

Darryl S. v. Dcs, D.S. · filed 2020-08-11(B)(8)(b)

DCS provided Father numerous services, including a domestic-violence counselor, but he attended only one intake session. ... The court described Father's efforts as "woefully inadequate."

Late service participation does not defeat the nine-month ground when the parent never takes services seriously, continues substance use, and does not make meaningful behavioral changes.

Alexandra C. v. Dcs · filed 2020-08-27(B)(8)(a)

As the juvenile court noted, by the time of trial, Mother had not shown she “ever attempted to make meaningful behavioral changes and [never] took the services seriously, even after [she] did start to engage.” On this record, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Mother substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances causing the children to be in an out-of-home placement.

Sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy an addiction may constitute substantial neglect under the nine-month ground despite positive steps during incarceration.

Desirae M. v. Dcs · filed 2020-09-10(B)(8)(a)

Indeed, when a parent “makes only sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy her addiction,” the superior court “is well within its discretion in finding substantial neglect and terminating parental rights on that basis.”

An uncooperative parent’s efforts may be too little and too late under § 8-533(B)(8)(a) when the parent’s own resistance prevents a timely assessment of parental fitness.

Roseann R. v. Dcs · filed 2020-10-22(B)(8)(a)

Thus, an uncooperative parent may indeed find his efforts “too little, too late” if his obstinance prevents DCS from evaluating parental fitness in a timely manner. ... Given these circumstances, we cannot say the juvenile court acted unreasonably in concluding Anthony F.’s recalcitrance in engaging in the case plan was essentially his neglect or willful refusal to remedy the circumstances causing the twins to be in out-of-home care for longer than nine months.

Objectively demonstrated, good-faith reunification efforts preclude termination under § 8-533(B)(8)(b), while substantial noncompliance or sporadic, aborted attempts support substantial neglect.

Asaunte W. v. Dcs, N.W. · filed 2020-12-01(B)(8)(b)

This termination ground focuses on a parent’s efforts to cure the circumstances preventing reunification. ... Objectively demonstrated, good faith efforts to comply with reunification services will preclude termination on this basis. ... Substantial noncompliance during the statutory time frame or making only “sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy” the circumstances (even if the parent later begins recovery efforts before the severance hearing) supports a finding of substantial neglect.

For the six- and nine-month time-in-care grounds, appreciable good-faith remedial efforts avoid a substantial-neglect finding, while disappearance and sporadic, aborted attempts can support termination.

Layke H. v. Dcs, M.S. · filed 2021-01-26(B)(8)(a), (B)(8)(b)

“[P]arents who make appreciable, good faith efforts to comply with remedial programs outlined by [DCS] will not be found to have substantially neglected to remedy the circumstances that caused out-of-home placement, even if they cannot completely overcome their difficulties . . . within one year . . . .” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 576 (App. 1994). “However, when a party . . . disappears for months at a time and makes only sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy her addiction in that first year, a trial court is well within its discretion in finding substantial neglect and terminating parental rights on that basis.” Id.

The six-month time-in-care ground focuses on the parent’s effort to remedy current placement circumstances and permits termination for only sporadic, aborted efforts rather than appreciable good-faith compliance.

Erika C. v. Dcs, I.C. · filed 2021-04-15(B)(8)(b)

This termination ground focuses on the parent’s “effort to cure the circumstances rather than the parent’s success in actually doing so” and is based on the circumstances “existing at the time of the severance.” Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 329–30 ¶¶ 20, 22 (App. 2007). Termination is appropriate when a parent fails to make “appreciable, good faith efforts to comply with remedial programs” or “makes only sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy” the circumstances causing the out-of-home placement. Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 576 (App. 1994).

A parent's late, sporadic participation that does not produce the behavioral changes needed to meet children's basic needs may constitute substantial neglect under the six- and nine-month time-in-care grounds.

Michael C., Tyana T. v. Dcs · filed 2021-04-29(B)(8)(a), (B)(8)(b)

Here, the superior court found that Father’s rehabilitation efforts were “too little too late.” ... Reasonable evidence supported the superior court’s finding that termination was warranted pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), (b).

Lack of phone access shortly before trial does not defeat substantial neglect when it did not cause the parent’s lack of engagement during the preceding year.

Marianna R. v. Dcs · filed 2021-11-09(B)(8)(b)

Even if phone access affected Mother’s participation, at most, it was a factor for only the few months before the termination hearing and did not cause her lack of engagement during the year when both children were out of her care. Reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that Mother substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances causing the children to be in out-of-home placement.

Engagement in services only just before and during trial may be too little and too late to overcome a finding of substantial neglect during the preceding nine-month period.

Christina B. v. Dcs, A.J. · filed 2021-11-18(B)(8)(a)

To the extent the JS-501568 analysis applies here, it supports the superior court’s conclusion that Mother’s engagement in services just before and during trial did not suffice to overcome the court’s contrary conclusion.

