Statute Annotations › Ohio › Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414

Permanent custody hearing: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Ohio
Case notes
3,787
Cited in passing
251
Citing cases indexed
19,029
Case dates
1982–2026
Screened through
2026-06-26
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-20
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

4,038 citing cases reviewed of 19,029 in the citation index: 3,787 interpreted the section (annotated below), 251 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-26 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1989 The revised permanent-custody scheme ended the former § 2151.414(A) good-faith reunification-plan and inadequate-parental-care prerequisites; current § 2151.414(B) states the custody grounds, while § 2151.412 no longer mandates a comprehensive reunification plan. source Source
  • 1996 Am.Sub.H.B. 419 removed the six-month minimum from the failure-to-remedy condition in § 2151.414(E)(1). Source
  • 1996 The revised § 2151.414(D) ceased to list adoption probability as a required best-interest factor; it remains potentially relevant evidence. Source
  • 1996 The amendment displaced the former seven-day disposition deadline for permanent-custody motions; current § 2151.414(A)(2) sets a 120-day hearing and 200-day order timetable. source Source
  • 1999-03-18 An amendment added § 2151.414(B)(1)(d), allowing the 12-of-22-month agency-custody ground without a separate cannot-or-should-not-place finding. Source
  • 1999-03-18 The amendment expanded § 2151.414(E) beyond the former eight factors and renumbered former (E)(8) and (E)(9) as (E)(13) and (E)(14); current (E) has sixteen grounds. source Source
  • 2007-03-28 In re C.F. held that § 2151.419 does not require a new reasonable-efforts determination at every hearing on a permanent-custody motion under § 2151.414, but the agency generally must have made reasonable reunification efforts; if it has not established them earlier, it must demonstrate them at that hearing, and reliance on § 2151.414(E)(1) requires examination of its case planning and efforts. Source
  • 2009-04 Am.Sub.H.B. 7 added § 2151.414(D)(2): when its four conditions are met, best interest and agency permanent custody follow without weighing the separate (D)(1) factors. source Source
  • 2014-09-17 H.B. 213 added a fifth § 2151.414(B)(1)(e) ground for a child adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent on three separate occasions. Source
  • 2014-09-17 H.B. 130 extended § 2151.414(E)(7) to specified trafficking convictions and related attempts or conspiracies. Source
  • 2016-10-12 H.B. 158 changed the terminology in § 2151.414(E)(2) from “mental retardation” to “intellectual disability,” without changing the placement test. source Source
  • 2020-11-03 In re A.M. held that § 2151.414(D)(1) requires consideration of each listed best-interest factor, but does not require express discussion or specific written findings for each; the court's decisions and judgment entry must still show that it considered them. Source
  • 2023-04-06 H.B. 281 changed the terminology in § 2151.414(E)(8) from “mental illness or defect” to “mental illness or disability,” without changing the placement test. source Source
  • 2023-12-27 In re Z.C. held that appellate review of a § 2151.414 permanent-custody judgment uses sufficiency and/or manifest-weight review according to the claim, superseding abuse-of-discretion review of the custody judgment. Source

Good-faith effort to implement reunification plans

Law changed since The 1989 revision ended the former § 2151.414(A) good-faith reunification-plan prerequisite for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414 requires the permanent-custody hearing to determine whether the board made a good-faith effort to implement the court-approved reunification plans.

In Re Smith · filed 1982-03-23

Finally, R.C. 2151.414 provides in part that, upon the filing of a motion for permanent custody of a child by the board, a hearing shall be conducted to determine, in part, if the board has made a good faith effort to implement the initial and comprehensive reunification plans for the child that were approved by the court. ... Nevertheless, the trial court found in its June 22,1981 judgment that the board had made a good faith effort to implement a plan of reunification for the Smith family. After a complete review of the record, we find that there is sufficient credible evidence to support the trial court’s finding. Therefore, although no written plan was prepared by the board, the board had indeed complied with the spirit of the Revised Code sections in issue.
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Law changed since The 1989 revision ended the former § 2151.414(A) good-faith reunification-plan prerequisite; the hearing and visitation points must be read under the revised statute.

Section 2151.414 provides for a single, purely adjudicatory hearing on a motion to convert temporary custody to permanent custody, and its good-faith reunification-plan requirement does not make visitation mandatory when exceptional circumstances justify denial.

In Re Jones · filed 1985-12-16(A)(1)

The single hearing prescribed by R.C. 2151.414 is purely adjudicatory. ... Before temporary custody can be converted to permanent custody, R.C. 2151.414 requires a court to examine the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) through (3). ... However, this court has held that in exceptional cases it is within the discretion of the juvenile court to deny visitation. ... In the case at bar, the juvenile court, relying on thé testimony of therapists and psychologists, and on Darnell’s own wishes, ... found that the denial of visitation was justified. We agree.
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Law changed since The 1989 revision ended the former § 2151.414(A) good-faith reunification-plan and inadequate-parental-care prerequisites.

Section 2151.414 requires a good-faith effort to implement reunification plans, and lengthy imprisonment of the sole parent may support findings that the child lacks adequate parental care and will continue to lack it.

In Re Hederson · filed 1986-03-05(A), (B)

Before a court may terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to a board such as CSB, R.C. 2151.414 (A) requires the court to determine: (1) that the county has made a good faith effort to implement the initial and comprehensive plans for the child; (2) that the parents have acted so as to leave the child without adequate parental care and that they will continue to so act within the near future; and (3) that it is in the best interests of the child to permanently terminate parental rights. Permanent custody may be granted to CSB only if the trial court determines upon clear and convincing evidence that the parents have acted in such a manner that the child is without adequate parental care and will continue to act in the near future in such a manner that the child will continue to be without adequate parental care. R.C. 2151.414(B). ... The statute places a duty upon CSB to make a good faith effort to reunify the family, but how much can be expected of CSB when the only remaining parent is in jail and in all likelihood will remain there until the child reaches the age of majority? A life sentence is quite different from a sixty- or ninety-day sentence. ... Where the sole parent’s term of imprisonment is a lengthy one, such imprisonment may be a significant factor in determining whether the parent has acted so as to leave the child without adequate parental care. Should such imprisonment satisfy the standard of clear and convincing evidence that the child is ... without adequate parental care, the continuing imprisonment of the parent may likewise be considered in determining whether such deprivation will continue. Under such circumstances, the imprisoned parent’s rights may be properly terminated.
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Section 2151.414 does not require a juvenile court to find that an agency made good faith efforts to implement a reunification plan before granting permanent custody.

In Re Noe, Unpublished Decision (7-21-1997) · filed 1997-07-21(A)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (A), a juvenile court need not find that the agency seeking permanent custody of a child has made good faith efforts to implement a reunification plan for the child and his or her parents.
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Division (E)(1)'s reasonable-efforts inquiry asks whether the agency did enough to satisfy reasonableness, not whether it could have done more.

In re J.H. · filed 2020-01-24(E)(1)

The issue in a reasonable-efforts determination is not whether the agency could have done more, but whether it did enough to satisfy the reasonableness standard in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1).
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Division (E)(1)'s reasonable-efforts inquiry is limited to the agency's efforts toward the parents, not toward a child's paternal great-grandparent.

In re I.H. · filed 2020-10-09(E)(1)

We find the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) is limited to reviewing appellee’s reasonable efforts towards the parents, not the child’s paternal great-grandmother.
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Requirements for permanent custody

Section 2151.414 requires a juvenile court deciding permanent custody to find by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that a statutory condition supports placing the child permanently with the agency, while considering the relevant best-interest factors.

In the Matter of Haywood, Unpublished Decision (5-9-2000) · filed 2000-05-09(B)(1)-(3), (D), and (E)(1), (4), and (9)

A trial court conducting a hearing on a motion for permanent custody must follow the guidelines set forth in R.C. 2151.414 . Pursuant to R.C. 2151.353 (A)(4), the court may grant such a motion if two determinations are made. The court must determine by clear and convincing evidence, after a child has been found by the court to be neglected, dependent, or abused, that it is in the child's best interest to grant the movant permanent custody "and that any of the following apply: (1) The child is not abandoned or orphaned and the child cannot be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with his parents; (2) The child is abandoned and the parents cannot be located; (3) The child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody." R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) through (3).
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Law changed since The 1989 revision ended the former comprehensive-reunification-plan prerequisite; this prior-commitment rule addressed that former prerequisite.

Section 2151.414 does not treat a stay order or a parent’s voluntary surrender of a child to an agency’s temporary custody as a prior commitment requiring a reunification plan before immediate permanent commitment.

In Re Smart · filed 1984-08-02

Neither the stay order, nor the agreement by appellant surrendering the child to the temporary custody of CSS pursuant to R.C. 5103.15, constitutes a “commitment” for purposes of the requirements of R.C. 2151.412 and 2151.414. ... Accordingly, failure by CSS to file a comprehensive reunification plan does not bar its action for immediate permanent commitment under R.C. 2151.353(A)(4), and appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
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Law changed since The 1989 revision replaced the former § 2151.414(A) reunification and inadequate-parental-care prerequisites with the current custody grounds.

Section 2151.414 requires findings on reunification efforts, inadequate parental care, and the child's best interests before permanent custody and termination of parental rights, with clear and convincing evidence required for the parental-care findings.

In Re Lay · filed 1987-12-28(A), (B)

Before a trial court may terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to a board such as CSB, R.C. 2151.414(A) requires the trial court to determine: (1) that the board has made a good faith effort to implement the initial and subsequent reunification plans; (2) that the parents have acted so as to leave the child without adequate parental care and that they will continue to do so in the near future; and (3) that it is in the best interests of the child to permanently terminate parental rights. Permanent custody may be granted to CSB only if the trial court determines upon clear and convincing evidence that the child is without adequate parental care and the parents will continue to act in the near future in such a manner that the child will continue to be without adequate parental care. R.C. 2151.414(B).
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Section 2151.414 normally governs a permanent-custody proceeding when the children were already adjudged abused, neglected, or dependent, but it does not apply when that adjudication was only as to other parents and the proceeding is original as to the biological parent.

Garabrandt v. Lucas County Children Services Board · filed 1988-04-15

R.C. 2151.353 is applicable to appellant rather than R.C. 2151.414 even though these children had been adjudged abused, neglected and/or dependent prior to the filing of the permanent custody complaint, a situation which normally requires application of R.C. 2151.414. However, in this case, the children’s state of abuse, neglect and/or dependency had previously been determined only as to Brenda and Donald Garabrandt and not as to appellant, David Garabrandt. The permanent custody hearing was original as to David Garabrandt, as he had never been named a party to any prior court proceedings affecting these children and their parents’ rights.
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Law changed since The 1989 revision replaced the former § 2151.414(A) good-faith reunification and inadequate-parental-care prerequisites.

Section 2151.414 requires a juvenile court considering permanent custody to determine whether the board made a good-faith reunification effort, whether the parent’s conduct leaves the child without adequate parental care and likely will continue to do so, and whether permanent termination is in the child’s best interest.

Jones v. Lucas County Children Services Board · filed 1988-12-16(A)(1), (A)(2), and (A)(3)

Former R.C. 2151.414 required the court to determine: (1) whether the county board made a “good faith effort” to implement a family reunification plan, R.C. 2151.414(A)(1); (2) whether the parent had “* * * acted in such a manner that the child is a child without adequate parental care, and will continue to act in the near future in such a manner that the child will continue to be a child without adequate parental care * * ,” R.C. 2151.414 (A)(2); and (3) whether it was “ * * in the best interest of the child to permanently terminate parental rights,” R.C. 2151.414(A)(3).
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Law changed since The 1989 revision replaced the former § 2151.414(A)(2) inadequate-parental-care finding with the current permanent-custody grounds.

Section 2151.414(A)(2) requires a trial court deciding permanent custody to determine that the parents have acted so as to leave the child without adequate parental care and will continue to do so in the near future.

In Re Ison · filed 1989-03-29(A)(2)

Before a trial court may terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to CSB, R.C. 2151.414(A) requires that the trial court determine: (1) that CSB has made a good faith effort to implement the initial and subsequent reunification plans; (2) that the parents have acted so as to leave the child without adequate parental care and that they will continue to do so in the near future; and (3) that it is in the best interests of the child to permanently terminate parental rights. Permanent custody may be granted to CSB only if the trial court determines upon clear and convincing evidence that the child is without adequate parental care and the parents will continue to act in the near future in such a manner that the child will continue to be without adequate parental care. R.C. 2151.414(B); ... R.C. 2151.414 sets out several factors to be considered in making a determination of adequate parental care, including the extent to which the parents have conformed to the court-ordered reunification plans; their existing mental and emotional status; and any physical, emotional, or mental neglect of the child.
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The revised version of § 2151.414 governs a permanent-custody motion filed after its January 1, 1989 effective date.

In re Barber · filed 1990-05-16

Effective January 1,1989, the procedure for termination of parental rights; vis-a-vis the respective responsibility of the government and parents was substantially changed. 142 v.s. 89, effective 1/1/89. This motion for permanent custody was filed in March, 1989, and the revised provisions of R.C. 2151.414 apply.
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Section 2151.414(D) and (E) require the court, before awarding permanent custody under § 2151.353, to determine that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

In Re Kutzli · filed 1991-04-09(D), (E)

R.C. 2151.353 allows permanent custody of a child who has been adjudicated an abused child to be made upon (1) the determination, in accordance with R.C. 2151.414(E), that the child “cannot be placed with one of his parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent”; and (2) the determination, in accordance with R.C. 2151.414(D), that “the permanent commitment is in the best interest of the child.”
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Section 2151.414 requires only one hearing on a motion to convert temporary custody to permanent custody, and that hearing must be adjudicatory in nature.

In Re Hopkins · filed 1992-01-15(A)

Neither Juv.R. 2(1) nor R.C. 2151.35 requires bifurcation to properly rule on a motion for permanent custody. What they do require is that the hearing be adjudicatory in nature in that the more lenient evidentiary and due process procedures available in a dispositional hearing are not available here. For example, R.C. 2151.35(B), which applies to dispositional hearings, allows relaxed evidentiary rules and limited cross-examination. The hearing under R.C. 2151.414 is to be adjudicatory in nature, because parental rights may be terminated. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to allow such a decision to be made under the less formal procedure followed at other dispositional hearings. ... In short, we hold that upon a motion under R.C. 2151.413 to convert temporary custody to permanent custody, the court need hold only one hearing, which will be adjudicatory in its procedural nature to determine if it is in the child’s best interest to do so. This conclusion is further bolstered by R.C. 2151.414’s numerous references to “a hearing,” see R.C. 2151.414(A), (D), (E), and “the hearing,” see R.C. 2151.414(B).
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Law changed since The 2009 addition of § 2151.414(D)(2) made its four-condition test an alternative to weighing the (D)(1) best-interest factors.

Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody when it is in the child's best interest and the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, requires consideration of relevant best-interest factors and at least one statutory factor supporting that placement finding, requires clear and convincing evidence, and requires findings of fact and conclusions of law upon a party's request.

In Re Meyer · filed 1994-10-25(B)(1), (C), (D), and (E)

Thus, these facts, taken together, constitute clear and convincing evidence which supports the trial court’s determination that permanent custody was in the best interests of the children and that they could not be placed with the appellants within a reasonable time. R.C. 2151.414(C) requires the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law “upon the request of any party.” The appellants made no such request. Our review of the record indicates that the juvenile court considered the relevant criteria and evidence when it granted permanent custody of the children to DCHS, and this analysis is adequately reflected in the juvenile court’s October 7 judgment entry. This court is satisfied that the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to meet the clear and convincing burden of proof required by R.C. 2151.414(B).
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Law changed since The 2009 addition of § 2151.414(D)(2) allows permanent custody when its four conditions are met without separately weighing the (D)(1) best-interest factors.

Section 2151.414 requires a court granting permanent custody to make clear-and-convincing findings on the statutory prerequisites, state those findings on the record, and consider all relevant best-interest factors listed in subsection (D).

In Re Brown · filed 1994-11-02(B), (D), and (E)

We conclude that parents’ constitutional rights may not be abridged by such a cursory judgment. The court is required by the statute to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that certain criteria have been met, and the court must state those findings on the record, such that it is clear to all parties that the decision is supported by the facts. ... Moreover, it is evident from a review of the record and the judgment entry of the juvenile court that the court failed to make the requisite determinations of what is in Nichole’s best interest. Rather, the court simply noted generally that Nichole “can be adopted quite readily,” and that there existed “a great need for a legally secure placement to provide stability” in her life. There is no evidence that the court considered the other statutory factors which must be considered in determining a child’s best interest, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D).
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Law changed since The 1999 amendment added the independent twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground in (B)(1)(d) and expanded the former eight (E) factors, so an (E) finding is no longer required on every agency motion.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing proof of an enumerated factor showing the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent, a best-interest finding, and reasonable reunification efforts or their futility before permanent custody may be granted.

