Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3937.18

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage to be offered in motor-vehicle liability policies, but it does not require stacking when the policy clearly excludes stacked coverage.

Ray v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 1974-06-14(A)

Ohio Revised Code Section 3937.18, which became effective in 1965, requires insurance carriers to offer uninsured motorist coverage in every motor vehicle liability policy issued. ... Curran states that an insured could collect from two policies where the coverages were “available to him.” We take this to mean that absent an effective exclusion of some sort, “stacking” is permitted. That is not the case here, however, as the policies clearly defined the limits of coverage not to include “stacking” when the insured was occupying an owned, but not described, vehicle. ... We conclude, therefore, that the clear language of the policies excluded the possibility of “stacking” the uninsured motorist coverages, and that those exclusions are effective under Ohio law.

Section 3937.18 requires automobile liability policies to provide uninsured-motorist coverage for insured persons legally entitled to recover from operators of uninsured vehicles, but it does not require coverage for damages exceeding an insured tortfeasor's policy limits.

Shelby Mutual Insurance v. Smith · filed 1976-01-28(A)

“Appellants’ position is that when the tortfeasor’s insurance is exhausted, he becomes “uninsured” as to any remaining damages left unpaid. In effect, appellants ask this court to find “uninsured” to be synonymous with “underinsured.” While this might be a commendable result of appropriate legislation, the plain language of R. C. 3937.18 does not support appellants’ position. ... Since Carl Couch had liability insurance coverage, and that coverage met the requirements of R. C. 4509.20, the court finds that R. C. 3937.18 does not require appellants’ own uninsured motorist insurance to cover the damages left unpaid when the tortfeasor’s insurance is exhausted.”

Section 3937.18 mandates an insurer's offering of uninsured-motorist coverage and does not cover a policy's medical-payments provision.

Katanik v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1982-10-28

Appellant misconstrues the meaning of R.C. 3937.18 which is entitled “Mandatory offering of uninsured motorist coverage,” in Page’s Ohio Revised Code Annotated. Clearly, the title of said statute demonstrates that it applies to the uninsured motorist provision of an insurance policy, and appellee fulfilled the statutory mandate when it paid appellant $80,000 pursuant to the uninsured motorist provision in the deceased’s policy. The Med-Pay provision, however, is an entirely different matter, not covered by R.C. 3937.18 as appellant urges.

Section 3937.18(A) generally guarantees an opportunity to buy uninsured-motorist coverage up to the liability limits, while former division (E) allows insurers to bar stacking and limit recovery to the highest limit under one policy.

Karabin v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance · filed 1984-04-25(A), (E)

Division (A) sets forth the general policy guaranteeing that an insured will be afforded the opportunity to purchase uninsured motorist coverage in an amount up to his liability limits. Division (E) provides a specific modification, permitting insurers to confine their liability to the limits of a single policy.

At the time of this 1978 accident, § 3937.18 barred an insurer from using an “other insurance” clause to avoid or proportionally limit uninsured-motorist liability when the insured had other similar coverage; the later 1980 amendment permitting anti-stacking terms did not apply.

Karam v. Allstate Insurance Co. · filed 1985-10-01

“Where an insurer provides uninsured motorist protection, as required by R.C. 3937.18, it may not avoid indemnification of its insured under that coverage by including in the insurance contract an ‘other insurance’ clause, which, if applied, would relieve the insurer from liability in circumstances where the insured has other similar insurance available to him from which he could be indemnified. Such an uninsured motorist coverage limitation is repugnant to the statute.” ... Notwithstanding, the decision in Curran was based on a broad construction of R.C. 3937.18 with the purpose of protecting persons injured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages. In Curran, the court did not limit its holding to those “other insurance” clauses which relieved a company of liability. ... It is noted that R.C. 3937.18 was subsequently amended effective 1980 (see 138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1458, 1459) to allow terms and conditions that preclude stacking. Nevertheless, this action arose in 1978 prior to the amendment and is therefore determined by the law in effect at that time.

Section 3937.18 requires excess liability insurance to comport with its uninsured-motorist-coverage requirement because the statute makes no exception for excess coverage.

Duriak v. Globe American Casualty Co. · filed 1986-12-24(A)

“Clearly, under the express terms of R.C. 3937.18, no exception is made with respect to excess insurance coverage. If the legislature desires to exempt excess liability carriers, they are free to do so. In the meantime, however, we are compelled to hold that excess liability insurance must comport with R.C. 3937.18.”

Section 3937.18 does not require a UM/UIM policy to be set off by amounts available under another applicable uninsured-motorist policy, though it does not prohibit a policy from requiring that setoff.

Harris v. Allstate Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (4-5-2005) · filed 2005-04-05

Therein, we analyzed similar language in R.C. 3937.18 and determined it does not require a UM/UIM policy be set-off by amounts available under any other applicable uninsured motorist policy.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured motorist coverage to protect insured persons legally entitled to recover from uninsured motorists and prevents an insurer from avoiding that coverage through an other insurance clause when the insured has other similar insurance available.

Repasy v. Nationwide Insurance · filed 1980-02-07

“R. C. 3937.18 itself indicates that uninsured motorist coverage is ‘for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles***.’ ... “Given this express statutory purpose, we are of the opinion that the uninsured motorist statute should be construed liberally in order to effectuate the legislative purpose that coverage be provided to persons injured through the acts of uninsured motorists. To permit an insurer, who provides uninsured motorist coverage, to avoid liability by an ‘other insurance’ clause in cases where other insurance is available to his insured would thwart that legislative intent. We therefore join those jurisdictions which have declined to give effect to ‘other insurance’ clauses in such cases. ... “Thus, where an insurer provides uninsured motorist protection, as required by R. C. 3937.18, it may not avoid indemnification of its insured under that coverage by including in the insurance contract an ‘other insurance’ clause, which, if applied, would relieve the insurer from liability in circumstances where the insured has other similar insurance available to him from which he could be indemnified.”

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist bodily-injury coverage to include related hospital and medical expenses and bars reducing the statutory coverage limit by excluding those expenses.

Kinkead v. Buckeye Union Ins. · filed 1970-03-13

We hold that under R. C. 3937.18 the coverage for bodily injury under which plaintiff might recover a verdict *210for damages from an uninsured motorist would be broad enough to include damages not only for pain and suffering but for related consequential items of damages of insured, such as for hospital and medical expenses necessitated by the accident. In writing the details of the coverage concerning Protection Against Uninsured Motorists, Part IV herein, the defendant insurance company may not reduce the $10,000.00 coverage as damages for bodily injury by excluding therefrom related damages of the insured such as his hospital and medical expenses caused by the accident.

Section 3937.18 requires automobile policies to provide uninsured-motorist coverage for bodily injuries caused by uninsured motorists, but does not require the extra hit-and-run coverage at issue.

Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Reddick · filed 1974-03-06

Each of those cases involved policy provisions implementing the statutorily mandated uninsured motorist coverage and purporting to limit the coverage in some manner clearly contrary to the statute. In the present case, the “hit-and-run” coverage provided by the insurer represents an extension of coverage beyond that required by the statute, as R. C. 3937.18 requires coverage only for injuries caused by uninsured motorists.

Section 3937.18(A) requires uninsured-motorist coverage for persons insured under the liability policy, so an exclusion for injury while occupying an owned motor vehicle not named in that policy does not violate the statute.

Cox v. United States Fire Ins. · filed 1974-08-27(A)

An examination of its language indicates that the uninsured motorists coverage required by It. C. 3937.18 is “* * * for the protection of persons insured thereunder # * with “thereunder” referring to the liability policy coverage. It is clear that the injured person in this case could not claim liability coverage while riding his own motorcycle through a policy which named only his Dodge Dart automobile. The public policy manifested by the language of It. C. 3937.18 requires that he be no more an “insured” for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage than for purposes of liability coverage as to an owned motor vehicle not named in the policy. The exclusion in question does not, therefore, conflict with the public policy manifested by the legislation.

Section 3937.18(A) requires uninsured-motorist coverage only when a claim is uncompensated because the tortfeasor lacks liability insurance, not when recovery is barred by substantive immunity law.

York v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 1980-12-23(A)

The intent and thrust of R. C. 3937.18 is not to provide coverage in all situations that might otherwise go uncompensated; rather, the uninsured motorist provision applies only when there is a lack of liability insurance. The insurance policy, and more importantly the statute, are not implemented when there is a lack of liability due to immunity.

Section 3937.18(A) requires uninsured-motorist coverage to protect insured persons legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles for bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death.

Kish v. Central National Insurance Group · filed 1981-07-01(A)

We conclude that uninsured motorist coverage provides additional protection to an insured. The relevant inquiry under the provisions of an uninsured motorist policy is not whether the third-party tortfeasor could have made a successful claim against his own liability insurer if he had been insured. Instead, the question is to be framed in the language of the statute: whether the insured is “legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom.” The insurability vel non of the tortfeasor’s conduct is immaterial if the injuries caused by the tortfeasor otherwise fall within the statutory definition. Thus, we adopt the rationale of Saylor and hold that the claim of an insured under the uninsured motorist provisions of an insurance policy may not be denied solely on the basis that the injury sustained by the insured was intentionally inflicted by another.

Section 3937.18 does not require an insurer to offer uninsured-motorist coverage for claimants who were "upon" the insured vehicle, although the insurer may contract to provide that protection.

