Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3937.18

Former § 3937.18(K)(2) permits an uninsured-motorist policy to exclude a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of a named insured, spouse, or resident relative.

Smith v. Guideone Ins., Unpublished Decision (9-11-2003) · filed 2003-09-11(K)(2)

Therefore, pursuant to former R.C. 3937.18, as amended by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 261, the provision in the GuideOne policy excluding from uninsured motorist coverage a vehicle "owned by or furnished available for the regular use of you or any `family member'" complied with the requirements of former R.C. 3937.18(K)(2), a presumptively valid statute at the time the policy was in effect.

Section 3937.18 authorizes a regular-use exclusion that protects insurers when an insured uses coverage bought for one vehicle while continually driving nonowned vehicles for which no premium was paid.

Sullivan v. Williams · filed 2011-11-29

The overriding purpose of the regular-use exclusion authorized by R.C. 3937.18 is to protect insurance companies from insured individuals purchasing coverage on one vehicle and then using that coverage for protection while continually driving nonowned vehicles for which no premium was paid.

Section 3937.18(I)(1) permits an uninsured or underinsured motorist policy to exclude coverage when an insured occupies an employer-provided vehicle available for regular use that is not covered by the policy.

Sposito v. Krzynowek · filed 2014-03-24(I)(1)

This court has held that, “in determining the validity of an exclusion of UM/UIM motorist coverage, a court must determine whether the exclusion conforms with R.C. 3937.18,” which is the case here.

Section 3937.18 permits a signed selection of lower UM/UIM limits when extrinsic evidence shows the insured understood the lower coverage and its effect on premiums, even without an exact dollar figure for the savings.

Wilson v. Murch, Unpublished Decision (3-29-2006) · filed 2006-03-29

While Lawson admitted that no exact dollar amount of savings was given to him, he stated that "[b]ased on [his] experience, [he] would have a pretty good idea of the magnitude of the savings." Minimally, Lawson knew that by going with the 2 million dollar limit, Farm Credit could be exposed to an extra $950,000 in losses than if they selected the $50,000 limit, and he knew that the premiums would be much less with the $50,000 limit than the $2 million limit. Contrary to Appellant's assertions, we find that the above extrinsic evidence is not in conflict, but rather, that it establishes that Lawson had working knowledge of the lowered insurance and its relationship to the overall cost of the insurance premium.

Under the H.B. 261 version of § 3937.18(C), a signed rejection of uninsured motorist coverage also rejects underinsured motorist coverage when the form defines the former to include the latter.

Byer v. Wright · filed 2005-04-15(C)

Thus, for purposes of this form, uninsured-motorist coverage was defined to include underinsured-motorist coverage. The rejection was valid as to both types of coverage.

Under the H.B. 261 version of § 3937.18, an insurer may use extrinsic evidence to establish that it informed the insured of the premium before the insured signed a rejection of underinsured motorist coverage.

Akins v. Harco Ins., Unpublished Decision (9-12-2005) · filed 2005-09-12

{¶ 5} In Hollon, as in the case before us,2 the insurer produced a written offer/rejection of UM/UIM coverage. Hollon, at ¶ 3; Akins, at ¶ 29. However, each of these written offers did not contain a premium.Hollon, at ¶ 3; Akins, at ¶ 29. Nevertheless, in both Hollon andAkins, the insurer provided an unrebutted affidavit averring that the insured was informed of the premium for UM/UIM coverage prior to rejecting that coverage. Hollon, at ¶ 6; Akins, at ¶ 22. Thus, because the pertinent facts in Akins are on all fours with the relevant facts inHollon, we are constrained to conclude, on remand, that appellant's first assignment of error is not well-taken.

Section 3937.18(A) makes uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage permissive rather than mandatory, so coverage is not implied by law when the policy clearly excludes it and incorporates that statutory change.

Kudla v. Wendt, Unpublished Decision (12-13-2007) · filed 2007-12-13(A)

The insurer in this case claims that, when it renewed the policy on January 13, 2002, it incorporated the changes to R.C. 3937.18 which became effective October 31, 2001 under S.B. 97. These changes make UIM coverage permissive rather than mandatory. Since the Allstate policy did not expressly include UIM coverage, incorporation of this change in the law would remove the implication of coverage by operation of law that existed under the previous version of R.C. 3937.18. ... Therefore, we hold that S.B. 267 allowed Allstate to amend its policy to incorporate statutory changes effective after the beginning of the last two-year guarantee period and Allstate did so, incorporating S.B. 97 by making clear in the declaration pages that the insured did not have UIM coverage.

Division (J)(1) permits uninsured/underinsured motorist policies to include exclusions for bodily injury suffered while an insured operates or occupies a non-specified vehicle.

Monroe Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Kuba, Unpublished Decision (12-16-2002) · filed 2002-12-16(J)(1)

We agree the language of H.B. No. 261 [R.C. 3937.18(J)(1)] permits such exclusions.

Subsection (J) permits an insurer to impose terms and conditions excluding underinsured-motorist coverage when an insured operates or occupies a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or regularly available for the use of a named insured, if the vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy.

Dotterer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (5-7-2003) · filed 2003-05-07(J)

However, effective September 13, 1997, the holding in Martin was effectively superceded by amendments to R.C. 3937.18. H.B. 261 amended R.C. 3937.18(J) by specifically allowing an insurer to include terms and conditions that preclude coverage when an insured is operating or occupying a motor vehicle owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of a named insured when that vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy.

Section 3937.18(1) permits an insurer to exclude from uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or regularly available for the use of a named insured, spouse, or resident relative, even through an exclusion other than the specifically described circumstance.

Green v. Westfield Insurance Co. · filed 2006-03-23(1)

This court finds that the above section clearly allows other means of excluding vehicles either owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of a named insured, a spouse, or a resident relative of a named insured. In other words, an insurance company is permitted under R.C. 3937.18 to draft the very exclusion that Westfield drafted in this contract.

Section 3937.18 permits uninsured/underinsured motorists policies to include terms and conditions that preclude coverage for bodily injury or death under specified circumstances.

Foss v. Cincinnati Ins. Cos., Unpublished Decision (3-31-2006) · filed 2006-03-31(I)

As amended, R.C. 3937.18, which governs uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage, permits the inclusion of "terms and conditions that preclude coverage for bodily injury or death suffered by an insured under specified circumstances." See, Subsection (I). ... "However, `uninsured motor vehicle' does not include any vehicle or equipment: ... "5. For which liability coverage is afforded under this policy." ... The vehicle involved in the accident was a covered vehicle under the liability policy therefore, uninsured motorists coverage does not apply.

Division (J) permits an insurer to exclude specified uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage situations through clear policy terms.

Batteiger v. Allstate Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (2-15-2002) · filed 2002-02-15(J)

We recognize that, under Scott-Pontzer and R.C. 3937.18(J), U.S.F. G. was permitted to draft its insurance policy to exclude coverage in this situation. Scott-Pontzer, 85 Ohio St.3d at 664. However, it was required to do so "with language that is clear and unambiguous and that comports with the requirements of the law." Id.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) does not invalidate an uninsured/underinsured motorist provision excluding relatives who do not live with the policyholder.

Rock v. Michigan Mutual Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (9-26-2002) · filed 2002-09-26(A)(1)

Moore is silent, however, regarding the validity of uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions which exclude relatives who do not live with the policyholder. Accordingly, we reject appellant's argument that the family member exclusion in the Michigan Mutual Insurance Company policy is violative of R.C. 3937.18(A)(1).

Section 3937.18 can support applying Ohio law to a multistate auto policy when the insurer offers Ohio uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, with invalid rejection producing UIM coverage by operation of law.

Moore v. Kemper Insurance Companies, Unpublished Decision (10-28-2002) · filed 2002-10-28

Included in the Kemper policy is an Ohio uninsured motorist coverage form. By offering Bank One UM/UIM coverage pursuant to R.C.3937.18, Kemper conveyed its intent Ohio law would apply.

Section 3937.18 expresses Ohio's overriding public-policy interest in applying its law to vehicles registered or garaged in Ohio.

McDonald v. Williamson, Unpublished Decision (12-11-2003) · filed 2003-12-11

Just as Hawaii's legislature intended its UM statute to apply to vehicles registered or principally garaged in its state, R.C.3937.18 is evidence of Ohio's "overriding public policy interest" in having its law apply to vehicles registered or garaged in this state.

Section 3937.18 imposes no choice of law on parties disputing the existence or extent of uninsured motorist coverage.

Humbert v. United Ohio Insurance · filed 2003-08-18

Further, the Supreme Court has stated that R.C. 3937.18, Ohio’s UIM statute, “unlike some Ohio statutes that apply to contractual relationships, imposes no choice of law on the parties if a dispute arises concerning the existence or extent of coverage.”

Section 3937.18(L)(1) treats a policy as an automobile liability policy only when it specifically identifies the automobiles covered by it.

Bertram v. West American Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (11-27-2002) · filed 2002-11-27(L)(1)

R.C. 3937.18(L)(1) requires specific identification of automobiles to be covered in order that the policy be deemed one of automobile liability insurance.

Former subsection (A) did not treat limited liability coverage arising from a homeowner’s residence-employee exception as enough to make the policy a motor vehicle policy.

In re Residence-Employee Exception in Homeowner's Ins. Policy Cases · filed 2002-12-23(A)

Limited liability coverage that may arise under the residence-employee exception in a homeowner’s insurance policy is not sufficient to transform the policy into a motor vehicle policy for purposes of former R.C. 3937.18(A).

A residence-employee coverage clause that is incidental to home ownership does not convert a homeowner's policy into a motor-vehicle policy subject to former § 3937.18's UM/UIM mandates.

Hionis v. Nationwide Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (3-20-2003) · filed 2003-03-20

The Supreme Court of Ohio recently held that a residence employee clause in an insurance policy that provides coverage incidental to home ownership does not convert the policy into a motor vehicle policy subject to the mandates of former R.C. 3937.18. Hillyer v. State FarmFire Casualty Co., 97 Ohio St.3d 411, 2002-Ohio-6662.1 ... In this case, the homeowner's policy contains a residence employee clause which provides coverage incidental to home ownership. Therefore, pursuant to the holding recently announced in Hillyer, we find that no material fact exists as to whether this policy provided UM/UIM coverage by operation of law. We find that the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Nationwide with regard to the homeowner's policy was proper.

Section 3937.18 permits UIM insurers to have subrogation rights, but that authorization does not eliminate the need to determine whether the insurer was prejudiced by a breach of a subrogation-related provision.

