Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative alimony when rehabilitation is feasible; a fixed payment period alone does not make an award alimony in solido.

Copenhagen v. Copenhagen · filed 2002-10-10(d)(1)

At the trial October 30, 1998, the trial court made a specific finding that Mrs. Copenhagen was not, at that time, employable, but made no findings that rehabilitation was not feasible. The alimony awarded, giving proper effect to the legislative preference expressed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-101(d)(1), is rehabilitative and not in solido.

Section 36-5-101(d) expresses a strong preference for rehabilitative support whenever possible.

Garland v. Tonia Garland · filed 2002-12-11(d)

The strong policy preference for awarding rehabilitative support whenever possible is clearly expressed by the legislature in statute as well as in court decisions.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative support when an economically disadvantaged spouse can become self-sufficient.

Duke v. Duke · filed 2003-01-14(d)(1)

We have determined that Ms. Duke is capable of becoming self-sufficient and that the statutory factors weigh in favor of rehabilitative support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative alimony when a disadvantaged spouse can become self-sufficient, even at a lower standard of living than during the marriage.

Goldberg v. Goldberg · filed 2003-01-16(d)(1)

From Robertson and Crabtree, we must conclude that, although the alimony statute refers to the parties’ relative earning capacity and their standard of living as factors to be considered, these factors have been deemed of only marginal relevance to the issue of whether the obligee spouse can be rehabilitated. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101 (d)(1)(A) and (I) (2001). Rather, the focus under both Crabtree and Robertson appears to be whether the obligee spouse can earn enough money to be self-sufficient, even if at a level far below the parties’ former standard of living and even if the earning capacity of the obligor spouse is far greater.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative alimony when the disadvantaged spouse can be rehabilitated.

Carroll v. Carroll · filed 2003-02-10(d)(1)

As the Supreme Court has pointed out on numerous occasions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) expresses a clear preference for rehabilitative alimony.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative spousal support when the recipient can become economically self-sufficient.

Barlow v. Barlow · filed 2003-03-19(d)(1)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) reflects a legislative preference for rehabilitative spousal support.

Rehabilitative alimony requires a finding that the disadvantaged spouse is capable of rehabilitation; when rehabilitation is not feasible, long-term support is appropriate.

Sanders v. Sanders · filed 2003-05-06(d)

The essential finding for an award of rehabilitative support is that the disadvantaged spouse is “capable of rehabilitation.”

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative alimony over alimony in futuro when rehabilitation is feasible.

Edmisten v. Edmisten · filed 2003-05-13(d)(1)

Where such disadvantage exists, the legislature has expressed a preference for rehabilitative alimony over long-term, open-ended alimony in futuro. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1); Robertson, 76 S.W.3d at 339-40; Burlew, 40 S.W.3d at 470; Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d at 358. ... Based upon the facts of this case, we conclude that rehabilitative alimony for a reasonable period would allow Wife to make the economic adjustment accompanying divorce. Consequently, we modify the award of alimony in futuro to an award of rehabilitative alimony.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits long-term spousal support when a spouse is economically disadvantaged and rehabilitation is not feasible after consideration of the relevant factors.

Nelson v. Nelson · filed 2002-05-21(d)(1)

However, where there is such relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation is not feasible in consideration of all relevant factors, including those set forth in the statute, the court may order support on a long-term basis or until death or remarriage of the recipient.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits long-term spousal support when a spouse is economically disadvantaged and rehabilitation is not feasible.

Nelson v. Nelson · filed 2002-07-23(d)(1)

However, where there is such relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation is not feasible in consideration of all relevant factors, including those set forth in the statute, the court may order support on a long-term basis or until death or remarriage of the recipient.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits alimony in futuro when rehabilitation is not feasible after consideration of all relevant factors, despite its preference for rehabilitative alimony.

Bowie v. Bowie · filed 2002-08-23(d)(1)

While we acknowledge that the legislature has expressed a preference for rehabilitative alimony in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1), the record on appeal shows, as found by the Trial Court, that Wife's possibilities to rehabilitate herself are limited. ... Accordingly, after applying all relevant statutory factors to the facts and circumstances shown by the record, we hold the Trial Court's award of alimony in futuro, as opposed to rehabilitative alimony, was not an abuse of discretion, and we affirm on this issue.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative alimony but permits long-term alimony when rehabilitation is not feasible after consideration of the relevant factors.

Bowie v. Bowie · filed 2002-10-29(d)(1)

While we acknowledge that the legislature has expressed a preference for rehabilitative alimony in Tenn.Code Ann. § 36 — 5—101(d)(1), the record on appeal shows, as found by the Trial Court, that Wife’s possibilities to rehabilitate herself are limited. ... Accordingly, after applying all relevant statutory factors to the facts and circumstances shown by the record, we hold the Trial Court’s award of alimony in futuro, as opposed to rehabilitative alimony, was not an abuse of discretion, and we affirm on this issue.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits alimony in futuro when the relevant factors show that an economically disadvantaged spouse cannot be rehabilitated.

Smith v. Riley Smith · filed 2002-11-20(d)(1)

Because of her profession, which is woefully underpaid, her age, her education, her health, her standard of living, and the disparity between the parties’ respective earning potentials, we hold that the award of alimony in futuro was predicated upon a finding that Ms. Smith cannot be economically rehabilitated.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits alimony in futuro when rehabilitation is not feasible, despite a preference for rehabilitative alimony.

Daniel v. Daniel · filed 2002-11-26(d)(1)

Nevertheless, while rehabilitative alimony is preferred, when rehabilitation is not feasible, the trial court may award alimony in futuro.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative spousal support, but permits long-term support when the circumstances warrant it.

Bernstein v. Bernstein · filed 2002-05-14(d)(1)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) (2001) reflects a preference for temporary, rehabilitative spousal support, as opposed to long-term support. ... The statutory preference for rehabilitative support does not entirely displace other forms of spousal support when the facts warrant long-term or more open- ended support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits permanent alimony when rehabilitation is not feasible after consideration of the relevant factors.

Dube v. Dube · filed 2002-12-09(d)(1)

While the legislature has expressed a preference for rehabilitative alimony in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1), the record on appeal shows, as found by the Trial Court, that Wife's possibilities to rehabilitate herself are extremely limited. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1). The evidence contained in the record does not preponderate against this finding by the Trial Court or against the Trial Court’s specific finding that “[t]here is no way this lady can be rehabilitated.” Accordingly, after applying all relevant statutory factors to the facts and circumstances shown by the record, we hold the Trial Court's award of permanent alimony, as opposed to rehabilitative alimony, was not an abuse of discretion, and we affirm on this issue.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits alimony in futuro when rehabilitation of an economically disadvantaged spouse is not feasible after considering the relevant factors.

Overstreet v. Overstreet · filed 2003-06-03(d)(1)

Where, considering all the relevant factors, rehabilitation is not possible, the courts should not refrain from awarding long-term support when that support is appropriate under the statutory factors. ... Therefore, we conclude that rehabilitative alimony is not required and that alimony in futuro is appropriate.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits long-term spousal support when one spouse is economically disadvantaged and rehabilitation is not feasible.