The Matter of Rothwell, Unpublished Decision (9-22-1997) · filed 1997-09-22(D), (E)(1)-(2)

A trial court shall grant permanent custody to an agency only when it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) one or more of the eight specifically enumerated factors in R.C. 2151.414 (E) are present, that (2) permanent custody is in the best interest of the child and that (3) reasonable efforts at reunification have been made or that such efforts would be futile. ... Based on a review of the record, this court finds that clear and convincing evidence existed from which the trial court could have found that neither child could be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time, thereby satisfying the requirement that one or more of the eight factors of R.C. 2151.414 (E) be present before a court can grant permanent custody.
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Section 2151.414 requires exacting guidelines to be followed when determining whether a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time, and requires clear and convincing evidence to support permanently removing children from parental custody.

In Re Robinson, Unpublished Decision (2-9-1998) · filed 1998-02-09

In this regard, and since the permanent deprivation of parental rights is such an extreme measure, the General Assembly has provided exacting guidelines for determining whether a child cannot be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with such parents. R.C. 2151.414 . See In re William S. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 95 . Furthermore, an order permanently removing children from the custody of their parents must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. R.C. 2151.414 . See In re Weaver (1992), 79 Ohio App.3d 59 .
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Law changed since The 1999 amendment added § 2151.414(B)(1)(d), allowing permanent custody on the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground without an inability-to-place finding.

Section 2151.414 requires a best-interest finding plus clear and convincing proof that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time before permanent custody may be granted.

Matter of Wright, Unpublished Decision (4-8-1998) · filed 1998-04-08(B)(1)

However, a best interest determination is not sufficient to grant permanent custody of a child to an agency and divest parents of their parental rights. In the instant case, the trial court further found that Ross could not be placed with appellant or his father within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. The record reveals, although appellant has a chemical dependency and acknowledges such dependency, she continuously and repeatedly failed, for a period of over six months, to substantially remedy the conditions causing Ross to be removed from her home. In light of the foregoing, we find the trial court's finding that Ross could not be placed with appellant within a reasonable time or should not be placed with appellant is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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Law changed since The 1999 amendment added the independent twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground; the 2009 addition of (D)(2) also permits best interest to be established without weighing the (D)(1) factors when all four conditions apply.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing findings that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, considering statutory best-interest factors and parental remediation or commitment.

Matter of Heather Flanagan, Unpublished Decision (4-22-1998) · filed 1998-04-22(D), (E)

R.C. 2151.414 governs the proper procedure juvenile courts must use when committing a child to permanent custody. ... Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 , the court must initially find by clear and convincing evidence that the granting of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interests of the child. ... Then, the court must determine that the child cannot, or should not, be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. ... When determining the best interests of a child, the court is to consider: (1) The reasonable probability of the child being adopted * * * (2) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parents * * * (3) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through his guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (4) The custodial history of the child; (5) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. R.C. 2151.414 (D). ... In evaluating the second prong of the termination test, courts are to determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the child cannot, or should not be placed with the parents. R.C. 2151.414 (E). Furthermore, the court shall determine whether the parents have failed to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to aid the parents. Id. Additionally, the court may consider whether the parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to communicate with the child or provide an adequate home for the child. Id. ... Accordingly, we believe this evidence is sufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard set forth in the statute that Heather could not, and should not, be placed in appellant's custody.
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Law changed since The 1999 amendment added the independent twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground, so an (E) inability-to-place finding is no longer required for every permanent-custody motion; the 2009 addition of (D)(2) created an alternative best-interest test.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence of a condition under subsection (E) showing that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, followed by consideration of the child's best interest under subsection (D).

Matter of Ciara B., Unpublished Decision (7-2-1998) · filed 1998-07-02(D), (E), and (E)(1)

At a hearing on the motion, the agency must offer clear and convincing evidence to establish that one or more of the conditions listed in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exists as to each of the child's parents. If, after considering all the relevant evi dence, the court determines that one or more of the conditions listed in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exists, the court can and must enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either of his or her parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with his or her parents. Finally, under R.C. 2151.414 (D), a juvenile court must consider the best interest of the child by examining factors relevant to that case.
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Section 2151.414(E)(1) requires the trial court to consider the listed factors when deciding whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents.

In the Matter of Eddy, Unpublished Decision (10-2-1998) · filed 1998-10-02(E)(1)

However, in addition to the best interest determination, the trial court must also consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1).
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Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing proof of a qualifying parental condition and consideration of the child's best interests before permanent custody may be awarded.

Matter of Jones, Unpublished Decision (12-14-1998) · filed 1998-12-14(D), (E)

R.C. 2151.353 (A)(4) sets forth the procedure to be followed and the standard to be applied in cases where a children services agency's original complaint requests permanent custody of an abused, neglected or dependent child. In re Pachin (1988), 50 Ohio App.3d 44 ; In the Matter of Skaggs, supra . R.C. 2151.353 (A)(4) provides that the court can commit a child adjudged dependent, neglected or abused to the permanent custody of a public children services agency if it makes the determinations required under R.C. 2151.414 . The agency must offer clear and convincing evidence to establish that one or more of the conditions listed in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exists as to each of the child's parents. If, after considering all of the relevant evidence, the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the conditions listed in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exists, the court can and must enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either of his or her parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with his or her parents. Finally, under R.C. 2151.414 (D), a juvenile court must consider the best interests of the child by examining factors relevant to that case. Only if these requisites are supported by clear and convincing evidence can a juvenile court terminate the rights of a natural parent and award permanent custody of a child to a children services agency. In re William S. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 95 .
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Before the September 1996 amendment, § 2151.414 motions were subject to a seven-day disposition deadline, and that deadline was directory rather than mandatory.

In re Davis · filed 1999-03-03(A)

The issue certified to this court is “whether the seven-day limit within which a juvenile court must enter its disposition of a child adjudicated as abused, neglected or dependent under R.C. 2151.35 also applies to motions filed by an agency under R.C. 2151.414 prior to the September 1996 amendment to that statute.” We find that the seven-day limit does apply but that it is directory, not mandatory, and that either party may seek to enforce the statutory time requirement through a writ of procedendo.
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Law changed since The 1999 amendment added § 2151.414(B)(1)(d), allowing the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground without a separate inability-to-place finding.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, including when a parent's chemical dependency prevents an adequate permanent home.

In Re Culver, Unpublished Decision (6-23-1999) · filed 1999-06-23(B), (B)(1), (D), and (E)(2)

R.C. 2151.414 (B) states that a juvenile court may grant permanent custody of a child to an agency such as CSB if two conditions are met. ... First, the trial court must find that granting permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414 (D). Second, the trial court must find that "[t]he child is not abandoned or orphaned and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents[,]" R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414 (E). These findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. R.C. 2151.414 (B). ... Under R.C. 2151.414 (E), if a juvenile court makes one of twelve enumerated findings, then the court must find that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or that the child should not be placed with either parent. ... The juvenile court found that Mother's chemical dependency was such that she was unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the children. ... Clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that Mother's substance abuse prevented her from providing an adequate permanent home for the children. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err by finding that the children could not or should not be placed with Mother. ... In determining the best interest of the child, R.C. 2151.414 (D) requires the trial court to consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (3) The custodial history of the child; (4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. ... The record demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the juvenile court did not err when it found that granting permanent custody of the children was in their best interest.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing findings that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, using the specified best-interest and parental-placement factors.

In Re Bickett, Unpublished Decision (7-28-1999) · filed 1999-07-28(B), (D), and (E)

In cases not involving an abandoned or orphaned child, a trial court is required to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody and (2) that the child cannot or should not be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time. R.C. 2151.414 (B). ... Regarding the first prong of the permanent custody analysis, whether permanent custody is in the child's best interest, a trial court, shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: ... (4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. R.C. 2151.414 (D). ... Regarding the second prong of the permanent custody analysis, if the trial court determines by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of twelve enumerated factors exists, then the trial court shall enter a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with his or her parents within a reasonable time. R.C. 2151.414 (E). ... Because the trial court complied with R.C. 2151.414 , Meloche's assignments of error are not well taken.
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Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits permanent custody when a child has been in an agency’s temporary custody for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period.

In Re ross/wright, Unpublished Decision (7-10-2000) · filed 2000-07-10(B)(1)(d)

Appellant's First Assignment of Error challenges the juvenile court's decision, under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), that the minor children could not be placed with her within a reasonable period of time. ... (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999. ... The fact that the children have been in long term foster care since 1995 is sufficient to grant permanent custody to the Agency.
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Section 2151.414 requires a juvenile court deciding an agency's permanent-custody motion to apply the statutory clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, make the required placement finding, and consider the child's best interests before terminating parental rights.

In the Matter of Charles S, Unpublished Decision (7-28-2000) · filed 2000-07-28

R.C. 2151.414 sets forth the procedure to be followed and standard to be applied in cases where a children services agency moves for permanent custody of an abused, neglected or dependent child. In re Amanda W. (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 136 , 141-142 . The agency must offer clear and convincing evidence to establish that one or more of the conditions listed in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exists as to each of the child's parents. In re William S. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 95 , syllabus. If the court determines that one or more of the conditions listed in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exists, the court can and must enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either of his or her parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with his or her parents. R.C. 2151.414 (E). Finally, under R.C. 2151.414 (D), a juvenile court must consider the best interests of the child by examining factors relevant to that case. Only then can the court terminate the rights of a natural parent and award permanent custody of a child to a children services agency. In re William S. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d at 99 .
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Section 2151.414(E)(4) requires a finding that a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time when the parent has shown a lack of commitment through inadequate support, visitation, or communication, or through unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home.

In Re McCrary · filed 1991-08-19(E)(4)

In pertinent part, R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) states that an entry finding that a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time shall be ordered if “[t]he parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment towards the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so, or by actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child.”
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Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence of a listed parental condition before a court may find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent and award permanent custody, while also requiring consideration of the child’s best interest.

In Re Amanda W. · filed 1997-11-21(E)(1)

At a hearing on the motion, the agency must offer clear and convincing evidence to establish that one or more of the conditions listed in R.C. 2151.414(E) exists as to each of the child’s parents. If, after considering all the relevant evidence, the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the conditions listed in R.C. 2151.414(E) exists, the court can and must enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either of his or her parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with his or her parents. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). Finally, under R.C. 2151.414(D), a juvenile court must consider the best interest of the child by examining factors relevant to that case.
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Section 2151.414(B)(3) requires consideration of relatives as permanent custodians only when the child is orphaned.

Matter Of: Wood, Unpublished Decision (6-28-1999) · filed 1999-06-28(B)(3)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B) (3), relatives only need to be considered in a permanent custody proceeding if the child is orphaned.
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Law changed since The 1999 amendment added § 2151.414(B)(1)(d); an (E) finding about each parent is no longer necessary when the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground applies.

Section 2151.414(B) requires clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that a statutory condition for permanent custody applies, while subsection (E) requires one or more listed factors as to each parent.

Matter of Gaul, Unpublished Decision (10-18-1999) · filed 1999-10-18(B), (E)

R.C. 2151.414 (B) sets for the burden and the factors upon which a trial court can grant a motion for permanent custody: B) The court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply: (1) The child is not abandoned or orphaned and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents; * * * R.C. 2151.414 (E) requires the presentation of clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the listed factors exist as to each parent before an award of permanent custody can be made.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2151.414(B) permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that custody is in the child's best interest and one statutory condition applies, while subsection (E) requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one listed factor as to each parent.

In Re Cundiff, Unpublished Decision (2-7-2000) · filed 2000-02-07(B), (E)

R.C. 2151.414 (B) enables a trial court to grant permanent custody if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child and any of the following apply: (1) The child is not abandoned or orphaned and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents; (2) The child is abandoned and the parents cannot be located; (3) The child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414 (E) requires the presentation of clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the twelve listed factors exist as to each parent before an award of permanent custody can be made. ... Based upon appellant's failure to complete the case plan, we find there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's decision to grant permanent custody of the child to appellee.
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Law changed since The 1999 amendment added § 2151.414(B)(1)(d), allowing permanent custody on the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground without an (E) finding.

Section 2151.414(E) requires clear and convincing evidence of one or more enumerated factors before permanent custody may be granted.

In the Matter of Nicholas H. · filed 2000-05-05(E)

Permanent custody may not be granted unless the trial court finds clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the enumerated factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) exist.
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Section 2151.414 permits a court to terminate parental rights and grant an agency permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

Matter of Kinstle, Unpublished Decision (2-12-1999) · filed 1999-02-12(B), (D)(4), and (E)(1), (4), (9), and (12)

A court may terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to an agency if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of the child and the child cannot be placed with either of the parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either of the parents.
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Section 2151.414(E) sets forth procedures for permanent-custody actions by a public children services agency or a private child placing agency with temporary custody.

Matter of Diedra Renee R., Unpublished Decision (3-12-1999) · filed 1999-03-12(E)

Appellant's reliance upon this case and the factors cited in R.C. 2151.414 (E) is misplaced, however, because that statutory section sets forth the procedures to be used in an action for permanent custody of a child by a public children services agency or private child placing agency with temporary custody.
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Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires clear and convincing findings that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, based on the analyses required by subsections (D) and (E).

In Re Stevens, Unpublished Decision (9-25-2000) · filed 2000-09-25(B)(1)

While appellant proffered her argument as to the order of the requisite determinations when terminating parental rights, we find that under the two-prong test created by R.C. 2151.414 (B), what is required is that the court find by clear and convincing evidence that granting permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414 (D), and that the children cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with their parents, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414 (E).
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Section 2151.414(B) requires proof that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest and that a statutory placement condition applies.

In Re Morris, Unpublished Decision (4-9-2001) · filed 2001-04-09(B)

In order for a court to grant permanent custody of a child to the State, the State must prove: that it is the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child and that any of the following apply: (1) The child is not abandoned or orphaned and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents; (2) The child is abandoned and cannot be located; (3) The child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414 (B).
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Section 2151.414(B)(1) and (E) may be satisfied by knowing, intelligent, voluntary stipulations to the required findings, which in this context also encompass reasonable and diligent agency efforts.

In the Matter of Starr J., Unpublished Decision (4-20-2001) · filed 2001-04-20(B)(1), (E)

There is nothing in the record to suggest that the counseled stipulations that appellants made on the record and in open court were not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. ... The effect of these stipulations was the equivalent of an admission to the required findings of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) and (E). In this context, a finding that R.C. 2151.414 (E) is satisfied necessarily encompasses a finding that appellee made reasonable and diligent efforts to assist the parents to remedy the problems which caused the child to be placed outside the home.
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Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that the children cannot or should not be placed with their parents within a reasonable time.

In Re Hayes, Unpublished Decision (4-19-2002) · filed 2002-04-19

R.C. 2151.414 provides the trial court may award permanent custody to DHS if it finds by clear and convincing evidence the children cannot be placed with the parents within a reasonable time, or should not be placed with them.
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A permanent-custody motion is not defective merely because the children had not yet met the twelve-of-twenty-two-month threshold when the motion was filed if another pleaded and proven ground independently supports custody under section 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

In the Matter of Meadows, Unpublished Decision (6-24-2002) · filed 2002-06-24(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

However, this fact does not render WCCSB's motion defective nor does it mean that the trial court erred in granting WCCSB's permanent custody motion. In its motion, WCCSB also alleged that Shane and Kyle cannot and should not be placed with any of their parents within a reasonable time. The trial court specifically found, by clear and convincing evidence presented at the permanent custody hearing, that the children cannot and should not be placed with appellant within a reasonable time. Thus, the trial court's granting of permanent custody to WCCSB, though arguably not proper under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), was proper under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a).
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A parent's agreement that permanent placement elsewhere serves the child's best interest is only evidence for the court to weigh, and the court need not conduct a plea-style colloquy before accepting it or entering a section 2151.414 permanent-custody order.

In Re Lakes · filed 2002-08-02

The court was not required to engage in a colloquy with Mrs. Lakes similar to that required by Juv.R. 29(D) or Crim.R. 11(C) before it either accepted her admission or entered its order.
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Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody only upon clear and convincing evidence that custody serves the child's best interest and the child has spent at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period in agency custody, with the child's relationships, wishes, custodial history, and need for permanent placement among the best-interest factors.