Ferrando v. Auto-Owners Mutual Insurance · filed 2002-12-27

As in cases involving a breach of a prompt-notice provision, a presumption of prejudice should be applied when evaluating the effects of the breach of a consent-to-settle or other subrogation-related provision. As in breach of prompt-notice cases, we find that the burden of presenting evidence to show a lack of prejudice should be on the insured who has failed to comply with the terms of the policy. An additional reason for applying a presumption of prejudice with the burden of presenting evidence on the insured is that the General Assembly has specifically allowed a right of subrogation to providers of UIM coverage. See Bogan, 36 Ohio St.3d at 29, 521 N.E.2d 447 (quoting R.C. 3937.18[E], now R.C. 3937.18[J]); Ruby, 40 Ohio St.3d at 160-161, 532 N.E.2d 730; McDonald, 45 Ohio St.3d at 29, 543 N.E.2d 456. However, simply because the General Assembly has allowed subrogation does not prevent courts from inquiring into insurer prejudice when a subrogation-related clause is not strictly complied with. If the insurer has suffered no prejudice from the insured’s technical breach, it is difficult to justify permitting the insurer to deny coverage.

Section 3937.18 permits an other-owned-auto exclusion for an insured occupying a vehicle owned by a named insured when that vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy, and defines a qualifying automobile liability policy as one serving as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified vehicles.

Mazza v. American Continental Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (1-29-2003) · filed 2003-01-29(J)(1), (L)(1)

"According to the above-cited provision, an insured is excluded from coverage when driving a non-covered vehicle, i.e., a vehicle that is not specifically identified in the declarations. ... Therefore, we agree with the holding in Niese. The term "you," as it is used in the "other owned auto" exclusion, applies to both CFGH and Appellant. ... Pursuant to our holding in Gilcreast-Hill, we conclude that the "parking" exception contained in the ACI Healthcare policy does not have the effect of transforming the policy into an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance," and, thus, the policy is not subject to R.C. 3937.18 on that basis. ... By failing to list the specific autos covered in the policy, the ACI Healthcare policy is not one which "serves as proof of financial responsibility *** for owners or operators of the motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy of insurance." R.C. 3937.18(L)(1). Therefore, the policy does not qualify as an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy" pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(L). As such, ACI was not required to provide UIM coverage to Appellant, and we find that Appellant's second assignment of error lacks merit.

Section 3937.18(D) and (K)(3) define when a vehicle is uninsured and exclude a political subdivision's vehicle unless its operator has applicable Chapter 2744 immunity; the statute's UM/UIM-offer requirement does not apply to a true self-insurer.

Pelc v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (2-20-2003) · filed 2003-02-20(D), (K)(3)

"(D) For purpose of this section, a motor vehicle shall be deemed uninsured in either of the following circumstances: ... (1) The liability insurer denies coverage or is or becomes the subject of insolvency proceedings in any jurisdiction; ... (K) As used in this section, `uninsured motor vehicle' and `underinsured motor vehicle' do not include any of the following motor vehicles: ... (3) A motor vehicle owned by a political subdivision, unless the operator of the motor vehicle has an immunity under Chapter 2744. of the Revised Code that could be raised as a defense in an action brought against the operator by the insured; ... Without a decision as to whether Russell and the City of Avon are entitled to immunity, it cannot be determined whether Pelc is uninsured or underinsured thereby entitling him to UM/UIM proceeds under Hartford's policies of insurance issued to Advanced Microfinish, Inc. ... We do not find the retention of $10,000 per occurrence makes Advanced Microfinish, Inc. self-insured. ... The facts of this case do not present the issue of whether UM/UIM coverage had to be offered by Hartford. Pursuant to the language of the policy, Hartford is not self-insured and the umbrella policy specifically contains an endorsement for UM/UIM coverage."

Under subsection (K)(1), an underinsured motor vehicle does not include a vehicle with applicable liability coverage under the same policy that provides uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.

McDaniel v. Westfield Companies, Unpublished Decision (12-11-2003) · filed 2003-12-11(K)(1)

Because the language in subparagraph 7 of the UM/UIM endorsement was specifically permitted by H.B. No. 261 to limit UM/UIM coverage, we cannot find that the provision is contrary to the coverage mandated by R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18(K)(1) excludes specified vehicles from the definitions of uninsured and underinsured motor vehicles; it does not itself create an absolute bar to recovery.

Cincinnati Companies v. Albers, Unpublished Decision (2-23-2004) · filed 2004-02-23(K)(1)

Because R.C. 3937.18(K)(1) merely excepted certain vehicles from the definition of "uninsured and underinsured motor vehicles" rather than acted as an absolute bar to recovery as the trial court held, the trial court's reliance upon this provision was improper.

The statute makes coverage turn on whether the tortfeasor’s vehicle is owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of a named insured or a family member, not on the tortfeasor’s identity or relationship to the claimant.

Morris v. United Ohio Insurance · filed 2005-04-22(E)(2), (K)(2)

As this example demonstrates, the tortfeasor need not be related to the claimant in order for R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) to apply. It is tortfeasor’s vehicle, not his identity, that determines whether (K)(2) applies. If the tortfeasor is driving a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of a named insured or his or her family members, then (K)(2) will preclude coverage. If, on the other hand, the tortfeasor is driving a different vehicle (a vehicle that is not owned by a named insured or a family member of a named insured), then (K)(2) will not preclude coverage. Accordingly, (K)(2) differentiates between insureds injured by a tortfeasor driving a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of a named insured (or his or her family members) and insureds injured by a tortfeasor driving a different vehicle.

Section 3937.18(B)(5) does not treat a co-employee protected by R.C. 4123.741's fellow-servant immunity as an uninsured motorist; the specified immunity provision covers Chapter 2744.

Cattrill v. Wayne Mutual, Unpublished Decision (9-21-2005) · filed 2005-09-21(B)(5)

Following this same reasoning, if the General Assembly had intended UIM coverage to extend to R.C. 4123.741 fellow servant doctrine immunity, then it would make no sense to omit any reference to R.C. 4123 while specifically including R.C. 2744. As the plain language of statute does not include R.C. 4123 within its definition of UIM, we conclude that the General Assembly intended that it be excluded. Accordingly, the negligent employee in the present case was not an UIM under R.C. 3937.18, the issue does not fall within the purview of R.C. 3937.18, and Cottrills' argument over the applicable version of R.C. 3937.18 is irrelevant, making any reference to the Snyder journal entry correspondingly irrelevant.

Section 3937.18 does not require an insurer to offer UM/UIM coverage when the insured is self-insured in a practical sense, including when it retains the risk of loss up to a deductible matching the liability limit.

Musser v. Musser, Unpublished Decision (3-19-2003) · filed 2003-03-19

Thus, we agree with appellant that R.C. 3937.18 does not apply to practical self-insurers and that Leggett and Platt's failure to comply with R.C. 4509.45(D) and R.C. 4509.72 is not fatal to appellant's claim that Leggett and Platt is a practical self-insurer. ... In the case at bar, Leggett and Platt's deductible, $1 million, matches the liability limit of $1 million. Leggett and Platt has agreed to assume the risk of loss up to the policy limits and, thus, retains ultimate responsibility in the event of a loss. Therefore, Leggett and Platt is self-insured in a practical sense and appellant was not required to comply with the R.C. 3937.18 mandatory offering of UIM coverage.

Section 3937.18 does not apply to an entity that is genuinely self-insured, including in a practical sense; an entity that retains some risk of loss is not self-insured.

Franklin v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins., Unpublished Decision (3-20-2003) · filed 2003-03-20

In general, self-insured entities are not subject to the requirements imposed by R.C. 3937.18. ... The statute likewise is not applicable to entities who can be viewed as being self-insured "in a practical sense." ... Consequently, regardless of whether the fronting agreement pertains to the entire policy or solely to the Garagekeepers Endorsement, not only did Ameritech fail to satisfy statutory requirements for self-insured status, it continued to bear some risk of loss. As such, Ameritech cannot be considered a self-insured entity.

Section 3937.18 applies to an insurance policy backed by a fronting agreement because the agreement does not make the insured self-insured.

Grubb v. Michigan Mut. Ins., Unpublished Decision (3-28-2003) · filed 2003-03-28

We conclude that Daimler Chrysler's fronting agreement with MMI does not render it self-insured. Accordingly, the subject policy of insurance is not exempted from the requirements of R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 does not require UM/UIM coverage from an entity that qualifies as a self-insurer in the practical sense, but whether UPSA qualified could not be decided conclusively on the record.

Riddle v. Wiegand, Unpublished Decision (6-16-2003) · filed 2003-06-16

We cannot conclusively find that UPSA is a self-insurer in the practical sense based upon its relationship with UPINSCO because the parties have not fully litigated this issue. For the purpose of reviewing the granting of summary judgment in favor of Liberty, we find that this is an issue best resolved by further proceedings below.

Section 3937.18 exempts a business that is self-insured in the practical sense from Ohio's UM/UIM coverage requirements.

Townsley v. National Union Fire Ins., Unpublished Decision (6-30-2003) · filed 2003-06-30

After a thorough review of the National Union commercial motor vehicle liability policy, the Payment Agreement, and the endorsement, we are of the opinion that this cause is indistinguishable from Kohntopp and Hartfield. Accordingly, on the authority of those cases, we find that a fronting agreement exists in this cause under which the risk of loss does not shift from Whirlpool to National Union. Consequently, Whirlpool is self-insured in the practical sense and is exempt from the provisions of R.C. 3937.18. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to National Union. Appellants' sole assignment of error is found not well taken.

Section 3937.18 does not apply to an employer that is self-insured in the practical sense, and a pre-S.B. 97 rejection of UM/UIM coverage must satisfy Linko's requirements for a coverage description and premium information.

Daugherty v. Hamilton, Unpublished Decision (7-11-2003) · filed 2003-07-11

This court has recently held that where an employer's insurance policy includes a total deductible amount that is equal to the policy limits, the employer is "self-insured in the practical sense" and not subject to the R.C. 3937.18 requirements. ... We must now determine whether the umbrella policy's UM/UIM rejection form, signed by Signature Label, conformed to the requirements of H.B. 261, the version of R.C. 3937.18 in effect at the time of the contract. ... Travelers asserts that the H.B. 261 amendments to R.C.3937.18 superseded the Linko requirements. We disagree. ... Reviewing the present rejection form, it does not state the premium for UM/UIM coverage and fails to provide a description of UM/UIM coverage as required under Linko. Accordingly, under Travelers' umbrella policy UM/UIM coverage exists as a matter of law.

