Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3937.18

Section 3937.18(H)'s limits of liability language does not violate Article I, Section 19a of the Ohio Constitution.

Dermer v. Wayne, Unpublished Decision (4-4-2000) · filed 2000-04-04(H)

We find neither R.C.3937.18(H), which contains "limits of liability" language, nor R.C. 3937.44 violate Article I, Section 19a of the Ohio Constitution.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an automobile policy to treat all claims arising from one person's bodily injury or death as a single claim subject to the applicable per-person limit, and § 3937.18(A)(2) allows underinsured-motorist limits to be reduced by amounts available for payment under applicable liability coverage, even if not recovered.

Stickney v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Unpublished Decision (10-19-1998) · filed 1998-10-19(H), (A)(2)

R.C. 3937.18(H) expressly permits the limiting language of the policies: ... Any such policy limit shall be enforceable regardless of the number of insureds, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the declarations or policy, or vehicles involved in the accident. ... We note that the `available for payment' language was introduced by Senate Bill 20 and that in the pre-amended version of the statute, the set off provision allowed the insurer to deduct `those amounts actually recovered.' Hence, the General Assembly has expressed its intent to expand the benefits to an insurer under the set off provision to amounts available to, but not necessarily recovered by, an insured. ... Based upon the clear legislative intent of S.B. No. 20, we find the policies' limits for liability language not to be in conflict with R.C. 3937.18 et seq. and the tortfeasor sub judice is not an underinsured motorists as to appellants.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) treats amounts available from the tortfeasor's liability carrier as the setoff amount for underinsured-motorist benefits, without reducing that amount for the insured's attorney fees or probate costs.

Mecurio v. General Accident Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-06-2001) · filed 2001-08-06(A)(2)

Expenses and attorney fees are not part of the set off equation under R.C. § 3937.18(A)(2) providing that underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier may set off amounts received by insured from applicable UIM policy limits; such fees are an expense of an insured and should not act, in order to increase UIM benefits, to reduce the "amounts available for payment" from the tortfeasor's automobile liability carrier.Wigglesworth, supra.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) permits an underinsured-motorist setoff only for amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by the claimant; money paid directly to satisfy a medical lien is not available for setoff.

Rucker v. Davis, Unpublished Decision (6-17-2003) · filed 2003-06-17(A)(2)

Here, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the amounts paid by the tortfeasors, the Davis family, were not available to Mr. Rucker because of the CIGNA lien. We see no difference between the statutory Medicare lien in Littrell and the CIGNA lien here. Thus, we find that the fifty thousand dollars paid by the Davis family was not actually accessible to and recoverable by Mr. Rucker. Therefore, the trial court did not err by refusing to allow Progressive to setoff the fifty thousand dollar payment against the policy's limit.

Section 3937.18(C) permits a liability insurer to set off amounts paid to wrongful-death beneficiaries against amounts otherwise recoverable under underinsured-motorist coverage for their loss-of-consortium and loss-of-support claims.

Wheelbarger v. Dayton Bd. of Edn., Unpublished Decision (8-20-2004) · filed 2004-08-20(C)

Accordingly, we hold that a liability insurance company is entitled to set off amounts paid to the beneficiaries of the decedent's estate from any amounts otherwise recoverable by those beneficiaries for loss of consortium and loss of support.

Former R.C. 3937.18 requires UM/UIM coverage to protect persons rather than vehicles.

Maltz v. Royal Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (6-30-2003) · filed 2003-06-30

Clearly, Royal's UM coverage protects persons, not vehicles, as required by former R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 requires UM/UIM coverage to be offered only to persons who are insured under the policy; a person who is not an insured is not entitled to UM/UIM coverage supplied by operation of law.

Grant v. Graening, Unpublished Decision (12-31-2003) · filed 2003-12-31

Because R.C. 3937.18 requires only that UM/UIM coverage be offered to those "insured" under the policy, "[i]f we find [the plaintiff] was not an insured under the policies, then our inquiry is at an end." Scott-Pontzer, 85 Ohio St.3d at 662. If a party does not qualify as an insured under the underlying policy, then that party is not entitled to UM/UIM coverage which might be part of that policy by operation of law.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured motorist coverage unless the named insured rejects it, and a renewal policy may omit the coverage after a prior rejection unless the named insured requests it in writing.

Coldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (6-18-1999) · filed 1999-06-18(C)

Pursuant to R.C. 3937.18, only the named insured may accept or reject UM coverage. In order to be a named insured under R.C.3937.18, a person must be listed as such on the declarations page of the insurance policy.

As amended by Senate Bill 20, Section 3937.18 permits an underinsured-motorist policy exclusion limiting coverage to bodily injury or death suffered by an insured.

King v. Western Reserve Mut. Casualty Co., Unpublished Decision (3-15-1999) · filed 1999-03-15(A)(2)

We hold that under R.C. 3937.18 as amended by Senate Bill 20, an insurance policy exclusion that limits underinsured motorist coverage to bodily harm or death sustained by an insured is valid.

The 1997 amendment to § 3937.18 adopted the corroborative-evidence test for unidentified motorists and applies prospectively because it was not expressly made retroactive.

Olinik v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1999-03-16(D)(2)

The legislature subsequently amended R.C. 3937.18 and adopted the “corroborative evidence test” set forth in Girgis, supra, making the amendment effective September 3, 1997. The amended statute was not made expressly retroactive. When the legislature has not specified retroactive application, the statute will be applied prospectively.

Section 3937.18(A) does not require mandatory underinsured motorist coverage for helicopters because a helicopter is not a motor vehicle under the statute; insurers may limit UIM coverage to motorized land vehicles.

Delli Bovi v. Pacific Indemn. Co. · filed 1999-04-28(A)

A helicopter cannot travel “upon a highway,” and we therefore hold that it is not a “motor vehicle” subject to a “motor vehicle liability policy of insurance” under R.C. 3937.18(A). ... Accordingly, we answer both of the certified questions in the negative, holding that a helicopter is not a motor vehicle for purposes of Ohio’s mandatory UIM coverage under R.C. 3937.18. Because we hold that the statute does not require that insurance providers offer UIM coverage for vehicles that cannot be used on the highway, insurance providers may contractually limit UIM coverage to motorized land vehicles.

Section 3937.18(A) does not require mandatory UIM coverage for a helicopter because a helicopter is not a motor vehicle subject to a motor vehicle liability policy under the statute.

Delli Bovi v. Pacific Indemnity Co. · filed 1999-04-28(A)

A helicopter cannot travel “upon a highway,” and we therefore *346hold that it is not a “motor vehicle” subject to a “motor vehicle liability policy of insurance” under R.C. 3937.18(A).

Under former R.C. 3937.18, “motor vehicle” takes the definition in R.C. 4511.01(B), and construction equipment is excluded based on whether it is employed in general highway transportation, not merely on its principal construction use.

Chase v. Westfield Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (10-10-2002) · filed 2002-10-10

The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the definition of "motor vehicle" as used in the version of R.C. 3937.18 in effect at the time the appellant entered into the insurance contract, is the definition found in R.C. 4511.01 (B). ... The Supreme Court recognized that construction equipment is not excepted merely based on its principal use but will be excepted when used in general highway transportation. This indicates to us that the Supreme Court found it imperative to employ a "use" standard only with regard to whether the vehicle was being used in general highway transportation at the time of the incident. ... The important inquiry is whether the tractor was being used in general highway transportation. The evidence presented demonstrates at the time of his death, Matthew was not using the tractor in "general highway transportation." As such, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Westfield.

Section 3937.18 applies to motor vehicle policies, not to a commercial general liability coverage part that is not a motor vehicle policy.

Griffith v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (7-14-2003) · filed 2003-07-14

We find this issue to be irrelevant because said coverage part is not a motor vehicle policy subject to R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18(A) defines a motor vehicle policy as one serving as proof of financial responsibility for owners or operators of specifically identified motor vehicles, so a policy identifying no specific automobiles is not subject to the statutory UM/UIM offer requirement.

Blair v. Cincinnati Insurance · filed 2005-08-17(A)

Because the commercial general liability policy does not specifically identify any automobiles, it cannot serve as proof of financial responsibility and is not a “motor vehicle policy” as defined in R.C. 3937.18. Thus, CIC was not required to offer UM/UIM insurance to Classi Images, and its failure to do so does not result in coverage by operation of law.

Section 3937.18(G) permits an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy to preclude all stacking of UM/UIM coverages without regard to premiums paid, including interfamily and intrafamily stacking.

Wodrich v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc., Unpublished Decision (5-21-1999) · filed 1999-05-21(G)

Contrary to Savoie, the legislature has now explicitly said that both intrafamily and interfamily stacking can be precluded, regardless of the number of premiums paid by an insured. Specifically, the statute now says that: [a]ny automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance that includes coverages offered under division (A) of this section or selected in accordance with division (C) of this section may, without regard to any premiums involved, include terms and conditions that preclude any and all stacking of such coverages, including but not limited to: (1) Interfamily stacking, which is the aggregating of the limits of such coverages by the same person or two or more persons, whether family members or not, who are not members of the same household; (2) Intrafamily stacking, which is the aggregating of the limits of such coverages purchased by the same person or two or more family members of the same household. R.C. 3937.18 (G). Whether one sees the logic in this statute or not, its effect is clear.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires UIM limits to be reduced by amounts available under all applicable bodily-injury policies covering persons liable to the insured, including contractual as well as tort liability, and division (G) authorizes anti-stacking terms.

