Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101

A severely disabled adult child can remain under a parent’s care and supervision for continued child support while staying in a group home four days a week when the parent pays for the stay, visits daily, and serves as guardian.

Gregory v. Gregory · filed 2016-06-30(k)(2)

However, the record demonstrates that not only does Mother pay for Stephanie to stay in the group home in order to allow her to experience a sense of independence, Mother also visits Stephanie in the group home daily. Additionally, as noted by the chancery court in its order, Stephanie is under a Texas guardianship order entered in 2010 naming Mother Stephanie‟s guardian. Therefore, we agree with the chancery court‟s finding that Stephanie is living “under the care and supervision” of her mother as required by the statute.

Section 36-5-101(k)(1) permits continued child support, including health insurance, until age twenty-one for a child with a disability as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Steward v. Rowland · filed 2016-06-02(k)(1)

Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence supports a finding of disability such that the child is in need of continuing health insurance coverage past the age of majority. Therefore, we affirm the trial court‘s order requiring Father to provide health insurance until the child reaches twenty-one.

A child may be severely disabled under subsection (k)(2) when mental and intellectual impairments prevent independent living, even without a physical disability.

Lillard v. Lillard · filed 2021-03-08(k)(2)

Cook does not stand for the proposition that a child must have both a physical and a mental limitation in order to have a severe disability. In fact, Preston’s inability to live independently was not primarily due to his physical limitations, as significant as they were, but due to his mental and intellectual deficits—deficits that are very similar to Daughter’s. Like Preston, the evidence shows that Daughter’s current mental and intellectual deficits are severe enough to render her incapable of living independently.

Section 36-5-101(k)(2) permits a court to consider extending support for a severely disabled child despite a brief interruption in child support.

Ratcliff v. Melody Leann Ratcliff Neal · filed 2024-11-04(k)(2)

We hold that under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101(k)(2), a brief interruption in child support does not divest a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider a petition to extend support for a severely disabled child beyond the age of majority.

Section 36-5-101(k)(2) permits child support for a severely disabled child to continue indefinitely when its conditions are met.

Reichert v. Reichert · filed 2026-02-19(k)(2)

Contrary to Father’s contention, when a child is found to be severely disabled under § 36-5-101(k) “support may be continued indefinitely.”

Section 36-5-101(n)(2) bars suits against the State seeking reimbursement of child support paid following the rescission of a legitimation, paternity, or support order.

White v. State ex rel Brenda Armstrong · filed 2000-04-10(n)(2)

To the contrary, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(n)(2) (Supp. 2000) specifically states that the State may not be sued “to compensate any person for repayment of child support paid . . . as a result of . . . the rescission of any orders of legitimation, paternity, or support.”

Section 36-5-101(a)(7) bars reimbursement from the State for child support paid under a vacated support order.

Lester G. Murphy, Sr. v. State of Tennessee Child Support Services · filed 2015-12-07(a)(7)

Mr. Murphy does not argue or cite any authority contrary to the trial court‟s holding that the statute barred recovery from the State; in our analysis, the statute is dispositive of his contention that the court erred. The statute cannot be clearer; the State is not liable to compensate Mr. Murphy, by reimbursement or otherwise, for the amounts he paid as child support pursuant to the 2008 order.

Section 36-5-101(h) permits parents to set child support by agreement when the agreement is written, approved by a court, incorporated into an order, and acknowledges that changes require court approval.

Berryhill v. Rhodes · filed 2000-05-30(h)

If the parties meet these requirements, they may enter into a valid agreement to set child support. In this case, the parties met none of the requirements of the statute. We fail to see how the enactment of § 36-5-101(h) evinces a legislative intent to uphold private agreements that fail to comply with the statute in any respect.

Section 36-5-101(h) requires a private child support agreement to have court approval, be incorporated in a court order, and acknowledge that changes require court approval.

Gorrell v. Tyree B. Harris, IV · filed 2004-10-15(h)

As in Berryhill, the Agreement in this case does not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-101(h) in that the Agreement is not approved by a court, is not incorporated in a court order and does not contain an acknowledgment that they may not alter the Agreement without court approval.