Under the former version of Section 3937.18, a self-insurer was exempt from the mandatory offer of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage; a fronting-policy insured retaining 100% of the risk through a letter of credit would qualify as self-insured in the practical sense.

Huff v. Keller, Unpublished Decision (10-21-2003) · filed 2003-10-21

If such letter of credit exists, we would agree with Appellee that USF had retained 100% of the risk of loss under the policy sub judice and that USF would be self insured in the practical sense. USF would therefore be exempt from the mandates of R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 does not require an employer with a policy having matching liability limits and deductible to offer uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage because the employer is self-insured in the practical sense.

Burchett v. Frey, Unpublished Decision (11-24-2003) · filed 2003-11-24

In this case, under the Liberty policy, ALCOA had a limit of liability of $5,000,000 and a deductible of $5,000,000 when the accident occurred.4 Accordingly, we find that ALCOA, as the holder of a policy with matching deductible and liability limits, is self-insured in the practical sense and therefore not required to meet the statutory requirements of R.C. 3937.18.5 As Gordon's claims6 for UM/UIM coverage under the Liberty policy issued to ALCOA fail as a matter of law, Gordon's first assignment of error is overruled.

Section 3937.18 does not impose its uninsured-motorist requirements on entities that qualify as self-insured, including in a practical sense, but the court declined to treat Sprint as self-insured.

Sprint Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., Unpublished Decision (11-24-2004) · filed 2004-11-24

In general, self-insured entities are not subject to the requirements imposed by R.C. 3937.18. ... The statute has likewise been held inapplicable to entities that can be viewed as being self-insured "in a practical sense." ... Nothing in the record indicates that Sprint has satisfied these statutory requirements. We, therefore, decline to find that it is self-insured for purposes of avoiding liability for uninsured motorist coverage, including the self-insured retention under the excess policy.

Section 3937.18 applies to an employer's partial fronting arrangement when the employer has not otherwise proven financial responsibility, so the arrangement does not make the employer a self-insurer for purposes of the statute.

White v. Ins Co of PA · filed 2005-04-26

Therefore, we hold that Preston’s partial fronting arrangement does not render Preston a self-insurer, which means that the provisions of former section 3937.18 are in full effect as to the automobile liability policy.

Former § 3937.18 applies to an employer's partial fronting automobile liability policy when the employer is not otherwise a qualified self-insurer.

White v. The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania · filed 2005-04-26

Therefore, we hold that Preston’s partial fronting arrangement does not render Preston a self-insurer, which means that the provisions of former section 3937.18 are in full effect as to the automobile liability policy.

Section 3937.18 applies to Wal-Mart because its practical self-insurance does not exempt it from the statute.

Bentley v. Pendleton, Unpublished Decision (6-29-2005) · filed 2005-06-29

The Ohio Supreme Court, however, reversed our decision. Thus, our previous decision (and the trial court's) concluding that Wal-Mart is self-insured and not subject to R.C. 3937.18 is in error.

Section 3937.18’s UM-coverage requirements may not be excused for a fronting policy merely by treating the insured as self-insured without considering the governing Gilchrist analysis.

Zappa v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (12-30-2005) · filed 2005-12-30

The Hunts allege that the trial court erred as a matter of law by finding Ford to be practically and truly self-insured under its "fronting" policy with Amerisure, and excusing the UM requirements of R.C. 3937.18. We agree.

Section 3937.18 does not require an insurer to offer UIM coverage when the insured is self-insured in the practical sense, and a self-insurance arrangement is not a policy of insurance under subsection (L).

Adams v. Fink, Unpublished Decision (3-21-2003) · filed 2003-03-21(L)

In the case at bar, the insured's deductible, $2 million, matches the liability limit of $2 million. Therefore, appellee's employer is self-insured in a practical sense and appellant was not required to comply with the R.C. 3937.18 mandatory offering of UIM coverage. ... Because self-insurance is not insurance at all, but the antithesis of insurance, a self-insurance arrangement cannot fall within the definition of a "policy of insurance" as used in R.C. 3937.18(L). ... We therefore conclude that because the employer is self-insured in the practical sense, appellant was not required to comply with R.C. 3937.18. Thus, appellant was not required to offer UIM coverage and UIM coverage may not be implied as a matter of law.

The statute permits an automobile insurance policy to exclude from the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or regularly available for the use of a named insured, spouse, or resident relative.

Flowers v. Ohio Mutual Insurance Group, Unpublished Decision (1-31-2003) · filed 2003-01-31(K)(2)

We further find that the OMI policy mirrors the language in the S.B. 57 version of R.C.3937.18(K)(2), excluding the appellees' automobile from the definition of an "uninsured motor vehicle."

Former § 3937.18(J)(1) permits an owned-but-uninsured exclusion only for vehicles not specifically identified in the policy, while § 3937.18(K)(2)'s contrary definition is unenforceable because the provisions cannot be harmonized.

Morris v. United Ohio Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (3-31-2003) · filed 2003-03-31(J)(1), (K)(2)

Then we turn to the definitional provision of R.C.3937.18(K)(2) and find that it says in essence — your vehicle can never be an uninsured motor vehicle even if you list it and pay a premium for it. The fact that (K)(2) precludes uninsured motorist coverage in an accident where the claimant, a spouse, or resident family member owns the vehicle, renders the (J)(1) promise of coverage for a listed vehicle illusory in nature. Do these provisions, when read in conjunction, mean that the consumer is purchasing uninsured motorist coverage for accidents only when they are not caused by the claimant's own vehicle? When read on its own, (K)(2) certainly seems to relay that message. But, when we add (J)(1) to the mix, we are hard pressed to glean that meaning. In short, we find that (J)(1) and (K)(2) are so ambiguous as to be unenforceable when read together.

Section 3937.18 treats (J)(1) and (K)(2) as complementary: (J)(1) permits certain policy exclusions, while (K)(2) excludes a vehicle owned by an insured from the uninsured/underinsured-motor-vehicle definition, so they do not conflict.

Kyle v. Buckeye Union Insurance · filed 2004-09-29(J)(1) and (K)(2)

Former R.C. 3937.18(J)(1) and (K)(2) are complementary. Paragraph (J) addressed certain circumstances in which a policy could exclude UM/UIM coverage for an insured. Paragraph (K) excluded certain tortfeasors’ vehicles from being considered uninsured or underinsured. Because these paragraphs address different topics, they do not conflict. ... The trial court and the court of appeals properly ruled that under these circumstances, R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) precludes UM/UIM coverage for Kathryn Kyle.

Section 3937.18 bars an insurer from reducing uninsured-motorist coverage by medical-payments amounts when the policy treats the coverages separately, because such a setoff is contrary to the statute's public policy and purpose.

Wayne Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bradley, Unpublished Decision (3-27-2006) · filed 2006-03-27

[A]n insurance policy clause which provides to the insurer a contractual right of subrogation as to payments made under the medical payments portion of the policy does not enable the insurer to avoid obligations it incurs pursuant to the uninsured motorist provision of the same insurance policy. Thus, even where the policy provides for subrogation as to payments made as medical payments coverage, a contract provision which would, in essence, enable the insurer to set off such medical payments against amounts due to the insured pursuant to uninsured motorist coverage is void as in derogation of the public policy and purpose underlying R.C. 3937.18.

Under the H.B. No. 261 version, statutory immunity available to the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle is also a defense to the insured's action to recover uninsured motorist coverage.

Smith v. Air-Ride, Unpublished Decision (3-27-2003) · filed 2003-03-27(A)(1)

Further, based upon the policy period at issue, covering April 1, 1998 to April 1, 1999, we find that such policy is governed by the H.B. No. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18, under which statutory immunity "that may be a defense for the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle shall also be a defense to an action brought by the insured to recover under uninsured motorist coverage."

The version of § 3937.18 in effect when the policy was issued governs the parties' rights and duties under the policy.

Sexton v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., Unpublished Decision (3-31-2003) · filed 2003-03-31

Further, the law in effect on the date the 1998 Travelers Policy issued, which was April 1, 1998, governs appellees' claims3. The law in effect on this date was the H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it concluded a pre-H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18 applied to appellees' claims. This matter is therefore remanded to the trial court for the court to determine whether, under the 1998 Travelers Policy, appellees are entitled to coverage according to the H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18.

The pre-HB 261 version of § 3937.18 governs the policy when its guaranteed two-year period began before the amendment.

Buder v. Indiana Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (6-5-2003) · filed 2003-06-05

Because McPherson is distinguishable, we find that Wolfe applies to the Business Auto Coverage of the Indiana policy and that the pre-HB 261 version of R.C. 3937.18 applies.

The pre-H.B. 261 version of § 3937.18 governs a policy during an existing two-year guaranteed policy period, making an other-vehicle exclusion invalid under that version unenforceable.

Wilson v. Haimerl, Unpublished Decision (8-18-2003) · filed 2003-08-18(J)(1)

It follows, then, that the pre-H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18 applies to this case and that the "other vehicle exclusion" is unenforceable under Martin.

Section 3937.18 applies to automobile or motor-vehicle liability policies, but it does not require UM/UIM coverage from an employer that is self-insured in the practical sense, including where liability limits match deductibles.

Hellman v. Motorists Mutual Insurance · filed 2003-05-23(L)

Thus, the Travelers CGL policy has not been shown to be a motor vehicle policy of insurance and, therefore, R.C. 3937.18 is not applicable. ... Accordingly, we find that Pepsi, as the holder of two policies with matching deductible and liability limits, is self-insured in the practical sense and therefore not required to meet the statutory requirements of R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 does not require a practical self-insurer that bears and secures the risk of loss to fulfill the statute’s uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage mandates.

Delong v. Myers, Unpublished Decision (5-27-2003) · filed 2003-05-27

Appellant argues ConAgra is not self-insured and therefore must comply with the mandatory provisions of R.C. 3937.18. We disagree. ... Based upon the foregoing, we find ConAgra to be self-insured in the practical sense and therefore is not required to fulfill the mandates of R.C. 3938.17. See, Grange Mutual Casualty Companyv. Refiners Transport Terminal Corp. (1986), 21 Ohio St.3d 47. The remaining issues are moot.

Section 3937.18 requires an insurer to offer UM/UIM coverage but does not require that offer for a vehicle treated as self-insured under the applicable financial-responsibility law.

