Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3937.18

Section 3937.18 requires automobile liability insurers to offer uninsured motorist coverage, but it does not require customers to buy it; an uninsured-motorist exclusion for carrying persons or property for a fee is unenforceable when it eliminates coverage for an Ohio tort claim.

Stanton v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1993-12-29

The General Assembly determined by enacting R.C. 3937.18 that automobile liability carriers must offer uninsured motorist coverage to their customers. ... The General Assembly has determined, however, that automobile liability carriers must only offer uninsured motorist coverage to their customers; it has not made the purchase of uninsured motorist coverage mandatory. ... Accordingly, we hold that an exclusion in the uninsured motorist coverage of an automobile liability policy which states that uninsured motorist coverage does not apply to the use of any motor vehicle by an insured to carry persons or property for a fee is unenforceable.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage when the claimant is an insured, was injured by an uninsured motorist, and has a claim recognized by Ohio tort law.

Laberdie v. State Farm Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (3-31-1998) · filed 1998-03-31

"The rationale of Alexander is not limited to the analyzed exclusion. Instead, this court made clear that R.C. 3937.18 is the yardstick by which all exclusions of uninsured motorist coverage must be measured. Under Alexander, the statute mandates coverage if (1) the claimant is an insured under a policy which provides uninsured motorist coverage; (2) the claimant was injured by an uninsured motorist; and (3) the claim is recognized by Ohio tort law." State Farm asserts that Alexander and Martin are not applicable to this case. While State Farm has not asserted that a specific policy exclusion applies in this case, we nonetheless find theAlexander tripartite test applies to determine if appellants are entitled to coverage.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) bars an insurer from excluding a relative from UM/UIM coverage solely because the relative does not live with the policyholder.

Rollin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 2000-09-20(A)(1)

The Moore court concluded that an insurance policy with UM/UIM provisions excluding relatives who did not live with the policyholder was unlawful pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(A)(1). ... Accordingly, any cases from this district conflicting with Moore are overruled.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) requires uninsured-motorist protection for insured persons and bars policy exclusions that deny that protection to qualifying relatives who do not live with the policyholder or for vehicles owned by an insured or relative.

Stafford v. Soha, Unpublished Decision (8-16-2001) · filed 2001-08-16(A)(1)

Despite this irregular, intermittent pattern of moving in and out of the policyholder's home by Gullion, and the fact that Gullion was not living in the policyholder's home at the time of the accident, we are forced to apply the version of R.C. 3937.18(A)(1)as it existed at the time of the 1996 renewal of the policy in question. ... Also, we must give effect to the pronouncement that insurance policies with uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions excluding relatives who do not live with the policyholder violates R.C. 3937.18(A)(1). ... Accordingly, Gullion was an insured person under the terms of the policy for purposes of R.C. 3937.18(A)(1).

Section 3937.18 permits uninsured-motorist policies to exclude coverage in the circumstances specified by divisions (J)(3) and (K)(2), including injuries caused by a specifically excluded driver and vehicles owned by or available for the regular use of an insured.

Robson v. Allstate Ins., Unpublished Decision (9-18-2001) · filed 2001-09-18(J)(3), (K)(2)

As a result of these two layers, the provisions of R.C. 3937.18(J)(3) have been met. Further, the language under "An Uninsured Auto Is Not" mirrors the exclusions allowable under R.C. 3937.18(K)(2). From our analysis, we find the policy's language has properly followed the allowable exclusions of the statute.

The former (J)(1) and (K)(2) provisions are ambiguous when read together; (K)(2) is unenforceable, and (K)(1) does not bar uninsured-motorist coverage when the insurer denied liability coverage under an intrafamily exclusion.

Ratkosky v. Scottsdale Surplus Lines, Unpublished Decision (6-5-2003) · filed 2003-06-05(J)(1), (K)(1), (K)(2)

In this case, we agree that subdivision (J)(1) is intended to limit rather than provide coverage for vehicles listed in the policy. Nonetheless, we are troubled by the fact that subdivision (J)(1) implies that coverage is available if the vehicle is listed in the policy while subdivision (K)(2) makes it clear that, even if listed, coverage can never be available. This doublespeak militates against a finding that these statutory provisions are unambiguous and, therefore, reconcilable. Thus, to some extent, we agree with the Morris court and disagree with the court in Kyle. ... Finding ambiguity, however, does not end our review. We must construe the language contained in the statute so as to determine the intent of the legislature. ... Despite our finding that R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) is unenforceable, Allstate contends that (K)(1) similarly justified the denial of UM coverage in this case because the vehicle involved in the accident had applicable liability coverage under its policy. Ordinarily this would be true if it had been any other individual driving the vehicle. In this case, however, Allstate denied coverage based on the intrafamily exclusion. Consequently, there was no liability coverage for this vehicle and Allstate cannot avoid providing UM coverage on this basis. ... Having found R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) unenforceable and (K)(1) inapplicable, it was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment to Allstate and deny appellant's cross-motion seeking similar relief.

Section 3937.18(I) permits a UM policy to include specified terms and conditions that preclude coverage, and the statutory exclusions are only examples rather than an exclusive list.

Kelly v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (7-14-2006) · filed 2006-07-14(I)

After the 2001 amendment, the exclusions in the statute serve only as examples; a UM policy may include any terms and conditions precluding coverage, as long as these circumstances are specified in the policy.

The statute does not require an insurer to offer uninsured-motorist coverage and permits a policy's valid driver-exclusion endorsement to limit or preclude that coverage.

Fruit v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-10-2006) · filed 2006-08-10(A), (I)(3)

Therefore, under the law in effect at the time of the accident and applicable to the Fruits' policies, State Farm was no longer required to offer uninsured motorist coverage to its insureds, and a valid driver exclusion endorsement could limit or preclude uninsured motorist coverage.

Division (I) permits an uninsured-motorist policy to include terms and conditions that preclude coverage in specified circumstances, including an intra-family or household-vehicle exclusion.

Wertz v. Wertz, H-06-036 (9-7-2007) · filed 2007-09-07(I)

Similar to Howard, Kelly and Green , we find that the intra-family coverage exclusion in the UM policy is enforceable under R.C. 3937.18 (I).

Section 3937.18(I)(1) permits an insurer to specify policy terms and conditions that preclude uninsured-motorist coverage beyond the examples listed in the statute, including a definition excluding a vehicle insured under the liability policy.

O'connor-Junke v. Estate of Junke, 91225 (11-13-2008) · filed 2008-11-13(I)(1)

Thus, based on the plain language of R.C. 3937.18 , we conclude that there is nothing in the statute that prohibits the type of definition at issue in this case.

Section 3937.18 permits insurers to include exclusionary or limiting provisions in uninsured-motorist policies, and its listed exclusions are not the only permissible ones.

Dunson v. Home-Owners Ins. Co. · filed 2010-05-03

But the current UM coverage statute unequivocally states that the specified exclusions are not the only acceptable exclusions.

Section 3937.18(J)(1) permits excluding uninsured motorist coverage for injury sustained while occupying a vehicle owned by or regularly available to certain insured persons when the vehicle is not identified in the policy.

Mizen v. Utica National Insurance Group · filed 2002-02-04(J)(1)

The above exclusion in the uninsured motorists section of Nationwide’s policy does not apply to the facts in this case. ... As Jeremy Mizen was not occupying a vehicle owned by either an employee of the Eastlake-Willoughby City Schools or any family member of an employee of the Eastlake-Willoughby City Schools, the insurance under the uninsured motorists section in Nationwide’s policy applies to cover the bodily injuries sustained by Jeremy Mizen.

Under subsection (B), a vehicle insured below Ohio's statutory minimum liability limits is treated as an uninsured motor vehicle for purposes of uninsured-motorist coverage.

Wolverton v. Vigilant Insurance Co. · filed 1976-09-30(B)

The question is whether the liability insurer, Vigilant Insurance Company, has denied coverage as defined by R. C. 3937.18(B), when the coverage applicable is less than the statutory limits required by R. C. 3937.18 and 4509.20. In our view, there is a denial of coverage under these circumstances as the coverage to which reference is made in R. C. 3937.18(B) is coverage in the minimum statutory amount required in Ohio.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage to protect insured persons who are legally entitled to recover damages for bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death caused by an uninsured motorist.

Motorists Mutual Insurance v. Speck · filed 1977-12-14

In Ohio, the action for wrongful death is controlled by R. C. 2125.01, et seq. The action must be brought in the name of the personal representative for th’e exclusive benefit of designated persons ‘‘and other next of Mn.” Under B. C. 3103.03, the husband is to support his ¡minor children as a primary obligation. “Lisa” Speck, although not a member of the household of her father, was still his minor unemancipated child; hence, Ralph Speck is entitled to the services of this child, as well as being liable for funeral expenses, since death did occur. Nelson v. Horton (1971), 31 Ohio App. 2d 159. R. C. 3937.18 says that the uninsured motorist insurance is “for the protection:of .persons in- ... surecT thereunder, who are legally entitled to recover damages * * " because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; * # *.” Uninsured motorist insurance is not liability insurance since it insures a person for losses which occur because of the conduct of a limited group of tortfeasors that is, financially irresponsible motorists. It is for this reason that we believe the general rule of construction of insurance contracts must be applied herein to carry out the objective of the uninsured motorist statutory requirement of providing financial protection for damages caused by uninsured motorists. If it is established that the death of “Lisa” Speck was caused by the acts of the uninsured motorist, the right on the part of Ralph Speck to be “legally entitled to recover” damages from the person is his right as the father upon whom the burden of support, medical care and if needed, funeral expenses, devolved, his loss is also the right to the earnings of his children during minority. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. said it would pay to Ralph Speck all such sums which he, Ralph Speck, shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the operator of the uninsured! automobile because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, sustained by Ralph Speck, caused by accident arising out of the use of the uninsured automobile. Ralph Speck was the insured under the contract of insurance. For the losses he sustained he is entitled to recover in the instant situation.