Kovatch v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., Unpublished Decision (9-24-1999) · filed 1999-09-24(A)(2), (G)

The phrase "persons liable to the insured" as used in R.C.3937.18(A)(2) is broad enough to encompass all persons who are liable to the insured. It does not distinguish between tort and contractual liability. As a result, the category of liable persons can include both those who are liable in contract, as well as those who may be liable in tort. In other words, the statute mandates that the policy limits of UIM coverage must be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury insurance policies, not just the amount of money that was recovered under the tortfeasor's policy.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires UM/UIM limits to be reduced by amounts available from the tortfeasor's liability coverage, while divisions (G) and (H) permit anti-stacking terms and a single per-person limit for claims arising from one person's injury or death.

Powers v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance, Unpublished Decision (12-6-1999) · filed 1999-12-06(A)(2), (G), and (H)

At the time Appellants entered into the present contract for insurance coverage with Appellee, the statutory law in effect was the S.B.20 version of R.C. § 3937.18 which permitted, indeed mandated, a reduction in the UM/UIM limits by amounts payable from the tortfeasor's liability insurance coverage. ... Section G of this statute provides that insurers offering UM/UIM coverage may: "include terms and conditions that preclude any and all stacking of such coverages . . ." Section H of the same statute provides that insurers offering UM/UIM coverage may: ". . . include terms and conditions to the effect that all claims resulting from or arising out of any one person's bodily injury, including death, shall collectively be subject to the limit of the policy applicable to bodily injury, including death, sustained by one person, and, for the purpose of such policy limit shall constitute a single claim. Any such policy limit shall be enforceable regardless of the number of insureds, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations or policy, or vehicles involved in the accident."

Section 3937.18(G) permits an automobile liability policy containing UM/UIM coverage to include terms precluding all stacking of that coverage, regardless of premiums paid.

Proper v. American Select Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (8-06-2001) · filed 2001-08-06(G)

A UIM provision, therefore, must be interpreted in light of the language of R.C. 3937.18 which governs such coverage.

Former § 3937.18 implies UM/UIM coverage into an automobile liability policy when the insurer fails to offer it, but that coverage does not extend to a person who is not an insured under the liability policy.

Szabo v. CGU International Insurance, PLC · filed 2002-09-19

It is, in short, unreasonable to read Scott-Pontzer for the proposition that an employee who is not named, either expressly or impliedly, under her employing corporation’s automobile liability policy, must nevertheless benefit from de jure UIM coverage on account of the insurer not having offered such to the corporate employer. Because individual employees did not have individual liability coverage under the CGU policy, it would be erroneous to find that they are entitled to UIM coverage thereunder as a matter of law.

Section 3937.18's operation-of-law UM/UIM coverage remains subject to valid policy notice and subrogation preconditions.

Chamberlin v. Williams, Unpublished Decision (11-22-2002) · filed 2002-11-22

Notice and subrogation clauses are valid and enforceable preconditions to an insurer's duty to provide underinsured motorist coverage even where UM/UIM coverage arises as a matter of law.

Section 3937.18 makes UM/UIM coverage apply by operation of law when the policy lacks a written, signed offer and rejection, but that automatic coverage does not determine who is an insured under the policy.

Tilton v. Cockfield, Unpublished Decision (12-12-2002) · filed 2002-12-12

Specifically, the court, after first finding Pontzer to be an insured,1 held that, because there was no written, signed offer and rejection of UM/UIM coverage in the excess liability policy, UM/UIM coverage was included by operation of law. ... While the automatic inclusion of UM/UIM coverage in a policy may, according toScott-Pontzer, determine the nature of such coverage, that inclusion does not determine who is an insured under a policy. ... We further hold that the automatic application of UM/UIM coverage does not turn non-insureds into insureds under the policy.

The version of § 3937.18 in effect then required both uninsured- and underinsured-motorist coverage, and its protection against dilution of mandated coverage applied to UIM coverage.

Berrios v. State Farm Ins. Co. · filed 2002-12-20

The version of R.C. 3937.18 operative in this case mandated UIM as well as UM coverage. ... Thus, we must apply Lindsey to this case involving UIM coverage as we would to a case involving UM coverage. ... To be treated the same as UM policyholder in this case, Berrios must recover under both the medical payments and UIM coverage. That is the result of the payment of separate premiums as well as the applicability of Shearer, Lindsey, and Clark.

Section 3937.18(A) permits UM/UIM coverage to be limited to losses from bodily injury or death suffered by the policy's insureds.

Cincinnat Equitable Ins. Co. v. Wells, Unpublished Decision (5-14-2004) · filed 2004-05-14(A)

It permits that coverage to be restricted to losses arising from bodily injuries and death which are suffered by a policy's insureds, as the CEIC policy expressly does.

The statute requires UM/UIM coverage to be offered in an amount equal to liability coverage but does not require identical terms and conditions.

Cooley v. Thi of Ohio at Greenbriar S., Unpublished Decision (1-18-2006) · filed 2006-01-18

We additionally note that former R.C. 3937.18 required insurers to offer UM/UIM coverage in an amount equal to the liability coverage. Nothing in the statute required the insurer to offer UM/UIM coverage that contained precisely the same terms and conditions as the liability coverage.

Section 3937.18(J)(1) permits a UM/UIM exclusion only for injury suffered while an insured operates or occupies a motor vehicle, so an exclusion cannot bar coverage for injuries sustained while occupying a bicycle.

McDonald v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (4-13-2006) · filed 2006-04-13(J)(1)

Thus, Motorists' "covered auto" exclusion, as applied, is invalid and violates R.C. 3937.18.

Former R.C. 3937.18's public policy does not invalidate a two-year contractual limitation period for filing UM/UIM claims when that period does not eliminate or reduce the coverage the statute requires.

Sarmiento v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co. · filed 2005-10-26

A contractual limitation period of two years does not violate the underlying purpose of UM/UIM coverage, because the limitation period does not eliminate or reduce the UM/UIM coverage required by former R.C. 3937.18. ... Therefore, we hold that a two-year contractual limitation period for filing UM/UIM claims is reasonable and enforceable, regardless of whether the foreign state in which the accident occurred provides a longer statute of limitations for the underlying tort claim.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) and (2) permits uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage to be limited to bodily injury or death suffered by persons insured under the policy, so an unambiguous driver exclusion may bar related claims.

Newkirk v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (6-1-1999) · filed 1999-06-01(A)(1) and (2)

A plain reading of the statutory changes to R.C.3937.18(A)(1) and (2) indicate that uninsured motorist coverage can be limited to those "insured under the policy." ... We conclude that this exclusion does not violate R.C. 3937.18, as amended by S.B. 20. ... The language of R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) and (2) requires uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage to be offered for bodily injury only to those "insured" under the policy.

Under the 1997 H.B. 261 version, § 3937.18(A)(1) permits insurers to limit UM/UIM coverage to accidents in which an insured suffers bodily injury, sickness, or disease.

Hedges v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 2006-05-03(A)(1)

In the H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18(A)(1), the phrase “suffered by any person insured under the policy” modifies its antecedent “bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death.” The statute allows insurers to restrict UM/UIM coverage to accidents in which an insured suffers bodily injury, sickness, or disease.

Section 3937.18(A) requires uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage when a policy provides motor-vehicle liability coverage, even if it covers only hired or non-owned automobiles and identifies no specific vehicle.

Selander v. Erie Insurance Group · filed 1999-06-02(A)

Under R.C. 3937.18, uninsured/underinsured coverage arises even though a liability policy refers only to “hired” or “non-owned” automobiles and fails to identify specific vehicles.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires underinsured-motorist coverage for losses from bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death suffered by an insured, limiting required coverage to physical injury or death suffered by an insured.

State v. Spoerndle, Unpublished Decision (6-16-1999) · filed 1999-06-16(A)(2)

In contrast, R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), as amended effective October 20, 1994, provides: Underinsured motorist coverage * * * shall provide protection for an insured against loss for bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, suffered by any person insured under the policy[.] (Emphasis added.) By specifying that the "loss * * * suffered by any person insured" for which underinsured motorist coverage is required is "for bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death," the legislature limited the scope of the statute. ... Specifically, the amended statute does not require coverage for damages based on any tort claim that is legally cognizable, but limits those claims required to be covered by underinsured motorist coverage to claims for physical injury or death suffered by an insured. ... R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) requires Nationwide to provide coverage for losses resulting from bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, suffered by the appellants as insureds. The policy exclusion at issue is consistent with the statutory requirements and does not impermissibly limit the appellants' UIM coverage.

Section 3937.18 permits an insurer to enforce a policy limitation restricting uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage to bodily injury or death personally suffered by an insured.

Spence v. National Mutual Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (6-30-1999) · filed 1999-06-30(A)(1)

We now hold that under R.C. § 3937.18 as amended by Senate Bill 20, an insurance policy exclusion that limits uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage to bodily harm or death sustained personally by an insured is valid.

Section 3937.18(A) requires uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage for losses resulting from bodily injury personally sustained by an insured.

Rakowski v. Cassel, Unpublished Decision (2-18-2000) · filed 2000-02-18(A)

However, upon consideration of the foregoing, we agree with the conclusion of the appeals court in Spence, supra, that R.C. 3937.18, as amended, "requires only that insurers provide [underinsured/uninsured motorist] coverage for losses resulting from bodily injury an insured personally had sustained." Spence, supra. Accordingly, appellant's reliance onHolcomb is misplaced. Appellant's first assignment of error is not well-taken.

The version of § 3937.18 in effect when the policy was contracted controls, and the S.B. No. 267 amendment permits UM/UIM coverage to be limited to damages for bodily injury sustained by an insured person.