Kohntopp v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (5-30-2003) · filed 2003-05-30(K)(4)

We also note that, at the time of the Kohntopps' accident, R.C. 3937.18(K)(4) provided that the terms "uninsured and underinsured motor vehicles" did not include a "motor vehicle self-insured within the meaning of the financial responsibility law of the state in which the motor vehicle is registered." By its own terms, R.C. 3937.18 exempted policies issued for self-insured companies from requiring the offering of UM/UIM coverage. Consequently, Scott-Pontzer, which addressed ambiguities in an insurance policy where the insurer was required to offer UM/UIM coverage, does not apply when UM/UIM coverage is not initially required. ... In other words, the ACE policy contains a fronting agreement which shifts no risk to the insurer because the deductible is equal to the policy liability limits. The insurance company may process and even pay claims, but never has a legal or contractual duty to pay anything "out-of-pocket" since all expenses and claims are included in and subject to the $2,500,000 deductible. As a result, Sunoco is ultimately legally responsible for any claims made in connection with the operation of its motor vehicles. Although we can find nothing in the record which indicates whether Sunoco complied with the financial responsibility requirements of R.C. 4509.05, this fact is irrelevant to our analysis. In our view, under the language of this particular policy, since there is no risk shifting to ACE, Sunoco is in a "practical sense" self-insured, regardless of whether it has complied with the statutory requirements. Consequently, ACE was not required to offer UM/UIM coverage under Ohio law and Scott-Pontzer is not applicable.

Under the applicable versions, § 3937.18 required an insurer to offer UM/UIM coverage equal to liability limits, allowed written rejection only after a compliant offer (with a 1997 presumption of an offer), and did not apply to amounts for which the insured was self-insured.

Hartfield v. Toys "R" US, Unpublished Decision (6-6-2003) · filed 2003-06-06(A), (C)

R.C. 3937.18(A), as effective on July 1, 1996, prohibited insurers from issuing a policy of motor vehicle insurance in Ohio without first offering its insured UM/UIM coverage in the same amount as the liability coverage in the policy. Failure to make the offer resulted in the insured acquiring coverage by operation of law at limits identical to the liability coverage. ... However, the insured could expressly and knowingly reject or reduce UM/UIM coverage in writing. R.C. 3937.18(C); Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. Furthermore, a valid rejection could follow only a valid written offer. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. ... R.C. 3937.18(C), as amended by H.B. No 261 in 1997, provided that a written rejection is binding and effective when executed and creates a presumption that an offer of UM/UIM coverage was made by the insurer. ... Thus, the Linko standard is appropriate in determining whether a valid offer and rejection was made under either the 1994 statute or the 1997 statute. ... Accordingly, the rejection of UM/UIM coverage is invalid and coverage is provided to appellee under the Travelers Auto Policy by operation of law. ... As a consequence, R.C. 3937.18 is inapplicable to the $500,000 deductible in the Travelers Auto Policy, and UM/UIM coverage is available only for damages exceeding the $500,000 deductible with a limit of $1.5 million.

Former § 3937.18 required insurers to offer UM/UIM coverage, but it did not apply to a corporation that was a self-insurer in the practical sense under a fronting agreement.

Hans v. Hartford Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (6-13-2003) · filed 2003-06-13

Although Labcorp had not complied with R.C. 4509.45(E) by filing a certificate of self-insurance, we join the appellate districts that have held that under the fronting agreement the corporation was a self-insurer in the practical sense and that the policy was not subject to the provisions of former R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 requires separate UM/UIM offers for separate insuring agreements, but it does not apply to the portion of a policy for which the insured is practically self-insured; coverage is required above that retention.

McCollam v. American Foreign Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (10-27-2003) · filed 2003-10-27

The issue Old Republic raises, in its first argument, concerns whether its Commercial Package Policy provides three separate and distinct insuring agreements requiring three separate offers of UM/UIM coverage pursuant to R.C. 3937.18. ... Accordingly, the trial court properly determined the Commercial Package Policy contains three separate and distinct insuring agreements. ... Applying the above cited case law to the facts of this case, we reach the following conclusions. First, Detroit Diesel is partially self-insured for the first $250,000 of any claim. ... Second, pursuant to our decision, in German, we conclude Old Republic is required to offer UM/UIM coverage, in the amount of $750,000, if it is determined that Appellee Benedict's damages exceed $250,000.

Under the applicable version of § 3937.18(L), an insurer need not offer UM/UIM coverage for an excess policy that is not a true umbrella policy because it does not require underlying primary insurance.

Wright v. Medamerica International, Unpublished Decision (10-24-2003) · filed 2003-10-24(L)(2)

Because it did not require underlying insurance to cover the retained amount, the 1998 policy did not constitute an "umbrella liability policy of insurance" under R.C. §3937.18(L)(2). Therefore, MedAmerica was not required to offer UM/UIM coverage, and its failure to have done so did not cause UM/UIM coverage to arise by operation of law.

Section 3937.18(C) does not exempt a renewal policy from the duty to offer UM/UIM coverage when the insured’s prior rejection was invalid.

Gladys Roberts, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant · filed 2003-07-30(C)

Section 3937.18(C), in 1998 when the policy in this case was issued, stated that UM/UIM offers “need not be provided in ... a policy renewal or a new or replacement policy ... where a named insured or applicant has rejected such coverages in connection with a policy previously issued.” ... Because Maclntire Chevrolet’s initial rejection of UM/UIM coverage was invalid, the renewal provision of § 3937.18(C) does not apply here.

Section 3937.18(L)(1) covers policies serving as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified vehicles, while § 3937.18(J)(1)'s permitted exclusion applies only after the claimant qualifies as an insured.

Standish v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-15-2003) · filed 2003-08-15(L)(1) and (J)(1)

The parties agree that the version of R.C. 3937.18(A) in effect at the time the policies were issued permitted an insured to reject UM/UIM coverage in any "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance," and that if such coverage was not rejected, it would be implied as a matter of law. ... R.C. 3937.18(L) defined "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance" as "(1) Any policy of insurance that serves as proof of financial responsibility, as proof of financial responsibility is defined by division (K) of section 4509.01 of the Revised Code, for owners or operators of the motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy of insurance; [or] (2) Any umbrella liability policy of insurance written as excess over one or more policies described in division (L)(1) of this section." ... Thus, we must determine whether the CGL and business owner's policies were automobile liability policies within the meaning of R.C.3937.18(L). ... In holding that the exceptions to the exclusions did not convert the policy into one for automobile liability coverage, we emphasized that the policy did "not provide liability insurance with respect to any vehicles `specifically identified in the policy of insurance' as required by R.C. 3937.18(L)(1)" and specifically excluded liability coverage for automobiles. ... Our holding in Bowling is controlling in the instant case. Like the policy in Bowling, the policies in the case at bar specifically excluded coverage for automobiles, and their limited exceptions for the parking of automobiles and for mobile equipment did not convert them into automobile liability policies. ... Here, as inBowling, the plain language of the policies excluded automobiles and could not serve as proof of financial responsibility for any vehicle "specifically identified in the policy of insurance" within the meaning of R.C. 3937.18(L)(1). We therefore hold that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment with respect to the CGL and business owner's policies. ... Standish next argues that the trial court erred in holding that there was no coverage under the BA policy. She contends that the BA policy's exclusion of coverage for vehicles that were not owned by the named insured violated R.C. 3937.18(J)(1), which permits an insurer to preclude coverage for an insured "[w]hile the insured is operating or occupying a motor vehicle owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of a named insured, a spouse, or a resident relative of the named insured." ... The permitted exclusions under R.C. 3937.18 apply, by logical necessity and by their very terms, only to an insured under the policy.

Section 3937.18 permits insurers to limit UM/UIM coverage, creates a rebuttable presumption that the insurer offered it, and makes a written rejection binding when executed.

Kohntopp v. Hamilton Mutual Insurance, Unpublished Decision (8-8-2003) · filed 2003-08-08

As the trial court determined, the policy meets the Linko requirements; the rejection and waiver of UM/UIM coverage is presumed valid under R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 requires a valid rejection or selection of lower UM/UIM limits to state the premium cost for UM coverage and expressly state the offered UM coverage limits.

Shirley v. Republic-Franklin Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (10-3-2003) · filed 2003-10-03

The Kemper case is directly on point. The reduction form signed by Canton Gear does not set forth the premium costs for UM coverage, or expressly state the UM coverage limits in its offer.

Under the H.B. 261 version of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3937.18, once a signed rejection form is produced, extrinsic evidence may be considered to determine whether the insurer made a valid offer of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.

Wears v. Motorists Mutual, Unpublished Decision (2-2-2005) · filed 2005-02-02

Under the dictates of Hollon, the trial court must now consider the extrinsic evidence in determining whether an offer has been made, because appellant has proffered a signed rejection form.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires a claimant seeking underinsured-motorist benefits to establish the tortfeasor's legal liability as a condition precedent, including the ability to prove every element of a wrongful-death claim.

Fish v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-11-2003) · filed 2003-08-11(A)(2)

Thus, we conclude, under a Scott-Pontzer analysis for UIM coverage pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), a person must establish the tortfeasor's legal liability as a condition precedent to UIM coverage. In a wrongful death cause of action, which was not recognized by common law, the two-year time limitation contained in R.C. 2125.02(D) is an element of the claim. Therefore, in order for appellee to be legally entitled to recover UIM damages under Wausau's policy, he must be able to prove the elements of a wrongful death claim. Appellee is unable to do this because he did not bring a wrongful death action within two years of Kenneth Fish's death.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) requires uninsured-motorist coverage for insured persons legally entitled to recover damages from uninsured motorists, and a statute-of-limitations defense does not defeat that entitlement.

Gooch v. Westfield Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (8-13-2003) · filed 2003-08-13(A)(1)

At that time, R.C. 3937.18 required the inclusion of UM coverage with motor vehicle policies of insurance "for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles[.]" R.C.3937.18(A)(1). ... Under the statutory law in effect at the time the policy became effective and our holding in Reich, Appellant's failure to commence an action against Ms. Hicks within the time required by the statute of limitations does not preclude her legal entitlement to recover under the policy.

Under former § 3937.18, the statutory "legally entitled to recover" qualification applies to uninsured-motorist coverage under division (A)(1), not underinsured-motorist coverage under division (A)(2).