Section 3937.18(D) treats a motor vehicle as uninsured when its liability insurer denies coverage.

State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Counts · filed 1990-11-07(D)

Therefore, pursuant to *450R.C. 3937.18(D), Kemper's denial of coverage rendered the Dairy Mart tractor-trailer an uninsured vehicle. ... We hold that the Dairy Mart tractor-trailer was an uninsured vehicle under both the State Farm and Kemper policies.

Section 3937.18(D) treats a vehicle as uninsured when its liability insurer denies coverage, so an insurer cannot use a conflicting policy definition to eliminate required uninsured-motorist coverage.

Staff v. State Farm Mutual Insurance · filed 1993-05-03(D)

A motor vehicle is “uninsured” if the liability insurer denies coverage. R.C. 3937.18(D). ... Here, as in State Farm, the insurance company’s exclusion based on the definition of an uninsured vehicle is unenforceable because it conflicts with R.C. 3937.18.

Former divisions (J)(1) and (K)(2) work together without conflict: (K)(2) defines an insured's own vehicle as never being uninsured or underinsured, while (J)(1) excludes coverage when the insured occupies an unlisted vehicle in an accident involving a non-family tortfeasor.

Kyle v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (1-31-2003) · filed 2003-01-31(J)(1), (K)(2)

Paragraph (K)(2) is a definitional section that defines the terms "uninsured motor vehicle" and "underinsured motor vehicle" for purposes of R.C. 3937.18 and UM/UIM coverage. Pursuant to this definition, a vehicle that is owned by, furnished to or available for the regular use of a named insured, a spouse or a resident relative of a named insured, can never be an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle. That is, under paragraph (K)(2), the insured's own vehicle can never be the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle for purposes of UM/UIM coverage. Paragraph (J)(1), however, provides that UM/UIM coverage for an accident will be excluded if the insured is driving a car not listed in the policy. Reading paragraphs (J)(1) and (K)(2) together, we see no inherent conflict. Rather, (J)(1) is limited by (K)(2) so that (J)(1) only applies in the context of an accident in which the insured is driving a vehicle not covered by the policy and the tortfeasor is not the named insured, spouse or resident relative of the named insured. Contrary to appellants' assertion, (J)(1) does not provide UM/UIM coverage for accidents in other-owned autos that are specifically identified in the policy.

Section 3937.18(E)(2) no longer permits a household exclusion from UM coverage; section 3937.18(E)(1) does not bar UM coverage when liability coverage was denied under a family exclusion, and section 3937.18(K)(1) therefore does not deny coverage for that vehicle.

Shay v. Shay · filed 2005-11-04(E)(2), (E)(1), (K)(1)

Because R.C. 3937.18(E)(2) permitted insurance companies to include a “household exclusion” to UM coverage in their policies, such a restriction in Ohio Mutual’s 1998 policy was enforceable. However, on September 21, 2000, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 267, 148 Ohio Laws, Part V, 11380, 11384-11385 (“S.B. 267”) eliminated R.C. 3937.18(E)(2) as created by H.B. 261. Without R.C. 3937.18(E)(2) in effect, a provision seeking to deny UM coverage on the basis of a “household exclusion” would be unenforceable because it is not permitted by statute and because it attempts to eliminate UM coverage for a recognized cause of action in violation of the purposes and mandates of R.C. 3937.18. ... Alternatively, even if we found R.C. 3937.18(E)(2) to be unenforceable, Ohio Mutual argues that R.C. 3937.18(E)(1) acts to preclude appellee from receiving UM coverage. We disagree. R.C. 3937.18(E)(1) states that an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle does not include “[a] motor vehicle that has applicable liability coverage in the policy under which the uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages are provided.” Ohio Mutual’s policy, however, specifically states that uninsured motor vehicle includes a vehicle to which a liability policy applies, but which has been denied coverage by the insuring company. ... Therefore, UM coverage could not be denied pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(K)(1) in this case.

Section 3937.18 treated a forklift as a motor vehicle requiring uninsured-motorist coverage under the law in effect in May 2001, and barred insurers from contractually narrowing that statutory definition.

Gibboney v. Johnson, Unpublished Decision (10-5-2006) · filed 2006-10-05

Although a subsequent version of the uninsured motorist statute did expressly exclude forklifts from the uninsured motorist statute, the law at the time of the accident in the case at bar occurred did not exclude a forklift as a motor vehicle. Therefore the statute required coverage for an accident involving a forklift that did not, as here, fit the statutory exceptions. ... The trial court erred, therefore, in ruling that a forklift, in May 2001, was not a "motor vehicle" under the definition of the uninsured motorists statute. Insurers were, moreover, precluded at that time, from limiting that definition in their contracts.

Section 3937.18(D) permits an insurance policy to define an uninsured motor vehicle so that a vehicle insured under the policy’s liability coverage is not treated as uninsured, even when liability coverage is denied under a household exclusion.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Donald McCauley and David McCauley · filed 1990-12-26(D)

Ohio Revised Code Annotated section 3937.18 mandates the offering of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. That section states that “a motor vehicle is uninsured if the liability insurer denies coverage-” Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 3937.18(D). Although that language would seem to indicate that the vehicle in question was uninsured because State Farm had denied liability coverage pursuant to the “household exclusion” contained in the policy, Ohio courts have recognized that the statute was not intended by the Ohio legislature to be so inflexible. ... Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in rejecting appellants’ argument that the State Farm policy impermis-sibly narrowed the statutory definition of an “uninsured motor vehicle” and that it did not err in granting State Farm summary judgment.

Section 3937.18 determines uninsured motorist coverage by the tortfeasor’s insured status rather than the vehicle’s status.

Buckeye Union Insurance v. Carrell · filed 1991-09-24

Finally, Buckeye argues that Carrell failed to establish that the vehicle was an uninsured motor vehicle. We disagree. The record in this case indicates that Carrell directed the trial court to Rowe v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 1, 583 N.E.2d 381, which followed Watson v. Grange Mut. Cos. Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 195, 532 N.E.2d 758, in holding that “ * * * R.C. 3937.18 requires an analysis of the tortfeasor’s insured status rather than the vehicle’s status. * * *” In this matter, the driver was uninsured; thus, the trial court could reasonably have found the uninsured motorist policy at issue applied to these facts.

Under former § 3937.18(K)(1), a vehicle with liability coverage under the same policy is not an uninsured motor vehicle for UM/UIM coverage.

Daugherty v. Chubb Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-18-2005) · filed 2005-08-18(K)(1)

The language in both Allstate and Great Northern's policies is the same statutory language set forth in former R.C.3937.18. ... Ms. Watson's vehicle was not an uninsured vehicle because it was insured under the liability provisions of the policy. Thus, appellant was not entitled to UM/UIM coverage, as she was not injured as a result of the actions of the driver of an uninsured vehicle.

Section 3937.18(A) does not provide uninsured motorist coverage for an injury involving a drill rig designed for use mainly off public roads while it is being operated off public roads.

Ameduri v. Machine Technology & Field Serv. · filed 2022-09-19(A)

The “use” of the Drill Rig does not support Appellant’s contention that he is owed UM coverage for any bodily injuries because the Drill Rig was not an “uninsured motor vehicle” at the time of the Accident.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage to be offered in Ohio automobile or vehicle liability policies and bars medical-payment benefits from reducing that coverage.

Shearer v. Motorists Mutual Insurance · filed 1978-01-04

Giving a liberal construction to effectuate the intent of the General Assembly that coverage be afforded to persons injured through the acts of uninsured motorists (see Curran v. State Automobile Mutl. Ins. Co. [1971], 25 Ohio St. 2d 33, 38), we hold that the rationale of this court in Bartlett, supra, applies to the proposed deduction of medical payments, and the policyholder may recover, subject to his policy limits, to the same extent he would be entitled to recover from his tortfeasor. ... The uninsured motorist coverage required to be offered by R. C. 3937.18 in all automobile or vehicle liability policies issued in the state of Ohio cannot be diluted or diminished by payments made to the insured pursuant to the medical payment provision of the same contract of insurance.

Section 3937.18 permits an insurer to enforce a UM policy clause barring payment of medical expenses already paid under the policy’s medical payments coverage.

Shenyey v. Glasgow, 91713 (3-26-2009) · filed 2009-03-26(I)

Effective October 31, 2001, the General Assembly amended R.C. 3937.18 pursuant to S.B. 97. ... Thus, pursuant to current law, the non-duplication clause is valid and enforceable.

Section 3937.18 permits an insurance policy to exclude other motor vehicles owned by the named insured from uninsured-motorist coverage when the exclusion is stated in reasonably specific language.

Orris v. Claudio · filed 1980-07-16(A)

Upon a review of all the considerations, we hold that where a policy of insurance contains reasonably specific language excluding other motor vehicles owned by the named insured from the uninsured motorist provision of the policy, such exclusion is valid, and not contrary to the public policy contained in R. C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) requires offered uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage to protect insured persons legally entitled to recover damages, and purchased coverage follows the insured rather than the vehicle.

Watts v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America · filed 1995-03-31(A)(1)

Although the policy provision in this case is different from that in Martin we believe the outcome in this case is driven by the rationale underlying the Martin decision. In Martin, the court struck down the “other owned vehicle exclusion” as being violative of the public policy found in R.C. 3937.18 which mandates that insurance companies offer uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. ... The rationale of this decision is that the underinsured motorist coverage once purchased follows the insured and not the vehicle.

Division (J)(1) permits an Ohio UIM policy to exclude injuries suffered while an insured operates or occupies a vehicle owned by or regularly available to a named insured or specified relative when that vehicle is not identified or otherwise covered under the policy.

