Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3937.18

Former § 3937.18 requires underinsured-motorist benefits when covered damages exceed the amount available from the tortfeasor's liability insurer.

Fultz v. Midwest Mutual Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (3-10-1997) · filed 1997-03-10

"[P]ursuant to former R.C. 3937.18, an underinsurance claim must be paid when the individual covered by an uninsured/underinsured policy suffers damages that exceed those monies available to be paid by the tortfeasor's liability carrier." ... "In the present case, appellant collected the full amount allowed under decedent's State Farm policy. Appellee is therefore entitled to collect up to the full limit from appellant to the extent that the amount of damages exceeds the amount already paid by State Farm."

Section 3937.18, as amended by Senate Bill 20, bars an insured from using underinsured-motorist coverage as excess insurance when the right to pursue that coverage accrues after the amendment's effective date.

Folger v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (2-20-1998) · filed 1998-02-20(A)(2)

[T]he operative date for determining whether to apply "former R.C. 3937.18" or the Savoie amendment (Am.Sub.S.B.20) is not the accident date but the date that the insured settled with the tortfeasor's liability carrier and became entitled to pursue underinsured coverage.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) requires uninsured-motorist coverage to be construed liberally, making policy limits contrary to the statute and its purpose unenforceable.

Schaefer v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1996-09-04(A)(1)

Furthermore, since R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) is remedial legislation, it must be liberally construed in order to effectuate the legislative purpose. Martin, 70 Ohio St.3d at 480, 639 N.E.2d at 440, citing Curran v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 33, 54 O.O.2d 166, 266 N.E.2d 566. An insurance policy provision will be deemed unenforceable if the provision is contrary to the statute and its purpose. Martin at 480, 639 N.E.2d at 440. ... Therefore, we hold that each person who is covered by an uninsured motorist policy and who is asserting a claim for loss of consortium has a separate claim subject to a separate per person policy limit. A provision in an insurance policy which reaches a contrary result is unenforceable.

Section 3937.18(A) requires UIM coverage for all persons insured under a motor-vehicle liability policy, and subsection (C) permits only the named insured to reject it.

Reese v. Indiana Insurance · filed 1996-09-10(A), (C)

We find nothing within the policy to distinguish additional named insureds from named insureds. Like the named insured, appellant’s name and address are specifically identified in the policy and both appellant and the named insured are issued liability coverage. According to R.C. 3937.18(A), such a policy for liability coverage cannot be issued without the accompanying UIM protection. Although the policy in this case attempted to limit coverage of additional named insureds to liability protection, this can be done only by obtaining a waiver of UIM coverage by the named insured.

Division (G) allows an automobile liability policy offering uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage to include terms and conditions that preclude stacking of those coverages.

Dick v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1996-09-17(G)

As we see it, the significance of the foregoing provision is clear and unambiguous. In accordance with the authority granted in R.C. 3937.18, it works to preclude what has become known in the insurance industry as the stacking of coverages. This means in the case sub judice that there was a total of only $100,000 available under the Allstate policy to satisfy all the claims arising out of the wrongful death of James Dick, notwithstanding the fact that the four family members on whose behalf the claims were asserted were each properly considered as insured persons within the meaning of the contract.

Section 3937.18 treats self-insurance as the legal equivalent of no insurance for distributing uninsured-motorist benefits and does not permit policy exclusions that fail to provide its full protection.

Jennings v. City of Dayton · filed 1996-09-27(A)

We hold that “self-insurance” is the legal equivalent of no insurance for purposes of the distribution of uninsured motorist benefits in accordance with R.C. 3937.18.

Amendments to Section 3937.18(A)(2) operate only prospectively when they contain no language making them retrospective.

Lanza-Costlow v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 1996-10-28(A)(2)

Initially, we note that Savoie was the law when this case was filed on October 5, 1993. However, Savoie was basically superseded by the General Assembly when it amended R.C. 3937.18 on October 20, 1994. Thus, this court must first determine whether the amended version of R.C. 3937.18 applies retrospectively. This issue was most recently addressed in Cole v. Holland (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 220, 225, 667 N.E.2d 353, 356. In Cole, the Ohio Supreme Court held: “Since Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 contains no retrospective language, amended R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) operates only prospectively.” Consequently, pending causes of action accruing prior to October 20, 1994, the effective date of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, are controlled by Savoie. The case sub judice was instituted after the Savoie decision, and was a pending cause of action accruing prior to October 20, 1994. Thus, this case is controlled by Savoie.

Section 3937.18(E) entitles an uninsured/underinsured motorist insurer to repayment from settlements or judgments obtained through the injured insured’s recovery rights, but does not authorize an independent negligence action against a fully insured joint tortfeasor.

United Ohio Insurance Co. v. Faulds · filed 1997-02-21(E)

R.C. 3937.18(E) expressly states that an uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier is entitled to repayment from the “proceeds of any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery of such person [its insured] against any person * * * legally responsible for the bodily injury or death” for which the uninsured/underinsured. payment is made. The language of this statute is clear and unambiguous in stating that entitlement to repayment is the result of the action of the injured party or parties against a joint tortfeasor. It does not provide the uninsured motorist carrier with the right to, finder aegis of subrogation, to obtain an assignment of the injured party’s negligence claim against a fully insured joint tortfeasor. Accordingly, we hold that the right of subrogation authorized by R.C. 3937.18(E) does not confer, even by written assignment in a subrogation agreement or contractual language to the contrary, on an uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier a right to maintain an independent cause of action in negligence against a fully insured joint tortfeasor.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) requires uninsured-motorist coverage for insured persons legally entitled to recover damages from uninsured-motor-vehicle owners or operators, and that entitlement can survive a settlement and release when the insurer consented to the settlement.

Bentley v. Grange Mutual Casualty Insurance · filed 1997-04-10(A)(1)

This language mirrors the language of R.C. 3937.18(A)(1), ... which requires UM coverage “for the protection of persons insured * * * who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles.” ... Appellant’s interpretation of “legally entitled to recover” is too restrictive. ... Under McDonald, because appellant consented to the settlement in which appellees’ wrongful death claims against the tortfeasor were released, the release did not effect a forfeiture of appellees’ contract rights to UM coverage.

Section 3937.18 invalidates a policy provision that eliminates underinsured-motorist coverage for an insured wrongful-death beneficiary who is not the personal representative and could not control the settlement.

Gibson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1997-08-22(A), (A)(2)

Accordingly, we hold that an automobile liability insurance policy provision which eliminates underinsured motorist coverage for persons insured thereunder who are injured under Ohio’s wrongful death statute, but are not the personal representative, violates R.C. 3937.18 and is therefore invalid.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) permits an insurer to reduce underinsured-motorist coverage by bodily-injury liability amounts available for payment to the insured, even if those amounts were not actually recovered, but only amounts available to insureds count.

King v. Western Reserve Group · filed 1997-12-01(A)(2)

We note that the “available for payment” language was introduced by Senate Bill 20 and that in the pre-amended version of the statute, the' setoff provision allowed the insurer to deduct “those amounts actually recovered.” Hence, the General Assembly has expressed its intent to expand the benefits to an insurer under the setoff provision to amounts available to, but not necessarily recovered by, an insured.

Division (H) permits an automobile liability policy to make all claims arising from one person's bodily injury or death collectively subject to the per-person limit, enforceable regardless of the number of insureds, claims, vehicles, or premiums.

Plott v. Colonial Insurance Company · filed 1998-02-23(H)

We find that neither R.C. 3937.18(H), which contains “limits of liability” language, nor R.C. 3937.44 violates Section 19a, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.

Section 3937.18 requires offered uninsured-motorist coverage and prevents a policy from diluting that coverage by deducting medical payments made under another part of the same policy.

Walter v. Wayne Mutual Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (3-4-1998) · filed 1998-03-04

The uninsured motorist coverage required to be offered by R.C. 3937.18 in all automobile or vehicle liability policies issued in the state of Ohio cannot be diluted or diminished by payments made to the insured pursuant to the medical payment provision of the same contract of insurance. A contract condition providing for a deduction for medical payments paid under another portion of the insurance contract is in derogation of the public policy and purpose underlying R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an automobile liability policy to treat all claims arising from one person’s bodily injury, including death, as a single claim subject to the applicable per-person limit, and under division (A)(2) underinsured coverage is unavailable when the available liability coverage is not less than the insured’s applicable underinsured coverage.

Welsh v. Sherwood · filed 1998-03-09(A)(2), (H)

Both policies defined “bodily injury” to include death. Both policies limit the wrongful death claimants to a single “per person” claim, as allowed by R.C. 3937.18(H). Therefore, appellees are not underinsured pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) under either the Motorists Mutual policy or the General Casualty policy.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires UIM limits to be reduced by amounts available under applicable bodily-injury liability coverage and caps UIM protection at the amount available if the tortfeasor were uninsured.

Csulik v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (3-9-1998) · filed 1998-03-09(A)(2)

In applying the above law to the facts of the case under consideration, we reach the following results. ... Second, with respect to the bodily injury claims of Nicole Csulik and Tiffany Lowden, we find the $300,000 limit of UIM coverage must also be set off by the $100,000 payment Nicole Csulik and Tiffany Lowden each received from Erie, leaving a maximum of $200,000 in available coverage for each claimant. ... In its final assignment of error, Sentry maintains its UIM coverage limits of $50,000, contained in the insurance policy issued to Larry Oney, is less than Sorenson's limit of $100,000 contained in his policy with Erie. Therefore, pursuant to R.C.3937.18(A)(2), Tiffany Lowden is not entitled to any UIM benefits since Sorenson's limits were greater than Sentry's UIM limits.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) permits an insurer to reduce underinsured motorist coverage limits by amounts available from the tortfeasor's liability coverage, so equal policy limits leave no underinsured motorist proceeds available.

Ott v. Borchardt , Unpublished Decision (3-31-1998) · filed 1998-03-31(A)(2)

Under this statute, Appellants, who have asserted the same issues as those raised in Beagle, would not be entitled to underinsured motorist proceeds, since their policy limits are the same as those of the tortfeasor. ... The passage of R.C.3937.18(A)(2) does nothing more than permit insurers to set off amounts available for payment from a tortfeasor's liability coverage against the limits of their own insureds' underinsured motorist coverage. ... Therefore, there is no violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

For causes of action arising before October 20, 1994, former § 3937.18 permits underinsured-motorist recovery when the insured’s damages exceed the tortfeasor’s available liability coverage, even if the tortfeasor’s liability coverage is greater than the insured’s underinsured-motorist limit.

Phillips v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance · filed 1998-04-03(A)(2)

Given that Savoie controls, appellee’s underinsurance claim must be paid when her damages suffered exceed those monies available to be paid by General Accident. ... The trial court did not err in holding that the State Automobile policy and R.C. 3937.18 do not prohibit recovery of underinsured motorist benefits even though Wanat’s liability coverage was greater than appellee’s underinsured motorist coverage.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) does not forbid separate and successive setoff of tortfeasor payments against an insured's underinsured-motorist policy limits for multiple claimants.

De Leon v. Western Reserve Mut. Cas. Co., Unpublished Decision (2-1-1999) · filed 1999-02-01(A)(2)

Therefore, while the amended version of R.C. § 3937.18(A)(2) may allow an insurance company to preclude setoff from a claimant's total damages, it does not forbid separate and successive setoff against the insured's policy limits.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires the amount of liability insurance available to the insured to be set off against the applicable underinsured-motorist policy limit.

