Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101

The cohabitation presumption applies only when an alimony recipient lives with a third person; another type of relationship does not trigger it.

Evans III v. Evans · filed 2004-08-23(a)(3)

We find unpersuasive Husband’s argument that the relationship between Wife and Mr. Quillen was the equivalent of living together and, therefore, triggered the rebuttable presumption in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(3). A stated requirement for the application of the statute is that the alimony recipient “live with” a third person. It does not include some other relationship.

When an alimony recipient cohabits with a third person, the recipient bears the burden of showing that neither person supports the other.

Lea v. Lea · filed 2003-07-18(a)(3)

Under the statute, cohabitation creates a presumption that shifts the burden of proof to the cohabiting spouse to demonstrate that he or she is not giving support to, or receiving support from the third party.

Section 36-5-101(a)(3)’s cohabitation presumption supports a set-off for alimony payments when the recipient offers no proof rebutting that the third person contributed to her support.

Gray v. Gray · filed 2003-07-31(a)(3)

The set-off for the alimony payments is consistent with the intentions of the legislature, as expressed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(3), which reads, ... There is no proof in the record to rebut the presumption that her paramour was contributing to her support, and thus that she was in no need of support from her estranged husband.

The presumption concerning an alimony recipient who lives with a third person does not require modification when the trial court credits evidence that the recipient pays rent and a prior living arrangement was temporary.

Tarkington v. Tarkington · filed 2003-10-02(a)(3)

The court found that no change in circumstances justified the modification of the alimony in futuro award and we cannot find on appeal that the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Regardless of the trial court’s statement from the bench, the Mother had testified that she was paying rent for her quarters. She had also stated that her previous living arrangements with Mr. Eddie Ray in Lobelville were temporary. The proof at trial at the very least, created a fact issue as to whether a change of circumstances exists. Nonetheless the essence of the inquiry is a credibility call to be made by the trial court.

Section 36-5-101(a)(3)’s presumptions can be rebutted when an alimony recipient’s temporary residence with a third person leaves the recipient still needing support.

Edwards v. Edwards · filed 2005-08-25(a)(3)

It implicitly found that Wife had successfully rebutted the dual presumptions set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(3). ... Given Wife’s very limited income and the fact that her residence with her daughter was only temporary (less than a year, in fact), we cannot say that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s decision that she was still entitled to receive the alimony payments of $475 per month.

Section 36-5-101(e)(4) makes child support guideline percentages rebuttable and does not treat the guidelines’ enactment as a substantial and material change permitting modification of an existing order.

Tronco v. Crosley · filed 1991-10-02(e)(4)

The statute establishing the use of guidelines explains the percentages are merely presumptive and may be rebutted. Moreover, the enactment of the statute is not to be considered a substantial and material change in circumstances that authorizes a court to modify an existing child support order. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(4). ... The applicability of the guidelines is rebutted in this case because the parties agreed and the trial judge, at the time of the divorce, determined the needs of the child and the father’s ability to pay substantially exceeded the guideline amounts.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1) requires written findings that applying the child support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate before a court deviates from them.

Ragan v. Ragan · filed 1993-03-24(e)(1)

In order to deviate from the guidelines the court is required to make written findings that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(l). In this case the trial judge did not make any written findings, and we do not find any reason in the record why the amount of support should not be set according to the guidelines. Therefore, we modify the lower court’s order to require the father to pay $398.53 per month as child support.

Subsection (e)(1) permits a court to depart from the child support guidelines only when applying them would be unjust or inappropriate in the particular case.

Lloyd Winfred Carden, Jr. v. Carden · filed 1995-12-01(e)(1)

Trial courts may depart from the guidelines, but only when applying the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in light of the facts of a particular case. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 1240-2-4-.02(7).

Section 36-5-101(e)(1) permits downward deviation from the child support guidelines to ensure equity between the parties, but the trial court’s discretion is limited.

Jones v. Jones · filed 1996-09-16(e)(1)

While § 36-5-101(e)(l) does authorize deviation in order to ensure equity between the parties, and while downward deviation is clearly not prohibited, the trial court’s authority to do so must be considered in light of the provisions dealing with such deviation — Rule 1240-2-4^.04(2) and (4).

Section 36-5-101(e)(1) requires written findings to justify a departure from the child support guidelines; otherwise, the court must order child support under the guidelines.

Joel Thomas Catlett, Jr. v. Marjean Ge'Nell Perryman Catlett · filed 1997-01-08(e)(1)

It appears to us that while the trial court may have found the application of the guidelines inappropriate in this case, it failed to fully comply with the above requirements. Those requirements are not a mere formality, as they strengthen a presumption which was created to protect the rights of minor children. We therefore remand this case to the trial court with instructions to make the required findings, unless it believes that the application of the guidelines would in fact be appropriate, in which case it must order child support.

Section 36-5-101(e) requires written findings explaining a deviation from the child support guidelines.

Eden v. Eden · filed 1997-03-05(e)

We are of the opinion that given the evidence in this case the trial court correctly found that there were appropriate reasons for deviating from the guidelines. Here, the trial court made written findings as to its reasons for deviating from the guidelines as required by statute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1996).

Section 36-5-101 makes the child support guideline amount rebuttably presumptive; substantially greater overnight parenting time may support a discretionary downward deviation.

Loftus v. Loftus, Jr. · filed 1997-07-18

There is a rebuttable presumption that the child support guidelines provide the correct amount of child support to be paid by the obligor parent. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101. ... We think the proper amount of child support under these circumstances addresses itself to the trial judge’s discretion and we find no abuse of that discretion in this case.

Section 36-5-101(e)(2) makes the child support guidelines a rebuttable presumption and permits discretion in setting support when an obligor's monthly net income exceeds $6,250.

Paula Van Slyke (Fleming) v. Philp Edward Fleming - Concurring · filed 1995-10-15(e)(2)

In 1989, the Tennessee Legislature enacted a statute which required the courts to apply the child support guidelines promulgated by the Department of Human Services as a rebuttable presumption when making such awards. ... The statute is now codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e). ... Despite argument to the contrary by Ms. Van Slyke, our reading of the record in the present case convinces us that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting her a $1,000 per month increase in child support.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1) requires a written finding that applying the child support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate before a court deviates from them.

Avery v. Lewis · filed 1998-12-18(e)(1)

First, we note that the trial court was required to make a written finding that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate if it found that the evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption that the guidelines should apply.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1) makes the child support guideline amounts a rebuttable presumption when courts set child support.

Scott v. Scott · filed 1999-04-30(e)(1)

When determining the amount of a parent’s child support obligation, trial courts must apply as a rebuttable presumption the amounts set forth in the child support guidelines.

Section 36-5-101 makes the guideline amount a rebuttable minimum for child support; an obligor generally cannot reduce that amount by paying other expenses for the child.

Brooks v. Brooks · filed 1999-06-01

The Child Support Guidelines establish a rebuttable presumption of a minimum amount of child support. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101 (1996). Obligor parents generally cannot decrease their minimum child support obligations merely by paying other expenditures for their children.

Section 36-5-101(d) permits consideration of the parties' financial inequality when determining child support.

Thompson v. Thompson · filed 1998-10-27(d)

Although we recognize the financial inequality of the parties, this fact can be considered with regard to child support. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d) (Supp. 1998).

Section 36-5-101 requires child support to be set in a definite dollar amount, rather than automatically increased by a percentage of future income.