Sporadic, aborted visitation that prevents any parent-child bond may establish substantial neglect or willful refusal under § 8-533(B)(8)(b).

Kristian v. v. Dcs, A.V. · filed 2022-04-14(B)(8)(b)

In fact, Father did not visit A.V. for another seven-and-a-half months, leading the case manager to testify that A.V. does not have a bond with Father. ... Termination is not limited to those who have completely neglected or willfully refused to remedy such circumstances, and may apply when a parent makes only sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy the circumstances.

The substantial-neglect inquiry under § 8-533(B)(8)(a) focuses on the parent’s effort to cure the circumstances, not ultimate success, and demands appreciable good-faith participation in remedial programs.

Heather G. v. Dcs · filed 2022-05-17(B)(8)(a)

The substantial neglect or willful refusal element focuses more on Mother’s “effort to cure the circumstances” resulting in placement than her “success in actually doing so.” ... Mother failed to prove participation in any alternative services aimed at remediating the substance abuse concern or alternatively, to prove her sobriety.

Six- and nine-month termination is improper when a parent makes appreciable good-faith remedial efforts, even if the parent has not yet successfully cured the circumstances.

Jessyca P., Devon J. v. Dcs · filed 2022-08-11(B)(8)(a), (B)(8)(b)

In contrast to the fifteen-month ground, these grounds focus on the “level of the parent's effort to cure the circumstances rather than the parent's success in actually doing so.” Marina P., 214 Ariz. at 329, ¶ 20. ... However, termination on this ground is not appropriate when a parent has made “appreciable, good faith efforts” to comply with remedial programs outlined by DCS. Id. at 576. ... Because the evidence does not support a finding that Father substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances causing D.R.J.'s out-of-home placement, the juvenile court erred in terminating Father's parental rights to D.R.J. on the six- and nine-month grounds.

The nine-month ground is effort-focused and cannot support termination when the parent makes more than trivial remedial efforts despite not yet achieving full success.

Prentice R. v. Dcs · filed 2022-08-30(B)(8)(a)

This ground “focuses on the level of the parent’s effort to cure the circumstances,” and not “the parent’s success in actually doing so.” Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 329, ¶ 20 (App. 2007). Thus, termination is inappropriate on this ground when a parent tries to remedy the circumstances but fails. Id. at ¶ 21. To defeat a petition for termination under Section 8-533(B)(8), the parent must make “at a minimum, something more than trivial or de minim[i]s efforts at remediation.” See Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 576, n.1 (App. 1994).

When a parent with a serious mental illness has not been found incompetent and the court considers that diagnosis, the juvenile court remains responsible for deciding whether the parent's efforts to remedy the placement circumstances were sufficient.

Marcos G. v. Dcs · filed 2022-11-10(B)(8)(a)

However, since Brandon B. was not found incompetent and the court was aware of his SMI status, it is the province of the juvenile court to determine whether his efforts were sufficient. ... Because reasonable evidence supports the court’s findings that his efforts were unsatisfactory, we must again decline to reweigh the evidence.

Recent court-compelled sobriety does not defeat substantial neglect under § 8-533(B)(8)(a) when the parent’s drug-testing compliance remains minimal and progress cannot be gauged outside a structured setting.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.L. · filed 2023-01-17(B)(8)(a)

Thus, his compliance with alcohol and drug testing in the six months leading up to trial was less than 0.1%, which clearly amounts to substantial neglect. ... As the case manager testified, such minimal compliance leaves no way to gauge the progress of Father’s sobriety, and regardless, he needed to demonstrate prolonged sobriety, employment, and housing stability outside of a structured setting.

A parent’s default admission to dependency allegations may substantiate the circumstances underlying § 8-533(B)(8)(b), and refusal to complete requested random testing may establish failure to remedy them.

Johnny R. v. Dcs, A.S. · filed 2023-01-19(B)(8)(b)

The significance of the court’s dependency finding is not weakened by his failure to appear; instead, he is deemed to have admitted all allegations in the petition, including his use of methamphetamine. ... Even though Father had many months before the termination hearing to obtain a hair follicle test, he substantially neglected or willfully refused to do so.

Completing some services does not defeat § 8-533(B)(8)(b) when the parent violates a safety plan, fails to protect an infant from an unsafe co-parent, and participates minimally in other required services.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to N.R. · filed 2023-02-07(B)(8)(b)

The juvenile court further found Father also failed to complete domestic violence counseling (although he did attempt to enroll the week prior to trial), told a service provider that he was “only taking [anger management classes] just to appease the courts,” was unable to participate in the Nurturing Parenting Program after making “inappropriate comments to providers,” and participated minimally in supervised visitation with N.R. Taken together, we conclude it was not an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to find that Father had failed to remedy the circumstances which caused N.R. to be removed from his care.