Joseph v. Csx Transportation Co., Unpublished Decision (3-18-1999) · filed 1999-03-18(A)(2)

The clear language of that statute3 requires a setoff of the amount of liability insurance available for payment to the insured from the policy limit of the applicable underinsured motorist coverage.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) provides gap underinsured-motorist coverage, allowing a setoff for amounts paid by the tortfeasor and barring stacking; the provision is constitutional.

Westfall v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, Unpublished Decision (6-30-1999) · filed 1999-06-30(A)(2)

Ohio law allows the appellees to "set off" underinsured motorist coverage against the amount already paid by the tortfeasor's insurance coverage, and does not allow "stacking" of insurance coverage. ... The plaintiff/insureds' allegation that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 204, 210 ("Senate Bill 20") is unconstitutional, is without merit. Senate Bill 20 and R.C.3937.18 (A) (2) was found to be constitutional in Beagle v.Walden (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 59.

Section 3937.18 barred an insurer from reducing underinsured-motorist coverage based on a reduced premium and from setting off liability payments against UIM policy limits, even when both coverages were in the same policy.

Tubbs v. Rowe, Unpublished Decision (8-16-1999) · filed 1999-08-16

In light of Cole and Keppel, it is clear that an UIM provider may not set off against policy limits the amounts received from the tortfeasor's general liability insurance, even when the UIM coverage and the general liability coverage are under the same policy. It is now apparent that the payment of a reduced premium for UIM coverage is not a valid justification for reducing UIM coverage under former R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 gives the right of setoff to the UIM carrier rather than the tortfeasor.

Lake v. Estate of Pohlkamp, Unpublished Decision (5-22-2000) · filed 2000-05-22

The right of setoff is a right held by the UIM carrier, not the tortfeasor.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) reduces underinsured motorist coverage by amounts available from liable parties' insurance, even if the insured did not actually recover those amounts.

Doganiero v. Insurance Co. of Ohio, Unpublished Decision (12-14-2000) · filed 2000-12-14(A)(2)

Although the probate court did not allocate to the appellants any part of the proceeds from the tortfeasor's insurance that were paid in settlement of the wrongful death claim, the set-off provided by R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) with respect to underinsured motorist coverage relates to amounts available to, but not necessarily recovered by, the insured.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) permits UIM policy limits to be reduced by amounts available under applicable bodily-injury liability insurance covering persons liable to the insured.

Barnett v. Carr, Unpublished Decision (2-5-2001) · filed 2001-02-05(A)(2)

UIM carriers may include terms in the insurance policy to set off their liability by any amounts that the insured recovers from the tortfeasor's liability insurance, pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2): The policy limits of the [UIM] coverage shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured.

Section 3937.18(A)(2), as amended by S.B. 20, requires UIM coverage only when the tortfeasor's liability coverage is less than the victim's UIM coverage and permits setoff against the tortfeasor's liability limits rather than the amount actually received.

Green v. Barbour, Unpublished Decision (2-9-2001) · filed 2001-02-09(A)(2)

In Moccabee, we held that R.C. 3937.18(A(2) requires an insurer to provide UIM coverage, "* * * only if the tortfeasor's liability coverage is less than the victim's underinsured motorist coverage." Moreover, the statute, as amended by S.B. 20, permits an insurer to set off UIM coverage against the limits of the tortfeasor's coverage rather than the amount actually received from the tortfeasor's liability coverage. Id.; Littrell v. Wigglesworth (Mar. 13, 2000), Butler App. No. CA99-05-092, CA99-08-141, unreported, at 10. ... Since David Barbour's liability coverage is equal to, or greater than, the UIM coverage under any of appellants' UIM policies, Barbour is not an underinsured motorist pursuant to the language. Accordingly, appellants' second assignment of error is not well-taken.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires underinsured-motorist limits to be reduced, for setoff, by amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by the claimant from all applicable bodily-injury liability bonds and policies.

Littrell v. Wigglesworth · filed 2001-05-23(A)(2)

For the purpose of setoff, the “amounts available for payment” language in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) means the amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by an underinsured motorist claimant from all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies (including from the tortfeasor’s liability carrier).

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires underinsured-motorist policy limits to be reduced by amounts available under applicable bodily-injury liability coverage, so the underinsured coverage is not excess insurance.

Turner v. Erie Insurance Group, Unpublished Decision (4-9-2001) · filed 2001-04-09(A)(2)

In the present analysis, the effective section of R.C.3937.18(A)(2) states "[t]he policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured." Ryan Turner's estate was paid $100,000 by American Select. The available underinsured motorist coverage under Erie's policy was for $100,000. Erie has no liability under this provision.

Section 3937.18(H) permits a policy to subject claims arising from one person’s bodily injury to a single limit, while § 3937.18(A)(2) reduces underinsured-motorist coverage by amounts actually accessible from applicable liability insurance.

Allen v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (6-28-2001) · filed 2001-06-28(A)(2), (H)

Given the legislative permission to collectively subject all claims to a single claim limit, the policies at issue validly do so. Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 282-284. ... As the Supreme Court explained, the "amounts available for payment" language requires "a comparison between the amounts that are actually accessible to the injured claimant from the tortfeasor's automobile liability insurance carrier and the injured claimant's own underinsured motorist coverage limits." Id. at 276. ... Accordingly, under the recent pronouncement of Littrell, plaintiffs are not underinsureds and are not entitled to recover from either Amica or Midwestern pursuant to the underinsured provisions of those policies.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) does not permit an insurer to set off underinsured-motorist coverage against a tortfeasor's liability limits instead of the actual amount available to the victim.

Green v. Barbour · filed 2001-07-05(A)(2)

The question certified for our consideration is “[w]hether R.C. 3937.18[A][2], as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. 20, permits an insurer to set off [underinsured motorist] coverage against a tortfeasor’s liability limits rather than the actual amount available to the victim.” ... Pursuant to our decisions in Littrell v. Wigglesworth (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 425, 746 N.E.2d 1077, and Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 744 N.E.2d 719, the certified question is answered in the negative.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) reflects a policy that an injured person should not be disadvantaged because the tortfeasor was underinsured; the available recovery is the underinsured-motorist policy limit after accounting for other available liability coverage.

Berrios v. State Farm Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (7-17-2001) · filed 2001-07-17(A)(2)

The court's rationale rests on the premise that an injured party should not be at a disadvantage because the negligent party was underinsured as opposed to uninsured. Consistent with the stated goal of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), the maximum amount available to the injured party should be that of the policy limits.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) makes underinsured-motorist coverage non-excess and reduces its limits by amounts available under applicable liability insurance, so coverage is unavailable when those amounts meet or exceed the insured's underinsured-motorist limits.

Chavis v. Tanner, Unpublished Decision (11-7-2001) · filed 2001-11-07(A)(2)

R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) provides, in part, that: * * * Underinsured motorist coverage is not and shall not be excess insurance to other applicable liability coverages, and shall be provided only to afford the insured an amount of protection not greater than that which would be available under the insured's uninsured motorist coverage if the person or persons liable were uninsured at the time of the accident. The policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all applicable body injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured. Based on the policy definition and R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), appellant is unable to collect from Erie unless the total insurance coverage for Mark Tanner at the time of the accident was less than $100,000.

Under R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), underinsured-motorist coverage is reduced by amounts actually received from the tortfeasor, not by comparing the tortfeasor's policy limits with the insured's policy limits.

Roth v. Hall, Unpublished Decision (12-13-2001) · filed 2001-12-13(A)(2)

Following the law of Clark and Littrell, Ms. Subers is entitled to underinsured motorist coverage up to the appropriate limit of her Allstate policy, reduced by any amounts received from the tortfeasor.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) treats amounts actually accessible and recoverable from other liability insurance as the setoff against underinsured-motorist limits, while former division (H) permits a policy to treat all claims from one person's injury or death as a single claim subject to the one-person limit.

Phelps v. Middleton, Unpublished Decision (4-30-2002) · filed 2002-04-30(A)(2), (H)

In a recent decision interpreting this section of the statute, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that, "[f]or the purpose of setoff, the `amounts available for payment' language in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) means the amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by an underinsured motorist claimant from all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies (including from the tortfeasor's liability carrier)." Clark v.Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 271, syllabus. Thus, the court must look at the amounts actually recovered from the other insurance, rather than comparing policy limits, as the trial court did. Id. at 276. ... This language clearly and unambiguously consolidates all claims resulting from the death of a single person into a single claim. SeeClark, supra at 282. Thus, the survivorship claim of the estate and all wrongful death claims are restricted to the single-person limit of $100,000 as set forth in the policy. As appellant received a settlement of $100,000 from American, the amount actually received by appellant was identical to the amount of underinsured motorist coverage. Thus, the amount paid by the American policy completely offsets the amount available from the Erie policy, and appellants are not entitled to underinsured motorist coverage.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) allows an insurer to reduce underinsured-motorist limits by amounts actually accessible to and recoverable from other applicable liability insurance, and § 3937.18(E) permits that setoff when clearly stated in the policy.

Reeves v. Cunningham, Unpublished Decision (12-31-2002) · filed 2002-12-31(A)(2), (E)

In interpreting this section of the statute, the Supreme Court of Ohio in Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 271, syllabus, held that, "[f]or the purpose of setoff, the `amounts available for payment' language in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) means the amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by an underinsured motorist claimant from all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies (including from the tortfeasor's liability carrier)." Thus, the court must look at the amounts actually recovered from the other insurance, rather than comparing policy limits, as the trial court did. Id. at 276. ... Moreover, "[a] setoff against the limits of underinsured and uninsured motorist coverage is permitted under R.C. 3937.18(E) provided the setoff is clearly set forth in the provisions of the insurance policy." In re Nationwide Ins. Co. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 11, syllabus. Accordingly, in the matter at hand, the $100,000 per person policy limit is offset by the $300,000 that was paid to appellant.

For underinsured-motorist setoff, § 3937.18(A)(2)'s “amounts available for payment” means amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by the claimant from applicable bodily-injury liability policies.

Masenheimer v. Disselkamp, Unpublished Decision (2-24-2003) · filed 2003-02-24(A)(2)

In Clark v. Scarpelli, 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 2001-Ohio-39, the Ohio Supreme Court was asked to interpret the "amounts available for payment"2 language in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2). The supreme court held that "[f]or the purpose of set-off, the `amounts available for payment' language in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) means the amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by an underinsured motorist claimant from all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies (including from the tortfeasor's liability carrier)." Id. at syllabus. "In other words, it means those amounts the insured actually recovers from a tortfeasor whose liability policy is subject to the claim of the insured[.]" Id. at 276. See, also, Littrell v. Wigglesworth, 91 Ohio St.3d 425, 2001-Ohio-87. ... Upon reviewing Allstate's policy and R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) as interpreted by the supreme court, we hold that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate. The policy clearly grants Allstate a right of setoff. We find that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to when Allstate can exercise its right of setoff. Pursuant to Clark, Littrell, and the terms of the policy, we find that appellants must first recover from the tortfeasors by way of settlements and/or judgments. Once appellants actually recover money from the tortfeasors, and thus, once the amount of recovery is known, Allstate can then exercise its right of setoff, and then pay appellants, if at all, pursuant to the terms of the policy.