Robertson v. Lori Vanhooser Robertson - Concurring · filed 1998-11-09(a)(2)(A)

Child support is addressed extensively at T.C.A. § 36-5-101. ... These provisions clearly reflect the intent of the legislature that child support be set in a definite dollar amount.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1) requires a written finding that applying the Child Support Guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate when a court deviates from them.

Quinn v. Gregory M. Quinn - Concurring · filed 1999-03-25(e)(1)

TennesseeCodeAnnotated§36-5-101(e)(1) requires thetrial court,whendeviating from the Child Support Guidelines, to make a written finding that the application of the Guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. Although the trial court found that the parties’ minor child should continue to attend Catholic High School, the finding was not in the context ofchild support, andis insufficient to constitutea written finding that theapplication of the Guidelines is inappropriate in this case.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)'s written-finding requirement for rebutting the Child Support Guidelines does not apply when a court determines an underemployed parent's income before applying the guidelines.

Ralston v. HollowwayRalston · filed 1999-08-03(e)(1)

That statute, however, is applicable only to the situation where a court determines that sufficient evidence exists to rebut the presumption that the Child Support Guidelines are determinative of the amount of support. Because the willful underemployment situation involves identification of the amount of income to which the guidelines are to be applied, the statute propounded by the father is simply not relevant to this situation.

Section 36-5-101(h) permits parties to agree to a child support calculation method different from the Guidelines’ percentage method.

McDonald v. Cowan · filed 2000-01-19(h)

As the Guidelines only purport to create a minimum child support obligation, we find it entirely permissible for the parties to enter into an agreement which provides a method of calculating child support that is different from the percentage type mechanism contemplated in the Guidelines.

Section 36-5-101(a)(2)(A) requires child support to be set at a definite amount rather than as an automatic percentage of future earnings.

Price v. Toni Price · filed 2000-06-12(a)(2)(A)

However, we reverse the order that the Husband pay a percentage of his future earnings finding this is contrary to statutory law.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1) permits a downward deviation from child support guidelines when assigning all extraordinary educational expenses to the noncustodial parent would be unjust or inappropriate.

Barnett v. Barnett · filed 2000-09-05(e)(1)

Tennessee Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1) also provides that the court awarding support may deviate from the guidelines “in order to provide for the best interest o f the child(ren ) or the equity be tween the p arties.” ... We hold that w holesale im position o f priva te sch ool tu ition on a n oncu stodial par ent may, in some instances, constitute just such an “unjust or inappropriate” application of the guidelines that would warrant downward deviation.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1) makes the child support guidelines’ amount a rebuttable presumption of the correct support amount.

Bowdoin Grayson Smith v. Ginger Lee Marenchin Smith · filed 2001-05-02(e)(1)

The amount dictated by the guidelines is to be applied by the courts as a rebuttable presumption of the correct amount of support. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1).

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) makes the child support guidelines a rebuttable presumption when courts set child support.

State ex rel Mickey Phillips v. Knox · filed 2001-08-30(e)(1)(A)

In setting child support obligations, the court is to apply “as a rebuttable presumption the child support guidelines. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A).

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) makes the child support guidelines a rebuttable presumption; an obligor’s joint custody does not affect their application when the other parent has primary physical custody.

Bennett v. Bennett · filed 2002-02-01(e)(1)(A)

In setting child support obligations, the court “shall apply as a rebuttable presumption the child support guidelines. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A). ... The fact that the obligor parent has joint custody of the child has no bearing on the application of the Guidelines where the obligor parent does not have primary physical custody and only has visitation.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) makes the child support guidelines presumptive; visitation travel expenses may warrant a deviation from the guideline amount.

Bunker v. Finks · filed 2002-04-16(e)(1)(A)

This Court has recognized that travel-related expenses for visitation may warrant a deviation from the Guidelines amount. Leach v. Leach, W2000-00935-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 467, at * 18 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2001), no appl. perm. app. filed. Under the facts and circumstances contained in the record on appeal, we hold that Father’s child support obligation as ordered by the Trial Court is appropriate.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires sufficient evidence and written findings to justify a deviation from the child support guidelines.

Walker v. Walker · filed 2002-04-17(e)(1)(A)

Due to the lack of proof in the record justifying a downward deviation from the Guidelines amount and the lack of written findings by the Trial Court in the Final Judgment regarding the variance, we hold that Wife’s child support obligation should equal the Guidelines amount of $443 per month based upon her income from her DuPont job and her receipt of alimony.

Section 36-5-101(e) requires courts to apply the Child Support Guidelines as a rebuttable presumption when setting child support.

Gray v. Gray · filed 2002-07-09(e)

Section 36-5-101(e) of the Tennessee Code Annotated provides that a trial court must apply as a rebuttable presumption the Child Support Guidelines in determining the amount of child support to be awarded.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires a court to calculate child support under the guidelines and make specific findings to justify any deviation, including for retroactive support.

State, ex rel Mary Clark v. Wilson · filed 2002-10-10(e)(1)(A)

The trial court is required to first determine the amount due under the guidelines and then make specific findings justifying any deviation.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) permits a court to deviate from the child support guidelines when the evidence justifies doing so.

State ex rel. Jennifer Barnes v. Brandenburg · filed 2003-05-30(e)(1)(A)

When we assume – as we must – that those findings were accurate, we hold, as a matter of law, that deviation from the guidelines is justified. ... See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) (“If the court finds that evidence is sufficient to rebut [the] presumption [that the guidelines should be applied], the court shall make a written finding that the application of the child support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in that particular case, in order to provide for the best interest of the child(ren) or the equity between the parties.”).

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) makes the child support guidelines a rebuttable presumption when determining retroactive child support.

State ex rel. Heather Middleton v. Cochran · filed 2002-08-20(e)(1)(A)

We hold the Trial Court should have started by applying the Guidelines in determining Father’s retroactive child support since there is a rebuttable presumption the Guidelines apply to child support determinations.

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) bars courts from using equity to retroactively reduce accrued child support, even when the obligor learns he is not the child's biological father.

State ex Rel. Dorothy Phillips v. Phillips · filed 2002-09-27(a)(5)

The 1987 revision to the statute bars courts from using equity to retrospectively modify child support awards.

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) bars child support modifications for periods before a modification request is filed, but permits modification for later periods.

Norman v. Norman · filed 2003-02-18(a)(5)

The prohibition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(5) applies only to modifications of child support for periods preceding the filing of a petition or motion to modify a child support award.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) makes the child support guidelines a rebuttable presumption for retroactive support awards; a deviation needs an evidentiary basis.

State, ex rel. Stacy Anderson v. Taylor · filed 2003-06-27(e)(1)(A)

Thus, the rebuttable presumption that the amount of child support set forth in the Guidelines clearly is to be applied to a petition for retroactive support. ... Here, as in Stewart, there is no evidentiary basis for the Juvenile Court to have deviated from the Guidelines. Under these circumstances, the Juvenile Court’s order was an abuse of discretion.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1) requires courts setting prospective child support to follow the child support guidelines unless a deviation is justified.

Hickman v. Misty Willis · filed 2003-08-11(e)(1)

Whatever discretion a trial court may have had in setting child support prior to the promulgation of the Child Support Guidelines by the Department of Human Services did not survive legislative enactment of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-101(e)(1).

Section 36-5-101(e)(1) requires written findings to support an upward deviation from the child support guidelines for other extraordinary expenses.

Rafieetary v. Rafieetary · filed 2003-11-18(e)(1)

In the present case, the violin lessons and Boy Scout expenses each constitute “other extraordinary expenses.” As such, imposing these expenses on Husband represents an upward deviation from the presumed guideline award. The lower court, consequently, erred when it failed to make “a written finding that the application of the child support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in that particular case, in order to provide for the best interest of the child or the equity between the parties.”