Estate of Davis v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., Unpublished Decision (12-14-2004) · filed 2004-12-14

In Ross v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos. (1998),82 Ohio St.3d 281, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the statutory law in effect at the time of contracting for insurance or renewing the policy defines the scope of UM/UIM coverage. Here, the parties agree that R.C. 3937.18, as amended by S.B. No. 267, effective September 21, 2000, is the applicable law to be applied to the policy at issue. Accordingly, we do not apply the most recent amendment to the statute, enacted on October 31, 2001 pursuant to S.B. No. 97, which significantly changed UM/UIM coverage in Ohio. ... The policy, however, then restricts who may claim UM/UIM coverage under the policy because of bodily injury. Specifically, in accordance with S.B. No. 267, the policy expressly limits UM/UIM coverage under the policy to "all sums which an insured person is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured person." UM/UIM coverage is not provided to "any person" who sustains bodily injury. Thus, even if Macenzy, as an unborn child at the time of Davis' death, arguably was an "insured person" under the policy, she is not entitled to UM/UIM benefits under the policy because she did not sustain the bodily injury on which plaintiff's claim against the Farmers policy is based. Rather, the bodily injury was sustained by Davis, the decedent, who plaintiff concedes was not an "insured person" under the policy.

The H.B. 261 version of section 3937.18(A) permits UM/UIM insurers to restrict coverage to bodily injury and death suffered by the insureds themselves.

Bowen v. Stewart, Unpublished Decision (2-16-2006) · filed 2006-02-16(A)

We hold that the H.B. 261 amendment to R.C. 3937.18(A) clears up the ambiguity mentioned in Moore.

Section 3937.18(A), as amended by 1997 H.B. 261, permits insurers to restrict uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage to accidents in which an insured suffers bodily injury, sickness, or disease.

Willet v. Geico General Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (8-3-2006) · filed 2006-08-03(A)

Pursuant to the Hedges decision, it is clear that under Ohio law, specifically the 1997 H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18 (A), insurers are allowed to restrict UM/UIM coverage to accidents in which an insured suffers bodily injury, sickness, or disease.

Under the 1997 H.B. 261 version of § 3937.18(A), an insurer may restrict UM/UIM coverage to accidents in which an insured suffers bodily injury, sickness, or disease.

Purchase v. McMillion, 88220 (4-12-2007) · filed 2007-04-12(A)

Pursuant to the Hedges decision, it is clear that under the 1997 H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18 (A), insurers are allowed to restrict UM/UIM coverage to accidents in which an insured suffers bodily injury, sickness, or disease.

Section 3937.18 requires a written reduction of UM/UIM coverage to satisfy the statute's requirements in the same manner as a written rejection.

Zurcher v. National Surety Corporation, Unpublished Decision (2-25-2002) · filed 2002-02-25

We find a written reduction, like a written rejection, must satisfy the terms of R.C.3937.18.

Section 3937.18(C)'s presumption of an offer from a signed rejection or selection of lower UM/UIM limits does not eliminate the requirement for a meaningful offer describing the coverage, premium, and coverage limits.

Edstrom v. Universal Underwriters Ins., Unpublished Decision (6-27-2002) · filed 2002-06-27(C)

The presumption and the amendments do not eliminate the requirement in Linko that there be a meaningful offer, one that is an offer in substance and not just in name. Id. at 449. In Linko, the Ohio Supreme Court applied the basic law of contracts to determine what constitutes a valid offer of UM/UIM coverage, and found that an offer must describe the coverage, list the premium costs of UM/UIM coverage, and expressly state the coverage limits. Id.

A rejection of UM/UIM coverage that did not comply with the version of R.C. 3937.18 in effect when the policy was entered does not prevent coverage from being imposed by operation of law.

Allen v. Johnson, Unpublished Decision (5-22-2002) · filed 2002-05-22

The commercial umbrella policy did not explicitly provide UM/UIM coverage but, as explained above, it will be imposed by operation of law because the school district's rejection of UM/UIM coverage did not comply with the version of R.C. 3937.18 that was in effect at that time.

Section 3937.18 does not require UM/UIM coverage for an employer that is self-insured up to retained amounts, but it applies to traditionally insured excess coverage; a rejection form may comply with the 1997 statute when it references the policy and the policy supplies the applicable limits.

Dalton v. Travelers Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (12-23-2002) · filed 2002-12-23(A)

By agreeing to reimburse and provide a promissory note and security, Collins is self-insured up to the retained amounts because the risk of loss has not shifted away from Collins. Collins is self-insured up to $500,000 under the commercial automobile policy and up to the policy limit of $1,000,000 under the general liability policy. Collins is insured in the traditional sense for the remaining 1.5 million of the commercial automobile policy. R.C.3937.18 does not apply to Collins and the National policies up to the retained amounts, but does apply to the 1.5 million. ... The rejection in this case is governed by the September 3, 1997 version of R.C. 3937.18. After review, we determine the rejection form conforms to the statute for the following reasons. ... The language of the form complies with the mandates of the 1997 revision of R.C. 3937.18.

A signed selection of lower UM/UIM limits may satisfy the statute when other evidence establishes a knowing offer and selection, including the applicable premium information.

Manalo v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., Unpublished Decision (2-7-2003) · filed 2003-02-07(C)

We find that the form signed by the duly authorized representative of Avon (attached hereto as Exhibit A), taken together with the comprehensive affidavit of Avon's duly authorized representative, fully satisfy the requirements of Linko that Avon made an "express, knowing rejection of UM/UIM coverage" (Linko, supra, 449) and further made an express knowing acceptance of lower coverage in the amount of $100,000, with complete knowledge of the premiums to be charged, a description of the coverage, and an express statement of the UM/UIM coverage limits. (Id). We find it totally beyond reason to believe that a sophisticated large corporation, multi-state and perhaps multi-national, Avon Products, did not act knowingly and in full knowledge of all the requirements in accepting full UM/UIM coverage and in accepting the lower figure of such coverage. The insured in this case was not your average individual consumer buying insurance, but rather a very knowledgeable corporate entity which purchased multitudes of insurance policies with full knowledge of all their applicable requirements.

The former version required insurers to offer both UM and UIM coverage together, so a named insured could not accept one without accepting the other.

Gates v. Nationwide Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (4-7-2003) · filed 2003-04-07(A), (C)

The policy at issue was effective from August 27, 1997 to August 27, 1998; therefore, LCSD must have contracted with Wausau to purchase the UIM policy on or before August 27, 1997. On August 27, 1997, the version of R.C. 3937.18 that was then in effect was the version that became effective on October 20, 1994. Under that version of R.C.3937.18, insurers like Wausau were required to provide both UM and UIM coverage in any automobile or motor vehicle liability insurance policy they issued. See former R.C. 3937.18(A). Former R.C. 3937.18(C) provides that "[t]he named insured may only reject or accept both coverages offered under division (A) of this section." Thus, in order to obtain UM coverage for its employees, as was expressly permitted under R.C. 3313.201, LCSD had to accept UIM coverage as well.

Section 3937.18(A) permits but does not require UM/UIM coverage, so such coverage is not implied by law, and former division (C)'s written-offer and rejection requirements no longer apply.

Arn v. McLean · filed 2005-02-18(A) (C)

Consequently, at the time of the February 21, 2002 renewal, State Farm did not have to offer or include UM/UIM coverage with its insurance policies, and such coverage could no longer be implied by operation of law. There was also no longer any need for an offer or a rejection of the coverage. Therefore, State Farm acted appropriately in instructing the insured that UM/UIM coverage was not provided but could be purchased if the insured contacted an agent.

After October 31, 2001, § 3937.18 no longer requires insurers to offer UM/UIM coverage or obtain a written rejection when issuing or renewing an automobile policy.

Burton v. Allstate Ins., Unpublished Decision (10-3-2005) · filed 2005-10-03

Thus, insurance companies that issue or renew policies after October 31, 2001, are no longer required to offer, and obtain a written rejection of, UM/UIM coverage.

For policies renewed after the 2001 amendments, § 3937.18(A) no longer required insurers to offer UM/UIM coverage or obtain a written rejection.

Marron v. Usaa Casualty Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (5-8-2006) · filed 2006-05-08(A)

The October 31, 2001 amendments to the statute entirely eliminated the requirement that UM/UIM coverage be offered with insurance policies. In passing the amendments, the General Assembly expressed its intent to supersede the holdings in Gyori, Linko, and their progeny. ... Furthermore, when Marron's policy was renewed on October 11, 2002, R.C. 3937.18 no longer mandated that USAA offer and obtain a written rejection of UM/UIM coverage. See R.C. 3937.18 (A). As such, Marron was no longer entitled to UM/UIM coverage as a matter of law at the time of the accident.

Under the 1997–2001 version of § 3937.18(C), rejecting UM/UIM coverage required a signed writing, and the insurer's offer had to disclose the coverage's availability, premium, description, and limits.

Vairetta v. Papesh, 90350 (3-6-2008) · filed 2008-03-06(C)

Accordingly, when reviewing an UM/UIM claim, we must first decide what version of R.C. 3937.18 applies to the insurance policy in question. ... We conclude, therefore, that the H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18 , which was in effect from 1997 to 2001, governs the case at hand. ... The pertinent part of H.B. 261, which at the time was R.C. 3937.18 (C), stated that "a named insured's * * * rejection of [UM/UIM] coverages * * * shall be in writing and shall be signed by the named insured * * *." In Linko , supra, the Ohio Supreme Court held that for a UM/UIM rejection to be valid under H.B. 261/R.C. 3937.18 (C), "the insurer must inform the insured of the availability of UM/UIM coverage, set forth the premium for UM/UIM coverage, include a brief description of the coverage, and expressly state the UM/UIM coverage limits in its offer; * * *." ... Therefore, we hold that the trial court applied the correct law to the situation at hand. ... A careful review of the record in the instant case, including Allstate's summary judgment motion with attached exhibits, the insurance policy in question, and the UM/UIM rejection, reveals that Allstate did not produce evidence, extrinsic or otherwise, that it made an offer to the Vairettas which included UM/UIM coverage description, limits, or premiums. Absent this proffer, a Hollon analysis necessarily fails. In the court's August 8, 2007 declaratory judgment, it noted that Allstate "provides no evidence that an offer was made that meets the above requirements. Plaintiff's affidavits support that no specific offer was ever made." Therefore, the Vairettas' UM/UIM rejection is invalid under Hollon. ... We note that if this case were before an Ohio court today, or anytime after October 31, 2001, when S.B. 97 changed the face of UM/UIM coverage once again, the outcome would be different. However, we conclude that the court did not err in treating the parties' motions as a declaratory judgment action, and concluding that the Allstate insurance policy in question "does provide UM coverage equal to the policy limits by operation of law."