Former Section 3937.18 requires an underinsurance provider to set off amounts actually recovered from tortfeasors against the insured's total damages, rather than against policy limits.

Leisure v. State Farm, Unpublished Decision (5-12-2003) · filed 2003-05-12

"Pursuant to former R.C. 3937.18, an underinsurance claim must be paid when the individual covered by an uninsured/underinsured policy suffers damages that exceed those monies available to be paid by the tortfeasor's liabilitycarriers. In determining the amount of underinsurance coverage to be paid on a claim involving an accident governed by former R.C. 3937.18, the underinsurance provider is entitledto set off the amounts actually recovered from the tortfeasor's liabilitycarriers against the insured's total damages, rather than against its policy limits." (Emphasis added.) Id. at syllabus. ... Clearly, pursuant to the Savoie and Cole decisions, in determining setoff, State Farm is only entitled to set off the amount appellees actually received from the tortfeasors, which is $148,000. Therefore, we will not consider the additional $200,000 that was available for payment under Farmers' liability policy.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires reducing underinsured-motorist policy limits by amounts available under liability policies covering persons liable to the insured, but does not require setoff of amounts available under other underinsured-motorist policies.

Wright v. the Cincinnati Insurance Co.,, Unpublished Decision (8-8-2003) · filed 2003-08-08(A)(2)

This statute clearly mandates that the limits of an underinsured motorist policy be reduced by the amount available under applicable liability policies. See Clark v. Scarpelli, 91 Ohio St.3d 271,2001-Ohio-39, 744 N.E.2d 719. However, it does not, contrary to the trial court's analysis, require that the limits be setoff by amounts available under any applicable underinsured motorist policies. Rather, the statute requires that the limits of an underinsured motorist policy be reduced by the amounts available to the insured under "all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured." While Cincinnati attempts to argue that "persons liable to the insured" include not only the tortfeasor but also an insurance company providing underinsured motorist coverage, this argument is not logical given the language of the statute. Even if we were to construe "persons liable to the insured" to include insurance companies providing underinsured motorist coverage, the statute requires setoff of amounts available to the insured under insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured. An insurance company is not covered by a policy, it issues a policy. Therefore, we cannot read the statute to require setoff of amounts available from other underinsured motorist providers. Furthermore, Cincinnati appears to ultimately concede this point. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statute.

Under former § 3937.18(A)(2), an underinsured-motorist insurer offsets amounts recovered from the tortfeasor against the insured's total damages, rather than against the policy limits.

Haney v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (6-24-2003) · filed 2003-06-24(A)(2)

Pursuant to former R.C. 3937.18, an underinsurance claim must be paid when the individual covered by an uninsured/underinsured policy suffers damages that exceed those monies available to be paid by the tortfeasor's liability carriers.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires an insurer providing underinsured-motorist coverage to reduce its policy limits by amounts available for payment from the tortfeasor, calculated from the insurer's policy limits rather than the arbitration award.

Hendry v. Cna Ins. Cos., Unpublished Decision (7-28-2003) · filed 2003-07-28(A)(2)

We conclude the trial court erred when it calculated setoff in this matter. R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) requires an insurer providing underinsured motorist coverage to set off, from its policy limits, any sum available for payment from the tortfeasor.

Section 3937.18(C) requires underinsured-motorist policy limits to be reduced by amounts available under applicable bodily-injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured.

Cline v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (10-7-2003) · filed 2003-10-07(C)

Former R.C.3937.18(A)(2), now subsection (C), provides, "The policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured." ... Based upon these sections, we find Buckeye Union is entitled to a $200,000 setoff.

Section 3937.18(C) reduces underinsured-motorist policy limits by amounts available under applicable bodily-injury liability coverage for persons liable to the insured.

Sandford v. State Farm, Unpublished Decision (6-30-2005) · filed 2005-06-30(C)

R.C. 3937.18(C) states, in relevant part, as follows: ". . . the policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage shall be reduced by those amount available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured . . ." ... Based on the foregoing, we find that the $100,000.00 UM/UIM policy limit under the State Farm policy is set-off by the $100,000.00 received by appellant and her husband from Nationwide.

Section 3937.18(C) requires underinsured-motorist coverage arising by operation of law to be reduced by amounts available under applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured.

Passmore v. Universal Underwriters Insurance · filed 2005-08-26(C)

R.C. 3937.18(C) provides that underinsured-motorist coverage “shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured.” Therefore, any underinsured-motorist coverage that arises by operation of law must be reduced by the amount available under liability coverage received.

Section 3937.18(C) requires comparing the amounts actually accessible from the tortfeasor's liability insurer with the claimant's underinsured-motorist coverage, and it does not allow underinsured-motorist coverage to function as excess insurance.

Bauer v. Liberty Mutual, Unpublished Decision (12-1-2005) · filed 2005-12-01(C)

The Ohio Supreme Court has held that for purposes of setting off the tortfeasor's liability coverage against uninsured motorist coverage limits, R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) requires "a comparison of the amounts that are actually accessible to the claimant from the tortfeasor's automobile liability insurance carrier and the claimant's own underinsured motorist coverage." ... Therefore, Dannielle's and Mary's subrogation liens for medical expenses are not setoff from the aggregate liability amount because these expenses were incurred for the medical care of Mary and Dannielle Bauer, who are insureds under Integon's policy. ... The Court also emphasized that pursuant to R.C. 3937.18, underinsured motorist coverage was not intended to be excess insurance to the tortfeasor's liability coverage and that the statutory language indicated that a person injured by an underinsured motorist should never be afforded greater coverage than that which would be available had the tortfeasors been uninsured. ... Because the Bauers have already received the $25,000 from Integon, along with a total of $75,000 from Progressive and State Farm, no underinsured motorist coverage is available because to do so, would allow them to receive more benefits than if the tortfeasors were uninsured, which is against the policy underlying R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 bars treating underinsured motorist coverage as excess insurance and requires reducing the coverage by amounts available under applicable bodily-injury liability coverage.

Lane v. Nationwide Assur. Co., Unpublished Decision (2-23-2006) · filed 2006-02-23

"* * * Underinsured motorist coverage is not and shall not be excess insurance to other applicable liability coverages, and shall be provided only to afford the insured an amount of protection not greater than that which would be available under insured's uninsured motorist coverage if the person or persons liable were uninsured at the time of the accident. The policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured." ... "By allowing Lane to settle with Erie for significantly less than its policy limits provided and then fully recover the limits of the Nationwide policy, allows Lane to seek a disproportionate windfall from Nationwide in contradiction to R.C. 3937.18."

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires underinsured-motorist coverage to be reduced by payments available from liable parties and limits recovery to no more than the protection that uninsured-motorist coverage would have provided.

Gleason v. Collier, Unpublished Decision (11-22-2006) · filed 2006-11-22(A)(2)

Nevertheless, we find that Auto Owners' UIM coverage for bodily injury must be reduced by all sums paid by or on behalf of "any other person or organization jointly or severally liable * * * for such bodily injury." Moreover, we note that the version of R.C. 3937.18 (A)(2) applicable to this policy mandated that the amount of UIM coverage available to an insured "shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured." Accordingly, we find that the payments from Collier, through State Farm, would act to reduce Auto Owners' UIM coverage obligation. ... Despite the foregoing, we find that, statutorily, Auto Owners is not required to pay any further UIM benefits to appellants. As cited above, the applicable version of R.C. 3937.18 (A)(2) states that "underinsured motorist coverage is not and shall not be excess insurance to other applicable liability coverages, and shall be provided only to afford the insured an amount of protection not greater than that which would be available under the insured's uninsured motorist coverage if the person or persons liable were uninsured at the time of the accident." The Ohio Supreme Court has unequivocally held that "[t]he language of R.C. 3937.18 (A)(2) * * * makes clear that the statute was intended to ensure that a person injured by an underinsured motorist should never be afforded greater protection than that which would have been available had the tortfeasor been uninsured." Clark v. Scarpelli , 91 Ohio St.3d 271 , 2001-Ohio-75 , ¶ 7 .

For underinsured-motorist setoff, the statute reduces coverage only by amounts available under automobile-liability policies covering persons liable for the original accident, not by later medical-malpractice insurance proceeds.

Gray v. Grange Mutual Casualty, Unpublished Decision (12-5-2006) · filed 2006-12-05(A)(2)

The language employed by Grange in the foregoing provisions evidences its intent to limit its coverage to automobile accidents involving uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles. These provisions demonstrate that the contract of insurance for UM/UIM coverage provided in the Grange policy is solely concerned with automobile accidents, not subsequent medical malpractice. Further, the set off provision of the policy employs language clearly drawn from the set off provision in R.C. 3937.18 (A)(2). We have already construed the set off provision of R.C. 3937.18 (A)(2) to encompass amounts available for payment only from automobile liability policies covering persons liable to the insured for original injuries sustained in the automobile accident. Accordingly, we conclude that Grange's policy does not permit it to set off the $700,000 settlement received from the medical malpractice defendants' liability insurance carrier against its UIM coverage limits.

Section 3937.18(B) requires uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages to have the same liability limits and equivalent changes in those limits, but it does not bar a provision that only allocates which insurer pays first.

Bond v. Caudy, Unpublished Decision (12-26-2006) · filed 2006-12-26(B)

The Gregory court found that R.C. 3937.18 (B) precluded Allstate's policy provision, the version in effect in 2001 provides, as follows: (B) Coverages offered under division (A) of this section shall be written for the same limits of liability. No change shall be made in the limits of one of these coverages without an equivalent change in the limits of the other coverage. {¶ 17} Thus, the court found that since Allstate only paid underinsured motorist benefits if the Allstate policy exceeded the limits of liability for similar coverage under any other policy, Allstate provided conditional and uncertain underinsured coverage and abrogated its duty under R.C. 3937.18 . However, we disagree with the reasoning of the court in Gregory. The Allstate policy provided the same limits of liability for insureds and additional insured persons. It does not eliminate or reduce the coverage, merely provides that another policy may pay the injured person first. Allstate's risk allocation does not alter the amount an injured person would have received from a tortfeasor who was insured it simply sets a priority as to which insurer pays first. Allstate's provision did not violate R.C. 3937.18 at that time and is not void.

Section 3937.18 permits a clearly stated policy provision to set off payments from liable tortfeasors against uninsured/underinsured motorist limits, so long as the setoff does not leave the insured with less protection than if the tortfeasor had been uninsured.

Haney v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 2010-06-21(A)(2)

Like the First District in Baker, in so holding we find that, “so long as the policy language is clearly stated and the setoff provision does not lead to any inconsistent or unfair result, any payment made, whether by an uninsured tortfeasor, an underinsured tortfeasor, or one or more joint tortfeasors, may be set off.” ... Here, as in Baker, the reduction or setoff accomplishes the public policy behind the underinsured motorist statute, that is, that the estate does not receive less compensation than it would have received if Ager had died solely as a result of a collision with an uninsured motor vehicle.

For an underinsured motorist policy entered before the amendment, the statutory setoff does not bar the insured's claim.