Halterman v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1981-07-02

R.C. 3937.18 does not mandate that Motorists Mutual offer within its policy an uninsured motorist clause that would insure those claimants who were “upon” the insured vehicle.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage to protect insured persons from losses caused by negligent uninsured motorists, not uninsured vehicles.

Watson v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co. · filed 1988-12-30(A)(1)

While there is no question that R.C. 3937.18 should be liberally construed, it must be construed “to effectuate the legislative purpose that coverage be provided to persons injured through the acts of uninsured motorists.” Curran v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co. (1971), 25 Ohio St. 2d 33, 38, 54 O.O. 2d 166, 169, 266 N.E. 2d 566, 569. The statute was designed to provide protection against the negligence of individuals, not inert machines.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) mandates uninsured-motorist coverage for insured persons legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles, but does not require coverage for bicycle-pedestrian accidents arising solely from bicycle use.

Haynes v. Lock · filed 1998-05-18(A)(1)

Contrary to plaintiffs argument, R.C. 3937.18, the uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance coverage statute, relies on the same definitions. R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) mandates that “uninsured motorist coverage * * * shall provide protection for bodily injury or death * * * for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operations of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, suffered by any person insured under the policy. * * *” (Emphasis added.) It does not mandate such coverage for “bicycles.”

Section 3937.18(A)(2) permits an insurer to limit underinsured-motorist coverage to claims for bodily injury, sickness, death, or disease suffered by an insured under the policy.

Johnson v. American Family Insurance · filed 2005-04-15(A)(2)

In other words, although referring only to amended R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) (uninsured motorist coverage), the legislature specifically declared its intent in the comment to also permit insurance companies to limit coverage for UIM claims to only insureds who suffered bodily injury, death, or disease. Therefore, the Sexton and Moore cases became inapplicable to automatically negate policy language that limited UIM coverage to only those claims that were for bodily injuries to an insured.

Section 3937.18 permits an insurer to limit uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage to cases in which an insured suffers bodily injury, including death.

Johnson v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. · filed 2011-12-15

“R.C. 3937.18 governs uninsured/underinsured recovery in Ohio. The statute has evolved over the years, but under the current version, an insurance company may limit uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage to instances where an insured has suffered bodily injury, including death.”

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured motorist coverage for injuries resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured vehicle, even when the vehicle does not physically strike the insured.

Miller v. Rollins Leasing Corp., Unpublished Decision (9-23-1999) · filed 1999-09-23

Here, on the other hand, the chain of events resulting in the accident which caused appellant's injuries was not broken by any event unrelated to the use of the trailer. Loading, transporting, and unloading freight are all components of a freight trailer's use. Here, appellant alleges that her injuries resulted from PetsMart's negligent acts related to loading thetrailer at the warehouse and/or from PetsMart's ordering her tounload the trailer after being informed of its dangerous condition. In either case, PetsMart's alleged liability is related to its use (or more accurately, misuse) of the trailer in hauling its freight. Thus, we do not see how the freight falling in the trailer here can be considered an intervening event unrelated to the uninsured vehicle's use.

Section 3937.18 does not provide uninsured motorist coverage for injuries caused by a fully insured motorist.

Ncs Healthcare, Inc. v. Brinkman, Unpublished Decision (11-3-2004) · filed 2004-11-03

In the case of uninsured motorist coverage, the insurer assumes the risk faced by the insured that a tortfeasor will be incapable of compensating the insured for the harm that tortfeasor has caused. See R.C. 3937.18. That is, the insurer steps into the role of the uninsured tortfeasor. It defies reason to say that the insurer on an uninsured motorist policy may be brought to account for the tortious conduct of a fully insured motorist; these are mutually exclusive things.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage equal to the damages the insured could legally recover from the uninsured motorist, so the insurer may not reduce that coverage by workers’ compensation benefits.

Bartlett v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1972-01-18

We conclude that R. C. 3937.18 requires coverage affording to the insured payment thereunder in an amount equal to the amount of damages he would legally be entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle within limits as set forth in R. C. 4509.20,. Accordingly, the policy provision for deduction of the workmen’s compensation benefits received is invalid because it does not provide the coverage required by R. C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage for the protection of persons insured under the policy, while allowing policy limitations that are not repugnant to the statute.

Buckeye Union Insurance v. Bradley · filed 1972-05-31

Finally and in summary, the court in a given case determines whether the policy coverage is repugnant to the statute, as was done in Curran v. State Automobile Insurance Company, 25 Ohio St. 2d 33, paragraph 1 of the syllabus. ... As observed by the court in the Curran case at page 38, the coverage required by the statute is “for the protection of persons insured thereunder. * * *” ... Based on the foregoing authorities, this court concludes that (1) defendant is not a person insured under the present facts and policy, and (2) no coverage is afforded while operating a government vehicle furnished for his regular use in connection with his employment with the Post Office Department.

Section 3937.18 requires minimum uninsured-motorist coverage but does not require coverages for multiple vehicles under one policy to be stacked.

Weemhoff v. Cincinnati Insurance · filed 1975-03-26

The dictates of that section, and public policy, are satisfied when the minimum limits mandated by E. C. 4509.20 are provided, and we find no provision within E. C. 3937.18 requiring coverages in one insurance policy to be compounded if more than one vehicle is afforded uninsured motorist protection.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) requires uninsured-motorist coverage to protect insured persons legally entitled to recover damages for bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death caused by an uninsured motor vehicle.

In re Estate of Reeck · filed 1986-01-22(A)(1)

Having carefully considered the uninsured motorist statute, the language of the insurance policy and the case law in this and other jurisdictions, we find that the proceeds of a settlement agreement reached pursuant to the uninsured motorist provision of the policy represent damages caused by a negligent and uninsured motorist. In the case of the death of an insured, the settlement proceeds under an uninsured motorist provision are to be distributed among those persons who are entitled by statute to bring a wrongful death action.

Section 3937.18 bars an insurer from offsetting medical-payments coverage against amounts owed under uninsured-motorist coverage, even when the policy includes a subrogation clause.

Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Lindsey · filed 1986-02-19

But an insurance policy clause which provides to the insurer a contractual right of subrogation as to payments made under the medical payments portion of the policy does not enable the insurer to avoid obligations it incurs pursuant to the uninsured motorist provisions of the same insurance policy. Thus, even where the policy provides for subrogation as to payments made as medical payments coverage, a contract provision which would, in essence, enable the insurer to set off such medical payments against amounts due to the insured pursuant to uninsured motorist coverage is void as in derogation of the public policy and purpose underlying R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 requires automobile policies to provide uninsured- and underinsured-motorist coverage, but does not require coverage for injuries caused by unidentified motorists.

State Automobile Mutual Insurance v. Rowe · filed 1986-12-24(A)

Given a literal reading, the terms of R.C. 3937.18 mandate only that coverage be extended for injuries caused by identified uninsured (and underinsured) motorists. While public policy may require that insurers provide coverage to insureds who are injured by hit-and-run motorists, R.C. 3937.18 does not require coverage for injuries caused by unidentified motorists. Therefore, because the insurance policy in this case provided, in addition to the basic mandated uninsured coverage, coverage for injuries caused by an unidentified motorist, the policy actually provided more protection than that required by statute. The “physical contact” limitation set forth in the hit-and-run clause is, therefore, neither a violation of R.C. 3937.18 nor of public policy.

Section 3937.18 does not require insurers to offer uninsured-motorist coverage for hit-and-run drivers, so an insurer may attach restrictions to such coverage.

Drage v. Mantifel · filed 1988-05-16

The Drages’ argument that the contact requirement contravenes R.C. 3937.18 is clearly foreclosed by Travelers and its progeny. If public policy does not demand that an insurer provide any hit-and-run protection at all, we see no reason why an insurer may not attach restrictions to coverage it chooses to offer.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) requires uninsured-motorist coverage for losses caused by uninsured operators, so an insurer may not exclude government-owned vehicles in a way that curtails that coverage.

Parrish v. Mid-American Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 1989-05-12(A)(1)

It is apparent that exclusion of government-owned vehicles from the policy definitions of “uninsured vehicle” is at odds with the statutory purpose of R.C. 3937.18 by curtailing the insurance coverage required to be afforded by that statute.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage to be analyzed based on the tortfeasor’s insured status, rather than the status of the vehicle.

Rowe v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1990-01-12

However, we disagree with State Farm’s application of R.C. 3937.18, the statute governing uninsured motorist coverage. This is because R.C. 3937.18 requires an analysis of the tortfeasor’s insured status rather than the vehicle’s status.

Section 3937.18 permits an unambiguous physical-contact limitation in a liability policy's hit-and-run uninsured-motorist clause.

Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brandenburg · filed 1990-04-18

We find that Rowe, which involved a non- contact collision, stands only for the proposition that when it is unambiguous, a "physical contact" limitation in a liability policy's hit-and-run clause violates neither R.C. 3937.18 nor public policy.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage for an insured legally entitled to recover damages from an uninsured motor vehicle, but a claim rejected because the claimant's injuries do not satisfy another state's tort threshold is not a denial of coverage that makes the vehicle uninsured.