Geren v. Westfield Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (3-8-2002) · filed 2002-03-08(J)(1)

The trial court based its decision to grant summary judgment to Travelers on R.C. 3937.18(J)(1) which states: ... Although appellant was an insured pursuant to Scott-Pontzer under the commercial auto policy issued by Travelers to his father's employer, he was injured while riding his own motorcycle. Thus, the "other owned vehicle" exclusion to UIM coverage applied.

Section 3937.18(J)(1) permits an uninsured-motorist policy to exclude injury while an insured operates or occupies an unlisted vehicle owned by a named insured, the named insured's spouse, or a resident relative.

De Uzhca v. Derham, Unpublished Decision (4-5-2002) · filed 2002-04-05(J)(1)

We agree with Maria that the statute has apparently failed to address the enforceability of "other owned auto" exclusions where the vehicle is owned by an insured other than the named insured. Under the plain meaning of the statute, therefore, "other owned auto" exclusions are permissible only when the auto is owned by the named insured. ... Manuel is therefore "a spouse, or a resident relative of a named insured," and the exclusion is enforceable as to Manuel under R.C. 3937.18(J)(1). ... We further conclude that the "other owned auto" exclusion is enforceable under R.C. 3937.18(J)(1).

Former § 3937.18(J)(1) permits excluding UIM coverage only when the insured occupies a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or regularly available for the named insured and the vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy.

Roberts v. Wausau Business Insurance · filed 2002-09-10(J)(1)

The exclusion in appellant’s policy states that UIM coverage only applies to autos “you” own. However, former R.C. 3937.18(J)(1) allows the exclusion of UIM coverage only where the insured is operating or occupying a motor vehicle owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of a named insured and is not specifically identified in the policy. In the case at bar, Julie Roberts was not occupying a motor vehicle owned by her or appellant. Rather, she was occupying a vehicle owned or operated by Roy Enyart. Hence, while former R.C. 3937.18(J) may have brought back the “other owned vehicle” exclusion, which had been found invalid in Martin, it did so only to the extent provided in that statute. Former R.C. 3937.18(J) did not allow for the specific exclusion in appellant’s policy as applied to the circumstances here. Therefore, the provision in appellant’s policy that sought to exclude UIM coverage where an insured was not occupying a vehicle owned by her or a named insured is invalid. Hence, appellant’s arguments in this regard are not well taken.

Section 3937.18 permits an other-owned-vehicle exclusion in UM/UIM coverage for a vehicle not specifically identified in the policy, and the exclusion may apply when the policy's term "you" includes the corporation and its employees.

Miller v. Grange Mutual Casualty Company, Unpublished Decision (10-21-2002) · filed 2002-10-21

The statute now provides that UM/UIM coverage may include terms and conditions that preclude coverage of bodily injury suffered by an insured when the insured is operating or occupying a motor vehicle owned, furnished to, or available for the regular use of the named insured, a spouse, or a resident relative if the motor vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy under which the claim is made, or not is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle for a motor vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. ... Applied to the "other owned vehicle" clause, the corporation can own a vehicle, but cannot suffer bodily injury or death.Scott-Pontzer's logic requires us to find the "you" here includes both the corporation and its employees. ... We find the trial court erred in concluding the Millers are entitled to UIM coverage under the policy issued by Grange to Hilltop. Accordingly, the assignment of error is sustained.

Section 3937.18(J)(1) permits an exclusion for injury sustained while the insured operates a vehicle owned by a named insured when that vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy.

Niese v. Maag, Unpublished Decision (12-13-2002) · filed 2002-12-13(J)(1)

We agree with these other courts and find that the language in the Westfield UIM exclusion is consistent with R.C. 3937.18(J)(1).

Section 3937.18(j)(1) permits an insurer to exclude UM/UIM coverage for bodily injury or death suffered while occupying a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or regularly available for use by a named insured, the named insured's spouse, or a resident relative, when the vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy.

Bergmeyer v. Auto Owners Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (1-13-2003) · filed 2003-01-13(j)(1)

Pursuant to the amended statute an insurance company may through terms and conditions preclude coverage for bodily injury or death suffered by an insured while the insured is operating or occupying a motor vehicle owned by, furnished to, or available for regular use of a named insured, spouse, or resident relative of the named insured if the motor vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy under which the claim is made. Thus, pursuant to the revised language of the statute, the insurer may deny coverage when the injured party is occupying a motor vehicle owned by a named insured, spouse, or resident relative of a named insured, if the motor vehicle is not itself insured under the policy. ... Our reading of the revised statute and the language of the policy in question leads us to conclude the General Assembly intended endorsements like the one before us to be valid and enforceable.

Section 3937.18(J) permits an uninsured-motorist policy to exclude coverage for bodily injury suffered while an insured occupies a noncovered vehicle owned by an employee when the policy treats “you” and “named insured” as synonymous.

Weyda v. Pacific Employer's Insurance · filed 2003-01-31(J)

Thus, we conclude that because “you” and “named insured” as used in the policy were synonymous, the exclusion in R.C. 3937.18(J) was enforceable for noncovered autos owned by an employee.

Section 3937.18 permits an insurer to exclude UM/UIM coverage for injury or death suffered while an insured occupies a vehicle owned by an insured, spouse, or resident relative if that vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy.

Mayle v. Gimroth, Unpublished Decision (5-12-2003) · filed 2003-05-12

The General Assembly amended R.C. 3937.18 effective September 3, 1997. Pursuant to the amended statute an insurance company may through terms and conditions, preclude coverage for bodily injury or death suffered by an insured while the insured is operating or occupying a motor vehicle owned by furnished to or available for the regular use of a named insured, a spouse, or a resident relative of the named insured if the motor vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy under which the claim is made. This means an insurer may now deny coverage when the injured party is occupying a motor vehicle owned by an insured, spouse, or resident relative of an insured, if the motor vehicle itself is not insured under the policy.

Section 3937.18 permits UM/UIM policies to exclude bodily-injury coverage for an insured operating or occupying a noncovered vehicle owned, furnished to, or regularly available to specified persons.

Nationwide Ins. v. Royal Personal Ins., Unpublished Decision (6-9-2003) · filed 2003-06-09

R.C. 3937.18 was amended effective September 3, 1997. The statute now provides that UM/UIM coverage may include terms and conditions that preclude coverage of bodily injury suffered by an insured when the insured is operating or occupying a motor vehicle owned, furnished to, or available for the regular use of the named insured, a spouse, or a resident relative if the motor vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy under which the claim is made, or not is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle for a motor vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. ... The "other owned vehicle" exclusion is in fact a valid, enforceable exclusion.

Section 3937.18(J)(1) permits an insurer to exclude UIM coverage for bodily injury suffered while an insured operates or occupies a vehicle owned, furnished to, or regularly available for use by a named insured, spouse, or resident relative, when the vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy; the court applied that exclusion to bar coverage here.

Univ. Underwriters Ins. v. Miller, Unpublished Decision (5-12-2003) · filed 2003-05-12(J)(1)

Under the H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18, the General Assembly enacted Section (J)(1), which permits insurers to include other-owned auto exclusions in UIM policies. ... In applying the Miller analysis to the case sub judice, we conclude the trial court did not err when it determined the other-owned auto exclusion in Cincinnati's policy precluded UIM coverage for the decedent. ... Accordingly, the other-owned auto exclusion contained in Cincinnati's business auto policy precludes coverage in favor of the decedent and his estate.

Section 3937.18(J)(1) permits an other-owned-vehicle exclusion to apply to an employee's UM claim when the employee operates her own vehicle that is not specifically identified in the employer's policy.

Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (7-21-2003) · filed 2003-07-21(J)(1)

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE TERMS "INSURED" AND "NAMED INSURED" ARE SYNONYMOUS FOR PURPOSE OF APPLYING R.C.3937.18(J)(1)." ... "Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not err in finding that he "other owned vehicle exclusion" excluding uninsured motorist (UM) coverage while operating or occupying a vehicle owned by a named insured, and not specifically identified in the policy, applied to employee's claim for UM benefits under the corporate employer's policy while the employee was operating her own vehicle."

Section 3937.18(J)(1) permits an other-owned-auto exclusion to apply to an insured family member, making the exclusion valid and enforceable.

Frazier v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-28-2003) · filed 2003-08-28(J)(1)

Frazier's next contention is that the other owned auto exclusion exceeds the scope of R.C. 3937.18 and is therefore unenforceable. ... We find Frazier's argument unpersuasive. ... We find that interpreting the statute as Frazier suggests would produce absurd and unreasonable results. ... We therefore reject Frazier's argument and find that the other owned auto exclusion is valid and enforceable.

Section 3937.18(J)(1) permits UIM exclusions for injuries sustained while an insured occupies a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or regularly available for the use of a named insured, spouse, or resident relative, without requiring the vehicle owner to be a policy-declarations named insured.

Chapman v. Chapman, Unpublished Decision (9-24-2003) · filed 2003-09-24(J)(1)

This Court recently rejected the same argument in Mazza v.American Continental Ins. Co., 9th Dist. No. 21192, 2003-Ohio-360, appeal allowed 2003-Ohio-3717. The appellant in that case argued that "the `other owned auto' exclusion authorized by R.C. 3937.18(J)(1) cannot be expanded to include any vehicle owned by any insured," but instead must be confined to those vehicles owned by named insureds. Id. at 9. This Court disagreed, expressly declining to "differentiate between the `named insured' and the `insured'" for the purpose of determining the breadth permitted by R.C. 3937.18(J)(1). Id. at 11. ... The trial court correctly determined that the "other owned auto" exclusion in the Liberty Mutual policy complies with R.C.3937.18(J)(1). Summary judgment on the basis that the exclusion rendered Appellant ineligible for UIM coverage under the Liberty Mutual policy was proper. The first assignment of error is overruled.