Hazel Ann Edde v. Edde · filed 2003-06-03(d)(1)

When granting a divorce, a court may grant an order for the payment of spousal support on a long-term basis or until the death or remarriage of the recipient spouse if there is relative economic disadvantage between the spouses and rehabilitation is not feasible.

The amount of alimony in futuro must be determined in accordance with the factors listed in § 36-5-101(d)(1).

Rose Marie Harper Britt v. Britt · filed 2003-10-15(d)(1)

We accordingly modify the award of alimony to Wife to an award of alimony in futuro. We remand for a determination of the amount of alimony in accordance with the factors enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits long-term spousal support when a spouse is economically disadvantaged and rehabilitation is not feasible after consideration of all relevant factors.

Miller v. Miller · filed 2003-12-10(d)(1)

The support statute itself provides for the grant of an award of support on a long-term basis “where there is such relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation is not feasible in consideration of all relevant factors.”

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires an award of alimony in futuro to be supported by evidence of the recipient’s need and the payer’s ability to pay.

Hazen v. Hazen · filed 2004-06-14(d)(1)

While consideration of the factors mentioned by the trial court militates towards an award of alimony in futuro for Wife, the lack of evidence in the record to support those factors along with the lack of Wife’s need and Husband’s inability to pay leads this Court to conclude that such an award is error.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits alimony in futuro when the economically disadvantaged spouse cannot be rehabilitated after consideration of the statutory factors.

Evans v. Evans · filed 2004-07-06(d)(1)

In addition, the trial court found, after considering all relevant factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(d), that Appellee could not be economically rehabilitated. Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it awarded alimony in futuro rather than rehabilitative alimony.

Section 36-5-101 permits alimony in futuro when economic rehabilitation is not feasible and long-term support is necessary; the award requires sufficient evidence to support that finding.

James R. Morrissett, Jr. v. Robbie Claire McKee Morrissett · filed 2004-07-23(d)(1)(E)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(E) (Supp. 2003). ... Where such rehabilitation is not feasible, long-term support is necessary, and the court may award alimony in futuro. ... Based on the record before us, we must conclude that Wife did not submit evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro, and that the award was therefore an abuse of discretion.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) distinguishes rehabilitative alimony from alimony in solido; an award should not be classified as rehabilitative when rehabilitation is unlikely.

Blevins v. Blevins · filed 2003-12-30(d)(1)

Rehabilitative support and maintenance is a separate class of spousal support as distinguished from alimony in solido and periodic alimony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1). ... Accordingly, we find that the award of rehabilitative alimony is not supported by the facts of this case. Nevertheless, we agree that Wife is deserving of alimony; therefore, the trial court’s award of $3,500 per month for 60 months is modified to alimony in solido rather than rehabilitative.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits a court to condition rehabilitative alimony on the recipient completing education within a set time and earning passing grades.

Igou v. Igou · filed 2004-02-25(d)(1)

Trial courts have wide discretion in awarding alimony, including the discretion to make alimony subject to conditions imposed by the court.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits long-term alimony when an economically disadvantaged spouse cannot be rehabilitated, with need and ability to pay central to the award.

Myrtle Marie Stagner v. Stagner · filed 2004-02-27(d)(1)

After carefully reviewing the record in light of the statutory criteria listed above, we hold the Trial Court erred in failing to award Wife long-term alimony.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative alimony when an economically disadvantaged spouse can be rehabilitated.

Cox v. Cox · filed 2004-05-05(d)(1)

Based upon the facts before us, including Wife’s desire and ability to be rehabilitated, we find that the indefinite award of possession of the marital residence to Wife with Husband having the substantial financial obligations for the mortgage is not supported by the evidence. This finding is based in part on the fact that Wife is relatively young and in good health and is pursuing an education and a new career. Moreover, there is a preference for rehabilitative alimony over alimony in futuro.

Section 36-5-101 expresses a preference for rehabilitative alimony when an economically disadvantaged spouse can be rehabilitated.

MaGill v. MaGill · filed 2004-08-31(d)(1)(C)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101 clearly reflects a legislative preference for an award of rehabilitative alimony.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(E) requires courts to consider the relevant statutory factors when deciding whether to award rehabilitative alimony.

Monica White Mueller v. Mueller · filed 2004-11-17(d)(1)(E)

In addressing the parties, the chancellor quoted from the statutory language in section 36-5- 101, noting those factors that were applicable to this case. Having thoroughly reviewed the record and the applicable statutory factors, we conclude that the chancellor did not abuse her discretion in awarding Wife rehabilitative alimony.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative alimony to help an economically disadvantaged spouse become self-sufficient.

Owens v. Owens · filed 2005-01-21(d)(1)

The legislature has clearly stated a preference for rehabilitative alimony designed to enable an economically disadvantaged spouse to attain economic self-sufficiency.

Rehabilitative alimony is appropriate when further education can improve an economically disadvantaged spouse’s earning capacity.

Troglen v. Troglen · filed 2005-04-28(d)(1)(C)

Based upon the testimony of Ms. Troglen at trial, however, and the statutory definitions, the class of alimony appropriate in this case is rehabilitative alimony rather than transitional alimony.

Section 36-5-101 favors rehabilitative alimony for economically disadvantaged spouses when rehabilitation is feasible.

Spurgeon v. Kevin Brooks Spurgeon · filed 2005-06-13(d)(1)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101 expresses a clear preference for rehabilitative alimony awards for economically disadvantaged spouses where rehabilitation is feasible.

Section 36-5-101 favors rehabilitative alimony; permanent alimony requires a finding that rehabilitation is not feasible.

Willie v. Melvin, III v. Anita Louise Johnson-Melvin · filed 2006-04-27(d)(1)(C)

Permanent alimony is disfavored under the statute absent a specific finding that rehabilitation is not feasible.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits transitional alimony to help a spouse adjust to the economic consequences of divorce, including support while pursuing education.

Halkiades v. Halkiades · filed 2004-12-29(d)(1)

Although not labeled as a particular type of alimony, this award is clearly intended to both rehabilitate Ms. Stohl and to assist her in during the a transitional period. Upon review of the evidence, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of alimony. We accordingly affirm the trial court’s award of $50,000 to Ms. Stohl, payable as transitional alimony.

Section 36-5-101 permits alimony in futuro when rehabilitation of an economically disadvantaged spouse is not feasible.

Alica Fay Smiley v. Smiley · filed 2005-02-02(d)(1)

While rehabilitative alimony is preferred where an economically disadvantaged spouse can be rehabilitated, Storey v. Storey, 835 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1992); the trial court has found that rehabilitation is not feasible in the case. Under such circumstances an award of alimony in futuro is justified. Compare Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d 356 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000); See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits alimony in futuro when a spouse cannot be rehabilitated because a physical disability prevents sustained work.

Crowe v. Crowe · filed 2005-07-14(d)(1)

The trial court found, and we agree, that while Mother may be mentally able and willing to teach full-time, she is physically unable to do so given her paralysis. ... Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Father to pay alimony in futuro in the amount of $3,500.00 per month.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(C) permits alimony in futuro when a spouse is economically disadvantaged and rehabilitation is not feasible, considering all relevant factors.