In Re Graham, Unpublished Decision (8-2-2002) · filed 2002-08-02(B), (D)

A juvenile court may terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to an agency if it finds the following by clear and convincing evidence: (1) it is in the best interest of the child; and (2) the child has been in the temporary custody of a children services agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period which ends on or after March 18, 1999. ... These factors include: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's family and others; (2) the wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem; (3) the custodial history of the child; and (4) the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement.
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Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing proof of at least one subsection (E) factor before finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent, plus a best-interest determination based on all relevant subsection (D) factors.

In Re Mack · filed 2002-08-15(B)(2), (D), (E)

The court must determine by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the sixteen factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(E) exist in order to find that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. ... In addition, the court must determine that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child by considering all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the five factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D).
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When a child is abandoned, subsection (B)(1)(b) does not require a determination that the child cannot or should not be reunified with either parent, regardless of how long the child was in temporary custody.

In Re Starkey · filed 2002-12-11(B)(1)(b)

More important, if the child is abandoned, then the court likewise need not make the reunification determination, regardless of temporary custody. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b).
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Law changed since H.B. 213 added a fifth ground, § 2151.414(B)(1)(e), effective September 17, 2014; the four-ground list is no longer exhaustive.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence both that permanent custody serves the child's best interests and that at least one of the listed circumstances in subdivisions (a) through (d) applies.

In Re Cook Alleged Dependent Child, Unpublished Decision (12-11-2002) · filed 2002-12-11(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) provides that when deciding whether to permanently divest parents of their custody rights, a trial court must apply a two-pronged test. The court must determine whether such action, by clear and convincing evidence, will serve the best interests of the children, and whether one of the factors in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d) applies.
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Permanent custody requires clear and convincing evidence both of a condition enumerated in subsection (B)(1) and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In the Matter of Sarah S., Unpublished Decision (8-11-2003) · filed 2003-08-11(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 sets forth a two-prong analysis to be applied by the juvenile court for a determination of whether permanent custody should be granted to an agency. The statute requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) the existence of one of the factors enumerated in (B)(1), and (2) an award of permanent custody to be in the best interest of the child.
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Permanent custody requires clear and convincing evidence both of a section 2151.414(B) qualifying circumstance, including a section 2151.414(E) inability-to-place finding, and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest under section 2151.414(D).

In the Matter of Ebenschweiger, Unpublished Decision (11-10-2003) · filed 2003-11-10(B), (D), (E)

Before a trial court can terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of the child to an agency, it must satisfy two statutory factors by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the child is abandoned, orphaned, has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, or that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent, based on the factors of R.C. 2151.414 (E); and (2) the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, utilizing, in part, the factors of R.C. 2151.414 (D).
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The inability-to-place finding and the twelve-of-twenty-two-month custody finding are alternative statutory grounds, either of which can support permanent custody when supported by the evidence.

In Re Mikayla, Unpublished Decision (11-17-2003) · filed 2003-11-17(B)(1)(a), (d)

Those findings are alternate findings under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1). (R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) and (a) respectively) Either of those findings, if supported by the evidence, would have been sufficient in and of itself to base a grant of permanent custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1).
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Law changed since The 1999 amendment added § 2151.414(B)(1)(d), allowing permanent custody of a child neither abandoned nor orphaned on the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground without an inability-to-place finding.

For children who are neither abandoned nor orphaned, subsection (B)(1) requires clear and convincing proof of best interest and that the children cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In Re La. B., Unpublished Decision (12-18-2003) · filed 2003-12-18(B)(1), (D), (E)

Under this section, an agency seeking permanent custody must prove to the trial court, based on clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the granting of permanent custody is in the best interest of the children, and (2) the children cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with their parents.
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Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody upon clear and convincing proof of best interest plus inability to place, abandonment, or twelve months of agency custody within a consecutive twenty-two-month period.

In Re Huston, Unpublished Decision (12-29-2003) · filed 2003-12-29(B)(1)

At the hearing held pursuant to R.C.R.C. 2151.414 the court may grant permanent custody of the child to an agency if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody, and: if the child is not abandoned and the child cannot be placed with either parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents; the child is abandoned, which means a parent has failed to visit or maintain contact with the child for more than ninety days [R.C. 2151.011 ]; or the child has been in the temporary custody of the agency for twelve or more months in a consecutive twenty-two month period ending after March 18, 1999.
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Law changed since H.B. 213 added a fifth ground, § 2151.414(B)(1)(e), effective September 17, 2014; the four-ground count is historical.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence both that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that one of the four enumerated statutory factors applies.

In Re Adams, Unpublished Decision (12-27-2004) · filed 2004-12-27(B)(1)

The Revised Code sets out a two-pronged test to be applied when considering a motion for permanent custody. Under this test, the trial court must determine, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that a grant of permanent custody to the DJFS is in the best interest of the child and (2) that one of four enumerated factors applies. R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1).
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Section 2151.414 applies the same permanent-custody procedure and burden to newborns as to older children and does not require denial of permanent custody merely because imminent harm is unlikely or a successful parent-child relationship may be possible.

In Re West, Unpublished Decision (6-10-2005) · filed 2005-06-10

R.C. 2151.414 specifies the procedure a court must use when deciding whether to grant a children services agency's request for permanent custody, whether the child is a newborn baby, toddler, etc. Nothing in the statute imposes any different burden upon the agency to prove that permanent custody would serve a newborn's best interest and nothing in the statute requires a trial court to deny permanent custody to the agency when the risk of imminent harm is low and when the chance of a successful parent-child relationship exists.
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Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) permits permanent custody without waiting twelve months when the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent, and subsection (C) permits a guardian ad litem to file the written report on the hearing date.

In Re Woods, Unpublished Decision (7-7-2005) · filed 2005-07-07(B)(1)(a), (C)

This section states if "any of the following apply." Subsection (a) states "if the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents." This subsection has nothing to do with the passage of any specific time, but references a reasonable amount of time. ... Pursuant to this section, the guardian ad litem may file a report on the day of the hearing.
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Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) requires both a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time and a finding that termination is in the child's best interest; proof by clear and convincing evidence of any one factor in division (E) requires the former finding.

In Re Walker, Unpublished Decision (12-12-2005) · filed 2005-12-12(B)(1)(a), (E)

Thus to terminate parental rights under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a), the trial court must find 1) that the child should not be placed with his or her parents within a reasonable time and 2) that terminating parental rights is in the best interest of the child. {¶ 8} To enter a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with his or her parents within a reasonable time, the trial court must review the factors under R.C. 2151.414 (E). If the trial court finds one of the factors present by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court must make the finding that the child cannot be returned to the parents.
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Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes one of the conditions in subsection (B)(1) and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest; a finding under (B)(1)(a) also requires at least one subsection (E) factor to apply to each parent.

In Re M.E., Unpublished Decision (4-13-2006) · filed 2006-04-13(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d), (D), and (E)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 (E) requires the trial court to find at least one of the listed sixteen factors applicable to each parent before entering a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. ... Once the trial court determines that any one of the conditions is present, it must then determine by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. ... We find that clear and convincing evidence exists to support the trial court's determination that the enumerated factors of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) and (d) exist, and that permanent custody to CCDCFS is in the best interest of all four children.
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Section 2151.414 governs a motion for permanent custody after a child has already been adjudicated dependent, so only the disposition of that motion remains to be decided and the proceeding need not be bifurcated.

In Re J.H., Unpublished Decision (6-26-2006) · filed 2006-06-26

On a motion for permanent custody under R.C. 2151.414 , where a child has already been adjudicated dependent, there is only one issue to decide, to wit: either the motion is granted, in which case the parental rights are terminated, or else the motion is denied.
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Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In Re Alexander, Unpublished Decision (12-19-2006) · filed 2006-12-19(B)(1)(a)

A court may grant permanent custody of a child to an agency if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child's best interest to grant permanent custody to the agency and that any of the factors in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) apply. R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1). ... The evidence clearly showed that Tia could not and should not be placed with appellant within a reasonable time. And Lorraine voluntarily surrendered all of her parental rights. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrated that it was in Tia's best interest for the court to grant permanent custody to appellee.
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Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody only upon clear and convincing evidence of a ground in division (B)(1) and that permanent custody is in the child's best interests; proof of one division (E) factor supports a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In Matter of L.M., 06ap-534 (4-5-2007) · filed 2007-04-05(B)(1)(a), (D), and (E)(1)

In order to terminate appellants' parental rights, FCCS was required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that (1 ) one of the four factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) applies; and (2) termination is in the child's best interests. ... If the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the enumerated factors in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) through (16) exist, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent. One factor alone will support a trial court's decision that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time period. ... In the final analysis, due to father's probation conditions and the refusal of mother and father to live apart, the child may not be reunited with them. Accordingly, the court's order is supported under R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1).
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Law changed since The 2009 addition of (D)(2) created an alternative best-interest test, and H.B. 213 added a fifth (B)(1) ground effective September 17, 2014.

Before granting permanent custody to a children’s services agency, a court must find by clear and convincing evidence both that one of the four conditions in division (B)(1) exists and that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest after considering all relevant factors, including those in division (D).

In Re Y.H., 88746 (6-15-2007) · filed 2007-06-15(B)(1)

The trial court must satisfy two requirements before ordering that a child be placed in the permanent custody of a children's services agency. First, the court must find that one of the four conditions under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) exists by clear and convincing evidence: ... If the trial court determines that one of these conditions is met, it then must determine by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child by considering all relevant factors, including those listed in R.C. 2151.414 (D).
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Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time and that granting permanent custody to a children's services agency is in the child's best interests.

In Re Justin K., Unpublished Decision (9-21-2007) · filed 2007-09-21(B), (D), and (E)

R.C. 2151.414 provides that a parent's rights may not be terminated unless the court finds evidence that (1) the child, "* * * cannot be placed with one of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent," and (2) that a grant of permanent custody of a child to a children's service agency is in the child's best interests. R.C. 2151.414 (B). With respect to the first requirement, R.C. 2151.414 (E) sets forth a list of 16 predicate findings. One of those findings must be established prior to a judicial conclusion that a child cannot or should not be placed with the child's parent. R.C. 2151.414 (E). If a court determines that one of the predicate findings exist, then the court must enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either of his or her parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1). The statute also enumerates certain criteria for evaluating whether permanent custody with a children's services agency is in the child's best interests. R.C. 2151.414 (D)(1) through (4). All of the court's findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, R.C. 2151.414 (B), In re William S. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 95 , and will not be overturned as against the manifest weight of the evidence if the record contains competent credible evidence by which the court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the essential statutory elements for a termination of parental rights have been established. In re S. (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 338 , 344-345 .
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Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) permits an award of permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that permanent custody is in the child's best interest, the child does not fall within the specified abandonment, orphan, or duration-of-custody categories, and the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In Re A.U., 22287 (1-11-2008) · filed 2008-01-11(B)(1)(a)

R.C. 2151.414 (B) sets forth the circumstances under which a court may grant permanent custody of a child to a children services agency. Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a), the court may grant permanent custody of a child if the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the children services agency, (2) the child is not abandoned or orphaned or has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999, and (3) the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents.
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Section 2151.414(B)(1) permits a juvenile court to award permanent custody to an agency upon clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that at least one of the statute's listed alternative conditions applies.

In Re N.R., Ca2007-12-314 (4-28-2008) · filed 2008-04-28(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) establishes the test for a juvenile court to apply in ruling on a motion by a public children services agency for permanent custody of a child. In re Schaefer , 111 Ohio St.3d 498 , 502 , 2006-Ohio-5513 , ¶ 31 ; In re C.E. , Butler App. Nos. CA2006-01-015, CA2006-02-024, 2006-Ohio-4827 , ¶ 22 . {¶ 11} The juvenile court may award permanent custody to an agency if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that: 1) the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, utilizing, in part, the factors of R.C. 2151.414 (D); and, 2) any of the following apply: the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent; the child is abandoned; the child is orphaned; or the child has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period. R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d); In re Schaefer , at ¶ 32-36.
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Law changed since The 2014 amendment added a fifth ground in § 2151.414(B)(1)(e); the former four-ground count is historical.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests and that one of the four factors in subsection (B)(1) applies.

In Re C.M., 07ap-933 (6-19-2008) · filed 2008-06-19(B)(1)

"[T]o terminate parental rights, the movant must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that (1) termination is in the child's best interests, and (2) one of the four factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) applies."
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Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that a circumstance in subsection (B)(1) exists; inability to place the child with a parent within a reasonable time is assessed under subsection (E), and best interest under subsection (D).

In Matter of Patrick, 2008 Ca 00063 (7-14-2008) · filed 2008-07-14(B)(1)(a), (D), (E)(1)

Revised Code § 2151.414 (B)(1) addresses under what circumstances a trial court may grant permanent custody. This statute provides as follows: {¶ 37} "(B)(1) Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, the court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply: {¶ 38} "(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned or has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents. ... {¶ 42} Ohio's present statutory scheme requires a court, in determining whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents (see R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a), supra), to consider the existence of one or more factors under R.C. 2151.414 (E), including whether or not "[following the placement of the child outside the child's home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child's home." See R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1); In re Bender , Stark App. No. 2004CA00015, 2004-Ohio-2268 . ... {¶ 67} Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court's conclusions pursuant to R.C. § 2151.414 (B) are supported by the weight of the evidence. {¶ 68} We further find the trial court's grant of permanent custody of the minor child to SCDJFS was made in the consideration of the child's best interests and did not constitute an error or an abuse of discretion.
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Section 2151.414 requires permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that custody is in the children's best interests and either the children were in state custody for twelve of the preceding twenty-two months or they cannot or should not be placed with a parent under the statutory conditions.

In Re S.K., 2008 Ca 67 (1-30-2009) · filed 2009-01-30(B)(1)(d), (B)(2), and (E)

A trial court shall terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody of children to the State if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the children's best interests and that the children have been in the State's custody for at least twelve of the preceding twenty-two months. R.C. § 2151.414 (B)(1)(d). Alternatively, the court shall grant permanent custody if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the children's best interests and that the children cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable period of time or that the children should not be placed with either parent because the parents have failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed from the home, despite reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the Agency to assist in reunification. R.C. § 2151.414 (B)(2) and (E). Both alternatives apply in this case.
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Law changed since H.B. 213 added § 2151.414(B)(1)(e), a fifth threshold ground, effective September 17, 2014.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) permits a court to terminate parental rights when clear and convincing evidence establishes that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that one of the circumstances in subsections (a) through (d) applies.

In Matter of J.A.G., 08ap-823 (2-24-2009) · filed 2009-02-24(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) provides that a court may permanently terminate parental rights if it determines, "by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody" and one of the R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d) factors apply.
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Section 2151.414 requires permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes the child's best interest and either twelve months of agency custody during the preceding twenty-two months or inability to place the child with a parent because the parents repeatedly failed to remedy the conditions causing removal despite reasonable reunification efforts.

In Re T.J., 23032 (3-20-2009) · filed 2009-03-20(B)(1)(d), (B)(2), and (E)

A trial court shall terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to the State upon a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that permanent custody is in a child's best interest and that the child has been in the State's custody for at least twelve of the preceding twenty-two months. R.C. § 2151.414 (B)(1)(d). Alternatively, a trial court shall grant permanent custody if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that the child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with either parent because the parents have failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions that caused the child to be removed from the home, despite reasonable case planning and diligent efforts to assist in reunification. R.C. § 2151.414 (B)(2) and (E). Both alternatives apply in this case.
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Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence of both a qualifying statutory basis for permanent custody and that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.

In re J.C. · filed 2010-02-24(B)(1), (B)(2), (D), and (E)

Before a juvenile court can terminate parental rights and award to a proper moving agency permanent custody of a child, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent-custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned, orphaned, has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, or that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(E); and (2) the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence both that one of the conditions in (B)(1)(a)-(d) applies and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re L.S. · filed 2011-08-04(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 sets forth a two-prong analysis to be applied by the juvenile court for a determination of whether permanent custody should be granted to an agency. The statute requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) one of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(d), and (2) an award of permanent custody is in the best interest of the child.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence of one condition in division (B)(1)(a) through (d) and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest, determined using the factors in division (D).

In re Y.V. · filed 2011-05-19(B)(1), (D)

In order to terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to a county agency, the record must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence the following: 1) the existence of one of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d); and, 2) permanent custody is in ... the best interest of the child. In making the latter determination, the court must consider the five factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D).
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Section 2151.414(D)(2) requires a best-interests finding and permanent transfer of custody when its four factors are met.

In re T.N.T. · filed 2013-03-06(D)(2)

In this instance, due to the duration of the child’s removal from the household, the standard to be applied is that found in R.C. 2151.414(D)(2), which requires a best interests finding and permanent transfer of custody if four factors are met.
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Section 2151.414(A) leaves an abuse, neglect, or dependency adjudication and an agency's temporary custody intact when a motion for permanent custody is denied.

