Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4123.01

Section 4123.01(C) covers a physical injury caused by workplace stress when the claimant proves a direct or proximate causal relationship between the stress and the injury.

Moore v. E.I. DuPontde Nemours Co. · filed 2015-12-10(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C) provides that: "Injury" includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment. ... As such, we cannot find by a preponderance of the evidence that a direct or proximate causal relationship existed between the alleged stress and the heart attack.

Section 4123.01(C) does not cover a death related to a preexisting condition unless an unusual event or experience in the course of employment produces the injury.

Ackerman v. Keller · filed 1970-04-13(C)

Therefore, the Workmen’s Compensation Law cannot be applied where death results from or is directly related to an adverse pre-existing physical condition, in the absence of an event or experience not regularly or ordinarily encountered in the course of employment and which produces the injury for which compensation is sought.

Section 4123.01(C) covers a work related rupture even when the employee was doing ordinary work without an unusual event apart from the injury.

Bunkley v. Republic Steel Corp. · filed 1972-02-23(C)

This claim is governed by R. C. 4123.01 (128 O. L. 743, Eff. Nov. 2, 1959), so that any injury received by a workman which was directly attributable and associated with the employment in which he was engaged at the time was compensable and embraced an injury accidental in character and result as well as one caused by accidental means. ... As a matter of law, where a workman sustains a rupture in the course of and arising out of his employment, although engaged in his usual occupation which is being carried on in the usual manner and without the intervention of an unexpected, unusual or fortuitous happening other than the occurrence of the injury, he is entitled to participate in the Workmen’s Compensation Fund of Ohio.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an unusual, unexpected injury arising from employment without requiring an external accidental cause.

Dearmond v. Sommer · filed 1975-09-08(C)

Accordingly, since it is uncontroverted that the employee in the instant cause suffered his injury in the course of his employment, and such injury was unusual, unexpected and resulted from ... his employment, we hold that it was a compensable injury under R. C. 4123.01(C).

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury that is an unusual and unexpected result of ordinary work activity as accidental in character and result.

Hunyadi v. San Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1975-10-29(C)

• So, too, in this case, a heart attack was not the usual but the unusual and unexpected result of carrying lugs from the cooler to the rolling table. It was, therefore, accidental in character and result.

An injury accidental in character and result need not occur suddenly or cause immediate pain.

McIntyre v. Kuhns Bros. · filed 1977-12-05(C)

We gather from defendant’s argument that it insists that the amendment to the definition of injury, adding injury accidental in character and result, requires that the result be sudden and spontaneous with some particular event and that the onset of the pain and injury be immediate, accompanying the sudden event. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the amendment bv the legislature.

Section 4123.01(C) defines an injury as one received in the course of and arising out of employment; an injury claim requires different proof from an occupational disease claim.

State Ex Rel. United States Playing Card Co. v. Industrial Commission · filed 1976-07-20(C)

“Injury” is defined in R. C. 4123.01(C), which is, in pertinent part, as follows: ... “* * * [A]ny injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” ... However, in an injury case, such evidence would not be necessary or even relevant.

Section 4123.01(C) includes injuries that are not preceded by an unusual event in its definition of compensable injury.

Czarnecki v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. · filed 1979-06-20(C)

Given the history behind the enactment of B. C. 4123.-01(C), the context of the disputed phrases and the mandate that workers’ compensation statutes be liberally construed in favor of the injured employee, we find that the General Assembly exercised its prerogative to include within the R. C. 4123.01(C) definition of compensable injuries those injuries which are not preceded by an unusual event.

Section 4123.01(C) permits compensation for an injury accidental in character and result without proof of one specific incident or unusual circumstance.

Howard v. White-Westinghouse, Inc. · filed 1981-09-29(C)

Appellee in this case has not proven accidental means but she has shown that her injury was accidental in character and result. As set forth above in Czamecki, appellee was not required to show that one specific incident, or unusual circumstance, caused her injuries as a prerequisite to a compensable injury.

Section 4123.01(C) does not require a sudden mishap or physical damage through external means for a workers’ compensation injury.

Schmidt v. Mayfield · filed 1987-07-16(C)

The appellant apparently does not seriously dispute the finding that the working conditions experienced by the appellee on October 28, 1983, might constitute an “injury” under R.C. 4123.01(C), and such finding is consistent with the case law which provides that a sudden mishap or physical damage through external means is not necessarily required to sustain a claim for injuries.

Section 4123.01(C) does not treat pneumonia allegedly caused by adverse working conditions as an injury when the evidence does not establish a compensable injury apart from disease.

Kellogg v. Mayfield · filed 1991-02-11(C)

Since there is no evidence that appellant suffered from an occupational disease, we agree with the result in Phillips, supra, and find that the trial court was correct in holding that appellant did not sustain an “injury” within the meaning of R.C. 4123.01(C) by contracting pneumonia.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a physical injury for workers’ compensation; atrial fibrillation alone does not qualify unless it causes a physical injury or unique circumstances make it one.

Beard v. Mayfield · filed 1991-04-16(C)

On its face and for purposes of being compensable within the workers’ compensation law, atrial fibrillation, a rapid irregular heartbeat, is not an injury without a showing that, in appellant’s circumstances, the atrial fibrillation has caused a physical injury or there are some unique circumstances so that for him atrial fibrillation is a physical injury.

Section 4123.01(C) requires evidence that work caused or aggravated a condition through a sudden injury or progressive work-related trauma.

Miller v. Emery Oil Co. · filed 1992-07-13(C)

Turning to the question of whether appellant’s condition is a compensable injury, “injury” is defined as any injury “ * * * whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). ... Quite simply, the evidence does not show that appellant’s arthritis resulted from a sudden injury or a progressive work-related trauma.

An injury caused by work activity can qualify under § 4123.01(C) even when a preexisting condition made the injury predictable.

Townsend v. Mayfield · filed 1992-09-09(C)

The Administrator’s position, here is that as work-related injuries become predictable, they become noncompensable under R.C. Chapter 4123. This is not what the legislature intended when it defined “injury” in R.C. 4123.01(C) as “any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.”

Section 4123.01(C) can cover a concussion, postconcussion syndrome, and post-traumatic headaches as compensable physical injuries when evidence supports their physical or physiological nature.

McKenney v. Hillside Dairy Co. · filed 1996-02-02(C)

Based upon the entirety of the record before us, we find that adequate testimony was adduced at trial to place into controversy the question of whether the injuries plaintiff suffered, described as concussion, postconcussion syndrome and post-traumatic headaches, are physical and/or physiological injuries and whether these injuries so described are compensable pursuant to R.C. 4123.01(C). Thus, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we find sufficient evidence existed from which reasonable minds might differ as to whether the claimed injuries were compensable physical injuries pursuant to R.C. 4123.01(C).

Section 4123.01(C)(2) excludes an injury caused primarily by the natural deterioration of tissue, an organ, or a body part.