Section 3937.18(J)(1) permits an other-owned-vehicle exclusion to apply when the term "you" encompasses both an insured and a named insured.

Dillen v. National Fire Ins., Unpublished Decision (10-29-2003) · filed 2003-10-29(J)(1)

We reject this interpretation of Scott-Pontzer and conclude, as we did in Mazza, that the term "you," as it is used in the "other owned auto" exclusion applies to both an insured and a named insured.

Former § 3937.18(J) does not permit a UM/UIM policy to exclude damages caused to an insured by the wrongful death of a family member arising from the use of an other-owned automobile.

Kotlarczyk v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins Co, Unpublished Decision (6-30-2004) · filed 2004-06-30(J)

Accordingly, former R.C. 3937.18(J) does not permit a UM/UIM policy to exclude from coverage damages caused to an insured by the wrongful death of a family member arising out of the use of an "other owned auto."

Former § 3937.18(J)(1) permits an insurer to offer UIM coverage excluding owned autos not specifically identified in the policy, without first offering broader coverage and obtaining a separate waiver.

Nentwick v. Erie Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (6-30-2004) · filed 2004-06-30(J)(1)

R.C. § 3937.18(J)(1) does not say that the insurer must first offer broader UIM coverage and then get permission from the insured to provide more limited coverage that excludes other owned autos not specifically listed in the policy.

Section 3937.18, as amended by H.B. 261, permits an insurer to limit UM/UIM coverage through an “other-owned auto exclusion” for an owned vehicle not insured under the policy.

Bailey v. Progressive Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-27-2004) · filed 2004-08-27

However, version H.B. 261 of R.C. 3937.18, (effective 10-31-2001), superceded the holding inMartin, supra, and allowed an insurer to limit UM coverage by a provision commonly referred to as the "other-owned auto exclusion." ... Pursuant to R.C.3937.18, appellants are barred from recovery by virtue of the "other-owned auto exclusion" under the UM/UIM portion of the American Family policy.

Former § 3937.18(J) permits an other-owned-vehicle exclusion only when the insured is using a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or regularly available for the named insured and the vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy.

Westfield Ins. Co. v. Ellis, Unpublished Decision (8-20-2004) · filed 2004-08-20(J)

In the current matter, appellant was not occupying a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of the "named insured," i.e., the University. Although H.B. 261 resurrected the "other owned vehicle" exclusion, which was found invalid in Martin it did so only as provided in the statute. Former R.C. 3937.18(J) did not permit the specific exclusion in appellant's policy when applied to the case sub judice. Consequently, Westfield's "other owned vehicle" exclusion does not comport with former R.C. 3937.18 and is invalid as applied to the current matter.

Under the pre-H.B. 261 version of Section 3937.18, a policy could not exclude UM/UIM coverage for bodily injury sustained while occupying a nonowned auto.

Frazier v. Bee, Unpublished Decision (1-27-2005) · filed 2005-01-27

However, that argument is contrary to Martin v. Midwestern Group Ins Co., and the mandate of the applicable version of R.C. 3937.18. ... There is no exclusion from coverage for bodily injury while occupying a nonowned auto contained in the Lightning Rod Ohio Uninsured Motorists Coverage Endorsement. Such exclusion would be unenforceable pursuant to Martin v. Midwestern Group Ins. Co. as the policy was issued prior to the effective date of H.B 261, which superseded the decision inMartin v. Midwestern Group Ins. ... We agree with the trial court's original analysis, and find the Lightning Rod policy does not require the named insured or his family members, here Ryan Frazier, to be operating or occupying a "covered auto" in order to be entitled to UIM coverage.

Former § 3937.18(J)(1) permits an insurer to exclude UM/UIM coverage when an insured is occupying an owned vehicle not specifically identified in the policy, and the version in effect when the policy's two-year period began governs.

Jackson v. State Auto Mutual, Unpublished Decision (2-15-2005) · filed 2005-02-15(J)(1)

Further, because former R.C. 3937.18(J)(1) is unambiguous, we do not need to interpret it in light of the overriding purpose of R.C.3937.18 to protect persons from uninsured/underinsured drivers. State exrel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1996),74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545 ("If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous and definite, it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is necessary."). Accordingly, applying former R.C. 3937.18(J)(1) as written, we conclude that State Auto could include Section A1 in its policy and, based upon Section A1, deny underinsured motorist coverage to appellants.

Section 3937.18(J)(1) permits an insurer to exclude UM/UIM coverage through an "other owned vehicle" clause, and the version in effect when the policy was entered controls.

Gallat v. Continental Casualty, Unpublished Decision (2-18-2005) · filed 2005-02-18(J)(1)

On September 3, 1997, the General Assembly enacted Am. Sub. H.B. 261, which added the new sections to R.C. 3937.18. R.C. 3937.18 (J)(1),2 that portion of the statute that permits an insurer to exclude UM/UIM coverage by means of an "other owned vehicle" clause, was effective through October 31, 2001. Because Patricia Gallat entered into her insurance contract with Progressive on March 1, 2000, R.C.3937.18(J)(1) is applicable to the case under consideration.

Section 3937.18(I)(1) permits an insurer to restrict underinsured-motorist coverage by excluding losses sustained while an insured occupies an other owned auto.

Brunn v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (1-5-2006) · filed 2006-01-05(I)(1)

R.C. 3937.18 provides an insurer may restrict UIM coverage by including terms that exclude coverage for losses sustained while the insured is occupying an "other owned auto".

Section 3937.18(J)(1) permits an uninsured/underinsured motorist policy to enforce an other-owned-vehicle exclusion for a vehicle not specifically identified in the policy.

Massari v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (1-26-2006) · filed 2006-01-26(J)(1)

In Frazier, this court made it clear that, in accordance with R.C. 3937.18(J)(1), other owned vehicle exclusion clauses are valid and enforceable.

Section 3937.18(j)(1) permits a UM/UIM policy to exclude coverage for bodily injury suffered while an insured operates or occupies a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or regularly available to a named insured or resident relative when the vehicle is not specifically identified or otherwise covered as a newly acquired or replacement vehicle.

Atterholt v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (3-29-2006) · filed 2006-03-29(j)(1)

As the law does not now mandate UM/UIM coverage, such case is only applicable in that it holds that we must effectuate the legislative purpose. ... Accordingly, this court has held on numerous occasions that the exclusion as contained in the policy in the case sub judice is valid. ... We find the exclusion in the policy to be applicable to Appellant and affirm the decision of the trial court at Appellant's costs.

Section 3937.18(I)(1) permits an insurer to restrict UIM coverage by excluding losses sustained while the insured is occupying an “other owned auto.”

American Modern Home Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins., 2007-L-044 (11-21-2007) · filed 2007-11-21(I)(1)

R.C. 3937.18 (I)(1) permits an insurer to restrict UIM coverage by including terms that exclude coverage for losses sustained while the insured is occupying an "other owned auto." However, although the "other owned auto" exclusion precludes coverage for the estate of a decedent, it does not preclude coverage for the claims of the decedent's wrongful death beneficiaries. See Aldrich v. Pacific Indemn. Co. , 7th Dist. No. 02 CO 54, 2004-Ohio-1546 , at ¶ 43 .

Section 3937.18 permits an uninsured-motorist policy to exclude coverage for injuries suffered while an insured operates a vehicle owned by a named insured or relative when that vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy.

Spelich v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2007-T-0043 (12-28-2007) · filed 2007-12-28(I)(1)

"Other owned vehicle exclusions are permitted to be included in automobile insurance policies regarding uninsured motorist coverage. R.C. 3937.18 . ... In this matter, the language of the Cherokee and Cavalier policies was not ambiguous. Instead, the other owned vehicle exclusions contained in those policies specifically excluded coverage in instances where an accident occurs while an insured is operating a vehicle that she or a relative owned. ... Thus, the valid other owned vehicle exclusions in the Cherokee and Cavalier policies preclude Spelich from being eligible for uninsured motorist coverage under those policies."

Section 3937.18 permits insurers to enforce other-owned-auto exclusions in UM/UIM policies.

Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Moore · filed 2013-06-03

Under R.C. 3937.18, other-owned auto exclusions such as the one in the Auto Policy are enforceable.

The post-September 21, 2000 amendment to R.C. 3937.18 superseded Moore, permitting enforcement of an other-owned-auto exclusion to UM/UIM coverage.

King v. Wachauf · filed 2013-06-17

Just a few months after Moore was decided, however, the General Assembly amended R.C. 3937.18 by enacting H.B. 267 (eff. 9-21-00), to supersede the holding in Moore. H.B. 267, § 3. See also Adams, 2004-Ohio-535, ¶ 20, Fn. 7. More recently, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that Moore should be limited to the 1994 S.B. 20 version of R.C. 3937.18.

For automobile insurance policies issued after September 3, 1997, subsection (J)(1) permits an “other-owned auto” exclusion in uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.

Morgenstern v. Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance · filed 2003-10-16(J)(1)

The present case, by contrast, shows that the Nationwide policy was issued on February 1, 1999, after the effective dates of the amendments. Therefore, the Nationwide policy’s “other-owned auto” exclusion is permitted under Ohio Revised Code § 3937.18(J)(1).

Section 3937.18(J)(1) makes other-owned-vehicle exclusions enforceable after the amendment.

Baughman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2000-05-24(J)(1)

The period in question ends 9/2/97 due to an amendment to R.C. 3937.18, whereby the legislature superseded this Court’s holding in Martin and made the ‘other owned vehicle’ exclusions enforceable once more. R.C. 3937.18(J)(1).

Section 3937.18(J)(1) permits uninsured motorist policies to exclude coverage for injury or death suffered while an insured occupies an owned vehicle not identified in the policy.