Section 36-5-101(e) requires retroactive child support to follow the guidelines but permits a different amount upon a finding that applying them would be unjust or inappropriate.

State v. Wilson · filed 2004-04-22(e)(1)(A)

A trial judge must set retroactive child support according to the guidelines found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101(e), but may deviate from the guideline amount if the deviation is accompanied by a finding that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) does not permit a court to eliminate child support because the child refuses to visit the parent who owes it.

Hill v. Hill · filed 2004-05-04(e)(1)(A)

We do not believe the trial court’s rationale for denying Father’s request for child support — Haley’s refusal to visit with her mother — is so similar to the “specific instances” expressly stated in the Guidelines as to be considered of the same type. Furthermore, we hold that the withholding of support in this case is not in the best interest of Haley.

Section 36-5-101(a)(2)(A) requires a definite child support amount; an award calculated as a percentage of future bonuses does not satisfy that requirement.

Schuett v. Egon Horst Schuett, Jr. · filed 2003-11-17(a)(2)(A)

Such “floating” child support awards are inconsistent with Tennessee’s Child Support Guidelines and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(2)(A) which requires trial courts to fix “some definite amount” for child support payments.

Section 36-5-101 authorizes child support in a divorce decree; a claim for support from before the parents’ marriage arises separately under § 36-2-311.

Tracy D. Simpson Kries v. Kries · filed 2004-11-29

The divorce decree, sets the divorce support as authorized pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101, whereas the non-marital child support derives from Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-311. On the record before us we agree with the mother’s analysis, and find the appellant’s issue to be without merit.

Section 36-5-101 requires courts determining child support to apply the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines as a rebuttable presumption.

A.B.C. v. A.H. · filed 2005-01-13

Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101, the trial court in determining the amount of child support must apply as a rebuttable presumption the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines.

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) does not bar retroactive child support when the new award does not modify an existing order for child support.

State of Tennessee, ex rel. Debra L. Ogelsby v. Bridges · filed 2005-05-17(a)(5)

We further hold that the decree does not offend Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(5) because the current judgment does not modify an existing “order for child support.”

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(a) makes the guideline child support amount a rebuttable presumption and requires written findings explaining a deviation.

State of Tennessee ex rel. Debra Mardis v. Mardis · filed 2005-06-20(e)(1)(a)

Additionally, the legislature has recognized that strict application of the guidelines might not always lead to an equitable result. While it has specifically provided that courts shall apply the child support guidelines as a rebuttable presumption, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(a), it has also provided: If the court finds that evidence is sufficient to rebut this presumption, the court shall make a written finding that the application of the child support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in that particular case, in order to provide for the best interest of the child(ren) or the equity between the parties. Findings that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate shall state the amount of support that would have been ordered under the child support guidelines and a justification for the variance from the guidelines. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(a).

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) permits a court to deviate from guideline child support if it makes specific written findings explaining why applying the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate.

Richardson v. Spanos · filed 2005-10-05(e)(1)(A)

Accordingly, trial courts may, in their discretion, deviate from the amount of support required by the Child Support Guidelines, State v. Wilson, 132 S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tenn. 2004); Jones v. Jones, 930 S.W.2d at 545, but when they do, they must make specific written findings regarding how the application of the Child Support Guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in the case. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-2-4-.07(1)(b) (Mar. 2005).

Section 36-5-101(h) permits parents to agree to child support above the Guidelines amount and to use a different calculation method if the resulting support meets or exceeds the Guidelines minimum.

Kesser v. Kesser · filed 2006-08-24(h)

We conclude that parties may agree in an MDA to a child support obligation that exceeds the amount payable directly to an obligee parent under the Guidelines and to a method of calculating child support that differs from the mechanism contemplated by the Guidelines as long as the resulting child support meets or exceeds the amount mandated under the Guidelines. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(h) (Supp. 1995) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the affirmation, ratification and incorporation in a decree of an agreement between the parties . . . as to child support.”). The trial court also must find that the parties’ agreement meets the minimum child support obligation provided under the Guidelines.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) allows a court to consider equity between the parties when deciding whether to depart from the child support guidelines.

In Re TKY · filed 2006-08-28(e)(1)(A)

The statute further provides, however, that the court may consider "the equity between the parties." Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A). ... In our view, the unique facts in this case support Mr. P.'s argument that he is entitled to equitable relief from his child-support obligation during the time that Mr. and Mrs. Y. interfered with his ability to parent T.K.Y.

Section 36-5-101(e) requires written findings explaining a deviation from the presumptive child support amount and why applying the Guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate.

Hamlett v. Givens · filed 2006-11-08(e)

On remand, if the trial court again approves the mediated parenting plan and its child support provisions, its order must contain written findings of fact stating the reasons for the deviation from the presumptive amount calculated under the Guidelines,12 and how application of the Guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in this case. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs 1240-2-4-.07.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) allows a court to reduce retroactive child support based on equity between the parties even when the specific parentage statute deviation factors do not apply.

Taylor v. Randall Robinson, Jr. · filed 2007-06-05(e)(1)(A)

Rather, the trial court can make use of the authority granted by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) to deviate from the guidelines and reduce retroactive child support “in order to provide for . . . the equity between the parties.” Thus, the statute allows the court to consider the equities between the parties even where the factors described in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-311(a)(11)(A) do not apply.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires written findings when a court deviates from the child support guidelines.

Edgeworth v. Edgeworth · filed 2007-08-23(e)(1)(A)

If, in setting this child support amount, the court finds that a deviation is necessary in order to accommodate for extraordinary educational expenses, or otherwise,8 the court shall provide written findings in this regard, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101 (e)(1)(A) and the Guidelines.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires written findings that applying the child support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate and that a deviation would serve the child’s best interests.

Cunningham v. Cheryl Lynne Cheatham Cunningham · filed 2008-06-25(e)(1)(A)

However, if the trial court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the presumptive support obligation, the trial court must make written findings that the application of the child support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in the particular case and that the best interests of the child(ren) would be served by a deviation in the child support amount.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires courts to apply the child support guidelines as a rebuttable presumption when determining child support.

Lana Walton Luster v. Walton · filed 2009-11-19(e)(1)(A)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) instructs the trial court to apply the child support guidelines, as set forth in the rules and regulations of the Department of Human Services, as a rebuttable presumption in determining the amount of child support.

Section 36-5-101(e) requires courts to use the Tennessee Department of Human Services child support guidelines when setting child support.

Gina Scarlett Ferrari Pace v. Ward Redden Pace · filed 2010-04-26(e)

Courts are required to use child support guidelines developed by the Tennessee Department of Human Services “to promote both efficient child support proceedings and dependable, consistent child support awards.” Id. at 249; see also Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. § 1240-2-4-.01(3)(b), (c).

Child support based on variable income is calculated by averaging that income and applying the appropriate support percentage.

Melinda Diane Anderson (Byrd) v. Donald Matthew Anderson, Sr. · filed 2005-08-23(a)(2)(A)

The proper remedy in the case at bar, as evidenced in Schuett, is to recalculate the husband’s variable income and apply the appropriate percentage for child support to the resulting average.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1)(A) requires a definite monthly child support amount; an order based on a percentage of income is impermissible.