Seals v. McKelley, Unpublished Decision (12-16-1999) · filed 1999-12-16(A)(2)

In the matter at hand, the record appears to reflect that the insurance contact was entered into on October 23, 1993, a date which preceded the statutory amendments to R.C. § 3937.18. Appellee has filed a document with this Court, entitled, "Appellee's Acknowledgement of Controlling Authority" where it concurs that Ross II is the controlling law in this matter. Essentially, Appellee is conceding that the setoff amendments do not apply to this matter, or at least that the summary judgment granted to Appellee was improper. On this basis, the decision of the trial court must be reversed and the matter remanded to the lower court for a determination pursuant to this Opinion.

In a case with multiple claimants, former subsection (A)(2) measures underinsured-motorist coverage against the liability proceeds available for payment, rather than the liability policy’s limit.

Webb v. McCarty · filed 2007-08-29(A)(2)

Accordingly, Webb and other claimants under his policy are underinsured to the extent that his UM policy’s per-accident limit, $300,000, exceeds the amount available for payment.

Section 3937.18(C) does not require an insurer to reoffer UM coverage for a renewal policy when the named insured previously rejected that coverage with the same insurer.

Hammer v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., Unpublished Decision (8-20-1999) · filed 1999-08-20(C)

It is axiomatic, therefore, that if UM coverage need not beprovided when it has previously been rejected, unless requested in writing, then it also need not be offered or rejected for any renewal policy thereafter. Hence, we find that once an insured has rejected an initial offer of UM coverage, an insurer is not required to re-offer UM coverage, or obtain an additional rejec tion, for any renewal policy thereafter. ... "Renewal policy" is not defined by the Ohio Revised Code. However, R.C. 3937.18(C) clearly did not require that a subsequent policy had to be identical to the initial policy in order to be considered a "renewal policy." ... Based on the foregoing, we find that where an insurer provides an insured liability coverage, all subsequent, consecu tive liability policies issued to the same named insured are "renewal" policies for purposes of R.C. 3937.18(C). ... As a renewal policy, if UM coverage was previously rejected, Lumbermens was not required to re-offer coverage or obtain a rejection for policy "03." ... In summation, we find that UM coverage was effectively rejected by ADS. We further find that policy "03" was a renewal policy. Because UM coverage had already been rejected in connec tion with a policy previously issued to ADS by Lumbermens, we find that Lumbermens was not required to re-offer UM coverage to ADS in connection with its 1996 renewal policy. See R.C. 3937.18(C);Hoskins, supra; and Stacy, supra.

Subsection (A) makes uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage available when the insurer has not obtained a written rejection of that coverage.

United Services Auto. Assoc. v. Gambucci, Unpublished Decision (2-18-2000) · filed 2000-02-18(A)

Given the clear and unambiguous language of the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in appellee's policy, we find absent a written rejection of said coverage pursuant to R.C.3937.18(A), the coverage is available sub judice.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) and (H) preclude an insured from recovering underinsured motorist benefits when the tortfeasor's insurer has already paid the decedent's estate policy limits equal to the insured's underinsured motorist policy limits.

Washington v. Citizens Security M. O. Ins., Unpublished Decision (9-21-2000) · filed 2000-09-21(A)(2) and (H)

Courts applying the Senate Bill 20 amendments in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) and (H), in cases involving multiple claimants and wrongful deaths, have determined that insureds are precluded from recovering from their own underinsured motorist carrier after the tortfeasor's liability insurance carrier has already paid the decedent's estate policy limits identical to those in the underinsured motorist policy from which recovery is sought. ... In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the torfeasor's insurer paid its policy limits of $50,000 to the decedent's estate. It is equally undisputed that the $50,000 per person liability policy limit paid to the estate is equal to the $50,000 per person underinsured motorist policy limit from which further recovery is sought. ... More importantly, however, we believe that the Senate Bill 20 amendments to R.C. 3937.18 were designed to preclude additional recovery under these circumstances. ... Accordingly, the Washingtons' fifth assignment of error is overruled.

Under § 3937.18(C), the statutory presumption created by a signed rejection of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage is rebuttable, and the 1997 amendments did not eliminate Linko's requirements for a meaningful written offer.

Pillo v. Stricklin, Unpublished Decision (1-28-2002) · filed 2002-01-28(C)

Appellants do not argue that the rejection form at issue meets the requirements of Linko, but rather that Linko is inapplicable sub judice because said case interpreted a former version of R.C. 3937.18. Appellants argue the version of R.C. 3937.18 applicable sub judice, as amended by H.B. 261, effective September 3, 1997, altered the requirements of offers and rejections and made them "less stringent then those at issue in Linko." ... Appellees argue H.B. 261 did not eliminate the Linko requirements. ... We concur with appellees that the 1997 Amendments to R.C. 3937.18 did not eliminate the Linko requirements. As noted by appellees, no provisions in H.B. 261 clarified or modified what the contents of a written offer must be. ... Thus, since the statutory presumption set forth in R.C. 3937.18(C) is not `specifically designated to be conclusive', we find that the same is rebuttable. ... In short, the presumption of an offer of coverages consistent with R.C. 3937.18(A) was rebuttable. Based upon the foregoing, we find the trial court did not err in finding that the uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage rejection form of the Continental policy did not satisfy the requirements of R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18's requirements for rejecting or reducing uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage are governed by the standards stated in Linko for this policy.

Morgenstern v. Cincinnati Insurance Companies · filed 2002-08-05

{¶ 17} In appellant’s first assignment of error, she maintains that the trial court erred in finding that Linko did not apply to Cincinnati’s umbrella policy. We agree. ... {¶ 19} We adhere to these previous decisions. For the reasons stated therein, we reverse the November 7, 2001 judgment entry to the extent it found Linko to be inapplicable.

Section 3937.18(C) permits a named insured to reject UM coverage only through a written, signed rejection following an adequate offer, and the rejection must be received before the policy begins.

Poulton v. American Economy Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (12-23-2002) · filed 2002-12-23(C)

Pursuant to H.B. 261, a named insured may reject UM coverage if it is in writing and signed by the named insured. ... If any of the elements are absent, there is no express offer and no rejection can be made as a matter of law. ... We likewise find the Gyoricase has not been superceded by H.B. 261, and that the signed rejection must be received prior to the commencement date of the policy. ... We find the trial court correctly determined there was no valid, knowing, and timely rejection of the UM/IUM motorist coverage.

Section 3937.18 requires an insurer to offer UM/UIM coverage, with any complete rejection or reduction in limits documented in writing; it does not require UM/UIM coverage to be equivalent in substance to liability coverage.

Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Xayphonh, Unpublished Decision (3-26-2003) · filed 2003-03-26

Appellants' argument that UM/UIM coverage must be equivalent in substance to the liability coverage or the policy violates R.C. 3937.18 is without merit. R.C. 3937.18 does not require such a result. See R.C. 3937.18; Holliman v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1999),86 Ohio St.3d 414, 417. R.C. 3937.18 requires only that UM/UIM be offered and, if rejected completely or accepted in a reduced amount, the rejection or reduction must be in writing. See Gyori, 76 Ohio St.3d 565;Linko, 90 Ohio St.3d 445.

Former § 3937.18(A) did not require a self-insurer, including a fronting-policy holder bearing the practical risk of loss, to carry UM/UIM coverage, while former § 3937.18(C) required pre-2001 coverage rejections to satisfy the Linko requirements.

Landers v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., Unpublished Decision (6-26-2003) · filed 2003-06-26(A), (C)

At the time Lucent entered into the contract of insurance with Reliance National, former R.C. 3937.18(A) generally required that insurance companies offer uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage when issuing automobile liability insurance. ... If coverage is not specifically rejected by the insured, it arises by operation of law. ... A very significant exception to this law exists in cases involving self-insurers. ... For these reasons, we find that Lucent is self-insured and thus no UM/UIM coverage can arise by operation of law. ... During the relevant time frame, R.C. 3937.18(C) provided that insureds could reject UM/UIM coverage. ... Because the commissioners signed the rejection after the enactment of HB 260, but before the October 2001 amendments which overruled Linko, the Linko requirements are applicable. American States' failure to include the requisite elements for a knowing rejection means that UM/UIM coverage arises by operation of law.

Section 3937.18(C) permits a properly offered and expressly rejected UM/UIM coverage to remain rejected for subsequent renewal policies unless the insured requests coverage in writing.

Coldwell v. Allstate Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (9-29-2003) · filed 2003-09-29(C)

Consequently, viewing the entire insurance agreement as contemplated by Linko, we find as a matter of law that Allstate made a proper offer and Carolyn made an express, knowing rejection of UM coverage in 1988. As the rejection of UM coverage occurred after the 1988 policy period began, it was effective beginning with the next policy period and renewed every policy thereafter pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(C).

Former § 3937.18 requires automobile liability policies to make uninsured- and underinsured-motorist coverage available, with coverage arising by operation of law when the insured does not expressly reject it.

Miller v. Watkins, Unpublished Decision (6-18-2004) · filed 2004-06-18

Former R.C. 3937.18 required that both uninsured- and underinsured-motorist coverage be made available under automobile liability insurance policies. ... If the insured did not expressly reject uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage, the coverage arose by operation of law. ... Because the purported rejection of the uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage was invalid, the coverage arose by operation of law pursuant to former R.C. 3937.18.

Under the governing version of § 3937.18, an express rejection of offered uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage may be established through separate proposal and rejection documents and extrinsic testimony, even when the insurer did not quote coverage equal to the liability limits.

Augenstein v. Murphy, Unpublished Decision (10-23-2006) · filed 2006-10-23(A)(2), (C)

Upon a review of the rejection and the proposal for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, it is apparent that there is no dispute that a written proposal was made and presented to Golden Hawk Transportation concerning uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage and that a rejection was executed by Raymond Miller on the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.

Section 3937.18 provides uninsured motorist coverage by law unless the named insured overtly and expressly rejects it.

Brady v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Group · filed 1973-06-19(A)

It is the view of the majority herein that where the facts show that there has been an express rejection of uninsured motorists coverage, as within the facts of the instant case, there is no issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) treats a vehicle as underinsured only when the coverage available is less than the insured's uninsured motorist coverage limits.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Reinhart · filed 1996-10-11(A)(2)

At the time of the accident, the tortfeasor’s insurance policy contained identical limits of liability coverage as those policies held by appellants. Because the policies contained identical limits, the tortfeasor was not underinsured as defined under R.C. 3937.18(A)(2). Consequently, appellants were not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits.

The section requires an insurer's UIM offer to describe the coverage and premium and state the coverage limits before a rejection can be effective.

Taylor v. Universal Underwriters Ins., Unpublished Decision (3-25-2003) · filed 2003-03-25(C)

In the present case, no documents fulfill the offer requirements set forth in Linko. ... Therefore, because there has been no valid offer and rejection of UIM coverage in this case, pursuant to Kemper, UIM coverage arises by operation of law. The trial court erred in finding otherwise.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured motorist coverage equal to liability coverage unless the insured expressly rejects the equivalent coverage, and places the burden of proving that rejection on the insurer.

Poots v. Motorist Insurance Companies · filed 1986-12-10(A)(1), (C)

In the absence of an express rejection of equivalent amounts of coverage, uninsured motorist insurance is provided the insured in an amount equivalent to the insured’s liability coverage by operation of law. ... If Motorist did not go forward in presenting evidence tending to establish an express rejection of such equivalent amounts of coverage, the trial court would have had no choice but to declare that both policies included such coverage by operation of law. Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that Motorist had the burden of proof.