In re Z.H. · filed 2013-09-11(A)

Under R.C. 2151.414(A), an adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency and the grant of temporary custody to an agency “shall not be affected by a denial of the motion for permanent custody.” Id. Thus, absent review at this point, if the agency fails to seek or is denied permanent custody, Father is without an effective remedy to challenge the initial juvenile proceedings which resulted in the adjudication of abuse and dependency and in the loss of custody.
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Section 2151.414(B)(1)(b)'s abandonment ground is established when a parent has failed to visit or maintain contact for more than 90 days.

In re V.R. · filed 2017-05-11(B)(1)(b)

Mother has not visited the children since May 16, 2016 and has had a total of eight visits with the children since they came into custody. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) states the trial court may grant permanent custody if the child is abandoned. Abandonment is defined in R.C. 2151.011(C) as, “a child is presumed abandoned when the parents of the child have failed to visit or maintain contact with the child for more than ninety days, regardless of whether the parents resume contact with the child after that period of ninety days.” May 16, 2016 until the hearing date of November 27, 2016 is in excess of 90 days.
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Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) has no minimum custody-duration requirement, so an agency need not hold temporary custody for a particular period before seeking permanent custody on that ground.

In re K.M. · filed 2017-10-23(B)(1)(a)

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) does not have any time qualification. As a result, appellee was not required to have temporary custody of K.M. for a particular period of time prior to moving for permanent custody.
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Permanent custody may be contrary to the child's best interest when the child must remain in therapeutic out-of-home care, cannot be placed in a foster or adoptive home, and would be harmed by severing a beneficial parental relationship.

In re C.C. · filed 2017-11-20(D)

Although they needed permanence in their lives, there was no other option for them than to continue living in out-of-home therapeutic placements for the foreseeable future. These children could not be returned to Mother’s home, but they also could not be placed in a foster home or an adoptive home. MCJFS has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in concluding that permanent custody was not in the best interest of C.C. or L.C.
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Sections 2151.414(B)(1)(b) and (B)(1)(d) are supported when the parents abandoned the child and the child remained continuously in agency custody for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period.

In re H.W. · filed 2018-02-09(B)(1)(b), (B)(1)(d)

The record fully supports the court’s determination that H.W. has been in appellee’s temporary custody for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, as it undisputed that H.W. has been in appellee’s custody without interruption since July 15, 2015. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). The record also supports the court’s finding that mother and father abandoned H.W., as mother last visited H.W. on August 3, 2015, and father visited last with H.W. on February 23, 2017. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b).
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When clear and convincing evidence establishes abandonment under Section 2151.414(E)(10), the juvenile court need not also determine whether the agency used reasonable reunification efforts or whether reasonable-time placement is possible.

In re C.M. · filed 2018-06-22(E)(10)

Since the juvenile court determined by clear and convincing evidence the twins were abandoned by appellant, the juvenile court was not required to determine whether appellee used reasonable efforts to reunify the twins with appellant or … whether the twins could not or should not be placed with appellant within a reasonable time. R.C. 2151.414(E)(10); see R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b).
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Suspension of visitation does not defeat abandonment under Section 2151.414(B)(1)(b) when the parent's voluntary failure to visit consistently and make case-plan progress caused the suspension and more than 90 days passed without contact.

In re B.C. · filed 2018-07-09(B)(1)(b)

Mother voluntarily chose not to do so, and therefore, did not have any contact with the children for more than 90 days. Thus, it was Mother's active choices that led to her inability to see the children, and the juvenile court's finding of abandonment is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
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A parent's lack of contact may constitute abandonment even after visitation is suspended when the parent's own repeated incarceration, missed services, and missed visits caused the suspension.

In re S.M. · filed 2018-11-19(B)(1)(b)

Mother disputes the juvenile court's finding she abandoned S.M. claiming any abandonment was not done "willfully." However, contrary to Mother's claim otherwise, it was Mother's own actions that caused in her visitation time being suspended, thereby resulting in the juvenile court's finding she had abandoned S.M. This includes Mother's repeated incarceration, unwillingness to attended the appointments necessary to complete her case plan services, and failure to attend all but five of the 29 scheduled visits with S.M.
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Section 2151.414(B)(1)(b)'s abandonment ground is supported when a parent has no contact with the child for more than 90 days, regardless of an asserted lack of intent to abandon.

In re A.J. · filed 2018-12-10(B)(1)(b)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.011(C), "a child shall be presumed abandoned when the parents of the child have failed to visit or maintain contact with the child for more than ninety days, regardless of whether the parents resume contact with the child after that period of ninety days." ... Father instead argues the evidence contrary to the juvenile court's decision is "so strong as to overcome the presumption" of abandonment. Father, however, did not cite to any evidence within the record to support his claim.
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Section 2151.414(D)(1) requires consideration of all relevant best-interest factors when deciding an agency's permanent-custody complaint, but the court lacks authority to order an alternative disposition the agency did not request.

In re T.J. · filed 2018-12-21(D)(1)

When a public children services agency files a complaint for permanent custody, the role of the juvenile court is limited to deciding the merits of that request. It lacks the authority to order an alternative disposition not requested by the agency. In re P.S., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos 08AP-1023 and 08AP-1024, 2009-Ohio-1545, ¶14. ... More importantly, though, there is ample evidence supporting the trial court’s best interests conclusion. In addition to providing that all relevant factors must be considered in making the “best interests” determination, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) sets forth factors for review.
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Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody only upon clear and convincing proof that custody is in the child's best interest and one of the conditions in division (B)(1)(a) through (e) applies.

In re Z. Children · filed 2019-05-01(B)(1), (D)(1)

A juvenile court may grant permanent custody of a child to an agency if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that (1) permanent custody is in the child’s best interest and (2) one of the circumstances provided in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies.
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Only one of division (B)(1)'s alternative findings is needed to satisfy the second prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re K.M. · filed 2019-05-13(B)(1)

Only one of these findings must be met to satisfy the second prong of the two-part permanent custody test.
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Divisions (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are alternative grounds, and either can independently support permanent custody when the best-interest requirement is also met.

In re D.W. · filed 2019-05-13(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion for permanent custody.
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Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence supports a qualifying division (B)(1) ground and the statutory best-interest determination.

In re A.D. · filed 2019-09-11(B)(1), (D)(1)

Upon review, we find sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's decision to grant appellee permanent custody of the children, and do not find any manifest miscarriage of justice.
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Only one of division (B)(1)'s alternative findings must be established to satisfy the second prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re A.S. · filed 2019-10-07(B)(1)

Only one of these findings must be met to satisfy the second prong of the two-part permanent custody test.
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Only one division (B)(1) ground is required, so a supported twelve-of-twenty-two-month finding makes errors concerning an alternative parental-placement ground harmless.

In re R.M.S. · filed 2019-10-18(B)(1)

A trial court is only required to find the applicability of one factor under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).
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A supported division (B)(1)(d) finding makes an additional division (B)(1)(a) finding superfluous because only one alternative division (B)(1) ground is required.

In re X.M.W. · filed 2020-02-12(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), ... however, only requires that “any” of the (a) through (e) factors exist, rendering any finding under (B)(1)(a) superfluous in light of the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) conclusion.
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Division (B)(1)'s grounds are alternatives, and only one must be met to satisfy the first prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re Co.J. · filed 2020-02-18(B)(1)

“The factors contained within R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) are alternative findings, and only one must be met in order for the first prong of the permanent custody test to be satisfied.”
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Division (B)(1)'s grounds are alternatives, and only one must be met to satisfy the first prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re C.J. · filed 2020-02-18(B)(1)

“The factors contained within R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) are alternative findings, and only one must be met in order for the first prong of the permanent custody test to be satisfied.”
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Divisions (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are independent grounds, so satisfaction of either eliminates the need to establish the other.

In re C.H. · filed 2020-03-02(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

Nevertheless, we emphasize that, as previously stated, findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are independent. As long as one was satisfied the other need not be.
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Only one division (B)(1) factor must be present to satisfy the first prong of permanent custody.

In re K.S. · filed 2021-03-11(B)(1)

Only one of the factors must be present for the first prong of the permanent custody analysis to be satisfied.
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When all four findings in subsection (D)(2) apply, permanent custody is in the child’s best interest and the court must commit the child to the agency’s permanent custody.

In re T.W. · filed 2021-06-17(D)(2)

The juvenile court made findings consistent with granting permanent custody under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2), which states if all four of its subsections apply, “permanent custody is in the best interest of the child, and the court shall commit the child to the permanent custody of a public children services agency or private child placing agency.”
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If every factor in subsection (D)(2) applies, permanent custody is necessarily in the child’s best interest and the court must grant permanent custody to the agency.

In re T.S. · filed 2021-06-17(D)(2)

Our review reflects that the juvenile court’s findings were supported by competent, credible evidence in the record. Because all the factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) apply, permanent custody was necessarily in the best interest of the child, and the trial court was required to grant permanent custody to CCDCFS.
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An abandonment finding under subsection (B)(1)(b) independently satisfies the first prong of the permanent-custody test without a reasonable-time placement finding under subsection (B)(1)(a).

In re A.P. · filed 2021-06-29(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(b)

{¶39} A trial court's finding of abandonment under R.C. §2151.414(B)(1)(b) will satisfy the first prong of the permanent custody test, independent of a finding under R.C. §2151.414(B)(1)(a) [Parental Placement within a Reasonable Time], allowing the court to move on to the second prong of considering whether the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child. In re A.M., 5th Dist. Stark No. 2013 CA 00113, 2013-Ohio-4152.
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An agency’s permanent-custody motion is a procedural due-process requirement rather than a requirement of subject-matter or case jurisdiction, and it may be forfeited or waived in proper circumstances.

In re J.C. · filed 2021-10-19(A)

Instead, the motion is simply a procedural due process requirement that can be forfeited or waived under the proper circumstances.
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Permanent custody requires clear and convincing evidence that custody is in the child's best interest and that at least one circumstance enumerated in subsection (B)(1) applies.

In re A.H. · filed 2021-11-09(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) states permanent custody may be granted if the trial court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child and: ... (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned * * * and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents. ... (b) The child is abandoned. ... (c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody. ... (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *. ... (e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state or another state.
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Permanent custody is supported when the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent, the custody-duration ground applies, and the best-interest factors favor agency custody.

In re W.H. · filed 2022-01-19(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d), (D)

Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court’s decision finding that K.H. could not or should not be placed with Appellant-Mother or Father within a reasonable period of time was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the grant of permanent custody to the Agency was in the child's best interest.
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Permanent custody is supported when sufficient evidence shows the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time and agency custody is in the child's best interest.

In re L.W. · filed 2022-05-03(B)(1), (D)

Based upon the foregoing, we find the trial court's findings that L.W. could not be placed with Appellant-Father within a reasonable time and that an award of permanent custody was in the child's best interest were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and were based upon sufficient evidence.
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The statutory presumption of abandonment arising from more than ninety days without visitation or contact is rebuttable.

In re S.G. · filed 2022-06-09(B)(1)(b)

{¶60} This provision creates a presumption of abandonment, which may be rebutted. In re S.B., 183 Ohio App.3d 300, 2009-Ohio-3619, 916 N.E.2d 1110.
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Permanent custody is proper when clear and convincing evidence establishes both the 12-of-22-month ground and that agency custody serves the children's best interest.

In re K.A.W. · filed 2022-09-16(B)(1)(d), (D)

On this record, the juvenile court did not err in terminating Mother's and Father’s parental rights and awarding permanent custody to GCCS; there was clear and convincing evidence that the children had been in the temporary custody of GCCS for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period and that an award of permanent custody was in the children's best interest.
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Undisputed abandonment and twelve months of agency custody within a consecutive twenty-two-month period satisfy the first prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re A.L. · filed 2022-11-17(B)(1)(b), (B)(1)(d)

Here, there is no dispute that A.L. had been abandoned by mother and had been in the temporary custody of FCCS for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, satisfying R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) and (d).
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Permanent custody is supported when competent, credible evidence establishes the custody-duration ground and that a legally secure agency placement is in the children's best interest.

In re G.H. · filed 2022-12-13(B)(1)(d), (D)(1)

After reviewing the record, Mother’s limited arguments on appeal, and the thoroughly analyzed and well written September 16, 2021 Magistrate’s Decision and April 6, 2022 Judgment Entry, we find the juvenile court’s determination to award permanent custody of G.H., D.K., and D.H. to LCDJFS was supported by competent, credible evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. It was in the best interests of the children to be placed in a legally secure and stable placement.
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Subsection (B) lists alternative permanent-custody grounds, and any one alternative can independently support the statutory finding.

In re Lu.M-R. · filed 2022-12-29(B)

{¶ 24} R.R. seems to contend that permanent custody can only be granted after a child has been in the temporary custody of FCCS for 12 months in a consecutive 22-month period. However, R.C. 2151.414(B) lists four alternatives, and any single alternative can independently support a finding of permanent custody.
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When all subsection (D)(2) factors apply, permanent custody is necessarily in the child’s best interest and the juvenile court must grant the agency permanent custody.

In re P.S. · filed 2023-01-19(D)(2)

The record demonstrates that all the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) apply to the facts of this case. Therefore, permanent custody was necessarily in the best interest of the child, and the juvenile court was required to grant permanent custody to CCDCFS. In re P.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110121, 2021-Ohio-1821, at ¶ 26.
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Even after the twelve-of-twenty-two-month threshold is met, the agency must separately prove by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re C.P. · filed 2026-04-24(B)(1)(d)

Once R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is met, “[t]he agency still must prove by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the child’s best interest to grant permanent custody to the agency.”
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Permanent custody requires both that the disposition be in the child's best interest and that a subsection (B)(1) threshold ground apply.

In re Z.B. · filed 2026-05-01(B)(1)

Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a trial court may terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to a children services agency if that disposition is in the child’s best interest and the child has been in the agency’s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period.
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Under the version applicable when the permanent custody motion was filed, § 2151.414 required clear and convincing evidence that the child could not or should not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time and that permanent custody was in the child’s best interest.

In Re Peterson, Unpublished Decision (8-28-2001) · filed 2001-08-28

Under the version of R.C. 2151.414 in effect when the permanent custody motion was filed, FCCS was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Faith could not be placed with appellant within a reasonable time or should not be placed with her, and that it was in Faith's best interest to grant the permanent custody motion.
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Section 2151.414(B) permits a grant of permanent custody only when clear and convincing evidence establishes that it is in the child's best interest and that one of the listed statutory circumstances applies.

In the Matter of Krems, Unpublished Decision (5-14-2004) · filed 2004-05-14(B)

The juvenile court may terminate the rights of a natural parent and grant permanent custody of the child to the moving party only if it determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency that filed the motion, and that one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d) is present. ... As noted above, there was clear and convincing evidence provided to support the juvenile court's determination to grant permanent custody to GCJFS.
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Section 2151.414(B)(2) permits permanent agency custody of a child who is neither abandoned nor orphaned when clear and convincing evidence establishes that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent and that permanent custody serves the child's best interest.

In the Matter of Brewer, Unpublished Decision (5-14-2004) · filed 2004-05-14(B)(2)

R.C. 2151.414 (B)(2) governs the termination of parental rights in a natural child when the child is neither abandoned nor orphaned. It provides that a court may grant custody of a child to a movant if the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) "the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents;" and (2) "it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody." R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1).
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Section 2151.414(B)(1) permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that it serves the child's best interest and the child has spent at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period in agency temporary custody.

In the Matter of H.E.R., Unpublished Decision (6-18-2004) · filed 2004-06-18(B)(1)

Although we do not deny the general proposition that such a right exists, a parent's right to custody may be terminated if a court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that "it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody" and (2) that "[t]he child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period[.]" R.C. § 2151.414 (B)(1). ... The foregoing findings, which are supported by the record, are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of R.C. § 2151.414 . Thus, we find no error in the trial court's determination, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of H.E.R. and J.A.R. to grant permanent custody to the State.
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Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) requires clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody serves the child's best interests and that the child spent at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period in agency temporary custody.

In Re Andy-Jones, Unpublished Decision (6-24-2004) · filed 2004-06-24(B)(1)(d)

In this matter, FCCS had to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Christian's best interests were served by a grant of permanent custody to FCCS and that Christian was in the temporary custody of FCCS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d).
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Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence of a listed ground and a finding that permanent custody is in the child's best interest before custody is granted to an agency.