Kurent v. Farmers Insurance of Columbus, Inc. · filed 1990-06-29(A), (D)

These provisions are in accordance with Ohio's statutory requirements and limitation as prescribed by R.C. 3937.18 (A) and (D). Accordingly, uninsured motorist coverage is available to the Kurents only if they are "legally entitled to recover" as contemplated by Ohio's laws and the insurance policy. ... This brief description of the operating structure of the Michigan no-fault system, when applied to the circumstances surrounding the Kurents' claim, leads to the conclusion that the Kurents are not legally entitled to recover from the Michigan tortfeasor and therefore do not have uninsured motorist benefits available to them. ... Second, the Kurents were not denied coverage by AAA, the Michigan tortfeasor's insurer, rather AAA refused any liability for the Kurents' claim because the Kurents' injuries were not sufficiently serious to satisfy the threshold requirement for recovery in tort for non-economic damages under Michigan law. ... In short, the Kurents' claim was rejected not because of insufficient insurance coverage, but rather because of insufficient injuries.

Section 3937.18(C) allows an insured to reject uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, and after rejection the insurer need not reoffer it at renewal unless the insured requests it in writing.

Estate of Cavanaugh v. Ohio Casualty Group · filed 1990-08-01(C)

R.C. 3937.18(C) specifically provides that an insured may reject or accept the mandatory offer of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. If rejected, upon renewal of the policy the insurer is not required to re-offer the coverage nor to include such coverage in the renewal unless the insured specifically requests in writing that such be added to the policy.

Section 3937.18(A) requires an excess liability umbrella policy covering liability from the use of a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in Ohio to provide uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.

Krstich v. United Services Automobile Ass'n · filed 1991-06-10(A)

With regard to the issue of whether an excess liability umbrella policy such as the one at issue here must offer uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, the Ohio statute could fairly be read to apply to the umbrella policy in the case at bar. By its own language, the policy at issue here protects the insured against any liability which may be imposed upon him resulting from his operation of a motor vehicle.

Under subsection (C), selecting some vehicles for uninsured-motorist coverage does not expressly reject coverage for other covered vehicles; the insurer must prove an express rejection.

Westfield Insurance v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1993-12-17(C)

We disagree. We think Westfield is correct that express acceptance of such coverage for certain vehicles is not relevant to the issue. A listing of certain vehicles for uninsured motorist coverage is merely an acceptance of uninsured motorist coverage for those particular vehicles, not an express rejection of such coverage for any other type of vehicle covered under West Carrollton’s fleet insurance policy. Instead, we believe Nationwide has the burden to show an express rejection of uninsured motorist coverage for any auto for which coverage was offered or described in the language of both the application and policy. See R.C. 3937.18(C).

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage and makes a contractual limitation period invalid when it expires before or shortly after the insured's right to that coverage accrues; when insolvency triggers coverage, accrual occurs upon notice of insolvency.

Kraly v. Vannewkirk · filed 1994-07-27(A), (D)

It is therefore our further determination that the validity of a contractual period of limitations governing a civil action brought pursuant to the contract is contingent upon the commencement of the limitations period on the date that the right of action arising from the contractual obligation accrues. Where the liability insurer of a tortfeasor has been declared insolvent, a right of action of an insured injured by the tortfeasor against his insurer under the uninsured motorist provision of his automobile insurance contract accrues on the date that the insured receives notice of the insolvency. Accordingly, a provision in a contract of insurance which purports to extinguish a claim for uninsured motorist coverage by establishing a limitations period which expires before or shortly after the accrual of the right of action for such coverage is per se unreasonable and violative of the public policy of the state of Ohio as embodied in R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) requires automobile liability policies to provide uninsured-motorist coverage for insured persons legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles, and it bars making physical contact an absolute prerequisite to recovery when admissible corroborative evidence exists.

Girgis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1996-03-06(A)(1)

Thus, to the extent that admissible corroborative evidence was available, we modify Reddick, Yurista and Rowe, and find that R.C. 3937.18 and public policy preclude contract provisions in insurance policies from requiring physical contact *307as an absolute prerequisite to recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage provision.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) mandates uninsured-motorist coverage for persons insured under the policy who are legally entitled to recover damages from uninsured motorists.

Harris v. Mid-Century Insurance · filed 1996-05-30(A)(1)

If the claimant is an insured under a policy with UM coverage, is injured by an uninsured motorist, and has a claim recognized by Ohio tort law, R.C. 3937.18 mandates coverage. ... Furthermore, while R.C. 3937.18 requires that UM coverage follow the insured and not the vehicle, it requires UM coverage only for persons insured under the policy. By definition, Shawna Harris was not an insured person under the Paynes’ insurance policy nor does public policy or R.C. 3937.18 demand that UM coverage be provided in such cases.

Section 3937.18(G)(2) validates intrafamily antistacking provisions that prevent an insured from aggregating uninsured-motorist limits under multiple policies.

Donovan v. State Farm Automobile Insurance · filed 1995-07-31(G)(2)

Assuming arguendo that the appellants’ settlement constituted an exhaustion of the $300,000 limit under Bogan, 36 Ohio St.3d 22, 521 N.E.2d 447, paragraph two of the syllabus, therefore permitting them to seek excess uninsured motorist coverage, it is undisputed that the limits of the uninsured motorist coverage are identical ($300,000 each), and both contain intrafamily antistacking provisions that are valid under both the holding of Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 620 N.E.2d 809, paragraph two of the syllabus, and the recently enacted S.B. 20, codified at R.C. 3937.18(G)(2) (effective 10-20-94).

Section 3937.18(C) requires a rejection of uninsured-motorist coverage by the named insured or an authorized agent; without an express rejection, subsection (A) provides coverage by operation of law at limits equal to the liability coverage.

Owens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1996-06-28(C), (A)

As a result of the above analysis, we find that the rejection form signed by Janet Owens did not effectuate a rejection of UM coverage by the named insured as R.C. 3937.18(C) requires. It follows then that in the absence of Stephen Owens’s express rejection, he was provided UM coverage by operation of law pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(A) in amounts equal to his liability limits.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) is remedial and requires uninsured-motorist coverage provisions to be construed liberally, invalidating a policy term that denies a separate per-person limit for a covered loss-of-consortium claim.

Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co. · filed 1996-09-04(A)(1)

Furthermore, since R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) is remedial legislation, it must be liberally construed in order to effectuate the legislative purpose. ... An insurance policy provision will be deemed unenforceable if the provision is contrary to the statute and its purpose. ... Therefore, we hold that each person who is covered by an uninsured motorist policy and who is asserting a claim for loss of consortium has a separate claim subject to a separate per person policy limit. A provision in an insurance policy which reaches a contrary result is unenforceable.

Section 3937.18(G) permits an insurer to include an antistacking provision, but the provision is narrowly construed and must be clear, conspicuous, and unambiguous in the context of its interaction with other policies.

Lovejoy v. Westfield National Insurance · filed 1996-12-18(G)

It is settled law in Ohio that R.C. 3937.18(G) allows insurance companies to provide antistacking language in insurance policies. The courts are not so settled, however, on the construction of the statute and its application to specific antistacking language. As the court noted in Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 505, 620 N.E.2d 809, 813, “[o]ur discomfort is rooted in a concern that liability insurers are collecting multiple premiums for multiple policies, while limiting recovery by antistacking language — the import of which is not known or understood by the insured consumer until tragedy strikes.” Policy considerations have led Ohio courts to construe R.C. 3937.18(G) narrowly. Id. ... Antistacking language must not only be clear, conspicuous and unambiguous within the confines of an individual policy, but also within the context of a foreseeable interaction with other policies, especially where multiple policies are issued by the same agency. ... In reviewing antistacking language, not only must the language be clear, conspicuous, and unambiguous, but the intent and understanding of the parties must also be clear. The ordinary meaning of the language used in these policies clearly does not offer an answer as to the clear intent of both parties. Because appellants failed to set forth any justification for the collection of premiums on a policy which it now contends was a similar policy, it would be contrary to public policy interests for the court to construe the antistacking language in a manner that would serve to provide no benefit to the consumer. Therefore, it can only be concluded that the trial court properly determined that the separate UMC provisions could not be construed as similar provisions.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) permits uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage to be limited by the policy limits chosen by the insured and is not unconstitutional under the challenges presented.

Beagle v. Walden · filed 1997-03-26(A)(2)

Insureds purchase their levels of protection. If an insured purchases uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of $100,000 per accident and $300,000 per occurrence, the insured is guaranteed total recovery for an accident up to those policy limits, regardless of the tortfeasor’s insurance status. If the insured purchases higher or lower policy limits, those limits will dictate the total recovery available stemming from an accident with an uninsured or underinsured tortfeasor.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage for a claimant who is an insured under a policy providing that coverage, is injured by an uninsured motorist, and has a claim recognized by Ohio tort law, but it does not require coverage for a person who is not an insured under the policy.

Critelli v. TIG Insurance · filed 1997-10-15

Affirming its holding in State Farm Auto. Ins. v. Alexander (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 397, 583 N.E.2d 309, the Supreme Court stated that R.C. 3937.18 mandates UM coverage if (1) the claimant is an insured under a policy which provides uninsured motorist coverage, (2) the claimant was injured by an uninsured motorist, and (3) the claim is recognized by Ohio Tort law. Martin, 70 Ohio St.3d at 481, 639 N.E.2d at 441. ... Appellant’s argument concerning the “other owned vehicle” exclusion addressed in Martin is not pertinent to the situation in this case. Appellant’s claim was denied because she was not an insured under the policy. As noted above, the UM motorist provision is intended to protect persons, not specific vehicles, but only “for persons insured thereunder” and when “the claimant is an insured.” Martin, supra.