Carpenter v. Bonniway Leasing, Inc. · filed 1993-08-16(C)(2)

The instruction that injury does not include an injury caused primarily by natural deterioration of tissue, an organ, or a body part is a correct statement of the law as stated in R.C. 4123.01(C)(2), and was properly given based on the evidence in this case.

Section 4123.01(C)(2) excludes injuries caused primarily by natural deterioration, but an injury accelerated by employment may be compensable.

Beardsley v. Manfredi Motor Transit Co. · filed 1994-10-03(C)(2)

However, workers’ compensation does not cover injury “caused primarily by the natural deterioration of tissue, organ, or part of the body.” R.C. 4123.01(C)(2). ... Since an employee may receive compensation if an injury is accelerated in the course of employment or arising out of employment, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not appellant’s injury was aggravated by his employment.

Section 4123.01(C)(2) allows a claim for a work-related aggravation of a condition caused primarily by natural deterioration.

Hanna v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1994-01-19(C)(2)

R.C. 4123.01(C)(2) does not foreclose claims where a condition, caused primarily by natural deterioration, is aggravated by a work-related injury.

Section 4123.01(C) covers injuries that develop gradually from work, but its definition of injury does not make the aggravation of a pre-existing disease compensable by itself.

Brody v. Mihm · filed 1995-04-26(C)

In Village, we held that “[a]n injury which develops gradually over time as the result of the performance of the injured worker’s job-related duties is compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C).” ... The change in the definition of “injury,” however, does not affect that portion of Miller which holds that a pre-existing disease aggravated during employment is not compensable.

Section 4123.01(C) covers injuries arising out of and received in the course of employment; evidence of harm from toxic paint fumes can create a factual dispute over whether an employee sustained such an injury.

Williams v. Harsco Corp. · filed 1994-04-25(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C) defines “injury” for workers’ compensation purposes as follows: ... Based upon all of the foregoing, we conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the appellant sustained injuries in the course of and arising out of her employment with Harsco.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur both in the course of and arising out of employment to qualify for workers’ compensation.

Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling, Inc. · filed 1998-02-24(C)

Even though the riggers’ travel meets the “in the course of employment” requirement under the foregoing analysis, it will fail the definition of injury under R.C. 4123.01(C) if it cannot be said to also arise out of the employment. Satisfaction of both statutory elements is a prerequisite to recovery from the fund.

Section 4123.01(C) includes injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and excludes injuries caused primarily by natural tissue deterioration.

Hess v. Ford Motor Company, Unpublished Decision (8-18-2000) · filed 2000-08-18(C)

In order to be entitled to workers' compensation benefits, appellee needed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence in the trial below that her disc herniation was a work-related injury as that term is defined in R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... We therefore conclude that competent, credible evidence existed to support a finding that appellee's injury occurred in the course of and arose out of her employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an employee seeking workers' compensation to show an injury received in the course of and arising out of employment.

Mayse v. Conrad, Unpublished Decision (2-21-2001) · filed 2001-02-21(C)

In order to participate in Ohio's workers' compensation fund, an employee must suffer from an "injury" received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment. ... We find the foregoing competent, credible evidence that the appellant did not suffer an injury in the course of and arising out of her employment.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury sustained in the course of and arising out of employment, including a bus driver’s fall on an employer bus while traveling to begin the second half of a split shift.

Ardrey v. Toledo Area Reg. Transit, Unpublished Decision (10-29-2004) · filed 2004-10-29(C)

An employee is entitled to participate in the workers' compensation fund if the employee sustains an injury, "whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... Because Ardrey's injury occurred in the course of and arose out of her employment with TARTA, the trial court did not err in granting Ardrey's motion for summary judgment and thereby establishing her right to participate in the workers' compensation fund for her injury.

Section 4123.01(C) treats an injury as compensable when the accident occurs in the course of and arises out of employment.

Moore v. Phillips, Unpublished Decision (4-14-2005) · filed 2005-04-14(C)

This award unquestionably establishes that the bureau determined that the accident, which is the subject of this litigation, occurred "in the course of" and "arises out of" the employment relationship so as to constitute a compensable injury under R.C. 4123.01 (C).

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur both in the course of and arising out of employment.

Saunders v. Holzer Hospital Foundation · filed 2008-03-04(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C) requires that the injury be sustained both in the course of and arising out of the injured employee's employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of employment and arise out of that employment; factual disputes about either requirement can preclude summary judgment.

Jones v. Multicare Health & Educational Servs., Inc. · filed 2013-02-28(C)

To recover workers’ compensation benefits, Ohio law requires that the worker demonstrate that an injury occurred both “in the course of” employment and that it “arises out of” that employment. ... Accordingly, having found that reasonable minds could differ in determining whether a sufficient causal connection exists between Jones’s injury and employment, we find that the trial court erred in deciding the issue as a matter of law.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur both in the course of and arising out of employment to be compensable.

Saunders v. Holzer Hospital Foundation, 08ca11 (4-30-2009) · filed 2009-04-30(C)

R.C. 4123.01 (C) requires that the injury be sustained both in the course of and arising out of the injured employee's employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to occur in the course of employment and arise out of employment, with a proximate causal connection between the work and the injury.

Ley v. Procter & Gamble Co. · filed 2010-03-08(C)

In order for an injury to be compensable under workers’ compensation law, the injury must have been in the course of the employment and arising out of the employment. ... The causal connection between the injury and employment must be that of proximate cause such that a condition of employment produces “a happening or event which as a natural and continuous sequence produces an injury without which the result would not have occurred.” ... Overall, after a review of the evidence, we find that the trial court did not err in denying P&G’s motion for directed verdict.

Section 4123.01(C) covers injuries received in the course of and arising out of employment; evidence that a heart attack occurred in the course of employment can preclude summary judgment for the employer.

Mataraza v. City of Euclid · filed 2011-06-09(C)

Under R.C. 4123.01(C), the term “injury” “includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” ... In short, where the plaintiff has presented evidence that the claimant’s heart attack occurred in the course of his employment, summary judgment in favor of the employer is erroneous.

Section 4123.01 defines injury without prescribing how the causal link between a workplace event and the injury must be established.

Starkey v. Builders Firstsource Ohio Valley, L.L.C. · filed 2010-04-09

Furthermore, as Starkey points out, R.C. 4123.01, in defining an injury, does not prescribe how the causal link is to be made between the work-related event and the employee’s injury.

Section 4123.01(C) allows compensation when a workplace injury substantially aggravates a pre-existing condition, even if the injury would not harm a healthy employee.

Schnipke v. Safe-Turf Installation Group, L.L.C. · filed 2010-09-07(C)

The trial court’s jury instruction concerning pre-existing conditions came from the Ohio Jury Instructions, 1 Ohio Jury Instructions Section 427.13, and was a correct statement of the law pursuant to R.C. 4123.01(C).

Section 4123.01(C)(4) allows subjective complaints to support substantial aggravation of a pre-existing condition when coupled with objective diagnostic findings, objective clinical findings, or objective test results.