Welsh v. Indiana Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (9-22-2003) · filed 2003-09-22(A)(1), (A)(2)

The "legally entitled to recover" phrase OHIC relies upon is only found in division (A)(1) of R.C. 3937.18. Division (A)(1) only applies to "uninsured motorist coverage." Division (A)(2) applies to "underinsured motorist coverage." Unlike division (A)(1), the phrase "legally entitled to recover" does not appear in division (A)(2). Had the legislature intended the phrase to apply to underinsured motorist coverage, it would have included "legally entitled to recover" language in division (A)(2). The fact the legislature specifically chose to statutorily define "legally entitled to recover" only for purposes of division (A)(1) (uninsured motorist coverage) further indicates the legislature did not intend the "legally entitled to recover" qualification to apply to underinsured motorist coverage. Because the case sub judice involves underinsured motorist coverage as set forth in division (A)(2), OHIC's argument is without merit.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires underinsured-motorist coverage but does not require an insured to be legally entitled to recover from the tortfeasor to receive underinsured benefits.

Welsh v. Indiana Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (9-22-2003) · filed 2003-09-22(A)(2)

We note that the "legally entitled to recover" phrase is only found in division (A)(1) of R.C. 3937.18, which only applies to "uninsured motorist coverage." Unlike division (A)(1), the phrase "legally entitled to recover" does not appear in division (A)(2), which applies to underinsured motorist coverage. Had the legislature intended the phrase to apply to underinsured motorist coverage, it would have inserted the "legally entitled to recover" language in division (A)(2). Because the case sub judice involves underinsured motorist coverage as set forth in division (A)(2), we find that the appellees were not required to be "legally entitled to recover" to receive underinsured benefits.

Section 3937.18(A) requires the policy's UM/UIM limits to rise by operation of law to the liability limits when the insurer lacks a written reduction of UM/UIM coverage.

Allen v. C.P.C. Cna, Unpublished Decision (9-4-2003) · filed 2003-09-04(A)

Having found that appellants are insureds, we agree with the trial court that the absence of a written reduction of UM/UIM coverage compelled the trial court to increase the policy's UM/UIM limits by operation of law to an amount equivalent to the policy's $1 million liability limits pursuant to Gyori v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Group, Inc. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 565, and R.C. 3937.18(A).

Section 3937.18(L)(1) treats a policy as an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy only if it serves as proof of financial responsibility for motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy.

Tharp v. Berdanier, Unpublished Decision (12-10-2003) · filed 2003-12-10(L)(1)

The "non-owned and hired automobile" endorsement clearly fails to "specifically identify" any automobiles as required by R.C.3937.18(L)(1).

Section 3937.18(J)(1) permits a UM/UIM policy to preclude coverage when an insured operates or occupies a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or regularly available for a named insured that is not specifically identified in the policy.

Oblinger v. State Auto Insurance Companies · filed 2005-09-09(J)(1)

National Union argues that R.C. 3937.18(J)(1) permitted it to narrow the class of vehicles to which UM/UIM coverage applied. ... But because National Union did not produce the schedule to which the policy referred, it could not demonstrate that the tractor-trailer in question was “not specifically identified in the policy under which a claim is made.” Accordingly, National Union could not claim the benefit of the limitation permitted under R.C. 3937.18(J)(1). ... Although we agree that the language of the policy excluded the tractor-trailer, we hold that this portion of the policy, which effectively excluded all autos garaged in Ohio from UM/UIM coverage, contravened public policy as expressed in R.C. 3937.18. ... These protections, as described in Linko and its progeny, are eviscerated when the insurance contract itself in effect eliminates UM/UIM coverage from all vehicles without regard to the notification and rejection requirements of R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 does not permit a named-driver exclusion to bar an insured’s UIM claim for wrongful-death losses.

Dickerson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Unpublished Decision (12-15-2003) · filed 2003-12-15(J)(3)

After reading R.C. 3937.18 and liberally construing it to effectuate its purpose, we find that it does not allow an exclusion of UIM claims based upon the insured's wrongful death losses.

Section 3937.18(A) applies when an automobile policy is delivered or issued for delivery in Ohio for a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in Ohio.

Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Bebsz, Unpublished Decision (12-24-2003) · filed 2003-12-24(A)

We therefore cannot determine whether the policy was "delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state" within the meaning of R.C. 3937.18(A), and we cannot be certain that Ohio law would apply to this matter.

Former subsection (K)(2) excludes a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or regularly available for use by a named insured, spouse, or resident relative from being an uninsured vehicle as a matter of law.

Kuhnle v. Zander, Unpublished Decision (12-31-2003) · filed 2003-12-31(K)(2)

Former R.C.3937.18(K)(2) specifically provided that "[a] motor vehicle owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of a named insured, a spouse, or a resident relative of a named insured" was not an uninsured vehicle in law. ... Appellant argues that R.C. 3937.18 is not applicable in this matter because appellee attempted to broaden the exclusion by using the term "insured person" instead of the statutory "named insured." In our view, this is a distinction without a difference in the matter sub judice. ... Appellant also suggests that R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) conflicts with section (J)(1) of the same statute and is, therefore, ambiguous and should be construed in favor of the insured. This is an argument which we have already considered and rejected. ... By both the terms of the insurance contract and the provisions of the effective UM/UIM statute, appellant was not entitled to UM/UIM coverage.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an insurer to limit all claims arising from one person's bodily injury to the policy's per-person limit, and the statute permits insurers to prohibit stacking of UM/UIM limits.

Cross v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (1-5-2004) · filed 2004-01-05(G), (H)

R.C. 3937.18(H) provides that any automobile liability insurance policy that includes underinsured motorist coverage may limit all claims arising out of any single individual's bodily injury to the per-person limit set forth in the insurance policy. ... Likewise, R.C. 3937.18 permits insurance companies to prohibit the stacking of UM/UIM policy limits.

Section 3937.18(E) and the prior version of subsection (B) treat a political subdivision's vehicle as not uninsured or underinsured where the statutory immunity and self-insurance rules do not make the subdivision eligible for UM/UIM coverage.

Safe Auto Insurance v. Corson · filed 2004-01-23(E), (B)

The relevant UM7UIM provision in effect at the time of the insurance contract between Corson and Safe Auto was R.C. 3937.18(E), as amended by Senate Bill 267. That provision stated that the terms “uninsured” and “underin-sured” did not apply where the motor vehicle was owned by a political subdivision, the operator was subject to immunity, and the action was brought against the operator. ... Under the previous version of R.C. 3937.18(B), the only way Safe Auto would be obligated to cover Corson’s damages is if the city had immunity. But the city did not have immunity. The city was liable for the officer’s negligence. The city was liable, whether or not it had insurance, because it was not immune unless the officer was on an emergency call.

Section 3937.18(A) applies only to an automobile liability policy delivered or issued for delivery in Ohio covering a vehicle registered or principally garaged in Ohio; when those conditions are absent, the insurer need not offer UM/UIM coverage under the statute.

Foster v. Motorists Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (3-8-2004) · filed 2004-03-08(A)

Because National Union's commercial auto policy was not delivered, or issued for delivery, in Ohio and because the policy does not cover vehicles registered or principally garaged in Ohio, R.C. 3937.18 is inapplicable to the National Union policy.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires underinsured-motorist setoffs to be based on amounts actually accessible to the claimant from the tortfeasor’s liability insurance; an insured’s Medicare lien expense does not reduce that amount available for payment.

Mathis v. Am. Commerce Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (4-22-2004) · filed 2004-04-22(A)(2)

The Ohio Supreme Court has held that, for purposes of setting off the tortfeasor's liability coverage against uninsured motorist coverage limits, R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) requires "a comparison of the amounts that are actually accessible to the claimant from the tortfeasor's automobile liability insurance carrier and the claimant's own underinsured motorist coverage limits." Clark v. Scarpelli, 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 276,2001-Ohio-39, 744 N.E.2d 719. ... In applying Littrell and Broughton to the instant case, Mathis is not entitled to reduce the amounts available for payment from the tortfeasors because the Medicare lien was an expense of the insured, Mathis. ... In the instant case, the Medicare lien was an expense of Mathis, the insured, and therefore she is not entitled to reduce the "amount available for payment" from the tortfeasors.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) does not provide UM/UIM coverage when the injury is caused by an auger rather than by the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle.

Jordan v. Dayton Testing Lab, Unpublished Decision (5-14-2004) · filed 2004-05-14(A)(1)

Under the relevant version of R.C. 3937.18(A), UM/UIM coverage arising by operation of law only provided for injury "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle * * *". ... Jordan's injury did not arise from either the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. Rather, Jordan was injured by the auger, which was not a motor vehicle. Therefore, UM/UIM coverage does not arise pursuant to R.C. 3939.18.

Section 3937.18(A) does not allow an employee to claim UM/UIM coverage based on an alleged offer/rejection violation unless the accident occurred in the course and scope of the employee's employment.

Hayman v. Diloretto, Unpublished Decision (6-21-2004) · filed 2004-06-21(A)

By extension, an employee is not able to claim UM/UIM coverage as a matter of law based on an alleged violation of the offer/rejection provisions of R.C. § 3937.18 unless the accident occurred in the course and scope of that person's employment.

Former § 3937.18 does not apply to require UM/UIM coverage for a person who is not an insured under the applicable policy endorsement.

Stephens v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (12-30-2004) · filed 2004-12-30

Absent coverage under the endorsement, former R.C. 3937.18 is inapplicable because appellant, under the terms of the endorsement, is not an insured in these circumstances.

Section 3937.18 does not mandate who must be an insured for underinsured-motorist coverage, so insurers and insureds may define who is and is not covered.

Mitchell v. Motorists Mut., Unpublished Decision (8-4-2005) · filed 2005-08-04

Further, as R.C. 3937.18 does not mandate who must be an insured for purposes of underinsured motorists coverage, the parties to an insurance policy are free to draft their own restrictions regarding who is and is not an insured.

Section 3937.18 does not require an insurer to treat every passenger as an insured for UM/UIM coverage when the policy validly excludes a passenger who has UM/UIM coverage under another policy.

Safeco Ins. of Ill. v. Motorists Mut. Ins., Unpublished Decision (4-27-2006) · filed 2006-04-27(A)

We find that the Motorists policy neither violates the purpose nor the language of R.C. 3937.18 and that Heil is not an insured for purposes of UM/UIM coverage under the Motorists policy.

Section 3937.18 permits an insurer to define who is an insured and to limit underinsured-motorist coverage to accidents involving vehicles specifically covered by the policy.

American Mfr. Mut. Ins. v. Kurtz, Unpublished Decision (11-29-2005) · filed 2005-11-29(J)(1)

Nothing in R.C. § 3937.18 prohibits parties from establishing a definition as to who is and who is not an "insured" under an insurance policy. ... Appellant once again concludes, and we must agree, that this evidence demonstrates that Appellee could not be covered because the vehicle involved in the accident was not covered under the plain language of the policy.