Leslie Randolph (Walker) Brown v. Ralph Truman Brown, Jr. · filed 2006-01-31(a)(1)(A)

Tenn. Code Ann. §36- 5-101(a)(1)(A) states that the court “shall set a specific amount which is due in each month”. This Court has repeatedly held that a child support order based on a percentage of income is not permissible, but must be fixed in a definite monthly amount.

Under the Guidelines applicable to this petition, § 36-5-101(g)(1)’s significant-variance requirement applies to modifications of base child support, but not to modifications for extraordinary educational expenses.

Kaplan v. Bugalla · filed 2006-04-13(g)(1)

We conclude that the “significant variance” provision in section 86-5-101(g)(l) pertains only to a modification of the “minimum base” child support calculated under the Guidelines and not to a modification for payment of extraordinary educational expenses.

A prior upward child support deviation does not automatically continue after modification; the custodial parent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that additional support is reasonably necessary for the child’s needs.

Skinner v. Thomas · filed 2008-12-11(e)(1)(B)

In light of the modification of other provisions of the April 2000 Agreed Order, Mother is not correct that an upward deviation is automatic or that the amount of the deviation should be automatically continued. When seeking an upward deviation, the statute clearly places the burden on the custodial parent to “prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that child support in excess of the amount provided for in the Guidelines was reasonably necessary to provide for the needs of the minor child left in her primary care.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(B).

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires a written finding that applying the child support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate before a court deviates from them.

Pennington v. Hennessee · filed 2011-06-08(e)(1)(A)

The 2005 order is deficient because it substantially and materially fails to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-1-1(e)(1)(A) and Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. Ch. 1240–2–4–.02(7), which require courts to “make a written finding that the application of the child support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in that particular case, in order to provide for the best interest of the child(ren) or the equity between the parties.”

A court that deviates from the child support guidelines must state the amount the guidelines would have ordered; a passing reference to the guidelines is insufficient.

Devore v. Devore · filed 2012-01-04(e)(1)(A)

We acknowledge the court’s reference to the guidelines in the order denying Husband’s motion to reconsider but hold that the court’s glancing reference to the guidelines was not adequate because it did not state the amount of support that would have been ordered pursuant to the guidelines. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A).

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires courts to apply the Child Support Guidelines as a rebuttable presumption when determining child support.

In Re: Andrea A. R. · filed 2012-02-07(e)(1)(A)

The statute requires the court to apply the Child Support Guidelines as a rebuttable presumption.

Section 36-5-101 requires courts to review child support agreements under the Child Support Guidelines and document an award that cures an earlier omission of child support.

Brown v. Lisa Denise Brown (Church) · filed 2012-04-13(e)(1)(A)

When reviewing agreements by parties, a trial court must use the Guidelines to review the adequacy of the child support provision. ... In our view, similar to the situation found in Flatt, a final judgment was lacking in this matter. However, now that the trial court has granted Wife credit for the back child support to which she was entitled and entered a child support award accompanied by the required paperwork, the error has been rectified.

A trial court that deviates from the child support guidelines must make written findings explaining the deviation, the guideline amount, and why applying the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate.

Ferrari-Bullock v. Randall · filed 2012-06-28(e)(1)(A)

If, in its discretion, a trial court decides to deviate from the amount of support required by the guidelines, it must state in its order the basis for the deviation, the amount the child support order would have been without the deviation, and why application of the child support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate.

Section 36-5-101(e) requires courts to use the Department of Human Services child support guidelines when setting child support.

Hill v. Kimberly Dawn Hill · filed 2012-10-05(e)

Courts are required to use child support guidelines developed by the Tennessee Department of Human Services “to promote both efficient child support proceedings and dependable, consistent child support awards.” Id. at 249; see also Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(e); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. § 1240-2-4-.01(3)(b), (c).

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires a court that deviates from the presumptive child support amount to state its reasons in specific written findings.

Barnes v. Barnes · filed 2012-10-24(e)(1)(A)

Thus, while the trial courts retain some discretion on a few issues that fall under the rubric of child support, they are for the most part required to either comply with the Child Support Guidelines or state in detail the basis for any decision to deviate from them.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires written findings supporting a child support deviation, including one for private school expenses.

Halliday v. Halliday · filed 2012-12-06(e)(1)(A)

We remand the case for the trial court to make specific findings with respect to potential private school expenses for the children, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) and the Guidelines.

Section 36-5-101(a)(7)'s bar on repayment after rescission of a legitimation order does not apply when the State mistakenly overcollects child support arrears.

State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Suzanna R. Phillips (Bobbitt) v. Phillips · filed 2013-04-30(a)(7)

Moreover, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101 (a)(7), with its prohibition on repayment as a result of, inter alia, rescission of a legitimation order, is not applicable here as was noted by the Trial Court in its order.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires courts to apply the Child Support Guidelines as a rebuttable presumption.

Kraus v. Thomas · filed 2013-06-07(e)(1)(A)

The statute requires the court to apply the Child Support Guidelines as a rebuttable presumption.

Section 36-5-101(e) requires a court to apply the child support guidelines when approving a parenting plan, even if the parents agree that neither will pay support.

Sykes v. Sykes · filed 2013-08-28(e)

An inquiry of this sort, however, is insufficient; the statute mandates that the guidelines be applied.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires a written finding explaining why the presumptive child support amount would be unjust or inappropriate before a court deviates from it.

Elizabeth LaFon Western Vinson v. Vinson · filed 2013-09-11(e)(1)(A)

When a trial court decides it is appropriate to deviate from the presumptive amount of child support, it must “make a written finding that the application of the child support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in that particular case, in order to provide for the best interest of the child or children, or the equity between the parties.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A).

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) permits a downward deviation from presumptive child support when the court makes the required findings; work travel expenses can support such a deviation.

Jesse v. Jesse · filed 2013-11-07(e)(1)(A)

We conclude the trial court was authorized to apply a downward deviation to the presumptive child support guidelines based on the facts of this case and did not abuse its discretion in deducting from their gross incomes the parties’ travel expenses for work before calculating the proper amount of child support to award.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires courts to apply the child support guidelines as a rebuttable presumption and explain any deviation.

In Re Jalin M.B. · filed 2014-03-19(e)(1)(A)

However, the trial court should have considered the child support guidelines and utilized the child support worksheet before determining that child support was not warranted. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court as it pertained to child support and remand the case with instruction to the trial court to utilize a child support worksheet. If the trial court deviates from the guidelines, the reason for the deviation must be adequately explained on the record.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) permits a downward deviation from the presumptive child support amount when the worksheet yields an inconsequential $5 monthly obligation.

William Stephanson McCloud, II v. McCloud · filed 2015-12-09(e)(1)(A)

A review of the record reflects that the child support worksheet yielded an obligation of $5 per month. Under these circumstances, we affirm the trial court‟s downward deviation from the presumptive child support order.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires written findings stating the basis for a deviation from the presumptive child support amount and the amount that would have been ordered without the deviation.

Rogin v. Rogin · filed 2013-07-10(e)(1)(A)

When making a deviation from the presumptive amount of support, the court must make written findings in its order detailing “the basis for the deviation and the amount the child support order would have been without the deviation.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(e)(1)(A); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-2-4-.07(1)(b).

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires written findings stating the guideline support amount and justifying any deviation from it.