Brate v. Rolls-Royce Energy Sys., Inc. · filed 2012-09-27(C)(4)

However, subjective complaints, coupled with objective diagnostic findings, objective clinical findings, or objective test results are sufficient.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) applies when the parties stipulate that a condition pre-existed the work injury; the claim must then be assessed under its substantial-aggravation rule.

Coler v. Anchor Acquisition, L.L.C. · filed 2012-12-31(C)(4)

The trial court concluded R.C. 4123.01(C)(4) was not applicable. We disagree. ... Because the parties stipulated Appellee’s bulging disc at L4-5 was pre-existing, the trial court’s finding to the contrary was erroneous.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a claimant seeking compensation for additional conditions to prove that the conditions exist and were proximately caused by a workplace injury.

Bell v. Bur. of Workers' Comp. · filed 2012-03-30(C)

To succeed on his workers’ compensation claim to participate for the additional conditions, Bell had to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered from the additional conditions and that they had been proximately caused by his February 2008 workplace injury. See R.C. 4123.01(C); see also Fox v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 162 Ohio St. 569, 576, 125 N.E.2d 1 (1955).

Section 4123.01(C) requires a causal connection between employment and injury; expert testimony is unnecessary when that connection is a matter of common knowledge.

Lemus-Sanchez v. Fayette Drywall, Inc. · filed 2014-05-16(C)

To participate in the workers’ compensation fund, Mr. Lemus-Sanchez needed to show “not only that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment but that a direct or proximate causal relationship existed between his injury and his harm or disability.” Fox v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 162 Ohio St. 569, 576, 125 N.E.2d 1 (1955), paragraph one of the syllabus; R.C. 4123.01(C). ... Here, we conclude that it is common knowledge that corneal laceration could result from the accident that occurred here. You don’t need a doctor to tell you that a cut is likely to result if a piece of concrete, displaced by jackhammer, flies up, breaks one’s glasses and hits the eye. Expert testimony was not necessary.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment.

Carnahan v. Morton Bldgs., Inc. · filed 2014-09-22(C)

Application of the Lord factors to the facts viewed in Carnahan’s favor demonstrates that, as a matter of law, Carnahan’s injury did not arise out of his employment.

Section 4123.01(C) defines a work-related injury as the occurrence that opens a workers’ compensation claim.

State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (Slip Opinion) · filed 2016-12-08(C)

To clarify any perceived inconsistencies in our prior cases, we reiterate that for purposes of workers’ compensation, an “injury” is “any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.”2 R.C. 4123.01(C). A work-related injury is the occurrence that triggers the filing of a report with the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation to open a claim.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a claimant seeking benefits for an additional condition to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the workplace injury proximately caused it.

Leasure v. UVMC · filed 2017-08-11(C)

In order to succeed on her workers' compensation claim to participate for the additional condition of lumbar spondylosis, however, Leasure had to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that she suffered from the additional condition and that it had been proximately caused by her workplace injury, i.e., the slip and fall in February of 1982. R.C. 4123.01(C); Fox v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 162 Ohio St. 569, 125 N.E.2d 1 (1955).

Section 4123.01(C) broadly defines injury, but a worker must show harm rather than merely an impact at work.

Webster v. Altenloh Brinck & Co., U.S., Inc. · filed 2021-03-31(C)

While R.C. 4123.01(C) defines “injury” expansively, as “any injury” arising out of employment, the statute does not define what is meant by the term “injury,” specifically. ... Aside from testimony that Webster struck her head in the fall, ... there was no testimony regarding harm to Webster’s head, and no expert testimony that described the symptoms of a “closed head injury,” as experienced by Webster.

Section 4123.01(C)(1) defines “injury” consistently for workers’ compensation coverage and the employer immunity that follows from that coverage.

Vacha v. Ridgeville · filed 2011-05-23(C)(1)

Conversely, if an employee’s “injury” does qualify for workers’ compensation coverage, that remedy is exclusive and the employer is immune from civil action liability arising out of an allegation that the employer was negligent or reckless in causing the employee’s injury. That is the only reasonable interpretation of the language of R.C. 4123.74 and 4123.01(C) and any other interpretation would be unfair to the employer in the overall balance of competing interests in the workers’ compensation system.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires aggravation of a preexisting condition to be considerable and established by objective evidence to qualify as a compensable injury.

Pflanz v. LOF · filed 2011-06-03(C)(4)

Thus, to be compensable, the aggravation of a preexisting condition must be substantial both in the sense of being considerable and in the sense of being firmly established through the presentation of objective evidence.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires evidence that employment activity probably caused a substantial aggravation of a preexisting condition; testimony that it could have done so is insufficient.

Tepe v. Tepe · filed 2012-03-20(C)(4)

According to Dr. Wenstrup, the alleged activities during the trial could have substantially aggravated the ulcer, but he gave no opinion that they probably did, or that they more than likely substantially aggravated the ulcer.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires objective findings to substantiate a substantial aggravation of a preexisting condition; worsening range-of-motion measurements can satisfy that requirement.

Cassens Transport Co. v. Bohl · filed 2012-05-21(C)(4)

As Cassens points out, Dr. Heis’ testimony fails to reference “objective diagnostic findings, objective clinical findings, or objective test results” as required under R.C. 4123.01(C)(4). ... Consequently, the ... record contained objective clinical findings demonstrating that Bohl’s range of motion decreased months after the initial injury despite medical treatment. Viewing this evidence, along with Dr. Heis’ testimony and Bohl’s testimony, a rational trier of fact could have concluded that Bohl suffered a substantial aggravation of preexisting degenerative arthritis of the cervical spine.

A worker seeking compensation for aggravation of a preexisting condition must show that a workplace accident substantially aggravated it.

Studnicka v. Bur. of Workers' Comp. · filed 2012-09-21(C)(4)

In order to make that claim based on the aggravation of a preexisting condition, he had to show that the condition was “substantially aggravated” by the accident. R.C. 4123.01(C)(4).

Section 4123.01(C) does not treat aggravation of a preexisting medical condition as a separate injury; aggravation is a theory of causation.

Starkey v. Builders FirstSource Ohio Valley, L.L.C. · filed 2011-07-07(C)

Because aggravation of a preexisting medical condition is a type of causation, it is not a separate condition or distinct injury as defined in R.C. 4123.01.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) allows a claim for a pre-existing condition substantially aggravated by a workplace accident when the claimant proves the condition and aggravation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Rubenbauer v. C. W. Zumbiel Co. · filed 2013-03-15(C)(4)

To succeed on his workers’ compensation claim Rubenbauer had to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered from the conditions alleged and that they had been proximately caused or had been substantially aggravated by his workplace accident.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires objective evidence of substantial aggravation of a pre-existing condition but does not require medical documentation of the condition from before the workplace injury.

