Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3937.18

Former § 3937.18(A) requires uninsured- and underinsured-motorist coverage to be offered under fronting automobile-liability policies.

Gilchrist v. Gonsor · filed 2004-12-30(A)

We hold that the uninsured- and underinsured-motorist coverage provisions of former R.C. 3937.18 apply to fronting policies and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) permits wrongful-death beneficiaries to recover under their own UIM policies for losses from the death of a person who was not an insured, but offsets UIM limits by amounts available under the tortfeasor's liability coverage, requiring a policy-limit-to-policy-limit comparison rather than an offset based only on amounts actually recovered.

Littrell v. Wigglesworth, Unpublished Decision (3-13-2000) · filed 2000-03-13(A)(2)

Although the instant case concerns UIM, not UM, coverage, the relevant language in the two subsections of R.C. 3937.18(A) is identical. In its effect, Moore has reversed the holdings ofKocel, Newkirk, and King. We must therefore find that the trial court erred in holding that James and Ernie Jr. were not eligible for recovery under their respective UIM policies for the deaths of John Jr. and Stella. Appellants' second assignment of error is well-taken. ... Had the General Assembly intended that offsets were to be according to those amounts the insured receives, in hand, from the tortfeasor's liability coverage, there would have been no need to change the language of this final sentence. Instead, the General Assembly rewrote the sentence, and the intent of the General Assembly is clear — offsets must now to be done through a policy limit to policy limit comparison, superseding the holding ofAndrews. Any other interpretation of S.B. 20 would render meaningless the substantial changes made in the statute.

Section 3937.18 bases the underinsured-motorist setoff on the tortfeasor's and insured's policy limits, rather than on the amount actually received or the claimant's individual compensation.

Barnett v. Carr, Unpublished Decision (3-26-2001) · filed 2001-03-26

Pursuant to our decision in Littrell v. Wigglesworth (Mar. 13, 2000), Butler App. No. CA99-05-092 and CA99-08-141, unreported, motion to certify conflict granted, 89 Ohio St.2d 1468, discretionary appeal allowed, 89 Ohio St.3d 1469, offsets are determined by a policy-limit to policy-limit comparison, not by the amounts actually received by a plaintiff. The same reasoning applies to Osborne's claim for UIM benefits, even though he was not party to the settlement. The Westfield policy provides a $100,000 per person limit and the Globe policy provides only $12,500 in UIM benefits. Appellants' motion to reconsider is denied as to this issue because Osborne is not entitled to UIM benefits under the Globe policy.

Section 3937.18(A) requires uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage for uncompensated wrongful death claims by statutory beneficiaries of an insured decedent.

Carroll v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2002-06-14(A)

We find the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Holt dispositive of this assignment of error.

Section 3937.18 permits an insurer to set off the tortfeasor's liability limits from UM/UIM limits and allows all claims arising from one person's bodily injury to be treated as a single claim subject to the per-person limit.

Lyles v. Glover, Unpublished Decision (3-27-2000) · filed 2000-03-27(A)(2) and (H)

R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) allows an insurer to set off the tortfeasor's liability limits against their UM/UIM coverage limits. ... R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) in no way denies the appellants the right to a remedy. It simply limits the contractual relationship between the insurer and the insured. ... R.C. 3937.18(H), as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, refers to underinsured motorist coverage; it specifically permits an insurance company to "include terms and conditions to the effect that all claims resulting from or arising out of any one person's bodily injury, including death, shall collectively be subject to the limit of the policy applicable to bodily injury, including death, sustained by one person, and for the purpose of such policy limit shall constitute a single claim. Any such policy limit shall be enforceable regardless of the number of insureds, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the declarations or policy, or vehicles involved in the accident." ... The claims of the Lyles family members arise out of the injuries sustained by David. Therefore, under R.C. 3937.18(H), all claims arising out of David's injuries constitute a single claim.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) does not permit an insurer to require bodily injury to the insured; subsection (H) permits per-person limits for all claims arising from one person's bodily injury, including death; and subsections (G)(1) and (2) permit anti-stacking provisions for interfamily and intrafamily coverage.

Plesz v. Plesz · filed 2000-04-06(A)(1), (H), (G)(1) and (2)

Moore held that R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) does not permit an insurer to limit recovery under UIM provisions to those cases where the insured suffers a bodily injury. Moore held that R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) is ambiguous. 88 Ohio St.3d at 31, 723 N.E.2d at 101. ... This court finds that the language used in subsection (H) is not ambiguous. It further finds that an insurance policy can restrict the coverage on all claims arising out of the bodily injury, including death, of a single person to the per person limits of the policy. Because the clauses in Everett’s policy that do that are valid, Everett may only receive $100,000 from State Farm under the uninsured motorist provision of his policy. ... R.C. 3937.18(G) permits an insurance company to issues policies that prevent “stacking” of UIM coverage under more than one policy. R.C. 3937.18(G)(1) and (2) prevent “interfamily” and “intrafamily” stacking.

Section 3937.18 permits insurers to include clear, unambiguous, and conspicuous policy terms barring stacking of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverages, and it does not permit limiting recovery to insureds who themselves suffered bodily injury.

Wallace v. Balint, Unpublished Decision (6-8-2000) · filed 2000-06-08(G), (A)(1), (A)(2)

R.C. 3937.18(G) permits insurance companies to include antistacking provisions in their policies.

Former division (G)(2) permits insurers to bar intrafamily stacking of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverages, while division (H) permits them to treat all claims arising from one person's bodily injury or death as a single claim subject to the per-person limit.

Wallace v. Balint · filed 2002-02-06(G)(2), (H)

Unquestionably, the policies at issue herein each include, pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(G)(2), valid antistacking language. But that is not the end of the story. ... The definitions of “stacking” set forth in the statute and in Black’s, Couch, and Savoie make clear that stacking occurs when one insured seeks coverage under more than one policy issued to himself or other family members. If the estate, the parents, Christopher, and Katrina are each permitted coverage only under their own policy, then stacking never occurs, and the antistacking language is never operative. Herein, no individual claimant-insured is seeking to aggregate or access any policy other than his own. ... Accordingly, the antistacking provisions of the State Farm policy that preclude the “stacking of any and all coverage” do not exclude James and Wanda Wallace from the coverage of one of the underinsured motorist policies held separately in their names, but they are precluded from stacking the remaining three policies. The same is true of decedent’s estate and policies. It follows then that the antistacking provisions of the Wallaces’ policies do not apply to Christopher and Katrina Wallace, since, based upon the definition of stacking, neither of them is attempting to stack his or her separately held underinsured motorist insurance with any other coverage. ... R.C. 3937.18(H) allows insurers to “include terms and conditions to the effect that all claims resulting from or arising out of any one person’s bodily injury, including death, shall collectively be subject to the limit of the policy applicable to bodily injury, including death, sustained by one person.” Each policy held jointly by James and Wanda Wallace contained a valid limitation as authorized by R.C. 3937.18(H). Therefore, James and Wanda Wallace are together confined to one claim at the per-person limit of a single policy.

Section 3937.18(A) requires underinsured-motorist coverage for an insured's losses arising from bodily injury or death, even when the bodily injury or death was suffered by another person.

Bernabei v. Cincinnati Ins. Cos., Unpublished Decision (9-20-2004) · filed 2004-09-20(A)

Since the words "for loss" and "damages" were not removed in the 1997 version of R.C. §3937.18(A), the Sexton and Moore holdings presumably continue to apply to the 1997 version of the statute. ... Upon closer analysis of the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretations of prior versions of R.C. § 3937.18(A), it is our opinion that the changes made to the statute in 1997 would not have affected the analysis used in either Sexton or Moore. ... Given the choice, the remedial nature of the statute requires an interpretation in favor of granting UIM coverage consistent withSexton and Moore. ... The trial court in this case was correct in applyingSexton and Moore to the 1997 version of R.C. § 3937.18(A) applicable to the Personal Auto policy. Appellee parents (and other family members) are entitled to UIM coverage for losses associated with the death of their son, Richard.

Section 3937.18 limits recovery under UM/UIM coverage to circumstances in which the insured suffers bodily injury or death.

Nixon v. Grange Mutual Casualty Company, Unpublished Decision (11-10-2004) · filed 2004-11-10

On September 20, 2000, R.C. 3937.18 was amended to limit recovery under an insurance policy's UM/UIM motorist coverage to circumstances in which an insured suffers bodily injury or death. ... Therefore, the law in effect at the time of the accident prohibits appellant's recovery, as she did not suffer bodily injury.

Section 3937.18 permits setoff of amounts paid by a tortfeasor, allows claims arising from one person's bodily injury to be treated as a single claim, and requires uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage only for automobile liability policies, not a homeowners policy without automobile liability coverage.

Dicke v. Safeco Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (12-13-2000) · filed 2000-12-13(A)(2), (H)

R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) allows an insurer to set off the tortfeasor's liability limits against their uninsured/underinsured coverage limits. ... Therefore, under R.C. 3937.18(H), all claims arising out of Todd's injuries constitute a single claim. ... For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the homeowner's policy issued by the appellee to the appellants was not an automobile policy for the purposes of R.C. 3937.18 and therefore, uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage was not required to be offered and does not arise by operation of law.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) provides underinsured-motorist coverage only when the liability limits available to the insured are less than the insured's underinsured-motorist coverage limits, with coverage reduced by applicable liability payments.

Coffield v. Allstate Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (12-29-2000) · filed 2000-12-29(A)(2)

Because appellant's underinsured coverage limit is only $25,000 per person, the same as Reese's limits and less than Earle's limits, she cannot be considered underinsured within the meaning of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2). Appellant is not eligible for underinsured benefits under her insurance policy issued by appellee; therefore, the trial court did not err by granting appellee's motion for summary judgment. Appellant's sole assignment of error has no merit.

When an insurer does not offer UM/UIM coverage in an automobile liability policy, former § 3937.18 imposed that coverage by operation of law, subject to the policy’s general notice conditions.