State of Tennessee, Ex Rel., Valerie Arlene Law v. Ferrell · filed 2013-08-20(e)(1)(A)

Also, “[f]indings that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate shall state the amount of support that would have been ordered under the child support guidelines and a justification for the variance from the guidelines.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A). ... In the absence of evidence or the requisite findings to support a deviation from the Guidelines, we are unable to evaluate the propriety of the trial court’s decision. Under these circumstances, we must vacate the trial court’s award and remand to the trial court to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Section 36-5-101 requires child support to be set as a definite amount payable in installments, rather than as an amount that fluctuates with income.

Allen v. Allen · filed 2013-10-09(a)(2)(A)

The child support guidelines have evolved over time, but at least since the Hanselman opinion, in March 2001, the law has been that child support must be calculated in a definite amount that is payable in installments rather than in an amount that fluctuates month to month.

Section 36-5-101(a)(2) requires a child support order to set a fixed, definite amount.

Heather Anne Gulish Gladwell v. Tony Neil Gladwell, Jr. · filed 2015-07-20(a)(2)

In this case, the trial court set Wife‟s child support obligation at “about $3956.” Because this amount is not definite as required by the statute, we remand this matter to the trial court for entry of an order setting Wife‟s child support in a fixed, definite amount.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires courts to apply the child support guidelines as a rebuttable presumption and permits a supported downward deviation.

Kernan v. Beverly J. Kernan Nabors · filed 2016-02-01(e)(1)(A)

The trial court is required to apply the child support guidelines as a rebuttable presumption. Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-101(e)(1)(A); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.07(1)(a). ... We conclude the court was authorized to apply a downward deviation to the presumptive child support guidelines based on the facts of the case and did not abuse its discretion in making deductions from Mother‟s gross income before calculating the proper amount of child support to award.

An above-guideline child support award requires the court to consider all of the obligor’s available income and specifically find that the deviation is reasonably necessary.

Lee Stack, III v. Stack · filed 2016-08-04(e)(1)(B)

In making its determination, the court must consider all available income of the obligor and make a specific finding that the deviation is reasonably necessary. ... The court considered both Father‟s available income and the goals of the Guidelines in its determination that an upward deviation of $100 was reasonably necessary in this case.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires courts to apply the child support guidelines as a rebuttable presumption when setting support.

Parrish v. Griggs · filed 2017-05-25(e)(1)(A)

Still, the court’s discretion is cabined by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) (Supp. 2016), which states that “the court shall apply, as a rebuttable presumption, the child support guidelines.”

Section 36-5-101(e) does not permit childcare expenses to serve as the basis for an upward child support deviation when the parenting plan separately requires the parent to pay a share of those expenses.

Gordon v. Gordon · filed 2018-10-16(e)

Moreover, because the parenting plan ordered the parties to divide childcare expenses equally, Father was specifically obligated to pay one-half of the childcare expenses. As a result, these expenses may not be considered as the basis for an upward deviation.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) makes the amount calculated under the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines the presumptive child support amount.

Cain-Swope v. Swope · filed 2016-12-23(e)(1)(A)

The amount of child support derived from a proper application of the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines sets the presumptive amount of support.

The amount calculated under the Child Support Guidelines is presumptive but rebuttable.

Maher v. Woodruff · filed 2017-04-13(e)(1)(A)

The amount of child support derived from the application of the formula set forth in the Child Support Guidelines is the presumptive amount of child support, and this amount is rebuttable. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04.01(1)(d)(1).

When considering child support above the guideline amount, the court must consider all available income of the obligor and specifically find that the deviation is reasonably necessary.

Christy Keller Elrod Church v. Elrod · filed 2019-03-25(e)(1)(B)

In making its determination, the court must consider all available income of the obligor and make a specific finding that the deviation is reasonably necessary.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) makes the child support guidelines a rebuttable presumption and permits an appropriate downward deviation when a child is in neither parent’s care.

Mitra v. Irigreddy · filed 2019-05-29(e)(1)(A)

We agree; however, the court is provided a certain amount of discretion in setting the support obligation and may deviate from the guidelines when appropriate. Following our review, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a downward deviation for the period of time that the Child was not in either party’s care.

A court deviating from the child support guidelines must state the guideline amount and justify the variance in written findings.

Wright v. Wright · filed 2019-09-06(e)(1)(A)

However, the trial court failed to state the amount of support that would have been ordered under the child support guidelines. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(e)(1)(A); it also failed to state its justification for the variance from the guidelines or why the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. Id. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the trial court’s order requiring father to pay excess child support, and remand to the trial court with instructions to make the requisite findings, pursuant to applicable law, and consistent with this opinion.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) makes the child support guidelines a rebuttable presumption and permits an upward deviation for a readily ascertainable special-needs expense.

Kibbe v. Kibbe · filed 2020-01-30(e)(1)(A)

In this state, child support is governed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-101. “In making the court’s determination concerning the amount of support of any minor child or children of the parties, the court shall apply, as a rebuttable presumption, the child support guidelines” that are promulgated by the Tennessee Department of Human Services Child Support Service Division. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A). ... Under these circumstances, we uphold the court’s upward deviation in child support when the amount of the special needs expense is readily ascertainable.

When continuing child support beyond a child’s minority, a court may use the child support guidelines to set the amount but is not bound by them.

Wilder v. Wilder · filed 2020-03-06(k)(3)

No doubt, when continuing child support beyond a child’s minority, a court is not bound by but “may use” the guidelines to set support.

Section 36-5-101(k)(3) permits, but does not require, a court to use the child support guidelines when setting support for a severely disabled child.

Niemeyer v. Niemeyer · filed 2024-04-17(k)(3)

As noted in Lillard, 2021 WL 861769, at n.3, the trial court was not required to use the child support guidelines in a section 36-5-101(k) matter. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(k)(3).

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) presumes child support will follow the guidelines and requires written findings to justify a deviation, including the presumptive amount and the reason for the variance.

In Re Gabby G. · filed 2025-08-13(e)(1)(A)

There is no finding of what the presumptive amount of support would be, that it would be inappropriate to apply the guidelines to this case, or that a deviation is in the child’s best interest. ... But the trial court failed to make the required findings to support a deviation in this case.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) requires courts to apply the Child Support Guidelines as a rebuttable presumption when setting child support.

Caroline Brown Smithwick v. Fred Barksdale Smithwick, IV · filed 2025-11-12(e)(1)(A)

The statute requires the court to apply the Child Support Guidelines as a rebuttable presumption.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) makes the presumptive child support amount rebuttable.

Taylor v. George Green Taylor, III · filed 2022-10-27(e)(1)(A)

This amount of support is rebuttable, however. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A). ... Consequently, we agree with the trial court that an upward deviation in Father’s presumptive child support for extraordinary educational expenses is appropriate and serves the children’s best interests.

Section 36-5-101(e)(1)(D) requires written findings to support a deviation from the child support guidelines.

Spight v. Spight · filed 2019-03-21(e)(1)(D)

If the trial court deviates from the Guidelines, the statute requires the trial court to make “written findings” to support the deviation. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-2-311(a)(11)(B), (F); see also Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-5-101(e)(1)(A), (D); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-2-4-.06(2).

Subsection (k) does not apply retroactively because its contempt enforcement provision has a penal component.

Kuykendall v. Wheeler · filed 1994-12-05(k)

In our examination of Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(k) we find that it is primarily procedural in nature. ... we hold that it should not be applied retroactively.

Section 36-5-101(a)(2)(B) does not retroactively terminate alimony obligations established before its enactment when the recipient remarries.

Julia Leach Bryan v. Leach · filed 1999-04-15(a)(2)(B)

We will not apply Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(2)(B) retroactively to create an automatic termination of contractual obligations undertaken and rights vested prior to its enactment.