Gardi v. Lakewood School Dist. Bd. of Edn. · filed 2013-08-08(C)(4)

There is no language anywhere in the statute that requires the pre-existing condition to be medically documented prior to the workplace injury that allegedly aggravated the condition. Accordingly, any requirement that a claimant must present pre-injury documentation of the pre-existing condition before the claimant may recover under R.C. 4123.01(C)(4) for substantial aggravation of the condition adds a requirement that is not in the statute.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires objective evidence of a substantial aggravation, but does not require medical documentation of the preexisting condition from before the workplace injury.

Haynik v. Sherwin-Williams Co. · filed 2014-04-17(C)(4)

Thus, this court has previously held that R.C. 4123.01(C)(4) does not require any medically documented proof of the injured worker’s condition prior to the aggravation injury. ... Such a requirement is not present in the statute, and we decline to make it so in the present case.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires evidence that a condition existed before a workplace injury to establish substantial aggravation of a preexisting condition.

Briggs v. Franklin Pre-Release Ctr. · filed 2014-06-09(C)(4)

This evidence is crucial because, without any evidence to suggest that Briggs' T4-7 syrinx existed prior to the workplace incident, Briggs was unable to show that the T4-7 syrinx was substantially aggravated by the workplace incident pursuant to R.C. 4123.01(C)(4).

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires objective medical evidence that a workplace injury substantially aggravated a preexisting condition; pre-injury medical records are not necessarily required.

Salyers v. Buehrer · filed 2015-10-30(C)(4)

A plaintiff does not necessarily need to present pre-injury medical documentation to establish a substantial aggravation, but there must be some objective medical evidence that establishes that the accident substantially aggravated a preexisting condition.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) allows compensation when a workplace injury substantially aggravates preexisting disc degeneration and causes a herniation; the herniation itself need not have existed before the injury.

Woods v. Bur. of Workers' Comp. · filed 2016-01-22(C)(4)

The Bureau and Phoenix, therefore, are applying an incorrect analysis when they insist that Woods cannot recover because his disc herniation did not exist before the accident. This is not a requirement. As is evident from the case law and the testimony at trial, the resulting condition is the disc herniation, and it can be caused by substantial aggravation of a pre-existing condition of degenerative disc disease.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires a substantial aggravation of a preexisting condition to be considerable and supported by objective evidence.

Rowland v. Buehrer · filed 2017-08-04(C)(4)

Paley opined that the January 14, 2015 fall substantially aggravated Rowland’s preexisting 2011 rotator cuff tear, and we conclude that his testimony regarding Rowland’s 2011 injury, and the objective range of motion tests he administered after her 2015 injury, and the MRI, is testimony sufficient to withstand the motion for summary judgment and allow a jury to determine whether Rowland suffered a substantial aggravation of a preexisting injury that is both considerable and firmly established through the presentation of objective evidence.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires objective evidence to establish a substantial aggravation of a pre-existing condition; subjective complaints may also be considered.

Harrison v. Panera, L.L.C. · filed 2013-12-06(C)(4)

We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that there was objective evidence, through Dr. Shaw’s physical examination and the x-rays, that Harrison’s arthritis had been substantially aggravated by the accident.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires a claimant seeking compensation for substantial aggravation of a pre-existing condition to prove that the condition existed before the injury and that the injury substantially aggravated it.

Strickler v. Columbus · filed 2014-03-31(C)(4)

Injuries covered by workers' compensation do not include "condition[s] that pre-existed an injury unless [the] pre-existing condition is substantially aggravated by the injury." R.C. 4123.01(C)(4). Thus, when a claimant seeks participation in the fund for a substantial aggravation of a pre-existing condition, the claimant bears the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the condition existed prior to the date of injury, and the injury substantially aggravated the pre-existing condition.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires objective evidence of substantial aggravation of a pre-existing condition, though subjective complaints may also support the claim.

Coler v. Anchor Acquisition, L.L.C. · filed 2014-09-15(C)(4)

The trial court was permitted to consider objective, as well as subjective, evidence of the substantial aggravation of appellee’s pre-existing condition, but there had to be some objective evidence. R.C. 4123.01(C); Brate v. Rolls-Royce Energy Systems, Inc., 5th Dist. No 12CA1, 2012-Ohio-4577. We find there was competent and credible evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that there was some objective evidence, coupled with subjective evidence, that appellee’s injury had been substantially aggravated by the accident.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires objective evidence of substantial aggravation of a pre-existing condition, but does not require documentation of the condition from before the injury.

Fabro v. OhioHealth Corp. · filed 2014-11-20(C)(4)

While R.C. 4123.01(C)(4) mandates objective evidence of substantial aggravation of a pre-existing condition, we agree with those courts that have held that the language of the statute does not require a plaintiff to produce pre-injury documentation of a pre-existing condition in order to prove a substantial aggravation claim.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires objective diagnostic findings, objective clinical findings, or objective test results to substantiate a substantial aggravation of a pre-existing condition.

Anderson v. Bueher · filed 2016-02-23(C)(4)

As for Dr. Wroble's November 18, 2013 operative notes, none of Dr. Wroble's statements, as cited above, constitute "objective diagnostic findings, objective clinical findings, or objective test results," as required by R.C. 4123.01(C)(4).

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires objective evidence of substantial aggravation of a preexisting condition; a diagnostic manual, self-reported history, and subjective psychological tests do not suffice.

Little v. Dayton Pub. Schools · filed 2015-01-23(C)(4)

We disagree with Little’s assertion that the DSM-IV, her history, and the psychological tests that Reynolds administered satisfy the requirements of R.C. 4123.01(C)(4).

Section 4123.01(C)(4) treats a substantial aggravation of a preexisting condition as an injury for workers’ compensation purposes.

Roos v. Morrison · filed 2019-04-24(C)(4)

Additionally, aggravation of a preexisting condition (at issue in this case) qualifies as an “injury” under Ohio’s workers’ compensation system. R.C. 4123.01(C)(4).

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires evidence of a pre-existing condition before a claimant can establish substantial aggravation of that condition.

Meredith v. Alliance Castings Co., L.L.C. · filed 2021-07-27(C)(4)

In order to establish substantial aggravation, there first must be evidence of a pre-existing condition.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires evidence of a pre-existing condition to establish substantial aggravation of that condition.

Siegel v. Morrison · filed 2021-08-03(C)(4)

In order to establish substantial aggravation, there first must be evidence of a pre-existing condition. ... We find appellant presented medical evidence to support conditions that pre-existed the date of the accident prior to the objected to testimony.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires objective evidence of substantial aggravation, but does not require objective evidence that the condition itself preexisted the injury.

Houlihan v. Morrison · filed 2021-09-08(C)(4)

However, R.C. 4123.01(C)(4) does not require the preexisting condition itself to be established by objective evidence.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) does not require objective evidence of a pre-injury reference point to prove substantial aggravation of a pre-existing condition.

Fowler v. Indian River Juvenile Corr. Facility · filed 2021-12-16(C)(4)

Because the Revised Code does not require objective evidence of a pre-injury reference point, we find that the trial court erred when it concluded that Fowler’s failure to provide objective evidence of a pre-injury reference point was a fatal flaw and that without it summary judgment should be granted.