Cox v. Cox · filed 2005-12-22(d)(1)(C)

An award of alimony in futuro is appropriate “where there is such relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation is not feasible in consideration of all relevant factors,” including those enumerated in § 36-5-101(d)(1)(E).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(C) permits alimony in futuro when one spouse is economically disadvantaged and rehabilitation is not feasible in light of the relevant factors.

Ort v. Ort · filed 2006-01-05(d)(1)(C)

An award of alimony in futuro is appropriate “where there is relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation is not feasible in consideration of all relevant factors,” including those enumerated in § 36-5-101(d)(1)(E).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(D) allows transitional support for a definite period when an economically disadvantaged spouse needs help adjusting to divorce but does not need rehabilitation.

Lewis v. Lewis · filed 2005-02-15(d)(1)(D)

However, in the absence of evidence of any planned rehabilitation, we have determined that Ms. Lewis’s spousal support should be characterized as transitional rather than rehabilitative support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(C) treats rehabilitative support as a separate class of spousal support from alimony in solido, periodic alimony, and transitional alimony.

Tresa Dorianne Barkley Young n/k/a Tresa B. Floyd v. Young · filed 2005-03-29(d)(1)(C)

This assertion is an incorrect statement of the law of alimony in this state, for the legislature has provided that “[r]ehabilitative support and maintenance is a separate class of spousal support as distinguished from alimony in solido, periodic alimony, and transitional alimony.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(C) (2003) (emphasis added); see also Self v. Self, 861 S.W.2d 360, 361 (Tenn. 1993) (“Under the statute, long-term support and maintenance is appropriate only where there is relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation of the disadvantaged party is not feasible.”).

A spouse who is unlikely to increase her earning capacity through further work or education may receive alimony in futuro rather than rehabilitative alimony.

Barlew v. Barlew · filed 2005-04-26(d)(1)(C)

Taking a realistic look at the economic realities of Wife’s situation, we believe the evidence supports the conclusion that she is not a candidate for rehabilitation because, among other reasons, she is likely already at the peak of her earning potential. Even if she were to quit her job and return to school full-time in pursuit of a potentially higher-paying career, she would still face the prospect of trying to find employment in her mid- to late fifties with little significant prior experience. Taking into consideration all of the relevant statutory factors, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision to award alimony in futuro rather than rehabilitative alimony.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(C) permits alimony in futuro when rehabilitation cannot bring an economically disadvantaged spouse to a reasonably comparable standard of living.

Brooks v. Brooks · filed 2005-07-06(d)(1)(C)

There is no evidence in the record to indicate that rehabilitative alimony for a short period of time would enable Wife to increase her earning capacity significantly enough to become economically self-sufficient. This is especially true using the test of pre-divorce standard of living or post-divorce standard available to the other spouse. That standard is applicable here because Wife suffered economic detriment, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, for the benefit of this thirty-one year marriage. Therefore, we conclude that rehabilitative alimony is not required and that the award of alimony in futuro was appropriate.

Transitional alimony requires evidence of the recipient spouse’s need; an award without that evidence is an abuse of discretion.

Darvarmanesh v. Gharacholou · filed 2005-07-19(d)(1)(D)

Although Wife’s complaint was sufficient to place Husband on notice that alimony would be sought in this case, “there must be some evidence in the record from which alimony may be granted.” Allen, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 61, at *9; see also Cranford v. Cranford, 772 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). Finding none, we must conclude that the trial court’s award of alimony in this case was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion and reverse that decision.

A spouse’s stated desire to enter a profession, without proof of the ability to do so, does not establish that rehabilitation is feasible.

Dowden v. Feibus · filed 2006-01-18(d)(1)(C)

The fact that an individual, such as Wife, states that she would like to be a lawyer, or a doctor, or a teacher, or a PGA tour player, or any such profession is, in and of itself, no proof that that individual has the capabilities to do so. While the desire to be such a professional is a necessary requirement to achieving that goal, it is by no means the sole requirement. Here, no proof was introduced that Wife was capable of getting into law school or of completing the curriculum.

A fixed alimony award with an ascertainable total and no contingencies is alimony in solido, even when paid in installments.

Campbell v. Campbell · filed 2006-08-08(d)(1)

The types of alimony a court with divorce jurisdiction may award are rehabilitative alimony, alimony in futuro, also known as periodic alimony, transitional alimony, and alimony in solido. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) (Supp. 2005). ... Viewed by these standards, the alimony awarded by the trial court was clearly alimony in solido, being for an amount that may be readily ascertained and with no contingencies that would terminate or alter the payments.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative and transitional spousal support but permits long-term support when the circumstances warrant it.

Fox v. Fox · filed 2006-09-01(d)(1)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(2005) reflects a statutory preference favoring rehabiltitative spousal support and transitional spousal support over long-term periodic spousal support. ... However, this statutory preference does not entirely displace the other forms of spousal support when the facts of the case warrant long-term or more open-ended support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(2) favors temporary, rehabilitative spousal support.

McKee v. McKee · filed 2010-08-17(d)(2)

There is a statutory bias in favor of temporary, rehabilitative spousal support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) factors supported an award of rehabilitative alimony in this case.

Totty v. Totty · filed 2000-05-02(d)(1)

Our review of the record, as well as a balancing of the factors contained in T.C.A. § 36-5- 101(d) leads us to conclude that rehabilitative alimony is warranted.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires consideration of alimony factors including property division and relative fault.

Fraysier v. Fraysier · filed 2001-02-27(d)(1)

When the amount of rehabilitative alimony awarded is considered along with all the factors contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1), such as the division of the marital property and the relative fault of the parties, it is clear that the Trial Court properly weighed all relevant factors in reaching its conclusion.

Section 36-5-101 may authorize child support based on a veteran’s disability benefits without being pre-empted by federal law.

Rose v. Rose · filed 1987-05-18

We noted probable jurisdiction, [3] 478 U. S. 1003 (1986), and now affirm. ... The Court of Appeals correctly identified the constitutional standard for determining whether § 36-820, as construed by the Tennessee courts to authorize an award of a veteran's disability benefits as child support, conflicts with federal law and is therefore pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause.

Homemaker contributions may be considered in an award for maintenance and support.

Batson v. Batson · filed 1988-09-30(d)(9)

A spouse’s non-monetary contributions as a homemaker are relevant not only to the division of the marital property [Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5) ] but also to an award for maintenance and support [Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(9) ]. In light of the nature of the Batsons’ marital property, we have determined that Mrs. Batson’s contributions as a homemaker are better recognized by making an award for maintenance and support.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) requires proof of a substantial and material change in circumstances since the original divorce decree to modify child support.

Turner v. Turner · filed 1988-12-20(a)(1)

Accordingly, a substantial and material change in circumstances must be shown to have occurred since the original divorce decree.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) permits a court to modify child support on either party’s application; the court’s statutory power to enforce a support order exists only during the child’s minority.

Hawkins v. Hawkins · filed 1990-07-23(a)(1)

Upon proper facts, a court may increase or decrease child support “on application of either party”, Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(l), but the power of the court to enforce an order of support is statutory and exists only during minority.

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) bars retroactive modification of child support arrearages and traditional equitable defenses to their enforcement; an obligor must seek current or prospective relief through a court order.