Section 3937.18(A) bases UM/UIM recovery on whether the insured is legally entitled to recover damages from the tortfeasor, not on where the decedent's wrongful death occurred.

Clement v. Grange Mutual Casualty Company, Unpublished Decision (4-22-1998) · filed 1998-04-22(A)

R.C.3937.18(A) distinguishes between insureds "who are legally entitled to recover damages." ... The test is not where a wrongful death occurs, but whether the insured is legally entitled to recover damages from the tortfeasor.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) does not provide uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage when the accident state's no-fault law substantially abolishes tort liability, because the insured is not legally entitled to recover from the tortfeasor under that state's law.

Bogden v. Allstate Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (11-10-1999) · filed 1999-11-10(A)(1)

Applying the Supreme Court's holding in Kurent and this court's application of Kurent in Payne and Duffy to the facts of the present case, it is apparent that the trial court properly determined that plaintiffs-appellants were not entitled to uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage since they were not "legally entitled to recover" from the tortfeasor under Michigan law. See Nichols v. Mets Paramedic Serv. (Aug. 13, 1997), Tuscarawas App. No. 96 AP 110091, unreported. Contrary to plaintiffs-appellants' position, R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) is not applicable to the case herein since Michigan's no-fault insurance laws do not provide immunity for the tortfeasor, but rather, substantially abolished tort liability in automobile accident cases subject to certain exceptions where severe physical harm results. Therefore, since plaintiffs-appellants have no legal right of recovery under Michigan law, there is no corresponding right to uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage in this instance.

Section 3937.18(A) treats an insured as legally entitled to recover when the insured can prove the elements of the claim against the tortfeasor, even after settling with the tortfeasor; the remaining question is the amount of UM/UIM coverage owed.

Dimalanta v. Travelers Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (2-6-2003) · filed 2003-02-06(A)

R.C. 3937.18(A) provides that uninsured motorist coverage is available to protect an insured person who is "legally entitled to recover damages" from the owner or operator of an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle. ... Rather, the court has stated that "the phrase `legally entitled to recover' means the insured must be able to prove the elements of his or her claim' against the tortfeasor." ... Likewise, in this case, appellant's settlement with State Farm for the policy limits demonstrates there is no issue regarding appellant's ability to prove the elements of his claim against the tortfeasor. Instead, the issue is the amount of UM/UIM coverage, if any, that Travelers must provide. Accordingly, Travelers' argument is without merit.

Section 3937.18 provides UIM coverage only when the insured is legally entitled to recover bodily-injury damages from the underinsured motorist.

Dorsey v. Campbell Hauling, Unpublished Decision (6-26-2003) · filed 2003-06-26(A)(1) and (A)(2)

Pursuant to statute and the UIM coverage provisions in CIC's insurance policies issued to plaintiff, plaintiff had a claim for UIM coverage only if she was "legally entitled to recover" damages for her bodily injury from the underinsured motorist. Former R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) and (2); Cole v. Holland (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 220, syllabus; Kurent v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 242, 245-246. The UIM statute is "premised on the tortfeasor's legal liability to the injured insured" and is intended to provide UIM coverage for injured persons who have a legal cause of action against a tortfeasor, whose liability coverage is less than the injured person's damages. (Emphasis sic.) State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Alexander (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 397, 400. Thus, Campbell Hauling's legal liability for plaintiff's injuries was a condition precedent to her entitlement to recover any UIM benefits from CIC. Kurent, supra. Accordingly, if Campbell Hauling was not legally liable to plaintiff for bodily injury damages resulting from the accident, CIC had no liability to pay UIM benefits to plaintiff. Id.

Under the 1994 version, a claimant seeking UIM benefits under § 3937.18(A)(2) must establish the tortfeasor's legal liability, and a wrongful-death claimant must be able to prove every element of the wrongful-death claim, including timely filing within two years.

Fish v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-18-2003) · filed 2003-08-18(A)(1), (A)(2)

Thus, we conclude, under a Scott-Pontzer analysis for UIM coverage pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), a person must establish the tortfeasor's legal liability as a condition precedent to UIM coverage. In a wrongful death cause of action, which was not recognized by common law, the two-year time limitation contained in R.C. 2125.02(D) is an element of the claim. Therefore, in order for appellees to be legally entitled to recover UIM damages under Travelers' policy, they must be able to prove the elements of a wrongful death claim. Appellees are unable to do this because they did not bring a wrongful death action within two years of Kenneth Fish's death.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) does not specify when an insured must be legally entitled to recover damages, so an insured's failure to seek uninsured-motorist coverage until after the wrongful-death limitations period does not by itself defeat coverage.

McCollam v. American Foreign Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (11-24-2003) · filed 2003-11-24(A)(1)

Therefore, we find the statute is ambiguous as to when the insured must be "legally entitled to recover." Because R.C. 3937.18 is a remedial statute to be liberally construed to give effect to the remedy it provides, the fact that appellees did not seek uninsured coverage until after the expiration of the two year statute of limitations does not serve as a basis to deny uninsured coverage.

Section 3937.18 allows an insured to seek UM/UIM coverage when the insured is legally entitled to recover from an uninsured motorist, even without pursuing recovery in a tort action.

Fischer v. United Services Automobile Assoc, Unpublished Decision (4-1-2004) · filed 2004-04-01

It is the legal entitlement to recover from an uninsured motorist, not the pursuit of recovery itself, that gives rise to a claim for UM coverage. Because R.C. 3937.18 is a remedial statute to be liberally construed to give effect to the remedy it provides, we find the fact that Fischer failed to pursue the wrongful death claim does not preclude him from seeking UM/UIM coverage under the statute.

Section 3937.18(1) does not bar uninsured motorist coverage solely because the insured failed to sue the tortfeasor within the statute of limitations.

Parker v. Buckeye Union Insurance, Unpublished Decision (5-9-2003) · filed 2003-05-09(1)

Like the Tenth District, we continue to believe that the reasoning of Binegar is sound and hold that the Parkers' failure to sue Garland within the statute of limitations does not render them no longer "legally entitled to recover" under the policy.

Section 3937.18’s removal of the phrase “legally entitled to recover” does not prevent an uninsured motorist policy from requiring the insured to be legally entitled to recover from the motorist.

Marusa v. Erie Ins. Co. · filed 2011-12-08

Snyder addressed the “legally entitled to recover” requirement and held that although the 2001 amendments to R.C. 3937.18 eliminated the phrase, that “does not mean that insurance contracts may not require proof that the insured is legally entitled to recover from the uninsured motorist.” Id. at ¶24. ... The Marusas were not legally entitled to recover from Officer Canda because of his immunity. Thus, when the definition and promise sections of the policy are read together, the Marusas were not entitled to coverage under the policy.

Former subsection (A)(2) requires underinsured-motorist benefits when the insured's damages exceed amounts available under the tortfeasor's liability coverage, with actual recoveries set off against total damages.

Laubenthal v. Midwestern Indemnity, Unpublished Decision (4-24-1998) · filed 1998-04-24(A)(2)

Upon review, we conclude that Laubenthal's cause of action accrued at the time of the accident. ... Thus, in view of our conclusion that the cause of action accrual date for a claim to underinsured motorist coverage is the date of the accident, the applicable law to this matter is that set forth in the third syllabus paragraph Savoie, 67 Ohio St.3d 500, and the underinsurance statute in effect at the time of theSavoie decision.

Section 3937.18(A)(2), as amended by Am.Sub. S.B. 20, is constitutional against the Ohio constitutional challenges raised in this case.

Krause v. Streamo, Unpublished Decision (9-3-2002) · filed 2002-09-03(A)(2)

Appellants now maintain that the trial court erred in sustaining both motions for summary judgment since R.C.3937.18(A)(2), as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. 20, is unconstitutional. ... Previously, in Plottv. Colonial Ins. Co. (1998), 126 Ohio App.3d 416, 710 N.E.2d 740, we found that revised R.C. 3937.18 did not violate Article I, Section 19(a) of the Ohio Constitution. ... Since based on the foregoing, R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), as amended by Am. Sub. S.B. 20, is constitutional, appellants' fifth assignment of error is overruled.

Section 3937.18 permits a clearly worded policy to apply the per-person limit collectively to claims arising from one person's bodily injury, including death.

Williams v. Carmean, Unpublished Decision (5-6-1998) · filed 1998-05-06

The single issue in this case is whether the policy language is sufficient to comply with the provisions of R.C. 3937.18 and R.C. 3937.44 and thereby limit the claimants in the pending wrongful death action to $100,000 collectively. ... We hold that the policy language is clear. Although the word "collectively" is not used, the policy unequivocally states that the liability of Motorists Mutual Insurance Company is limited to $100,000 for damages for bodily injury, including death for one person in any one accident, regardless of how many individuals assert a claim.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an automobile liability policy to make all claims arising from one person’s bodily injury or death collectively subject to that person’s policy limit as a single claim, without requiring exact statutory wording.

Kasakaitas v. Heritage Mutual Insurance · filed 1999-02-09(H)

While the statute does allow enforcement of policy limitations, it does not require specific wording. Rather, the statute requires the policy “include terms and conditions to the effect that all claims resulting from or arising out of any one person’s bodily injury, including death, shall collectively be subject to the limit of the policy applicable to bodily injury, including death, sustained by one person, and for the purpose of such policy limit shall constitute a single claim.” (Emphasis added.)

Section 3937.18(H) permits an uninsured-motorist policy to limit total recovery for damages arising from one person's bodily injury, including damages sustained by others, to the policy's per-person limit.

Lippert v. Peace, Unpublished Decision (4-23-1999) · filed 1999-04-23(H)

This limit of liability is permitted by R.C. 3937.18(H). See Karr v. Borchardt (Dec. 24, 1998), Seneca App. No. 13-98-36, unreported. The policy language in this case limits liability to the "each person" maximum for all damages arising out of bodily injury to one person. Since Bryan's loss of consortium claim arises from Natalie's bodily injury, the recovery is limited to the $50,000 per person maximum.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an automobile policy to treat all claims arising from one person's bodily injury as a single claim subject to the per-person limit, regardless of the number of insureds or claims.

Westerfield v. Metropolitan Insurance · filed 1998-09-17(H)

As a result, since the terms of appellee’s policy were unambiguous and conformed with both R.C. 3937.44 and 3937.18, it is clear that Harmon Westerfield is not allowed to recover damages for his wife’s medical expenses. The policy specifically limits- its liability by providing that the “declarations for ‘each person’ is the maximum we will pay any one person for all damages resulting from any one accident.” Under the terms of the policy, “damages” is defined as “the cost of paying those who suffer bodily injury or property damage.” Consequently, since the applicable limit concerning all claims for damages, either consequential or direct, is controlled by the number of injured persons in the accident, and, here, only Mrs. Westerfield was injured, the policy’s $50,000 “each person” limit is controlling.

Section 3937.18(H) permits a UM/UIM policy to treat all claims arising from one person's bodily injury or death as a single claim subject to the applicable per-person limit, regardless of the number of insureds or claims.