Luckenbill v. Midwestern Indemnity Co. · filed 2001-06-01

Former R.C: 3937.18, which became effective on October 24,1994, was in effect when the Midwestern policy was issued. It required an insurer to provide UM/UIM coverage in every automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance issued, unless the policyholder declined coverage. If UM/UIM coverage was not offered, it became part of the policy as a matter of law. ... We find that a general, predicative condition for coverage in a policy of liability insurance, such as a notice provision, applies to UM/UIM coverage imposed by law for the benefit of the insured to the same extent that it applies under the policy’s terms for liability coverage, which likewise benefits the insured when he is at fault.

Section 3937.18 permits an underinsured-motorist policy to prohibit stacking by treating underinsurance as non-excess coverage and limiting recovery to the amount available if the tortfeasor were uninsured.

Grabits v. Jack, Unpublished Decision (12-20-2001) · filed 2001-12-20(A)(1)

As previously noted, however, the Ohio General Assembly amended R.C.3937.18. The amendment, which became effective October 20, 1994, provides that underinsurance is not excess insurance, and the policy holder is only entitled to recover an amount that she would receive if the tortfeasor was uninsured. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20. Underinsured motorist policies in Ohio may thus prohibit stacking.

Section 3937.18 limits underinsured-motorist recovery to the per-person policy limit, permits anti-stacking provisions, and reduces that limit by amounts paid by legally liable parties.

Gray v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (3-4-2002) · filed 2002-03-04(G), (H)

First, consistent with R.C. 3937.18(H), the policy contains language that limits State Farm's liability to the per person policy limits. ... Since McLean was the only person who suffered bodily injury in the accident, this provision limits appellants' total recovery for the accident to the $100,000 per person limit. ... In addition, the State Farm policy provides anti-stacking language consistent with R.C. 3937.18(G). ... After considering the policy language, including the limits of liability, anti-stacking and reduction language, we find that the State Farm policy limits appellants to the $100,000 per person limit and that amount is reduced by the $75,000 paid to appellants on behalf of the tortfeasors. ... We find no merit to appellants' argument that R.C. 3937.18, as amended by Senate Bill 20 violates the Contract Clause of the Ohio or United States Constitution.

Section 3937.18(H) bars insurers from consolidating claims arising from one bodily injury into the single per-person limit, but the amendment could enter an existing policy only on a new contract or renewal.

Weisman v. Casualty Group of Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (4-3-2002) · filed 2002-04-03(H)

Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, effective October 20, 1994, overruled the holding of Savoie, including its prohibition against insurers consolidating claims arising out of a single bodily injury to the single per-person limit. See R.C. 3937.18(H). ... Therefore, the only instance in which Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 could be incorporated into a policy of insurance would be "if a new contract of insurance had been entered into or a renewal (representing a new contract of insurance) of the existing policy had occurred." Ross,82 Ohio St.3d at 289. ... Accordingly, Savoie was the controlling law regarding the issue of her UIM coverage with Casualty.

Section 3937.18(G) permits insurers to include anti-stacking provisions but does not prohibit policies that allow stacking.

Cornett v. State Farm Mutual Insurance, Unpublished Decision (7-12-2002) · filed 2002-07-12(G)

Presumably, the Cornetts are referring to R.C. 3937.18(G), which authorizes anti-stacking provisions. This law does not, however, preclude stacking. Insurance companies are free to offer policies that provide stacked coverages. The fact that the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in the Cornetts' policies are not stacked does not result from the statute, but from the policies themselves, which contain anti-stacking provisions. Because these are clearly set forth in the policies of insurance, we see no obligation on the part of State Farm to inform the Cornetts that these anti-stacking provisions are expressly permitted by law.

Section 3937.18(G) permits insurance policies to preclude stacking of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverages, and section 3937.18(A)(2) requires available tortfeasor insurance to be set off against underinsured motorist policy limits.

Kulikowski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Unpublished Decision (10-10-2002) · filed 2002-10-10(G); (A)(2)

R.C. 3937.18(G) legislatively overruled the distinction inSavoie at its progeny, including our court's pronouncement in Winkhartv. State Farm Ins. Co. (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 794, 689 N.E.2d 120, between full and discounted policies. ... We have concluded that the anti-stacking provisions of R.C. 3937.18(G) apply to this case and Kulikowski's arguments underSavoie are inapplicable. As such, pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(G) and the conforming language of the subject policies, the court correctly determined that Kulikowski could not stack the underinsured motorist coverage from his two State Farm policies. ... Thus, according to the policy language, we must compare the amount of available insurance from the tortfeasor with the policy limits of Kulikowski's State Farm policies. Here, because the amount of insurance available from the tortfeasor's insurer, $971,000, exceeded Kulikowski's $300,000 UM/UIM policy limits, he is not entitled to underinsured motorist coverage from State Farm. Therefore, based on the set-off provision of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) and the language of the State Farm policies, the trial court should have granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment.

Section 3937.18 mandates underinsured-motorist coverage that protects people rather than vehicles, so an ambiguous corporate policy may cover the corporation's employees.

Pioneer Insurance Co. v. Kirby, Unpublished Decision (2-10-2003) · filed 2003-02-10

The Court reasoned that R.C. 3937.18, which mandates UIM coverage, was designed to protect people, not vehicles. Id. Therefore, it determined it was "reasonable to conclude that `you,' while referring to [a corporation], also includes [the corporation's] employees, since a corporation can act only by and through real live persons." Id. ... In this case, "you" is defined as the named insured, Lakefront Lines, Inc. According to Scott-Pontzer, the UIM policy was mandated to protect people, not vehicles. Because it has been found that UIM protects individuals, the "you" in ISOP's UIM policy is ambiguous because it is defined as protecting only Lakefront, a company. Therefore, under the reasoning in Scott-Pontzer, ISOP's UIM policy also covers Lakefront's employees since a corporation can only act by and through real live people. As such, Current, as an employee of Lakefront, would be covered by the UIM policy.

Section 3937.18 can impose underinsured motorist coverage on commercial umbrella and commercial general liability policies by operation of law.

Keeton v. Motorists Mut. Ins., Unpublished Decision (3-25-2003) · filed 2003-03-25

Therefore, applying Heiney to the present case, the conditions precedent in the insurance policies requiring appellant to provide notice to Motorists of his intent to make a claim apply to both UIM coverage that is expressly provided in the business automobile policy and UIM coverage that is impressed upon the commercial umbrella and commercial general liability policies by operation of law pursuant to R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) makes UIM coverage available only when the total liability coverage available for payment is less than the insured's UIM limits; equal limits do not satisfy that threshold.

Likens v. Westfield Ins., Unpublished Decision (8-3-2005) · filed 2005-08-03(A)(2)

Consequently, Appellant cannot meet the threshold requirement because the tortfeasor's per person liability limit of $100,000 and her own UM/UIM limits were the same. Under Appellant's policy, her parents are her "relatives" and the $100,000 they received from the tortfeasor satisfied the claim they had made against the tortfeasor as insureds, which was the identical amount of liability coverage for insureds under Appellant's policy. As Appellant's policy limits were identical, the statutory threshold was not met. This Court agrees with the trial court that the amount "available for payment" and "actually recovered by an insured" equals the amount of UIM coverage available from Appellant's policy. Consequently, Appellant is unable to receive UIM coverage under her own policy for her father's injuries. As the threshold requirement is dispositive of Appellant's additional arguments in her brief, we decline to address them.

Section 3937.18 requires contractual restrictions on UM/UIM coverage to comply with the statute's purpose of providing coverage to injured persons whose tortfeasor's liability insurance is insufficient for full compensation, so a limitation that impermissibly restricts an insured's ability to obtain UIM benefits cannot be enforced under the circumstances.

Mowery v. Welsh, Unpublished Decision (3-31-2006) · filed 2006-03-31

With regard to UM/UIM coverage, "[a]ny contractual restriction on the coverage mandated by R.C. 3937.18 must comply with the purpose of this statute." Ady v. W. Am.Ins. Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 593, syllabus. We are mindful that the purpose of R.C. 3937.18 is to "provide underinsured motorist coverage for injured persons who have a legal cause of action against the tortfeasor but who are under compensated for their injuries because the tortfeasor's liability coverage is insufficient to provide full compensation."Miller, 69 Ohio St.3d at 623. To permit Appellant to prevail on this claim would enable it to impermissibly restrict an insured's right to assert a claim for UIM benefits. Such a result would clearly contravene the purpose of R.C. 3937.18 by thwarting an insured's ability to obtain UIM coverage. Through this pronouncement, we are not suggesting that a two-year statute of limitations is per se unreasonable, but instead find that under the provisions of the insurance agreement and facts presented herein it was inequitable to enforce the statute of limitations provision.

Former § 3937.18(A)(2) required an umbrella policy providing automobile liability coverage to include equivalent underinsured motorist coverage, including excess coverage, absent a valid rejection.

Skolnick v. Cincinnati Insurance Companies, 2007-T-0088 (5-9-2008) · filed 2008-05-09(A)(2)

Since Jay Skolnick's personal umbrella liability endorsement, by its express terms, covered "relatives for any occurrences involving an automobile," and provided for "excess insurance over and above that provided in the basic policies," we are compelled to conclude, under the applicable law at the time the accident occurred, that the coverage limit arising by operation of law under the umbrella policy was $2,000,000, based upon the coverage limit contained in Item 3. See Duriak , 28 Ohio St.3d at 72 ("Clearly, under the express terms of R.C. 3937.18 , no exception is made with respect to excess insurance coverage. If the legislature desires to exempt excess liability carriers, they are free to do so. In the meantime, however, we are compelled to hold that excess liability insurance must comport with R.C. 3937.18 ."); cf. Siemens , 16 Ohio App.3d at 132 (holding that "in issuing the umbrella endorsement" with similar coverage terms, the insurance company "issued * * * liability insurance requiring the offering of uninsured motorist coverage in accordance with R.C. 3937.18 ," and finding the policy limit for UM under the umbrella policy to be $1,100,000).

Section 3937.18(F) permits UIM policies to preclude stacking, while subsection (C) requires UIM limits to be reduced by amounts available under insurance covering persons liable to the insured.