Section 36-5-101 requires a court to ensure that an agreed child support amount meets or exceeds the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines before approving it.

Ramsey v. Ramsey · filed 2013-10-29

Regardless of whether the parties reached an agreement regarding child support, the trial court must ensure that the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines are followed and that the support amount set meets or exceeds that established by the Guidelines before approving such an agreement.

Section 36-5-101(j) permits parties to agree on all aspects of child support, subject to court approval.

Tavino v. Victoria Ashley Spear Tavino · filed 2014-10-27(j)

Moreover, as the trial court noted, the parties were free to enter an agreement, subject to the trial court’s approval, as to all aspects of child support.

Section 36-5-101 requires a father to support his child after legitimation; an agreement releasing him from future child support does not end that duty.

Richards v. Read · filed 1999-07-27

This legitimation triggers the long settled civil liability of a father for the support of his children. Evans v. Evans, 125 Tenn. 112, 140 S.W. 745 (1911); Damron v. Damron, 212 Tenn. 14, 367 S.W.2d 476 (1963); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101 (Supp.1998); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-203(b)(2)(1996).

Section 36-5-101(h) permits a court to incorporate a child support agreement into a decree; a payment voluntarily promised beyond the legal support duty remains enforceable as a contract.

Arze v. Mary Anne Bracken Arze · filed 2005-05-23(h)

Because Father had no legal obligation to pay any child support under the Guidelines, the entire sum of $2,000 is thus a contractual obligation governed by principles of contract law, not the Guidelines.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) permits a court to order an obligor spouse to provide health insurance coverage to a dependent spouse.

Zettersten v. Zettersten · filed 2000-08-31(f)(1)

Pursuant to §36-5-101(f)(1) of the Tennessee Code, the court can order an obligor spouse to provide health insurance coverage to the dependant spouse.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) allows a court to direct one party to pay premiums for insurance covering the other party’s health care costs.

Patsy Oakley v. Oakley · filed 2001-06-19(f)(1)

An award for health insurance is specifically allowed under section 36-5-101(f)(1) of the Tennessee Code which states: “[t]he court may also direct a party to pay the premiums for insurance insuring the health care costs of the other party.”

An award of health insurance premiums as alimony requires evidence of the recipient’s insurability, the premium cost, and the paying spouse’s ability to pay.

Ronnie Gale Martin v. Deborah Elaine Kent Martin · filed 2004-06-14(d)(1)

As a result, there was no proof offered as to whether Wife, in her condition, could be insured and if so, the cost of the premiums and whether the Husband has the ability to pay those premiums. ... Accordingly, we vacate the award of health insurance and remand to determine whether Wife can be insured, and if so, the cost of the premiums and whether the Husband has the ability to pay those premiums.

An award of health insurance premiums as spousal support requires evidence of insurability, premium cost, and the paying spouse’s ability to pay.

Martin v. Martin · filed 2004-07-14(d)(1)

As a result, there was no proof offered as to whether Wife, in her condition, could be insured and if so, the cost of the premiums and whether the Husband has the ability to pay those premiums. ... Accordingly, we vacate the award of health insurance and remand to determine whether Wife can be insured, and if so, the cost of the premiums and. whether the Husband has the ability to pay those premiums.

Medical insurance premiums ordered for a former spouse are periodic support subject to modification when their cost becomes known.

Wiltse v. Wiltse · filed 2004-08-24(f)(1)

Given that medical insurance premiums are regarded as periodic support and, therefore, subject to modification, we believe that such questions of Appellant’s ability to pay may be raised by Appellant when the amount of insurance premiums after the term of COBRA coverage is ascertainable.

Section 36-5-101 permits a court to order a spouse to pay the other spouse’s health insurance premiums after considering the alimony factors.

Morton v. Morton · filed 2005-08-15(f)(1)

This statute also provides, in pertinent part: “The court may also direct a party to pay the premiums for insurance insuring the health care costs of the other party.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(l) (2001). ... After considering the facts of this case in light of the various factors set out in Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101, we find no abuse of discretion in the Trial Court’s ordering Husband to provide Wife with ... medical insurance coverage for the remainder of Wife’s life.