Kirby v. Pioneer Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (3-22-1999) · filed 1999-03-22(H)

Any automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance that includes coverages offered under division (A) of this section [UM/UIM coverage] and that provides a limit of coverage for payment of damages for bodily injury, including death, sustained by any one person in any one automobile accident, may, notwithstanding Chapter 2521. of the Revised Code, include terms and conditions to the effect that all claims resulting from or arising out of any one person's bodily injury, including death, shall collectively be subject to the limit of the policy applicable to bodily injury, including death, sustained by one person, and, for the purpose of such policy limit shall constitute a single claim. Any such policy limit shall be enforceable regardless of the number of insureds, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the declarations of the policy, or vehicles involved in the accident. ... We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in finding that the "Limit of Liability" in the Pioneer policy limits recovery for multiple wrongful death claimants to a single "per person" claim.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an automobile policy to make all claims arising from one person's bodily injury or death collectively subject to the single-person policy limit.

Estate of Fox v. Continental Insurance, Unpublished Decision (5-7-1999) · filed 1999-05-07(H)

By contrast, the insurance contract in this case was renewed after the amendments, meaning that Savoie and Schaeffer would not apply. Instead, the rights and duties of Buckeye Union or Continental and Appellants would be governed by R.C. 3937.18(H). As we have already said, that section expressly lets insurers restrict multiple wrongful death claimants to a single "each person" limit.

Subsection (H) permits an automobile liability policy to make all claims arising from one person's bodily injury a single claim subject to the per-person limit, but the policy language must actually trigger that limitation; ambiguous language is construed in favor of the insured.

Beagle v. Mosley, Unpublished Decision (7-23-1999) · filed 1999-07-23(H)

Because appellants and their insurer both agree that R.C. 3937.18(H) is applicable to this case, we begin by reviewing that provision. ... The dispute between appellants and their insurer is whether the language in their insurance policy actually triggered the provisions in the above quoted statute that would allow the insurer to limit appellants to recovering payment for a per person limit of $50,000. ... Applying these guidelines, we agree with appellants that the policy language in this case is ambiguous at best. ... Because the language in the policy is ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of appellants. The trial court erred when it granted appellants' insurer summary judgment after ruling that appellants could only collect payment for one per person limit for underinsurance, less the per person limit of the tortfeasor's insurance coverage.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an automobile liability policy with underinsured motorist coverage to make all claims arising from one person's bodily injury collectively subject to the policy's per-person limit.

Davidson v. Uhrig, Unpublished Decision (6-28-2001) · filed 2001-06-28(H)

The clear import of the foregoing provisions, as applied to underinsured motorist coverage, is to permit automobile insurers to limit all claims, including consortium claims, arising out of any single individual's bodily injury to the per person limit shown in the insurance policy.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an insurer to limit all claims derived from one person's injury in one accident to the single per-person coverage limit applicable to the injured person, without limiting damages recoverable from the tortfeasor.

Gilbert v. Mueller, Unpublished Decision (6-21-2002) · filed 2002-06-21(H)

Under R.C. 3937.18(H), as amended, insurers may now validly limit claims derived from any one person's injury in one accident to the single per person coverage limit applicable to the injured person. This court has previously reached that conclusion.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an insurer to subject all claims arising from one person's bodily injury to a single per-person limit only when the policy language clearly and unambiguously imposes that limit.

Webb v. McCarty, Unpublished Decision (2-23-2006) · filed 2006-02-23(H)

Therefore, based on this court's decision inFerguson, which this court followed in Hall, we find that by using the phrase "for bodily injury," appellee's limits of payment section in its UM/UIM coverage form does not clearly and unambiguously limit all claims derived from one person's bodily injury to the single per-person limit of the policy, i.e., $100,000.

The 1994 amendment to § 3937.18(A)(2) does not apply retroactively to an earlier accident, so the pre-amendment rule governs the insured’s underinsured-motorist claim.

Colegrove v. Weyrick, Unpublished Decision (5-6-1998) · filed 1998-05-06(A)(2)

This court held in Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. McBee (Aug. 21, 1996), Summit App. No. 17440, unreported, at 4, that R.C. 3937.18, as amended in October 1994, cannot be applied retroactively. ... This claim is not affected by the recent amendment of R.C.3937.18.

The pre-S.B. 267 version of § 3937.18 applies during the policy's existing two-year guaranteed period; the S.B. 267 version cannot apply until that period ends.

Yates v. Allstate Ins., Unpublished Decision (3-28-2005) · filed 2005-03-28

Accordingly, pursuant to Slone, we find that it is the pre-S.B. 267 version of R.C. 3937.18 that is applicable.

Section 3937.18 does not require UM/UIM coverage for a commercial general liability policy that is not an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy.

Wheeler v. Western Reserve Mut. Cas. Co., Unpublished Decision (4-9-2003) · filed 2003-04-09

Accordingly, we conclude that the CGL policy issued by Lightning Rod to Worner Roofing was not an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy and was therefore not subject to R.C. 3937.18. Underinsured motorists coverage does not apply by operation of law, and Lightning Rod was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 3937.18 did not require an employer's pre-House Bill 261 commercial general liability policy to offer UM/UIM coverage when its valet-parking or mobile-equipment provisions did not turn it into a motor vehicle policy.

Welsh v. Indiana Insurance, Unpublished Decision (10-27-2003) · filed 2003-10-27

The parties agree that this is a pre-House Bill 261 policy. This court has previously held that neither a valet parking provision nor a mobile equipment provision, in a pre-House Bill 261 case, renders a CGL into a motor vehicle policy. Fish v. OhioCas. Ins. Co. (Aug. 18, 2003), Stark App. No. 2003CA0036, 2003-Ohio-4381 (citing Heidt v. Federal Ins. Co. (April 7, 2003), Stark App. No. 2002CA00314, 2003-Ohio-1785). Therefore, Westfield was not required to offer UM/UIM coverage and no such coverage is created by operation of law for failing to offer such coverage.

Section 3937.18 permits an insurer to provide underinsured-motorist coverage with a per-person limit that aggregates claims arising from one person's bodily injury and to offset the coverage by payments from the tortfeasor's insurer.

Waite v. Progressive Insurance · filed 1998-06-12(H); (A)(2)

R.C. 3937.18(H), as amended by Am.Sub. S.B. No. 20, refers to underinsured motorist coverage; it specifically permits an insurance company to “include terms and conditions to the effect that all claims resulting from or arising out of any one person’s bodily injury, including death, shall collectively be subject to'the limit of the policy applicable to bodily injury, including death, sustained by one person, and for the purpose of such policy limit shall constitute a single claim. Any such policy limit shall be enforceable regardless of the number of insureds, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the declarations or policy, or vehicles involved in the accident.” ... As noted above, R.C. 3937.18 permits an insurance company to contract with its insured for underinsured motorist coverages, to limit the amounts paid on those coverages, and to offset those amounts by any payments made by the tortfeasor’s insurance company. R.C. 3937.18(A)(2).

Section 3937.18(H) permits an insurer to aggregate multiple derivative claims arising from one insured's bodily injury into a single per-person limit, and § 3937.18(A)(2) treats coverage as underinsured only when the tortfeasor's available liability limits are lower than the insured's UM/UIM limits.

Somock v. Hall, Unpublished Decision (1-23-1999) · filed 1999-01-23(H), (A)(2)

As quoted above, R.C.3937.18(H) explicitly authorizes insurers to limit multiple derivative claims, that arise out of the injuries of a single insured, to a single per-person coverage limit. ... Because the tortfeasor's liability coverage was limited to $100,000 per person, the same as appellants' underinsurance coverage limit, they are not "underinsured" under R.C.3937.18(A)(2).

Section 3937.18(H) permits an insurer to limit multiple derivative claims arising from one insured’s injury to a single per-person coverage limit, and under division (A)(2) underinsured status is determined by comparing the tortfeasor’s liability-policy limits with the insured’s underinsured-motorist-policy limits.

Smock v. Hall · filed 1999-01-25(H); (A)(2)

While their argument had validity prior to the amendment of R.C. 3937.18, it is no longer viable. As quoted above, R.C. 3937.18(H) explicitly authorizes insurers to limit multiple derivative claims, that arise out of the injuries of a single insured, to a single per-person coverage limit. Appellee’s policy included such a limitation that was properly held enforceable by the trial court. ... Because the tortfeasor’s liability coverage was limited to $100,000 per person, the same as appellants’ underinsurance coverage limit, they are not underinsured under R.C. 3937.18(A)(2).

Section 3937.18(H) permits an insurer to limit all claims arising from one bodily injury or death to one policy limit, while Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires reducing underinsured-motorist limits by amounts available under applicable liability coverage.

Rogers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (7-12-1999) · filed 1999-07-12(H), (A)(2)

Under their first issue for review, appellants argue that summary judgment was inappropriate because, even if S.B. 20 controls, the policy language was too ambiguous to effectively incorporate the per person limit. S.B. 20 allows insurers to limit all claims arising out of a single bodily injury or death to a single policy limit. R.C. 3937.18(H). ... We find that the contract clearly and unambiguously limits all claims arising out of a single death to the single per person limit of $100,000. The contractual limit is authorized under the current version of R.C. 3937.18(H). ... S.B. 20 clearly states: "The policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured." R.C.3937.18(A) (2). ... Therefore, the insurer is entitled to offset against underinsured motorist coverage those amounts available for payment from the tortfeasor's insurance carrier.

Section 3937.18 permits an insurer to aggregate derivative consortium claims under one injured person's per-person limit and to offset underinsured coverage by the tortfeasor's policy limits available for payment, so no underinsured benefits are due when those limits exceed the insured's UIM limits.

Carruth v. Erie Ins., Unpublished Decision (9-21-2000) · filed 2000-09-21(A)(2), (H)

R.C. 3937.18(H) as amended provides: ... Any such policy limit shall be enforceable regardless of the number of insureds, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the declarations or policy, or vehicles involved in the accident. ... A plain reading of this policy language leads us to conclude that the policy validly limited loss of consortium claims to the single per person policy limit applicable to appellant Arthur Carruth. ... Thus, by the terms of the policy appellants Jacqueline and Alicia Carruth are not entitled to their own per person limit. ... As the court in Stickney concluded, we also find that based upon the clear legislative intent of S.B. 20 the policies limits of liability language is not in conflict with R.C. 3937.18 et seq. ... Thus, appellants' underinsurance motorist coverage policy limit was fully offset by the tortfeasor's coverage by the terms of the subject insurance contracts; appellants in this case are not underinsured as to the alleged tortfeasor because the each person limits of his liability coverage at $100,000 is greater than the each person limits of appellants' $50,000 underinsured coverage provided in each policy issued by appellee State Farm. ... Accordingly, we find appellee not obligated to pay underinsured risk coverage.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) permits a setoff of amounts available under the tortfeasor's liability coverage, while divisions (G) and (H) permit anti-stacking and single-claim/per-person limits.