Former subsection (H) permits a policy to limit all claims arising from one person's bodily injury to the per-person limit, while subsection (A)(2) requires UIM limits to be reduced by amounts available under applicable liability coverage.

Bebout v. Tindall, Unpublished Decision (7-27-2004) · filed 2004-07-27(H) and (A)(2)

Accordingly, the language of each of the policies clearly and unambiguously, and in conformity with former R.C.3937.18(H), limits Grange's liability to the "each person" limit of $100,000 for all claims arising out of Jason's death. ... Accordingly, pursuant to former R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) and Stickney, the trial court did not err in determining that the $100,000 UM/UIM policy limit should be reduced by the $50,000 collectively available to plaintiffs under Tindall's liability policy.

Former § 3937.18(J)(1) authorizes an other-owned-auto exclusion, former § 3937.18(L)(1) requires an automobile or motor-vehicle liability policy to specifically identify the covered motor vehicles, and former § 3937.18(K)(2) does not apply where the insured is not the tortfeasor.

Pyros v. Loparo, Unpublished Decision (2-15-2005) · filed 2005-02-15(J)(1), (K)(2), and (L)(1)

The version of R.C. 3937.18 in effect at the time the auto policy was issued authorizes this coverage exclusion. ... Under the reasoning of Kyle, former R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) is inapplicable to the case at bar because there is no indication that Christopher Pyros was a tortfeasor in this case. ... We find that the auto policy validly excludes UM/UIM coverage for plaintiffs under the circumstances of this case. ... Therefore, pursuant to the exclusion provision cited above, as authorized by former R.C. 3937.18(J)(1), the auto policy does not provide UM/UIM coverage for plaintiffs relating to bodily injury sustained by Christopher Pyros while occupying his 1997 Acura. ... We also observe that the Utica First policy is not subject to former R.C. 3937.18's requirement that an insurer offer UM/UIM coverage to its insureds under a policy of automobile liability or motor vehicle liability insurance because the policy is not an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability insurance policy. ... The Utica First policy does not identify any motor vehicle "precisely, particularly and individually," and therefore is not an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance. Consequently, plaintiffs are not entitled to UM/UIM coverage under the Utica First policy.

Section 3937.18(B)(3) requires additional evidence supporting an insured's testimony to establish entitlement to uninsured-motorist benefits.

Disinger v. Progressive Ins., Unpublished Decision (6-9-2005) · filed 2005-06-09(B)(3)

This language provided in the actual policy itself is almost identical to the statutory language of R.C. 3937.18(B)(3), the applicable statute for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. Thus, according to the language of both the applicable statute and the policy itself, all that is needed to support summary judgment on Disinger's behalf, granting her the pertinent insurance benefits, is additional evidence that would support her claim that a rock falling from the back of a "semi-trailer" caused the accident at issue here.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires UIM limits to be reduced by amounts available under liable persons’ bodily-injury policies, while divisions (G) and (K)(1) permit intrapolicy antistacking and exclude a vehicle covered by the same policy’s liability coverage from UIM coverage.

Pallay v. Nationwide Insurance · filed 2005-10-31(A)(2), (G), (K)(1)

Although uncodified Section 9 to Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 does not specifically say that intrapolicy antistacking provisions will be permissible, it is clear from the “including but not limited to” language, and from the legislature’s sharp rejection of the Savoie decision, that intrapolicy antistacking in an auto insurance policy would be permitted under the revised statute. ... This new provision not only allows for an auto insurance policy to include intrapolicy antistacking, it appears to require such language. ... R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) requires that UIM benefits be reduced by any “amounts available for payment” under all insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured, which would include any payments deriving from Mrs. Pallay’s liability to appellee. ... Littrell did not require that Medicare liens be deducted automatically from the “amounts available for payment” calculation required by R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), but rather, merely required that it should be considered.

Section 3937.18(C) compares the amount actually available to the insured from the tortfeasor's policy, after distribution among multiple claimants, with the insured's UIM limits.

Pierson v. Wheeland, Unpublished Decision (3-22-2006) · filed 2006-03-22(C)

"Thus, the trial court concluded that because Wheeland's Allstate policy of $65,000 was not less than Ridgeway's Allstate policy of $25,000, under the requirements of R.C. 3937.18(C), Ridgeway's policy was not required to provide UIM coverage to Ridgeway. ... We disagree with this reasoning. After reviewing the trial court's decision and order, it is the conclusion of this Court that the trial court appears to have misinterpreted the \"available for payment\" language in the statute and performed a policy-to-policy comparison instead. ... Therefore, under the analysis of Littrell as discussed above, $20,000 is the amount \"available for payment\" to Ridgeway from Wheeland's policy. As this amount is less than his own Allstate underinsured policy, we find that Ridgeway is entitled to UIM coverage."

Section 3937.18 sets a minimum proof requirement for uninsured-motorist coverage but permits the policy to impose additional coverage conditions or exclusions, including requiring the insured to be able to obtain a judgment against the tortfeasor.

Snyder v. American Family Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (12-20-2005) · filed 2005-12-20(D), (I)

Moreover, R.C. 3937.18(D), which states that "an insured shall be required to prove all elements of the insured's claim that are necessary to recover from the [tortfeasor]" does not equate to a prohibition on all conditions precedent to coverage, or exclusions therefrom, even those based upon the affirmative defenses of sovereign immunity or fellow-servant immunity. R.C. 3937.18 sets forth a floor, not a ceiling. That is, it sets forth the minimum that an insured must be able to prove in order to be entitled to UM coverage for each particular claim. However, R.C. 3937.18(I) makes it clear that the contract can require that the insured prove something more; e.g., as in this case, she must prove that she could actually obtain a judgment from the tortfeasor. Because Columbus and the officer are statutorily immune from liability, as appellee concedes, she cannot meet this condition precedent to coverage.

Section 3937.18 places its policy-related requirements on insurers issuing automobile policies, not on the insurance agents who sell them.

Advent v. Allstate Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (6-1-2006) · filed 2006-06-01

R.C. 3937.18 , as it is in effect today and in its previous incarnations, placed requirements upon the insurance companies writing the policies, not the agents who sold them. ... Therefore, we find that Norton did not owe the Advents any duty arising from R.C. 3937.18 .

Section 3937.18 permits, but does not require, a motor-vehicle insurance policy to include uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, and insurers issuing or renewing policies after October 2001 need not offer that coverage or obtain a written rejection.

Arn v. United Servs. Auto. Assn., Unpublished Decision (7-31-2006) · filed 2006-07-31

In October of 2001, S.B. 97 went into effect, amending R.C. 3937.18 . With respect to UM/UIM coverage, R.C. 3937.18 now states that any insurance policy that insures against loss "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, may, but is not required to, include uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage," or both. (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, insurance companies that issue or renew policies after October of 2001 are no longer required to offer, and obtain a written rejection of, UM/UIM coverage.

Section 3937.18(A), as amended by S.B. No. 97, does not require an insurer to offer UM/UIM coverage, and such coverage is not implied by operation of law.

St. Clair v. Allstate Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (11-22-2006) · filed 2006-11-22(A), (C)

But the legislature superseded the holdings of Linko and Gyori by statute in S.B. No. 97, effective October 31, 2001. This act amended R.C. 3937.18 (A) to eradicate the requirement that an insurer offer UM/UIM coverage. The legislature also deleted the written-rejection requirement that had been set out in R.C. 3937.18 (C). ... The law in effect at the time of the last renewal, S.B. No. 97, did not require Allstate to offer UM/UIM coverage, and the St. Clairs did not actually have that coverage in the policy prior to the renewal apart from the legal fiction. We decline to recognize the implication of coverage where the legislature has clearly spoken on this issue.

Under the Senate Bill 20 version of § 3937.18, extrinsic evidence cannot be used to establish a valid UM/UIM offer after a written rejection; the offer requirements must be satisfied in writing.

Wiencek v. Higgins, Unpublished Decision (10-19-2006) · filed 2006-10-19

However, S.B. 20 does not provide such presumption and the Supreme Court has specifically drawn a distinction between the two statutes in Hollon, supra, which, to us, requires a conclusion that extrinsic evidence is not permitted under S.B. 20.

Section 3937.18(J)(1) permits insurers to limit UM/UIM coverage to specifically identified vehicles and to newly acquired or replacement vehicles only as provided by the policy's terms and conditions.

Stephens v. Norris, Unpublished Decision (9-5-2006) · filed 2006-09-05(J)(1)

The statutory language of R.C. 3937.18 (J) permits insurers to use terms and conditions that limit UM/UIM coverage to autos specifically identified in the policy. The statute further allows insurers to limit UM/UIM coverage for autos that do not constitute "newly acquired" or "replacement" autos as defined by the policy. The statute does not require insurers to identically match the statute word-for-word to their policies. ... The terms and conditions set forth in the Business Auto Coverage Form are permissible under the former UM/UIM statute, R.C. 3937.18 (J)(1). ... Upon review of the record, we find that the trial court did not err in granting MMIC Motion for Summary Judgment because MMIC did not fail to comply with the applicable version of R.C. 3937.18 (J)(1).

Section 3937.18(I) permits an insurer offering UM/UIM coverage to specify policy terms and conditions excluding coverage beyond the listed circumstances, and does not require coverage merely because a vehicle is specifically identified.

Green v. Westfield Natl. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (9-29-2006) · filed 2006-09-29(I)(1)

R.C. 3937.18 (I)(1) specifically allows insurers to "include terms and conditions that preclude coverage for bodily injury * * * suffered by an insured under specified circumstances, including not limited to any of the following circumstances[.]" (Emphasis added). The language chosen by the legislature necessarily means that an insurer is allowed to include terms and conditions which preclude UM/UIM coverage for circumstances other than those listed in the statute, provided they are specified within the policy. ... It is clear to this Court that R.C. 3937.18 (I) does not provide that UM/UIM coverage is mandatory if a vehicle is specifically identified in the policy.

Section 3937.18(I) permits insurers to include UM/UIM coverage terms and conditions beyond its listed examples, including exclusions or limitations, so long as they do not otherwise violate the statute.

Howard v. Howard, 06ca755 (5-31-2007) · filed 2007-05-31(I)

R.C. 3937.18 (I) is not an exhaustive list of the terms and conditions that insurers may include in their policies. ... Insurers may include other terms and conditions as long as those terms and conditions do not otherwise violate R.C. 3937.18 .

Division (I) permits an insurer offering UM/UIM coverage to include policy terms and conditions that preclude coverage in specified circumstances, including circumstances not expressly listed in the statute, and does not distinguish definitions from exclusions.