Section 36-5-101(k) requires payments to continue at the full amount of the existing support order when child-support arrears remain after emancipation.

Patterson v. French · filed 2001-06-18(k)

Such a reduction in the support obligation is directly at odds with section 36-5-101(k), which requires the effect of the existing order to continue “in an amount equal to the then existing support order.”

A child support arrearage remains in effect after the support order would otherwise terminate until the arrearage and costs are paid.

In Re: Estate of James Edgar Miller · filed 2013-01-22(f)(3)

Section 36-5-101(f)(3) provides that a child support arrearage in existence at the time an order for child support would otherwise terminate continues in effect until the unpaid arrearage and costs are satisfied.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) permits a court to require one parent to pay all of a child’s medical expenses that insurance does not cover.

Rice v. Rice · filed 2001-07-19(f)(1)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1) (Supp. 2000)2 specifically empowers trial courts to order a parent to be responsible for all of a child’s uncovered medical expenses.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) permits a court to assign uninsured child health care costs to either parent or divide them between the parents without findings justifying a departure from the child support guidelines.

High v. High · filed 2003-04-25(f)(1)

However, the Tennessee Code provides that “[t]he court . . . may order either party to pay all, or each party to pay a pro rata share of, the health care costs not paid by insurance proceeds.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 36-5- 101(f)(1). The Code further provides that “[t]he necessity to provide for the child’s health care needs shall also be a basis for modification of the amount of the order, regardless of whether a modification in the amount of child support is necessary.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1) (Supp. 2002). As the statute provides that such costs may be ordered without changing “the amount of child support[,]” these costs are properly viewed as an addition to, as opposed to a deviation from, the obligor’s child support obligation under the Guidelines. Furthermore, neither of the aforementioned Code provisions requires that the court make specific findings justifying such an award.

For an obligor with net income above $10,000 per month, the custodial parent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that support above the guideline amount calculated on $10,000 is reasonably necessary for the children.

Kaplan v. Bugalla · filed 2002-05-10(e)(1)(B)

It cannot be seriously questioned that the effect of this 2001 Act of the General Assembly is to reverse the burden of proof as to income in excess of $10,000 per month and place upon the custodial parent, rather than the obligor, the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that child support in excess of the amount calculated under the guidelines on $10,000 is reasonably necessary to provide for the minor children of the parties.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(B) limits the income used to calculate child support to $10,000 per month unless proof shows that greater support is reasonably necessary for the child’s needs.

Zabaski v. Zabaski · filed 2002-12-11(e)(1)(B)

That may or may not translate to a net income of less than $10,000 per month, but under a recent amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(B), child support cannot be based on an amount greater than that without proof that a greater amount of support is reasonably necessary for the child’s needs.

When an obligor’s net monthly income exceeds $10,000, the custodial parent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that support based on income above that amount is reasonably necessary for the child.

Turner v. Yovanovitch · filed 2003-03-18(e)(1)(B)

For an obligor parent whose monthly net income exceeds $10,000, however, the custodial parent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that child support based on income in excess of $10,000 per month is reasonably necessary to provide for the needs of the child.

When an obligor’s net income exceeds $10,000 per month, the custodial parent must prove that support above the guideline amount is reasonably necessary for the child’s needs.

Rogers v. Rogers · filed 2003-05-13(e)(1)(B)

Applying this statute to this case, it was incumbent upon the wife to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that child support in excess of $2,100.00 was reasonably necessary to provide for the needs of the minor child.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(B) places the burden on the custodial parent to prove that support above the guideline amount is reasonably necessary; it does not make the custodial parent’s income a basis for reducing that support.

Smith v. Smith · filed 2004-10-20(e)(1)(B)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(e)(1)(B) does not purport to address the child support obligation of Mother as the obligee. Rather, the statute simply assigns Mother the burden of proving that the expenses are reasonably necessary for the support of the children, which she did.