Section 36-5-101(a)(2)(B)'s automatic termination of alimony upon remarriage does not apply retroactively to contractual obligations and rights established before its enactment.

Bryan v. Leach · filed 2001-06-05(a)(2)(B)

We will not apply Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(2)(B) retroactively to create an automatic termination of contractual obligations undertaken and rights vested prior to its enactment.

The July 1, 2003 amendment to section 36-5-101(e)(4) does not apply retroactively to earlier child support orders.

Reed v. Kidd · filed 2004-04-01(e)(4)

However, this amendment became effective on July 1, 2003 and does not provide for retroactivity.

Section 36-5-101(d) requires consideration of its alimony factors when awarding attorney’s fees as alimony; an award is inappropriate when the spouse has sufficient funds to pay those fees.

Wade v. Wade · filed 1994-12-05(d)

The factors set forth above require us to reverse the trial court’s award of alimony in the amount of $15,000.00 to be applied to Wife’s attorney’s fees. Moreover, we have modified the trial court’s property division and Wife now has a sufficient award from which to pay her attorney’s fees.

Section 36-5-101(d) supplies factors for deciding whether to award alimony and attorney's fees; the decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

James William Miller, Jr. v. Prentice-Miller · filed 1995-11-01(d)

In view of the court's findings and considering the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(d), we do not think the trial judge abused his discretion in this case.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts awarding attorney fees as alimony to consider the parties’ financial resources; support from a new partner may reduce a party’s need or count as a financial resource.

McCray v. Irene Carol Klanseck McCray · filed 1997-08-10(d)(1)

Since attorney fees are considered an award of alimony, the trial court should again consider the relevant factors in 36-5-101(d)(1) before making such an award. ... We believe that for purposes of alimony, the support that Mr. McCray receives from Ms. McClarnon may be considered either as reducing his need or as a financial resource that falls in the category of “all other sources.” We therefore do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Ms. McCray.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts awarding attorney’s fees as spousal support to balance the statutory factors, including financial need and ability to pay.

Lonnie Wilder v. Wilder · filed 2001-08-29(d)(1)

Spousal support decisions require a “careful balancing” of the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-101(d)(1). ... In this case, the Trial Judge did not engage in the analysis and balancing of the statutory factors in making the award, never addressing the issue of the husband’s need and the wife’s ability to pay.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts to balance the statutory spousal-support factors when deciding an attorney’s-fee award.

Wilder v. Wilder · filed 2001-09-24(d)(1)

Spousal support decisions require a “careful balancing” of the factors set forth in Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits a court to consider its spousal support factors, including relative fault, when awarding attorney’s fees.

Shelia Bland v. Bland · filed 2002-02-20(d)(1)

The trial court could consider the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1), including the relative fault of the parties. Moreover, Wife should not be required to dissipate the funds acquired in the division of property when Husband can pay the fees.

Fault may be considered when awarding attorney’s fees as alimony, but fault alone cannot justify an award without demonstrated need.

Dawn Larsen Niceley v. James Jacob Niceley, IV · filed 2002-03-21(d)(1)(K)

Attorney’s fees in a divorce case are not awarded on a “prevailing party” theory. Thus, fault in the breakup of the marriage alone does not justify an award of such fees as spousal support because a spouse with adequate property and income is not entitled to an award of additional alimony for attorney’s fees.

Section 36-5-101(d) makes need the controlling factor when attorney’s and witness fees are awarded as alimony.

Powell v. Patsy Powell · filed 2003-01-21(d)

Attorney’s fees constitute alimony in solido, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(2002) sets forth the relevant factors to consider when making an alimony award. ... Need is the critical factor to be considered in making an award of alimony, and an award of attorney’s fees is proper when one spouse is disadvantaged and does not have sufficient resources with which to pay attorney's fees. ... As the award of witness fees also took the form of alimony, need would also be the controlling factor in determining the propriety of an award of such fees.

Section 36-5-101(d) treats attorney’s and witness fees awarded as alimony as dependent on need, including whether the spouse has resources to pay them.

Powell v. Powell · filed 2003-04-07(d)

Attorney’s fees constitute alimony in solido, and Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(2002) sets forth the relevant factors to consider when making an alimony award. ... In the instant case Mrs. Powell did not lack resources to prosecute her suit and the final decree certainly provides funds out of which these attorney and witness fees may be paid. The award of attorney’s fees and witness fees to Mrs. Powell was, therefore, in error and is reversed.

Property received in a divorce is a factor in deciding an alimony award for attorney’s fees.

Nigro v. Nigro · filed 2003-07-11(d)(H)

In addition, he received a substantial amount of property in the final decree, a factor to be considered in an alimony award. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(H). In view of the broad discretion given to trial judges in these matters, we are not persuaded to alter the allocation of attorney’s fees ordered in the trial court.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(E) requires courts awarding attorney’s fees as alimony in solido to consider the statutory factors, including the division of marital property.

Farnsworth v. Sidney W. Farnsworth, Iii · filed 2003-10-17(d)(1)(E)

Because an award of attorney’s fees is considered alimony in solido, the trial court must consider the relevant factors enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(E) (2003). ... Because one of those factors to consider is “[t]he provisions made with regard to the marital property as defined in § 36-4-121" and this Court has remanded this cause for further findings on the issue of the parties’ marital debts, we are unable to determine the propriety of an award of attorney’s fees.

Section 36-5-101(d) provides the factors used to determine attorney fee awards as a form of spousal support.

Gulvartian v. Gulvartian · filed 2004-02-24(d)

Attorney fee awards are treated as a form of spousal support determined by consideration of the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d).

Attorney’s fees awarded as alimony are subject to the spousal support factors in § 36-5-101(d)(1).

Sandlin v. Sandlin · filed 2004-06-03(d)(1)

As alimony, an award of attorney’s fees is subject to the same statutory factors enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) (2001).

Attorney’s fees awarded as spousal support require consideration and balancing of all relevant factors, including those listed in subsection (d)(1).

Christopher Grey Cummings v. Pepper Lynne Werner Cummings · filed 2004-10-15(d)(1)

Therefore, all relevant factors, including those listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1), are to be considered and balanced in a determination of whether to award attorney’s fees.

Section 36-5-101(d)'s alimony factors govern whether to award attorney's fees as alimony.

Bevill v. Ellis M. Bevill, Sr. · filed 2004-12-30(d)

In determining whether or not such an award is appropriate, a trial court is therefore directed to consider the same statutory factors as those used to order alimony, which are set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(E) requires courts considering attorney’s fees as spousal support to weigh its listed factors, especially the spouse’s need and the other spouse’s ability to pay.

Carol Ann Vick Watson v. Frank Lee Watson, Jr. · filed 2005-02-16(d)(1)(E)

As a result, a trial court must consider the factors enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(E), with the most important factors being the need of the economically disadvantaged spouse and the ability of the obligor spouse to pay.

Section 36-5-101 supplies the factors courts use to decide whether to award attorney fees as spousal support in a divorce case.

Cantrell v. Cantrell · filed 2005-03-28

Thus, when deciding whether an award of attorney fees is appropriate, the courts rely on the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101, such as the relative earning capacity and education of the parties, the length of the marriage, the parties’ age and physical conditions, the relative fault of the parties and such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.

Courts must consider the subsection (d)(1) alimony factors when deciding whether to award attorney’s fees as spousal support.

Edenfield v. Kara Leigh Cooper Edenfield · filed 2005-10-31(d)(1)

Therefore, the statutory factors listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) are to be considered in a determination of whether to award attorney’s fees.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(E) requires courts deciding whether to award attorney’s fees as alimony to consider the statutory alimony factors.