MMPI-2 results can provide objective test evidence that a work injury substantially aggravated a preexisting psychological condition.

Dunn v. Devco Holdings, Inc. · filed 2023-03-06(C)(5)

The testimony presented by the parties provided evidence from which the trial court could conclude that the MMPI-2 provided objective results. ... Thus, with its first argument under this assignment of error, Devco has not established that the trial court’s conclusion in this case is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Section 4123.01(C)(5) allows objective x-ray findings to substantiate aggravation of a pre-existing condition even if the expert does not call the findings objective.

Weston v. FCA US, L.L.C. · filed 2023-06-09(C)(5)

While Dr. Giagordis fails to use the term “objective” in his testimony, he clearly references objective clinical x-ray findings performed on the appellee.

Section 4123.01(C)(5) does not require medical documentation of a preexisting condition from before the workplace injury to establish substantial aggravation.

Taye v. Cuyahoga Hills Juvenile Corr. Facility · filed 2026-01-08(C)(5)

In contravention to the statutory language of R.C. 4123.01(C)(5) and the holdings of Gardi and Haynik, CHJCF argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because Taye failed to provide pre-injury documentation. ... Viewing the only argument raised in the CHJCH’s summary judgment motion — that Taye failed to provide pre-injury documentation of his aggravated condition — we find CHJCH was not entitled to summary judgment.

Section 4123.01(C)(4)'s objective-evidence requirement may be satisfied at summary judgment by a physician's report and testimony drawing on clinical findings, postinjury MRIs, medical records, and treatment history.

Schaefer v. Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc. · filed 2018-09-28(C)(4)

For purposes of the summary judgment exercise, what was elicited from Dr. Moufawad in his report and deposition was sufficient to comport with the R.C. 4123.01(C)(4) requirement of objective diagnostic findings, objective clinical findings, or objective test results.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) permits consideration of subjective complaints of substantial aggravation when objective diagnostic or clinical findings support them.

State ex rel. Knight Transp. v. Indus. Comm. · filed 2021-12-28(C)(4)

Because Dr. Fye's opinion constitutes objective diagnostic and/or objective clinical findings that the aggravation of the claimant's preexisting arachnoid cyst condition had not abated, the commission could also consider the claimant's subjective complaints in reaching its decision.

Section 4123.01(C)(4) requires objective diagnostic findings, clinical findings, or test results to substantiate substantial aggravation of a preexisting condition.

Brannon v. Buehrer · filed 2013-02-28(C)(4)

A compensable injury does not include a condition that preexisted the injury unless the “pre-existing condition is substantially aggravated by the injury. Such a substantial aggravation must be documented by objective diagnostic findings, objective clinical findings, or objective test results.” R.C. 4123.01(C)(4). Dr. Kilroy never cited any objective medical evidence that Brannon’s “preexisting COPD” had been substantially aggravated by his work exposures.

Section 4123.01(B) does not treat a company physician treating an injured worker as an employee for purposes of fellow-employee immunity.

Proctor v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1972-11-09(B)

We conclude that a physician on the employer’s payroll is not an “employee” as defined in E. C. 4123.01(B) and therefore not an employee within the meaning of the immunity section of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Section 4123.01(A)(2) includes a person serving an employer as an employee unless the employment is both casual and outside the usual course of the employer’s business.

Proctor v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1973-10-10(A)(2)

It thus appears that a person “in the service of” a qualifying employer is an “employee,” unless that person’s employment is both casual and not in the usual course of his employer’s business.

Section 4123.01(A)(2) includes a worker supplied by a staffing company as the customer's employee when the worker serves the customer under an implied contract of hire.

Campbell v. Central Terminal Warehouse · filed 1978-12-06(A)(2)

Furthermore, we find that under the express provisions of R. C. 4123.01 appellant was an “employee” of Central.

Section 4123.01 includes paid church workers as employees and their incorporated church as an employer.

Victory Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Industrial Commission · filed 1982-03-24(A)(2), (B)(2)

Thus, the persons receiving pay for operating the church and school fall within the plain language of the statute’s definition of employees. Likewise, the church comes within the statutory definition of an employer.

Section 4123.01(B) permits an entity that controls a worker’s daily activities and indirectly pays workers’ compensation premiums to be treated as the worker’s employer.

Foran v. Fisher Foods, Inc. · filed 1985-06-05(B)

These indirect payments as well as the day-to-day exercise of control are sufficient to establish Fisher Foods as appellant’s employer for purposes of this appeal.

Section 4123.01(A)(2) extends workers’ compensation coverage to household employees who earn $160 or more in cash from one employer in a calendar quarter.

Rowe v. Riess · filed 1986-08-05(A)(2)

R.C. 4123.01(A)(2), as amended October 13, 1983, extends workers’ compensation coverage to household employees who earn $160 ... or more in cash in any calendar quarter from a single employer, and includes as “employer” every person who has in service one or more workmen regularly.

A surety for an insolvent self-insured employer that bears responsibility for benefit payments from the statutory surplus fund qualifies as an employer for participating in benefit determination proceedings and appealing an adverse decision.

Holben v. Interstate Motor Freight System · filed 1987-07-01(B)(2)(b)

Therefore, we hold that a surety for an insolvent self-insured employer, which bears the financial responsibility for benefit payments from the statutory surplus fund, is included within the definition of “employer” in R.C. 4123.01(B) for the limited purpose of participating in the workers’ compensation benefit determination proceedings, and therefore may appeal a decision of the Industrial Commission or a regional board of review to the court of common pleas, pursuant to R.C. 4123.519.

Section 4123.01’s definition of employee covers a person paid at a set rate to work off a fine under a municipal court’s direction.

Faulkner v. Mayfield · filed 1988-03-25(A)(1)(a)

The clear legislative intent is to make workers’ compensation coverage broad enough to include the entire range of employment relations people might enter into. There are no specific statutory exclusions from participation in the fund for persons who are injured while working off a fine, nor has the issue presented in this case ever been considered in Ohio.

A paid union representative may qualify as an employee for workers’ compensation when the union is obligated to pay for the work and controls how it is performed.

Doyle v. Mayfield · filed 1988-08-15(A)(1)(b)

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that appellee was an employee of the union under the workers’ compensation statute and therefore was entitled to participate in the workers’ compensation fund.

Section 4123.01 covers a household worker whose employment contract would have paid at least $160 in a calendar quarter but for an injury, even if the worker had not yet earned that amount.

Skaggs v. Mayfield · filed 1989-05-16(A)(1)(b)

We are persuaded that it was the intention of the legislature to offer coverage to any household worker who according to his contract of employment will in the quarter concerned earn $160 or more and who, but for his injury, would have earned $160 or more, and we so hold.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) includes supervisory workers in its definition of employee.

State ex rel. Cotterman v. St. Marys Foundry · filed 1989-10-11(A)(1)(b)

The statute does not require that an employee be non-supervisory, but requires only that he be in the service of any person, firm or private corporation.