Rutledge v. Barrett · filed 1991-01-07(a)(5)

Those provisions are conspicuously absent from the provision in § 36-5-101(a)(5), which now controls this case. The 1987 amendment specifically bars retroactive modification and puts the burden on the obligor to come into court and seek any current or prospective relief to which he may be entitled, by means of a formal court order. To permit the interposition of traditional equitable defenses to the enforcement of child support orders would obviously defeat the very purpose of the amendment, by creating a situation where exceptions could easily swallow up the rule.

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) bars retroactive increases and decreases in child support for periods before a modification action is filed and notice is given.

Brown v. Heggie · filed 1993-11-24(a)(5)

T.C.A. § 36 — 5—101(a)(5) clearly provides that an order for child support is a judgment not subject to modification as to any time period or any amounts due prior to the date that an action for modification is filed and notice to the opposing parties. The statute makes no distinction between retroactive increases or decreases.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1), as applicable at the hearing, allowed modification of child support upon a substantial and material change of circumstances, including a change in custody and visitation.

Lumpkins v. Lumpkins · filed 1995-10-04(a)(1)

The record demonstrates a substantial change in the Lumpkins’ circumstances since their divorce in 1991. The most significant change is the change in their custody and visitation arrangement. In addition, there appear to have been changes in the parties’ income. There is also a large, unexplained variation between the amount of Mr. Lumpkins’ child support in the August 1992 order and the amount of child support contemplated by the guidelines. Accordingly, the special judge had sufficient grounds to reconsider the amount of Mr. Lumpkins’ child support.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) uses a significant variance between the guideline amount and the existing child support order as the standard for modification, replacing the material change of circumstances test.

Turner v. Turner · filed 1995-12-15(a)(1)

By the time of the hearing, the “material change of circumstances” test had been replaced by the “significant variance" test.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1)'s significant-variance rule applies when modifying an existing child support order, not when making an initial support order.

State ex rel. Smith v. Early · filed 1996-07-12(a)(1)

Both of these sources assume the existence of a current order of support. In other words, there must be an existing judgment for the court to modify. In this case, there was no judgment prior to the instant action. Plaintiff did not ask the court to modify an existing order; she asked the court to make an initial order. Under these circumstances, the fifteen percent modification rule is inapplicable.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) permits a change in spousal support only upon a substantial and material change of circumstances; foreseeable inflation does not qualify.

Jo Ann Beach Hedge v. John Henry Hedge, III · filed 1996-08-02(a)(1)

Courts may decree an increase or decrease in the amount of spousal support only upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1). ... Although, as the chancellor found, a dollar does not buy as much today as it did in 1981, the effect of inflation is foreseeable and thus not a material change.

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) bars equitable defenses that would retroactively reduce a child support obligation.

State., ex. rel. Sherry Mcallister v. Goode · filed 1997-09-17(a)(5)

Equitable defenses that would have the effect of retroactively modifying a child support obligation are no longer available in cases such as this one because of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s construction of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(a)(5).

When a child support order departs from the guidelines by court order, modification depends on whether the circumstances that caused the departure have changed.

Stevenson v. Stevenson · filed 1998-01-28(a)(1)

Therefore, since we have a court-ordered deviation, the issue becomes whether there has been a change in the circumstances which caused the deviation.

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) permits a child support modification to take effect retroactively.

Ford v. Ford · filed 1998-10-21(a)(5)

We concur with the trial court’s conclusion that the modifications to Mr. Ford’s child support obligation should be made retroactive to September 1, 1995. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(5) (Supp. 1998).

Section 36-5-101(a)(5)’s restriction on retroactive modification applies only to child support obligations, not spousal support obligations.

State ex rel. Paula Buchanan v. Buchanan · filed 1999-03-18(a)(5)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(5)’s restrictions against retroactive modification apply only to child support obligations.

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) permits a child support modification effective from the filing of a petition held open by the court, but prohibits modification for periods before a petition was filed.

Ausbrooks v. Ausbrooks · filed 1999-05-21(a)(5)

Under these circumstances, the trial court’s action in holding open Husband’s petition to modify child support and later ordering a modification retroactive to the filing of the first petition, while not customary, did not amount to a retroactive modification prohibited by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101.

A petition to modify child support under § 36-5-101 puts the guideline amount at issue, including applicable grounds for deviation.

Howard v. Howard · filed 1999-06-25(a)(1)

Based on the father’s pleading, the parties had notice that the amount of child support was in dispute pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101. ... That request of necessity required the Court to look at the criteria for deviation to determine that proper amount of support.

A party seeking to increase child support must provide evidence of the obligor’s net income to establish the significant variance required for modification.

Mims v. Mims · filed 1999-07-26(a)(1)

Appellee, however, has failed to offer any proof as to Appellant’s current or previous net income, which is needed to determine whether a significant variance exists.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) requires a parent seeking to modify child support to show a significant variance between the existing award and the guideline amount under current circumstances.

Sandusky v. Sandusky · filed 1999-09-22(a)(1)

As the party seeking modification of the previous child support award, Father had the burden of demonstrating that there existed a significant variance3 between the amount previously set and currently ordered and the amount which would be due under the Child Support Guidelines based on current circumstances. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1) (Supp. 1998); Turner v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 340, 342-343, 345 (Tenn. App. 1995).

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) uses a significant variance between the guideline amount and the existing order as the standard for modifying child support.

Stacey v. Stacey · filed 1999-10-06(a)(1)

Therefore, in a case such as this, the significant variance test, rather than the change of circumstances test, is the correct standard for modification of a child support order.

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) bars retroactive modification of child support for amounts due before an action to modify support is filed and notice is mailed.

Hoefler v. Hoefler · filed 1999-10-12(a)(5)

Even if we could consider the argument, we could not grant Ms. Hoefler a retroactive modification of the child support orders in existence up until the time the trial court relieved Mr. Hoefler from any further obligation to pay child support for his son because to do so would be to violate Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(5).

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) requires a significant variance between the existing child support obligation and the amount required under the Guidelines before support is modified; the fifteen percent standard measures those obligations, not a change in income.

Jackson v. Jackson · filed 2000-03-29(a)(1)

As the Appellee contends, the fifteen percent significant variance standard does not apply to income. Rather, the question is whether the obligor’s existing support obligation varies by fifteen percent or more from the amount that would be required when applying the obligor’s income at the time of the hearing.

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) prohibits increasing or decreasing child support for a period before a modification action is filed and notice is given to the opposing party.

Bullington v. Hudson · filed 2000-04-26(a)(5)

This statute is clear in its prohibition of a modification of child support as to any time period prior to the date that an action for modification is filed and notice is given to the opposing parties. The statute makes no distinction between retroactive increases or decreases.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) requires a significant variance between the guideline amount and the existing child support order before the order may be modified.

State ex rel Ledbetter v. Godsey · filed 2000-06-22(a)(1)

The applicable standard for determining whether an existing child support order should be modified is the “significant variance test” which the General Assembly adopted in 1994.

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) permits a court to make a child support modification effective as of the filing of the modification action.

Hayes v. Hayes · filed 2000-07-12(a)(5)

This language suggests that an order of child support is subject to modification as to any time period after the filing of an action for modification. ... We therefore conclude that, because Ms. Beuerlein filed a petition requesting an increase in child support on March 4, 1997, it was within the trial court’s discretion to apply its ruling retroactively to that date.