Before the 1994 amendment, an insured was not legally entitled to uninsured-motorist benefits when the tortfeasor was immune from liability, because the insured could not recover damages from that tortfeasor.

Middleton v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., Unpublished Decision (11-17-1997) · filed 1997-11-17(A)(1)

Applying the rule set forth in York, we hold that the Middletons are not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage in this case. The record indicates that Jackson and the city were determined to be immune from liability under R.C. 2744.02 and2744.03. The Middletons are consequently not "legally entitled" to collect damages for bodily injury from either Jackson or the city and as such have no right to receive uninsured motorist coverage under either former R.C. 3937.18 or the express language of their policy with State Farm.

Section 3937.18 requires an express rejection to provide less uninsured-motorist coverage than liability coverage, but it does not require a new rejection each time an insured replaces a vehicle covered by the original policy.

Stacy v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., Unpublished Decision (2-27-1998) · filed 1998-02-27

Upon consideration, this court finds, as a matter of law, that Nationwide was not required by law to ask Walter Stacy to sign a new statement rejecting equivalent uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage each time he changed vehicles between 1977 and 1983.

Section 3937.18(G) permits an insurer to preclude stacking of uninsured-motorist coverage, but the antistacking provision must be unambiguous, clear, and conspicuous.

Stover v. State Farm Insurance Co. · filed 1998-05-21(G)

At the time the policy was effective, insurance companies were permitted, pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(G), to preclude the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage. ... However, to be valid, the antistacking provisions, must be both unambiguous, clear and conspicuous in the insurance contract.

Section 3937.18 and public policy preclude an insurance policy from making physical contact an absolute prerequisite to recovery under uninsured-motorist coverage when admissible corroborative evidence is available.

Witherspoon v. Allstate Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (6-26-1998) · filed 1998-06-26

Appellant argues the "corroborating evidence" test as set forth in Girgis violates public policy because it is contrary to the legislative intent of R.C. 3937.18, uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage. We decline to overrule the Supreme Court of Ohio's clear language in Girgis at 306-307 wherein the court gave due consideration to public policy issues: ... Thus, to the extent that admissible corroborative evidence was available, we modify Reddick, Yurista and Rowe, and find that R.C. 3937.18 and public policy preclude contract provisions in insurance policies from requiring physical contact as an absolute prerequisite to recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage provision.

Section 3937.18 permits an uninsured-motorist claim without physical contact when independent third-party evidence corroborates that an unidentified vehicle's negligence proximately caused the injury.

Muncy v. American Select Insurance · filed 1998-06-30

In Girgis, the court held that R.C. 3937.18 and public policy “preclude contract provisions in insurance policies from requiring physical contact as an absolute prerequisite to recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage provision.” Id., paragraph one of the syllabus. ... The test to be applied in cases where an unidentified driver’s negligence causes injury is the corroborative evidence test, which allows the claim to go forward if there is independent third-party testimony that the negligence of an unidentified vehicle was a proximate cause of the accident. ... Under Girgis, then, plaintiff was required to present corroborating evidence that (1) the source of the wood in the roadway was an unidentified vehicle, and (2) the wood in the roadway caused decedent’s accident. ... When all of the evidence is construed in plaintiffs favor for purposes of summary judgment, the independent, third-party evidence under Girgis creates a genuine issue of material fact whether the wood pallet on Fisher Road was the proximate cause of decedent’s fatal accident. Under Girgis, defendant’s summary judgment motion should have been denied.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage and permits a reasonable contractual two-year deadline for bringing a claim.

Veloski v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance · filed 1998-09-21

In Miller the Supreme Court found a one-year deadline contrary to the purpose of R.C. 3937.18 on the grounds that the deadline purported “to delete or eliminate ... the rights of the insured to coverage required” under the law governing uninsured motorists. The court expanded the contractual limitation of one year consistent with the two-year statute of limitations for bodily injury actions. ... Therefore, the contract limitation of two years on uninsured motorist claims, even when the uninsured motorist is unidentified, does not violate Ohio policy.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) mandates uninsured-motorist coverage for insureds legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles for bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death.

West American Insurance v. Holman · filed 1998-10-30(A)(1)

Pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(A)(1), uninsured motorist coverage is mandated for the protection of insureds “who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom.”

Section 3937.18(A)(1) requires an insured seeking uninsured-motorist coverage to be legally entitled to recover from the tortfeasor, subject to statutory and common-law defenses.

Laibson v. Cna Insurance Companies, Unpublished Decision (5-14-1999) · filed 1999-05-14(A)(1)

If the insured is legally entitled to recover from the tortfeasor, and demonstrates that either (1) the tortfeasor was uninsured at the time of the accident, (2) that the tortfeasor is unidentified, or (3) that the tortfeasor's insurer has become insolvent, then the insurer is obligated to provide uninsured-motorist coverage. R.C. 3937.18(A) and3937.18(D); Kraly v. Vannewkirk (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 627,635 N.E.2d 323; Miller v. Progressive Cas. Ins.

Section 3937.18 requires underinsured-motorist coverage for insured persons and does not permit a policy clause that makes that coverage conditional or illusory for an additional insured passenger.

Gregory v. Allstate Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (6-24-1999) · filed 1999-06-24(A)(2), (G)

Allstate submits that this clause does not eliminate UIM coverage, per se, or reduce the coverage that might be available; it merely requires Gregory to recover under another policy providing her with UIM coverage: to wit her own Midwestern policy. Passengers who are not resident relatives under the Allstate policy are, therefore, provided with conditional and uncertain UIM coverage. R.C 3937.18 clearly mandates UIM coverage "which shall be in an amount of coverage equivalent to theautomobile liability or motor vehicle liability coverage and shall provide protection for an insured against loss for bodily injury * * * suffered by any person insured under the policy * * *" In an attempt to insulate itself from primary UIM coverage for non-resident passengers, Allstate has abrogated its duty under R.C. 3937.18 to provide the mandated UIM "coverage".

Section 3937.18(A)(1) requires uninsured-motorist coverage in an amount equivalent to the policy's own automobile or motor-vehicle liability coverage, not to the liability coverage in a separate underlying policy.

Holliman v. Allstate Ins. Co. · filed 1999-09-15(A)(1)

By its language, R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) requires only that uninsured motorist coverage “be in an amount of coverage equivalent to the automobile liability or motor vehicle liability coverage.” Here, while the Nationwide policy is the underlying liability coverage with respect to Nationwide’s uninsured motorist coverage, it is not the underlying liability coverage with respect to the umbrella policy, which presumably provided liability coverage in itself. The noted provisions of R.C. 3937.18 do not require that the Allstate uninsured motorist provisions be in the amount of coverage equivalent to the liability coverage in the Nationwide policy.

Section 3937.18(G) permits insurance policies to prohibit any type of stacking of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, including stacking across policies held by non-family members.

Lemble v. Belknap, Unpublished Decision (9-30-1999) · filed 1999-09-30(G)

S.B. 20, which amended R.C. 3937.18(G), explicitly indicated that this section was being amended to supersede the Savoie holding and permit contract language which prohibits any type of stacking of uninsured/underinsured claims. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the facts of this case constitute "inter-family" stacking or some other type of stacking. The anti-stacking language in these two policies is broad enough to cover this type of stacking.

Section 3937.18(H) permits insurers and insureds to contractually limit recovery of uninsured-motorist benefits without limiting the damages recoverable in a wrongful-death civil action.

Ackerman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Unpublished Decision (12-10-1999) · filed 1999-12-10(H)

We hold that R.C. 3937.18(H) does not violate Section 19a, ArticleI of the Ohio Constitution because the statute does not limit the amount of damages a plaintiff may recover in a civil action for wrongful death. Instead, the statute speaks only to the contractual agreement between the insurer and the insured, and permits insurers to contractually limit recovery of uninsured-motorist benefits.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage when the claimant is an insured, was injured by an uninsured motorist, and has a claim recognized by Ohio tort law; a claimant is not an insured merely because the policy covers the claimant in hypothetical liability situations.

Woods v. Owners Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (2-1-2000) · filed 2000-02-01

R.C. 3937.18 mandates uninsured motorists coverage where "(1) the claimant is an insured under a policy which provides uninsured motorist coverage; (2) the claimant was injured by an uninsured motorist; and (3) the claim is recognized by Ohio tort law." Martin v. Midwestern Group Ins. Co. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 478,481. ... Here, Woods fails the first prong of the Martin test because he is not an insured under the Policy. ... Woods is not an insured simply because the Policy covers him in hypothetical situations. ... Accordingly, we find that the plain and ordinary language of the policy indicates that Woods is not an insured under the Policy. ... Thus, as a matter of law, the uninsured motorists provision of the Policy does not violate R.C. 3937.18 and Woods is not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage under the Policy.

Section 3937.18 does not bar a UM insurer that satisfies Civ.R. 24(A) from intervening in the insured's action against an uninsured tortfeasor or thereby deprive the insured of UM protection.