When the obligor’s net monthly income exceeds $10,000, the custodial parent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that support above the amount calculated on $10,000 is reasonably necessary for the children’s needs.

Wilson v. Gay Lynn Wilson · filed 2005-04-13(e)(1)(B)

In order to base child support on an income in excess of $10,000 per month, the custodial parent must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the additional money is reasonably necessary to provide for the needs of the minor children pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-101(e)(1)(B).

For monthly net income above $10,000, the custodial parent must establish need for child support exceeding the guideline amount calculated on $10,000.

Guzman v. Alvares · filed 2006-07-11(e)(1)(B)

The obli-gor is required to pay $4,600.00 directly to the custodial parent, and the custodial parent must establish need with regard to the remaining amount.

Section 36-5-101(d)(2) ends rehabilitative alimony when either the recipient or payer dies unless the divorce decree specifically provides otherwise.

Varner v. Varner · filed 2002-08-21(d)(2)

This is of some significance, because under the statute, rehabilitative alimony terminates upon the death of either recipient or payer, unless otherwise specifically stated in the divorce decree.

Section 36-5-101(a) gives the court that issued a divorce decree continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to enforce its child support provisions.

Ethan Rider v. Rider · filed 2003-03-19(a)

This triggers Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a), and vests the Fourth Circuit Court of Davidson County, Tennessee with continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) keeps a child support order under the issuing court’s control, so another court may enforce it but cannot increase future payments under it.

Kirkpatrick v. O'Neal · filed 2004-12-15(a)(1)

As noted previously, when a court enters an order for child support, that particular court retains jurisdiction over support issues pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1). ... In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the Trial Court had the power to enforce the child support order of the Sumner County Circuit Court requiring Father to pay $650 per month in child support. However, we also conclude that the Trial Court was without jurisdiction to modify that order by increasing the amount of child support to be paid in the future.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1)'s significant-variance requirement does not apply to an order for extraordinary educational expenses such as private school tuition.

Turnage v. Turnage · filed 2004-11-15(a)(1)

Thus, an obligee spouse is not required to prove a significant variance before obtaining an order that the obligor spouse pay amounts for extraordinary educational expenses.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(a) permits a discretionary downward deviation from child support when an obligor custodial parent pays private school tuition and the guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate.

Cain-Swope v. Swope · filed 2020-02-21(e)(1)(a)

While the new guidelines give trial courts the discretion to add extraordinary educational expenses to child support, courts can also choose to depart from those guidelines when doing so would be unjust and inappropriate.

For a high-income obligor, the custodial parent must show that support above the amount based on $10,000 in monthly net income is reasonably necessary for the child.

Redmond v. Cletidus Marquell Hunt · filed 2004-12-10(e)(1)(B)

In light of the foregoing, the trial court properly should have applied the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101(e)(1)(B) and Tennessee Rules & Regulations 1240-2-4- .04(3) which were in effect at the time of the July 2003 hearing. Thus, the burden of proof was on Mother to demonstrate that support in excess of the percentage based on a net income of $10,000 per month was reasonably necessary to provide for the needs of T.L.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(B) requires proof that support above the amount calculated on $10,000 in monthly net income is reasonably necessary for the child’s needs; private-school tuition can justify the increase.

Kesser v. Peter Hale Kesser · filed 2005-01-27(e)(1)(B)

The trial court expressly references Wife’s testimony regarding Daughter’s private school tuition, which the trial court relied on to justify an amount in excess of the $2,100.00 mandated by the Guidelines. ... The record does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that an amount of child support above that required by the Guidelines is warranted in this case.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(B) requires written findings on whether child support above the statutory threshold is reasonably necessary for the children’s needs.

Beyer v. Beyer · filed 2013-04-05(e)(1)(B)

The trial court, however, failed to make any findings and provided no justification as to why an amount of child support in excess of the statutory threshold amount was reasonably necessary to provide for the needs of the children. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(B). As a result, we are unable to evaluate the propriety of the trial court’s decision. Therefore, we remand this issue to the trial court to make the requisite findings and to determine whether an amount of child support in excess of the statutory threshold amount was reasonably necessary to provide for the needs of the children.