Section 3937.18(A) permits an insured to choose lower uninsured motorist coverage limits; renewing without requesting higher limits does not add those higher limits by operation of law.

Dushaw v. Nationwide Insurance Co. · filed 1989-01-03(A)

By renewing the policy without requesting uninsured coverage at the higher policy limits, the insured effectively rejected uninsured motorist coverage at the higher policy limits, and such coverage will not be implied by operation of law.

Section 3937.18(C) requires a meaningful offer of UM/UIM coverage; a rejection is invalid when the insurer cannot show that the insured knew the coverage premium.

Evans v. Wallen, Unpublished Decision (6-23-2006) · filed 2006-06-23(C)

In our view, the trial court did not err in concluding that the extrinsic evidence failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that Evans had knowledge of the elements of a valid offer of UM/UIM coverage. For example, there is no evidence that Evans knew the premium for the UM/UIM coverage that she purportedly rejected. Although Evans and Young testified that Evans had had access to this information at her office, the evidence fails to create a genuine issue of material fact that Evans had been informed — by her own research or otherwise — of the premium for the UM/UIM coverage. As such, her rejection of such coverage was invalid, and summary judgment in Evans's favor was appropriate.

Section 3937.18 mandates uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage designed to protect persons, not vehicles.

Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 1999-06-23

We note again, as we have often in the past, that uninsured motorist coverage, mandated by law pursuant to R.C. 3937.18, was designed by the General Assembly to protect persons, not vehicles. Martin v. Midwestern Group Ins. Co. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 478, 639 N.E.2d 438, paragraph one of the syllabus. Since R.C. 3937.18 mandates underinsured as well as uninsured motorist coverage, obviously the same rationale applies to underinsured motorist coverage.

Section 3937.18(E) allows an injured party to sue an uninsured tortfeasor after receiving less-than-policy-limits payment from an uninsured-motorist carrier, while the insurer is subrogated only to the extent of its payment.

Davis v. Nicastro, Unpublished Decision (9-1-1999) · filed 1999-09-01(E)

We hereby hold that logic, fairness, and a reasonable interpretation of the language set forth in R.C. 3937.18 (E) necessitates a conclusion that an injured party is not barred from suing an uninsured tortfeasor if that injured party receives payment from an uninsured motorist carrier for less than the policy limits.

Section 3937.18(A) applies to insurance policies delivered outside Ohio when they cover vehicles registered or principally garaged in Ohio.

Starks v. Federal Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (8-18-2003) · filed 2003-08-18(A)

We find the instant case to be similar to Vohsing v.Federal Insurance Company (May 5, 2003), Licking App. No. 2002CA00101,2003-Ohio-2511, wherein we had to determine whether Ohio law, or more specifically, whether R.C. § 3937.18 applies, to a policy of insurance which was issued and delivered in a state other than Ohio, but covers automobiles principally garaged in the State of Ohio. ... As the Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted R.C. §3937.18(A) to apply to insurance policies delivered out of state, but which cover vehicles registered or garaged in Ohio, we find that the Federal insurance policy issued to J.H. Roberts Industries was subject to Ohio law, not Illinois law.

Former § 3937.18(H) permits, but does not require, an automobile policy to consolidate all claims arising from one person's bodily injury or death into the per-person limit.

Nicolini-Brownfield v. Eigensee, Unpublished Decision (9-16-1999) · filed 1999-09-16(H)

We also note that contrary to appellant-Nationwide's assertion, former R.C. 3937.18(H) does not require that automobile insurance policies contain uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions that consolidate derivative claims into single claims. Rather, former R.C. 3937.18(H) merely states that such provisionsmay include such language. As this court has concluded above, the provision at issue here did not include such language. In addition, former R.C. 3937.18(H) did not legislatively overruleHolt v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 401, which stated that a wrongful death claimant who is a statutory beneficiary of an insured decedent can recover under the uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions of the decedent's insurance policy if the wrongful death claimant is not a named insured under the policy. Id.

Section 3937.18(J) allows an insurer to consolidate all claims arising from or resulting from one person's bodily injury, including death, into a single claim.

Westfield Natl. Ins. Co. v. Young, Unpublished Decision (11-6-2006) · filed 2006-11-06(J)

The policy's language is unambiguous and consistent with R.C. 3937.18 (J), which allows insurers to consolidate all claims arising from or resulting from any one person's bodily injury, including death, to a single claim.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an automobile insurer to contractually limit a wrongful-death beneficiary’s recovery of uninsured-motorist benefits to the limits stated in the policy; it does not limit damages recoverable in a wrongful-death civil action or eliminate a meaningful remedy.

Carrier v. State Farm Mutual Ins., Unpublished Decision (9-16-1999) · filed 1999-09-16(H)

This court rejected the same constitutional challenge in Scancarello v. Erie Ins. Co.

Former Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3937.18 does not require a homeowner’s policy with limited liability coverage for nonregistered, nonhighway vehicles to offer uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.

Davidson v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 2001-04-11

Consequently, we hold that a homeowner’s insurance policy that provides limited liability coverage for vehicles that are not subject to motor vehicle registration and that are not intended to be used on a public highway is not a motor vehicle liability policy and is not subject to the requirement of former R.C. 3937.18 to offer uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.

Former § 3937.18 does not require a homeowner’s policy with only limited liability coverage for vehicles not subject to motor-vehicle registration and not intended for public highways to offer uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.

Dye v. Owners Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (7-30-2001) · filed 2001-07-30

A homeowner's insurance policy that provides limited liability coverage for vehicles that are not subject to motor vehicle registration and that are not intended to be used on a public highway is not a motor vehicle liability policy and is not subject to the requirement of former R.C. 3937.18 to offer uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.

Section 3937.18 does not require uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage in a homeowner's policy that provides only limited liability coverage for injuries to a residence employee sustained in a motor vehicle.

Henry v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins., Unpublished Decision (9-28-2001) · filed 2001-09-28

Here, the policy provided limited liability for injuries to a residence employee as sustained in a motor vehicle. We find, pursuant to Davidson,supra, and our earlier decisions cited above, that R.C.3937.18 does not apply to this homeowner's policy.

Section 3937.18 does not require UM/UIM coverage in a homeowner's policy merely because the policy provides limited liability coverage for a residence employee's injuries arising from the use of a motor vehicle.

Vohsing v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (1-14-2002) · filed 2002-01-14

The sole issue for our review is whether a homeowner's policy that provides limited insurance coverage to an insured for liability to a residence employee arising out of the use of a motor vehicle that is subject to motor vehicle registration laws on the public highways is sufficient to subject said homeowner's policy to R.C. § 3937.18, thereby requiring UM/UIM coverage. ... Consequently, the policy at issue in this case cannot be construed so as to provide UM/UIM coverage.

Section 3937.18 does not require a homeowner's policy's limited residence-employee motor-vehicle liability coverage to include UM/UIM coverage.

Stevens v. Allstate Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (6-14-2002) · filed 2002-06-14

We find appellants' assignment of error not well-taken on the authority of this court's decisions in Ruiz v. Rygalski (Mar. 29, 2002), Lucas App. No. L-01-1363, as amended at Ruiz v. Rygalski (May 8, 2002), Lucas App. No. L-01-1363, and Burkholder v. German Mut. Ins. Co. (Mar. 15, 2002), Lucas App. No. L-01-1413. ... We further find that our holding is in direct conflict with Lemm v. TheHartford (Oct. 4, 2001), Franklin App. No. 01AP-251, which is currently before the Ohio Supreme Court for its consideration. Lemm v. TheHartford (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 1475. As such, we respectfully submit this case to the Ohio Supreme Court, pursuant to Art. IV, Section 3(B)(4), Ohio Constitution, for review and final determination on the following issue: "When a homeowner's insurance policy provides express liability for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident when the injured party is the homeowner's residence employee and the injury occurred in the course of that employment, is the policy deemed an automobile liability or motor vehicle policy subject to the requirement of former R.C. 3937.18 to offer uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage?"

Section 3937.18(A) does not require uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage for a homeowner’s policy merely because its residence-employee exception may provide limited liability coverage involving a motor vehicle.

Hillyer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. · filed 2002-12-13(A)

We find that the limited liability coverage that may arise under the residence-employee exception in a homeowner’s insurance policy is insufficient to transform the policy into a motor vehicle policy for purposes of former R.C. 3937.18(A).

Section 3937.18 required Argonaut's umbrella policy, as a motor vehicle liability policy, to provide $1,000,000 in uninsured-motorist coverage.

Sheaffer v. Westfield Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (9-10-2003) · filed 2003-09-10

In our judgment entry addressing appellees' first motion for reconsideration, we found Argonaut's umbrella policy to be a motor vehicle liability policy containing UM coverage in the limit amount of $1,000,000. ... We re-affirm our judgment entry filed on June 17, 2003, and overrule Argonaut's Second Assignment of Error.

Section 3937.18(A) applies to a policy that provides limited motor-vehicle liability coverage for recreational vehicles, even when it is not issued for a particular vehicle, and extends uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage by operation of law in an amount equal to the policy's liability coverage.