Bennett v. Butler, Unpublished Decision (6-30-2000) · filed 2000-06-30

We reject both of appellants' arguments for the following reasons. First, we note that rules of court override statutes on procedural matters, see Section 5(B), Article IV, Ohio Constitution; State v. Barnes (Dec. 30, 1999), Clermont App. No. CA99-06-057, unreported, at note 1, so the provisions of Civ.R. 24(A) establishing the procedure for intervention would override any statutory procedural requirements for intervention. Second, we note that permitting an UM insurer who meets the requirements of Civ.R. 24(A) to intervene does not mean its insured is not entitled to UM coverage and does not, therefore, leave the insured without UM protection. Instead, it permits the UM insurer to have some assurance that it will only be obligated to reimburse its insured for legitimate UM costs.

Before S.B. No. 20, § 3937.18 did not require uninsured-motorist benefits when the at-fault driver had liability insurance but was immune; S.B. No. 20 changed the statute to permit coverage in that situation.

Drake-Lassie v. State Farm Insurance, Unpublished Decision (12-19-2000) · filed 2000-12-19

R.C. 3937.18, as construed by earlier Ohio Supreme Court decisions, had held that an insurance company was not liable to its policyholders on an uninsured-underinsured claim when the person responsible for injuring the policyholder had liability insurance but was immune from liability based upon a statutory grant of immunity. ... S.B. No. 20 modified the statute so uninsured motorists coverage applied in such situations and a person who was injured by an immune driver could at least recover from their uninsured motorist coverage.

Section 3937.18 supports the public-policy rule that a contractual limitations period cannot extinguish an uninsured/underinsured-motorist claim before the claim accrues.

Gooden v. Grange Mutual Casualty Ins., Unpublished Decision (3-12-2001) · filed 2001-03-12

However, in 1993, the law in Ohio changed with respect to uninsured/underinsured coverage, which change in law was set forth in the Ohio Supreme Court decision of Savoie vs. Grange Mutual Insurance Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500. ... However, we do agree with appellants, to a certain extent, that the above provision would violate public policy if it extinguished a claim for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage by establishing a limitations period, which expired before or shortly after the accrual of a right of action for such coverage. See R.C. 3937.18 and Kraly vs. Vannewkirk (1994),69 Ohio St.3d 627 . In other words, if there existed no claim for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage within the two-year contractual provision, we believe that it would violate public policy to extinguish any possible claims for uninsured/underinsured motorist claims before those claims ripened.

Section 3937.18(A) requires uninsured-motorist coverage to be offered to persons insured under the liability policy.

Bianchi v. Moore, Unpublished Decision (5-11-2001) · filed 2001-05-11(A)

However, R.C. 3937.18 only requires that UM coverage be "offered to persons insured under the [liability] policy" of insurance.

Section 3937.18 does not require a homeowner's policy covering vehicles that are not subject to registration and are not intended for public highways to offer uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.

Bergen v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (5-29-2001) · filed 2001-05-29

The court found that "[a] homeowner's insurance policy that provides limited liability coverage for vehicles that are not subject to motor vehicle registration and that are not intended to be used on a public highway is not a motor vehicle liability policy and is not subject to the requirement of former R.C.3937.18 to offer uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage." Id. at syllabus. ... Based on the Supreme Court's decision in Davidson, the trial court erred in finding UM/UIM coverage existed by operation of law in this case. MMIC's third assignment of error is sustained.

Section 3937.18's requirements were satisfied because the commercial policy included uninsured motorist coverage, which the insurer offered and the sole proprietor accepted.

Herschell v. Rudolph, Unpublished Decision (4-12-2002) · filed 2002-04-12

Further, Meridian satisfied the requirements of R.C.3937.18 since the policy at issue includes an uninsured motorist coverage provision. Obviously, Meridian offered such coverage and Rudolph, d.b.a. Excalibur, accepted it.

Section 3937.18 mandates offering uninsured motorist coverage in an amount equal to the liability insurance provided to the insured, but it does not require coverage for a person who is not an insured under the policy.

Schaeffer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (9-13-2002) · filed 2002-09-13

Under the relevant version of R.C. 3937.18, Ohio's uninsured motorist statute, the mandatory offering of uninsured motorist coverage is an amount equal to the amount of liability insurance provided to the insured. However, as we discussed in the first assignment of error, Schaeffer was not an insured under the policy. She was not a named insured, and she did not reside in her parents' home, thus she did not qualify for coverage as a "relative." For these reasons, we find that Schaeffer was due no coverage under the policy and the regulations of R.C. 3937.18 do not apply to her in this case.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage to be offered with automobile or motor-vehicle liability policies, including policies proving financial responsibility for specifically identified vehicles and umbrella liability policies.

Munoz v. Nationwide Fire Mutual Ins., Unpublished Decision (11-8-2002) · filed 2002-11-08(L)(1) and (L)(2)

The version of R.C. 3937.18, effective at the time of the policy in this case, required that "no automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance" may be provided unless UM coverage is offered. ... Appellants argue that, pursuant to the definition in R.C.3937.18(L)(1), Nationwide's homeowners' policy qualifies as an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance," for which UM coverage had to be offered. Insofar as Nationwide's homeowners' policy does not specifically identify any covered motor vehicle(s), we find that it is not an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance," as such is defined by R.C.3937.18(L)(1). ... We find that the "Other Insurance" clause of Nationwide's policy does not transform this policy into an umbrella policy. The homeowners' insurance policy is a primary policy of insurance and the "Other Insurance" clause merely apportions and prioritizes a loss when there is more than one primary policy in issue. ... Accordingly, we find that Nationwide's homeowners' policy is not an umbrella policy. ... Based on the foregoing, we find that Nationwide was not required to offer appellants UM coverage and its failure to do so does not give rise to said coverage by operation of law.

The statute's “legally entitled to recover” requirement asks whether the insured can prove the tort claim’s elements; a statute-of-limitations defense is not itself an element, and the statute protects persons injured by uninsured drivers.

Karafa v. Toni, Unpublished Decision (1-16-2003) · filed 2003-01-16(A)(1)

The 1994 statute defines "legally entitled to recover" as being "able to prove the elements of his claim that are necessary to recover damages." The elements of an injured party's claims are determined by common law: that is, a duty, a breach of that duty which is the proximate cause of an injury, and damages. The statute of limitations is a statutory creation designed to limit the exercise of the right to pursue recovery for the damages resulting from the tortfeasor's actions. It is not an element of that claim, but rather, a defense to it. ... Because Karafa can prove the elements of his claim against the tortfeasor, he, therefore, has met the requirement under the contract provision "legally entitled to recover." Karafa's failure to preserve the statute of limitations against the tortfeasor, therefore, does not preclude his claim against the insurance company. ... Because the purpose of R.C. 3937.18 is to protect the rights of persons who are injured by uninsured drivers, Karafa should not be precluded from coverage by any deceptive and dilatory acts of his employer. To rule otherwise would contradict the purpose of the statute.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) requires an insured seeking uninsured-motorist coverage to be legally entitled to recover damages, but it is ambiguous about when that entitlement is determined.

Ponser v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-18-2003) · filed 2003-08-18(A)(1)

We find, however, that such phrase, as used in the statute, is ambiguous since the statute does not specify at what point in time the determination of whether an insured is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured vehicle is to be made.

Section 3937.18 does not exempt an employer from its mandates merely because it has a large deductible, and it does not mandate UM/UIM coverage under a general-liability policy that is not a motor vehicle liability policy.

Brown v. Travelers Insurance, Unpublished Decision (11-17-2003) · filed 2003-11-17

As initial matter, we find that AOL/Time Warner was not self insured "in the practical sense" as it contains only a one million dollar deductible and was therefore not exempt from the mandates of R.C. § 3937.18. ... Pursuant to this Court's prior holding in Pickett v. OhioFarmers Ins. Co., (Jan. 14, 2002) Stark App. Nos. 2001CA00227 and 2001 CA00236, 2002 Ohio 259, wherein we held that a general liability policy which provided only incidental coverage for a narrow class of mobile equipment and did not list any specifically identified vehicles was not a "motor vehicle liability policy" and therefore UM/UIM coverage was not mandatory pursuant to R.C. § 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured motorist coverage to be equivalent to liability coverage and does not permit a territorial exclusion from that coverage merely because the accident occurred outside the specified geographic area.

Fazio v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (5-28-2004) · filed 2004-05-28(A), (J)

According to the statute, the uninsured motorist coverage provided to appellee by State Farm is required to be equivalent to the automobile liability coverage. ... Pursuant to the R.C. 3937.18, as a matter of law, UM coverage must be equivalent to liability coverage, and must therefore apply in Mexico. To this extent, the UM coverage offered by State Farm is not "equivalent" to the liability coverage; and therefore, must be construed as arising by operation of law. ... We find it persuasive the legislature did not include therein a geographical limitation of coverage. ... Therefore, though we recognize our brethren from the Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Districts2 have concluded otherwise, we find State Farm's territorial exclusion invalid pursuant to Alexander and Stanton, supra, and our reading of R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) made an insured legally entitled to recover when able to prove the claim's elements, while preserving non-Chapter-2744 statutory or common-law immunity defenses; subsection (F) barred exclusions or reductions based on workers' compensation benefits but did not eliminate fellow-servant immunity as a defense.