Gaines v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (4-30-2002) · filed 2002-04-30(J)(1)

We conclude that the policy unambiguously excludes uninsured motorist coverage for bodily injury to an insured when the insured is operating or occupying a vehicle owned by the insured but the vehicle is not covered under the State Farm policy.

Division (C) gives an insurer a subrogation right to recovery proceeds after payment, but that general right does not by itself permit a direct setoff against underinsured-motorist limits before the insured is fully compensated.

James v. Michigan Mutual Insurance · filed 1985-08-07(C)

At the time of the appellee’s accident with Smith, R.C. 3937.181(C) provided: “The benefits provided under underinsured motorist coverages shall be subject to the same provisions as to denial of coverage, insolvency, subrogation or off-set as provided in uninsured motorist coverage under divisions (B), (C) and (D) of section 3937.18 of the Revised Code.” In turn, the relevant portion of R.C. 3937.18(C) provided: “In the event of payment to any person under the coverage required by this section and subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, the insurer making such payment to the extent thereof is entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery of such *388person against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily injury for which such payment is made * * *.” ... the appellant’s general right of subrogation does not entitle the appellant to deduct, directly from the limits of the appellee’s underinsured motorist coverage, the payment made to the appellee on behalf of Smith.

Section 3937.18 permits underinsured-motorist setoffs to be applied separately and successively for multiple insureds, so long as each receives at least the amount available under uninsured-motorist coverage and total insurer payments do not exceed the policy limit.

Zelko v. Parsons · filed 1985-12-16

Applying the principle of James to multiple insureds requires State Auto to apply the setoff in a way which allows each insured to receive a total amount of compensation that is no less than the amount of compensation he would have received if he had been injured by an uninsured motorist, viz., the $35,000 uninsured policy limit, while at the same time ensuring that the total amounts paid by State Auto do not exceed the $35,000 underinsurance policy limits clearly set forth in the policy. Appellants’ policy, former R.C. 3937.181 (now R.C. 3937.18), the trial court’s holding, and the Supreme Court’s holding in James, supra, are consistent with the theory of separate and successive treatment of the individual insureds as long as the total amounts paid to appellants collectively do not exceed the limits of their underinsurance coverage.

Section 3937.18(A) does not require uninsured motorist coverage from self-insurers or financial responsibility bond principals.

Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Refiners Transport & Terminal Corp. · filed 1986-01-02(A)

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the uninsured motorist provisions of R.C. 3937.18 do not apply to either self-insurers or financial responsibility bond principals.

Section 3937.18 does not require self-insurers, including self-insured common carriers, to provide uninsured motorist coverage.

Robinson v. Yellow Cab Co. · filed 1986-08-26

The essence of appellant’s action is a declaratory judgment claim alleging that appellees, who admittedly were self-insured, were responsible under R.C. 3937.18 to provide uninsured motorist coverage to appellant. ... The syllabus of the Grange case provides: ... “The uninsured motorist provisions of R.C. 3937.18 do not apply to either self-insurers or financial responsibility bond principals.” ... In the meantime, the Grange case is the law of this state and dictates that Robinson’s injuries are her burden to bear unassisted.

Section 3937.18(E), now (G), allows an automobile liability policy with uninsured-motorist coverage to include terms and conditions that prevent stacking of uninsured-motorist coverages.

Hedrick v. Motorists Mutual Insurance · filed 1986-02-05(E), now (G)

By the 1980 amendment to R.C. 3937.18, the legislature allowed insurance companies to include provisions in their policies to prohibit the stacking of insurance coverage. To construe the statute otherwise would defeat the objectives of the legislature in amending the statute. ... For the foregoing reasons, this court holds that an insurance policy provision which denies uninsured motorist coverage, when bodily injury is sustained by any person while occupying a motor vehicle owned by an insured but which vehicle is not specifically insured under the policy, is a valid exclusion.

Section 3937.18(G) permits an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy to preclude stacking of uninsured-motorist coverages, but the antistacking provision must be unambiguous, clear, and conspicuous.

Dues v. Hodge · filed 1988-04-06(G)

An insurance company may, pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(G), preclude the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage. The antistacking provision, however, must be both unambiguous and clear and conspicuous in the automobile insurance contract.

Section 3937.18 permits an insurer to bar stacking through a clear and conspicuous policy provision and requires uninsured and underinsured coverages to have the same liability limits.

Nilsen v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 1990-02-06(G) (B)

"The antistacking provision appearing in the body of the main policy is in conformity with R.C. 3937.18 which permits insurance companies to preclude the aggregation of policy coverage. ... The issue before this court is whether the antistacking provision contained in the uninsured motorist coverage applies to prohibit the stacking of underinsured motorist coverage set forth in the policy endorsement as well. ... Therefore, we hold that appellees are permitted to stack the underinsured motorist coverage of the three vehicles. ... Regardless of arguments favoring either the clarity or ambiguity of the limitations of underinsured motorist coverage, we find that such limitations are identical to those disclosed on the declarations page for uninsured motorist coverage. This finding is statutorily mandated by R.C. 3937.18(B), which states: \"Coverages offered under division (A) of this section [uninsured and underinsured coverage], shall be written for the same limits of liability.\" Therefore, the limits of underinsured coverage are \"$100,000 each person, $300,000 each occurrence\" as written for uninsured coverage."

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires underinsured motorist coverage to apply when the projected amount available for payment under the tortfeasor’s policy is less than the insured’s underinsured motorist coverage limits.

Knudson v. Grange Mutual Companies · filed 1986-03-21(A)(2)

The above interpretation of the legislature’s intent in requiring the offering of underinsured motorist coverage leads us to the conclusion that the legislature intended to require insurance companies to offer a type of underinsured motorist coverage which would provide coverage when the actual amounts available for payment to the victim under the tortfeasor’s insurance coverage are less than the victim’s underinsured motorist coverage limits. ... Therefore, we are compelled to rule that an insurance company is obligated to offer underinsured motorist coverage that is applicable when the projected amount available for payment under the tort-feasor’s insurance policy is less than the victim’s underinsured motorist coverage limits.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) requires uninsured-motorist coverage for insured persons legally entitled to recover damages, and subsection (F) bars excluding or reducing those benefits because of workers’ compensation benefits from the same injury.

Thiel v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1986-04-16(A)(1), (F)

Therefore, to reconcile these statutes and their legislative intents, and considering the language of R.C. 3937.18(F), the determination that an injured fellow employee is not “legally entitled to recover” uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) cannot be based upon the conditional immunity which arises under R.C. 4123.741.

Section 3937.18 allows a named insured to reject uninsured-motorist coverage or choose approved lower limits, and the court applied that rule to an insured added to an existing policy.

Johnson v. Great American Insurance Co. · filed 1988-02-24(A)

While we find these policy considerations persuasive, we need not go so far today. Under the facts sub judice, Susan was added to Wayne’s existing policy with Great American. Thus, Susan impliedly consented to the terms of that policy. To hold otherwise would require an insurer to make all disclosures required by R.C. Chapter 3937 to an insured that is added to an existing policy prior to binding the new insured. If an insured that is added to an existing policy does object to the terms of that policy, the new insured may seek to subsequently modify those terms or purchase a separate policy. However, at the time that the name of a new insured is added to an existing policy, the new insured is bound by the policy’s existing terms absent a specific request otherwise.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) triggers underinsured-motorist coverage only when the amount recoverable from the liable person is less than the insured's underinsured-motorist coverage.

Ware v. Nationwide Insurance Co. · filed 1986-06-18(A)(2)

Thus, underinsurance coverage is triggered when the maximum amount recoverable from the person liable is less than the amount of coverage carried by the insured. In this case, both policy holders had coverage of $25,000. Therefore, the underinsured coverage under R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) is not applicable.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) treats a tortfeasor as underinsured when multiple claimants reduce the amount actually payable to the injured party below the insured’s policy limits.

Brown v. Erie Insurance · filed 1986-12-29(A)(2)

In light of this analysis of the legislative intent in requiring insurance companies to offer underinsured coverage, we hold that when, due to multi-pie claimants, the actual amount payable to an injured party under the tort-feasor’s policy is less than the insured’s policy limits, the tortfeasor is an underinsured.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires underinsured motorist coverage only when the tortfeasor’s available liability limits are less than the insured’s underinsured motorist limits; equal limits do not satisfy that threshold.

Hill v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1990-04-25(A)(2)

Thus, as shown in the above analysis, unless otherwise provided by an insurer, underinsured motorist liability insurance coverage is not available to an insured where the limits of liability contained in the insured’s policy are identical to the limits set forth in the tortfeasor’s liability insurance coverage.

Section 3937.18(A) requires both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in covered automobile liability policies, subject to the named insured's valid rejection.

Dick v. Hart · filed 1990-06-01(A)

Upon consideration of the foregoing, this court finds that, as to whether there had been a valid rejection of uninsured motorist coverage, there remains no genuine issues as to any material fact and that reasonable minds could only conclude that Tod Motors did expressly reject uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.

Section 3937.18(G) permits enforceable policy terms that preclude stacking uninsured motorist coverages, including exclusionary provisions that prevent recovery under more than one policy.

Saccucci v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1987-09-02(G)

Thus, we interpret R.C. 3937.18(G) to provide that express anti-stacking provisions, as well as other exclusionary provisions which would act to prevent insureds from receiving payments under more than one policy of insurance, are valid and enforceable policy limitations.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) permits reducing underinsured-motorist limits by amounts recovered from liable persons only when the tortfeasor is underinsured; subsection (A)(1) does not authorize a setoff against uninsured-motorist coverage, and subsection (E)'s subrogation right does not permit recovery before the insured is fully compensated.