Modroo v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 2008-08-05(F), (C)

Ohio law allows an insurance contract to “include terms and conditions that preclude any and all stacking” of UIM coverages. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3937.18(F). Ohio law also states that UIM policy limits “shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under . . . insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3937.18(C). Based on these statutory provisions, we conclude that the District Court did not misapply Ohio law when it denied the stacking of coverages and allowed offsets under the personal auto policy.

When multiple tortfeasors are liable, § 3937.18(C) requires combining all available liability-coverage limits to determine whether the insured is underinsured, rather than assessing each tortfeasor separately.

Jeffrey G. Stagnaro Administrator of the Estate of David Bouma v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2020-08-27(C)

Based on our review of the statute and relevant case law, we hold the limitation in R.C. 3937.18(C) applies to both tortfeasors jointly. The combined limits of coverage available for payment to Bouma from “all persons liable” is $4,100,000, which far exceeds the $250,000 limits of his UIM coverage.

Section 3937.18 does not provide underinsured motorist coverage when the tortfeasor's liability limits equal the insured's underinsured motorist coverage limits.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Walden · filed 1990-06-11

R.C. 3937.18 requires "* * * an insurer to provide coverage to its insured when the tortfeasor's coverage is less than the limits of the insured's uninsured motorist coverage at the time of the accident." Id. at 244. ... For these reasons, we conclude that Telly Steimel is not entitled to the underinsured motorist coverage of the Nationwide policy.

Section 3937.18(C) does not require an insurer to reduce underinsured motorist coverage by amounts available under another underinsured motorist policy.

Savage v. Encompass Ins., Unpublished Decision (1-14-2005) · filed 2005-01-14(C)

We agree and find R.C. 3937.18 does not require Glens Falls' UIM policy be reduced by the available Nationwide amounts.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires underinsured motorist coverage when the liability coverage available to an insured is less than the insured's uninsured motorist coverage limit.

Schreck v. Grange Ins., Unpublished Decision (5-2-2005) · filed 2005-05-02(A)(2)

We also note that this definition of UIM coverage is in conformance with the UIM coverage that was required by R.C. 3937.18(A)(2). ... Therefore, the definition in the Western Reserve policies is not contrary to R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an uninsured/underinsured motorist policy to treat all claims arising from one person's bodily injury, including derivative claims, as a single claim subject to that person's per-person limit.

Campbell v. Allstate Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (5-19-2000) · filed 2000-05-19(H)

Therefore, R.C. 3937.18(H) had no application to the decision in Schaefer. Had that section been in effect when the claim accrued and the policy providing the coverage went into effect, R.C. 3937.18(H) would have required merger of the consortium claim in Schaefer with the bodily injury claim for purposes of coverage. ... Therefore, as R.C. 3937.18(H) became effective prior to both the effective date of the policy and the date the claim accrued, that section permits the merger of Sean Campbell's loss of consortium claim into Kara Campbell's bodily injury, which the Victoria policy expressly provides.

Section 3937.18 permits an insurer to treat claims arising from one person's bodily injury as a single claim, reduce underinsured-motorist limits by payments from liable parties, and enforce clear anti-stacking terms.

Steinbach v. State Farm Ins. Company, Unpublished Decision (5-22-2000) · filed 2000-05-22(H), (A)(2), and (G)

R.C. 3937.18(H) expressly permits liability insurance policies to include language which limits the available coverage. ... Pursuant to the above language, an insurer is permitted to include policy language to the effect all claims arising from the bodily injury sustained by one person shall be considered collectively as a single claim subject to a single "per person" limit. ... The Steinbachs' claims for personal injury and loss of consortium constitute a single claim; therefore, the coverage available for their total damages is limited to the "each person" amount. ... R.C. 3937.18(A) provides, in pertinent part: ... The policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured. ... State Farm is permitted to set off the $100,000 received by the Steinbachs from the tortfeasor against the $100,000 "each person" limit of their policies. ... R.C. 3937.18(G) permits an insurer to include terms and conditions which preclude any and all stacking in a policy of insurance. ... We find Section 1 contains effective, unambiguous anti-stacking language. ... Based upon the foregoing, we find the Steinbachs are not entitled to UIM coverage from State Farm pursuant to the anti-stacking provision.

Section 3937.18(A) requires a written offer of UM/UIM coverage, but does not require the written offer to include every detailed term formerly required by the predecessor statute; oral discussions may supplement it.

Hansberry v. Westfield Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (6-27-2000) · filed 2000-06-27(A)

The amendment is reflected at R.C. 3937.18 (A)(2). This statute does not, however, state that an offer of UIM coverage must contain the same details that had been required by former R.C. 3937.181 (B). The legislature did not carry over the "detailed offer" language of former R.C. 3937.181 (B) into its amendment of R.C.3937.18 (A). Thus, what was once expressly required of an offer of UIM coverage is no longer mandated by the current statutory language.

Section 3937.18(C) makes a written, signed rejection of UM/UIM coverage effective when signed, presumes an offer of coverage, and does not require the rejection before the policy takes effect; the Linko offer requirements remain applicable.

Raymond v. Sentry Ins., Unpublished Decision (3-8-2002) · filed 2002-03-08(C)

The trial court is correct with respect to Gyori. The Legislature clearly considered that case and acted to accept that a rejection of UM/UIM coverage must be in writing and, tacitly by its creation of a presumption, that there must be an offer of coverage. The General Assembly deleted the Gyori requirement that the coverage rejection must come prior to the effective date of the policy.

Section 3937.18 requires insurers to offer uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage when a policy qualifies as a motor vehicle liability policy.

Workman v. Carlisle Engineered Prod., Unpublished Decision (1-23-2003) · filed 2003-01-23

If a policy qualifies as such, the provisions of R.C. 3937.18 require an offering of UIM coverage.

Under the version of § 3937.18 applicable to these policies, a written UM/UIM offer without premium information is invalid, and coverage arises by operation of law when there is no valid offer and rejection.

Hindall v. Intl · filed 2003-07-25

Under Roberts, we must hold the written offer of UM/UIM coverage in this case to be fatally defective.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage to be offered when an insurance policy provides even limited motor-vehicle liability coverage, and incorporates that coverage into the policy by operation of law.

Stacy v. Wausau Business Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (6-13-2000) · filed 2000-06-13

Based upon the exceptions, the question is whether "an automobile vocational technical class," "golf cart or tractors," "non-owned vehicle operated on rail or crawler treads" or "stationary automobile" make appellee's policy a "motor vehicle liability policy." ... These designations, coupled with the "on premises or between premises" language of the policy, leads us to conclude that appellee's policy is a limited "motor vehicle liability policy" and therefore should have offered uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage. By operation of law, said coverage is incorporated into the policy.

Section 3937.18(L)(2) includes umbrella liability policies within the definition of automobile or motor vehicle liability policies, but a primary homeowner's policy without excess or umbrella coverage does not qualify.

Pillo v. Stricklin, Unpublished Decision (2-5-2001) · filed 2001-02-05(L)(2)

At issue in this matter is whether the trial court erred in determining that the above homeowner's policy is not an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance as defined in R.C. 3937.18. ... In the case sub judice, the homeowner's insurance policy issued by appellee to appellants clearly does not qualify as an umbrella policy. ... Rather, the homeowner's policy issued by appellee is the primary policy of insurance and provides no excess or umbrella coverage. ... Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not err in granting appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment while overruling that filed by appellants.

Section 3937.18(L) defines an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy to include a policy serving as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified vehicles or an umbrella liability policy; a general liability policy lacking those characteristics is not such a policy and does not trigger mandatory UM/UIM coverage.

Pickett v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (1-14-2002) · filed 2002-01-14(L)

We further find that the general liability policy in this case does not serve as proof of financial responsibility as defined in R.C. §4509.01(K) and the policy has no listing of specifically identified vehicles. We therefore find, in accordance with R.C. § 3937.18, that the general liability policy issued in the case sub judice is not an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability of insurance.

Section 3937.18(A) requires uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage with an automobile liability policy, but a homeowner's policy providing only incidental motor-vehicle coverage through a residence-employee exception is not such a policy.

Wetterau v. Utica National Ins. Group, Unpublished Decision (7-24-2002) · filed 2002-07-24(A)

This Court is persuaded by the reasoning of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio in Tate v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co. (S.D.Ohio 2002), 184 F. Supp.2d 713, 717, fn3, quoting Marinov. Cincinnati Ins. Co. (May 14, 2001), Cuyahoga Common Pleas No. CV-414468: ... Therefore, the Tate v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co. court concluded that the residence employee exception provides merely incidental motor vehicle coverage, more like the policy at issue in Davidson than in Selander, and was not sufficient to bring the policy within the parameters of R.C.3937.18. Tate, 184 F. Supp.2d at 717. ... Because Wetterau's homeowner's policy was not an automobile liability insurance policy, no UM/UIM coverage would be imposed by operation of law. Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Republic-Franklin.

Section 3937.18(L)(1) treats a policy as an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy only when it serves as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified vehicles.

Devore v. Richmond, Unpublished Decision (8-2-2002) · filed 2002-08-02(L)(1)

This court finds that the CGL policy in this case does not serve as proof of financial responsibility as defined in R.C. 4509.01(K) for owners or operators of specifically identified vehicles. This court therefore finds, in accordance with R.C. 3937.18, that the CGL policy issued in the case sub judice is not an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance.

Former § 3937.18(A) required automobile or motor vehicle liability policies to provide uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, but a homeowner’s policy with only limited coverage for unregistered, off-road vehicles was not subject to that requirement.

Boughan v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (10-8-2002) · filed 2002-10-08(A)

Consequently, we find that Boughan's homeowner's policy through Grange is not a motor vehicle liability policy under R.C. 3937.18 as a matter of law and, therefore, Grange is not required to provide uninsured/underinsured coverage.

Under former § 3937.18, residence-employee coverage in a homeowner's policy does not by itself make the policy a motor vehicle liability policy requiring UIM coverage.