In Re L.F., Unpublished Decision (8-26-2004) · filed 2004-08-26(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 sets forth a two-prong analysis to be applied for a determination that permanent custody should be granted to an agency: First, the judge must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) exists. Second, that the award of permanent custody is in the best interest of the child.
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Section 2151.414(B)(2) permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes that it is in the child's best interest and that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In Re M.C., Unpublished Decision (9-7-2004) · filed 2004-09-07(B)(2)

Once a juvenile court does find by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency, R.C. 2151.414 (B)(2) provides that a court may grant permanent custody if, under R.C. 2151.414 (E), the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot or should not be placed with his parents.
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Section 2151.414(B) permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes that it is in the child's best interest and that one of four specified circumstances exists.

In the Matter of A.C., Unpublished Decision (10-18-2004) · filed 2004-10-18(B)

A juvenile court may grant a public children services agency permanent custody of a child if it determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the child's best interest and that one of the four circumstances listed in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a)-(d) exists. R.C. 2151.414 (B). Appellant concedes that A.C. has been in CCDJFS's temporary custody "for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999." R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d). Therefore, the only question in dispute in this case was whether it was in A.C.'s best interest to grant CCDJFS permanent custody of him.
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Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody serves the child's best interests and that a qualifying statutory category applies.

In the Matter of Hinkle, Unpublished Decision (11-16-2004) · filed 2004-11-16(B)(1)

We find that FCCS established by clear and convincing evidence that the Hinkle children's best interests are served by placing them in the permanent custody of FCCS. Through the evidence adduced at the hearing, we find that the trial court correctly applied the statutory guidelines found in R.C. 2151.414 , and its judgment was not contrary to law.
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Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence of both a qualifying ground for permanent custody and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In Re T.S., Unpublished Decision (1-7-2004) · filed 2004-01-07

Before a juvenile court can terminate parental rights and award to a proper moving agency permanent custody of a child, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned, orphaned, has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least twelve months of the prior twenty-two months, or that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414 (E); and (2) the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414 (D).
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Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody serves the child’s best interest and that a qualifying placement condition exists.

In re C.P. · filed 2014-01-16(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) granting permanent custody of the child to the agency is in the best interest of the child under R.C. 2151.414(D), and (2) either the child (a) cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with either parent if any one of the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) are present; (b) is abandoned; (c) is orphaned and no relatives are able to take permanent custody of the child; or (d) has been in the temporary custody of one or more public or private children services agencies for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period.
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Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires a two-part test before a court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody to a children services agency.

In re A.D. · filed 2014-11-17(B)(1)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody to a children services agency if it makes findings pursuant to a two-part test.
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Section 2151.414(B)(1) permits permanent custody when it serves the child's best interest and one of the listed circumstances applies, including abandonment.

In re T.H. · filed 2019-03-11(B)(1)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), the juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a children services agency if the court makes findings pursuant to a two-part test.
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Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence of a listed permanent custody condition and that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.

In re C.L. · filed 2023-02-16

R.C. 2151.414 contains a two-prong test that courts must apply in deciding whether to award permanent custody to the agency. ... The record contains competent, credible evidence that the essential statutory elements for permanent custody have been established by clear and convincing evidence.
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Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires the court to find a statutory ground for permanent custody and determine that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.

In re M.S.M. · filed 2023-10-16(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(B) therefore provides a two-pronged analysis the trial court is required to apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial court will determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) (a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child.
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Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest once a listed condition is established.

In re C.H. · filed 2024-01-11(B)(1)

Once the first prong is met, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that granting permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).
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Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence that an enumerated ground applies and that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.

In re N.M. · filed 2014-10-29(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) establishes a two-part test for courts to apply when determining whether to grant a motion for permanent custody to a public children services agency. The statute requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) one of the enumerated factors in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) apply, and (2) permanent custody is in the best interest of the child.
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Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that custody serves the child’s best interest and the child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In re T.T. · filed 2014-12-12(B)(1)(a)

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the conclusion that such an award was in the best interest of the children and that the children could not safely be reunified with Mother within a reasonable period of time.
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Section 2151.414 contemplates an award of temporary custody to a welfare department followed by a motion for permanent custody.

In Re Snider · filed 1984-03-16

While R.C. 2151.414 was not in effect at the time of the decision in In re Height, supra, that section does not alter the situation as it contemplates the prior award of temporary custody to a welfare department followed by a motion for an award of permanent custody, which also did not here occur.
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Section 2151.414 permits an award of permanent custody when the statutory grounds are established and the award is in the child's best interest.

In Re Darnell, Unpublished Decision (6-5-2006) · filed 2006-06-05(B)

There is sufficient and competent credible evidence demonstrating Brianna cannot be placed with either of the parents within a reasonable time and should not be placed with them. There is sufficient and competent credible evidence demonstrating an award of permanent custody is in Brianna's best interest.
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Chronic mental illness—Mandatory placement finding

Under subsection (E)(2), a juvenile court must find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent when the parent's chronic mental illness is so severe that the parent cannot provide an adequate permanent home now or within one year after the hearing.

In Re E.H., Unpublished Decision (9-13-2006) · filed 2006-09-13(E)(2)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(2), because the trial court found that Williams had a chronic mental illness that was "so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year after the [hearing]," it was required to enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. ... Given the severity of Williams' mental illness, her long history of failing to comply with the prescribed plan of treatment necessary to manage her illness, and the concern of her psychiatrist and others that she may again stop taking her medication, there was ample evidence before the trial court from which it could conclude that Williams suffered from a mental illness that was so severe that it made her unable to care for E.H. at the current time or any time in the near future.
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A parent's mental-health condition alone does not establish unsuitability under § 2151.414(E)(2); the court must find that the condition prevents the parent from providing an adequate permanent home.

In re M.G. · filed 2014-03-17(E)(2)

The trial court recognized that appellant’s mental health condition, alone, does not make her an “unsuitable” parent. Instead, the trial court was required to find that appellant cannot provide an adequate home because of her mental health condition. The testimony presented at the hearing supports the trial court’s finding that although appellant is receiving active treatment, she still suffers from lapses that would impair her ability to attend to the twins. The record demonstrates that, if the twins were reunified with their parents, they would not be supervised while in appellant’s care. Without this supervision, the safety of the twins would be compromised. Dr. Huntsman, the court-appointed psychologist, opined, “with reasonable psychological certainty, that [appellant] lacks the mental competency and capacity to parent her boys adequately.”
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A severe chronic mental illness can support a finding that children cannot be returned within a reasonable time even when the parent loves them and can make good parenting decisions during periods of stability.

In re A.E. · filed 2014-10-14(E)(2)

Everyone testified that there was a strong bond between Currier and the children and that she was capable of making good parenting decisions when her mental illness was not an issue. However, there was ample testimony that Currier has repeatedly placed the children in dangerous situations and has provided little stability for them. As recently as July 2013, Currier attempted to commit suicide by overdosing. Although the children did not witness this attempt, her feelings of hopelessness caused her to make a decision without considering the needs of her children or the effect her decision would have on her children. The pattern of this type of behavior has been repeated numerous times.
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Placement with parents—Enumerated factors as to each parent

A cannot-or-should-not-be-placed finding requires at least one subsection (E) factor to exist as to each parent, and fails when the record establishes none for one parent.

In re S. Children · filed 2020-07-22(E)

As we have determined that the trial court’s entry does not establish the presence of any of the factors with respect to father, we hold that the trial court’s finding that the children cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time was not supported by sufficient evidence and that, consequently, the trial court erred in granting permanent custody of J.J.S. and J.K.S. to HCJFS.
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Under subsection (E), a court must find that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time if clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one enumerated factor as to each parent.

In re J.C. · filed 2013-07-15(E)

Under R.C. 2151.414(E), the trial court must consider all relevant evidence before making this determination. The trial court is required to enter such a finding if it determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the factors enumerated in R .C. 2151.414(E)(1) through (16) exist with respect to each of the child's parents.
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Because subsection (E)’s grounds are alternatives, an error in one factor is harmless when another factor supporting the cannot-or-should-not-be-placed finding is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

In re T.K. · filed 2017-12-20(E)

As long as one of the Section 2151.414(E) alternative grounds was properly supported by clear and convincing evidence, a parent will not have suffered any prejudice arising out of any error in the juvenile court’s alternative finding under Section 2151.414(E). ... Accordingly, the juvenile court’s unchallenged alternative Section 2151.414(E) ground satisfies the first prong finding that the children could not be returned to either parent pursuant to Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a).
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Failure to remedy, lack of commitment, and unwillingness to provide necessities were supported where a parent could not provide adequate income or housing and was inconsistent with visitation.

In re A.E. · filed 2025-04-24(E)(1), (4), and (14)

From the testimony and evidence presented at trial, R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (4), and (14) apply to Father’s situation. Father’s own testimony demonstrates that he is unable to provide financially for three children, because he earns $1,000 a month, but has over $2,000 in monthly finances. ... Father was also unable to demonstrate that he can provide adequate housing for his children. ... Father also was inconsistent with his visitation and video calls with the children.
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Subsection (E)'s cannot-or-should-not-be-placed inquiry concerns parents, not family caregivers.

In re A.C. · filed 2026-05-07(E)

R.C. 2151.414(E) makes no mention of “family caregivers.” It only addresses parents. Our analysis is limited to the plain language of the statute.
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Section 2151.414(E) requires clear and convincing evidence that a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

In the Matter of Kitana, Unpublished Decision (7-23-2004) · filed 2004-07-23(E)

R.C. 2151.414 (E) sets forth various factors the court must use in determining by clear and convincing evidence the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. ... Based on the foregoing, we find that there was clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the children could not or should not be placed with appellants within a reasonable time.
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Lack of commitment—Adequate permanent home

A parent's repeated refusals to cooperate with agency workers and counseling, coupled with insubstantial and short-lived case-plan progress, can establish by clear and convincing evidence a lack of commitment to providing an adequate permanent home under subsection (E)(4).

In re T.W. · filed 2013-08-05(E)(4)

Given this evidence, the trial court could conclude by clear and convincing evidence that Wright lacked the commitment to providing an adequate home as set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(4).
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Section 2151.414(E)(4) supports a finding that a parent lacks commitment to provide an adequate permanent home when the parent repeatedly refuses agency assistance and access, discontinues counseling, and makes little sustained progress on the case plan.

In re M.W. · filed 2013-08-05(E)(4)

In addition, there was substantial evidence that Wright lacked commitment to provide an adequate home for M.W. Wright frequently would not work with the Agency workers to try and help M.W. When the workers would offer assistance, she would decline it. When the caseworkers wanted to view the home, she refused. Even when Wright allowed the workers into the home, she refused to give them access to all the rooms. At times, she even refused the workers access to the children. When it came to counseling, Wright would decide to discontinue her therapy if she believed the therapist was reporting to the Agency. Over the multiple years she worked on her case plan, she did not make much progress and most of the progress she did make disappeared over time. Given this evidence, the trial court could conclude by clear and convincing evidence that Wright lacked the commitment to providing an adequate home as set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(4).
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Twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground—No reasonable-efforts finding

When permanent custody is based on the child's having been in agency custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period and the child's best interest, the court need not consider whether the agency engaged in reasonable case planning and diligent efforts to help the parents remedy the conditions that caused removal.

In re S.J. · filed 2013-08-23(B)(1)(d), (D)(1), and (E)(1)

In relying on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) and R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the trial court did not need to consider – and it did not address – whether MCCS engaged in reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home.
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When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground in Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is established, the court need not also find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In re B.M. · filed 2023-11-13(B)(1)(d)

Under the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), when a child has been in an agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive 22-month period, a trial court need not find that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents.
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When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground and best interest are established, a court need not additionally consider the Section 2151.414(E) placement factors.

In re O.G. · filed 2024-05-16(B)(1)(d), (E)

Similar to the trial court, we also conclude that there was no “need” to consider the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors in the instant case. However, the trial court analyzed some of these factors in its journal entry, hence, we review them as well.
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Once the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground is established, the court need not also find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In re Z.W. · filed 2025-04-21(B)(1)(d)

Again, under the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), when a child has been in an agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive 22-month period, a trial court need not find that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents.
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The reasonable-time ground and twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground are mutually exclusive; once the latter applies, subsection (E)'s reasonable-time factors are unnecessary.

In re Ki.K. · filed 2025-11-14(B)(1)(a) and (d)

With respect to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), if a child has been in an agency’s temporary custody for at least 12 of 22 months, the juvenile court need not find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, so it is unnecessary to apply the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors. ... Subsections (a) and (d) of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) are, therefore, mutually exclusive.
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Best interests—viable reunification alternatives

The availability of a placement that avoids terminating parental rights is neither controlling nor entitled to greater weight than the other permanent-custody factors.

In re N.R. · filed 2021-05-06(B)

“[R.C. 2151.414(B)] does not make the availability of a placement that would not require a termination of parental rights an all-controlling factor. The statute does not even require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors.”
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The availability of a placement that avoids terminating parental rights is not controlling and need not receive more weight than other best-interest factors.

In re K.A. · filed 2021-05-24(D)

The statute does not make the availability of a placement that would not require a termination of parental rights an all-controlling factor. The statute does not even require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors.”
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Section 2151.414(D)(1) does not support a best-interest finding for permanent agency custody when a potentially viable reunification placement has not been adequately explored and the record lacks clear and convincing evidence favoring permanent custody.

In re S.D. · filed 2013-08-15(D)(1)

We cannot say that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the children to be placed in the permanent custody of CCDCFS on these facts.
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A legally secure permanent placement could be achieved without terminating parental rights where an approved aunt had extensive caregiving experience, a safe home, family support, and successful visits with the child.

In re A.H. · filed 2025-08-01(D)(1)(d)

We hold that the juvenile court could have achieved a legally secure permanent placement for A.H. without terminating her parents’ rights and awarding HCJFS permanent custody. ... This evidence illustrated that the juvenile court could have achieved a legally secure permanent placement for A.H. without granting HCJFS permanent custody.
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Abandonment—Ninety-day presumption

A parent’s 30-day visitation suspension does not defeat abandonment when more than 90 additional days pass before visitation resumes.

In re C.W. · filed 2018-09-24(B)(1)(b)

The testimony of Olague was that White’s visits were suspended for 30 days on October 7, 2016, but he did not resume visiting with C.W. until June 9, 2017. Tr. 18. Even excluding the 30 days of the suspension, more than 90 days had passed before visits were resumed. Thus, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that White had abandoned C.W.
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Notes 1–150 of 3,787, oldest cases first.