Nova v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (6-30-2004) · filed 2004-06-30(A)(1), (F)

"an insured is legally entitled to recover damages if the insured is able to prove the elements of the insured's claim that are necessary to recover damages from the owner or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle. The fact that the owner or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle has an immunity under Chapter 2744 of the Revised Code or a diplomatic immunity that could be raised as a defense in an action brought against the owner or operator by the insured does not affect the insured's right to recover under uninsured motorist coverage. However,any other type of statutory or common law immunity that may be a defensefor the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle shall also be adefense to an action brought by the insured to recover under uninsuredmotorist coverage." (Emphasis added.) ... R.C. 3937.18(F) stated that UM coverage "shall not be made subject to an exclusion or reduction in amount because of any workers' compensation benefits payable as a result of the same injury or death." ... The policies, therefore, are not in conflict with R.C. 3937.18(F). However, as noted in Webb, a party may, nonetheless, use the Fellow Servant Immunity Doctrine as a defense to liability.

Section 3937.18 does not bar a policy from reducing uninsured-motorist benefits by amounts paid on behalf of legally responsible persons when the reduction prevents the insured from receiving more protection than the statute contemplates.

Heaton v. Carter, Unpublished Decision (2-13-2006) · filed 2006-02-13(A)(1), (A)(2)

Although the tortfeasors at issue have both joint and severable liability, to include the set-off language in section (A)(1) would be superfluous due to the nature and purpose of uninsured motorist coverage, as there is no coverage to set-off. The purpose of Section (A)(2) is to afford the insured protection not greater than that which would be available under the insured's uninsured coverage if the person or persons liable were uninsured. To allow appellant to recover $100,000 from Magers' carrier and $100,000 from Grange would result in appellant receiving protection greater than appellant would have available under appellant's own uninsured coverage ($100,000) had either or both joint tortfeasor's been uninsured. Therefore, we find the parties were free to contractually set-off the uninsured coverage by amounts received by or on behalf of persons or organizations legally responsible (Magers), and Grange's set-off provision noted supra does not violate public policy.

Subsection (I) permits an insurer's UM policy to specify terms and conditions that preclude UM coverage in circumstances beyond the statute's listed examples, including a restriction defining when a vehicle is uninsured.

Calhoun v. Harner, 1-06-97 (11-13-2007) · filed 2007-11-13(I)

The phrase "including but not limited to," which S.B. 97 added to R.C. 3937.18 (I), is determinative. It permits insurers to include "terms and conditions" in a policy that preclude UM coverage under circumstances other than those listed in the statute, as long as the circumstances are specified in the policy. Green , 2006-Ohio-5057 , at ¶ 16 ; see, also, Kelly , 2006-Ohio-3599 , at ¶ 12 ; Snyder , 2005-Ohio-6751 , at ¶¶ 21-23 . "[Insurance companies and their customers are [therefore] free to contract in any manner that they see fit." Green , 2006-Ohio-5057 , at ¶ 20 . Since that is what happened in this case, we find the appellants' first argument, and their conclusion that UM restriction is invalid, meritless. ... But, because R.C. 3937.18 permits insurers to include "terms and conditions" that preclude UM coverage, we fail to see how the definition-exclusion distinction is of any consequence.

Under subsection (I), an insurer may include policy terms and conditions that preclude uninsured-motorist coverage in specified circumstances beyond the examples listed in the statute.

Calhoun v. Harner, 1-06-97 (3-17-2008) · filed 2008-03-17(I)

After S.B. 97, the exclusions in the UM statute serve only as examples. A UM policy may now include "terms and conditions that preclude [UM] coverage for bodily injury or death suffered by an insured under specified circumstances, including but not limited to" any of the circumstances specified in the UM statute. R.C. 3937.18 (I), Am. Sub. S.B. No. 97, effective 10-31-2001; Snyder v. Am. Family Ins. Co. , 114 Ohio St.3d 239 , 2007-Ohio-4004 , 871 N.E.2d 574 , ¶ 15; Green v. Westfield Ins. Co. , 9th Dist. No. 06CA0025-M, 2006-Ohio-5057 , ¶¶ 16-17 ; Kelly , 2006-Ohio-3599 , at ¶ 7 .

Under the S.B. 267 version of § 3937.18(C), a signed rejection is effective on the date signed, and extrinsic evidence may establish that the offer included the coverage description, limits, and premium.

Peters v. Tipton, 07 Ha 3 (3-19-2008) · filed 2008-03-19(C)

We conclude that under the relevant version of R.C. 3937.18, the rejection can validly be made and returned after the policy period commences as a rejection is effective on the date signed. Here, even assuming there is an issue of fact as to whether the rejection forms were signed and returned to Liberty Mutual prior to the commencement of the policy period on August 1, 2001, appellant's own submissions from Liberty's underwriting files establish that the forms were returned prior to the January 9, 2002 accident. This is a timely rejection under R.C. 3937.18 (C). ... The extrinsic evidence sufficiently established the elements of a meaningful offer and thus a valid rejection here. Thus, UM coverage did not arise by operation of law.

At the relevant time, § 3937.18(A) permitted but did not require insurers to provide uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage in a motor vehicle liability policy.

Kudla v. Wendt, 89375 (6-19-2008) · filed 2008-06-19(A)

The version of R.C. 3937.18 (A) in effect at the time State Farm issued the policies in this case, however, did not require the insurer to provide UIM coverage at all. Rather, it allowed, but did not require, an insurer to provide uninsured and/or underinsured motorist coverage in a motor vehicle liability policy.

Section 3937.18(C) applies to underinsured-motorist coverage, not uninsured-motorist coverage.

English v. Progressive · filed 2016-03-04(C)

While Progressive argues R.C. 3937.18(C) applies in this case, it is apparent that this this provision refers only to UIM coverage and not UM coverage. As appellant is seeking benefits under UM coverage, R.C. 3937.18(C) is inapplicable in this case.

Section 3937.18(A) does not require an insurer to offer uninsured-motorist coverage or obtain the insured’s written refusal.

Williams v. Shawnee Twp. · filed 2023-01-30(A)

First, Williams’s argument that Acceptance Insurance was negligent by failing to offer her uninsured-motorist coverage is without merit. That is, under Ohio law, there is no requirement that Acceptance Insurance offer uninsured-motorist coverage to Williams or obtain her written refusal. See Arn v. McLean, 159 Ohio App.3d 662, 2005-Ohio-654, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.); R.C. 3937.18(A).

Section 3937.18 requires a named insured to reject uninsured motorist coverage in writing before the policy year begins for the rejection to be effective.

Ayres v. All America Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (12-18-1998) · filed 1998-12-18

In the instant case, the purpose of R.C. 3937.18 would be served by permitting the terms of the policy to control. Although White was an insured under the policy issued by appellant to Cort Leasing, she was not a named insured in the declaration page. Thus, a named insured did not reject uninsured coverage before the beginning of the policy year. Even if the lease agreement could have been construed as a rejection of uninsured motorist coverage, it was not executed prior to the commencement of the policy year. Therefore, the trial court properly determined that White was an insured under the policy issued by appellant to Cort Leasing.

Section 3937.18(C) requires a written offer of uninsured motorist coverage before a rejection can be effective, and the rejection must be written and received before the policy year begins.

Fleishour v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co., Unpublished Decision (3-1-1999) · filed 1999-03-01(C)

All parties agree the incident from which this claim for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage arose occurred when the syllabus law of Gyori was in effect. Said syllabus states as follows: 1. There can be no rejection pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(C) absent a written offer of uninsured motorist coverage from the insurance provider. 2. In order for a rejection of uninsured motorist coverage to be expressly and knowingly made, such rejection must be in writing and must be received by the insurance company prior to the commencement of the policy year. ... Appellant's insurance agent, Matthew S. Hollinger, admitted there was never a written offer of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage for the 1996 policy. ... The written rejection was for the 1994 policy year, not the 1996 policy year for which appellant claims coverage. Pursuant to Gyori, appellee's "renewal" argument is without merit.

Section 3937.18 mandates uninsured motorist coverage when the claimant is an insured, is injured by an uninsured motorist, and has a claim recognized by Ohio tort law.

Irving v. Brown, Unpublished Decision (7-29-1999) · filed 1999-07-29

The Ohio Supreme Court has concluded that the statute mandates coverage if (1) the claimant is an insured under a policy that provides uninsured motorist coverage; (2) the claimant was injured by an uninsured motorist; and (3) the claim is recognized by Ohio tort law.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) does not permit an insurer to require an insured to suffer bodily injury, sickness, or disease to recover uninsured motorist damages.

Rakowski v. Cassel, Unpublished Decision (3-17-2000) · filed 2000-03-17(A)(1), (A)(2)

Upon consideration of the foregoing, this court finds that, regardless of whether the issue is coverage under R.C.3937.18(A)(1) or (A)(2), the policy underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Moore, supra, which was issued two days before our opinion in this case, requires the reversal of our disposition as to appellant's first assignment of error.

Section 3937.18 does not invalidate a policy provision that defines an injured person as outside the policy’s insured class rather than excluding coverage for a covered person.

Selective Insurance v. Wilson · filed 2003-07-29

Martin thus stands for the proposition that UIM coverage cannot be taken from an insured while occupying a vehicle owned by the insured but not listed in the policy. However, we find that Selective’s policy provision in the case sub judice neither “eliminates” UIM coverage respecting Wilson nor acts as an illegal exclusion.

Section 3937.18 does not require uninsured-motorist coverage for unknown or hit-and-run vehicles, so a policy may require physical contact for such coverage.