Section 36-5-101(a) uses a significant variance between the guideline amount and the existing order as the standard for modifying child support.

Wilson v. Wilson · filed 2000-07-31(a)

In a case involving the modification of a child support order, the proper standard is the “significant variance test” adopted by the General Assembly in 1994.

A child support award that previously deviated from the Guidelines may be modified when the circumstances supporting that deviation change.

Nichols v. Nichols · filed 2000-08-29(a)(1)

If there is a previously ordered deviation from the Guidelines, the child support order may be modified if there is a change in the circumstances which were the basis for the deviation.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) requires modification of child support when the guideline amount significantly varies from the amount currently ordered.

Chambers v. Amonette · filed 2000-09-22(a)(1)

According to section 36-5-101(a)(1) of the Tennessee Code, the trial court must modify child support payments if a significant variance is found between the amount suggested in the Guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered.

A significant variance can support a child-support award under subsection (a)(1).

In re: Stephanie Ann Linville, a Minor · filed 2000-12-07(a)(1)

Furthermore, based on the state of the record before us, we cannot find that there was not a significant variance upon which to base an award of child support.

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) bars an increase in child support for a period before a modification action is filed and notice is given.

Farley v. Leblanc · filed 2000-01-10(a)(5)

According to this statute, an order for child support is not subject to modification until an action for modification is filed and notice of the action is given.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) permits modification of child support only upon proof of a significant variance between the current payment and the guideline amount based on the obligor’s current income.

Walter Hanselman, Jr. v. Hanselman · filed 2001-03-15(a)(1)

For all cases heard on or after July 1, 1994, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1) (Supp. 2000) permits modifications only upon proof that there is a “significant variance” between the current child support and the support the guidelines would require the obligor spouse to pay based on the spouse’s current income.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) requires modification when guideline support significantly differs from the current order, unless an unchanged prior court-ordered deviation caused the difference.

Willis v. Willis · filed 2001-03-20(a)(1)

Upon petition for modification of child support obligations, trial courts must increase or decrease support obligations upon a showing of a significant variance between the amount of support provided in the child support guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered unless such variance was the result of a previous court-ordered deviation and the circumstances causing the deviation have not changed.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) permits a child support modification only when there is a significant variance between the existing order and the amount due under current guidelines.

Scott v. Scott · filed 2001-03-20(a)(1)

Child support modifications are appropriate upon the application of either party only if a “significant variance” arises between the amount of support payable under the original order and the amount payable under the current child support guidelines.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) permits a child support reduction when the guidelines show a significant variance and the obligor is not willfully and voluntarily underemployed.

State of Tennessee, ex rel., Woody M. Hartley v. Robinson · filed 2001-05-09(a)(1)

As Mr. Hartley is not willfully or voluntarily underemployed, he was entitled to a reduction of his support payments to this amount. We hereby reverse the trial court’s denial for a reduction of child support payments and direct that court to enter an order reducing Mr. Hartley’s future child support payments to $601 per month.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) permits modification of an agreed child support obligation when a significant variance exists between that obligation and the guideline amount.

Huntley v. Huntley · filed 2001-06-14(a)(1)

The MDA does not control Defendant’s current child support obligation because, as discussed, a significant variance exists.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) requires modification when the guideline support amount significantly differs from the current order, unless an unchanged earlier court-ordered deviation caused the variance.

Willis v. Willis · filed 2001-06-18(a)(1)

Upon petition for modification of child support obligations, trial courts must increase or decrease support obligations upon a showing of a significant variance between the amount of support provided in the child support guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered unless such variance was the result of a previous court-ordered deviation and the circumstances causing the deviation have not changed.

Section 36-5-101(5) prohibits increasing child support for a period before a modification petition is filed, even when the obligor failed to provide required income information.

Tinsley v. Tinsley · filed 2002-02-22(5)

In the case before us, it is clear that the trial court’s award of “an increase in Child Support retroactively prior to the filing of the Petition until January 1, 1997” is a retroactive modification of support which is prohibited by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(5).

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) makes a significant variance between the current support order and the Guidelines amount the test for modifying child support.

Huntley v. Huntley · filed 2001-03-27(a)(1)

Additionally, despite Defendant’s argument, the correct inquiry in a child support modification matter is not whether there is a material change of circumstances but whether there is a “significant variance” between the current obligation and the obligation set by the Guidelines.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) preserves the court’s authority to make later child support orders when circumstances warrant, even if the parties’ agreement was incorporated into the decree.

State, ex rel Steven Wrzesniewski v. Miller · filed 2001-10-15(a)(1)

The Court retains continuing jurisdiction over subsequent issues in domestic matters, such as child support, the appellant’s assertion to the contrary, notwithstanding. Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-101(a)(1).

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) gives courts continuing jurisdiction over child support despite an agreed order purporting to settle the issue permanently.

State Ex Rel. Wrzesniewski v. Miller · filed 2001-12-07(a)(1)

The Court retains continuing jurisdiction over subsequent issues in domestic matters, such as child support, the appellant’s assertion to the contrary, notwithstanding. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1).

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) prevents a court from retroactively terminating or forgiving child support owed before the parties bring a change to the court’s attention.

Davis v. Davis · filed 2002-05-22(a)(5)

Furthermore, our Supreme Court has held in Rutledge v. Barrett, 802 S.W.2d 604 (Tenn. 1991) that pursuant to the above statute, a child support order is not subject to retroactive modification. ... Therefore, we find that the trial court erred in retroactively terminating and forgiving child support prior to April 27, 2001, when the Father and Mother informed the trial court of their reconciliation.

When a child support agreement does not state why support exceeds the guidelines, § 36-5-101(a)(1) requires the court to use the significant variance test to decide whether to modify support.

Pardue v. Pardue · filed 2002-06-26(a)(1)

In such instances, the court must rely on the only remaining provision of § 36-5- 101 (a)(1) and "decree an increase or decrease of such allowance when there is found to be a significant variance . . . ".

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) requires an increase in child support when the guideline amount significantly exceeds the amount currently ordered.

Wade v. Wade · filed 2002-12-31(a)(1)

The obligation imposed under the guidelines, properly considering his imputed gross income, is $1,490.00 per month. This represents an increase of $222.97 per month, or a 17.6% increase. This meets the statutory definition of significant change thereby warranting an increased award of child support to Appellee for the year 2001.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) uses a significant variance between the guideline amount and the current order to determine whether child support should be modified.

Lacey v. Lacey · filed 2003-05-21(a)(1)

To determine whether an existing child support order should be modified, the “significant variance test” is applied.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) governs modification of an existing child support award.

Milam v. Milam · filed 2002-04-23(a)(1)

After an initial award of child support the modification of that award is governed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1).

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) permits a reduction in child support when the obligor establishes a significant variance between the ordered amount and the guideline amount.

Coates v. Coates · filed 2002-05-31(a)(1)

Consequently, we conclude that Father has demonstrated a significant variance under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1) and was entitled to a reduction in his child support obligation.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) does not require a child support decrease when applying the guidelines to the obligor’s potential income produces no significant variance from the existing award.