Section 4123.01(B)(2)(a) includes an Ohio employer that hires employees to perform at least some of their work in Ohio, even if their contract calls for work primarily elsewhere.

Bridges v. National Engineering & Contracting Co. · filed 1990-02-28(B)(2)(a)

This line of cases disposes of the dispute before us today, as here we deal with an Ohio employer who hired employees to perform at least some of their work in Ohio, and the employees suffered injury within Ohio. Under such circumstances, the Ohio employer is clearly an “employer” within the meaning of R.C. 4123.01(B)(2)(a).

Section 4123.01(B)(2) includes an employer bound by an express or implied contract of hire; signing a worker's paychecks can support an implied employment relationship.

Bagin v. Irc Fibers Co. · filed 1991-01-02(B)(2)

The crucial question in this case boils down to whether an employee-employer relationship existed between appellee and appellant's husband. "Employer" is defined by R.C. 4123.01 (B) as: ... Although appellant correctly cites Coviello v. Indus. Comm. (1935), 129 Ohio St. 589 , 3 O.O. 9, 196 N.E. 661 , for the proposition that, in order for an employer-employee relation to exist, there must be an implied or expressed contract of hire, appellee's signing of appellant's husband's paychecks is sufficient at least to imply such a relationship.

Section 4123.01(B)(2) does not limit employers to those whose employees work exclusively in Ohio.

Dotson v. Com Trans, Inc. · filed 1991-10-25(B)(2)

This section does not limit “employer” to mean only those who have employees working exclusively in Ohio.

A person performing community service in lieu of a misdemeanor sentence is not an employee of the agency where the work is performed because there is no express or implied contract of hire with that agency.

Republic-Franklin Insurance v. City of Amherst · filed 1990-04-18(A)(1)(a)

There is no express or implied contract of hire between the community service worker and the agency using his services. Hence, the community service worker cannot be considered an employee of the agency.

A municipal worker engaged in horseplay disconnected from employment is not “in the service of” the employer unless the employer consents to or acquiesces in the horseplay.

Caygill v. Jablonski · filed 1992-09-30(A)(1)(a)

Upon consideration of the entire record of proceedings that was before the trial court and the law as set forth above, this court finds: ... (2) pursuant to R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(a), a person who is under a contract of hire with a municipal corporation is an “employee” when he is “in the service of” such employer; (3) an employee who causes an injury on his employer’s time and premises while engaged in “horseplay,” disconnected from his employment, is not “in the service of” his employer and does not qualify for statutory immunity under R.C. 4123.741, unless his employer consents to or acquiesces in such horseplay; ... (7) the trial court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that appellee was immune from liability under R.C. 4123.741.

Section 4123.01(A) excludes an independent contractor from employee status when the carrier does not control the manner or means of the contractor’s work.

Haring v. Triangle Equipment Corp. · filed 1992-11-06(A)

Nevertheless, upon review of the undisputed facts in this case, we believe reasonable minds could only conclude that appellant was an independent contractor and not an employee of Triangle.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(a) excludes a worker engaged in horseplay disconnected from employment from the definition of an employee in service of the employer.

Caygill v. Jablonski · filed 1994-01-21(A)(1)(a)

The basis for our finding was that (1) R.C. 4123.741 only gives immunity to tortfeasors who are “employees”; (2) an employee is defined under R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(a) as “[ejvery person in the service of * * * ” his employer (emphasis added); and (3) a worker who is engaged in horseplay disconnected with his employment is not at that time in the service of his employer and is not, therefore, an “employee” entitled to immunity under R.C. 4123.741.

Section 4123.01(B)(1) treats the county as the employer for workers’ compensation purposes when a claimant works for a county board of mental retardation.

Istenes v. Lake County Auditor · filed 1994-09-19(B)(1)

Therefore, in light of Tudor, appellee’s assertion that the board of mental retardation is the real party in interest is incorrect because under R.C. 4123.01(B), the county is the proper party.

Section 4123.01(B) defines “employer” without distinguishing between self-insured employers and employers insured through the state fund.

Powers v. City of North Royalton · filed 1995-05-04(B)

There is no distinction between those employers who are self-insured and those insured through the state fund.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(a) treats volunteer members of township or municipal police and fire departments as employees by operation of law, but does not include volunteers assisting a county park district’s law enforcement unit.

Conover v. Lake County Metro Parks System · filed 1996-09-30(A)(1)(a)

The statute does not mention volunteers that work with county-sponsored police organizations, only volunteer policemen who provide services to townships and municipalities. Consequently, this court will not insert volunteer members of a unit related to a county park district law enforcement unit into the language of R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(a).

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(a) includes a county work-relief worker in its definition of “employee” for workers’ compensation purposes.

State ex rel. Patterson v. Indus. Comm. · filed 1996-12-24(A)(1)(a)

Further, R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(a) defines “employee” to include “[e]very person in the service of the state, or of any county, municipal corporation, township, or school district therein.” Appellant’s decedent was thus an “employee” for purposes of receiving compensation due.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) does not shift employer status to the party that hired a noncomplying independent contractor when an off-duty officer is injured while performing police duties.

Cooper v. City of Dayton · filed 1997-06-06(A)(1)(b)

Consequently, we conclude that the city of Dayton, not Groeeryland or Pawelski, was Cooper’s “employer” for workers’ compensation purposes. As a result, we find R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(b) inapplicable.

Section 4123.01(A) defines “employee” in Chapter 4123 as the individual worker, not the worker’s estate.

Sallach v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 1997-06-30(A)

R.C. 4123.01(A) defines “employee” as used in R.C. Chapter 4123 as meaning the worker individually, not the worker’s estate.

A person working for a private corporation is an employee under § 4123.01(A)(1)(b) even when using an assumed name.

Dennis v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1997-07-16(A)(1)(b)

An “employee” for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act includes “[e]very person in the service of any * * * private corporation.” R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(b). ... The person calling himself Walter Dennis is the employee who was in the service of Ford from 1976 until the time he filed a workers’ compensation claim for injury allegedly sustained in the course of his employment with Ford.

Section 4123.01(G) defines a self-insuring employer as one authorized to pay workers’ compensation and benefits directly; an employer participating as an insured company does not qualify.

Minneapolis Flour Co. v. City of Cleveland · filed 2010-06-10(G)

Minneapolis Flour’s assertion that it participates in the Ohio Workers’ Compensation system demonstrates that it is not a self-insured employer within the meaning of R.C. 4123.01(G).

Section 4123.01(C)’s employment-related injury standard does not require the commission to apply every Lord and Cooper factor when identifying the responsible employer.

State ex rel. Village of Oakwood v. Industrial Commission · filed 2010-12-02(C)

There is no exhaustive list of factors to be used when determining whether an injury was incurred in the course of, and arose from, a claimant’s employment and thus is compensable under the workers’ compensation system. ... We believe that this principle applies in cases such as this one, in which the issue is the identification of the proper employer. The three factors identified in Lord and Cooper, while helpful to making this determination, are not exhaustive, and we do not believe that the commission must be required to apply the factors in every case in which the identity of the correct employer is uncertain.