Wolf v. Insurance Co. of Ohio, Unpublished Decision (1-16-2003) · filed 2003-01-16

The Wolfs alleged that UIM coverage arose as a matter of law because their policy provided coverage for "residence employees" injured while operating motor vehicles in the course of their employment, and that coverage transformed the policy into an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance" under the former version of R.C. 3937.18.2 ... The sole question in this appeal is whether the "residence employee" coverage in the homeowner's policy gives rise to UIM coverage as a matter of law. Because of the the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion inHillyer v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co.,3 we find that it does not and overrule the assignment of error.

Under the former version of § 3937.18, residence-employee coverage in a homeowner's policy does not make the policy an automobile or motor-vehicle liability policy that must include uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.

Carlile v. Usaa Casualty Co., Unpublished Decision (1-16-2003) · filed 2003-01-16

The sole question in this appeal is whether the "residence employee" coverage in the homeowner's policy gives rise to UIM coverage as a matter of law. Because of the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion inHillyer v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co.,2 we find that it does not and overrule the assignment of error.

Section 3937.18(L)(1) requires an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy to serve as proof of financial responsibility for vehicles specifically identified in the policy, or to be an umbrella liability policy.

Bowles v. Utica National Insurance Group, Unpublished Decision (1-17-2003) · filed 2003-01-17(L)(1)

R.C. § 3937.18 as it was in effect on the date of the accident, provided that an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance means any policy of insurance that serves as proof of financial responsibility, as proof of financial responsibility is defined in the Revised Code, for owners or operators of the motor vehicles specifically listed in the policy of insurance, or any umbrella liability policy. ... The new version of R.C. § 3937.18(L) limits the definition of automobile liability policy by requiring vehicles to be "specifically identified" therefore, Republic Franklin would have been required to offer underinsured motorists coverage to New Song if its policy served as proof of financial responsibility for owners or operators of motor vehicles specifically listed in the policy of insurance, or if the policy was an umbrella liability policy. ... The policy before us has no listing of specifically identified vehicles, and we therefore conclude it is not a motor vehicle or automobile liability policy. For this reason, we conclude appellee Republic Franklin did not have to offer UM/UIM insurance coverage to New Song, and the coverage does not arise by operation of law.

Under subsection (L)(1), a policy qualifies as an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy only if it serves as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified motor vehicles; incidental coverage and general vehicle categories are insufficient.

Ribeiro v. John Doe Ins. Cos., Unpublished Decision (1-30-2003) · filed 2003-01-30(L)(1)

In addition, the effective version of R.C. 3937.18(L), defines a motor vehicle policy as: "(1) Any policy of insurance that serves as proof of financial responsibility, as proof of financial responsibility is defined by division (K) of section 4509.01 of the Revised Code, for owners or operators of the motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy of insurance." This policy is not a motor vehicle policy as that term is defined by R.C. 3937.18(L). ... In order to qualify as a motor vehicle policy, the policy must "specifically identify" the motor vehicles subject to coverage. R.C. 3937.18(L)(1). ... As it stands, the current terms of the policy exclude coverage for motor vehicles in general and only provide incidental coverage for parking autos and the use of certain "mobile equipment." Unlike standard automobile policies, this policy has no listing of specifically identified automobiles. For these reasons, we find that general categories of vehicles providing coverage in exceptions to exclusions do not qualify as "specifically identified" vehicles under the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms.

Former Section 3937.18(A) does not require UM/UIM coverage for a homeowner’s policy merely because a residence-employee exception provides limited liability coverage that may involve a motor vehicle.

Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Torok, Unpublished Decision (2-12-2003) · filed 2003-02-12(A)

We find that the limited liability coverage that may arise under the residence-employee exception in a homeowner's insurance policy is insufficient to transform the policy into a motor vehicle policy for purposes of former R.C. 3937.18(A).

Section 3937.18(A) does not transform a homeowner's policy into a motor vehicle policy merely because it provides limited coverage for residential employees injured in a motor vehicle accident while acting within the scope of employment.

Kotouch v. Westfield Cos., Unpublished Decision (2-25-2003) · filed 2003-02-25(A)

The language in Kotouch's policy which provided limited coverage to residential employees injured in a motor vehicle accident while acting in the scope of their employment does not transform the policy into a motor vehicle policy for the purposes of former R.C. 3937.18(A).

A policy is subject to Ohio’s UIM-coverage mandate only if it serves as proof of financial responsibility and insures motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy.

Bogan v. Johnson · filed 2003-03-10(L)

R.C. 3937.18 required insurers, offering automobile insurance in Ohio, to make UIM coverage available to policy holders. This mandate is applicable only to “automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance.” R.C. 3937.18(L) requires that the policy both serve as “proof of financial responsibility” and insure motor vehicles “specifically identified in the policy” in order to qualify as an automobile or motor vehicle policy.

Under the amended statute, a commercial general liability policy that is neither an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy nor an umbrella policy does not require the insurer to offer UIM coverage, and such coverage does not arise by operation of law.

Blake v. First Fin. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (3-21-2003) · filed 2003-03-21(L)

Since FFIC's CGL policy is not an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance" within amended R.C. 3937.18, FFIC was not required to offer UIM coverage as part of the policy. Consequently, such coverage does not arise by operation of law because of any failure to offer such coverage when the policy was issued.

Section 3937.18 required insurers of automobile or motor-vehicle liability policies to offer UM/UIM coverage; if no valid offer and rejection occurred, coverage arose by operation of law, including for a commercial liability policy with limited non-owned-auto coverage.

Lawler v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company · filed 2003-03-31

Because the State Farm policy provided essentially the same limited automobile liability coverage as was provided by the commercial liability policy at issue in Selander, the State Farm policy was an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy triggering the obligation to offer UM/UIM coverage. Because the policy provided no UM/UIM coverage and no valid offer and rejection of such coverage was obtained, UM/UIM coverage arose by operation of law.

Section 3937.18 does not require UM/UIM coverage in a commercial general liability policy merely because it contains valet-parking or mobile-equipment provisions.

Heidt v. Federal Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (4-7-2003) · filed 2003-04-07(A)

Therefore, a "valet parking" provision does not transform a CGL policy into a motor vehicle liability policy under either the pre-H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18 or the post-H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18. ... The "mobile equipment" provision was not specifically addressed in the Szekeres case. However, we conclude the "mobile equipment" provision also does not transform the CGL policy into a motor vehicle liability policy under the pre-H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18. ... Therefore, the "mobile equipment" provision does not convert the CGL policy into a motor vehicle liability policy requiring UM/UIM coverage to be offered. This policy was not intended to satisfy the statutory requirement of financial responsibility against liability arising from the ownership or operation of vehicles used for transportation on the highway. Therefore, Federal's CGL policy is not a motor vehicle liability policy under which UM/UIM coverage had to be offered and Appellee Heidt cannot avail himself of UM/UIM coverage under said policy.

Section 3937.18 treats a policy as a motor vehicle liability policy only under the statutory definitions, and an umbrella policy qualifies only if written as excess over a policy described in division (L)(1).

Sheaffer v. Westfield Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (4-29-2003) · filed 2003-04-29(L)(1), (L)(2)

This court has previously determined, in the Bowles decision, that the inclusion of "hired" and "non-owned" provisions in a policy of insurance does not transform the policy into a motor vehicle liability policy under the H.B. 261 version of 3937.18. ... Thus, Argonaut's CGL policy is not a motor vehicle liability policy and it was therefore, not required to offer UM/UIM coverage to Rodhe's Market, Inc. when it issued the policy. ... The S.B. 57 version of R.C. 3937.18(L)(2) provides that an umbrella policy is a motor vehicle liability policy of insurance only when it is Awritten as excess over one or more policies described in division (L)(1) of this section. ... Because the umbrella policy under consideration is not excess over a policy described in R.C.3937.18(L)(1), it also is not a motor vehicle liability policy, and Argonaut was not required to offer UM/UIM coverage under said policy.

Under the applicable version, § 3937.18(L) does not treat general hired/non-owned auto provisions as a motor-vehicle liability policy, and an umbrella policy excluding auto liability need not offer UM/UIM coverage.

Dancy v. Citizens Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (5-30-2003) · filed 2003-05-30(L)(1), (L)(2)

Section (L) of R.C. 3937.18 specifically defines what is a motor vehicle liability policy of insurance. It has been judicially determined, in both the Jump and Bowles cases, that the inclusion of "hired" and "non-owned" provisions in a policy of insurance does not transform the policy into a motor vehicle liability policy under the H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18 and Citizens therefore, did not have to offer UM/UIM coverage. ... Accordingly, we conclude that since the excess/umbrella policy did not provide coverage for autos, Citizens was not required to offer UM/UIM coverage as required by R.C. 3937.18 and such coverage may not arise by operation of law.

Section 3937.18(L)(1) does not apply to a commercial general liability policy that does not insure motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy.

Dalton v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (6-2-2003) · filed 2003-06-02(L)(1)

Because appellant's commercial general liability policy does not insure motor vehicles "specifically identified in the policy," R.C. 3937.18 does not apply.

Section 3937.18 does not require uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage under a homeowner's policy that does not qualify as a motor vehicle policy of insurance.

Blackwell v. Allstate Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (4-10-2003) · filed 2003-04-10(A)

This court follows the Ohio Supreme Court's reasoning inHillyer, supra, and concludes the homeowner's policy in question does not qualify as a motor vehicle policy of insurance under the applicable version of R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 does not require a commercial general liability policy to offer UM/UIM coverage merely because it contains valet-parking or mobile-equipment provisions that do not make it a motor vehicle liability policy.

Fish v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-18-2003) · filed 2003-08-18

Western American's provisions concerning "valet parking" and "mobile equipment" are almost identical to the provisions reviewed in Heidt. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in Heidt, we conclude these provisions contained in Western American's CGL policy do not transform the policy into a motor vehicle liability policy thereby requiring the mandatory offering of UM/UIM coverage even though the policy pre-dates the H.B. 21 version of R.C. 3937.18.