Dunkel v. Motorists Mutual Insurance · filed 1987-10-16(A)(1), (A)(2), (E)

Therefore, Clements does not qualify as an under-insured motorist under either the definition found in Motorists’ policy or under R.C. 3937.18(A)(2). Consequently, coverage under the underinsured motorist provisions of Motorists’ policy would not have been available. ... Although there is language in Motorists’ policy which appears to provide for a setoff against its uninsured motorist coverage, we find no statutory authority allowing such a provision. ... Thus, insurers may not apply a setoff with respect to the uninsured motorist coverage now provided for in R.C. 3937.18(A)(1). ... Thus, R.C. 3937.18(E) was not available to Motorists.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires underinsured-motorist coverage, measured after amounts actually recovered from liable persons, while subsection (E) gives the paying insurer rights to settlement or judgment proceeds through subrogation.

Bogan v. Progressive Casualty Insurance · filed 1988-03-30(A)(2), (E)

As previously mentioned, the term “exhaust” is not found in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2). Nevertheless, the court of appeals below determined that inclusion of this requirement within the underinsured motorist provision did not violate the statutory mandate since the requirement of exhaustion, strictly speaking, was applicable only to the timing of the policy’s application and not the amounts recoverable under the underinsured motorist provision. This reading of both the statute and the provision appears reasonable. ... The exhaustion clause, as construed herein, is a valid precondition to coverage under such policy. ... We therefore hold that a provider of under-insured motorist coverage has unreasonably withheld its consent to a settlement by its injured insured when the refusal to give consent was based upon the exhaustion clause in the policy as we have determined herein to have been fully satisfied. Under such circumstances, the failure to consent to the settlement violates public policy and the intent of the General Assembly as expressed in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2). ... Furthermore, in the context of the case before us, the right of subrogation is specifically granted to providers of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage by the General Assembly. ... Based upon such established common law, and further strengthened by the specific statutory provision, R.C. 3937.18, we can only conclude that a subrogation clause is reasonably includable in contracts providing under-insured motorist insurance. Such clause is therefore both a valid and enforceable precondition to Progressive’s duty to provide underinsured motorist coverage.

Section 3937.18(E) permits an insurer to set off payments made under uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage against the policy limits when the policy clearly provides for the setoff.

In re Nationwide Insurance · filed 1989-08-16(E)

Accordingly, we hold that a setoff against the limits of underinsured and uninsured motorist coverage is permitted under R.C. 3937.18(E), provided that the setoff is clearly set forth in the provisions of the insurance policy.

Section 3937.18 requires underinsured-motorist coverage for wrongful-death losses and does not authorize reducing multiple statutory survivors' separate claims to a single per-person limit.

Wood v. Shepard · filed 1988-08-03(A)(2)

Nowhere in R.C. 3937.18 is authority granted to limit claims for wrongful death to a single person limit of liability. ... Accordingly, we hold that each person entitled to recover damages pursuant to R.C. 2125.02 for wrongful death, and who is an insured under an underinsured motorist provision of an insurance policy, has a separate claim and such separate claims may not be made subject to the single person limit of liability in the underinsured motorist provision.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) does not prevent reasonable policy limits on the amount of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage available for an accident.

Crane v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1989-04-28(A)(1)

In so holding, the Dues court reasoned that R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) does not indicate an intent to override reasonable limitations on the amount of coverage available for each accident. ... Upon consideration of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dues, we find that there is no basis for a determination other than that the reasoning and holding of Dues is equally applicable to underinsured motorist coverage and is controlling in this case.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage for derivative claims but permits a policy to limit all claims arising from one person’s bodily injury to a single liability limit.

King v. Safeco Insurance · filed 1990-02-14

Under the Dues holding that an insurance policy may validly limit recovery for all claims arising out of bodily injury sustained by one person to a single limit of liability, we hold that the trial court’s declaration that King’s policy provided separate liability limits for her son’s bodily injury claim and her derivative claims was erroneous.

Section 3937.18 supports the inclusion and enforcement of a subrogation clause in an underinsured-motorist policy as a precondition to coverage.

Hartford Casualty Insurance v. Easley · filed 1990-06-26

Based upon such established common low, and further strengthened by the specific statutory provision, R.C. 3937.18, we can only conclude that a subrogation clause is reasonably includable in contracts providing underinsured motorist insurance. Such clause is therefore both a valid and enforceable precondition to Progressive's duty to provide underinsured motorists coverage.

Subsection (F) supports the rule that workers' compensation benefits do not reduce an injured plaintiff's uninsured-motorist damage award.

Rieke v. Ohio Insurance Guaranty Ass'n · filed 1990-06-27(F)

R.C. 3937.18(F) and R.C. 4123.93 provide additional authority that the legislature intended that workers' compensation benefits are not to reduce an injured plaintiffs damage award.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) covers only insured persons legally entitled to recover from the tortfeasor, while subsection (F) bars policy exclusions or reductions based on workers’ compensation benefits and does not override statutory immunity.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Webb · filed 1990-10-10(A)(1), (F)

This case requires a review of the proper construction to be given to the phrase “legally entitled to recover” as used in R.C. 3937.18(A), as well as the phrase within the policy here, “legally entitled to collect.” We hold that since Webb is not legally entitled to recover from Creekmore due to the fellow-employee immunity provided by R.C. 4123.741, Webb may not recover upon the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy issued him by State Farm.

Section 3937.18 treats underinsured coverage as unavailable when the liability limits available to the insured equal the insured's underinsured-motorist limits, even if multiple claims mean the insured actually receives less.

In re Estate of Bondurant · filed 1990-10-31(A)(2)

Bondurant's Estate attempts to distinguish Hill on the basis that Hill does not address the issue of multiple claims that result in the injured receiving less than full underinsured limit. The Supreme Court in Hill points out, however, that R.C. §3937.18 uses the phrase "the limits of liability available for payment to the insured." The statute does not say "the amount actually received by the insured." ... Bondurant's Estate maintains that it is simply inaccurate to say that there was $400,000 worth of coverage available for payment to him in this case However, the statute in that same subparagraph two does utilize the phrase "amounts actually recovered" when it discusses how to determine the limits of liability on the under insured motorist coverage. Because the legislature utilized the two different phrases, we must assume that it meant two different things by those phases. ... On the authority of Hill, supra, we find that the trial court correctly determined that underinsured coverage was not available to the Estate under the J.C. Penney Policy.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires underinsured-motorist coverage when the liability limits available to the insured are less than the insured’s uninsured-motorist limits, and the court applied it to permit coverage where the insured’s and tortfeasor’s policy limits were not identical.

Felber v. Grange Mutual Insurance · filed 1991-08-28(A)(2)

Considering the Grange policy first, it does not provide identical coverage under the Hill court’s interpretation of R.C. 3937.18. In Hill, both the insured and the tortfeasor had dual-limit, $50,000-per-person, $100,000-per-occurrence policies. Here, as already indicated, Felber’s policy limits were not identical to the tortfeasor’s policy limit. Therefore, according to Hill, Felber is not precluded from recovering under her Grange underinsured motorist coverage.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) provides underinsured-motorist coverage when the amount actually available to the insured under the tortfeasor’s policy is less than the insured’s underinsured-motorist coverage limits.

Nixon v. All State Insurance · filed 1993-08-31(A)(2)

Reading this statute, in conjunction with the public policy behind its adoption, the inescapable conclusion is that, when determining whether a motorist is underinsured, the amount actually available for payment under the tortfeasor’s policy must be compared with the insured’s underinsured motorist coverage limits.

Section 3937.18(A) permits an uninsured-motorist policy to exclude coverage for bodily injury sustained while occupying a vehicle owned by an insured but not specifically insured under the policy.

Dunfee v. Midwestern Indemnity Co. · filed 1990-11-14(A)

Dunfee claims that the trial court’s construction of the policy violates R.C. 3937.18(A). The trial court relied upon Hedrick v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., supra, to determine that the provisions under review were not in violation of the statute, and that the exclusion in the policy was valid. Having examined the policy in light of the pronouncements of Hedrick, supra, and in light of similar issues reviewed by prior cases in this court discussing nearly identical policy exclusions, we find no error in the trial court’s decision. The syllabus in Hedrick, supra, states: ... “An insurance policy provision which denies uninsured motorist coverage, when bodily injury is sustained by any person while occupying a motor vehicle owned by an insured but which vehicle is not specifically insured under the policy, is a valid exclusion.” (Emphasis sic.) The exclusionary language considered in Hedrick is nearly identical to that of the policy considered herein. We find no error.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) limits uninsured-motorist coverage to insured persons legally entitled to recover damages from negligent parties who lack liability insurance.

Renwick v. Lightning Rod Mutual Insurance · filed 1991-02-26(A)(1)

The phrase “legally entitled to recover” was defined in the syllabus of Sumwalt v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 294, 12 OBR 368, 466 N.E.2d 544, to mean “ * * * that the insured must be able to prove the elements of her claim necessary to recover damages.” In the present case, the Michigan motorist did carry liability insurance but the appellee did not establish the necessary elements to pursue her claim against the Michigan insurer. Appellee’s injuries did not reach the level of severity required to pursue a tort claim under Michigan law. Therefore, appellee’s claim was denied not because of lack of coverage, but for lack of liability because she had failed to prove a necessary element.

Section 3937.18 supplies implied underinsured-motorist coverage and permits only setoff, anti-stacking, and other expressly provided exclusions, so it does not authorize an exclusion for regular business use of a non-owned vehicle.

Demetry v. Kim · filed 1991-02-26(A)(2)

This same conclusion can be reached if we resort to the provisions of R.C. 3937.18 as a type of gap filler. R.C. 3937.18 provides for setoff, anti-stacking, and other expressly provided exclusions only. There is nothing in the statute which provides for an exclusion based upon regular business use of a non-owned vehicle.