State Auto Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lopez, Unpublished Decision (9-30-1999) · filed 1999-09-30(A)

However, as appellees point out, former R.C. 3937.18(A) applies not only to motor vehicles registered in this state, it also applies to motor vehicles principally garaged in this state. Hence, the fact that the homeowner's policy here does not provide coverage for recreational vehicles subject to motor vehicle registration does not preclude application of former R.C. 3937.18(A). ... Given that former R.C. 3937.18 is a remedial statute and should be liberally construed in favor of the insured, we find former R.C. 3937.18 applies to the homeowner's policy even though such policy was not issued for delivery with respect to some particular motor vehicle. Having concluded that former R.C. 3937.18(A) applies to the homeowner's policy herein, uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage is extended to appellees by operation of law in an amount equal to the liability coverage of the homeowner's policy.

Section 3937.18 applies to a homeowners' policy that provides motor-vehicle liability coverage, requiring uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage by operation of law in an amount equal to the policy's liability coverage.

Chapple v. Erie Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (3-2-2000) · filed 2000-03-02(A)

Having failed to find any substantive distinguishing factor between the case at bar and the cases set forth above, we find that R.C. 3937.18 applies to the homeowners' policy in question, and that uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage is extended to the plaintiff by operation of law, and in an amount equal to the liability coverage of the policy.

Former Section 3937.18 required motor vehicle liability policies to offer uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, but did not apply to a homeowner’s policy’s limited liability coverage for vehicles not subject to motor vehicle registration.

Dicke v. Safeco Ins. Co. · filed 2001-04-11

Homeowner’s insurance policy that provides limited liability coverage for vehicles not subject to motor vehicle registration is not a motor vehicle liability policy and is not subject to the requirement of former R.C. 3937.18 to offer uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.

Section 3937.18's uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage mandate does not apply to the homeowner's policy at issue because it was not a motor vehicle policy subject to the statute.

Hoke v. State Farm Fire Casualty Co., Unpublished Decision (7-26-2002) · filed 2002-07-26

"Appellant claims the trial court erred in finding her homeowner's policy was not a motor vehicle policy controlled by the mandates of R.C. 3938.17. We disagree. ... In the above cited cases, we found the residence employee provision could not be construed to a policy subject to R.C. 3937.18. The sole assignment of error is denied."

Section 3937.18 does not apply to similar homeowner's policies because of the residence employee exceptions.

McClure v. West American Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (11-2-2002) · filed 2002-11-02

Appellants urge us to reconsider our decisions in Ruiz v.Rygalski, 6th Dist. No. L-01-1363, 2002-Ohio-1519; Westmark v. FarmersIns. of Columbus, Inc., 6th Dist. No. F-01-018, 2002-Ohio-1524; andBurkholder v. German Mut. Ins. Co., 6th Dist. No. L-01-1413, 2002-Ohio-1184, wherein we found that similar homeowner's policies were not subject to R.C. 3937.18 based upon the residence employee exceptions. After careful review of the arguments raised by appellants we conclude that the above-cited cases were properly decided and, based on same, find that appellants' sole assignment of error is not well-taken.

Section 3937.18's public-policy protections for statutorily required uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage do not invalidate a one-year limitation in a renters policy.

Fair v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. · filed 2006-04-12

In voiding the provision at issue in Miller, the court found that “the effect of the policy provision was to deprive appellants of the coverage required by R.C. 3937.18 [the uninsured -underinsured coverage statute ].” Miller, 69 Ohio St.3d at 623, 635 N.E.2d at 320. Thus, the court held that: A provision in a policy for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage which precludes the insured from commencing any action or proceeding against the insurance carrier for payment of uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits, unless the insured has demanded arbitration and/or commenced suit within one year from the date of the accident, is void as against public policy. Miller, 69 Ohio St.3d at 619, 635 N.E.2d at 318 (syllabus). Miller is inapposite. The coverage at issue in this case is a renters policy, not uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.

Section 3937.18 does not require uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage under a homeowner's policy solely because it covers a residence employee's use of a motor vehicle.

Brozovic v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., Unpublished Decision (9-13-2001) · filed 2001-09-13

Brozovic relies on R.C. 3937.18 and Selander v. Erie Ins. Group (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 541, in arguing that because the policy provides coverage for use of a motor vehicle by residence employees, State Farm must provide UM/UIM coverage under his parents' homeowner's policy. ... In regard to the coverage for residence employees, this same issue was recently determined by this court in Davis v. Shelby Ins. Co. (June 14, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 78610, unreported, and Hillyer v. State Farm Fire Casualty Co. (Aug. 21, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 79176, unreported. This court in Hillyer analyzed the identical policy language and found that it is clear that the policy is intended to exclude any coverage for bodily injury occurring in an automobile accident to the insured or his family members. The sole exception to this broad exclusion is coverage provided to a residence employee in the course and scope of that employee's employment. Because Brozovic is not an employee of the residence, he cannot obtain coverage under his parents' homeowner's policy for injuries incurred as a result of an automobile accident.

Section 3937.18 does not require uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage under a homeowner's policy whose automobile coverage applies only to residence employees when the insured was not a residence employee.

Bergstrom v. State Farm Fire, Unpublished Decision (12-6-2001) · filed 2001-12-06

This appeal addresses whether a homeowner's policy that covers use of an automobile by an insured's residence employee necessarily confers uninsured/underinsured (UM/UIM) coverage under R.C. 3937.18 for a decedent insured who died as a result of an automobile accident when the insured is not a residence employee. ... In this case, decedent was not a residence employee. As such, we find that the plaintiff is not entitled to UM/UIM coverage under her homeowner's insurance policy for injuries sustained as a result of an automobile accident.

Former R.C. 3937.18(A) does not create UIM coverage by operation of law from residence employee coverage in a homeowner's policy.

Colen v. Allstate Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (1-9-2003) · filed 2003-01-09(A)

Inasmuch as the issue presented for review here concerns whether residence employee coverage in a homeowner's policy creates UIM coverage by operation of law, in accord with Hillyer, it does not. ... Accordingly, for the reasons expounded by the Ohio Supreme Court in Hillyer, the assignment of error presented is overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Former R.C. 3937.18(A) does not create underinsured motorist coverage by operation of law from residence employee coverage in a homeowner's policy.

Widdi v. Utica First Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (1-16-2003) · filed 2003-01-16(A)

Inasmuch as the issue presented for review here concerns whether residence employee coverage in a homeowner's policy creates UIM coverage by operation of law, in accord with Hillyer, it does not.

Former R.C. 3937.18(A) does not require UM/UIM coverage for a residence-employee clause in a homeowner's policy when motor vehicle involvement is incidental to coverage.

Pfenning v. Nationwide Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (1-30-2003) · filed 2003-01-30(A)

Accordingly former R.C. 3937.18 does not apply here, and Pfenning's second assigned error is without merit.

Section 3937.18 does not require uninsured motorist coverage under a homeowner's policy merely because its resident employee clause provides coverage incidental to homeownership.

Shirley v. Republic-Franklin Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (12-15-2003) · filed 2003-12-15

After the trial court filed its decision, the Ohio Supreme Court cited the case of Hillyer v. State Farm Fire CasualtyCompany, 97 Ohio St.3d 411, 2002-Ohio-6662, 780 N.E.2d 262, wherein it found the resident employee clause in an insurance policy which provides coverage incidental to homeownership does not convert the policy to a motor vehicle liability insurance requiring the insurer to offer uninsured motorist coverage. ... On the authority of Hillyer, supra, the assignment of error is overruled.

Division (H) permits an uninsured/underinsured motorist policy to make all claims arising from one person's bodily injury or death collectively subject to the policy's single per-person limit, regardless of the number of insureds or claims.

Stewart v. State, Unpublished Decision (10-7-1999) · filed 1999-10-07(H)

By their express terms, R.C. 3937.18(H) and Section 10 of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 make enforceable language in an uninsured/underinsured motorist policy which purports to consolidate all claims for damages arising out of the death of one person into a single claim subject to the policy's per person limit of liability, notwithstanding the multiple wrongful death claims created by R.C. Chapter 2125.

Subsection (H) permits an underinsured-motorist policy to make the injured person's claim and all derivative claims arising from that injury collectively subject to one per-person limit.

Izev v. Nationwide Mutual, Unpublished Decision (11-17-1999) · filed 1999-11-17(H)

In light of this and the law set forth above, this Court holds that, under R.C. 3937.18(H), as amended on October 20, 1994, and as applied on November 25, 1995, underinsured motorist provisions limiting an individual's claims and all derivative claims flowing therefrom to a single per person limit are legal and enforceable.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an uninsured-motorist policy to treat all claims arising from one person's bodily injury, including derivative claims, as a single claim subject to the per-person limit.

Greiner v. Timm, Unpublished Decision (3-28-2000) · filed 2000-03-28(H)

This court has already recognized that the purpose of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 was to legislatively overrule Savoie, including its prohibition against insurers consolidating claims arising out of a single bodily injury to the single per-person limit. Thus, this court determined that Schaefer, by implication as an extension of Savoie, was overruled by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20.

Section 3937.18(H) permits a UIM policy to treat all claims arising from one person's bodily injury as a single claim subject to the applicable per-person limit, regardless of the number of insureds or claims.

Butler-Peak v. Cunningham · filed 2000-06-30(H)

However, we need not reach these issues, as the matter is controlled by the policy terms and by R.C. 3937.18(H). Specifically, R.C. 3937.18(H) says that an insurance policy which has UIM coverage “may, notwithstanding Chapter 2125. of the Revised Code, include terms and conditions to the effect that all claims resulting from or arising out of any one person’s bodily injury, including death, shall collectively be subject to the limit of the policy applicable to bodily injury, including death, sustained by one person, and, for the purpose of such policy limit shall constitute a single claim. Any such policy limit shall be enforceable regardless of the number of insureds, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the declarations or policy, or vehicles involved in the accident.”