When an obligor’s net monthly income exceeds $10,000, the custodial parent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that support above the guidelines is reasonably necessary for the children’s needs.

Julie C. W. v. Frank Mitchell W. Jr. · filed 2021-02-26(e)(1)(B)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(B) provides that “if the net income of the obligor exceeds ten thousand dollars ($ 10,000.00) per month, then the custodial parent must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that child support in excess of the amount provided for in the child support guidelines is reasonably necessary to provide for the needs of the minor child or children of the parties.” ... The evidence in the record is not sufficient for us to ignore the Trial Court’s credibility determinations. We do not find that the Trial Court abused its discretion in declining to order Wife’s requested upward deviation.

When the obligor’s net monthly income exceeds $10,000, the custodial parent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that support above the guideline amount is reasonably necessary for the children’s needs.

Melanie Miller Hollis v. Charles Myers Hollis, Jr. · filed 2022-06-29(e)(1)(B)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(B) provides that “if the net income of the obligor exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) per month, then the custodial parent must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that child support in excess of the amount provided for in the child support guidelines is reasonably necessary to provide for the needs of the minor child or children of the parties.”

Section 36-5-101(b) allows a physical custodian or the State acting on her behalf to seek child support in a Title IV-D case without legal custody, despite a challenge to service in the custody proceeding.

State of Tennessee ex rel., Elizabeth Wray v. Collins · filed 2007-03-20(b)

The present case falls within the reasoning of Beard, and Grandmother, or the State on her behalf, can seek child support from Mr. Collins if the trial court establishes that he is the father of R.E.R. Grandmother had physical custody of R.E.R. for over six months, and she could initiate a support action despite the challenge to service of process in the dependency and neglect proceeding.

Section 36-5-101(b) allows specified public assistance claimants to seek child support without showing that the child’s caretaker has legal custody; physical custody suffices.

In Re Justin A. H. · filed 2014-07-07(b)

It states that legal custody is not a prerequisite for the child’s caretaker to obtain an order for child support; the caretaker need not show “any more than physical custody of the [child]” in order to have standing to seek such support.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) allows a court to reduce retroactive child support based on equity between the parties, even when the factors in § 36-2-311(a)(11)(A) do not apply.

State of Tennessee, ex rel., Tammy Laree Kennamre v. Thompson · filed 2009-08-27(e)(1)(A)

Rather, the trial court can make use of the authority granted by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) to deviate from the guidelines and reduce retroactive child support “in order to provide for ... the equity between the parties.” Thus, the statute allows the court to consider the equity between the parties even where the factors described in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-311(a)(11)(A) do not apply.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) bars retroactive modification of child support, but prorating arrears when a child reaches majority does not violate that bar.

Peterson v. Peterson · filed 2009-11-20(f)(1)

Nevertheless, for purposes of calculating a child support arrearage, proration of the child support based on the emancipation of one of the children covered under the order does not constitute improper retroactive modification.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(F) requires a court that deviates from the child support guidelines to state the total retroactive support that would have been due without the deviation.

K.A.G. v. B.L.I. · filed 2009-11-25(e)(1)(F)

As can be seen, in addition to specific written findings, the trial court is required to state in its order the total amount of retroactive support that would have been due had a deviation not been made by the court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(F); Tenn Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-2-4-.06(2).

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) permits child support to be awarded retroactive to the date a parent petitioned for a change in custody and requested support.

In Re Drake L. · filed 2010-07-13(f)(1)

An order of support retroactive to December 31, 2007 is consistent with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1) and with the obligation of a parent. Since our statutes support the award of retroactive child support under these circumstances, we reverse the court’s refusal to award Father child support retroactive to the date of Father’s petition, December 31, 2007, and remand for determination of this amount.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) bars retroactive modification of child support for any period before a petition to modify is filed.