251 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

In Re Williams, the court cited the statute while stating the general evidentiary burden, but it expressly treated the challenge to the sufficiency of the clear-and-convincing evidence as mooted and did not decide it on the merits. opinion →
In Re Adoption of Mays, the court merely cited § 2151.414 in describing juvenile-court proceedings as a contrast to the adoption proceedings at issue; it did not interpret or apply § 2151.414. opinion →
In re McMunn, the appellate court did not decide whether § 2151.414 is vague or overbroad; it held only that the constitutional challenge was waived because it was not raised in the trial court. opinion →
In re Murray, the court quoted § 2151.414(A) only while discussing why a neglect or dependency adjudication might never receive appellate review; it did not decide what § 2151.414 means or requires. The holding concerned whether the juvenile-court disposition was a final, appealable order under §§ 2505.02 and 2501.02. opinion →
In Re Massengill, the court mentioned § 2151.414(E)(2) and (E)(4) only in a footnote describing the evidence supporting the trial court's disposition; it did not interpret or apply those statutory factors as a legal issue. opinion →
In Re Knotts, the court mentioned § 2151.414 as one procedural route that might have been available if a prior adjudication existed, but it reversed because the record lacked proof of abuse or dependency and because the hearings were not properly bifurcated; it did not construe or independently apply § 2151.414. opinion →
Matter of Moses, Unpublished Decision (2-25-1998), the opinion reproduces R.C. 2151.414(D) and (E) only as cross-references within quoted R.C. 2151.353(A)(4), and does not interpret or independently apply either subsection; the operative holding concerns the untimely R.C. 2151.415 motion and continuing jurisdiction under R.C. 2151.353(F) and (E)(1). opinion →
In re Davis, the opinion only certifies that a conflict exists and states the issue for briefing; it does not decide how § 2151.414 applies. opinion →
Matter of Reid, Unpublished Decision (7-10-1998), the court cited § 2151.414(C) only to contrast its juvenile permanent-custody report requirement with the shared-parenting provisions it was applying; it did not construe or apply § 2151.414. opinion →
In the Matter Of: McCauley, Unpublished Decision (8-27-1998), the court cited R.C. 2151.414 (E) as authority for the evidentiary standard in an abuse adjudication under R.C. 2151.031, without interpreting or independently applying this statute. opinion →
In Re Heston, the appellate court merely reports that the trial court applied R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) in awarding permanent custody; it does not interpret or independently decide what the statute means or requires. opinion →
In re Morgan, the citation reports the juvenile court's dispositional finding, while the appellate court did not interpret or independently apply the subsection; its remand rested on errors concerning dependency and summary judgment. opinion →
In Re Bunting, Unpublished Decision (10-13-1998), the statute appears only in the appellant's notice argument; the appellate court did not construe or independently apply it, resolving the issue through its findings about actual notice of the adjudicatory hearing and proper service of the later permanent-custody motion. opinion →
Matter of Emily Jean P., Unpublished Decision (5-7-1999), the statute appears only in a footnote as an example of other code provisions reflecting timeliness; the appellate court did not construe or apply R.C. 2151.414, resolving the appeal under R.C. 3107.16(B). opinion →
In Re: Wieland, Unpublished Decision (7-9-1999), the court cites R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) only in passing to support its discussion of the purpose of reunification case plans; it decides the appeal under privilege statutes and does not construe or apply § 2151.414. opinion →
In Re: Sitra Children, Unpublished Decision (7-19-1999), the opinion mentions O.R.C. 2151.414(B) only in a list of circumstances requiring clear-and-convincing proof. The court's decision concerns the burden for a parent seeking to modify temporary custody, and it does not construe or apply § 2151.414. opinion →
Jeroncic v. Dept. of Human Services, Unpublished Decision (7-27-1999), the court merely mentions R.C. 2151.414 (B) while contrasting the statutory dependency action with habeas corpus; it does not decide the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
In Re: Jackson, Unpublished Decision (8-13-1999), the court cited R.C. 2151.414(E) only while reciting the general permanent-custody framework. Its decision addressed whether the agency made reasonable reunification efforts under R.C. 2151.419; it did not construe or independently apply § 2151.414. opinion →
In Re Knight, Unpublished Decision (11-24-1999), the court recited R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) as the general permanent-custody framework, but it did not decide how that statute applies; it resolved the appeal under R.C. 2151.353 because the uncle had not filed a motion for legal custody. opinion →
In Re Hart, Unpublished Decision (12-9-1999), the statute appears only in the appellant's assignment of error and argument about a guardian ad litem report. The court did not decide what § 2151.414(C) requires: it held the 1996 issue was not properly before it and the 1998 issue was moot. opinion →
In the Matter of Young, Unpublished Decision (12-21-1999), the court cited R.C. 2151.414 only in passing to support its conclusion that the permanent-custody decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence; it did not construe the statute or decide what it requires or how it applies. opinion →
In the Matter of Donnelly, Unpublished Decision (3-31-2000), the opinion only reports that the trial court considered the statutory factors; the appellate court decides the counsel and due-process issues without interpreting or applying the statute. opinion →
In Re Kirkland, Unpublished Decision (6-2-2000), the statute appears only in a footnote quoting another case as background for the holding that Juv.R. 34(I) applies to permanent-custody hearings; this court did not construe or apply R.C. 2151.414. opinion →
In Re Bowman, Unpublished Decision (8-25-2000), the court merely recited R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (E) as the governing framework before resolving the appeal on the separate reasonable-efforts requirement in R.C. 2151.419(B); it did not interpret or independently apply R.C. 2151.414. opinion →
In re Wieland, the court construed the testimonial-privilege statutes, not R.C. 2151.414. It mentioned R.C. 2151.414 only as one of several dependency-law provisions in explaining that no statutory exception authorized disclosure of treatment communications. opinion →
In re Wieland, the court cited R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) only as part of the reunification-plan context and did not interpret, apply, or decide what that provision requires; the holding concerned testimonial privileges under other statutes. opinion →
In Re Sadiku, the court expressly declined to decide the statutory sufficiency challenge and treated it as moot; it reversed on rebuttal testimony and due process under section 2151.35, while expressing only nondecisive concerns about the section 2151.414 burden. opinion →
In the Matter of Kyle, Unpublished Decision (12-1-2000), the court declined to reach the permanent-custody merits and reversed under the psychologist-patient privilege statutes; section 2151.414 appears within its account of Wieland’s privilege holding rather than an independent construction or application of this section. opinion →
In Re Wooldridge, Unpublished Decision (12-20-2000), the statute appears in a see-also citation supporting a summary evidentiary-sufficiency conclusion; the court identifies no statutory requirement or application-specific facts from which to write a substantive note. opinion →
In Re Pittman, Unpublished Decision (6-13-2001), the entire staged text is a dissent, expressly disagreeing with the majority on best interest; its criticism of subsection (B)(1)(d) and proposed factual disposition are not holdings of the deciding court, and it states the unfitness issue is not on appeal. opinion →
In re Hoffman, the Supreme Court order accepts a certified conflict and directs briefing on guardian-ad-litem cross-examination under subsection (C); it does not resolve that statutory question. opinion →
In the Matter of Mikaela B., Unpublished Decision (3-29-2002), section 2151.414 appears only in the parent’s assignment of error; the court reviews an award of legal custody under Section 2151.353(A)(3) and does not construe or apply Section 2151.414. opinion →
In the Matter of Estep, Unpublished Decision (6-26-2002), the opinion decided whether a delinquency dispositional hearing had to be recorded under R.C. 2151.35 and Juv.R. 37; it mentioned section 2151.414 only to explain that the proceeding was not a permanent-custody hearing. opinion →
In Re Ortiz, Unpublished Decision (7-24-2002), the parents did not challenge the permanent-custody findings under section 2151.414; the court decided only that their dependency stipulation waived a challenge to evidence that they posed a danger to the child. opinion →
In Re Austin, Unpublished Decision (10-2-2002), the opinion cites R.C. 2151.414 only in a footnote after concluding that the record contained clear and convincing evidence; it does not interpret or apply any provision of the statute. opinion →
In the Matter of Barnhart, Unpublished Decision (10-30-2002), the opinion recounts the trial court's analysis under § 2151.414 only as procedural history and expressly notes that the mother did not challenge the permanent-custody disposition; the appellate holdings concern the separate neglect and dependency adjudication. opinion →
In Re Secrest, Unpublished Decision (12-20-2002), the opinion mentioned subsection (E) only while reciting a general permanent-custody framework; it reversed solely because the agency's reunification efforts were unreasonable under R.C. 2151.419 and expressly treated the mother's section 2151.414 challenges as moot. opinion →
In Re Secrest, Unpublished Decision (12-20-2002), the opinion mentioned subsection (E) only while reciting a general permanent-custody framework; it reversed solely because the agency's reunification efforts were unreasonable under R.C. 2151.419 and expressly treated the mother's section 2151.414 challenges as moot. opinion →
In Re Walker, Unpublished Decision (2-21-2003), the statute appeared in a constitutional challenge that the appellate court held was waived because it had not been raised below; the court did not decide the statute's constitutionality or otherwise construe it. opinion →
In Re Hoffman, Unpublished Decision (3-3-2003), section 2151.414 appeared only in the grandmother's contention that it preferred family placement; the court rejected her appeal based on her failure to timely assert a legally protectable custody interest and did not construe the section. opinion →
In the Matter of G., Unpublished Decision (3-7-2003), the statute appeared only in procedural history describing the permanent-custody order; the sole appellate issue concerned waiver of the right to counsel, not section 2151.414. opinion →
In Re DT, the Illinois court cites Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.414(B)(1) only in a comparative list of authorities offered by the respondent concerning other states' burdens of proof; it does not construe or apply the Ohio statute. opinion →
People v. B.T., the Illinois court cites Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.414(B)(1) only in a comparative string cite of other jurisdictions' standards, based on the respondent's authorities, and does not construe or apply the Ohio statute. opinion →
In Re Alyssa C., although the opinion discussed several division (E) factors and identified evidentiary problems, it expressly declined to rule whether the evidence supported the statutory findings because the parents had waived that issue; it reversed instead for denial of counsel. opinion →
In re Jones, the opinion cites subsection (E)(1) only while explaining the general reunification purpose of case plans; it decides the scope of therapist-client privileges, not the meaning or application of § 2151.414. opinion →
In the Matter of Savanah M., Unpublished Decision (10-31-2003), the opinion reports the trial court's findings under section 2151.414, but the appellate issue and holding concern whether the absent parent waived her right to counsel. opinion →
In the Matter of Rowe, Unpublished Decision (11-13-2003), the case concerns legal custody rather than permanent custody, and the opinion expressly notes that section 2151.414(D) did not apply; the trial court merely borrowed its factors for guidance. opinion →
In the Matter of Goff, Unpublished Decision (11-14-2003), the opinion recites section 2151.414's permanent-custody framework as background, but the appellate holding concerns the father's lack of standing to challenge denial of a stay based on the grandparents' separate appeal. opinion →
Putthoff v. Thompson, Unpublished Decision (1-9-2004), the opinion cites section 2151.414 only to explain that a different statute's guardian-ad-litem requirement applies to agency permanent-custody motions; this visitation dispute was not a section 2151.414 proceeding and the court decided nothing about the target section. opinion →
In the Matter of J.D., Unpublished Decision (1-29-2004), the court mentioned division (E)(2) only to show that mental illness was not the determinative basis for termination while deciding a separate due-process claim concerning appointment of a psychiatric expert; it did not construe or apply the subsection. opinion →
In Re Foucht, Unpublished Decision (2-6-2004), the citation appears in an excerpt reporting the trial court's decision, and another reference appears only in a party's assignment of error; the appellate court did not construe or independently apply § 2151.414, instead affirming under general evidentiary-sufficiency and abuse-of-discretion principles. opinion →
In Re Babbs, Unpublished Decision (2-10-2004), the court quoted another case's construction of § 2151.414 only in support of a separate final-appealability analysis, reversed on constitutional notice grounds, and expressly declined as moot the remaining assignments challenging the statute. opinion →
In the Matter of McLemore, Unpublished Decision (2-12-2004), the statute appears only in the party's constitutional and best-interest assignments of error, which the appellate court expressly declined to decide as moot after reversing on an evidentiary hearsay issue. opinion →
In Re G.R., Unpublished Decision (3-4-2004), the court recited subsection (B) only as background concerning the original permanent-custody award; it reversed because the later motion to modify that disposition was handled without the evidentiary hearing and guardian-ad-litem notice required by R.C. 2151.353. opinion →
In Re Barnosky, Unpublished Decision (3-9-2004), the court cited subsection (B)(1) only to contrast the clear-and-convincing standard for permanent custody with the preponderance standard applicable to the temporary-custody order actually under review, expressly noting that permanent custody was neither sought nor granted. opinion →
In re Williams, the court mentioned § 2151.414(D)(2) only while describing the agency's argument against independent counsel, rejected that argument, and based its holding on § 2151.352 and the Juvenile Rules. opinion →
Monroe County Department of Human Services v. Kelli B., the Wisconsin Supreme Court included the Ohio statute only in a footnote string cite listing termination-of-parental-rights statutes from every state; it decided the constitutionality of a Wisconsin incestuous-parenthood statute and said nothing about the meaning or application of Ohio Section 2151.414. opinion →
In re Guardianship of Stein, the separate concurrence cites R.C. 2151.414 only generally, together with R.C. 2151.353, for a broad proposition about juvenile-court custody decisions; it does not interpret or apply Section 2151.414. opinion →
In Re Ella C., Unpublished Decision (1-4-2005), the references to R.C. 2151.414 only report the trial court's permanent-custody ruling; the appellate court decided whether the agency made reasonable efforts under R.C. 2151.419 and did not construe or apply R.C. 2151.414. opinion →
In Re Halstead, Unpublished Decision (1-27-2005), the appeal concerned an award of legal custody, not permanent custody. The court cited R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and (E) only in a string of authorities to contrast the clear-and-convincing standard used in permanent-custody proceedings with the preponderance standard applicable to the legal-custody decision before it; it did not construe or apply § 2151.414 to decide the case. opinion →
In Re S.G. M.G., Unpublished Decision (3-17-2005), the only reference to R.C. 2151.414(B) appears in a footnote listing an assignment of error that the appellate court expressly declined to address after reversing on a separate Juvenile Rule 29(D) issue; the court therefore decided nothing about the statute. opinion →
In Re Tyler S., Unpublished Decision (3-18-2005), the appellate court only reports the trial court's findings under R.C. 2151.414 as procedural history; it reverses on the separate right-to-counsel issue under R.C. 2151.352 without deciding what § 2151.414 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
In Re M.W., Unpublished Decision (3-24-2005), the court mentioned subsection (E)(2) only while deciding whether the mother's mental health was sufficiently determinative to require sua sponte appointment of a psychiatric expert; it did not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of the statute. opinion →
In Re Graves, Unpublished Decision (3-25-2005), the citations to § 2151.414 appear only in the reproduced trial-court decision. The appellate court did not construe or independently apply the statute; it affirmed the custody ruling under manifest-weight review. opinion →
In Re A.C., the only mention of the statute appears in the mother's fourth assignment of error, which the appellate court expressly declared moot and did not decide. opinion →
In Re Nibert, Unpublished Decision (5-24-2005), the court did not decide what R.C. 2151.414 means or how it applies; it expressly held that the assignment alleging misapplication of the statute was moot after reversing on a separate procedural ground. opinion →
In Re A.A., Unpublished Decision (5-26-2005), the court merely reports the mother's statutory argument and expressly declines to address it after reversing on a separate Juvenile Rule issue, so it decides nothing about R.C. 2151.414. opinion →
In Re Roberts, Unpublished Decision (6-8-2005), the court did not reach the merits of the statutory arguments because they were waived, and it declined plain-error review; its discussion of the statute's timing rule merely reported the Ohio Supreme Court's holding in In re C.W. opinion →
In Re Edward M., Unpublished Decision (6-30-2005), the opinion mentions R.C. 2151.414 only while reporting the trial court's findings. The appellate court reversed on the denial of a continuance and expressly declined to address the assignments challenging the evidentiary and best-interest rulings, so it did not decide anything about the statute. opinion →
In Re Terrence, the court merely recited R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) as background and mentioned it when discussing mediation; it reversed because the mother's waiver was not knowing and voluntary, without construing or applying the statute's permanent-custody grounds. opinion →
In Re J.J., Unpublished Decision (11-17-2005), section 2151.414(A)(2) appears only in the appellant's second assignment of error. The appellate court expressly rendered the remaining assignments moot and declined to address them, so it did not decide anything about the statute. opinion →
In Re Maxwell, Unpublished Decision (2-6-2006), the court recited general requirements of R.C. 2151.414 but did not decide whether the trial court complied with them; it rejected the assignment of error because the appellant failed to object to the magistrate's decision and provide the necessary record. opinion →
In Re Laigle, Unpublished Decision (2-21-2006), the opinion mentions R.C. 2151.414 only while recounting the trial court's findings. The appellate court decided the denial of a continuance and the request for a planned permanent living arrangement under R.C. 2151.353, without construing or independently applying R.C. 2151.414. opinion →
Charleston County Department of Social Services v. Jackson, the Ohio provision appears only in a multi-state string citation supporting a general observation that some states treat incarceration as a ground for termination; the South Carolina court did not interpret or apply Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414. opinion →