Section 3937.18(H) permits an auto-liability policy to treat all claims arising from one person's bodily injury or death as a single claim subject to one per-person limit, even when multiple insureds seek damages, if the policy language is clear and unambiguous.

Justice v. State Farm Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (10-18-2000) · filed 2000-10-18(H)

We find R.C. 3937.18 mandates provision of uninsured motorists coverage, and, pursuant to Moore, supra, the insurance coverage may not be limited in such a way that the insured must suffer bodily injury in order to be compensated for his or her damages. However, we find Ohio law permits an insurer to consolidate all the claims which arise out of a single death into a single claim under the single limits, if the policy language is clear and unambiguous. Each insured is still entitled to compensation for his or her damages arising out of decedent's death. Thus, we find the overriding legislative intent enacting R.C. 3937.18, is not thwarted.

Section 3937.18(H) allows a policy to treat all claims arising from one person's bodily injury or death as a single claim subject to the single per-person limit, if the policy language is clear and unambiguous.

Justice v. State Farm Insurance · filed 2000-10-18(H)

However, we find that Ohio law permits an insurer to consolidate all the claims which arise out of a single death into a single claim under the single limits, if the policy language is clear and unambiguous. Each insured is still entitled to compensation for his or her damages arising out of decedent’s death. Thus, we find that the overriding legislative intent enacting R.C. 3937.18 is not thwarted.

Section 3937.18(H) permits derivative claims, such as a child's loss-of-consortium claim, to be subject to a single per-person underinsured-motorist coverage limit with the physically injured person.

Wheeler v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co., Unpublished Decision (12-19-2000) · filed 2000-12-19(H)

Appellants maintain the trial court erred in finding the Grange policy limits could be set-off from the amount received from the tortfeasor. Further, appellant argues any derivative claims, like the consortium claim of the minor child, should not be subject to a single per-person limit under R.C. 3937.18(H). In light of our decision of Steinbach v. State Farm Mut. AutomobileIns. Co. (May 22, 2000), Licking App. No. 99CA00064, unreported, appellants' arguments are overruled.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an automobile liability policy to treat all claims arising from one person's bodily injury as a single claim subject to one per-person limit, and section 3937.18(A)(2) permits reducing underinsured-motorist limits by amounts available under the tortfeasor's liability coverage.

Kleinsmith v. Allstate Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (12-22-2000) · filed 2000-12-22(H), (A)(2)

R.C. 3937.18(H) expressly permits liability insurance policies to include language which limits the available coverage. ... Appellee is permitted to set off the $12,500.00 received by appellants from the tortfeasor against the $12,500.00 "each person" limit in the subject insurance policy.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an automobile liability policy to treat all claims arising from one person's bodily injury, including death, as a single claim subject to the applicable per-person limit, if the policy language clearly does so.

Lippert v. Peace, Unpublished Decision (3-27-2001) · filed 2001-03-27(H)

In the present case, Appellants claim accrued on August 26, 1996, well after the effective date of R.C. 3937.18(H). This is not a case where Allstate is attempting to limit its policy so that Bryan would have to suffer bodily injury, sickness, or disease in order to recover damages. Rather, after examining the policy language, it is clear that Allstate intended to merge all of the claims arising from Natalie's accident into a single claim. R.C. 3937.18(H) authorizes this, as long as the policy language is clear to that extent.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an underinsured-motorist policy to subject all claims, including consortium claims, arising from one person's bodily injury to that person's per-person policy limit.

Carmon v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 2001-07-26(H)

The clear import of the foregoing provisions, as applied to underinsured motorist coverage, is to permit automobile insurers to limit all claims, including consortium claims, arising out of any single individual’s bodily injury to the per-person limit shown in the insurance policy.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an automobile liability policy to make all claims arising from one person's bodily injury, including death, subject collectively to that person's per-person limit.

Mays v. Taylor, Unpublished Decision (12-14-2001) · filed 2001-12-14(H)

This Court recognizes that under R.C. § 2125.02(A)(1), both parents of wrongful death victims are presumed to suffer damages. Moore v. StateAuto (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 27. That section, however, must be read in light of R.C. § 3937.18(H), which states: "Any automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance that includes coverages offered under division (A) of this section [uninsured or underinsured] and that provides a limit of coverage for payment for damages for bodily injury, including death, sustained by any one person in any one automobile accident may, notwithstanding Chapter 2125 of the Revised Code, include terms and conditions to the effect that all claims resulting from or arising out of any one person's bodily injury, including death, shall collectively be subject to the limit of the policy applicable to bodily injury, including death, sustained by one person, and for the purpose of such policy limit shall constitute a single claim. Any such policy limit shall be enforceable regardless of the number of insureds, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the declarations or policy." The aforementioned provision explicitly gives insurance companies the authority to limit derivative claims to a single "per person" limit.

Section 3937.18 applies to a new or renewed insurance contract under the law in effect at contracting or renewal, permits policy terms barring stacking under subsection (G), and allows one per-person limit for multiple derivative claims from one insured's injury under subsection (H).

Meece v. State Farm Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (10-13-1999) · filed 1999-10-13(G), (H)

Based upon our review of the provisions of the policies and the applicable case law, we hold that the policies were not continuations of prior policies, but were new contracts of insurance. Therefore, the provisions of R.C. 3937.18, as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, were applicable to the insurance policies. ... Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policies and R.C. 3937.18(G), the Meeces were not entitled to stack uninsured-motorist coverages. ... R.C. 3937.18(H) explicitly authorizes insurers to limit multiple derivative claims, including claims for loss of consortium, that arise out of the injuries of a single insured, to a single per-person limit.

Amendments to § 3937.18 enacted after an insurance policy’s issuance apply to a renewal only when the renewal creates a new contract of insurance separate from the original policy.

Zabukovec v. Farmers Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (10-22-1999) · filed 1999-10-22

Statutes pertaining to a policy of insurance and its coverage, which are enacted after the policy's issuance, are incorporated into any renewal of such policy if the renewal represents a new contract of insurance separate from the initial policy.

The post-October 20, 1994 amendment to § 3937.18 applies to a policy renewal only when the renewal constitutes a new contract of insurance; renewals that merely continue a pre-amendment policy remain governed by the prior law.

Thompson v. Olinn, Unpublished Decision (11-4-1999) · filed 1999-11-04(A)(2)

For all the foregoing reasons, we find that the December 22, 1994 and June 22, 1995 renewals of plaintiffs' UM/UIM policy did not constitute new contracts of insurance. Because the effective date of plaintiffs' policy was June 22, 1994, prior to the October 20, 1994 effective date of the amendment to R.C.3937.18, this case is governed by the law as interpreted inSavoie.

For an automobile insurance policy renewed after S.B. 20's effective date, the provisions of R.C. 3937.18 enacted through S.B. 20 apply to the policy's underinsured-motorist coverage.

Havens v. State Farm Ins. Cos., Unpublished Decision (8-30-2001) · filed 2001-08-30

Within the parameters of that case, plaintiffs and defendant contest whether the provisions of R.C. 3937.18, enacted through S.B. 20, control the coverage issues presented here. ... Accordingly, the renewal, in actuality, is a new policy, incorporating the provisions of S.B. 20, enacted October 20, 1994, and rendered those provisions applicable to plaintiffs. ... Given Wolfe and Smith, the trial court did not err in concluding that S.B. 20 applies to the policy State Farm issued to plaintiffs.

Section 3937.18(E) permits an insurer to exclude a vehicle insured under the policy’s liability coverage from the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle, but the exclusion does not automatically become part of an existing policy and must be incorporated before or when a new guaranteed policy period begins.

Vanhoose v. Cartmill · filed 2001-09-28(E)

As of September 1997, when R.C. 3937.18(E) was enacted, Allstate was permitted to exclude the Vanhoose’s vehicle from the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle under the terms of its insurance policy. Such an exclusion had previously been held to violate the legislature’s intent in enacting R.C. 3937.18. See State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Alexander (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 397, 400, 583 N.E.2d 309. The enactment of R.C. 3937.18(E) did not automatically incorporate such an exclusion into existing policies, however. It is unclear from the record before us when Allstate did, in fact, insert such an exclusion into its policy language. If such a exclusion was incorporated into Phillip’s Allstate policy before or when it was renewed in November 1997, which was the beginning of a successive two-year period, Vanhoose was not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage at the time of the accident. If, on the other hand, Allstate did not incorporate such an exclusion before or when the policy was renewed in November 1997, the exclusion would not have been effective during the November 1997 to November 1999 guaranteed policy period pursuant to R.C. 3937.31(A), and Vanhoose would have been eligible for uninsured motorist coverage at the time of the accident.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an uninsured-motorist policy, through appropriate language, to consolidate claims arising from one bodily injury—including negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims—under the single per-person limit.

Stephenson v. Grange Mut., Unpublished Decision (11-4-1999) · filed 1999-11-04(H)

However, the entire purpose of S.B. 20 (effective October 20, 1994), was to legislatively overrule the holding ofSavoie, including its prohibition against insurers consolidating claims arising out of a single bodily injury to the single per-person limit. ... Thus, S.B. 20 (in particular, the enactment of R.C. 3937.18[H]) returned the law of Ohio to where it was pre-Savoie and pre-Schaefer. ... Under such authority, negligent infliction of emotional distress claims may be consolidated, by appropriate policy language, with all other claims arising out of a single bodily injury and subject to the single per-person limit under the policy.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an automobile liability policy to limit all claims arising from one person's bodily injury, including death and wrongful-death claims, to a single per-person limit.