Ashworth v. Ehrgott · filed 2010-09-16(f)(1)

Notwithstanding the fact that Father waived the May 2008 retroactive date at the trial court level, it is clear under both Tennessee and Indiana law that child support cannot be retroactively modified before a petition to modify has been filed. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1); Carter v. Dayhuff, 829 N.E.2d 560, 568 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) ("[A] trial court has the discretionary power to make a modification for child support relate back to the date the petition to modify is filed, or any date thereafter.").

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) bars retroactive modification of child support owed before a modification action is filed and notice is mailed.

State of Tennessee, ex rel Natalie L. Dancy v. King · filed 2011-04-05(f)(1)

Thus, we similarly conclude that Mr. King is not entitled to retroactive relief from his child support obligation and arrearage. We may only consider whether he is entitled to relief from his support obligation since the date of his petition, July 14, 2009, and going forward.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) allows a court to consider equity between the parties when deciding retroactive child support, even if the factors in section 36-2-311(a)(11)(A) do not apply.

Burnine v. Dauterive · filed 2011-07-27(e)(1)(A)

Moreover, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) allows the court to consider “the equity between the parties” even where the factors described in section 36-2-311(a)(11)(A) do not apply.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) bars courts from forgiving child support arrearages under a valid order, even when later paternity testing shows the obligor is not the biological father.

In Re: Treasure D.I. · filed 2012-02-28(f)(1)

The trial court was without authority to forgive any portion of Father’s child support arrearage – even where later paternity testing establishes that Father is not the biological father of the Child – because such forgiveness constitutes an unlawful retroactive modification of a valid child support order.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) bars a court from forgiving child support that became due before a petition to modify was filed.

State of Tennessee, ex rel. Rebecca Estes v. Estes · filed 2012-03-13(f)(1)

Consequently, the trial court was without authority to forgive any portion of Father’s child support arrearage prior to the filing of the petition to modify his child support obligation because such forgiveness constitutes an unlawful retroactive modification of a valid child support order.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) prohibits retroactive modification or elimination of child support arrearages established by a valid order.

State of Tennessee ex rel. Ronda M. Letner v. Carriger · filed 2012-08-20(f)(1)

Therefore, the Trial Court was not permitted under Tennessee law to modify or eliminate Carriger’s duly ordered child support arrearage obligations.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) does not bar damages measured by past child support payments when the award neither reduces arrearages nor changes a child support obligation.

Hodge v. Craig · filed 2012-10-01(f)(1)

Mr. Craig’s April 3, 2009 damage award is not a retroactive modification of a child support obligation prohibited by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1) for two reasons. ... Therefore, the 2009 damage award did not have the effect of reducing or extinguishing any child support arrearage owed by Mr. Craig. ... Second, the April 3, 2009 judgment did not purport to change or modify Mr. Craig’s child support obligations as they had existed following the January 2005 order relieving him of his responsibility to pay child support.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) bars modification of child support for periods before a modification petition is filed and notice is given, even when the obligor misrepresented income.

In the Matter of: Christopher A. D. · filed 2012-11-20(f)(1)

As is clear from the language, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101(f)(1) prohibits modification of an existing child support order as to any time period prior to the date that an action for modification is filed and notice is given to the opposing parties. ... Consequently, we must hold that the Juvenile Court in the instant case lacked the authority to modify Father’s support obligation for any time prior to Mother’s filing of her petition on October 22, 2008.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) does not bar retroactive modification of a temporary child support order before final judgment.

In Re: Jaiden C.W. and Caiden J.W., Children Under the Age of 18 Years (d.o.b. 7/27/2006) · filed 2011-06-07(f)(1)

The existence of a temporary order setting child support pending trial does not bar reexamination and retroactive modification of the award at trial; rather, a temporary order of child support is an interlocutory order subject to retroactive modification.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) does not bar a court from determining the correct child support amount when the original amount was improperly determined.

Amezcua v. Amezcua · filed 2012-03-26(f)(1)

S ince the original amount of support was improperly determined, the determination of the correct amount is not a retroactive modification of support as contemplated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1).

Section 36-5-101’s provision for payment to a spouse or other custodian does not bar retroactive child support for an adult child who brings a parentage action.