Section 4123.01(B)(1)(b) treats a public service corporation as a private employer, but an entity that provides no services directly to the public does not qualify as one.

State ex rel. Ohio-Kentucky-Indiana Regional Council of Govts. v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp. · filed 2021-06-15(B)(1)(b)

Because OKI does not provide a public service and does not provide any services directly to the public, the magistrate erred in concluding OKI qualified as a public service corporation under R.C. 4123.01(B)(1)(b).

Section 4123.01(B)(1)(a) defines public employers by specific entity categories; calling an organization a public body does not make it a public employer.

State ex rel. Ohio-Kentucky-Indiana Regional Council of Govts. v. Bur. of Workers' Comp. · filed 2022-09-06(B)(1)(a)

OKI does not fit into any of the categories of public employers in R.C. 4123.01(B)(1)(a), which are delineated with great specificity. The fact that OKI calls itself a “public body” in its articles (apparently for the purpose of receiving federal transportation funds), does not override the terms of the Ohio Revised Code and make OKI a “public employer” for workers’ compensation purposes when it does not meet the statutory definition of one.

Section 4123.01, as amended, contains no definition of benefits.

Swartz v. Flowers · filed 1973-07-31

In the first instance, the interpretation of R. C. 4123.01 and 4123.66 that the Attorney General seems to find important, no longer applies today because R. C. 4123.01 has been amended, and the amended version excludes any definition of benefits.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to arise out of and occur in the course of employment; the zone of employment extends only to places under the employer’s control.

Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Industrial Commission · filed 1977-01-24(C)

Barber, supra, and Merz, supra, clearly stand as authority for the proposition that it is indispensable to a zone of employment determination that the place of injury be under the control of the employer.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a causal connection between the injury and employment, assessed from the circumstances of the accident, including proximity to work, employer control, and employer benefit.

Lord v. Daugherty · filed 1981-06-17(C)

The issue as to whether there is a sufficient “causal connection” to justify the injured party’s right to participate in the Workers’ Compensation Fund depends upon the “totality of the facts and circumstances” regarding the accident. Such circumstances include: (1) the proximity of the scene of the accident to the place of employment; (2) the degree of control the employer had over the scene of the accident; and (3) the benefit the employer received from the injured employee’s presence at the scene of the accident. ... In this case, there is no construction of the evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that the decedent was within the scope of his employment at the time of his accident.

Section 4123.01(C)’s requirement that an injury arise out of and occur in the course of employment may be evaluated under the two-pronged special hazard rule.

Johnman v. Packard Electric Division · filed 1986-09-15(C)

We hold that appellant’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits should have been analyzed in the context of the two-pronged test of the special hazard rule.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to arise out of and occur in the course of employment to qualify for workers’ compensation.

Dolby v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1989-03-20(C)

An injury sustained by an employee is compensable under Ohio’s Workers’ Compensation Act only if it was “received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.”

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury both to occur in the course of employment and to arise out of it before compensation is allowed.

Fisher v. Mayfield · filed 1990-03-14(C)

We now expressly recognize the conjunctive nature of the coverage formula of “in the course of and arising out of” the employment. Therefore, all elements of the formula must be met before compensation will be allowed.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of employment and arise out of it; an injury during voluntary blood donation did not qualify where donation was not a regular incident of employment.

Williams v. Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. · filed 1994-12-27(C)

In order for an injured employee to collect workers’ compensation benefits, the injury must have been “received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). ... Hence, we find the injury to appellee’s arm did not arise out of appellee’s employment. ... We also find that the injury to appellee’s arm did not occur during the course of appellee’s employment.

Section 4123.01(C) covers injuries sustained while returning from a medical examination required to maintain benefits for a prior work injury when those injuries arise out of the employment.

Woodrum v. Premier Auto Glass Co. · filed 1995-05-17(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C) defines a compensable injury as one which is accidental and received in the course of and arising out of the injured employee’s employment. ... We find that appellant’s injuries were directly and proximately caused by circumstances that arose out of his employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a causal connection between employment and injury; a heart attack unrelated to employment is not compensable.

Childers v. Whirlpool Corp. · filed 1995-08-24(C)

In the absence of any allegation or evidence that the decedent’s heart attack was caused or accelerated by physical or mental stresses brought on by his employment, we must conclude that the decedent’s actual heart attack would not be compensable, as it was unrelated to his employment. See R.C. 4123.01(C)(2). We therefore reject the appellant’s contention that an injury caused by Hill’s allegedly negligent treatment of a noncompensable injury is compensable under the workers’ compensation statute.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an on-call employee’s injury while traveling to answer an employer page when the travel is a substantial part of the job and the injury arises out of the employment.

Durbin v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation · filed 1996-06-26(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C) provides that in order for an injury to be compensable, it must be “received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” ... In light of the totality of the circumstances, and by applying a liberal construction to the words “in the course of, and arising out of,” we hold that Durbin’s injuries occurred in the course of and arose out of his employment.

An injury caused by an employee’s idiopathic condition and an unimpeded fall onto an ordinary floor does not arise out of employment.

Harris v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation · filed 1996-12-18(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C) states that for an injury to be compensable from the workers’ compensation fund, it must be “received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” This test is conjunctive. ... We hold that Harris’s injury did not arise out of his employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; an injury during a personal errand after work does not qualify.

Jackson v. Univ. Hosp. of Cleveland · filed 1997-08-18(C)

For the foregoing reasons, this court finds that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of University Hospitals and denied appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, since, it is apparent from the record, appellant’s injury did not occur in the course of, or arise out of, her employment with University Hospitals.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment to qualify for workers' compensation.

Pascarella v. Abx Air, Inc., Unpublished Decision (8-10-1998) · filed 1998-08-10(C)

Even if Pascarella's injury occurred "in the course of employment," it will not meet the statutory definition of R.C. 4123.01 (C) unless it also arose out of his employment. Both elements are required for recovery from the workers' compensation fund. ... In summary, we find that the trial court improperly granted the motion for summary judgment filed by ABX because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Pascarella's injury was in the course of and arose of his employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment.

Duncan v. Ohio Blow Pipe Co. · filed 1998-10-05(C)

In order for an injury to be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, both prongs of the test set forth in R.C. 4123.01(C) must be satisfied. That is, the injury must be received “in the course of’ as well as “arise out of’ the employment.

Section 4123.01 requires a claimant to prove an accidental injury in the course of and arising out of employment.

Cruze v. Corning, Inc., Unpublished Decision (11-17-2000) · filed 2000-11-17

In order to prove his claim for relief, Cruze had the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he sustained an accidental injury in the course of and arising out of his employment. R.C. 4123.01 ; Fisher v. Mayfield (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 275 . ... Here, its use lacked any capacity to confuse or mislead the jury, referring as it did to those elements that were necessary to the claim, which the court had previously identified.

An injury must be received in the course of and arise out of the employee’s employment.