Demers v. Demers · filed 2003-12-10(a)(1)

Because the trial court found that application of the guidelines to Father’s potential income would result in the same support award as that previously ordered, then there is no “significant variance,” and a decrease in the child support award was not mandated.

An obligor seeking a decrease in child support must show a significant variance between the guideline amount and the amount currently ordered.

Neiswinter v. Murray · filed 2003-12-31(a)(1)

Thus, in order to obtain a decrease in child support, the obligor parent must show a “significant variance”, or a difference of 15%,8 “between the guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered.”

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) bars modification of child support for any period before the modification complaint is filed.

Abercrombie v. Abercrombie · filed 2004-03-29(a)(5)

Father, however, is not entitled to any modification of Mother’s percentage child support obligation for any period prior to March 19, 2002, the date on which he filed the complaint seeking a modification. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(5) (Supp. 2003).

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) bars retroactive relief from accrued child support even when a later DNA test disproves paternity.

In the Matter of T.S.R. · filed 2004-06-17(a)(5)

Having determined that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101 (Supp. 2002) and the Tennessee Supreme Court’s interpretation of it precludes Reed’s argument that the order should be declared null and void, this Court will now address Reed’s estoppel argument.

A parent who agrees to a parenting plan increasing child support without preserving an objection waives the defense that the increase lacks the required significant variance.

Mary Ann Gurganus Eure v. Eure · filed 2003-10-17(a)(1)

While the issue was properly raised in Mother’s answer to Father’s counterclaim, the record supports the conclusion that Mother waived her lack-of-a-significant-variance defense when she agreed to the PPP reflecting the increase in child support.

When modifying an existing child support order, the court must address whether a significant variance exists between the support required by the Guidelines and the amount currently ordered.

Ricky D. Watkins, Sr. v. State of Tennessee, Department of Human Services, ex rel, Dorothy M. Prather · filed 2004-07-21(a)(1)

Finally, we note that, even though previous orders for child support existed for all three of Father’s children, the trial court did not address the issue of whether a significant variance existed between the amount of support required by the Guidelines and the amount currently ordered. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1) (2001).

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) bars modification of child support amounts due before an action for modification is filed and notice is given.

State of Tennessee ex rel. Margaret Estelle Mitchell v. Ray Allen Lea State of Tennessee ex rel. Katherine A. Yarbrough · filed 2004-11-16(a)(5)

Thus, under the plain language of the statute, an order for child support is not “subject to modification as to any time period or any amounts due” before a petition for modification is filed by one of the parties and notice is given according to the statute.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1)(A) allows an increase in child support when a significant variance arises and the circumstances behind an earlier downward deviation have changed.

West v. West · filed 2004-11-30(a)(1)(A)

The statute further provides that the court does not have to order such an increase or decrease if “the variance has resulted from a previously court-ordered deviation from the guidelines and the circumstances which caused the deviation have not changed.” ... Clearly, the circumstances justifying the original downward deviation in child support had changed, as Mother went from no income to income, as the trial court found, in excess of $25,000 over a two-year period.

Section 36-5-101(a)(5) permits modification of a child support order only from the date the petition for modification is filed.

Buettner v. Buettner · filed 2005-06-02(a)(5)

A child support order is not retroactively modifiable, but may be modified only as of the date a petition for modification is filed.

A party seeking to modify child support based on changed income must prove a significant variance between the guideline amount and the existing order.

Demonbreun v. Demonbreun · filed 2005-12-28(a)(1)(A)

The party seeking the modification of the child support order has the burden of proving the existence of a significant variance.

Section 36-5-101(g)(1) does not require modification of a child support award when a significant variance stems from a prior court-ordered deviation and the circumstances behind that deviation have not changed.

Elizabeth S.F. Martella v. Martella · filed 2006-01-05(g)(1)

Thus, courts are not required to modify an existing child support award, even when a significant variance exists, if the variance results from “a previously court-ordered deviation from the guidelines and the circumstances that caused the deviation have not changed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g)(1).

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) bars retroactive modification of child support orders, but calculating arrears from a child’s emancipation date is not a retroactive modification.

Lichtenwalter v. Lichtenwalter · filed 2006-01-30(f)(1)

Factoring in the reality that two of the Lichtenwalters’ children had become emancipated for the purpose of... determining the amount of Mr. Lichtenwalter’s support arrearage was not a retroactive modification of any earlier child support order. Rather, it was an appropriate application of the settled legal principle that a parent’s legal duty to support their child ends when the child becomes emancipated. Accordingly, the substitute judge did not run afoul of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1).

A parent opposing child support modification bears the burden of proving that a significant variance resulted from willful or voluntary underemployment.

Wine v. Wine · filed 2007-05-18(g)

The burden of proving that a significant variance is the result of willful or voluntary underemployment is on the party opposing the modification.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) authorizes a court to change child support when there is a significant variance between the guidelines amount and the current order.

Parris v. Parris · filed 2007-09-18(a)(1)

Trial courts have the authority to increase or decrease child support obligations when there is a “significant variance between the amount of support provided in the child support guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered . . . .” Willis v. Willis, 62 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1) (Supp. 2000)).

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) permits child support to be modified retroactively to the date a modification petition was filed, subject to the statute’s conditions.

State of Tennessee, ex rel. Kathy D. Flores v. Ralph · filed 2008-03-12(f)(1)

A child support order may be modified, i.e., the amount of support increased or decreased, retroactively to the date of a petition for modification.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) bars retroactive forgiveness of child support arrears and permits modification only from the date a modification request is filed and notice is provided.

State of Tennessee, Ex Rel., Margaret v. Hickman v. Ronald L. Dodd · filed 2008-11-21(f)(1)

Accordingly, a trial court may not retroactively forgive a child support arrearage, but may only modify child support obligations back to the date that a petition or motion for modification is filed and notice is provided to the non-moving party.

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) bars retroactive modification of a child support order for periods before a modification petition is filed and notice is mailed.

Donna Michele Locastro Corbin v. Corbin · filed 2009-02-24(f)(1)

In other words, a child support order is not retroactively modifiable; it may be modified only as of the date a petition for modification is filed. ... Applying all these principles to the case at bar, we conclude that the trial court did not err in awarding retroactive child support only from the date of Mother’s counter-petition to modify the consent order.

Section 36-5-101(d)(2) does not require a material change in circumstances when the court has reserved the question of whether a spouse can be rehabilitated and later makes its initial alimony determination.

Walton v. Walton · filed 2005-08-10(d)(2)

In this situation, then, the trial court’s February 12, 2003 order was not final as to the alimony award, because the issue of whether Wife was capable of being rehabilitated had not actually been adjudicated. Thus, unlike Perry, Wife was not required to show a material change in circumstances in order to obtain alimony in futuro.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1)(A) allows an increase in an existing child support order based on the obligor’s income only when the guideline amount significantly differs from the current order.

Melody D. Dickson v. Dickson · filed 2005-12-05(a)(1)(A)

In cases where a party seeks a modification of an existing child support order based upon an increase in the obligor parent’s income, a court can grant relief only if “there is found to be a significant variance, as defined in the child support guidelines . . ., between the guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2004).

Section 36-5-101(g)(1) requires a court to modify child support when there is a significant variance between the guideline amount and the current order, unless the variance results from an earlier deviation whose circumstances have not changed.