Clark v. Scarpelli, Unpublished Decision (12-17-1999) · filed 1999-12-17(H)

However, as we mentioned previously, R.C. 3937.18(H) has supplanted this holding in Wood by now allowing insurance companies to limit all claims arising out of one bodily injury to a single per-person limit, including wrongful death claims. The General Assembly does not distinguish between loss of consortium and wrongful death, but instead allows limitation of "all claims resulting from or arising out of any one person's bodily injury, including death." R.C. 3937.18(H) (emphasis added). Consequently, the Atkinson court's reliance on Wood is no longer a legitimate argument for the distinction between wrongful death and loss of consortium claims in UIM cases.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an insurer to limit all claims arising from one person's bodily injury to the applicable per-person underinsured-motorist coverage limit.

Izev v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (6-13-2001) · filed 2001-06-13(H)

The passage of S.B. 20 amended R.C. 3937.18 and now permits insurers to limit all claims arising out of a single individual's bodily injury to the per person limit.1 R.C. 3937.18(H).

As amended by S.B. 20, § 3937.18(H) allowed an insurance policy to treat all claims arising from one person's bodily injury as a single claim.

Piergallini v. Brister, Unpublished Decision (6-11-2002) · filed 2002-06-11(H)

Pursuant to the terms of the 1996 policy at issue in this case, it is clear State Farm took advantage of the change in R.C. 3937.44 and R.C.3937.18(H) and included a provision treating all claims arising out of one person's bodily injury as a single claim. Thus the Piergallinis cannot avail themselves of the holdings in Schaefer and Jones.

Section 3937.18(H) permits an automobile liability insurer to consolidate all claims arising from one person's bodily injury into a single claim, provided the policy language does so clearly and unambiguously.

Saunders v. Mortensen · filed 2004-01-21(H)

Former R.C. 3937.18(H) as amended by Am.Sub.S.B.No. 20 in 1994, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 204, 212, permitted automobile liability insurers to include provisions in insurance policies that consolidate all claims arising out of any one person’s bodily injury into a single claim. Although a policy need not use the exact wording of R.C. 3937.18(H), the language must clearly and unambiguously consolidate such claims in order to give effect to the limit.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) requires underinsured-motorist limits to be reduced by amounts available for payment, while subsection (H) permits all claims arising from one person’s bodily injury or death to be treated as a single claim under one policy; coverage may protect insureds for loss from injury to any insured even when the claimant did not suffer the actual injury.

Berry v. Przyborowski, Unpublished Decision (11-19-1999) · filed 1999-11-19(A)(2), (H)

We conclude that Linda, Earl, Sr. and Darrell are entitled to benefits. As noted, R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) states that underinsured motorist coverage must "* * * provide protection for insuredsthereunder against loss for bodily injury, sickness, or disease,including death, suffered by any person insured under the policy* * *." (Emphasis added.) The statute does not limit recovery only to those insureds who actually suffer the bodily injury, sickness, disease or death, but clearly states that insureds are protected for loss by reason of injury to any insured. Therefore, we find that, while a plain reading of the statute does require that an insured suffer bodily injury, it does not require that the insured person claiming rights to underinsured proceeds suffer the actual injury. ... The pertinent language in this statutory provision indicates that in determining the amount of set-off, the amount availablefor payment must be considered. ... Accordingly, we find that the underinsured motorist carriers must focus on what each claimant received from the tortfeasor's carrier in relation to their claims when determining how much is to be set-off. ... R.C. 3937.18(H) permits an insurer to consider as one all claims made a result of the death of one person. ... We also impliedly upheld the constitutionality of R.C. 3937.18(H) on the same grounds in that case when we found that the per person limits were valid and enforceable despite a challenge to that statute. Id.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) makes underinsured-motorist coverage available only when the liability coverage available to the insured is less than the applicable underinsured-motorist limits, while subsection (H) permits a policy to treat claims arising from one person's bodily injury or death as a single claim.

Brown v. Saliba, Unpublished Decision (6-28-2000) · filed 2000-06-28(A)(2), (H)

The plain language of the above cited statute clearly indicates that UM/UIM coverage is available only when the total available liability insurance limits are less than the applicable UM/UIM limits. ... It is clear that pursuant to the plain language of the cited statutory section, an insurer may include language in the insurance policy that effectively limits multiple wrongful death claimants to a single claim. ... This provision clearly limits the multiple wrongful death claimants to the insurance policy's single "per person" claim when one person suffers death as the result of one occurrence, which is contemplated and authorized by R.C. § 3937.18 (H).

Section 3937.18(H) permits all claims arising from one person's bodily injury to be treated as a single claim subject to the per-person limit, while § 3937.18(A)(2) compares underinsured coverage with the amounts available for payment under the tortfeasor's policy.

Smith v. State Farm Insurance Companies, Unpublished Decision (10-26-2000) · filed 2000-10-26(A)(2), (H)

Initially, because S.B. 20 applies to the policies at issue, the provisions of R.C. 3937.18(H) control, and state: Any automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance that includes coverages offered under division (A) of this section and that provides a limit of coverage for payment for damages for bodily injury, including death, sustained by any one person in any one automobile accident, may, notwithstanding Chapter 2125. of the Revised Code, include terms and conditions to the effect that all claims resulting from or arising out of any one person's bodily injury, including death, shall collectively be subject to the limit of the policy applicable to bodily injury, including death, sustained by one person, and, for the purpose of such policy limit shall constitute a single claim. Any such policy limit shall be enforceable regardless of the number of insureds, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the declarations or policy, or vehicles involved in the accident. ... Given the legislative permission to collectively subject all claims to a single claim limit, the policies at issue validly do so. ... Given the Supreme Court's previous interpretation of "available for payment" inAndrews, the legislature's maintaining the same language in the amended version of R.C. 3937.18 suggests that the comparison is not of limits only, but between the underinsured limits and the amounts available for payment under the tortfeasor's policy. Fox v. Auto-Owners Ins. (June 12, 1998), Montgomery App. No. 1456, unreported. ... Pursuant to R.C.3937.18(A)(2), the insureds under each policy may recover the difference between the amount of the underinsured coverage provided in the State Farm policy and the amount they collectively recovered through the tortfeasor's policy.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) measures the underinsured-motorist set-off by amounts actually received from the tortfeasor, rather than by comparing policy limits.

Mejia v. Heimsch, Unpublished Decision (6-25-2001) · filed 2001-06-25(A)(2)

The Ohio Supreme Court determined that the amount of set-off should be determined by the amounts actually received by the injured parties, not by a policy-limit to policy-limit comparison. Littrell v. Wigglesworth, (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 425, 430. ... Thus, in this case, appellants collectively are limited to the $50,000 per person limit under the West American policy as the maximum payable under UIM coverage. Because collectively appellants have received an amount greater than $50,000 from the tortfeasor, they are not entitled to UIM benefits under the West American policy. See Clark at 284.

Former division (A)(2) reduces UIM policy limits by amounts available under applicable bodily-injury liability policies covering persons liable to the insured, not by UIM payments from the insured's own carrier.

Headley v. Grange Guardian Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (1-6-2003) · filed 2003-01-06(A)(2)

"The policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured." (Emphasis added.) 1997 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 261, 147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2372. ... In this case, AMMIC's BAP and CCP policies provide secondary UIM coverage and did not provide coverage for the tortfeasor. Therefore, AMMIC is not entitled to a set-off of UIM coverage paid by Headley's carrier."

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in automobile liability policies, but a homeowners policy excluding motor-vehicle liability is not such a policy.

Overton v. Western Reserve Group, Unpublished Decision (12-8-1999) · filed 1999-12-08(A)

Accordingly, we hold that the policy in question was not an automobile liability policy for purposes of R.C. 3937.18. As such, UM/UIM coverage was not required and does not operate by law.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage when a liability policy provides motor-vehicle liability coverage, including limited coverage for registered vehicles traveling on public highways.

Mlecik v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Unpublished Decision (11-14-2002) · filed 2002-11-14

Steadfast's policy applied to "registered" motor vehicles that traveled on "public" highways. Since these qualifications are not merely "incidental" to the vehicles' character, the trial court correctly concluded R.C. 3937.18 applied to the policy.

Section 3937.18 does not require underinsured-motorist coverage for a commercial general liability policy when automobile coverage arises only incidentally through narrow exceptions to a general exclusion.

Mazzocki v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., Unpublished Decision (2-20-2003) · filed 2003-02-20

Because the use of an automobile is merely incidental to coverage afforded under the commercial general liability policy, we find that the limited liability coverage that may arise under this policy is insufficient to transform the policy into an automobile policy for purposes of UIM coverage.

Section 3937.18 requires UM/UIM coverage only for an automobile liability policy covering specifically identified vehicles; incidental parking-auto and mobile-equipment coverage does not trigger that requirement.

Acree v. Cna Insurance Companies, Unpublished Decision (6-13-2003) · filed 2003-06-13(L)(1)

An "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance" is "any policy of insurance that serves as proof of financial responsibility * * * for owners or operators of the motor vehicle specifically identified in the policy of insurance." ... Thus, the commercial general liability policy was not an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance" within R.C. 3937.18, and UIM coverage was not required. ... Where there are no specifically identified vehicles, R.C. 3937.18 does not impose UM/UIM coverage.

Section 3937.18 requires an automobile liability policy to identify the covered motor vehicles specifically, and policies that do not meet that definition need not offer UM/UIM coverage.

Vanwinkle v. Indiana Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (1-18-2005) · filed 2005-01-18(L), (A)

We conclude that Talawanda's EPL with Nationwide did not specifically identify any motor vehicles, therefore it did not satisfy the R.C. 3937.18(L) definition of an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance. Consequently, Nationwide was not required to offer uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage as part of the policy, and such coverage does not arise by operation of law pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(A).

The version of § 3937.18 in effect when the automobile insurance contract was entered controls the parties' rights, and under the applicable pre-amendment version, policy provisions limiting recovery through anti-stacking or excess-coverage terms are invalid.