Bousquet v. State Auto Ins. Co., 89601 (3-6-2008) · filed 2008-03-06(I)

However, contrary to Mrs. Bousquet's argument, the statute's plain language in using the phrase "including but not limited to," indicates that the list of "terms and conditions" that may preclude coverage is not exhaustive. ... Under the current R.C. 3937.18 , insurance companies are not required by law to offer UM/UIM coverage. If insurers opt to offer UM/UIM coverage, they are free to include exclusions or limitations on that coverage. ... We agree with the Fourth District and fail to see how the definition-exclusion distinction is of any consequence.

Section 3937.18 permits an insurer to omit uninsured- or underinsured-motorist coverage and, when such coverage is provided, to include terms excluding coverage when the person suffering bodily injury is not an insured.

Crabtree v. 21st Century Insurance · filed 2008-04-04(A), (I)(5)

Under the current version of R.C. 3937.18, an insurer “may, but is not required to,” include uninsured-motorist coverage or underinsured-motorist coverage, or both, in a motor vehicle policy. See R.C. 3937.18(A). Additionally, policies with uninsured-motorist coverage may limit or exclude coverage under circumstances that are specified in the policy even if those circumstances are not also specified in the statute.

Section 3937.18(I)(1) permits excluding UM/UIM coverage for a vehicle owned by, or furnished or available for the regular use of, a named insured, spouse, or resident relative, when the vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy.

Coleman v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., C-070779 (7-18-2008) · filed 2008-07-18(I)(1)

Thus we analyze this case by interpreting R.C. 3937.18 (I)(1) to read as it was obviously meant to read: "(1) owned by, or (2) furnished or available for the regular use of." The parties, and other courts, have assumed this meaning, evidently without noticing the patent absurdity of the original language. And under this interpretation, calling for a regular-use analysis, we hold that Coleman's use was regular.

Former R.C. 3937.18(J)(1) and (K)(2) permit intrafamily exclusions that limit UM/UIM coverage for vehicles owned by, furnished to, or regularly available to a named insured, spouse, or resident relative, without eliminating a direct claim against the tortfeasor.

Burnett v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 2006-T-0085 (9-26-2008) · filed 2008-09-26(J)(1) and (K)(2)

The former R.C. § 3937.18 (K)(2) does not eliminate a cause of action, but rather, as the Supreme Court of Ohio has decided, limits UM/UIM coverage of an insured to exclude vehicles that are already covered under the policy. Following this rationale, there is no blatant avenue of redress being circumvented by the legislation. The injured individual can still bring a claim directly against the tortfeasor. Such redress provides illusory relief. One family member is suing another, but there is no coverage for the loss. We are bound, however, by the Supreme Court of Ohio's interpretation of these statutory provisions, and thus we must accept this outcome.

Section 3937.18(I) permits an insurance policy to include terms and conditions that exclude or limit UM/UIM coverage for specified circumstances, including circumstances not listed in the statute.

Geico General Ins. Co. v. Van Meter, 07ca3002 (9-29-2008) · filed 2008-09-29(I)

In Howard v. Howard , Pike App. No. 06CA755, 2007-Ohio-3940 , we upheld the validity of such "household exclusions." ... Additionally, in Snyder v. Am. Family Ins. Co. , 114 Ohio St.3d 239 , 2007-Ohio-4004 at ¶ 15 the Ohio Supreme Court recently addressed the expansive language of R.C. 3937.18 (I): "The 2001 statute for the first time permits policies with uninsured-motorist coverage to limit or exclude coverage under circumstances that are specified in the policy even if those circumstances are not also specified in the statute. See R.C. 3937.18 (I)." ... Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we hereby overrule Appellant's first "assignment of error."

Section 3937.18(I) permits an insurer to limit UM/UIM coverage so that it does not pay medical expenses already paid or payable under medical-payments coverage in the same policy.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Grace · filed 2009-11-17(I)

Based upon the foregoing, we hold that R.C. 3937.18(I), as amended by S.B. 97, permits an insurer to limit coverage so as to preclude payment pursuant to UM/UIM coverage for medical expenses that have previously been paid or are payable under the medical payment coverage in the same policy.

Under the H.B. 261 version of § 3937.18, a signed UM/UIM rejection may be supported by extrinsic evidence showing a meaningful offer, and coverage may be excluded when the insured occupies an unidentified vehicle furnished for the insured’s regular use.

Roush v. Butera · filed 2012-06-07(C), (J)(1)

In Hollon v. Clary, 104 Ohio St.3d 526, 2004-Ohio-6772, 820 N.E.2d 881, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that H.B. 261 modified the strict Linko requirements. ... Accordingly, the court went on to hold that “[o]nce a signed rejection is produced, the elements of the offer may be demonstrated by extrinsic evidence.” Id. at syllabus. ... Based on this evidence, we agree with the trial court’s finding that National Union made a valid offer of UM/UIM coverage, which was properly rejected. ... The exclusion in Roush’s Nationwide policy, which was issued on September 14, 2000, is enforceable under the applicable version of R.C. 3937.18, which was amended by H.B. 261. ... For example, R.C. 3937.18(J)(1) provides that coverage may be precluded: ... The language contained in R.C. 3937.19(J)(1) is unambiguous. Kyle v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co., 103 Ohio St.3d 170, 2004-Ohio-4885, 814 N.E.2d 1195. In very clear terms, R.C. 3937.18(J)(1) allowed Nationwide to exclude coverage to Roush, who was a operating motor vehicle furnished to him or available for his regular use by his employer. The vehicle was not specifically identified in the policy under which a claim was made. Therefore, we find Roush was excluded from UM/UIM coverage under his personal Nationwide policy.

Section 3937.18(I) permits an insurer to exclude UM coverage for policy-specified circumstances even when the statute does not expressly list those circumstances.

Custer v. Custer · filed 2016-02-09(I)

R.C. 3937.18 permits an insurer to exclude UM coverage for circumstances specifically listed in the policy even if those circumstances are not set out in the statute.

Section 3937.18(I) permits an auto-insurance policy to include UM/UIM coverage exclusions or limitations beyond the statute's examples if the provisions are stated in the policy and do not conflict with § 3937.46's wrongful-death requirements.

Kaiser v. Goff · filed 2022-12-29(I)

In summary, R.C. 3937.18(I) now contains examples of provisions limiting and excluding UM/UIM coverage, but allows for policies that include any terms and conditions precluding coverage as long as these circumstances are specified in the policy and do not conflict with the content of R.C. 3937.46 regarding wrongful-death claims. It is undisputed that the Safeco Policy at issue in this case is governed by the current version of R.C. 3937.18 and that the provision Safeco cited as precluding UM/UIM coverage is not set forth as an example in R.C. 3937.18(I).

Section 3937.18 permits an insurer to limit uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage to people occupying a covered auto.

Kollar v. Smiley · filed 2008-05-20

In the present case, the terms and conditions that West American Insurance Company put in the policy issued to Mr. Kollar was that the person claiming the UM/UIM coverage had to be “occupying” a “covered auto.” Under the reasoning of Green, this limitation on such coverage is authorized by R.C. 3937.18.

Under division (A) as amended by S.B. No. 97, an automobile liability policy may, but need not, include uninsured-motorist, underinsured-motorist, or both coverages, and the amendment can validate the policy's stated lower limits.

Advent v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2006-10-24(A)

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the S.B. No. 97 changes to R.C. 3937.18(A) applied to the Allstate policy at the time of the accident and that the Allstate policy provided UM/UIM coverage in the amounts of $50,000 per person/$100,000 per accident.

Subsection (J) does not itself give an underinsured-motorist carrier a direct right to pursue the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor's insurer.

Wilson v. Sanson, Unpublished Decision (11-30-2006) · filed 2006-11-30(J)

With respect to GMAC, no such direct right is provided by R.C.3937.18(J) or the release and trust agreements. However, we do find that such a right arises through equitable subrogation.

Section 3937.18 does not apply to vehicles designed for off-road use, so an insurance policy may exclude them from uninsured- and underinsured-motorist coverage.

State Automobile Insurance v. Pasquale · filed 2007-03-21(E) and (K)

For the stated reasons, we hold that an insurance policy may exclude off-road vehicles from uninsured- and underinsured-motorist coverage under former R.C. 3937.18 as amended by 1997 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 261.

Section 3937.18(I)(5) permits an insurer to deny uninsured-motorist coverage when the person who suffered the injury is not an insured under that policy, and the statute does not prevent the parties from defining who is insured.

Engler v. Stafford, L-06-1257 (5-11-2007) · filed 2007-05-11(I)(5)

The applicable version of R.C. 3937.18 allows insurers to deny coverage for bodily injury or death "[w]hen the person actually suffering the bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death is not an insured under the policy." R.C. 3937.18 (I)(5). In addition, "[n]othing in R.C. 3937.18 * * * prohibits the parties to an insurance contract from defining who is an insured person under the policy." Holliman , at 416-417; see, also, Lightning Rod Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. , 168 Ohio App.3d 505 , 2006-Ohio-4411 , ¶ 12 ; Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. , 8th Dist. No. 86124, 2006-Ohio-2063 , ¶ 13 ; Mitchell v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. , 10th Dist. No. 04AP-589, 2005-Ohio-3988 , ¶ 21 ("[A]s R.C. 3937.18 does not mandate who must be an insured for purposes of underinsured motorist coverage, the parties to an insurance policy are free to draft their own restrictions regarding who is and is not an insured.").

Section 3937.18(C) permits an insurer to define who is an insured for underinsured-motorist coverage, including excluding a passenger who is insured for that coverage under another policy.

Keffer v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 06ca652 (5-17-2007) · filed 2007-05-17(C)

In the case at bar, we believe that nothing prohibits Central Mutual from defining who is an insured under the UIM policy provisions. We agree with the rationales expressed in Shepherd , Mitchell , and Safeco that limiting the definition of an insured as Central Mutual has in the case at bar does not contravene R.C. 3937.18 .

Section 3937.18(C) requires UIM limits to be reduced by amounts available under liability policies covering persons liable to the insured, but it does not itself require setoff of benefits available under other UIM policies.

Merz v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., Ca2006-08-203 (5-14-2007) · filed 2007-05-14(C)

However, R.C. 3937.18 (C) plainly states that the policy limits of UIM coverage must be reduced only "by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured." (Emphasis added.) This language precludes a finding that R.C. 3937.18 (C) requires setoff of amounts available from other UIM providers. See Wright , 2003-Ohio-4201 at 20; Savage , Fairfield App. No. 04CA39, at 25.

Section 3937.18 permits insurance policies to define who qualifies as an insured for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.