Mitchell v. Green · filed 2006-05-30(g)(1)

Pursuant to section 36-5-101(g)(1) of the Tennessee Code, upon a petition for modification of child support obligations, a trial court shall decree an increase or decrease of support when there is found to be a significant variance, as defined in the child support guidelines . . . , between the guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered, unless the variance has resulted from a previous court- ordered deviation from the guidelines and the circumstances that caused the deviation have not changed.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1)(A) requires a court to modify child support when the guidelines amount differs significantly from the amount currently ordered; under the applicable guidelines, a 15% difference qualifies.

Rebecca Lee Bradshaw Owings v. Owings · filed 2006-11-27(a)(1)(A)

Therefore, in other words, once the trial court determines the obligor parent’s level of income as defined under the Guidelines, if the amount of child support correlating to that level of income is 15% more or less than the current level of child support, the trial court is obligated to order a corresponding increase or decrease in child support.

A court considering a petition to modify child support must determine whether there is a significant variance between the current obligation and the amount set by the guidelines.

Bradley v. Bradley · filed 2010-07-08(g)

In considering a petition to modify child support, the trial court must determine whether there is a significant variance between the obligor’s current obligation and that set by the guidelines. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g); Kaplan v. Bugalla, 188 S.W.3d 632, 636 (Tenn. 2006).

Section 36-5-101(g) requires a court considering a child support modification to determine whether current support significantly varies from the guideline amount.

Corder v. Corder · filed 2011-02-28(g)

In considering a petition to modify child support, the trial court must determine whether there is a “significant variance” between the obligor parent’s current support and the support pursuant to the child support guidelines.

Section 36-5-101(g) requires a court to compare the existing child support obligation with the amount calculated under the Guidelines and modify support if there is a significant variance.

Kendle v. Kendle · filed 2011-04-28(g)

Accordingly, on remand, the trial court is instructed to apply the Guidelines to determine whether a significant variance is present using Father’s income as an employee of the Wilson County Fire Department, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g); and, if such a variance is present, to set child support in the amount required by the Guidelines.

Section 36-5-101(g) requires a significant variance between guideline support and the support currently ordered before child support may be modified.

Butler v. Butler · filed 2012-10-05(g)

The threshold condition for a change in child support is a significant variance between the amount due under the child support guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered.

Section 36-5-101(g)(1) permits modification of child support when the guideline amount significantly varies from the amount currently ordered.

Schreur v. Hollye Richelle Garner · filed 2011-06-20(g)(1)

The statute addressing child support provides for modification of support when there is found to be a significant variance between the amount that would be owed pursuant to the guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered.

A parent seeking to modify child support must prove a significant variance; drawing less income does not establish one when the parent has not shown an inability to draw more.

Marilee Ann Petrey Jones v. Jones · filed 2010-05-20(g)(1)

Therefore, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Father failed to carry his burden of proving a significant variance such that he is due a modification of child support.

Section 36-5-101(g)(1) requires a significant variance between the existing child support obligation and the amount under current guidelines before support is modified.

Kelly v. Kelly · filed 2011-01-20(g)(1)

In considering a petition to modify child support, the trial court must determine whether there is a significant variance between the obligor’s current obligation and that set by the current guidelines.

Section 36-5-101(g) requires a court considering a child support modification to determine whether a significant variance exists between the guideline amount and the current obligation.

Thomas James Milam, Jr. v. Donna Lisa Vinson Milam · filed 2012-05-17(g)

The modification of child support is governed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g). In considering a petition to modify child support, the trial court must determine whether a “significant variance” exists between the Child Support Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) and the amount of support currently owed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g). ... We affirm the trial court’s finding that this change in income constituted a “significant variance” under the Guidelines.

Section 36-5-101(g)(3) allows a court to consider modifying future child support despite arrears when the arrears did not result from intentional action.

Bradford v. Pitts · filed 2012-01-31(g)(3)

Regardless of any potential waiver, Father’s unilateral reduction of child support was not intentional but was the result of his loss of income. ... Thus, the trial court did not err in considering the petition, despite any arrearage.

Section 36-5-101(g) requires a significant variance between the current child support obligation and the guideline amount before support is modified.

Gulley v. Fletcher · filed 2013-02-07(g)

When considering a petition to modify child support, the trial court must determine whether there is a significant variance between the obligor’s current obligation and that set by the guidelines.

Section 36-5-101(g) requires a significant variance, as defined by the child support guidelines, before a court may modify a child support obligation.

State of Tennessee Ex Rel., Wendy Harrison v. Scott · filed 2013-05-29(g)

When considering a petition to modify child support, the trial court first must determine whether there is a significant variance between the obligor’s current obligation and that set by the guidelines.

A child support award may be modified based on a significant variance as defined in the child support guidelines.

Muhlstadt v. Muhlstadt · filed 2013-07-19(g)(1)

Modification of an award of child support is governed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(g)(1); the modification must be based on a “significant variance, as defined in the child support guidelines . . . between the guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered.”

Section 36-5-101(f)(1) requires notice before a prospective modification of child support.

S.A.M.D. v. J.P.D. · filed 2013-09-30(f)(1)

Prospective modifications of child support are also subject to the notice requirement contained in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-5-101(f)(1).

Section 36-5-101(g) makes a significant variance between the current support order and the amount under the child support guidelines the test for modifying child support.

Allbert v. Figueiredo · filed 2014-12-19(g)

With respect to a petition to modify child support, the inquiry for the court is whether a significant variance exists between the current support order and the obligation established by the child support guidelines. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g); Kaplan v. Bugalla, 188 S.W.3d 632, 637 (Tenn. 2006).

A petition to modify visitation or the primary residential parent can trigger review of child support if the other party receives adequate notice and the Child Support Guidelines show a significant variance.

Leonardo v. Leonardo · filed 2015-06-18(f)(1)

Importantly, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-5-101(f)(1) requires only that a party file an ―action for modification‖ in order to trigger review of child support. In other words, the statute does not specify that such ―action for modification‖ must be an action for modification of child support.

Child support must remain modifiable and cannot be capped within a combined alimony and child support award.

Lubell v. Lubell · filed 2015-11-12(g)(1)

Because child support must remain modifiable and cannot therefore be “capped” at a maximum amount, we conclude that the trial court erred in this regard as a matter of law.

When a prior child support order contains no deviation, modification turns on whether the current presumptive support amount differs from the prior amount by at least 15 percent.

Melissa L. Blackshear (Thompson) v. Blackshear · filed 2014-03-19(g)(1)

Since there was no deviation in the prior child support order, we are only required to compare the current presumptive child support order with the prior child support order to determine if there is a 15 percent variance.

Section 36-5-101(g)(1) governs modification of child support and requires a significant variance, as defined in the child support guidelines, before support is increased or decreased.

Ghorashi-Bajestani v. Bajestani · filed 2017-03-01(g)(1)

Modification of an award of child support is governed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g)(1). ... Under this statute, “the court shall decree an increase or decrease of support when there is found to be a significant variance, as defined in the child support guidelines . . . between the guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g)(1).

Section 36-5-101(g)(1) permits modification of child support when there is a significant variance, assessed using reliable current income evidence.