The six-month ground contains no forward-looking requirement that impediments to parenting will continue or that the parent will remain unable to parent in the near future.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.G. · filed 2023-05-09(B)(8)(b)

The text of the statute does not support Father’s suggestion that the six-month ground required the superior court to find whether Father would be able to parent in the near future—there is no such requirement in the statute. Compare A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) (requiring the court to find “a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future”) with -533(B)(8)(b) (requiring only that the court find “the parent has substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement”).

Section 8-533(B)(8)(c) permits termination after fifteen months of out-of-home placement when the parent has not remedied the circumstances causing placement and is unlikely to provide proper care in the near future.

Juan A. v. Dcs, I.T. · filed 2016-11-01(B)(8)(c)

Under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(c), a parent’s rights may be terminated when a child has been placed out of home for a cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer[,] . . . the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement and there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.

Section 8-533(B)(8)(c) requires fifteen months in out-of-home placement, inability to remedy the circumstances causing placement, and a substantial likelihood that the parent cannot exercise proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.

Andrew B. v. Dcs · filed 2015-06-16(B)(8)(c)

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), the Children must have been in an out-of-home placement for a “cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer” and the parent must have been “unable to remedy the circumstances that cause[d] the child[ren] to be in an out-of-home placement and there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.”

The fifteen-month time-in-care ground focuses on whether the parent actually remedied the circumstances causing placement, not on the parent's good-faith efforts to do so.

Jurgen M., Ashley C. v. Dcs · filed 2015-08-18(B)(8)(c)

Unlike the nine months’ ground, the fifteen months’ ground does not focus on the parent’s good-faith efforts to remedy the circumstances, only whether the parents actually remedied the circumstances.

Under the fifteen-month time-in-care ground, the issue is whether the parent actually remedied the circumstances causing placement, not how extensively the parent tried or complied with services.

Anne-Marie O. v. Dcs, A.O. · filed 2015-10-06(B)(8)(c)

Notwithstanding Mother’s compliance, we consider whether she actually remedied the circumstances that caused Child’s placement — not the extent of her efforts to do so. See id.

Section 8-533(B)(8)(c) requires a parent to remedy the circumstances causing out-of-home placement, not merely participate in programs intended to address them.

Vanessa D. v. Dcs, V.W. · filed 2015-11-10(B)(8)(c)

The statute, however, requires Mother to remedy the circumstances causing the out-of-home placement, not merely participate in programs. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

For the fifteen-month time-in-care ground, the circumstances causing placement include those existing at severance that prevent the parent from appropriately providing for the children.

Yhossiris v. Dcs · filed 2015-10-20(B)(8)(c)

For the evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings, the court has to determine that the circumstances which caused the children to be removed includes “those circumstances existing at the time of the severance that prevent a parent from being able to appropriately provide for his or her children.” Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22, 152 P.3d 1209, 1213 (App. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). And the evidence supports the court’s findings and conclusion.

The fifteen-month ground requires inability to remedy the circumstances, regardless of whether the inability was willful or followed failed good-faith efforts.

Barbara K. v. Ades · filed 2014-05-13(B)(8)(c)

Section 8-533(B)(8)(c), on the other hand, requires only that Mother has been “unable to remedy the circumstances” causing removal, regardless of whether that inability was willful or simply the result of failed good-faith efforts.

The fifteen-month ground requires fifteen cumulative months in out-of-home placement, inability to remedy the circumstances, and a substantial likelihood of inability to parent effectively in the near future.

Michele M. v. Ades · filed 2014-06-03(B)(8)(c)

The fifteen-months time-in-care ground requires proof that: The child has been in an out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer pursuant to court order or voluntary placement pursuant to [A.R.S.] § 8-806, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement and there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the future.

Time-in-care termination requires clear and convincing evidence that the agency diligently provided reunification services and the parent remained unable to remedy the placement circumstances.

Jacqueline C. v. Ades · filed 2014-06-05(B)(8)(c)

Parental rights may be terminated on time-in-care grounds if the superior court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that CPS made a diligent effort to provide family-reunification services and "the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement."

The circumstances causing out-of-home placement are those that exist at the time of termination.

Amanda S. v. Ades, R.R. · filed 2014-06-10(B)(8)(c)

The “circumstances which cause[d] the child to be in an out-of-home placement” are those that exist at the time of termination.

The relevant circumstances are those existing at severance.

Thomas H., Echot T. v. Dcs · filed 2014-08-28(B)(8)(c)

The relevant circumstances are those existing at the time of severance.

A supported fifteen-month out-of-home-placement finding establishes a termination ground.

Luis T., Angelica T. v. Dcs · filed 2014-11-04(B)(8)(c)

The superior court’s finding regarding the 15 months’ time in care ground for severance is thus supported by the evidence and establishes a basis for termination of Mother’s parental rights.

The circumstances to be remedied are those existing at termination rather than those existing when the dependency petition was filed.

Diana R. v. Dcs, I.E. · filed 2014-12-18(B)(8)(c)

The “circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement” are the circumstances existing at the time of the severance rather than at the time of the initial dependency petition.