Powell v. Grange Mutual Cas., Unpublished Decision (6-8-2005) · filed 2005-06-08

Nothing in R.C. § 3937.18 prohibits parties from establishing a definition of who is and who is not an "insured" under an insurance policy.

Section 3937.18(I)(5) permits an insurer to exclude bodily-injury or death coverage when the person who suffered the injury or death is not an insured under the policy, and the policy may define who qualifies as an insured.

Lightning Rod Mutual Insurance v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co. · filed 2006-08-28(I)(5)

“Nothing in R.C. 3937.18 * * * prohibits the parties to an insurance contract from defining who is an insured person under the policy.” ... In this case, Grange exercised its ability to define who is an insured under the policy it issued to Helen Calendine to exclude from that definition passengers who are insured under other policies.

Section 3937.18(A) permits an uninsured motorist policy to define who is an insured, including by requiring a relative to reside primarily with the policyholder.

Henderson v. State Farm Mutual Insurance · filed 2005-12-21(A)

Henderson’s argument fails to acknowledge that she must be an insured according to the first prong of the Martin test, and that “[n]othing in R.C. 3937.18 or Martin prohibits the parties to an insurance contract from defining who is an insured person under the policy.” Holliman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 715 N.E.2d 532, 535 (Ohio 1999) (citing Wayne Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mills, 692 N.E.2d 213, 218 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)).

Former § 3937.18(E)(3) excludes a political subdivision’s vehicle from the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle when the subdivision is self-insured within the meaning of the state’s financial-responsibility law, and a certificate of self-insurance is not required.

Rogers v. City of Dayton · filed 2008-05-21(E)(3)

Nevertheless, Dayton complied with the financial-responsibility law that applies to political subdivisions by creating a self-insurance program for political-subdivision tort-liability purposes as authorized under former R.C. 2744.08(A). 141 Ohio Laws, Part III, 6083, 6085. Because former R.C. 3937.18(E)(3) does not specifically refer to R.C. Chapter 4509, we hold that Dayton is self-insured “within the meaning of the financial responsibility law of the state,” and its vehicle is not uninsured for purposes of R.C. 3937.18(E)(3).

Former § 3937.18(E)(2) was unconstitutional because it arbitrarily classified injured persons based on household status without a rational basis.

Burnett v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Companies · filed 2007-04-06(E)(2)

Thus, R.C. 3937.18(E)(2) is unconstitutional because it impermissibly classifies individuals based upon a familial relation, so that injured persons related to the tortfeasor are precluded from recovery while injured persons not related or even nonresident relatives can pursue recovery under the policy.

A named insured's signed selection of UIM coverage limits binds other named insureds and insureds under the policy.

Rice v. Progressive Max Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (11-18-2004) · filed 2004-11-18(C)

Because Consolidated selected the UIM coverage to be limits of $100,000, its signature is binding on all other named insureds, insureds (such as East Ohio), or applicants.

A named insured's written selection of reduced underinsured-motorist limits binds another named insured only when that other insured expressly selects those limits in writing.

Parrish v. Coles, 06ap-696 (6-26-2007) · filed 2007-06-26(C)

We agree that the language of R.C. 3937.18 (C) does expressly permit such an action. If a named insured selects reduced UIM limits on behalf of another, in accord with the express written selection of those limits by the other named insured , then the action is indeed binding on the other insured.

The version of § 3937.18 governing UM/UIM coverage is determined by the date the insurance contract became effective, and the statute makes UM/UIM coverage part of the liability policy as written.

Byrd v. Smith · filed 2007-07-24

The court agrees with the plaintiff that UM/UIM coverage became a part of the liability policy pursuant to Ohio’s UM/UIM statute as it was written. However, the court finds that the determination of which version of R.C. 3937.18 applies is based upon the date the insurance contract became effective and not the date of the collision.

Section 3937.18 permits an insurer to exclude UM/UIM coverage for an insured who did not sustain bodily injury in the accident.

Peffley v. Motorists Ins. Group, 22086 (8-31-2007) · filed 2007-08-31(A)(1)

Motorists argues that neither manifest error of law nor newly discovered evidence are the only grounds for reconsidering an interlocutory ruling. Motorists argues that "apparent justice" was served by the court's reconsidering its original summary judgment decision since Peffley was not entitled to UM/UIM coverage under the applicable policy because Motorists was authorized by R.C. 3937.18 to exclude coverage for insured persons who do not incur bodily damage in an automobile accident. We agree.

Former § 3937.18(K)(2) permits an intra-family exclusion that bars uninsured motorist coverage for a vehicle owned by the named insured.

Burnett v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Cos., Unpublished Decision (8-22-2005) · filed 2005-08-22(K)(2)

Subsequently, however, the legislature enacted H.B. 261 which authorized the use of the intra-family exclusion by adding section (K)(2). Thus, theAlexander decision was no longer controlling. ... Based upon the Kyle decision, it is clear that appellee is precluded from coverage under the uninsured provisions of the policy issued by Motorists to Mr. Burnett.

Section 3937.18(I)(1) permits an uninsured/underinsured motorist policy to exclude coverage under specified circumstances, including a household exclusion, when the policy states the specific circumstances.

Lawrence v. Lawrence, 06-Ca-14 (9-7-2007) · filed 2007-09-07(I)(1)

We agree with the Kelly and Green courts. The current version of the statue permits insurance companies to include the household exclusion. The policy must set out the specific circumstances, but the statute does not enumerate all the circumstances under which exclusion is permissible. We find the exclusion in the instant case is enforceable.

Section 3937.18 allows a reasonable household exclusion from uninsured motorist coverage even when the facts present less risk of collusion than in Finch.

Frederick v. Westfield Companies · filed 1989-01-20

While we agree with appellants’ contention that the same degree of collusion is simply not probable in the case sub judice, we do not find that a possibility of collusiveness was the driving force behind the Finch decision. In contrast, our evaluation of Finch indicates that the court was merely stating yet another reason to uphold the validity of such a clause. ... The absence of facts mirroring Finch is not fatal in its application to the case sub judice.

The pre-October 31, 2001 version of § 3937.18(H) permitted an enforceable two-year policy limitation on bringing uninsured-motorist claims, and the later amendment did not apply retroactively.

American Standard Ins. v. Holloway, Unpublished Decision (9-14-2007) · filed 2007-09-14(H)

Effective October 31, 2001, R.C. 3937.18 (H) was amended to provide that: "Any policy of insurance that includes uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages may include terms and conditions requiring that * * * each claim or suit for uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages be made or brought within three years after the date of the accident causing the bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death *."

Section 3937.18(H) permits an insurance policy to require that an uninsured- or underinsured-motorist claim be made within three years after the accident, rather than after the tortfeasor's liability limits are exhausted.

Barbee v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 2011-09-29(H)

Additional support for this conclusion is found in the following language of R.C. 3937.18(H): “Any policy of insurance * * * may * * * require[ ] that * * * each claim or suit for * * * underinsured motorist coverage * * * be made or brought within three years after the date of the accident * * * .” (Emphasis added.) The language “date of the accident” was chosen by the General Assembly after our decision in Ross. The General Assembly was aware that underinsured-motorist-coverage provisions routinely require exhaustion of the tortfeasor’s limits of liability. If the General Assembly had wanted to run the three-year period from the date that liability limits are exhausted, rather than from the date of the accident, it could easily have drafted the statute to reflect this intention. It did not.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an insurance policy to require uninsured- or underinsured-motorist claims or suits to be brought within three years after the accident, or within one year after the liable insurer becomes subject to insolvency proceedings, whichever is later, so long as the insured has not prejudiced subrogation rights.

Shrit v. Williams · filed 2014-11-21(H)

R.C. 3937.18(H) provides that insurance companies may limit the amount of time within which an insured may bring a claim for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage. ... For better or worse, the General Assembly has spoken on this issue and specifically permitted insurance companies to insert three-year limitation periods into their insurance contracts. Therefore, we conclude that this insurance provision is not against public policy. ... While we acknowledge that there could be a set of facts that make application of the three-year limitation period patently unreasonable and potentially unconstitutional, that set of facts is not in the record before us.

Under § 3937.18(A)(2), amounts actually received from the tortfeasor reduce UIM limits, and an insured cannot deduct a Medicare lien arising from the insured's own injuries to increase UIM benefits.

Boila v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 06 Ma 166 (11-7-2007) · filed 2007-11-07(A)(2)

Since Appellant received $100,000 from the tortfeasor, Nationwide is not contractually bound to provide further UIM benefits. This is not the type of situation envisioned by Littrell or Pallay for which a Medicare lien may be excluded from the "amounts available for payment" calculation in determining UIM coverage, and therefore, the trial court was correct in denying UIM coverage and granting partial summary judgment to Appellee.

Section 3937.18(C) reduces underinsured-motorist coverage by amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by the claimant from all applicable bodily-injury liability coverage, including the tortfeasor’s liability policy.

Boehm v. Butcher · filed 2007-09-07(C)

The phrase “amounts available for payment” under the statute means “the amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by an underinsured motorist claimant from all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies (including from the tortfeasor’s liability carrier).”

A medical lien for services provided to the insured does not reduce the amount available for payment when calculating underinsured-motorist coverage.

Gilliland v. Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 2010-06-01(C)

While in the present case, the pot is simply diminished because of expenses that the claimant here incurred. We note that the Littrell court expressly stated that expenses incurred by the insured do not reduce the amount available for payment within the meaning of current R.C. 3937.18(C).

Section 3937.18(I)(1) permits an insurance policy to exclude uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage when an insured is operating or occupying a vehicle owned by a named insured or resident relative that is not specifically identified or covered as a newly acquired or replacement vehicle.

Siciliano v. the National Mutual Insu. Co., 06ca61 (11-30-2007) · filed 2007-11-30(I)(1)

Under R.C. 3937.18 (I), parties are permitted to include specific preclusions in uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. Subsection (1) states the following: ... "(I) Any policy of insurance that includes uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages may include terms and conditions that preclude coverage for bodily injury or death suffered by an insured under specified circumstances, including but not limited to any of the following circumstances: ... "(1) While the insured is operating or occupying a motor vehicle owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of a named insured, a spouse, or a resident relative of a named insured, if the motor vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy under which a claim is made, or is not a newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle covered under the terms of the policy under which the uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages are provided." ... As cited supra, we find the specific and unambiguous language of the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in the policy sub judice excluded injuries suffered by the insured while operating a vehicle not listed as a covered vehicle under the policy. Therefore, uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage is not available to appellee.