A commercial general liability policy that does not specifically identify any motor vehicle is not an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy subject to § 3937.18, so the insurer need not offer UM/UIM coverage and such coverage does not arise by operation of law.

Bell v. Currier, Unpublished Decision (6-23-2003) · filed 2003-06-23(L)

Since the AMM CGL policy does not specifically identify any motor vehicle, it is not an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy subject to R.C. 3937.18.

Under the pre-H.B. 261 version of Section 3937.18, limited coverage for an automobile vocational technical class and/or golf carts or tractors does not make a school district's CGL policy a motor vehicle liability policy requiring a mandatory offer of UM/UIM coverage.

Moorhead v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins., Unpublished Decision (7-21-2003) · filed 2003-07-21

Based on our previous decisions in Szekeres v. State FarmFire Cas. Co., Licking App. No. 02CA00004, 2002-Ohio-5989, Pickettv. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., Stark App. Nos. 2001CA00227, 2001CA00236,2002-Ohio-259, Jett v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., Stark App. No. 2002CA00183, 2002-Ohio-7211 andHillyer v. State Farm Fire Cas.Co., 97 Ohio St.3d 411, 2002-Ohio-6662, we find the that the "an automobile vocational technical class" and/or "golf cart or tractors" provisions do not transform the CGL policy into a motor vehicle liability policy under the pre-H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 requires UM/UIM coverage to be offered under an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy, but a policy covering only generally described hired or non-owned autos does not qualify unless it specifically identifies the vehicles.

Wikstrom v. Hilton, Unpublished Decision (9-5-2003) · filed 2003-09-05(L)(1)

The version of R.C. 3937.18 that was in effect at the time the Indiana policy was entered into included a definition of "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance" under paragraph (L). That provision reads: "As used in this section, `automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance' means either of the following: (1) Any policy of insurance that serves as proof of financial responsibility, as proof of financial responsibility is defined by division (K) of section 4509.01 of the Revised Code, for owners or operators of the motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy of insurance; (2) Any umbrella liability policy of insurance." ... Accordingly, if a policy of insurance serves as proof of financial responsibility for owners or operators of motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy, it qualifies as an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance for which UM/UIM coverage must be offered. ... We therefore conclude that the Indiana insurance policy at issue was not an automobile liability or motor vehicle policy of insurance and, therefore, Indiana was not required to offer UM/UIM coverage. Accordingly, such coverage did not arise by operation of law and the trial court did not err in granting Indiana summary judgment on Hilton's third party complaint for declaratory judgment.

Section 3937.18's mandatory UM/UIM-offer requirement does not apply to a CGL policy that is not an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy.

Wertz v. Indiana Insurance, Unpublished Decision (11-05-2003) · filed 2003-11-05(L)

Therefore, the CGL policy issued by Appellee is not an automobile or motor vehicle liability insurance policy. Consequently, it is not subject to the mandatory UM/UIM offer provision of former R.C. 3937.18, and it does not contain UM/UIM coverage by operation of law.

Section 3937.18 applies to a business auto policy that serves as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified vehicles listed in a schedule.

Pitsenbarger v. Foos, Unpublished Decision (11-26-2003) · filed 2003-11-26(L)

Since the business auto policy would serve as proof of financial responsibility for those vehicles on the schedule on file with the company described in the endorsement, Travelers Business Auto policy is an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance to which R.C. 3937.18 applies.

Section 3937.18(A) does not require an insurer to offer UM/UIM coverage when an education liability policy provides only incidental automobile coverage and is not an automobile liability policy.

Darrel Henry, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Wausau Business Insurance Co., Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee · filed 2003-12-08(A)

Accordingly, we find that the education liability policy at issue is not an automobile liability policy for the purpose of O.R.C. § 3937.18.

Section 3937.18(L)(1) treats a policy as a motor vehicle liability policy only when it specifically identifies the motor vehicles covered.

Turvey v. Ocheltree, Unpublished Decision (2-10-2004) · filed 2004-02-10(L)(1)

The policy does not specifically identify vehicles contained in either the mobile equipment or the valet parking provision; therefore, we find the CGL Policy is not a motor vehicle policy pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(L)(1), and UM/UIM coverage is not afforded to appellants.

Under the 1997 version of § 3937.18, hired- and non-owned-auto coverage in a general liability policy does not make it an automobile liability policy subject to the statute’s offer/rejection requirements.

Medure v. Medure, Unpublished Decision (6-9-2004) · filed 2004-06-09(L)

Celina is correct that, under the 1997 version of R.C. § 3937.18, an extension of coverage for hired and non-owned autos does not convert a general liability policy into an automobile liability policy, and thus, does not require the insurance company to follow the offer/rejection requirements of R.C. §3937.18.

Section 3937.18 does not require uninsured-motorist coverage merely because a commercial general liability policy includes incidental parking coverage; that provision does not make the policy a motor-vehicle liability policy.

Reese v. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Underwriter · filed 2004-10-07

Plaintiffs argue that the parking provision converts the policy into one that includes motor vehicle liability coverage and that is therefore subject to R.C. 3937.18, thus requiring Fidelity to include UM coverage. We disagree. ... This court has construed this provision several times and has consistently held that this one provision does not convert what is otherwise a nonmotorvehicle insurance policy into a motor-vehicle insurance policy.

Section 3937.18 does not require uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in a commercial general liability policy that provides only incidental coverage and does not specifically identify motor vehicles.

Deffenbaugh v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (11-4-2004) · filed 2004-11-04(L)

Based upon the case law of this appellate district, we find the provisions cited by appellants do not convert the commercial general liability policy into a motor vehicle liability policy for purposes of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.

Section 3937.18(L) requires a policy to serve as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified motor vehicles to qualify as an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy subject to Ohio's UM/UIM coverage statute.

Russell v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (11-5-2004) · filed 2004-11-05(L)

In this case, we hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that the Heritage policy was not an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance within the meaning of R.C. 3937.18, and that UM/UIM coverage did not arise by operation of law.

Former § 3937.18 required an offer of UIM coverage only when the policy was an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy, including a policy serving as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified vehicles or an umbrella policy over such a policy.

Walter v. Allstate, Unpublished Decision (6-1-2005) · filed 2005-06-01(L)

Thus, pursuant to former R.C. 3937.18, Continental was required to offer UIM coverage only if the policy in question was an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy. ... Therefore, the Continental policy is not an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance and former R.C. 3937.18 does not apply.

Under former R.C. 3937.18(L), an insurance policy is subject to the statute's mandates only if it serves as proof of financial responsibility under R.C. 4509.01(K) or is an umbrella liability policy.

Griewahn v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 2005-03-28(L) (L)(1) (L)(2)

Under the applicable version of R.C. 3937.18, this insurance policy is only subject to the mandates of that statute if (1) it serves as proof of financial responsibility, as that phrase is defined by R.C. 4509.01(K), or (2) it is an umbrella liability policy of insurance. Former R.C. 3937.18(L). This insurance contract meets neither of these definitions.

Former § 3937.18(A)(1) required UM/UIM coverage only for an automobile or motor-vehicle liability policy; incidental, narrow motor-vehicle coverage was insufficient to make this professional-liability policy such a policy.

Hiller v. Ohic Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (9-1-2006) · filed 2006-09-01(A)(1)

"However, a policy will not be construed as an \"automobile or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance\" where it includes only \"incidental\" motor vehicle coverage, i.e., where the motor vehicle coverage is \"remote from and insignificant to the type of overall coverage the policy provide[s].\" Hillyer v. State Farm, 97 Ohio St.3d 411 , 416 , 2002-Ohio-6662 ; see, also, Davidson v. Motorists Mutual Ins. Co., 91 Ohio St.3d 262 , 2001-Ohio-36 . ... At best, the policy implicitly covers a narrow class of accident scenarios incidental to the express, primary coverage set forth in the policy. As such, the motor vehicle liability coverage is \"remote from and insignificant to the type of overall coverage the policy provided,\" Hillyar, supra, and insufficient to transform the policy into an \"automobile or motor vehicle liability policy\" as a matter of law."

The section requires insurers issuing motor vehicle liability policies to offer uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.

Stacy v. Wausau Business Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (4-8-2002) · filed 2002-04-08

We do not find that our previous decision is in conflict with or is inconsistent with the holding in Davidson, supra. In Davidson, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a homeowner's insurance policy that provided limited liability coverage for vehicles that were not subject to motor vehicle registration and that were not intended to be used on a public highway was not a "motor vehicle liability policy" subject to statutory requirement to offer uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage. In the case sub judice, we found that the policy included coverage for "[o]n premises or between premises use of golf carts or tractors" and that both golf carts and tractors were "motor vehicles".

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage only when the policy is an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy meeting the statutory definition.

Ashley v. Baird, Unpublished Decision (5-28-2003) · filed 2003-05-28(L)(1)

The plain meaning of these statutes provides that for an insurance policy to be considered an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability insurance policy in a post-H.B. 261 context, the policy must either (1) serve as proof of financial responsibility for owners or operators of the motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy, or (2) be an umbrella liability insurance policy written in excess over a policy that serves as proof of financial responsibility.

Section 3937.18 treats all claims arising from one person's bodily injury as a single claim subject to one per-person underinsured-motorist limit, which is reduced by amounts available from liable parties.

Wallar v. Randolph, Unpublished Decision (6-27-2000) · filed 2000-06-27(A)(2) and (H)

According to the statutory provision outlined above, all claims arising out of a single bodily injury are considered to be a single claim for insurance purposes. The statute also specifically provides that there is a maximum of one "each person" limit of underinsured motorist coverage available for all claims due to a single bodily injury. The Staff Notes accompanying the above statutory provisions make clear the General Assembly's intent that a single "each person" limit of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage is to apply where there has been a single bodily injury or death. ... The language of the policy provides and the revised code allows that the $100,000 underinsured coverage be set off by the collective amount received from the party liable for the bodily injury. Therefore, in this case, the trial court found and we agree that nothing is available for payment under the underinsured motorist provision of the policy because the party liable for the injury, Randolph, paid $1 million in damages for a single bodily injury and all claims arising therefrom thus requiring set off of the entire amount available for payment under the State Farm policy.