In Re R.E., Unpublished Decision (3-17-2006), the opinion mentions R.C. 2151.414(B) only while reporting the juvenile court's permanent-custody order; the appellate court decided a separate right-to-counsel issue under R.C. 2151.352 and juvenile rules, without construing or applying § 2151.414. opinion →
In Re S.R., Unpublished Decision (5-9-2006), the court merely recited R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) as background and expressly noted that appellant alleged no error concerning the substantive merits; it decided only procedural challenges to the denial of continuances and did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
In Re A.B., the opinion quotes R.C. 2151.353(A)(5)(b), which cross-references division (D) of R.C. 2151.414 for determining whether adoption is in the child's best interest, but the court neither interprets nor applies R.C. 2151.414; its holding concerns the agency-request requirement in R.C. 2151.353(A)(5). opinion →
In Re K.D., Unpublished Decision (9-13-2006), the opinion cites the statute only while reporting the juvenile court's findings; the appellate court declines to consider the mother's unpreserved arguments and does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
In Re T.M., Unpublished Decision (12-11-2006), the court cited R.C. 2151.414 only as an example of the notice that would be required if Children Services later filed a permanent-custody motion; no such motion was before the court, and the appeal was dismissed for lack of a final appealable order. opinion →
In Re J.J., Unpublished Decision (2-8-2007), section 2151.414(A)(2) appears only in the quoted assignment of error and in a footnote reporting appellant's concession that it did not apply; the court resolved the timing issue under R.C. 2151.35(B)(1) and did not construe or apply § 2151.414. opinion →
In Re J.B., Unpublished Decision (2-14-2007), the references to R.C. 2151.414 report the trial court's abandonment and best-interest findings; the appellate court expressly recognized that those findings were not challenged and decided instead whether the child required separate counsel. opinion →
In Matter of Jordan H., Unpublished Decision (8-10-2007), the opinion reports the trial court's findings under R.C. 2151.414 as procedural history, but the sole appellate issue concerns denial of a continuance; the appellate court does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
In re Adams, the court quoted subsection (A) only while explaining the reasoning of In re Murray and distinguishing that case; the issue decided was whether denial of permanent custody was a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02, not the meaning or application of R.C. 2151.414. opinion →
In Re A.P., Unpublished Decision (10-10-2007), the court cited R.C. 2151.414 only to explain why the grandmother's argument rested on a mistaken premise: the parents voluntarily surrendered their rights, so the statutory permanent-custody test was not litigated. The appeal was resolved on intervention, adequacy of the record, and lack of prejudice, not by construing or applying the statute. opinion →
In Re A.W., 07ca14 (2-13-2008), the only reference to R.C. 2151.414(A) appears in a see-also citation parenthetical reporting In re Sox's holding; this court decided the appeal under R.C. 2151.353(F) and 2151.415(D)(2), not the cited statute. opinion →
In Re R.H., 22352 (2-22-2008), the opinion mentions R.C. 2151.414 only while reporting the issue and holdings of In re Davis. This court does not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 2151.414; it relies on Davis only by analogy for the availability of procedendo in addressing delay in this delinquency proceeding. opinion →
In Matter of Jordan M., S-07-021 (4-18-2008), the court cited R.C. 2151.414 only to describe the general permanent-custody framework and procedural history; the appellate issues and holdings concerned whether the parents knowingly and voluntarily entered stipulations, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of the statute. opinion →
In Re D.H., the opinion cites § 2151.414 only within a quotation of R.C. 2151.35(A)(2) and a descriptive footnote; the court decided whether R.C. 2151.35(A)(2) and Juv.R. 37 required pretrial proceedings to be recorded, not the meaning or application of § 2151.414. opinion →
In re H.F., the court cited R.C. 2151.414(A) only to support its separate conclusion that the earlier adjudication and temporary-custody order was final for appellate-timing purposes; it did not decide a disputed question about the statute itself. opinion →
In re C.P., the opinion identifies an alleged error concerning R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) only as one of the mother's assignments of error. The appellate court reverses on the separate right-to-counsel issue under R.C. 2151.352 and expressly declares all remaining assignments moot, so it does not decide anything about § 2151.414. opinion →
Spears v. Bush, the opinion mentions R.C. 2151.414(D) only while recounting the disposition of an earlier appeal; the present appeal decides civil pleading and political-subdivision immunity issues, not the meaning or application of section 2151.414. opinion →
In re T.T., the court recited R.C. 2151.414 as the general permanent-custody framework, but the sole assignment of error and the court's ruling addressed reasonable reunification efforts under R.C. 2151.419; it did not interpret or decide an issue under R.C. 2151.414. opinion →
In re C.B., the majority cited R.C. 2151.414(D) only as additional support while deciding whether the juvenile court’s custody order affected a substantial right and was final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02; it did not construe or apply § 2151.414. The separate concurrence’s references to § 2151.414 timing provisions do not constitute the court’s holding. opinion →
In re J.M., section 2151.414(F) appears only as the basis of the agency’s party-status argument. The court rejected that argument as overly technical and decided the appeal under the Supreme Court’s judicial-disqualification ruling, not by construing or applying the statute. opinion →
In re E.J., the only citations to R.C. 2151.414 appear in the appellate opinion's quotation of the magistrate's findings, which is procedural history. The appellate court decided a continuance issue and ineffective-assistance claims without construing or independently deciding any requirement or application of the statute. opinion →
Beard v. Bloomfield, the statute appears only in a footnote explaining the scope of the Hoffman precedent; this court distinguished that permanent-custody case and did not construe or apply R.C. 2151.414 in deciding the parental-custody appeal. opinion →
Richland Cty. Children Servs. Bd. v. Adam, the sole reference to R.C. 2151.414(E)(16) appears in the procedural history describing the statutory basis appellant cited in his motion. The appellate court dismissed the parental-rights portion for lack of a final appealable order and did not interpret or apply § 2151.414; its substantive statutory discussion concerned R.C. 2151.413 instead. opinion →
Sypherd v. Sypherd, the court cited R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) only as a passing contrast while deciding the admissibility of guardian-ad-litem testimony in a domestic-relations case under R.C. 3109.04(F); no claim under R.C. 2151.414 was before the court or decided. opinion →
In re A.K., the court cited R.C. 2151.414(D) only as one possible source of best-interest factors and in describing the trial court’s analysis. It reversed under R.C. 2151.281 and Juv.R. 4 for failure to appoint a guardian ad litem, and expressly declined as moot the assignment challenging the best-interest decision, so it did not decide a holding about R.C. 2151.414. opinion →
State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, the sole reference to R.C. 2151.414 only describes the issue decided in an earlier case, In re Davis, and the court expressly says Davis is inapplicable; this opinion instead construes R.C. 2152.83(A)(1). opinion →
In re Z.R., the court cited subsection (B)(1)(d) only as contextual support for its holding that a dependency complaint filed in an improper county must be dismissed; no permanent-custody motion was before it and it did not apply the subsection to decide permanent custody. opinion →
In re D.C., this was a legal-custody appeal, and the court cited R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors only as nonbinding guidance for the distinct legal-custody determination. opinion →
In re K.C., the appeal concerned competing motions for legal custody, not permanent custody, and the court treated R.C. 2151.414(D) only as guidance for the legal-custody best-interest determination. opinion →
In re Jones Children, the opinion mentions § 2151.414 only as one example of several statutes imposing reasonable-efforts duties; it decides the mother's reasonable-efforts challenge under § 2151.419 in a legal-custody case and does not construe or apply § 2151.414. opinion →
In re A.P.D., the court distinguished permanent-custody proceedings governed by section 2151.414(C) from the shared-parenting dispute before it, which was governed by section 3109.04; it did not apply or decide an issue under section 2151.414. opinion →
In re D.S., this was a legal-custody case governed by sections 2151.353 and 3109.04; section 2151.414 appeared only in a parenthetical analogy supporting the standard of review. opinion →
In re D.T., the appeal concerned legal custody rather than permanent custody; the court mentioned section 2151.414 only as optional guidance and decided the case under the legal-custody best-interest standard. opinion →
In re M.O., section 2151.414(D) appeared only as authority invoked by parties concerning best-interest factors; the appellate holding concerned the limits on temporary-custody extensions under other statutes. opinion →
In Re B.C., the Supreme Court listed section 2151.414 among existing procedural safeguards while deciding whether due process requires delayed appeals from parental-rights termination judgments; it did not decide a disputed issue about the statute itself. opinion →
In re I.B.L., the opinion only reported the trial court's statutory finding as procedural history; the appellate holding concerned whether due process required transporting an incarcerated parent to the permanent-custody hearing. opinion →
In re S.U., the court recited Section 2151.414's general permanent-custody framework, but the father's appellate claims concerned reasonable reunification efforts under Section 2151.419 and ineffective assistance, not the construction or disputed application of Section 2151.414. opinion →
In re J.T., the court recited Section 2151.414's framework, but reversed solely because the children needed independent counsel due to a conflict with the guardian ad litem; it held the separate manifest-weight challenge moot. opinion →
Frick v. Howell, this was a domestic custody-modification appeal governed by section 3109.04; the court mentioned section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) only to contrast permanent-custody proceedings and ultimately could not determine whether the trial court relied on the guardian ad litem's statement. opinion →
In re the Matter of T.A.H., the agency challenged the trial court's application of R.C. 2151.414, but the appellate court dismissed for lack of a final appealable order and did not decide any issue about the statute. opinion →
In re S.M., the opinion only reports the trial court's evidentiary use of Section 2151.414; the appellate holdings addressed the incarcerated father's due-process and ineffective-assistance claims, not the statute's meaning or application. opinion →
In re T.C., the opinion only reported the trial court's section 2151.414 findings as procedural history; the appellate holdings concerned guardian-ad-litem testimony and the separate reasonable-efforts statute. opinion →
In re K.S., this was a legal-custody appeal governed by section 2151.353; the court used section 2151.414(D)(1)'s permanent-custody factors only as nonbinding guidance. opinion →
In re S. Children, the court reviewed an award of legal custody to grandparents and referred to section 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody factors only as optional guidance. opinion →
In re D.T., the appeal concerned legal custody of children to relatives; the court used section 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody test only as guidance rather than deciding an issue under the statute. opinion →
In re C.S., the appeal concerned legal custody rather than permanent custody, and the court referenced section 2151.414(D) only as optional guidance for a legal-custody best-interest decision. opinion →
In re B.P., the appeal concerned legal custody to adult relatives; the court used section 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody factors only as instructive guidance. opinion →
Hill v. Hill, this domestic-relations appeal cited a permanent-custody case only by analogy concerning an appellant's failure to challenge an independent finding; it did not decide anything about Section 2151.414. opinion →
In re E.C., the appeal decided only whether denying a continuance was an abuse of discretion; § 2151.414(A)(2)'s 200-day guideline appeared only as supporting context and was not construed or independently applied as the issue on appeal. opinion →
In re A.L., the court recited the permanent-custody framework, but the father did not challenge the statutory findings; the appeal concerned only denial of a continuance. opinion →
In re J.B., the appellate holding concerned permissive intervention by a relative under procedural rules, not the meaning or application of Section 2151.414. opinion →
State ex rel. Allen Cty. Children Servs. Bd. v. Mercer Cty. Common Pleas Court, Probate Div. (Slip Opinion), the majority decided the concurrent jurisdiction of probate and juvenile courts under adoption and custody statutes; § 2151.414 appears only in the dissent's critique of that jurisdictional analysis and was not construed by the court. opinion →
In re M.N., the opinion cited R.C. 2151.414(E) only by analogy as general guidance while deciding parental unsuitability in a private legal-custody dispute under a different framework. opinion →
IN RE TA.L. IN RE A.L. IN PETITION OF R.W. & A.W. IN RE PETITION OF E.A.A.H. AND T.L., the dissent cited the Ohio statute only as one example in a multistate survey of statutes requiring an explicit best-interests finding; the District of Columbia court did not construe or apply Ohio law. opinion →
In Re A.J., the court referred to R.C. 2151.414's amendment only as historical support for refusing to insert a good-faith requirement into administrative substitute-care rules; it expressly limited review to the agency's denial of a relative caregiver and did not review permanent custody. opinion →
In re B.Y., the majority reversed on due-process grounds governing the mother's purported voluntary surrender and expressly declined to decide whether the evidence independently satisfied § 2151.414; the statutory references describe the unreviewed findings below. opinion →
R.E. v. H.F., the opinion only cited a different parental-rights termination case under Section 2151.414 to distinguish it; this appeal concerned a custody modification under Section 3109.04 and did not apply or construe Section 2151.414. opinion →
In re A.B., the opinion decided that the appeal became moot when the child reached majority under R.C. 2151.353(F)(1); section 2151.414 appears only in that different statute's list of disposition orders and was not construed or applied. opinion →
In re A.R., the opinion mentions the trial court’s findings under section 2151.414 only as procedural history; the appellate issues concern reasonable reunification efforts under section 2151.419 and ineffective assistance of counsel. opinion →
In re A.D., the opinion cites subsection (D) only in a string describing sources other courts have consulted in legal-custody cases; this court actually applied section 3109.04(F)(1) and did not decide any issue about section 2151.414. opinion →
In re M.O., the opinion mentioned Section 2151.414(D) only while reporting the juvenile court's reasoning below; the appellate issues were governed by Sections 2151.353 and 3109.04, and the court did not adopt or construe Section 2151.414. opinion →
In re J.P., the opinion only reports that the trial court invoked section 2151.414 and subsection (E)(11); the appellate analysis resolves the assignments under the juvenile rules, the neglect statute, and the manifest-weight standard without construing section 2151.414. opinion →
In re R.R., section 2151.414 appears only in a footnote listing statutes that govern dependency actions; the appeal decides intervention and final-order issues and does not construe or apply this section. opinion →
In re A.F., the opinion mentioned Section 2151.414(D) only while recounting the juvenile court's analysis below; the appellate court reviewed legal custody under Sections 2151.353 and 3109.04 and did not construe or apply Section 2151.414. opinion →
In re A.E.R., the opinion merely notes that a cited case arose from a permanent-custody award under section 2151.414; the appeal instead construes probate guardianship statutes and does not decide any issue about section 2151.414. opinion →
In re Z.C., the majority summarily affirmed the permanent-custody decision without construing section 2151.414; the only detailed discussion of the statute appears in a separate concurrence and therefore is not the court's holding. opinion →
In re H.S., the majority reversed because the agency failed to provide reasonable reunification services under sections 2151.413(D)(3)(b) and 2151.419; section 2151.414 appears only in procedural background, while the detailed twelve-of-twenty-two discussion is in a partial dissent. opinion →
In re L.M., the opinion recites section 2151.414's permanent-custody framework, but expressly notes that the parents did not challenge any findings under it; the appeal instead decides reasonable reunification efforts under section 2151.419. opinion →
In re J.W., the opinion mentions subsection (D) only while explaining that the father cited best-interest factors without developing an argument; the court expressly declined to create that argument for him. opinion →
In re T.C., the opinion addresses the separate statutory requirement for specific dependency-adjudication findings and mentions section 2151.414 only by contrast and in describing another case; it does not decide an issue under section 2151.414. opinion →
In re N.M.P., the document is only an order determining that a conflict exists and directing briefing on a statutory question; it does not decide what section 2151.414 means or how it applies. opinion →
In re M.W. Children, the opinion cites subsection (A)(2)’s timing interest while deciding a procedural due-process challenge to denial of the mother’s opportunity to testify; it does not construe or apply a requirement of section 2151.414. opinion →
In re T.J., the opinion cites subsection (E)(11) only in the father’s argument that an involuntary termination might disadvantage him in a future case; the court resolves procedural objections concerning a proposed voluntary surrender and does not decide an issue under section 2151.414. opinion →
In re J.J., the opinion cites subsection (E)(11) only in the father’s argument about a possible detriment in future cases; the court decides procedural objections regarding a proposed voluntary surrender, not the meaning or application of section 2151.414. opinion →
In re B.J., the opinion cites subsection (E)(11) only in the father’s argument about future consequences of involuntary termination; it resolves procedural issues regarding a proposed voluntary surrender and does not decide an issue under section 2151.414. opinion →
In re W.J.S., section 2151.414 appears only within Section 2151.353(F)(2)'s description of disposition orders that may be modified; the court construed Sections 2151.353 and 2151.415 governing a planned permanent living arrangement, not Section 2151.414. opinion →
In re A.G., the father did not challenge the trial court's Section 2151.414 findings, and the appellate court mentioned them only in a general record-sufficiency observation while deciding other statutory issues. opinion →
In re D.M., the Section 2151.414 findings are reported as procedural history and assignments of error; the court reversed for failure to appoint independent counsel and expressly held the statutory sufficiency and best-interest issues moot. opinion →
In re F.B., the citations only identify the statutory grounds stated in an earlier trial-court permanent-custody judgment; the appellate court decided conflict-of-interest and procedural arguments without construing section 2151.414. opinion →
In re A.C., the only Section 2151.414 issue was a claimed failure to hold the required permanent-custody hearing, but the appellants withdrew that assignment of error; the court decided only the grandparents' legal-custody challenge. opinion →
In re M.W., the opinion resolves legal custody under sections 2151.353 and 3109.04; section 2151.414 appears only in a parenthetical citation concerning the abuse-of-discretion standard. opinion →