Scobey v. Scobey · filed 2017-09-13(g)(1)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g)(1) governs child support modification. It provides, “Upon application of either party, the court shall decree an increase or decrease in support when there is found to be a significant variance, as defined in the child support guidelines established in subsection (e), between the guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered….” ... Because Husband did not provide the trial court with evidence of his “most recent actual income,” and did not present credible testimony concerning his and Wife’s past or future income, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny Husband’s petition to decrease child support.

Section 36-5-101(g)(1) requires an obligor seeking to modify a child support order to show a significant variance between the guidelines and the support currently ordered.

Lorenzo Reed, Sr. v. Akende-Reed · filed 2018-01-25(g)(1)

To modify an existing child support order, the obligor parent must show a significant variance “between the guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g)(1) (2017).

Section 36-5-101(g) requires the party seeking to modify child support to prove a significant variance between guideline support and the amount currently ordered.

Lisa Marie Paterson (Potter) v. Paterson · filed 2019-05-21(g)

Modification of a child support obligation is governed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-101(g); a court cannot modify child support unless the party moving to modify the obligation proves that there is a “significant variance ... between the guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered.”

Child support may be modified when there is a significant variance between the existing obligation and the amount calculated under current guidelines using the obligor’s current income.

State of Tennessee Ex Rel., Amanda C. Sensing v. Sensing · filed 2019-10-31(g)(1)

Father rightly points out that the proper standard for determining whether child support should be modified is whether there is a significant variance between the obligor’s existing child support obligation and the child support obligation calculated under the current child support guidelines based upon the obligor’s current income.

Section 36-5-101(g)(1) permits child support to be modified upon a proper showing; a combined alimony and child support payment does not prevent modification when the child support amount is separately calculable and uncapped.

Carla Jo Capps Jones v. Jones · filed 2019-11-04(g)(1)

As such, Husband’s alimony obligation of $2,812 per month is easily calculated as a separate amount. Moreover, neither the child support award nor the alimony award was “capped,” and either award could be modified upon a proper showing.

Section 36-5-101(g)(1) requires a significant variance between the current and proposed child support obligations before support may be modified.

Hill v. Liesa Francine Hill · filed 2021-10-12(g)(1)

In the present action, the trial court failed to determine whether a significant variance existed such that modification of the existing child support order was warranted.

Section 36-5-101(g)(1) requires a significant variance between the guideline amount and the current support order to modify child support.

Smallman v. Smallman · filed 2023-11-13(g)(1)

The modification of child support payments is governed by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101(g), which requires courts to “decree an increase or decrease of support when there is found to be a significant variance, as defined in the child support guidelines . . . , between the guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g)(1); see Kaplan v. Bugalla, 188 S.W.3d 632, 636 (Tenn. 2006); see also Wine v. Wine, 245 S.W.3d 389, 393–94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).

Section 36-5-101(g)(1) permits a court to increase child support upon finding a significant variance, even when the petition sought a decrease and neither party requested an increase.

Cox v. Rebecca Lynne Thumm Cox · filed 2025-05-28(g)(1)

Having so determined, the trial court properly increased the amount of Father’s child support obligation even though neither party had requested an increase in Father’s child support obligation.

Section 36-5-101(g)(1) bars a child support modification based on a prior deviation when the circumstances that caused the deviation have not changed and no other circumstances produce a significant variance.

Tigart v. Tigart · filed 2021-09-24(g)(1)

In short, the reason for the upward deviation in his child support obligation (i.e., to ensure that the children enjoy a lifestyle similar to that enjoyed during the marriage) has not changed. In the absence of a change in the circumstances that resulted in the deviation, a modification of the original child support order would be proper only if there were “other circumstances . . . that would lead to a significant variance between the amount of the current order, excluding the deviation, and the amount of the proposed order[.]” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.05(5) (emphasis added).

Section 36-5-101(g)(1) requires a significant variance before a court may modify a child support obligation.

In Re Jonathan S. · filed 2022-08-26(g)(1)

Relevant here, “[a] significant variance is defined as at least fifteen percent (15%) difference in the current support obligation and the proposed support obligation.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240- 02-04-.05(2)(b); see also Hill v. Hill, No. E2019-02226-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 4745384, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2021); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g)(1) (“Upon application of either party, the court shall decree an increase or decrease of support when there is found to be a significant variance[.]”). ... The trial court’s failure to consider whether a significant variance existed before modifying Mother’s child support obligation constitutes an abuse of its discretion.

Section 36-5-101(g)(1) permits modification of a child support order only upon proof of a significant variance.

Stephanie Paige Roper (now Stephanie Paige Bruce) v. Roper · filed 2026-01-23(g)(1)

A child support order may only be modified upon proof of a significant variance.

Section 36-5-101(a)(3) creates a rebuttable presumption that a person receiving alimony in futuro who lives with a third person no longer needs the full award and that the court should suspend some or all of the obligation.

Wilburn v. Wilburn (In Re Wilburn) · filed 1991-04-04(a)(3)

Notwithstanding this automatic termination, the court will terminate Mrs. Wilburn’s entitlement to alimony as of December 10, 1990, the date the December alimony payment was due under the terms of the divorce decree, due to the plaintiff’s testimony that she began cohabiting with her present husband in December, 1990. ... Under Tennessee law, there is a rebuttable presumption that a person receiving, alimony in futuro who is living with a third person does not need the amount of support previously awarded, and that the court should suspend all or part of the alimony obligation of the former spouse.

Section 36-5-101(a)(3)'s cohabitation presumption applies to alimony in futuro, not rehabilitative alimony.

Rust v. Rust · filed 1997-05-21(a)(3)

We do not believe the chancellor erred in this determination, but we do not adopt the appellant’s argument that the rebuttable presumption found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-10(a)(3) thereby applies to this case. We note that the terms of the statute refer specifically to alimony in futuro, not to rehabilitative alimony, and that the two forms of modifiable alimony are based on opposite findings as to the possibility of the obligee spouse becoming capable of providing his or her own support.

Section 36-5-101(a)(3)’s cohabitation presumption applies to alimony in futuro and does not shift the burden of proving continued need for rehabilitative alimony.

Stockman v. Stockman · filed 1999-08-17(a)(3)

Therefore, Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-101(a)(3)’s rebuttable presumption does not apply to the award of rehabilitative alimony herein and, therefore, does not shift the evidentiary burden to Wife to prove she still needs the support.

Section 36-5-101(a)(3)(A)'s rebuttable presumption of no need when an alimony recipient lives with a third person applies to alimony in futuro.

Oaks v. Oaks · filed 1999-09-22(a)(3)(A)

While living with a third person establishes a rebuttable presumption that the recipient does not need alimony under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(3)(A), that section deals with alimony in futuro specifically.

When an alimony in futuro recipient lives with a third person, the recipient must rebut the presumption that the prior amount is no longer needed by proving a continued need for alimony.

Wright v. Quillen · filed 2002-01-04(a)(3)

However, whether some future cohabitation could have been anticipated by the parties in light of the fact that this was Mr. Quillen’s fourth marriage is not determinative. Rather, once cohabitation was proved, the burden shifted to Mr. Quillen to rebut the presumption that he was neither being supported by nor supporting Ms. Evans, and to demonstrate that he still needs alimony.