Bell v. William Hall Bell · filed 2004-11-29(d)(1)(E)

As previously indicated, in determining whether to award fees to Wife, the trial court was required to consider the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(d)(1).

Section 36-5-101(d)’s alimony factors apply to attorney-fee awards as alimony in solido; fees may be awarded when a spouse needs help paying them to avoid depleting awarded assets and the other spouse can pay.

Deborah B. Hall Byrd v. Byrd · filed 2004-12-21(d)

As with any alimony award, in deciding whether to award attorney's fees as alimony in solido, the trial court should consider the relevant factors enumerated in T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d), see supra. ... Here, Husband has the means to provide a portion of Wife’s attorney fees, and Wife continues to have some need of assistance in paying her attorney’s fees in order to avoid a depletion of assets that the trial court awarded. Consequently, we hold that the trial court erred in not awarding Wife at least some portion of her attorney’s fees.

Section 36-5-101(d) requires courts to consider alimony factors when deciding whether to award attorney fees as alimony in solido, including the obligor’s ability to pay.

Simmons v. Simmons · filed 2006-01-31(d)

Courts are to consider the relevant factors under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d) when deciding whether to award alimony, and attorney fees are considered a form of alimony in solido. Koja v. Koja, 42 S.W.3d 94, 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). We have already determined the financial obligations, specifically alimony, imposed on Husband exceeded his ability to pay. Awarding attorney fees would only aggravate the matter.

Courts deciding whether to award attorney fees in a divorce should consider the alimony factors in subsection (d)(1)(E).

Watkins v. William C. Watkins, Jr. · filed 2004-12-14(d)(1)(E)

In determining whether to award attorney fees, a trial court should consider the relevant factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(E), supra.

Section 36-5-101 permits a court to award a former spouse attorney’s fees as alimony in solido in an alimony modification proceeding.

Owens v. James Emery Owens · filed 2013-07-30

In addition, a court may award a former spouse attorney’s fees as alimony in solido pursuant to § 36-5-101 in a modification or alimony proceeding.

Section 36-5-101 provides a basis for awarding attorney’s fees in post-divorce support proceedings.

Wiser v. Cyrus W. Wiser, Jr. · filed 2015-04-30

Wife is entitled to an award of her fees pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-5-101 and 36-5-103(c).

Section 36-5-101(i)’s alimony factors apply when deciding whether to award attorney’s fees as alimony in solido.

Ingram v. Ingram · filed 2018-06-07(i)

After reviewing the facts of this case, we have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife alimony in solido in the amount of $7,500.00. Here, the trial court considered the relevant statutory factors used in making alimony determinations noting that the parties were married for twenty-six years, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(i)(3), Wife’s disability, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(i)(5), Husband’s fault in the divorce, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(i)(11), and the sources of incomes of each party, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(i)(1).

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) bars retroactive modification of child support, but allows a credit for support the obligor provided directly by paying for the child’s necessaries.

Vicky v. Klein · filed 1996-05-31(a)(5)

Specifically, this court has acknowledged that the statute prohibits retroactive modifications of child support payments. As for credits, however, this court has held that they are not modifications. Instead, the credit recognizes that the obligor parent provided the support the court ordered in the first place. ... Applying these rules to the present case, it is clear that Appellant is entitled to a credit.

A petition for relief under subsection (a)(5) is unnecessary to offset expenditures against child support arrearages, although a child support obligation cannot be modified retroactively.

Dix v. Carson · filed 1998-12-17(a)(5)

While a child support obligation cannot be modified retroactively, a petition for relief pursuant to § 36-5-101(a)(5) need not be filed in order to offset expenditures against child support arrearages.

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) prevents retroactive forgiveness of accrued child support; the parents’ remarriage does not automatically bar collection of arrearages accrued before remarriage.

Pass v. Pass · filed 1999-02-24(a)(5)

Based on the reasoning in the cases espousing the majority view, as well as Tennessee law proscribing the retroactive modification or forgiveness of accrued child support arrearages, we hold that claims for child support arrearages based on the parties’ first divorce decree, which accrue prior to the parties’ remarriage, are not as a matter of law barred by their remarriage.

Section 36-5-101(a)(4) permits child support payments to be directed to the court clerk or directly to the spouse; payments made directly to a child may be credited for necessities the custodial parent did not provide.

Paula Sue Gilbert Brownyard v. Brownyard · filed 2000-11-08(a)(4)

Child support is usually paid to the clerk of the court or to the custodial parent. ... There is no evidence in the record that the checks written to Ryan Brownyard and RG Brownyard were for necessities for Ryan that were not provided by Mother, the custodial parent.

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) bars laches as a defense to a claim for child support arrearages.

Patsy Moss v. McGarvey · filed 2002-10-15(a)(5)

The statute expressly prohibited any such retroactive modifications, stating that child support orders “shall be a judgment entitled to be enforced as any other judgment of a court.” ... Therefore, we must conclude that the trial court did not err in rejecting Father’s laches defense, and in granting Mother’s petition.

The parent owed child support retains the right to recover an arrearage after the child reaches majority.

Lichtenwalter v. Lichtenwalter · filed 2007-07-12(f)

Other portions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36 — 5—101(f) support the conclusion that the parent to whom child support is owed is entitled to seek reimbursement for a child support arrearage even if the child has reached majority by the time the suit is filed.

Payments made to third parties for a child’s expenses at the custodial parent’s express direction may be credited against a child support obligation.

Tracye Jenae Simpson (Brogden) v. Simpson · filed 2006-06-26(a)(4)

We do not believe these same payments lose their character as child support simply because Mother, instead of directing the payments to go into her checking account, directed the payments to go to third parties in payment of expenses incurred by Mother for the child.

Section 36-5-101(f)(3) allows a court to change the monthly payment applied to a child support arrearage after the child reaches adulthood.

King v. Wulff · filed 2011-10-04(f)(3)

The statute specifically states that the current monthly child support amount shall stay in place “[a]bsent a court order to the contrary.” There is nothing in the statute to limit the court’s authority to change by court order the monthly payment to be applied toward an arrearage.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) bars retroactive modification of a child support order but allows a court to find that ordered support was satisfied through deposits into a joint account available to the custodial parent.

Estes v. Estes · filed 2012-04-16(f)(1)

The express words of the statute governing child support make it clear that a child support order may not be retroactively modified. ... Based on the facts of this case, we conclude Father satisfied his obligation to pay $1,270 a month in child support throughout the parties’ period of reconciliation, from June 2002 through August 2006.

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) bars retroactive modification of child support awards, but permits credit for necessaries an obligated parent provided to the child.

Castle v. Baker · filed 2001-09-21(a)(5)

Mother’s reliance upon Benson as support for this argument is not well based, because the Benson Court acknowledged, unequivocally, that the necessaries rule does not violate Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(5).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(E)(xii) requires trial courts to consider each party’s tax consequences when setting child support, including dependency exemptions, even if a party raises the issue only after trial.

Kendrick v. Kendrick · filed 1997-06-26(d)(1)(E)(xii)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(E)(xii) requires trial courts to consider the tax consequences to each party when fashioning child support payments. ... The duty of a trial court to make these considerations is clear from the statute and need not be raised by the parties to take effect.

When setting child support, subsection (d)(1)(L) calls for consideration of tax consequences and allows the court to allocate the child’s federal dependency exemption to a noncustodial parent in its discretion.