In re M.A.S., section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) appears only in a footnote acknowledging that child wishes are a best-interest factor; the appeal decided standing, appointment of independent counsel, and guardian-ad-litem procedure rather than construing or applying the statute. opinion →
In re K.M., the opinion recited division (B)(1)(a) only as a general permanent-custody rule while this child's appeal concerned legal custody under section 2151.353; it did not apply section 2151.414 to the disposition. opinion →
In re D.M., the opinion recited division (B)(1)(a) only as a general permanent-custody rule while this child's appeal concerned legal custody under section 2151.353; it did not apply section 2151.414 to the disposition. opinion →
In re D.M., the opinion recited division (B)(1)(a) only as a general permanent-custody rule while this child's appeal concerned legal custody under section 2151.353; it did not apply section 2151.414 to the disposition. opinion →
In re A.M., the opinion recited division (B)(1)(a) only as a general permanent-custody rule while this child's appeal concerned legal custody under section 2151.353; it did not apply section 2151.414 to the disposition. opinion →
In re J.M., the opinion decides legal custody under sections 2151.353 and 3109.04; section 2151.414 appears only in a parenthetical citation about the abuse-of-discretion standard. opinion →
In re K.M. (Slip Opinion), the Supreme Court decides whether section 2151.35(B)(1)'s 90-day dispositional deadline requires dismissal; it mentions section 2151.414(A)(2)'s different 120-day rule only as a statutory contrast. opinion →
In re M.J.H., section 2151.414(D)(1) appears only in the procedural history describing the mother's objection to the magistrate; the appellate court decided legal custody and a temporary-custody extension under other statutes without construing or applying Section 2151.414. opinion →
In re E.S., section 2151.414(B)(1) appears only in procedural history describing the agency's permanent-custody motion; the appeal was resolved on service, appointment of counsel, and the adjudicatory or dispositional timetable. opinion →
In re E.S., the opinion mentioned section 2151.414 only while reporting the agency's permanent-custody allegation; the appeal decided notice and service issues concerning earlier adjudicatory and dispositional orders, not the permanent-custody statute. opinion →
In re E.S., the opinion decides whether the mother's voluntary surrender of parental rights was knowing and valid; section 2151.414 appears only in the procedural history describing the juvenile court's separate permanent-custody findings. opinion →
In re Adoption of Y.E.F. (Slip Opinion), section 2151.414 appears only to contrast juvenile-court permanent-custody proceedings with probate-court adoption proceedings; the opinion decided whether indigent parents facing private adoption are constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel. opinion →
In re D.E., the majority mentioned section 2151.414 only while describing the general best-interest focus and expressly declined to decide the statutory weight-of-evidence challenge after remanding on federal Indian Child Welfare Act grounds; the dissent's contrary merits analysis is not the court's holding. opinion →
In re K.K., the court mentioned subsection (A)(2)'s nonjurisdictional timing language only as an analogy while deciding whether a different statute, R.C. 2151.35(B)(1), imposed a jurisdictional deadline. opinion →
in re K.A., the sole assignment of error concerned the guardian ad litem's duties under R.C. 2151.281 and Superintendence Rule 48; the discussion of § 2151.414 merely supplied uncontested permanent-custody background. opinion →
In re K.M.N., section 2151.414 appears only inside section 2151.353(F)(1)'s list of statutes authorizing dispositional orders; the appeal was dismissed as moot because the child had turned eighteen, and the court did not decide anything about section 2151.414. opinion →
Madeira v. Oppenheimer, the court cited a prior case involving section 2151.414 only by analogy for the proposition that clear-and-convincing evidence can protect constitutional rights; it decided the burden under the vexatious-litigator statute, not section 2151.414. opinion →
In re K.J., the opinion recited § 2151.414 as general permanent-custody background, but the appeal was resolved on the absent transcript, untimely objections, and the aunt's lack of party status rather than any disputed meaning or application of this section. opinion →
In re K.J., the opinion recited § 2151.414 as general permanent-custody background, but the appeal was resolved on the absent transcript, untimely objections, and the aunt's lack of party status rather than any disputed meaning or application of this section. opinion →
In re Z.M., the case decided a legal-custody dispute under R.C. 2151.353 and R.C. 3109.04; it mentioned subsection 2151.414(D) only to note that some courts use its factors and that the choice of statute was immaterial. opinion →
In re W.D.K., the court cited a permanent-custody case discussing section 2151.414(D)(1) only by analogy when recommending fuller findings under the juvenile-record-sealing statute; it did not decide anything about section 2151.414. opinion →
State v. Morgan, the criminal appeal mentioned § 2151.414 only to evaluate whether a child-endangerment conviction might create a collateral consequence for mootness; it did not decide a permanent-custody issue under the statute. opinion →
In re A.L.M., the court decided legal custody under R.C. 2151.353 and R.C. 3109.04; it only noted in passing that subsection 2151.414(D)(1) contains a similar list. opinion →
In re J.S., the opinion only reports the agency’s permanent-custody allegations; the appeal was decided on service, standing, and waiver rather than any construction or application of section 2151.414. opinion →
In re J.T., section 2151.414 appears only in the opinion's report of the trial court's permanent-custody ruling; the appellate court decided solely that the mother lacked standing to assert the nonappealing father's due-process rights and did not review the statute's application. opinion →
State v. Nicholas, the criminal juvenile-bindover decision cited § 2151.414 only as an example of a statute expressly requiring clear and convincing evidence while construing a different provision's burden of proof. opinion →
State v. McBride, the criminal appeal used subsection 2151.414(B)(1) only as one example in a string cite contrasting statutes that expressly require clear and convincing evidence. opinion →
In re C Children, the only reference to section 2151.414(A)(2) appears in the procedural history of a different cited case and reports that trial court's explanation for denying a continuance; this appeal decided waiver of the right to counsel, not this statute. opinion →
In re R.G.M., section 2151.414(C) appears only inside a quotation from an earlier permanent-custody precedent; this legal-custody appeal instead held that due process required an opportunity to cross-examine the psychologist whose report the trial court relied upon. opinion →
In re A.S., the mother cited section 2151.414(D) factors in challenging an award of legal custody, but the court applied the legal-custody standard and section 3109.04(F), without construing or adopting section 2151.414. opinion →
In re Adoption of M.L.M., the adoption appeal cited Section 2151.414 only as an example showing that a child's best interest is relevant in juvenile custody law; the court decided ripeness and the statutory need for parental consent, not the meaning or application of Section 2151.414. opinion →
In re J.R., the opinion only reported the juvenile court's findings under Section 2151.414; the father's appeal raised ineffective assistance concerning his absence from trial and did not challenge the permanent-custody findings or require the appellate court to construe or apply this statute. opinion →
In re S.M., the court decided a legal-custody appeal under R.C. 2151.353(A)(3); it mentioned R.C. 2151.414 only as one of several possible sources of best-interest guidance and to contrast permanent-custody predicates, without construing or applying a particular provision. opinion →
In re J.H., the opinion decided a father's challenge to temporary- and legal-custody rulings; it cited section 2151.414 only parenthetically as authority for an abuse-of-discretion standard and did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
In re B.H., the opinion merely identifies section 2151.414 as governing termination of parental rights; the appeal concerned the mother's right to appointed counsel and did not review or construe the statutory permanent-custody standards. opinion →
In re J.C., the mother's argument invoked Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d) to challenge denial of a grandmother's legal-custody request, but the appellate court did not reach that statutory argument because the mother lacked standing. opinion →
In re Baby Girl O., the court decided under R.C. 2151.419(A)(2)(e) that prior involuntary termination as to a sibling relieved the agency of reasonable reunification efforts; section 2151.414 appeared only as one statute referenced by that separate provision and as a general clear-and-convincing-evidence citation. opinion →
In re T.M., the appeal concerned the validity of a father's consent and ineffective assistance under the juvenile rules; section 2151.414 was mentioned only to identify the agency's permanent-custody motion and was not construed or applied. opinion →
In re L.C., the opinion recites the magistrate's findings under sections 2151.414(B), (D), and (E) as procedural background; the appellate holdings concerned ineffective assistance and failure to appoint the mother a guardian ad litem, not the statutory permanent-custody standards. opinion →
In re E.H.-B., the appeal was limited to a reasonable-efforts bypass under section 2151.419(A); the opinion mentioned sections 2151.414(D)(1) and (E) only as the unchallenged framework for an initial permanent-custody disposition and did not construe or apply them. opinion →
In re S.W., the appeal concerned temporary custody and ineffective assistance; section 2151.414 appeared only in a quoted discussion distinguishing the appellate review standard for permanent-custody judgments and was not applied to the rulings at issue. opinion →
In re B.M., the appellate court decided whether counsel was ineffective for failing to seek an extension under Section 2151.415; Section 2151.414 appeared only in reporting the trial court's underlying placement finding. opinion →
In re J.K-S., the opinion reported the juvenile court's Section 2151.414 findings, but the father did not contest any of them; the appellate court expressly confined its decision to the Kinship Caregiver Act and held that issue moot. opinion →
In re J.K., the sole issue was ineffective assistance for failing to seek a temporary-custody extension under section 2151.415(D)(1) and Juv.R. 14; the section 2151.414 findings were recited as background to the prejudice analysis rather than independently construed or reviewed. opinion →
In re R.G.M., the opinion cites section 2151.414 only as a comparison while construing the different procedures and rights applicable to legal-custody dispositions under section 2151.42(B). opinion →
In re G.H., the appeal concerned objections to a magistrate's legal-custody ruling; section 2151.414 appeared only in a footnote correcting the mother's mistaken statement of the appellate standard for permanent-custody cases and was not applied. opinion →
In re L.M., the parents raised a Section 2151.414 best-interest challenge, but the appellate court reversed on an Indian Child Welfare Act inquiry error and expressly declined to address the statutory permanent-custody arguments as premature. opinion →
In re O.P., the sole appellate issue was whether denial of a continuance violated the incarcerated mother's due-process rights; section 2151.414 appeared only as the general permanent-custody standard and in the reported trial-court findings, without independent statutory analysis. opinion →
In re B.R., the opinion mentions the trial court's failure to state the statutory permanent-custody findings, but reverses solely because a post-hearing report was admitted and relied on without an opportunity to respond; it does not decide a claim construing or applying section 2151.414. opinion →
In re J.L., the opinion mentions R.C. 2151.414 only in a parenthetical explaining the scope of R.C. 2151.419’s reasonable-efforts requirement; it resolves the appeal under R.C. 2151.419(A)(2)(e)’s bypass provision rather than deciding anything about R.C. 2151.414. opinion →
In re S.T., the opinion recites R.C. 2151.414(D) factors as possible guidance in a legal-custody dispute, but reverses solely because the juvenile court improperly refused to hear new evidence under Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d), without deciding the statutory-factor issue. opinion →
In re C.H., the section appears only in an assignment of error challenging the timing and merits of permanent custody; the court reversed for failure to await a transcript and expressly held the statutory issues moot. opinion →
In re N.C., the statute appears only in procedural history describing the alternative grounds alleged in the permanent-custody motion; the appeal instead decides the constitutional requirements for accepting a parent's waiver and stipulation. opinion →
In re A.K., the opinion concerns an abuse, neglect, or dependency adjudication under R.C. 2151.35; it cites Section 2151.414 only by analogy for the appellate standard of review and decides nothing about the permanent-custody statute. opinion →
In re K.C., the appeal concerns intervention, kinship-caregiver status, and foster placement; Section 2151.414(D) appears only in a string of possible sources courts have consulted for general best-interest principles and is not applied to decide the appeal. opinion →
In re N.A., section 2151.414 appears only within the quoted jurisdiction-retention language of section 2151.353(F)(1); the opinion construes the latter statute and does not decide anything about section 2151.414. opinion →
In re J.C., section 2151.414(E)(1) appears only in the appellant's assignment of error; the court resolves reasonable efforts under section 2151.419 based on abandonment and does not construe or apply section 2151.414. opinion →
In re B.D., the appeal raised whether the twelve-of-twenty-two-month calculation could include custody time from prior dismissed cases, but the court expressly declined to reach the statutory merits because the father had not preserved the issue; treating the trial court's calculation as approved would misstate the holding. opinion →
In re A.S., the opinion recites the permanent-custody framework, but the father's appellate issues concern appointment and cross-examination of a guardian ad litem under other law; the court does not decide the meaning or application of Section 2151.414. opinion →
In re S.B., the opinion cites section 2151.414 only to distinguish appellate review of permanent-custody proceedings from the domestic-relations custody standard at issue; it does not decide anything about section 2151.414. opinion →
In re K.M.H., the only reference reports that the magistrate considered subsection (D)(1) alongside another statute; the appellate court decides plain error in a legal-custody award and does not itself construe or apply section 2151.414. opinion →
In re K.J., the opinion mentions R.C. 2151.414 only while reporting the juvenile court's permanent-custody findings; the appellate issue and holding concern whether the mother validly waived her right to counsel when counsel withdrew, not the statute's meaning or application. opinion →
In Re Moore, the § 2151.414(D)(2) discussion is quoted from another court. This court’s decision concerns whether the children’s right to counsel required an investigation. opinion →
In Re Amber G., Unpublished Decision (10-22-2004), the opinion reports the trial court's finding under § 2151.414; the appellate court decides whether failure to appoint a guardian ad litem prejudiced the mother. opinion →
Holloway v. Sally Brush Clermont County, Ohio, the references to § 2151.414(C) appear in a dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
In re J.H., the court decided a legal custody dispute and cited § 2151.414(D)(1) only as guidance; it did not decide that section’s rules for permanent custody. opinion →
In the Matter of Layne, Unpublished Decision (6-25-2001), the court decides whether psychologist-patient privilege permits disclosure in a permanent custody proceeding; it does not decide a rule of § 2151.414. opinion →
In Re Williams, Unpublished Decision (6-11-2002), the court decides whether to uphold an award of legal custody and mentions § 2151.414 only as a comparison to permanent custody. opinion →
In Re F.M., Unpublished Decision (8-1-2002), the court decides the standard for temporary no contact orders under R.C. 2151.33 and Juv.R. 13; it mentions § 2151.414 only as a comparison to permanent termination. opinion →
In re C.C., the court decided a legal custody appeal and mentioned § 2151.414(D) only as guidance from the permanent custody statute. opinion →
In re P.T., the court decided a legal custody appeal under R.C. 2151.353 and cited § 2151.414(D)(1) only as possible guidance; it did not decide that section's own rules. opinion →
In re S.D., the court decided legal custody and cited § 2151.414(D)'s permanent custody factors only as guidance; it did not decide a rule of that section. opinion →
In re J.B., the court decided a legal custody issue and cited § 2151.414(D) as guidance; it did not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
In re E.H., the court reviewed a legal-custody decision under R.C. 2151.42 and cited § 2151.414(D) as a source of best-interest factors; it did not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
In re K.A., the court borrowed Section 2151.414’s best interest factors to review an award of legal custody; it did not decide a rule governing permanent custody under this section. opinion →
In re L.P., the court decided a legal custody appeal and mentioned § 2151.414(D) as guidance; it did not decide a rule under that section. opinion →
In re C.C., the court cites the permanent custody factors as guidance for a legal custody decision; it does not decide a rule of § 2151.414. opinion →
In re A.C., the court decided legal custody and mentioned the permanent custody test only as possible guidance; it did not decide a rule under § 2151.414. opinion →
In re M.T., the court used the section’s best-interest factors as guidance for a legal-custody decision; it did not decide a rule governing permanent custody under § 2151.414. opinion →
In re M.F., the court decided the timing issue under R.C. 2151.353(F)(2), without deciding a rule of § 2151.414. opinion →
In re M.G., the court used § 2151.414(D) factors as guidance in a legal custody decision; it did not decide the section’s own rules. opinion →
In re E.Z.-S., the court mentions § 2151.414(D) as a possible source of best-interest factors while deciding legal custody under § 2151.353; it does not decide a rule of § 2151.414. opinion →
In re B.H., the court cites the section’s best-interest factors as guidance when reviewing an award of legal custody. opinion →
In re A.H., the court cited the section’s permanent-custody factors as guidance while affirming an award of legal custody. opinion →
In re I.E., the court cites the section’s best-interest factors as guidance when reviewing a legal-custody decision under R.C. 2151.42. opinion →
In re N.C., the court considered the section’s permanent custody factors as guidance when reviewing a legal custody decision under R.C. 2151.42. opinion →
In re D.H., the court lists the section’s permanent-custody factors as possible guidance while reviewing an award of legal custody. opinion →
In re Q.S., the court cites Section 2151.414(D)(1) as a possible guide when reviewing a temporary custody decision under Section 2151.353. opinion →
In re E.S., the court cites Section 2151.414(D)(1) as a source of best-interest factors for a legal-custody modification under Section 2151.42. opinion →
In re S.S., the court cites the section’s permanent custody factors to explain the different standard governing a request for legal custody. opinion →
In re L.S., the court mentions the section’s best-interest factors while affirming a visitation modification without deciding a rule of the permanent custody statute. opinion →
In re M.G., the court cites the section’s permanent custody factors as guidance when deciding a legal custody dispute. opinion →
In re J.R., the court cites the section’s best-interest factors as guidance for a legal-custody decision. opinion →
In re J.B., the court cites the section’s best-interest factors as guidance for a legal custody modification governed by R.C. 2151.42. opinion →
In re A.M., the court mentions the section as the source of the best interests analysis while deciding whether the evidence supported a dependency finding. opinion →
In re Z.T., the court cites the section’s permanent-custody factors as guidance when reviewing an award of legal custody to Mother. opinion →

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