Underinsured motorist coverage is reduced by a payment under an applicable bodily injury liability policy, regardless of how the claimant allocates the payment.

Combs v. Black, Unpublished Decision (5-16-2006) · filed 2006-05-16(A)(2)

As underinsured, if we do not allow Erie to set off Progressive's payment, appellants will receive a minimum of $200,000. Such an outcome clearly contradicts the statutory intent of R.C. 3937.18 (A)(2).

Under the amended statute, underinsured motorist coverage is unavailable when the tortfeasor's liability limits equal the insured's UIM limits, if the amended statute governs the renewed policy.

Dixon v. Grange Mutual Casualty Company, Unpublished Decision (6-30-2000) · filed 2000-06-30(A)(2)

Since the new contract was issued in February 1996, after the effective date of S.B. 20, the terms of coverage under the new policy were governed by the law pursuant to amended R.C. 3937.18. Application of that statute precludes plaintiffs from recovering any UIM benefits through their policy with Grange.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires a policy-to-policy comparison for a single claimant seeking underinsured-motorist coverage under a single policy, so equal tortfeasor and underinsured-motorist limits permit no additional recovery.

Denney v. Progressive Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (5-17-2002) · filed 2002-05-17(A)(2)

We need not make the determination of whether the "amounts available for payment" language includes Medicare costs. Since we are not dealing with multiple parties and multiple policies, the "amounts available for payment" language is inapplicable. This case involves a single claimant, namely, appellant, seeking underinsured motorist coverage under a single policy. Therefore, we compare the limits of the tortfeasor's policy with the limits of the appellant's underinsured motorist coverage. Each provided for $12,500 per person. This is the amount appellant received. He is not entitled to anything in excess of the $12,500.

Section 3937.18 does not apply to a matching-deductible policy where the insured retains the risk as a practical self-insurer; alternatively, a signed rejection can govern renewal policies without a new request.

Lafferty v. Reliance Insurance · filed 2000-07-17(A), (A)(2), and (C)

The court concludes that under the matching deductible policy issued by Reliance, ConRail was a self-insurer in the practical sense and that the Reliance policy was not subject to the provisions of O.R.C. § 3937.18. Assuming arguendo that the Reliance policy was governed by O.R.C. § 3937.18, the court finds that, unlike the situation in Gyori, here the requirements of the statute relating to rejection of UM/UIM coverage were satisfied and the policy provided no UM/UIM coverage for vehicles operated in Ohio.

Former § 3937.18(A) did not require a matching-deductible or fronting policy whose insured was, in effect, a self-insurer to comply with the statute's offer requirement.

Marshall v. Ace USA, Unpublished Decision (5-20-2002) · filed 2002-05-20(A)

Here, however, Ingersoll's policy with ACE does provide underinsured motorist coverage, and the fact that Ingersoll's policy with ACE did not have to comply with former R.C. 3937.18(A), since Ingersoll is, in effect, a self-insurer, is immaterial.

Section 3937.18's UM/UIM provisions do not apply to an entity that is a self-insurer in the practical sense because it entirely bears the risk of loss.

Cincinnati Insurance v. Torok · filed 2003-03-31

Under the agreement, AEP agreed to reimburse Federal for all claims made under either of the policies. In addition, the agreement was secured by a letter of credit obtained by AEP. Since AEP entirely bore the risk of loss, it was a self-insurer “in the practical sense.” ... Therefore, the UM/UIM provisions of R.C. 3937.18 and the case law interpreting the statute are inapplicable.

Section 3937.18's mandatory UIM provisions do not apply to practical self-insurance arrangements, including a fronting policy with matching liability limits and deductibles.

Dorsey v. Federal Insurance · filed 2003-09-26(A), (C)

Therefore, we must conclude that the Federal policy is self-insurance in the practical sense and is not subject to mandatory provisions of Ohio’s UIM laws, including R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 does not create UM/UIM coverage for a self-insured arrangement because it applies only to policies of insurance.

Redd v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA · filed 2003-01-22

If, on the other hand, GM is self insured, then the BA Policies do not meet the definition of “policies of insurance” and Ohio’s UM/UIM statute does not apply to create UM/UIM coverage as a matter of law.

When multiple claimants have separate policies, underinsured motorist coverage is offset by the amount the claimant actually received from the tortfeasor's insurer.

Estate of Jackson v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2007ca00205 (11-3-2008) · filed 2008-11-03(A)(2)

The amount available for payment to Tonya McDonald is $33,000 from the tortfeasor's liability carrier. As a result, the tortfeasor was underinsured as to Tonya McDonald, and Tonya McDonald has UM/UIM coverage up to the per person limit of her State Farm policy after setting off the amount recovered from the tortfeasor.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) reduces underinsured-motorist policy limits by amounts available under applicable liability policies, so an insured who has already received more than the underinsured limits is not underinsured or entitled to further payment.

Pearson v. Motorists Insurance Companies, Unpublished Decision (9-1-2000) · filed 2000-09-01(A)(2)

However, in this case, the trial court's application ofAndrews to Pearson was consistent with a correct application of R.C.3937.18(A)(2). In the present analysis, the effective section of R.C.3937.18(A)(2) states "[t]he policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured." The amount of underinsurance potentially available to Pearson under the terms of his policy was $12,500. Pearson received a payment in the amount of $54,946 from Mycyk's policies. Because this amount exceeds the limits of his underinsurance policy, by definition Pearson was not underinsured in this incident.

Section 3937.18(C) requires underinsured-motorist policy limits to be reduced by amounts available under liability policies covering liable persons, and it does not provide excess coverage.

Mack v. Stanford, Unpublished Decision (4-7-2003) · filed 2003-04-07(C)

If underinsured motorist coverage is included in a policy of insurance, the underinsured motorist coverage shall provide protection for insureds thereunder for bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, suffered by any insured under the policy, where the limits of coverage available for payment to the insured under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured are less than the limits for the underinsured motorist coverage. Underinsured motorist coverage in this state is not and shall not be excess coverage to other applicable liability coverages, and shall only provide the insured an amount of protection not greater than that which would be available under the insured's uninsured motorist coverage if the person or persons liable to the insured were uninsured at the time of the accident. The policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured. R.C. 3937.18(C). ... Once Mack's coverage is reduced by the amounts available for coverage by Sanford's insurer, there is nothing left. Thus, Metropolitan was entitled to summary judgment and the first assignment of error is overruled.

Former § 3937.18(A)(2) reduces underinsured-motorist policy limits by amounts available under applicable liability policies covering persons liable to the insured, including the full recovery received by an estate when the policy provides aggregate per-accident coverage to multiple insureds.

Mid-American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Broughton · filed 2003-09-30(A)(2)

Former R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) provides that the policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured. The insured in this case is more than one person, Judith, Amanda, and Jeremy. The money Jeremy’s estate received from the settlement with the tortfeasor’s insurer is an amount available for payment from an insurance policy covering persons liable to the insured. Therefore, the aggregate amount that Mid-American owes to its insureds, $300,000, must be reduced by the amount Jeremy’s estate received, $20,000.

For setoff purposes, amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by an underinsured-motorist claimant from all bodily-injury liability bonds and insurance policies are deducted from UIM coverage, and “liable” includes both contractual and tort liability.

Carpenter v. Western Reserve Group, Unpublished Decision (3-31-2004) · filed 2004-03-31(A)(2)

"For the purpose of setoff, the `amounts available for payment' language under R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) means the amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by an underinsured motorist claimant from all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies (including from the tortfeasor's liability carrier)." ... Appellants had received a total of $100,000 each from the other insurance companies. Therefore, this amount was required to be set off against the amount appellee owed under the UIM section of the policy. ... This court has held that the term "liable" as used in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), includes contractual as well as tort liability.

Former § 3937.18(A)(2) reduces underinsured-motorist policy limits by amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by the claimant from applicable bodily-injury liability coverage.

Camp v. State Farm Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (1-23-2007) · filed 2007-01-23(A)(2)

The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that "[f]or the purpose of setoff, the `amounts available for payment' language in R.C. 3937.18 (A)(2) means the amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by an underinsured motorist claimant from all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies (including from the tortfeasor's liability carrier)." Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 271 , syllabus. ... Here, plaintiff already has recovered $50,000 from Progressive, the tortfeasor's automobile liability insurance carrier. ... Pursuant to the setoff provision in the State Farm policy, the $50,000 UM/UIM coverage limit of the State Farm policy is reduced by the $50,000 plaintiff received from Progressive. Consequently, we conclude that plaintiff is not entitled to recover UM/UIM benefits under the State Farm policy.

Section 3937.18 embodies Ohio public policy against insurance provisions that extinguish an uninsured-motorist claim before or shortly after the claim accrues.

Fauskey v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Unpublished Decision (10-19-2000) · filed 2000-10-19

4. A provision in a contract of insurance which purports to extinguish a claim for uninsured motorist coverage by establishing a limitations period which expires before or shortly after the accrual of a right of action for such coverage is per se unreasonable and violative of the public policy of the state of Ohio as embodied in R.C. 3937.18. ... Based upon the syllabus law of Kraly, we find the subject policy's two-year statute of limitations to be invalid.

Section 3937.18 makes a contractual limitation on uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage unreasonable when it expires before or shortly after the insured's right to that coverage accrues.

Montgomery v. State Automobile Mutual, Unpublished Decision (12-18-2000) · filed 2000-12-18

Thus, a contractual limitations period for uninsured motorist benefits "which expires before or shortly after the accrual of a right of action for such coverage is per se unreasonable and violative of the public policy of the state of Ohio as embodied in R.C.3937.18." Id. at paragraph four of the syllabus. ... At a minimum, however, Kraly established that courts must consider whether or not it is equitable to commence a limitations period in a policy of insurance on the date of the accident that gave rise to the insured's claim for uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits.