Danelz v. John Gayden, M.D. · filed 2013-03-25(c)(2)(A)

These statutes include Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5- 101, which provides for the payment of child support to the spouse or other person with custody of the child at issue. ... In doing so, we decline to draw the negative inference drawn by the trial court below, and instead find that the lack of any provision in the child support statutes for payment of child support to an adult child does not nullify the child support mandate in the parentage statutes.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) prohibits changing child support owed for a period before a modification action is filed and notice is mailed.

Lester G. Murphy, Sr. v. State of Tennessee Child Support Services · filed 2014-04-29(f)(1)

Under the circumstances, the imposition of “back support” calculated on an amount different from that established in an existing order violates the statutory prohibition against retroactive modification of an existing child support order.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) bars modification of child support amounts due before a modification action is filed and notice is mailed to the opposing party.

Langlo v. Langlo · filed 2015-04-20(f)(1)

Child support judgments are not “subject to modification as to any time period or any amounts due prior to the date that an action for modification is filed and notice of the action has been mailed to the last known address of the opposing parties.”

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires courts to presumptively apply the Child Support Guidelines when awarding retroactive child support.

In re Jake S. · filed 2015-04-29(e)(1)(A)

However, the court’s discretion is “cabined by the statutory requirement that it must presumptively apply the Child Support Guidelines.”

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) bars courts from forgiving child support arrears that accrued before a petition to modify support was filed.

Dawn Noles Martin (Gorham) v. Martin · filed 2015-05-20(f)(1)

Therefore, trial courts are without authority to forgive any portion of child support arrearages prior to the filing of a petition to modify the child support obligation. Such forgiveness constitutes an unlawful retroactive modification of a valid child support order.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) gives a trial court discretion to make a child support modification retroactive to the date a parent filed a request for modification.

McCosh v. Jennifer Burns McCosh · filed 2015-08-31(f)(1)

In any event, the statute provides the trial court with discretion to order modification retroactive to the date a parent’s request for such relief was filed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in doing so here.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) bars crediting Social Security disability benefits against child support arrears accrued before a petition to modify support was filed.

Sewell v. Sewell · filed 2016-05-27(f)(1)

We therefore determine that the trial court did not err by denying Father‟s request for an offset as an impermissible retroactive modification of child support.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) makes child support orders enforceable judgments and bars courts from reducing support payments that became due before an action to modify the order was filed.

Lee v. Shannon Snider Lee · filed 2017-03-31(f)(1)

What Husband requested at trial, therefore, the court simply lacked authority to grant. Any award of less than the full amount of the child support arrearage would have amounted to a retroactive modification of a valid child support order.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) bars modification of child support amounts due before an action for modification is filed.

Contreras v. Kimberly Dawn Contreras (Hinson) · filed 2018-07-25(f)(1)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-101(f)(1) (2014) provides that an order for child support “shall not be subject to modification as to any time period or any amounts due prior to the date that an action for modification is filed . . . .”

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) bars modification of child support for periods before a petition to modify is filed.

Andrea (Messer) Schwager v. Messer · filed 2019-09-27(f)(1)

Similarly, in this matter, because Mother did not file a petition seeking to modify Father’s child support obligation in any respect until 2015, the trial court correctly ruled that Father’s child support obligation could not be modified for any time prior to the date of filing of Mother’s petition.

Section 36-5-101 bars a child support modification from taking effect before the petition seeking modification was filed.

Baker v. Grace · filed 2022-09-13(f)(1)(A)

Because Mother filed her petition to modify Father’s child support obligation on December 18, 2020, the modification of Father’s existing child support obligation could not take effect prior to that date.

Retroactive child support decisions under § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) must follow the Child Support Guidelines.

Conners v. Hahn · filed 2025-02-26(e)(1)(A)

Decisions on retroactive child support “must be made within the strictures of the Child Support Guidelines.” Richardson, 189 S.W.3d at 725; see also Berryhill v. Rhodes, 21 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tenn. 2000); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) (Supp. 2024).

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) supplies the interest rate for child-support arrearages in a judgment that also includes amounts governed by a different statutory rate.