Stauffer v. State Farm Insurance Companies, Unpublished Decision (2-7-2001) · filed 2001-02-07(A)(2), (G), (H)

Under the current version of R.C. 3937.18, Appellants are precluded from obtaining underinsured motorist coverage. ... In this case, each of Appellants' policies contained uninsured/underinsured coverage of $50,000 per person, the same as Anita Wells' automobile liability policy. Thus, in accordance with the plain language of the above statute, Appellee was entitled to set off the $50,000 of recovery already provided by the tortfeasor's insurer against that same amount contained in Appellants' policies. Furthermore, R.C. 3937.18 precludes each of the appellants in this case from asserting a separate claim as a result of Taylor Stauffer's death, regardless of the fact that four automobile liability insurance policies were in effect at the time. ... The language contained in the policies at issue contains such limitations. Thus, in accordance with the above quoted statutes, Appellants are subject to the highest per person coverage limit offered under the policies, i.e. $50,000.

The statute permits underinsured-motorist policies to combine all claims arising from one person's bodily injury under a single per-person limit and permits setoffs of amounts available to the insureds, but not amounts available to noninsured claimants.

Post v. Harber, Unpublished Decision (2-16-2001) · filed 2001-02-16(A)(2), (H)

The clear import of the foregoing provisions, as applied to underinsured motorist coverage, is to permit automobile insurers to limit all claims, including consortium claims, arising out of any single individual's bodily injury to the per person limit shown in the insurance policy. ... We therefore disagree with appellees' suggestion that R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) permits a strict policy limit to policy limit comparison in all situations. Rather, the statute provides a set off of the amount available to an insured or insureds. An insurer may not set off amounts available to other claimants who are not "insureds" under its policy. ... Thus, we believe that under the facts presented in the case at bar, R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) permits the insurers to aggregate appellants' claims and to set off the amounts collectively available to appellants under all applicable automobile liability policies.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) permits an insurer to reduce underinsured-motorist benefits only by amounts available for payment to the insured making the claim, not amounts paid to another insured claimant.

Catledge v. American Select Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (12-20-2001) · filed 2001-12-20(A)(2)

The remaining determination is what amounts are available for payment to appellants. In this case, the tortfeasor carried an insurance policy with Progressive with a per person limit of $12,500. Since Progressive actually paid the $12,500 limit to appellants, this amount clearly qualifies as an amount "available for payment" and could be applied by appellee as a setoff against the $300,000 limit applicable to appellants. The record reveals no other "amounts available for payment" to appellants. Therefore, appellee was entitled to only setoff $12,500 against the $300,000 limit. After applying the setoff, appellants are entitled to $287,500 under their policy with appellee. Since appellee has already paid appellants $262,500 under the policy, appellee is required to pay appellants the remaining difference, $25,000, the total amount appellee and the trial court incorrectly applied as a setoff. Under this calculation, appellee does not have to pay any more than the $300,000 single policy limit.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) permits an underinsured-motorist insurer to set off amounts actually accessible to the insured from the tortfeasor's liability insurance, while section 3937.18(H) permits all claims arising from one person's bodily injury to be subject to a single per-person policy limit.

Cordle v. Jackson, Unpublished Decision (1-18-2002) · filed 2002-01-18(A)(2), (H)

Moreover, due to the facts in this case, a limit-to-limit comparison would result in the same outcome; however, as explained above, appellants are not entitled to UM benefits because (1) R.C.3937.18(H) and State Farm's policy limit appellants' UM benefits to $50,000; (2) besides appellants, no other persons are entitled to any portion of the tortfeasor's liability insurance; (3) the amount available from the tortfeasor is equivalent to appellants' UM coverage; and (4) pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), the amount of appellants' UM coverage can be entirely setoff by the amounts actually accessible to appellants from the tortfeasor's liability insurance.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an insurer to aggregate all claims arising from one person's bodily injury under a single per-person limit, while section 3937.18(A)(2) permits reducing underinsured-motorist coverage by amounts available under applicable liability insurance.

Sammons v. Barrett, Unpublished Decision (6-24-2002) · filed 2002-06-24(H), (A)(2)

Pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(H) "[a]n insurer is permitted to include policy language providing that all claims arising from the bodily injury sustained by one person shall be considered collectively as a single claim subject to a single "per person" limit." Id. ... Therefore, appellants are not underinsured since the $12,500.00 limit of liability contained in the tortfeasor's insurance policy is equal to the $12,500.00 in underinsured motorist coverage contained in the American Family Insurance policy issued to appellant Deborah Sammons. Appellee American Family Insurance Company is permitted to setoff the $12,500.00 received by appellant Deborah Sammons from the tortfeasor against the $12,500.00 "each person" limit in the insurance policy.

Section 3937.18 does not prohibit an insurer from defining “underinsured motor vehicle” or “bodily injury” in its policy, and subsection (H) permits the policy to subject all claims arising from one person's bodily injury to the applicable per-person limit.

Bentley v. Progressive Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (11-26-2002) · filed 2002-11-26(A), (H)

As we explain below, the clear, unambiguous policy provisions contained in appellant's policy preclude appellee from receiving UIM benefits. Additionally, the clear, unambiguous policy provisions are not contrary to the coverage mandated under R.C. 3937.18. Nothing in R.C. 3937.18 prohibits appellant from defining what constitutes an "underinsured motor vehicle" or "bodily injury" and nothing in appellant's definitions of an underinsured motor vehicle or bodily injury contradicts R.C. 3937.18. ... The clear import of the foregoing provisions, as applied to underinsured motorist coverage, is to permit automobile insurers to limit all claims, including [derivative] claims, arising out of any single individual's bodily injury to the per-person limit shown in the insurance policy.

Section 3937.18(E) permits an enforceable subrogation clause as a precondition to an insurer’s duty to provide underinsured motorist coverage.

Weiker v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 1998-06-17(E)

Pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(E), the inclusion of a subrogation clause in insurance contracts providing underinsured motorist coverage is a valid and enforceable precondition to the duty to provide such coverage.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires underinsured-motorist limits to be reduced by amounts available under applicable bodily-injury liability coverage, and amended section 3937.18(H) permits enforcement of a consolidation clause limiting multiple claims arising from one person's injury or death to the applicable per-person limit.

Coletta v. Yang, Unpublished Decision (1-15-1999) · filed 1999-01-15(A)(2), (H)

The General Assembly amended former R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) to clarify that, despite the supreme court's holding inSavoie, 67 Ohio St.3d 500, at paragraph three of the syllabus, the purpose for enacting and amending division (A)(2) of the statute was "to provide an offset against the limits of underinsured motorist coverage of those amounts available for payment from the tortfeasor's bodily injury liability coverage." Section 8, S.B. 20. Furthermore, the "Limit of Liability" clause pertaining to uninsured motorist coverage under Part IV of the St. Paul policy is valid and enforceable under R.C. 3937.18(H) as amended by S.B. 20. See Section 10, S.B. 20. Thus, the trial court properly determined that Coletta was not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage because the $100,000 limit on recovery for Yan's bodily injury, including death, was equal to the $100,000 limit on recovery of uninsured motorist benefits. ... Because the General Assembly emphasized in Section 10 of S.B. 20 its intent to supersede the supreme court's refusal in Savoie, 67 Ohio St.3d 500, at paragraphs one and four of the syllabus, to enforce a consolidation clause such as the St. Paul "Limit of Liability" provision, we cannot agree that R.C. 3937.18(H) is ambiguous in any respect.

Section 3937.18 requires underinsured-motorist coverage to be provided by substance even when the policy does not use the word "underinsured."

Howard v. State Auto Mutual Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (3-14-2000) · filed 2000-03-14

Plaintiffs initially argue that because the State Auto insurance policy does not use the term "underinsured" in any portion of the policy, the policy fails to comply with the requirements of R.C. 3937.18. Despite plaintiffs' contentions to the contrary, the policy provides underinsured coverage, even though it is not so labeled, by stating that State Auto will pay compensatory damages when the amount paid by the tortfeasor's insurance company "is not enough to pay the full amount" the insured is entitled to recover.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, and a medical-payment subrogation clause that diminishes payments under that coverage is unenforceable as against public policy.

Warner v. Suscha, Unpublished Decision (6-23-2000) · filed 2000-06-23

However, it is well established that when such clauses dilute or diminish payments to which an insured is entitled pursuant to uninsured or underinsured motorists coverages mandated by R.C.3937.18, these provisions are violative of public policy and will not be enforced.

Former § 3937.18(E) makes a subrogation clause in an underinsured-motorist policy a valid and enforceable precondition to coverage.

Estate of Houser v. Motorists Ins., Unpublished Decision (6-4-2002) · filed 2002-06-04(E)

Former R.C. 3937.18(E), the version of the law governing this agreement, provided that "the inclusion of a subrogation clause in insurance contracts providing underinsured motorist coverage is a valid and enforceable precondition to the duty to provide such coverage."34 Further, the Ohio Supreme Court has found that "by executing a release which precludes an insurer from exercising its subrogation rights, an insured materially breaches his insurance contract and discharges his insurer from its obligation to provide coverage."35 The Court has also stated that "an insured who settles with and releases an underinsured tortfeasor before giving her insurance notice * * * is precluded from bringing an action against her insurer for underinsured motorist benefits."36 In the present case, we find that forcing Hartford to pay UIM coverage to the appellants, who have signed away any rights of subrogation, would be contrary to the underlying intent of former R.C. 3937.18(E) and would deprive Hartford of those rights for which it contracted. By releasing Jason Stansberry, the appellants destroyed Hartford's subrogation rights, and thus the appellants are not entitled to UIM coverage.

Section 3937.18's amended underinsured-motorist provisions apply based on when the claim accrued; a claim accruing on the accident date is governed by Savoy rather than the current statutory language effective after the accident.

Starcher v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., Unpublished Decision (6-18-1998) · filed 1998-06-18

The trial court concluded, when applying the current language of R.C. 3937.18, appellant was excluded from recovery under the two policies issued by appellee because the policy limits are offset in toto by the settlement with Nationwide. We disagree. In Webb v. Coronet Insurance Group (Dec. 9, 1996), Stark App. No. 96-CA-00141, unreported, we found the plaintiff's claim for underinsured motorist coverage accrued on the date of the accident. Upon revisiting this issue, we adhere to our decision in Webb although we recognize the opposite decision was reached by the Second District Court of Appeals in Ross v. Farmers Ins. Group (Jan. 10, 1997), Montgomery App. No. CA-15865, unreported. As such, Savoy applies and appellee's exposure in the case sub judice is $100,000 per person/$300,000 per occurrence.

The version of § 3937.18 in effect when the insurance contract was entered controls the parties' rights and obligations; a later amendment requiring offsets against uninsured or underinsured motorist policy limits does not apply.

Rhodes v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (1-12-2000) · filed 2000-01-12

In Ross v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 281, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the statutory law in effect at the time of entering into a contract of insurance controls the rights and duties of the contracting parties. In the present case, the accident occurred on February 4, 1994, and appellant was covered by an existing policy of insurance on that date. R.C.3937.18, as amended, could not have been the controlling law because the amendment did not become effective until October 20, 1994, over at least eight months after the date of the accident and clearly after the parties had entered into the contract of insurance involved here. Therefore, the amended R.C. 3937.18 cannot now control the rights and obligations of the parties as it was not in effect at the time of the insurance contract in the case at bar. Ross, supra.

Section 3937.18 does not govern an underinsured-motorist claim arising from a 1989 accident and filed before the statute's effective date.

Aufdenkamp v. Allstate, Unpublished Decision (1-19-2000) · filed 2000-01-19

Savoie was superseded by R.C. 3937.18, which was enacted on October 20, 1994. As the accident occurred on August 1, 1989 and Mr. Aufdenkamp filed suit on July 21, 1994, which are both prior to the effective date of R.C. 3937.18, Savoie controls. See Rossv. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 281, 290.