Doran v. Allstate Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (12-10-1999) · filed 1999-12-10

Thus, under Savoie, limitations on the stacking of coverages were expressly prohibited. As applied to the case at bar, the damages that appellants suffered exceeded the limits of all other available insurance policies. Therefore, the underinsured portion of Allstate's policy issued to Glemma Schultz was accessible to appellants to fully compensate them for their losses. The policy provisions that Allstate relies upon in its argument violate R.C.3937.18 as interpreted by the Savoie court and, therefore, are invalid.

The version of Section 3937.18 in effect when the automobile insurance contract was entered into controls the parties’ rights and duties for an underinsured motorist claim.

Smith v. Gragg, Unpublished Decision (1-8-1999) · filed 1999-01-08

TIG does not dispute Flora Smith's correct assertion that the statutory law in effect on August 23, 1994 — the most recent renewal of the TIG policy prior to the accident — governs her claim for underinsured motorist coverage, and the matter will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with Ross,82 Ohio St.3d 281 and Savoie, 67 Ohio St.3d 500.

Subsection (H) permits an automobile policy to treat all claims arising from one person's bodily injury as a single claim subject to one per-person limit, but its applicability depends on the law in effect when the insurance contract or renewal contract was entered into.

Clevenstine v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (12-22-1999) · filed 1999-12-22(H)

Since the trial court used the date of the accident to determine the applicability of R.C. 3937.18, as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, the trial court erred. Such error was not harmless as there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning when the renewal contract was entered into and when such contract began. This issue is material to determine whether R.C. 3937.18, as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, applied to the present case. If the new contract date was issued on December 7, 1994 and became effective on November 1, 1994, then R.C. 3937.18, as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, applied and appellee would be entitled to subrogation on the $100,000.00 settlement amount against a single per person policy limit of $100,000.00. However, if the new contract was issued on August 30, 1994, and became effective on September 9, 1994, then R.C. 3937.18, as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, would not apply, and appellee could have sought subrogation on the $100,000.00 settlement amount against two separate per person policy limits of $100,000.00. Schaefer,supra.

For policies governed by former § 3937.18, an underinsurance provider must set off amounts recovered from the tortfeasor against the insured's total damages, not against the policy limit.

Stocklas v. Erie Insurance Group, Unpublished Decision (12-30-1999) · filed 1999-12-30

Thus, this case is controlled by former R.C. 3937.18 as interpreted by the holding in Savoie v. Grange Mutual Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500,620 N.E.2d 809. ... In Savoie, the court held that: "* * * underinsured motorists * * * are entitled to collect up to the full amount of their underinsured policy to the extent that their damages exceed the amounts which the tortfeasor's insurer has already paid to them."Id. at 508. "In determining the amount of underinsurance coverage to be paid on a claim involving an accident governed by former R.C. 3937.18, the underinsurance provider is entitled to set off the amounts actually recovered from the tortfeasor's liability carriers against the insured's total damages, rather than against its policy limits." Cole v. Holland (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 220,667 N.E.2d 353, syllabus. Thus, if appellants' damages exceed the amount already paid by Motorist, they are entitled to recover the unsatisfied balance of their damages from the full amount of Westfield's $500,000 policy.

Section 3937.18's public policy bars an insurer from using a medical-payments setoff or reimbursement provision to reduce amounts owed under the same policy's uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.

Staas v. McAllister, Unpublished Decision (3-10-2000) · filed 2000-03-10

More important, the Ohio Supreme Court has not made such a distinction. ... However, the supreme court disagreed, stating that: an insurance policy clause which provides to the insurer a contractual right of subrogation as to payments made under the medical payments portion of the policy does not enable the insurer to avoid obligations it incurs pursuant to the uninsured motorist provisions of the same insurance policy. Thus, even where the policy provides for subrogation as to payments made as medical payments coverage, a contract provision which would, in essence, enable the insurer to set off such medical payments against amounts due to the insured pursuant to uninsured motorist coverage is void as in derogation of the public policy and purpose underlying R.C. 3937.18. Id. at 155. ... Consequently, we find the trial court correctly rejected Shelby's claim for reimbursement of medical payments.

For a policy entered into in 1991, the 1988 version of § 3937.18 applied, and the insurer's underinsurance set-off was against the insured's total damages rather than the policy's underinsured-motorist limit.

Metropolitan Property v. Wetterau, Unpublished Decision (7-25-2001) · filed 2001-07-25(A)(2)

The relevant law, therefore, is the law in effect at the time Anne Dobbins contracted with Metropolitan for automobile liability insurance. ... The statutory law in effect on March 6, 1991 was R.C.3937.18, as amended effective January 1, 1988. ... In Cole, 76 Ohio St.3d at syllabus, the Supreme Court clarified that the insurer's set-off is against the insured's total damages, not the policy limit of underinsurance coverage. This holding applies even where the liability and underinsurance coverages are sought under the same insurance policy.

Former § 3937.18 requires liability proceeds to be set off against total damages rather than underinsured policy limits.

Winkhart v. State Farm Insurance · filed 1996-12-23(A)(2)

To the contrary, in reaffirming Savoie, the Cole court specifically referred to R.C. 3937.18 as follows: ... “We hold that pursuant to former R.C. 3937.18, an underinsurance claim must be paid when the individual covered by an uninsured/underinsured policy suffers damages that exceed those monies available to be paid by the tortfeasor’s liability carriers. In determining the amount of underinsurance coverage to be paid in a situation involving an accident governed by former R.C. 3937.18, the underinsurance provider is entitled to set off the amounts actually recovered from the tortfeasor’s liability carriers against the insured’s total damages, rather than against its policy limits.” (Emphasis added.) ... Finding State Farm’s arguments to be without merit and the decision in Cole controlling, we hold that State Farm is not entitled to set off the amount paid by Progressive against the proceeds appellant is entitled to receive pursuant to his underinsured-motorist coverage with State Farm.

Former § 3937.18(H) permits an insurer to provide separate coverage for survivorship and other derivative claims and does not bar coverage broader than the statute's minimum requirements, while former § 3937.18(A)(2) requires applicable liability payments to be set off against underinsured-motorist limits.

Ruda v. Lear, Unpublished Decision (2-10-2000) · filed 2000-02-10(H), (A)(2)

We agree with plaintiff's construction of the statute. The legislature's use of the word "may" in former R.C. 3937.18(H) unambiguously reveals the intent to permit insurers to offer separate coverage for survivorship and other derivative claims in addition to normal underinsurance coverage. See, e.g., State exrel. City of Niles v. Bernhard (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 31, 34-5. We concur with the Seventh District Court of Appeals that "[a]lthough [former] R.C. 3937.18 sets forth the minimum requirements for underinsurance motorist coverage, the statute does not operate to preclude and insurer from providing broader coverage than that required by law." King v. Western Res. Mut. Cas. Co. (March 15, 1999), Monroe App. Nos. 805, 806, 807, unreported at *4, 1999 WL 148376, discretionary appeal allowed at 86 Ohio St.3d 1420.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) makes underinsured-motorist coverage non-excess and reduces its limits by applicable liability coverage, while subsection (H) permits one per-person limit for all claims arising from one person's bodily injury.

Maric v. Adams, Unpublished Decision (3-31-2000) · filed 2000-03-31(A)(2), (H)

"The amendment to R.C. 3937.18 specifically authorized insurers to limit multiple derivative claims, such as claims for loss of consortium, to a single per-person coverage limit. ... Because two persons sustained bodily injury in the accident, all claims, including those for loss of consortium, were subject to total coverage in the amount of $200,000 under their uninsured motorist policy. Appellants received $200,000 from their insurance company in uninsured motorist benefits; therefore, they are not entitled to additional coverage. ... Pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), they are not entitled to more money now that the tortfeasor's liabilty insurance has agreed to pay."

Section 3937.18(A)(2) measures UIM setoff by amounts actually available to and recoverable by the claimant, while subsection (H) permits collective treatment of claims arising from one bodily injury or death only when the policy clearly and unambiguously provides for it.

Luckenbill v. Hamilton Mutual Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-31-2001) · filed 2001-08-31(A)(2), (H)

Likewise, the final paragraph of the "limits of liability" clause in Hamilton's policy does not contain appropriate language complying with R.C. 3937.18(H). Instead, this paragraph simply says that Hamilton will pay no more than the limits indicated, regardless of the number of claims, insureds, vehicles involved in the accident, and so on. Accordingly, since the policy lacks any language consolidating wrongful death claims into a single claim and subjecting them collectively to the single person limit, the claims in this case must be treated as individual, separate claims under the Hamilton policy.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) bars an insurer from limiting underinsured motorist coverage so that the insured must suffer bodily injury, sickness, or disease to recover damages.

Wright v. Allstate Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (9-13-2000) · filed 2000-09-13(A)(1)

This court concludes that the grant of summary judgment was not appropriate. ... The Court held in Moore that "R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) * * * does not permit an insurer to limit underinsured motorist coverage in such a way that an insured must suffer bodily injury, sickness, or disease in order to recover damages from the insurer." ... Thus, it is clear that Allstate's policy provisions restricting underinsured coverage to instances where bodily injury or death was suffered by an insured individual are void as contrary to law and are unenforceable.

The amended statute bars underinsured motorist coverage when the tortfeasor's liability coverage is at least as great as the insured's underinsured motorist coverage, and it applies to a renewal that constitutes a new insurance contract.

Akers v. Bush, Unpublished Decision (3-6-2000) · filed 2000-03-06(A)

Under the amended statute, appellants are not entitled to underinsured motorist coverage because the tortfeasor's liability coverage is in an amount at least as great as Akers' underinsured motorist coverage. ... Therefore, R.C. 3937.18 as currently enacted, i.e., with the S.B. 20 amendment, applies to the insurance contract at issue.