Former division (H) permits an automobile liability policy to make all claims arising from one person's bodily injury or death collectively subject to the single-person policy limit and does not violate Ohio's separation-of-powers, wrongful-death-damages, remedy, equal-protection, or privileges-and-immunities provisions.

Webb v. Progressive Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (11-1-2001) · filed 2001-11-01(H)

The language used is quite clear: the $25,000 limit of liability includes the total of all claims made and all claims derived from the bodily injury. Hence, this language cannot be read to conclude, as we did in Nicolini-Brownfield, that the $25,000 limit is available to any claimant separately. Rather, the language at issue here clearly consolidates all claims into a single claim. ... Given all of the above, we determine that R.C. 3937.18(H), as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. ... R.C. 3937.18(H), as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, is the uninsured/underinsured automobile liability policy counterpart to R.C.3937.44. They both purport, in essence, to allow liability policies to consolidate all claims into a single claim. ... Having determined that former R.C. 3937.18(H) does not violate Section19a, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, appellants' second assignment of error is overruled. ... This court has previously rejected these arguments in Scancarello, supra. Hence, we feel compelled to follow our previous decision on these matters, again, at least until the Supreme Court determines otherwise.

Section 3937.18 does not invalidate a two-year uninsured-motorist policy limitation when, on the facts, it shortens the wrongful-death limitations period by at most one day.

Mitchell v. State Auto. Mut. Ins.: Co., Unpublished Decision (12-13-2001) · filed 2001-12-13

State Auto's policies do not violate R.C. 3937.18, as did the policies in Miller and Kraly. State Auto's policies did not reduce the applicable statute of limitations by half, as did the policy in Miller. Nor did they leave plaintiffs with only a few months to commence an action, as was the result of the insurance provision in Kraly. Instead, State Auto's policies permitted plaintiffs two years from the date of the accident to commence an action or institute arbitration proceedings to recover policy benefits. While plaintiffs' cause of action under R.C. 2125.02(D) arising from the wrongful death of their decedent would have accrued on the date of his death, or the day following the accident, enforcement of the limitations clause in State Auto's policies with plaintiffs deprives plaintiffs, at most, of one day of the statute of limitations they would have had under the wrongful death statute. Unlike Miller and Kraly, the limitations period in State Auto's policies, varying from the wrongful death statute of limitations by one day, can neither be deemed unreasonable, nor a dilution or elimination of plaintiffs' rights.

Section 3937.18's public policy permits a reasonable two-year contractual limitations period for uninsured-motorist claims when the period begins upon accrual of the cause of action, but treats a period expiring before or shortly after accrual as unreasonable.

Miller v. American Family Ins., Unpublished Decision (12-30-2002) · filed 2002-12-30

Accordingly, a provision in a contract of insurance which purports to extinguish a claim for uninsured motorist coverage by establishing a limitations period which expires before or shortly after the accrual of the right of action for such coverage is per se unreasonable and violative of the public policy of the state of Ohio as embodied in R.C. 3937.18. ... In light of these cases, it is clear that a two-year contractual limitations period that begins to run when a cause of action for uninsured motorist benefits accrues is reasonable. In the present case, the tortfeasor was uninsured on the date of the accident. Although the tortfeasor indicated to the trooper on the scene of the accident that he was insured, the validity of that insurance could have been readily determined. Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the day of the accident, June 22, 1999, is the day on which the contractual limitations period began to run. Appellants did not file their amended complaint adding CIC as a party defendant until June 25, 2001, and therefore did not timely assert their claim for uninsured motorist benefits.

The 2001 amendment to subsection (H) permitting three-year limitations periods does not apply retroactively, so a pre-amendment two-year limit on an uninsured-motorist claim does not violate Ohio public policy.

Terry v. Wright, Unpublished Decision (6-10-2005) · filed 2005-06-10(H)

Because there is no retroactive effect to the October 31, 2001 amendment of R.C. 3937.18(H), and because courts have found that prior to the effective date of the amendment a two-year limitation period to bring suit for an uninsured motorist claim did not violate public policy, we do not find that the two-year contractual time limit in this case violated the public policy of Ohio.

The statute's public policy permits a reasonable contractual time limit for bringing uninsured- or underinsured-motorist claims; a two-year limitation does not unlawfully eliminate or reduce the required coverage and applies equally to UIM claims.

Whanger v. Grange Mut. Casualty Co., 06-Je-18 (6-21-2007) · filed 2007-06-21

A contractual limitation period of two years does not violate the underlying purpose of UM/UIM coverage, because the limitation period does not eliminate or reduce the UM/UIM coverage required by former R.C. 3937.18 .

Section 3937.18(H) permits an insurance policy to require that an uninsured- or underinsured-motorist claim or suit be brought within three years after the accident, or within one year after the liability insurer enters insolvency proceedings, whichever is later, so long as the insured has not prejudiced the insurer's subrogation rights.

Lynch v. Hawkins · filed 2008-03-21(H)

This action is governed by statute, R.C. 3937.18(H), which became effective on October 31, 2001. The statutory provision specifically authorizes a three-year contractual limitations period in UM insurance policies commencing from the date of the accident unless underinsured status is predicated on the insolvency of the liability insurer: ... “(H) Any policy of insurance that includes uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages may include terms and conditions requiring that, so long as the insured has not prejudiced the insurer’s subrogation rights, each claim or suit for uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages be made or brought within three years after the date of the accident causing the bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or within one year after the liability insurer for the owner or operator of the motor vehicle liable to the insured has become the subject of insolvency proceedings in any state, whichever is later.” R.C. 3937.18(H).

After the October 2001 amendments, Section 3937.18 made UM/UIM coverage subject to the policy's terms, allowing insurers to impose a clear contractual filing deadline shorter than the written-contract limitations period.

Kovach v. Tran · filed 2009-02-13(I), (H)

The version of R.C. 3937.18 that was enacted in October 2001 was radically different from the version that existed prior to that date. No longer were insurance companies compelled to offer uninsured/underinsured motorist protection. Insurance companies were given the power to decide whether they wanted to offer such coverage or not. ... Since insurance companies are free to set forth a time limit in an insurance policy that is less than the statute of limitations set forth for written contracts in the Ohio Revised Code, this limitation is legal.

Section 3937.18(H) permits a UM/UIM claim to be limited to three years after the accident causing bodily injury, or one year after the liable driver's insurer becomes subject to insolvency proceedings, whichever is later.

Mendoza v. Seger · filed 2019-10-18(H)

Pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(H), a claim may be limited to “within three years after the date of the accident causing the bodily injury * * * or within one year after the liability insurer for the owner or operator of the motor vehicle liable to the insured has become the subject of insolvency proceedings in any state, whichever is later.”

Under former § 3937.18(C), one named insured's rejection of equivalent underinsured motorist coverage did not automatically bind other named insureds; each named insured had to expressly reject the coverage.

Grooms v. Marshall · filed 2000-10-23(C)

Under former R.C. 3937.18(C), one named insured’s (Treber) rejection of equivalent UIM coverage is not automatically effective against other named insureds (Christopher and Betty) as would be the case under current R.C. 3937.18(C). Under the former law, each named insured must expressly reject such equivalent UIM coverage for all of them to be bound.

Section 3937.18 does not authorize a named-driver exclusion to limit an insured's UIM benefits for a loss caused by an underinsured motorist.

Parrish v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., Unpublished Decision (12-15-2003) · filed 2003-12-15

Further, we find that the named driver exclusion can not properly limit Parrish's UIM benefits for the loss he seeks, because R.C. 3937.18 did not authorize such an exclusion.

Section 3937.18(H) allows an automobile policy to treat all claims arising from one person's bodily injury or death as a single claim subject to the applicable per-person limit, and those limits are constitutional.

Maletz v. State A. Mutual, Unpublished Decision (11-8-2000) · filed 2000-11-08(H)

Based on our holding in Smith and the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Beagle, we find that the "per person" limits found in R.C.3937.18(H) are constitutional.

Section 3937.18(H) limits the amount of liability insurance coverage available per person, rather than limiting wrongful-death damages.

Nitchman v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 2001-01-17(H)

As Nationwide aptly noted, this court has previously held that R.C. 3937.18(H) and 3937.44, governing a “per person” limit for liability coverage, do not violate the Ohio Constitution’s prohibition on limiting damages in wrongful death, because the statutes limit only the amount of coverage under the insurance contract.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an insurer to limit all bodily injury claims arising from one person's injury in an automobile accident to the policy's per-person limit.

Gustin v. Usaa Casualty Insurance Co, Unpublished Decision (2-13-2001) · filed 2001-02-13(H)

Therefore, the trial court did not err by concluding that R.C.3937.18(H), allowing an insurer to limit all bodily injury claims for one person injured in an automobile accident to the "per person" limitation in the policy, is constitutional.

Section 3937.18(H) subjects a loss-of-consortium claim to the same single per-person limit as the injured person's claim.

Ryberg v. Allstate Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (7-12-2001) · filed 2001-07-12(H)

Finally, we reject appellants contention that the trial court erred in relying on the current version of R.C. 3937.18(H) to hold that appellant Brauchler's loss of consortium claim was consolidated with appellant Ryberg's claims and subject to the same single, per-person limit. This court has already rejected the very same arguments raised by appellant here. See Greiner v. Timm (Mar. 28, 2000), Franklin App. No. 99AP-618, unreported. Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court has recently applied R.C.3937.18(H) to consolidate a loss of consortium claim into the single, per-person limit. See Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 271 . As such, the trial court correctly consolidated appellant Brauchler's loss of consortium claim with appellant Ryberg's claims, finding that all such claims were subject to the same $50,000 per-person limit.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an automobile liability policy to treat all claims arising from one person's bodily injury, including death, as a single claim subject to the policy's per-person limit.

Eby v. Progressive Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (12-24-2001) · filed 2001-12-24(H)

After an independent review of the case law, the statutory authority, and the language of the instant policy, we find that R.C. 3937.18(H) permits insurers to consolidate all claims arising out of the bodily injury to any one person to the per-person policy limits and the terms of the instant policy unambiguously incorporate that permitted consolidation into this insurance contract.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an insurance policy to consolidate consortium claims arising from one person's bodily injury into a single per-person limit when the policy clearly provides for that limitation.