For underinsured-motorist coverage, the version of § 3937.18 in effect when the automobile liability policy was entered into governs the parties’ rights and duties.

Ross v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos. · filed 1998-07-01(A)(2)

Accordingly, we hold that for the purpose of determining the scope of coverage of an underinsured motorist claim, the statutory law in effect at the time of entering into a contract for automobile liability insurance controls the rights and duties of the contracting parties.

For an underinsured-motorist claim, the version of § 3937.18 in effect when the automobile liability insurance contract was entered controls the parties’ rights and duties and the scope of coverage.

Ross v. Farmers Insurance Group of Companies · filed 1998-07-01(A)(2)

Accordingly, we hold that for the purpose of determining the scope of coverage of an underinsured motorist claim, the statutory law in effect at the time of entering into a contract for automobile liability insurance controls the rights and duties of the contracting parties.

For an underinsured-motorist claim, the version of § 3937.18 in effect when the policy was renewed governs recovery.

Stocklas v. Erie Insurance Group, Unpublished Decision (10-22-1999) · filed 1999-10-22

However, since the decision of the trial court, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Ross v. Farmers Ins. Group (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 281,695 N.E.2d 732, which held that the law in effect on the date of the policy renewal is the law that controls recovery. Thus, this case is controlled by former R.C. 3937.18 as interpreted by the holding in Savoie v. Grange Mutual Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500,620 N.E.2d 809.

Which version of § 3937.18 governs an underinsured-motorist claim depends on when the parties entered into the automobile insurance contract.

Gray v. State Farm Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (4-2-2001) · filed 2001-04-02

We therefore find that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to when the parties entered into an insurance contract, and thus as to whether either R.C. 3937.18, as amended by S.B. 20, or former R.C. 3937.18, as interpreted by Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, applies to appellants' claim.

Section 3937.18(A) does not require an insurer to make a new offer of UM coverage merely because a vehicle is added to an existing automobile liability policy, absent a substantial policy change.

Savage v. Shelby Insurance Group, Unpublished Decision (7-22-1998) · filed 1998-07-22(A)

We find that the act of adding a vehicle to an existing automobile liability insurance policy does not by itself create a substantial change in the insurance policy implicating the mandatory provisions of R.C. 3937.18(A). To find otherwise, would require insurers to offer UM coverage at every turn, since adding a vehicle to a motor vehicle insurance policy is one of the most routine occurrences in the automobile insurance business. Nowhere does R.C. 3937.18(A) place such an exhaustive duty upon the insurer. The statute and regulations mandate an offering of UM coverage at the time a policy is issued. In this case, Kildow knew the extent of his coverage and stated that at the time he added the vehicle, he intended for his coverage to remain the same. Shelby did not issue a new policy to Kildow.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) triggers underinsured motorist coverage only when the total liability coverage available from all persons liable is less than the insured's UM coverage; the policies of joint tortfeasors are considered together.

Vawter v. Select Transportation, Inc., Unpublished Decision (12-2-1999) · filed 1999-12-02(A)(2)

Based upon the express language of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), we reject appellant's arguments and find that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Nationwide. The unambiguous language of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) mandates no other reasonable conclusion.

Section 3937.18(A) permits, but does not require, automobile policies to include uninsured- or underinsured-motorist coverage, and the 2001 amendment eliminated coverage implied by law.

Advent v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2008-05-20(A)

The cumulative effect of the General Assembly’s amendments to R.C. 3937.18 in S.B. 267 and S.B. 97 leads us to conclude that insurers may incorporate any changes permitted or required by the Revised Code at the beginning of any policy-renewal period on or after October 31, 2001 (the effective date of S.B. 97) within the policy’s two-year guarantee period that began on or after September 21, 2000 (the effective date of S.B. 267). ... Moreover, modification of the UM coverage terms of an automobile insurance policy is a change permitted or required by the Revised Code, after October 31, 2001 (the effective date of S.B. 97), at the beginning of any policy-renewal period within the two-year guarantee period that began after September 21, 2000 (the effective date of S.B. 267).

Section 3937.18(C) makes underinsured-motorist coverage nonexcess coverage and reduces its limits by amounts available under liable parties' bodily-injury coverage; coverage is not triggered when the at-fault driver's applicable liability limit exceeds the insured's underinsured-motorist limit.

Dionisio v. Home-Owners Insurance Company · filed 2025-08-28(C)

The Policy is only triggered if the amount available under the at-fault driver’s liability policy is less than the limit stated in the Policy’s underinsured motorist coverage (See Doc. 29-1 at 34; Doc. 32 at 10; O.R.C § 3937.18). Underinsured coverage is not triggered here because the at-fault driver policy limit of $2 million (Canadian) exceeds the Policy limits of $1 million (US) -- regardless of conversion rates. ... The at-fault driver cannot be considered underinsured.

Section 3937.18(A) requires uninsured-motorist coverage for losses caused by an uninsured or underinsured motorist only when the loss involves bodily injury, sickness, or disease; nonphysical emotional distress is not a bodily injury under the statute.

Erie Insurance v. Favor · filed 1998-09-03(A)

R.C. 3937.18(A) provides that uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage must be provided with any automobile liability insurance policy to protect against loss for bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, caused by the actions of an uninsured or underinsured motorist. ... Nonphysical harms such as emotional distress are not “bodily injury” as defined by R.C. 3937.18 and are therefore not covered under the Erie policy.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage for losses from bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, and emotional-distress damages do not fall within that bodily-injury coverage.

Craig v. Orange Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (11-5-1999) · filed 1999-11-05

R.C. 3937.18 provides that the insurance policy must protect against loss for "bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death," which is identical to Grange's policy language. Consequently, the Grange policy is in compliance with R.C. 3937.18 and is enforceable. The question then becomes whether emotional distress is covered under the definition for "bodily injury" found both in the statute and in the Grange policy.

The pre-2001 version of § 3937.18 did not require the insured to sustain bodily injury to recover damages, allowing a parent’s potential claims for losses arising from a minor child’s injuries.

Quickle v. Progressive Cas. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-26-2004) · filed 2004-08-26

The pre-2001 version of R.C. 3937.18 did not require that an insured sustain bodily injury in order to recover damages.

For policies governed by the H.B. 261 amendment, § 3937.18 permits an insurer to require the insured to suffer bodily injury before recovering UM/UIM damages.

Aulizia v. Westfield Natl. Ins. Co., 2006-T-0057 (6-15-2007) · filed 2007-06-15(A)

Because the contract at issue is governed by the H.B. 261 amendment to R.C. 3937.18 , the limitation requiring an insured to suffer bodily injury before being entitled to damages is valid and enforceable under Hedges.

Section 3937.18(A) does not require a joint self-insurance pool organized under R.C. 2744.081 to offer uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage or provide it in an amount equivalent to its liability coverage.

Public Entities Pool of Ohio v. Sexton, Unpublished Decision (3-31-2000) · filed 2000-03-31(A)

R.C. 3937.18 applies to any "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance." Id. Thus, "[w]here motor vehicle liability coverage is provided, even in limited form, uninsured/underinsured coverage must be provided." Selander v.Erie Insurance Group (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 541, 544. However, the coverage must be provided by a policy of insurance. ... Because a self-insurance pool is not an insurance companyengaged in an insurance business the benefits they offer theirmembers are seemingly outside the definition of automobileliability or motor vehicle liability policies of insurance in R.C.3927.18 [3937.18](A). If so, the UM/UIM requirements imposed byR.C. 3937.18(A) don't apply to liability coverage offered byself-insurance pools organized pursuant to R.C. 2744.091 [2744.081](A).Adams v. County Risk Sharing Authority, Inc. (Nov. 25, 1996),Scioto App. No. 2357, unreported. Any doubt whether the sectionmight require self-insurance pools to offer UM/UIM coverage isforeclosed by the final clause of R.C. 2744.081(E)(2), whichdeclares that they are "not subject to the insurance laws of thisstate." R.C. 3937.18 is such a law. ... The equivalency requirements of R.C. 3937.18(A) cannot apply if R.C. 3937.18(A) does not apply. We have found that a self-insurer or pool that is organized pursuant to R.C. 2744.081 is exempt from the requirements of R.C. 3927.18 [3937.18](A) with respect to the liability coverage it offers. Therefore, a pool which does provide UM/UIM coverage need not offer it in an equivalent amount by reason of R.C. 3937.18(A).

Section 3937.18(A)'s UM/UIM requirements do not apply to liability coverage offered by a joint self-insurance pool.

Caton v. Board of Commissioners, Unpublished Decision (4-29-2003) · filed 2003-04-29(A)

Because a self-insurance pool is not an insurance company engaged in an insurance business, the benefits they offer their members are seemingly outside the definition of automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policies of insurance in R.C. 3927.18(A). If so, the UM/UIM requirements imposed by R.C. 3937.18(A) don't apply to liability coverage offered by self-insurance pools organized pursuant to R.C. 2744.091(A).

Section 3937.18(A)'s uninsured/underinsured-motorist requirements do not apply to coverage offered by a local government self-insurance pool because the pool's agreement is not a policy of insurance subject to Ohio's insurance laws.

Barrett v. Harleysville Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (1-22-2004) · filed 2004-01-22(A)

We find that OTARMA is a local government risk pool established under R.C. 2744.081; therefore, the agreement is not a policy of insurance subject to the uninsured motorist requirements found in R.C. 3937.18, nor is it subject to the rationale of Scott-Pontzer as limited by Galatis.

Section 3937.18's allowance of denying uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage for a decedent who was not an insured, but only a relative of an insured, survived the appellant's asserted Ohio constitutional challenges.

Clark v. Forney · filed 1998-09-30

While conceding that this is permitted by R.C. 3937.18, appellant nevertheless argues that the statute is unconstitutional as it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution, Section 2, Article I; the constitutional prohibition against limiting tort damages, Section 19(A), Article I, Ohio Constitution; and abrogates the right to remedy found in Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution. ... With respect to appellant’s constitutional arguments, we have already considered and rejected these arguments.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an automobile liability policy that includes uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage to treat all claims arising from one person's bodily injury as a single claim subject to the applicable per-person limit, and the court upheld the provision's constitutionality.

Beagle v. Mosley, Unpublished Decision (7-23-1999) · filed 1999-07-23(H)

We also agree with the tortfeasor's insurer that the statutes in question are constitutional.

Section 3937.18(A)(2), as amended by S.B. 20, requires a UIM/UM insurer to reduce available policy limits by the funds available from the tortfeasor's liability insurance.

Rulong v. Allstate Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (2-25-2000) · filed 2000-02-25(A)(2)

This does not mean, however, that this Court is prepared to find S.B. 20 constitutionally defective on the remaining grounds. To the contrary, since Beagle left R.C. § 3937.18 (A) (2) intact, this statute, as amended, enjoys a "strong presumption of constitutionality."

Section 3937.18 requires insurers to offer uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage while allowing the legislature to define its limits.

Haddad v. State Farm Automobile Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (2-28-2000) · filed 2000-02-28(A)(2)

We find that S.B. 20, as codified at R.C. 3937.18 does not violate Ohio's equal protection clause.