Section 3937.18 does not extend underinsured-motorist recovery to a survivor’s claim against her own insurer when the decedent was not an insured under that policy and the claim is too remote from the statute’s purpose.

Rotsinger v. State Farm Insurance · filed 1992-03-13(A)(2)

We held that such a claim was “too remote from the intent of the legislators in enacting R.C. 3937.18.” Hill, supra. ... Therefore, we find that Rotsinger, as a matter of law, is not entitled to maintain her claim against State Farm. Accordingly, Pavia’s second assignment of error is found not well taken.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires underinsured-motorist coverage when the tortfeasor's available bodily-injury liability limits are less than the insured's uninsured-motorist limits, and coverage exclusions must comply with the statute's purpose.

Nationwide Insurance v. Johnson · filed 1992-11-30(A)(2)

R.C. 3937.18 governs the mandatory offering of underinsured motorist coverage in Ohio and in relevant part states that such coverage shall be provided to an insured for bodily injury loss “ * * * where the limits of coverage available for payment to the insured under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons hable to the insured are less than the limits for the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage at the time of the accident.” R.C. 3937.18(A)(2). ... Exclusions in an insurance contract that pertain to the coverage authorized by R.C. 3937.18 are permissible, provided the restrictions comply with the statute’s purpose. ... Those exclusions which vary from the statute’s requirements are unenforceable.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) does not specify who must suffer the bodily injury, sickness, or disease, and a clear policy provision limiting coverage to bodily injury sustained by an insured person is not in conflict with the statute.

Brown v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1991-08-07(A)(2)

R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) provides: “Uninsured motorist coverage * * * shall provide protection for an insured against loss for bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, where the limits of coverage available for payment to the insured under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured are less than the limits for the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage at the time of the accident.” The statute is silent as to who must suffer the bodily injury, sickness, and disease. ... In the case sub judice, the relevant policy provision provides that coverage extends to “bodily injury sustained by an insured person.” We find this language clear, unambiguous and not in conflict with the relevant statute.

Section 3937.18 permits an automobile insurer to apply one limit to separate claims arising from one bodily injury when the policy limitation tracks the corresponding liability-coverage limit and is stated unambiguously.

State Farm Automobile Insurance v. Rose · filed 1991-08-21

“ * * * (1) that wrongful death claimants do have separate claims under R.C. 2125.02(A)(1); (2) that under R.C. 3937.18 an insurance carrier may apply a single limit to separate claims arising out of a single bodily injury provided the policy limitation tracks the corresponding limitation on liability coverage; but (3) that insurance companies have the burden of stating policy limitations clearly and unambiguously.”

Section 3937.18 permits an uninsured-motorist policy to apply one limit to separate wrongful-death claims arising from one bodily injury when the policy's limit tracks the liability-coverage limit and is clear and unambiguous.

Werner v. Cincinnati Insurance · filed 1991-09-17

The majority limited the holding of Wood and found that it applied only to situations when “ * * * the policy limitations in uninsured or underinsured motorist provisions do not track the corresponding limitation on liability coverage, and are ambiguous on their face. * * * ” Rose, supra, at 532, 575 N.E.2d at 462. ... Because we find that “resulting from” is substantively analogous to “arising out of,” we conclude that this language is sufficiently clear and unambiguous and, therefore, find that the per person limit of $100,000 applies to the wrongful death claims of the insureds. Appellant’s second assignment of error is sustained.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) treats each insured person entitled to recover for a wrongful death as having a separate underinsured-motorist claim, so the claims cannot be subjected to a single-person liability limit.

Derr v. Westfield Companies · filed 1992-05-06(A)(2)

Each person entitled to recover damages pursuant to R.C. 2125.02 for wrongful death, and who is an insured under an underinsured motorist provision in an insurance policy, has a separate claim and such separate claims may not be made subject to the single person limit of liability in the *540underinsured motorist provision. (R.C. 2125.02 and 3937.18[A][2], construed and applied.)

Section 3937.18(A) includes damages for a relative’s wrongful death within uninsured-motorist coverage, while subsection (G) provides an antistacking remedy when recovery may come from more than one source.

Fay v. Motorists Insurance · filed 1992-05-18(G), (A)

Thus, we hold that absent binding precedent to the contrary, Barber’s estate is entitled to recover from her insurer even though, as intimated by appellee, there would be recovery from more than one source. Insurance laws provide insurance companies with a viable remedy by way of the antistacking statute, R.C. 3937.18(G). ... This does not detract from the legal principle set forth in Sexton that such damages are recoverable because of wrongful death caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist. Thus, such damages for death are within the contemplation of R.C. 3937.18(A) and an insurance policy issued thereunder.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) permits an underinsured-motorist insurer to set off only amounts paid under liability coverage for a person legally liable to the insured, not collateral underinsured-motorist payments.

Ward v. Wayne Mutual Insurance · filed 1991-12-16(A)(2)

We agree with the trial court and with Ward that under the statutory and contractual language, appellant may only set off the amount paid by the tortfeasor’s insurance company, because only that amount was paid by an insurance company on behalf of a person legally obligated to her.

Section 3937.18 applies separately to each named insured, so each must separately reject equivalent underinsured motorist coverage; a named insured who expressly rejects it remains bound by that rejection.

Allgire v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1992-06-25

The statute speaks of “the named insured.” When a policy includes more than one insured, the statute applies separately to each named insured.

Section 3937.18(G) allows an automobile policy to clearly and conspicuously preclude stacking of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverages, and section 3937.18(A)(2) allows an insurer to set off payments made on behalf of all persons contractually liable to the insured, including the tortfeasor's insurer and the insurer of the vehicle occupied by the insured.

Hower v. Motorists Mutual Insurance · filed 1992-12-11(G); (A)(2)

Accordingly, we hold that the language in an automobile insurance policy that “[i]f this policy and any other policy providing similar insurance apply to the same accident, the maximum limit of liability under all the policies shall be the highest applicable limit of liability under any policy” is not ambiguous and is a valid anti-stacking provision. ... Thus, we hold that an insurer whose underinsurance liability is statutorily and contractually reduced by sums paid to the insured on behalf of “persons liable to the insured,” within the meaning of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), is entitled to set off the amount paid by the tortfeasor’s insurer as well as the amount paid by the insurer of the vehicle the insured was driving at the time of the accident.

Section 3937.18(G) permits an automobile liability policy providing uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage to preclude stacking, but it does not eliminate coverage under a single policy before claimants reach the policy's contracted limits.

Nixon v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1992-12-15(G)

The Ohio R.C. § 3937.18(G) as amended in 1982 states: Any automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance that includes coverages offered under division (A) of this section [uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage] may include terms and conditions that preclude stacking of such coverages. ... The Defendant cites to this court a number of cases as authority for the proposition that under Ohio anti-stacking laws it owes the Plaintiffs nothing under its insurance policy. The Court disagrees. ... In each of these cases, the insured had more than one insurance policy. The anti-stacking provision is meant to prevent someone from collecting double or triple the maximum amount they insured themselves for and the amount the insurance company agreed to risk for one accident. ... However, that is not the situation here. Donna Davis, through her estate, is attempting to collect from her one insurance policy benefits for which she paid premiums. ... Therefore, State Farm may set off any amount already paid to each plaintiff individually. Accordingly, under the terms of Donna Davis’s policy, State Farm, at the most, owes the difference between what each plaintiff has already been paid and $100,000 up to their $300,000 limit. ... On the other hand, to allow State Farm to escape all coverage when the insured has not received the amount she has insured herself for would be contrary to public policy. Accordingly, until each party has reached their maximum, State Farm may be liable for claims up to each party’s maximum ($100,-000) or State Farm’s maximum pay out ($300,000), whichever is less.

Section 3937.18(E) permits an insurer to set off payments made by liable tortfeasors against uninsured-motorist coverage limits when the setoff is clearly stated in the policy and does not produce an unfair or inconsistent result.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Baker · filed 1993-10-27(E)

In this case, the language in Nationwide’s Endorsement 1604 clearly states that the limits of the uninsured motorist coverage will be reduced by any amounts paid by or for any liable parties. Further, the Estate will not, by this interpretation, receive less compensation than if Mrs. Hirschauer’s death had been caused solely by an uninsured motorist and, therefore, the setoff provision does not lead to an unfair or inconsistent result. Accordingly, the trial court erred by relying solely on R.C. 3937.18(E) and ignoring the policy endorsement language. Notwithstanding the fact that Nationwide has made no payment on its uninsured motorist coverage and notwithstanding the fact that the Estate has not been fully compensated for damages for Mrs. Hirschauer’s death, precedent is clear that the insurance policy language controls here and that Nationwide is entitled to a setoff of all payments made by or for any liable parties.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires comparing the amount actually available for payment to the insured under the tortfeasor’s policy with the insured’s underinsured-motorist coverage limits; coverage applies when the available amount is less.

Motorists Mutual Insurance v. Andrews · filed 1992-12-14(A)(2)

We agree with the above-mentioned appellate courts that the clear language of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) requires a comparison between the amount actually available for payment to an insured and the policy limits of the insured’s underinsured motorist coverage.

Section 3937.18(E) permits enforcement of a policy clause protecting an insurer's subrogation rights, while division (G) permits clear and conspicuous terms in an automobile liability policy that preclude stacking of uninsured-motorist coverages.

Nickschinski v. Sentry Insurance · filed 1993-06-07(E), (G)

A clause which protects the subrogation rights of a provider of uninsured motorist coverage is valid and enforceable. R.C. 3937.18(E); ... R.C. 3937.18(G) provides: ... “Any automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance that includes coverages offered under division (A) of this section [uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage] may include terms and conditions that preclude stacking of such coverages.” ... Insurance companies are thus permitted to include anti-stacking language in any automobile liability policy of insurance. ... An anti-stacking provision will be upheld if it is “clear and conspicuous and in no way deceptive.”