Buckeye Union Ins. v. Cooperman · filed 1972-09-12(B)

In Ohio, as stated, we have no specific requirement that there be coverage of the “unknown,” “unidentified” or “hit-and-run” vehicle within the uninsured motorist coverage; therefore, there is no definition of the breadth or extent of such type coverage, or statutory requirement of a showing of “physical contact.” ... We hold that the provisions of the instant policy requiring a showing of physical contact in the instance of claimed damage occasioned bv a “hit-and-run” vehicle are not in conflict generally with the insurance laws of the state of Ohio, nor with E. C. 3937.18, nor are such provisions unreasonable, burdensome or against public policy of this state.

Section 3937.18 permits uninsured-motorist coverage for hit-and-run vehicles to require physical contact between the unidentified vehicle and the insured or the vehicle occupied by the insured.

Yurista v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1985-07-31

This issue was addressed and answered by this court in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Reddick (1974), 37 Ohio St. 2d 119 [66 O.O.2d 87], where we considered a similar hit-and-run provision in an automobile liability insurance policy definition of an uninsured motor vehicle. In Travelers, we held that such a restriction of coverage to accidents where the injury results from physical contact of the unidentified vehicle with the insured or the automobile occupied by him was compatible with R.C. 3937.18, the uninsured motorist statute, and with public policy.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage that fully protects the insured for damages recoverable from an uninsured motorist, and it bars policy provisions reducing that coverage because of workers’ compensation benefits.

Bartlett v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. · filed 1973-03-28(D)

The Court of Appeals also correctly concluded that “R. C. 3937.18 requires coverage affording to the insured payment thereunder in an amount equal to the amount of damages he would legally be entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle within limits as set forth in R. C. 4509.20.. Accordingly, the policy *53provision for reduction of the workmen’s compensation benefits received is invalid because it does not provide the coverage required by R. C. 3937.18.”

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage to protect insured persons legally entitled to recover from uninsured motorists, rather than particular vehicles.

Gay v. Universal Underwriters Ins. · filed 1973-04-04(A)

We hold that R. C. 3937.18 is for the “protection of persons insured thereunder,” not vehicles. The named insureds, Duane and Juanita Worden, who bought and paid for >the policy, are insured, as required by R. C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 prevents insurance policies from requiring physical contact as an absolute prerequisite to uninsured motorist coverage.

Bobovnik v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 1997-01-22

Regardless of appellant’s arguments under this assignment of error, we again reiterate that the Ohio Supreme Court in Girgis recently held that R.C. 3937.18 and public policy preclude contract provisions in insurance policies from requiring physical contact as an absolute prerequisite to recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage provision.

Section 3937.18 bars an insurance policy from requiring physical contact as an absolute prerequisite to uninsured motorist recovery and permits corroborative evidence instead.

Musaelyants v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2001-08-15

In Girgis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 302, 662 N.E.2d 280, the Ohio Supreme Court held that R.C. 3937.18, as well as public policy, precludes contract provisions in insurance policies from requiring physical contact as an absolute prerequisite to recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage provision. The court further stated that in such instances the test to be applied in lieu of requiring physical contact is the corroborative evidence test, which allows the claim to go forward if there is independent third-party testimony that the negligence of an unidentified vehicle was the proximate cause of the accident. ... The testimony of Petrenko does satisfy the independent corroborative evidence test. ... Accordingly, we conclude that because Petrenko’s testimony independently established that the unidentified driver was the proximate cause of the accident, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.

Section 3937.18 and public policy prohibit making physical contact an absolute condition of uninsured motorist recovery when independent third-party testimony corroborates an unidentified vehicle’s negligence.

Girgis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. · filed 1996-03-06

Thus, to the extent that admissible corroborative evidence was available, we modify Reddick, Yurista and Rowe, and find that R.C. 3937.18 and ... public policy preclude contract provisions in insurance policies from requiring physical contact as an absolute prerequisite to recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage provision.

Section 3937.18 does not apply retroactively to an insurance policy issued before Ohio enacted its compulsory uninsured-motorist-coverage law.

Buckeye Union Insurance v. Price · filed 1974-07-10(B)

However, as the trial court pointed out, the policy in question was issued on May 14, 1961. Ohio’s compulsory uninsured motorist coverage law was enacted in 1965, four years later. The cases based upon that law are not controlling; and this court cannot give retroactive effect to that statute. This case must be decided upon a common-law interpretation of the language of the 1961 insurance policy.

Section 3937.18(A) requires uninsured-motorist coverage in a motor-vehicle liability policy of insurance, but does not require it in a financial-responsibility bond.

Kerr v. Personal Service Insurance · filed 1975-02-13(A)

We therefore hold that there exist sound definitional and policy reasons to distinguish a bond from a policy of liability insurance. The trial court ruled correctly that the instrument in question is a bond and that R. C. 3937.18 does not require that uninsured motorist coverage be included in financial responsibility bonds.

The prior version of § 3937.18, as construed in the cited Ohio Supreme Court decisions, did not entitle the insurer to summary judgment on its attempted per-person coverage limitation.

Reidling v. Meacham, Unpublished Decision (6-23-2000) · filed 2000-06-23

Under the prior version of R.C.3937.18, as interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Savoie v.Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, Wood v. Shepard (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 79 [38 Ohio St.3d 86], and Hillyer v. GreatAmerican Ins. Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 410, appellant was not entitled to summary judgment.

Section 3937.18(C) entitles an insurer that pays an uninsured-motorist injury claim to proceeds from a settlement or judgment recovered from the person responsible for the injury.

Foremost Insurance v. Walters · filed 1975-11-24(C)

In 1970, the Legislature enacted R. C. 3937.18(C), entitling an insurer paying a claim for injury under uninsured motorist coverage to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of rights of recovery for such injury against the one responsible for it.

When an insurer pays uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits, it may pursue recovery from responsible parties, including through an insolvent insurer's proceedings, but may not recover from the insured beyond the insured's rights against the insolvent insurer.

Bailey v. Reithmiller · filed 1989-04-17(E)

Under the plain meaning and strict construction rules, an insurer is only prohibited from attempting to recover against an insured to the extent of the insured’s rights against his insolvent insurer. In this case, the extent of ap-pellee’s rights against Reliable was $12,500. Therefore, appellants are not prohibited from going after appellee for $17,500 ($30,000 less $12,500).

Section 3937.18(E) grants uninsured- and underinsured-motorist insurers subrogation rights, but an insurer loses the protection of its subrogation clause when it fails to respond within a reasonable time after notice of a settlement offer.

McDonald v. Republic-Franklin Insurance · filed 1989-08-09(E)

In R.C. 3937.18(E), the General Assembly specifically granted the right of subrogation to providers of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. ... The insurer’s failure to respond, within a reasonable time, to notification by its insured of a settlement offer will operate to void a subrogation clause in the insurer’s underinsured motorist provision.

Section 3937.18(E) gives a UM insurer a right to subrogate claims against any person legally responsible for the injury, while former subsection (A)(2) permits reducing coverage limits by amounts recovered from liable persons.

Blackburn v. Hamoudi · filed 1990-09-18(E), (A)(2)

Under the contract of insurance and R.C. 3937.18(E), Grange Mutual has a right to subro-gate its insured's claims against joint tortfeasors who qualify neither as uninsured or underinsured motorists Alternatively, regarding Grange Mutual's prayer for declaratory judgment, Grange Mutual has a right of set-off and reimbursement against its insureds for amounts they receive from Dr. Hamoudi.

Section 3937.18(E) gives an insurer that pays uninsured-motorist benefits subrogation rights against any person legally responsible for the covered injury, not just the uninsured motorist.

Motorists Mutual Insurance v. Nussbaum · filed 1994-12-05(E)

“In the event of payment to any person under the coverages required by this section and subject to the terms and conditions of such coverages, the insurer making such payment to the extent thereof is entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery of such person against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily injury or death for which such payment is made, including any amount recoverable from an insurer which is or becomes the subject of insolvency proceedings, through such proceedings or in any other lawful manner. * * * ” ... Pursuant to R.C. 4507.07(B), Smith was jointly and severally liable for the acts of Valentine. The liability of Smith and Valentine were inextricably intertwined: if Valentine was liable for the accident, Smith was also liable in the same proportion as Valentine. Clearly, had this case proceeded to judgment against Smith and Valentine, Motorists would have had subrogation rights as to the judgment against Smith.

Section 3937.18(E) recognizes an underinsurer’s right of subrogation in underinsured-motorist coverage.

Love v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1995-06-22(E)

These provisions are consistent with R.C. 3937.18(E), which expressly recognizes an underinsurer’s right of subrogation.

Section 3937.18(E) gives a UM insurer that pays a claim a subrogated right to recover from legally responsible persons, but requires the claim against a fully insured joint tortfeasor to be asserted in an action brought by the insured rather than independently by the carrier.

Cincinnati Ins. v. Keneco Distributors, Unpublished Decision (11-19-1999) · filed 1999-11-19(E)

However, we have previously held that "* * * the right of subrogation authorized by R.C. 3937.18(E) does not confer, even by written assignment in a subrogation agreement or contractual language to the contrary, on an uninsured/ underinsured motorist carrier a right to maintain an independent cause of action in negligence against a fully insured joint tortfeasor." Faulds, 118 Ohio App.3d at 356. ... Accordingly, based on our decision in Faulds andWestfield, supra, we find that Cincinnati does not have an independent cause of action against Keneco with respect to the funds it paid pursuant to the terms of its UM coverage. Cincinnati can only assert its claim against Keneco arising out of UM coverage in an action brought by Cincinnati's insureds. See R.C.3937.18(E).