Karen Gale Engel v. Jerry Burton Young, Sr. · filed 2002-05-31(d)(1)(L)

In fashioning child support orders, the trial court should consider “such other factors, including the tax consequences to each party, as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(L). ... Thus, in fashioning the support order herein, the trial court was authorized to order Mother to execute a release that would enable Father to obtain the federal tax exemption, and we review the trial court decision on the allocation of the exemption for the child under the abuse of discretion standard.

Section 36-5-101(d)(2) requires a substantial and material change in circumstances before a court may extend or otherwise modify a rehabilitative alimony award, including a temporary, open-ended award.

Perry v. Perry · filed 2003-08-27(d)(2)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-101(d)(2) places limitations on a court’s ability to extend, or otherwise modify, its initial rehabilitative alimony award. In particular, it requires the court to make a finding that a substantial and material change in circumstances exists before the court may modify the award.

A party seeking to terminate rehabilitative alimony because of changed circumstances must petition the trial court before raising the issue on appeal.

Emily Patricia Russell Ray v. James Franklin Ray, Sr. · filed 2005-08-16(d)(2)

Finally, it is our determination that the issue of whether the award of rehabilitative alimony to Ms. Ray should be terminated based upon the changed circumstances alleged by Mr. Ray in his brief should have been requested upon petition to the trial court prior to appeal to this Court. In this regard, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(2)(2001 & Supp. 2004) provides, An award of rehabilitative, temporary support and maintenance shall remain in the court’s control for the duration of such award, and may be increased, decreased, terminated, extended, or otherwise modified, upon a showing of substantial and material change in circumstances.

Section 36-5-101 requires child support payments in Title IV-D cases to be paid through the trial court clerk or the Department of Human Services.

Sandra K. Baker (Abroms) v. State of Tennessee, ex rel., Gary D. Baker · filed 1997-12-05(a)(4)(A), (a)(4)(E)(i)

While trial courts have discretion in cases not covered by Title IV-D, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(4)(A), -101(a)(4)(E)(i) require child support payments in all Title IV-D cases to be paid through either the trial court clerk or the Department of Human Services.

Section 36-5-101(g) does not limit required life insurance coverage to the total amount of child support owed.

Judith Ann Warren Taylor v. Taylor · filed 1998-06-08(g)

We read nothing in the statute and find nothing in the case law which forces the trial court to limit the amount of Husband’s life insurance to the amount of child support ordered by the court.

Section 36-5-101(g) permits a court to require life insurance to secure an alimony obligation.

Davis v. Davis · filed 2002-11-12(g)

The Order to obtain life insurance to secure the obligation was a remedy available to the Trial Court. See Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-101(g), and see Cunningham v. Cunningham, 2000 WL 33191364 at *9. Accord, Emison v. Emison, 1999 WL 1336054 at *12, and Dix v. Carson, 1998 WL886555 (Dec. 17, 1998). We find no abuse of discretion in the Trial Court’s ruling on this issue.

Section 36-5-101(g) permits life insurance to secure alimony, and the court should consider whether an existing policy can name the other spouse as beneficiary.

Cain v. Cain · filed 2004-03-03(g)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g) provides support for Husband’s argument by providing that “[t]he court may direct either or both parties to designate the other party . . . as beneficiaries under any existing policies insuring the life of either party.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g) (Supp. 2003). On remand, in the event that the trial court awards Wife life insurance, the trial court should consider whether Husband has any existing life insurance to which Wife could be named as a beneficiary.

Section 36-5-101(g) permits a court to direct either or both parties to maintain life insurance, but does not apply to a request to change which parent maintains insurance when the parties agreed on that obligation.

Williams v. George Jay Williams, IV · filed 2005-05-24(g)

While Father is correct that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g) does provide as stated, the parties in this case contractually agreed that Father and not Mother would maintain life insurance. Thus, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g) is not applicable to the issue before us.

Section 36-5-101(i) gives the trial court discretion to let a parent choose a life insurance beneficiary to serve as trustee for the children.

Peters v. Sharon Olene (Coats) Peters · filed 2009-02-19(i)

We believe the above statute gives the trial court the discretion to allow father to designate a beneficiary of his choice as trustee for the benefit of the children and find no abuse of that discretion.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) does not give a divorce court continuing jurisdiction to order child support after the child turns eighteen.

Day v. Vici Martha Day Gaywood · filed 1999-04-19(a)(1)

The provisions cited above authorize the divorce court to order support for a “child,” “minor child,” “children,” or “minor children” of the parties. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1) (Supp. 1998); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(1) (Supp. 1998). ... Consistent with Kilby and Scott, we find nothing in Tennessee’s domestic relations statutes authorizing a divorce court to exercise continuing jurisdiction over a child who is over eighteen years of age.

Section 36-5-101(p)(2) requires continuing support for a severely disabled child, subject to findings on the child’s best interest and the obligor’s ability to pay.

State ex rel. Margaret Holtsinger v. Elrod · filed 2001-12-10(p)(2)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(p)(2) requires (as did the common law) continuing support of a severely disabled child, subject to findings of the child’s best interest and the obligors ability to pay.

Section 36-5-101(p)(3) permits courts to use the child support guidelines to set continued support for a disabled adult child, including an increase in the amount.

Clayton O. Lovlace, Jr. v. Susan Verlain Irvine Lovlace · filed 2004-06-28(p)(3)

Thus, section 36-5-101(p)(1)-(2) provide the court with the statutory authority to extend the obligation of child support beyond the age of majority, and 36-5-101(p)(3) provides that it may set the amount of that obligation in accordance with the child support guidelines. ... Reading the statutory scheme as a whole, we disagree with Mr. Lovlace that the trial court lacked the authority to increase his child support obligation based upon the child support guidelines.

Section 36-5-101(p)(2) permits continued support for a severely disabled adult child only when support was ordered during the child’s minority or as a modification of another valid support order.

In Re: Conservatorship of Michael Thomas Jones and Timothy Alan Jones Beverly Anne Jones v. Jones · filed 2004-12-22(p)(2)

Therefore, in applying section 36-5-101(p)(2), we must conclude that a trial court has the authority to “continue child support” for a severely disabled child only where an order awarding support was entered when the child was a minor, or as a modification of any other valid child support order.

Section 36-5-101(p)(2) permits continued support for a severely disabled adult child living under a parent’s care when that care serves the child’s best interest and the obligor can pay.

Finn v. Mary Louise Summer Bundy · filed 2005-02-22(p)(2)

The final requirement for the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(p)(2) is that the obligor parent, here Mr. Finn, is financially able to pay support. ... Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order that Mr. Finn continue to provide support for the benefit of his adult disabled child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(p)(2).

Under the pre-2008 version of § 36-5-101(k), a divorce court lacked jurisdiction to make an initial child support award after a severely disabled child reached eighteen.

Edith Nell Allen Shaw v. Shaw · filed 2011-09-21(k)(2)

In the case at bar, James had already reached the age of eighteen before Mother filed her divorce petition and before the divorce court ordered Father to pay child support for James. Based upon the reasoning of Jones, we therefore conclude that the divorce court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of child support for James, and the court’s order requiring Father to pay such support was void and unenforceable.

Whether a child is severely disabled requires an individualized assessment of how physical and mental impairments affect the child’s ability to live independently.

Beverly Lynn Durham (Hess) Cook v. James Preston Hess, III · filed 2013-04-24(k)(2)

Moreover, the determination of whether a particular person is “severely disabled” requires an individualized assessment of how that person’s physical and mental impairments affect his or her ability to live independently.