Section 3937.18(A) applies to a motor vehicle liability policy covering a vehicle registered and principally garaged in Ohio even when the policy was not delivered or issued for delivery in Ohio.

Henderson v. Lincoln Natl. Speciality Ins. Co. · filed 1994-02-01(A)

"Does Ohio Revised Code § 3937.18 apply to an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance covering vehicles registered and principally garaged in Ohio, when said policy was not delivered, or issued for delivery in Ohio by the insurer?" ... "The certified question is answered in the affirmative."

Section 3937.18 applies to an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy covering vehicles registered and principally garaged in Ohio even when the policy was not delivered or issued for delivery in Ohio.

Henderson v. Lincoln National Speciality Insurance · filed 1994-02-02(A)

“Does Ohio Revised Code § 3937.18 apply to an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance covering vehicles registered and principally garaged in Ohio, when said policy was not delivered, or issued for delivery in Ohio by the insurer?” The certified question is answered in the affirmative.

Section 3937.18(C) allows an insured to expressly reject equal uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage by intentionally selecting lower limits on a clear coverage form.

Lucas v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1994-03-16(C)

In light of the above factors, we believe that appellant’s intentional decision to choose a lower limit as indicated on the form sufficiently rejected full coverage.

Section 3937.18 does not require uninsured-motorist coverage for motorboats because a motorboat is not a “motor vehicle” under R.C. 4501.01.

Floch v. Farmers Insurance Group of Companies · filed 1994-10-03

Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that a motorboat is not a motor vehicle for purposes of R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) requires uninsured-motorist coverage for insured persons legally entitled to recover damages from operators of uninsured motor vehicles; an unmotorized bicycle is not included.

Brown v. USAA Casualty Insurance · filed 1995-04-24(A)(1)

R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) provides that “uninsured motorist coverage * * * shall provide protection for bodily injury or death * * * for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom * * *.” ... While the term “motor vehicle” has been interpreted by courts to include such vehicles as a backhoe being operated on a public highway, and a golf cart, the court can find no authority for an extension of the definition to include a bicycle which is not motorized and is operated by muscular power. Accordingly, the court holds that a bicycle is not included within the definition of “motor vehicle” for purposes of the applicability of the uninsured motorist coverage in the policy of the parties.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) treats amounts paid or payable by tortfeasors as reducing the insured's damages, rather than reducing the underinsured-motorist policy limits.

Kuhner v. Erie Insurance · filed 1994-11-03(A)(2)

Thus, Savoie makes it clear that the “setoff’ of $75,000 is from the total damages sustained by plaintiffs, not from the underinsured coverage of the Erie policy. We shall construe the judgment of the trial court to be consistent with Savoie and R.C. 3905.18, as construed thereby, rather than inconsistent therewith. With such a construction, the trial court did not err, since the “setoff’ will be from the total damages which plaintiffs sustained, rather than from the policy limits of the Erie policy.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) requires uninsured-motorist coverage for insureds legally entitled to recover damages for bodily injury or death from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles.

State Automobile Mutual Insurance v. Cleveland Carriage Co. · filed 1994-11-07(A)(1)

Pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(A)(1), uninsured motorist coverage is mandated for the protection of insureds “who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom[.]” (Emphasis added.) ... Considering the foregoing with regard to R.C. 3937.18, it is clear that uninsured motorists coverage is not warranted since the Administrator’s damages were not caused by the “owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.”

When a self-insured rental company offers liability coverage, § 3937.18 subjects it to the statute's uninsured-motorist-coverage requirements, and a customer's rejection must be knowing and clear.

Tyler v. Kelley · filed 1994-11-07(A), (C)

We find these authorities instructive and persuasive. Accordingly, we hold that by offering and extending liability coverage to its customer herein, Reserve brought itself within the requirements of the uninsured motorist statute by engaging in the equivalent conduct of a liability insurer.

The 1994 amendments to R.C. 3937.18 apply prospectively because the General Assembly did not clearly and expressly indicate that they were to operate retroactively.

Cartwright v. the Maryland Ins. Group · filed 1995-07-05

After reviewing Sections 7, 8, and 9 of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, we cannot find any language representing a clear indication that the General Assembly intended the amendments to R.C. 3937.18 to be retroactive in operation.

Section 3937.18(A)(2), as amended effective October 20, 1994, does not apply retroactively because it contains no clear, express, or specific indication of retroactive application.

Hobler v. Motorists Mutual Insurance · filed 1995-08-09(A)(2)

The recently, and relevant, amended version of R.C. 3937.18, effective October 20, 1994, does not clearly, expressly, or specifically indicate that R.C. 3937.18 is to be applied retroactively. Specifically, the entire statute, in its amended version, makes no mention of application of the statute prior to the amended effective date.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) permits an insurer to reduce underinsured-motorist coverage limits by amounts recovered from liable parties, and subsection (E) permits that setoff when it is clearly stated in the insurance policy.

Smith v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1995-12-14(A)(2), (E)

“setoff against the limits of underinsured and uninsured motorist coverage is permitted under R.C. 3937.18(E), provided the setoff is clearly set forth in the provisions of the insurance policy.” ... “Given the ambiguity surrounding the Savoie decision, we are inclined to follow James and In re Nationwide in conjunction with the language of R.C. 3937.18 applicable to this case. Under this law, Nationwide in this case clearly had a right to set off the $25,000 appellant had received from the tortfeasor’s liability insurer against its own coverage limits. The policy that appellant had with Nationwide explicitly provided for a right of setoff in such cases and R.C. 3937.18 authorizes a setoff.”

Section 3937.18, as amended by S.B. No. 20, applies to underinsured-motorist actions filed after October 20, 1994.

Ellis-Rivera v. Progressive Insurance Companies · filed 1996-06-10(A)(2)

The court finds that S.B. No. 20 applies to this case because the case was filed on July 28, 1995. S.B. No. 20 is applicable to cases filed after the effective date of the statute, October 20, 1994.

Section 3937.18(A) applies to a commercial garage hazard insurance policy, and a policy exclusion cannot eliminate underinsured-motorist coverage for a claim arising from a cause of action recognized by Ohio tort law.

Landis v. Grange Mutual Insurance · filed 1994-07-22(A)

Upon consideration thereof and the law, this court finds that this attempted distinction is without merit and that the decision in Alexander and the provisions of R.C. 3937.18 are applicable to the policy of insurance issued by appellant to Foster Chevrolet.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) permits a non-member-of-household limitation on uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage for a parent's wrongful death.

Visocky v. Farmers Insurance of Columbus · filed 1994-09-01(A)(1)

The deeper issue, of course, is whether this limitation on coverage is valid under R.C. 3937.18(A)(1).

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage for an injured person who has a legal cause of action against the tortfeasor, rather than indemnifying the policyholder for a loss unrelated to the tortfeasor's legal liability.

Amon v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co. · filed 1996-07-08(A)(1) and (A)(2)

The uninsured/underinsured provision in appellee’s policy, in effect, provides liability coverage for a tortfeasor to cover the tortfeasor’s obligations, not an indemnity policy to cover the policyholder’s loss. ... Because appellee does not have a legal claim against the tortfeasor, there is no coverage under the uninsured/underinsured provision of her insurance contract. ... Requiring appellant to pay underinsured benefits to appellee in this circumstance where appellant would have no subrogation rights against the tortfeasor would contravene the intent underlying R.C. 3937.18 and deprive appellant of rights for which it contracted.

Section 3937.18(A) requires UM/UIM coverage for a claimant who is an insured under the policy, but it does not prohibit the policy from defining who qualifies as an insured person.

Wayne Mutual Insurance v. Mills · filed 1996-07-31(A)

Although it is true that Alexander and Martin prohibit denial of UM/UIM coverage on the basis of the “household” or “other owned vehicle” exclusions, neither of those cases prohibits the parties to an insurance contract from defining who is to be an “insured person” under the terms of the policy. Indeed, the Martin court specifically stated that “the statute mandates coverage if (1) the claimant is [a named] insured under a policy[.]” (Emphasis added.) Martin v. Midwestern Group Ins., 70 Ohio St.3d at 481, 639 N.E.2d at 441.

Former § 3937.18 governed when an underinsurance claim had to be paid and how the amount of underinsurance coverage was determined.

Sigmon v. Hatfield · filed 1996-08-07

Insurance—Motor vehicles—Pursuant to former R.C. 3937.18, an underinsurance claim must be paid, when—Determining amount of underinsurance coverage to be paid.

Former § 3937.18 requires underinsured-motorist coverage to be applied without allowing an insurer to set off liability payments made under the same automobile policy against the underinsured-motorist coverage limits.

Keppel v. Jack Keppel Estate · filed 1996-08-07

“May an insurer who insures different members of the same household under one policy of automobile insurance enforce a provision in the policy that provides for a set-off, against the limits of underinsured motorist coverage, of any amount paid to the insured under the liability coverage of the same policy?” ... “We answer the certified question in the negative.”

Former Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires an underinsurance provider to set off amounts recovered from the tortfeasor's liability carriers against the insured's total damages, rather than against the policy limits.

Cole v. Holland · filed 1996-08-07(A)(2)

We hold that pursuant to former R.C. 3937.18, an underinsurance claim must be paid when the individual covered by an uninsured/underinsured policy suffers damages that exceed those monies available to be paid by the tortfeasor’s liability carriers. In determining the amount of underinsurance coverage to be paid in a situation involving an accident governed by former R.C. 3937.18, the underinsurance provider is entitled to set off the amounts actually recovered from the tortfeasor’s liability carriers against the insured’s total damages, rather than against its policy limits.