Section 3937.18(E) grants providers of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage a right of subrogation.

Hines v. State Farm Insurance · filed 2001-09-25(E)

Moreover, the Ohio legislature has specifically granted the right of subrogation to providers of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in R.C. 3937.18(E).

Section 3937.18(E) grants uninsured/underinsured motorist insurers a right of subrogation.

Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Estate, McClain, Unpublished Decision (3-8-2002) · filed 2002-03-08(E)

First, we recognize that the right of subrogation has been granted to uninsured/underinsured motorist providers by the General Assembly pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(E). Consequently, a subrogation clause in an uninsured motorist policy is a valid precondition to the insurance company's duty to provide coverage.

Section 3937.18(E) grants providers of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage a right of subrogation, and preserving that right may be required as a condition of coverage.

Alatsis v. Nationwide Ins. Enterprise, Unpublished Decision (6-11-2002) · filed 2002-06-11(E)

In R.C. 3937.18(E), the General Assembly specifically granted the right of subrogation to providers of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. ... Nonetheless, plaintiff's failure to preserve Nationwide's subrogation rights prevents her recovery, whether or not Nationwide demonstrates the settlement caused Nationwide any loss.

Section 3937.18(E) gives a UM/UIM insurer that paid benefits a right to proceeds from its insured's recovery, but does not permit the insurer to bring an independent negligence action against a fully insured joint tortfeasor.

Goldney v. Byrd, 88285 (4-26-2007) · filed 2007-04-26(E)

The effective version of R.C. 3937.18 (E) that applies to this case provides, in relevant part, that "the insurer making such payment to the extent thereof is entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of any right of recovery of such person against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily injury or death for which such payment is made." It has been held that this section does not permit a UM/UIM carrier to bring its own independent action in negligence. Keneco , supra; Faulds , 188 Ohio App.3d at 355 . Rather, the UM/UIM carrier is entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery of its insured against any person legally responsible for the insured's bodily injury. Id.; R.C. 3937.18 .

Section 3937.18(E) gives an insurer that pays an insured's claim a subrogation right allowing it to pursue the tortfeasor in its own name.

State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. v. Trumpy, Unpublished Decision (12-29-2000) · filed 2000-12-29(E)

In doing so, however, the trial court ignored the right of subrogation which arises under the statute and at common law when contribution among tortfeasors is not at issue. ... In the present matter, it is undisputed that appellant compensated Hogrefe for his claim against appellee. Unless appellee was a volunteer in making this payment (a scenario no one raises), the payment was made with the expectation that the payor would be substituted for Hogrefe in his claim against appellee. Whether there was an express or implied subrogation by contract or whether subrogation arose at law, appellant is, as a result of that subrogation, now the real party in interest. Civ.R. 17. As such, appellant is entitled to pursue this claim in its own name.

Section 3937.18 establishes public policy requiring uninsured-motorist coverage broad enough to protect insured persons legally entitled to recover damages, and private insurance contracts cannot restrict the coverage's amount or scope contrary to that policy.

Watters v. Dairyland Insurance · filed 1976-01-14

We find that this provision in the Dairyland policy restricts the amount and scope of coverage contrary to the intent of R. C. 3937.18. We hold that it is repugnant to the law of Ohio and, therefore, is void and unenforceable as a matter of public policy.

Section 3937.18(A) requires uninsured-motorist coverage in each automobile liability policy issued in Ohio and does not imply an exception for an insured who owns multiple vehicles and buys separate policies.

Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Volkmann · filed 1978-04-19(A)

The unambiguous and mandatory language of R. C. 3937.18(A) dictates that “[n]o automobile * * * policy * * * be delivered * * * unless * * * coverage for bodily injury or death is provided therein * * * for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles * * *(Emphasis added.) Clearly, this statute requires that uninsured motorist coverage be provided within each policy of automobile liability insurance issued in this state, and the statute contains no suggestion that relief from this obligation is to be implied where an insured owns more than one vehicle and has occasion to purchase separate policies of insurance thereon.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist coverage for insured persons legally entitled to recover from uninsured motorists, but it does not prohibit reasonable family-member exclusions from that coverage.

Dairyland Insurance v. Finch · filed 1987-09-16(A), (E)

Second, there is no language in R.C. 3937.18 prohibiting insurance companies seeking to minimize possible collusive suits from excluding coverage to family members. ... Given the limited amount of flexibility incorporated into R.C. 3937.18 by the General Assembly, we see no reason to contort and twist the statute to achieve an opposite result. ... Accordingly, we conclude that public policy does not prevent the issuance and enforcement of an automobile insurance policy containing a reasonable exclusionary clause, within the uninsured motorist provision, prohibiting intrafamilial recovery of damages against the issuer of the policy.

Section 3937.18 does not require uninsured-motorist coverage for injuries caused by an insured automobile merely because a family member is excluded from liability coverage.

Nussbaum v. Progressive Casualty Insurance · filed 1988-12-05(B) (D)

It is well settled that Ohio recognizes exclusionary clauses in automobile insurance contracts. ... R.C. 3937.18 does not prohibit family member exclusions in an automobile insurance contract. ... The policy’s liability provision is not ambiguous merely because Julia is included as an insured and excluded from recovery. ... We conclude that the coverage here applies to the Oldsmobile auto. That is the policy’s plain language and is not inconsistent with the statute. ... The vehicle is not ipso facto uninsured simply because there is an exclusion of liability for a person in Part I.

Section 3937.18(D) does not prohibit an uninsured-motorist policy from excluding coverage through the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle, including for a vehicle owned by or regularly available to the insured or a family member.

George v. Ohio Casualty Group of Insurance Companies · filed 1989-11-29(D)

In Dairyland, the court upheld the exclusionary language included in the uninsured motorist portion of the policy. The court noted that the intent of R.C. 3937.18, which was to provide insureds with protection against drivers without coverage, was not violated by the exclusionary language. Dairyland, supra, 32 Ohio St.3d at 364, 513 N.E.2d at 1328. According to the Dairyland court, the car in which the appellant was riding when she was injured was covered. That coverage, however, was not available to her as an insured because of the exclusion. Although the policy in Dairyland did not contain the exclusionary language within the definition of an uninsured vehicle as it does in the present policy, we find Dairyland controlling.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured-motorist policies to provide the statutory coverage and does not permit an insurer to reduce that coverage by redefining “uninsured motor vehicle”; specific exclusions may be contracted for if stated as exclusions.

Coppola v. Buckeye Union Ins. · filed 1990-12-31

However, it is the opinion of this court that Dairyland, supra is not controlling herein because the appellee did not list the provision upon which it relies in the exclusion section of Part C, but rather in the definition's portion. ... An insurer cannot issue policies that offer less coverage than is mandated by statute. An insured may specifically contract to exclude coverage for a specific occurrence or to a specific person but it cannot do so by redefining statutory language. ... The policy language under which the appellee relies should have been placed under the exclusion section. Sufficiently, if an insurance company wants to exclude someone from coverage, they should put that exclusion under the portion of the contract that is titled "exclusions", that is where areasonable person would look to see what type of coverage they do not have.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage for persons with recognized tort claims and does not permit a policy to exclude or reduce that coverage merely because the accident involved the insured's vehicle.

State Farm Automobile Insurance v. Alexander · filed 1992-01-15(A)(1) and (2)

Accordingly we hold that an automobile insurance policy may not eliminate or reduce uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, required by R.C. 3937.18, to persons injured in a motor vehicle accident, where the claim or claims of such persons arise from causes of action that are recognized by Ohio tort law.

Section 3937.18 does not bar a clear per-person limit on uninsured-motorist coverage when the policy limitation tracks the corresponding liability limitation.

Berleman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1992-04-29

In so holding, the court limited Wood v. Shepard to instances where insurance companies attempt to evade providing uninsured/underinsured coverage without statutory authorization. ... State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rose held that endorsement 6890AW was similar to the clause in Burris v. Grange Mut. Cos., in which the court upheld the application of the per-person limitation of coverage and distinguished Wood v. Shepard. ... However, the Rose case has made that ruling erroneous. We, therefore, sustain the sole assignment of error advanced by the appellants.

Section 3937.18(A) requires uninsured-motorist coverage for an insured legally entitled to recover damages from an uninsured motorist, so a policy exclusion for use without the owner's permission is invalid when it defeats that coverage.

Nationwide Insurance v. Tobler · filed 1992-06-08(A)

In the present case, Lilze’s estate is legally entitled to recover damages for the wrongful death of Lilze if Seebree’s conduct is determined to be tortious in the underlying wrongful death suit. See R.C. 2125.02. However, it will be uncompensated because Seebree had no liability insurance. Therefore, under the provisions of R.C. 3937.18(A), Lilze’s estate is entitled to uninsured motorist coverage. If it is determined that Lilze’s estate has a legal right to recover from Seebree, then the issue of whether Lilze was driving with permission is irrelevant and the exclusion contravenes the provisions of the statute. Accordingly, pursuant to Alexander, supra, we conclude that the exclusion for use of a motor vehicle without permission is invalid and Lilze’s estate is entitled to uninsured motorist coverage.