Michelle Kay (Clark) Love v. Clark · filed 2018-05-17(a)(5)

As the trial court correctly concluded, two different statutory rates applied to the judgment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-5-101(a)(5) (2001) (current version at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(f)(1) (2017)); 47-14-121 (2001) (amended 2012).

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) does not apply to overpayments of post-emancipation child support.

Blankenship v. Cox · filed 2014-04-17(f)(1)

She relies exclusively on Tenn. Code Ann.§ 36-5-101(f)(1) and Tenn. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.06(4); however, neither provision relates to overpayment of post-emancipation support.

A child’s health care needs can warrant modification of a child support order even without a significant variance in the support amount.

Allen v. Allen · filed 2014-04-28(g)(2)

However, “[t]he necessity to provide for the child’s health care needs shall also be a basis for modification of the amount of the order, regardless of whether a modification in the amount of child support is necessary.” ... In this case, modification of the existing child support order was warranted based on undisputed evidence that, after the 2009 order was entered, Mother took on the $97.75 per month cost of the child’s health and dental insurance.

Section 36-5-101(l)(2) restricts fee awards against the State, the Title IV-D contractor, or the applicant, but does not restrict fees against the party subject to a Title IV-D enforcement action.

In re Chase R. · filed 2015-10-06(l)(2)

It is well established that, in Title IV-D cases, a court may not access fees and costs to the State, the Title IV-D contractor, or the applicant unless there is a clear showing of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11 violations. Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-101(l)(2). However, the Legislature has placed no such limitation on the assessment of attorney‟s fees and costs to the party against whom the Title IV-D enforcement action is brought.

A reduction in child support when a child reaches majority is not a retroactive modification barred by § 36-5-101(f)(1); the reduction takes effect when the child reaches majority.

Mithcell v. Tricia Lurlene Hall · filed 2016-02-26(f)(1)

Indeed, June 14, 2011 is the only date consistent with the case law cited above and the explicit expectations of the parties in their agreed parenting plan. In our judgment, the Trial Court erred in designating the date of the final hearing, March 31, 2014, as the effective modification date as such a date is contrary both to Tennessee law and the agreement of the parties.

Section 36-5-101(h)(1) gives courts discretion to allocate children’s mental health treatment costs between parents.

McClain v. McClain · filed 2017-09-21(h)(1)

Assessing costs for mental health treatment is within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(B) calculates net capital gains annually, deducting capital losses in the year they occur.

In Re: Ava B. · filed 2017-12-20(e)(1)(B)

Further, under the plain language of § 36-5-101(e)(1)(B), the calculation of “net capital gains” is made on an annual basis. ... Further, because the objectives of the child support guidelines differ from the federal income taxation statutes, we do not agree with Father that capital losses for child support purposes should be considered in years other than the year in which they occur.

Section 36-5-101(f)(2) permits an appearance bond up to the child support arrearage, but the arrearage is a ceiling rather than the default bond amount.

State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Rachel Beth Haynes v. Daugherty · filed 2019-09-10(f)(2)

This section of the statute also authorizes the trial court to set the appearance bond up to the amount of the alleged arrears but the amount of the alleged arrears is the maximum that may be set; it should not be the default amount for assuring the defendant’s appearance at future hearings.

Section 36-5-101(l) requires a court deciding attorney fees in a child support dispute to consider the financial factors specified in the statute.

State, ex rel., Melody Kay Rogers v. Lewis · filed 2016-10-21(l)

With that principle in mind, since the trial court did not consider the factors provided in the statute, we are vacating the award of attorney’s fees and remanding this case to the trial court to consider the factors provided by this statute.

Section 36-5-101(a)(9) excludes payments dividing marital pension property from income used to calculate child support.

Blakemore v. Blakemore · filed 2020-06-25(a)(9)

The consideration of pension income in determining Wife’s support obligation was error.

Section 36-5-101(d) governs distribution of child support payments and provides no factors for classifying marital property.

Richardson v. Richardson · filed 2020-12-14(d)

And the current version of 36-5-101(d) does not contain any factors that should be considered in ruling on any issue, much less issues of marital property classification.