Campo v. Daniel, Unpublished Decision (12-26-2002) · filed 2002-12-26(H)

Although Clark referenced wrongful death claims as being subject to R.C. 3937.18(H) consolidation, other courts have held that consortium claims of the kind involved in this case are likewise amenable to consolidation. ... We see no compelling reasons demonstrating that these courts were wrong in holding that consortium claims could be consolidated within a single limit of liability. ... Wallace is controlling and we therefore find that the Allstate limitation of liability provision in the motorcycle policy does not violate R.C. 3937.18(H).

Section 3937.18(A)(1) requires uninsured-motorist coverage to protect people from losses that would otherwise go uncompensated.

Myers v. Central Insurance Companies · filed 1997-05-02(A)(1)

Although the court specifically addressed a loss-of-consortium claim, its holding is applicable to the present case. ... Additionally, “since R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) is remedial legislation, it must be liberally construed in order to effectuate the legislative purpose.” ... If an insurance policy provision is contrary to the statute and its purpose, it will be deemed unenforceable. ... Therefore, in accordance with Schaefer, this court finds as a matter of law that appellant is entitled to a separate per-person limit of uninsured-motorists coverage for his damages. ... According to Schaefer, such a provision is unenforceable.

When an insured has rejected UM/UIM coverage in writing, the same insurer need not reoffer it on a policy renewal or replacement, including when the insured merely changes covered vehicles, unless the insured requests the coverage in writing.

Jarvis v. Victoria Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (11-8-2000) · filed 2000-11-08(C)

Under R.C. 3937.18(A), persons who are issued automobile liability insurance policies for automobiles registered or principally garaged in Ohio must be offered UM coverage, as well as underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. The applicant may then accept or reject the coverages. R.C.3937.18(C). The rejection of coverage must be in writing and signed by the named insured. Id. "Unless a named insured or applicant requests such coverages in writing, such coverages need not be provided in or made supplemental to a policy renewal or replacement policy where a named insured or applicant has rejected such coverages in connection with a policy previously issued to the named insured or applicant by the same insurer." Id.

The version of § 3937.18 in effect when the guaranteed two-year policy period began governs whether the insured may recover underinsured-motorist benefits; the 1994 amendment did not apply to this policy.

Snyder v. Cross, Unpublished Decision (11-29-2000) · filed 2000-11-29

As such, R.C. 3937.18 as amended does not apply. The law in accordance withSavoie, supra clearly applies and appellee is entitled to recover under the underinsured motorist provision within her parents' policy.

Section 3937.18(C) allows an insurer to omit uninsured-motorist coverage from a renewal or replacement policy when the insured previously rejected that coverage, unless the insured requests it in writing.

Greenwood v. Meridith, Unpublished Decision (3-30-2001) · filed 2001-03-30(C)

With respect to the question of whether new offers and express rejections of uninsured motorist coverage need be obtained with each renewal of a policy, that version of R.C. 3937.18(C) stated, in pertinent part: "Unless a named insured or applicant requests such coverages in writing, such coverages need not be provided in or made supplemental to a policy renewal or replacement policy where a named insured or applicant has rejected such coverages in connection with a policy previously issued to the named insured or applicant by the same insurer." ... In the present matter, Greenwood had rejected uninsured motorist coverage in connection with a policy previously issued to him by Progressive. ... As such, under the statute, Progressive was not required to offer or provide uninsured motorist coverage, absent a written request from Greenwood for the coverage.

The version of § 3937.18 in effect when an insurance policy is issued or renewed defines the scope of uninsured motorist coverage, and the named insured may reject or reduce that coverage; Abarta's reduction to $25,000 was valid.

Ortiz v. U.S. Fid. Guar., Unpublished Decision (11-10-2005) · filed 2005-11-10(A)

The record before us reveals that the business automobile policy that is central to this appeal was issued on May 1, 1989, and, as such, is subject to the version of R.C. 3937.18, as amended by House Bill 1, effective January 5, 1988. The statutory law in effect at the time an insurance policy is issued or renewed defines the scope of uninsured motorist coverage in the policy. ... The record further reflects that Charles Hanlon, Chief Financial Officer of Abarta, Inc., elected to reduce the limits of liability for uninsured motorist coverage, which according to the above cited version of the statute, he was permitted to do. ... The foregoing indicates that Abarta, Inc. made a knowing and intelligent rejection of an offer to purchase uninsured motorist coverage equal to the policy's liability limits. We conclude Abarta Inc.'s election to reduce its uninsured motorist limit to $25,000 was valid at the time it was done and at the time of Ortiz's accident.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) bases the underinsured-motorist setoff on amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by the claimant, while subsection (H) permits a clearly and unambiguously worded policy to consolidate wrongful-death claims from one person’s injury into a single per-person limit.

Clark v. Scarpelli · filed 2001-04-11(A)(2), (H)

For the purpose of setoff, the “amounts available for payment” language in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) means the amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by an underinsured motorist claimant from all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies (including from the tortfeasor’s liability carrier). ... As set forth above, R.C. 3937.18(H) permits automobile liability insurers to include provisions in their insurance policies that consolidate all individual wrongful death claims arising out of any one person’s bodily injury into a single claim and thereby limit all wrongful death damages to a single per-person policy limit. This consolidation must affirmatively appear in the policy, i.e., insurers must include language within their policies of insurance that clearly and unambiguously consolidates such claims in order to give effect to such a limit.

Section 3937.18 applies to any automobile or motor-vehicle liability policy issued in Ohio and requires the insurer to offer UM/UIM coverage, but does not require every policy or insured to have that coverage.

Westfield Ins. v. Wausau Business Ins., Unpublished Decision (12-30-2002) · filed 2002-12-30

We also disagree with Wausau's argument that it is not bound by the requirements of R.C. 3937.18. This statue contains no exemption for certain insurers, from the mandates of the UM/UIM statute, depending on the identity of the insured. Rather, the statute explicitly provides that it applies to any automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance delivered or issued for delivery in this state. ... In making this argument, Wausau misinterprets R.C. 3937.18. This statute does not require that every auto policy contain UM/UIM coverage. Nor does it require insureds to obtain UM/UIM coverage. Instead, the statute imposes upon an insurer the duty to offer such coverage.

For policies written after H.B. 261 and before S.B. 97, Section 3937.18 does not displace Linko's requirements for a valid offer of underinsured motorist coverage.

Hoop v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins Ins Co, Unpublished Decision (7-3-2003) · filed 2003-07-03(C)

For present purposes, we sustain the Hoops' first assignment of error and hold that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Nationwide on the basis that R.C. §3937.18, as amended by H.B. 261, superseded Linko's requirements regarding a valid offer of UIM coverage.

Section 3937.18(G) permits an insurer to restrict its liability for bodily-injury coverage and consolidate claims arising from bodily injury.

Grant v. Ladd, Unpublished Decision (6-4-2001) · filed 2001-06-04(G)

R.C. 3937.18(G) permits Grange to restrict its liability for bodily injury coverage and to consolidate the claims.

Section 3937.18 permits insurers to include underinsured-motorist setoff provisions in their policies without requiring them to do so, and the amended provision is constitutional against equal-protection, remedy, separation-of-powers, and one-subject-rule challenges.

Ball v. Guaranty National Insurance · filed 2001-06-04(A)(2)

First, S.B. No. 20 does not require insurers to include setoff provisions in their policies. It merely gives them the opportunity to do so. ... We find that R.C. 3937.18, as amended by S.B. No. 20, does not violate the constitutional provisions of equal protection, right to a remedy, separation of powers, or the one-subject rule.

Section 3937.18 requires meaningful underinsured-motorist coverage for all named insureds, including the individuals through whom a corporate named insured acts.

Miller v. Hartford · filed 2001-06-14(A) (C)

This court believes that the answer must be “No,” so that the statutory and legislative mandate be achieved. Coe cannot buy a policy and Hartford cannot offer a policy in which only one named insured — Fred Fields— has UM coverage. Therefore, all of the corporations have UM coverage. But for UM coverage for a corporation to have meaning — to comply with the legislative purpose of such coverage — the corporate employees, officers, directors, and shareholders must be covered and read into the definition of the ambiguous “You.”

Section 3937.18(A)(2) does not require a policy naming a corporation to extend UIM coverage to an employee acting outside the scope of the employee’s duties when the policy covers employees and other associated individuals while acting within the scope of their duties.

Miller v. Hartford · filed 2001-07-05(A)(2)

The second question for this court to address is whether, in listing the corporate entity of Coe Manufacturing Company as a named insured, the policy as a whole operates in such a way that it violates the UIM requirements of R.C. 3937.18. It does not. The policy specifically includes Coe’s employees,26 directors, officers, and stockholders27 as individual insureds when acting within the scope of their duties as such. Each of these individuals is afforded UIM coverage under the policy.

Section 3937.18 does not require a homeowner’s policy offering only incidental liability coverage for limited motorized vehicles to provide uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.

Davis v. Shelby Insurance Co. · filed 2001-06-25(A)

We acknowledge that the Davidson court did not specifically address whether a “residence employee” exclusion in a homeowner’s policy could be construed so as to provide UM/UIM coverage. ... We see no reason, however, not to extend the reasoning of Davidson to the policy at issue in this case. ... Consequently, the policy at issue in this case cannot be construed so as to provide UM/UIM coverage.

Section 3937.18 requires UM/UIM coverage to be offered with a motor vehicle liability policy, but incidental motor-vehicle coverage in a homeowner's policy does not convert it into such a policy; any required offer is limited to the covered residence employee.

Hillyer v. State Farm Fire, Unpublished Decision (8-2-2001) · filed 2001-08-02

We agree with this analysis. If any UM/UIM coverage should have been offered, it would have been limited to the residence employee only. It would not have extended to any family member of the insured. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer because the insured had no UIM coverage for his daughter under his homeowner's insurance.