Bradley v. Bureau of Workers' Compensation, Unpublished Decision (9-25-2000) · filed 2000-09-25(C)

"Injury" is defined by R.C. 4123.01 (C) to include: any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment. ... The jury could reasonably have found that an injury did not occur in the course of Bradley's employment with Tri-State.

A teacher acting partly as a union representative can be injured in the course of employment while discussing employment matters with management at school during work hours.

Brown v. Upper Sandusky Schools · filed 2000-10-13(C)

The trial court’s ruling on this issue is without precedent and endorses the erroneous presumption that union representatives are not covered under worker’s compensation for the work-related injuries they sustain.

Section 4123.01(C) excludes an injury sustained while commuting to a fixed workplace because the commute is not in the course of employment.

Hughes v. Hughes Enterprises, Inc., Unpublished Decision (12-14-2000) · filed 2000-12-14(C)

For the purposes of workers' compensation, R.C. 4123.01 (C) defines an "injury" as "any injury, whether caused by external means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." ... As we have already stated, the coming-and-going rule provides that a commute to a fixed work situs bears no meaningful relationship to the employment and thus, does not fit within the "in the course of" prong of the test.

An officer who slips on his front porch steps before reporting for an overtime shift is not injured in the course of employment under § 4123.01(C).

Rantamaki v. Conrad, Unpublished Decision (3-3-2006) · filed 2006-03-03(C)

Therefore, even when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to appellant, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether appellant sustained his injury while "in the course" of his employment. Appellant fails to meet the first prong of the R.C. 4123.01 (C) inquiry.

An injury sustained while an employee is joyriding falls outside the course of employment and is not compensable.

Keating v. Classic East, Inc., 2008-L-001 (7-25-2008) · filed 2008-07-25(C)

With the foregoing facts in evidence, we hold the injuries leading to the decedent's death were not sustained "in the course of, and arising out of" his employment.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury sustained while an employee returns to her car after a brief personal shopping trip following her shift when the connection to her employment remains intact.

Taylor v. Meijer, Inc. · filed 2009-04-17(C)

Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the time, place, and circumstances of her injury, we conclude that Taylor’s injury, sustained when she exited the Meijer store ten minutes after the end of her shift to return to her car — albeit with groceries — occurred in the course of and arose out of her employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; whether helping a coworker meets that standard can require factfinding.

Cotton v. Bureau of Workers' Compensation · filed 2011-01-28(C)

Whether an injury arises in the course of employment is a mixed question of law and fact, and genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment for either party in the case before us.

An employee's injury in the employer's parking lot after voluntarily picking up a paycheck under the employer's pay policy arises out of and occurs in the course of employment.

Hirschle v. Mabe, 22954 (4-27-2009) · filed 2009-04-27(C)

Her injury has a causal connection to an important (especially to her) aspect of her employment. Therefore, her injury arose out of her employment, satisfying the coverage formula's first conjunct. ... That the injury occurs while engaging in a voluntary activity is irrelevant. Therefore, Ms. Hirschle received her injury "in the course of" her employment.

An injury sustained during a personal detour for lunch may fall outside the course of employment and therefore be ineligible for workers’ compensation benefits.

Jones v. Multicare Health & Educational Servs., Inc. · filed 2014-08-28(C)

To recover workers’ compensation benefits, Ohio law requires that the worker demonstrate that an injury occurred both “in the course of” employment and that it “arises out of” that employment. ... Therefore, there was competent, credible evidence to support the notion that Jones’ injury was related to a personal frolic and did not occur in the course of his employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur both in the course of and arising out of employment; ordinary commuting hazards do not satisfy that requirement.

Deems v. Minute Men, Inc. · filed 2016-12-21(C)

To qualify for participation in Ohio’s workers' compensation scheme, an employee must suffer an injury “in the course of, and arising out of,” her employment. R.C. 4123.01(C). ... Deems did not suffer an injury in the course of, and arising out of, her employment.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury sustained while an employee walks from an employee parking lot to work when the circumstances establish a causal connection to employment.

Taylor v. Promedica Mem'l Hosp. · filed 2017-08-04(C)

Accordingly, we find that appellee meets both the "in the course of" and "arising out of" prongs of R.C. 4123.01(C).

Section 4123.01(C) covers injuries received in the course of and arising out of employment; briefly setting aside a work item to speak with coworkers does not necessarily take an employee outside the course of employment.

Owens v. Giant Eagle, Inc. · filed 2022-01-27(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C) defines an injury for purposes of workers’ compensation. ... The fact that Owens placed the cheese on the deli counter prior to his ankle injury and went to speak with his manager and coworkers behind the deli counter does not place Owens’s activities outside of the scope of employment. ... Accordingly, we find that the assigned error has merit and Giant Eagle was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury that develops gradually from the performance of job duties.

Village v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1984-12-31(C)

We hold, therefore, that an injury which develops gradually over time as the result of the performance of the injured worker’s job-related duties is compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C).

Section 4123.01(C) covers work injuries that develop gradually; a gradual injury need not develop over months or years.

Hunt v. Mayfield · filed 1989-11-22(C)

R.C. 4123.01 defines an injury as “any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). ... Clearly then, gradual injury does not mean months or years under the terms of Village.

Section 4123.01(C)'s definition of injury includes aggravation of a pre-existing condition.

Rutter v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., Unpublished Decision (5-26-1999) · filed 1999-05-26(C)

Revised Code § 4123.01 (C) provides that injuries covered under the workers' compensation system shall be those injuries "received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." ... First, "an injury, for workers' compensation purposes, includes an aggravation of a pre-existing condition."

Section 4123.01(C)(2) excludes conditions caused primarily by natural deterioration, but a separate instruction on that exclusion is unnecessary when the instructions as a whole require proof that the condition was proximately caused by the workplace accident.

Mokros v. Conrad, Unpublished Decision (10-29-1999) · filed 1999-10-29(C)(2)

By the jury instructions it is abundantly clear that the jury could find that Appellee's condition could have been caused by something other than the accident in question, including natural deterioration. The court emphasized that to be compensable, Appellee's condition must have been proximately caused by the December 31, 1989, accident. Absent contrary proof, we must presume that the jury followed the court's instructions. Pang v. Minch (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 186 , 195 . We hold that the trial court's instructions to the jury were proper and that the court did not abuse its discretion.

Section 4123.01(C) covers injuries that develop gradually from job duties; such an injury need not occur when the worker first feels pain.

Zestos v. Powertrain Div., Unpublished Decision (9-27-2002) · filed 2002-09-27(C)

The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that "[a]n injury which develops gradually over time as the result of the performance of the injured worker's job-related duties is compensable under R.C. 4123.01 (C)." Village v. General Motors Corp. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 129 , syllabus. Thus, it follows that an injury may not necessarily occur until repeated exposure to that which caused the harm.

Section 4123.01(C)(2) excludes injury or disability caused primarily by the natural deterioration of tissue, an organ, or any part of the body.

Laporte v. J.P. Food Service, Unpublished Decision (9-21-2001) · filed 2001-09-21(C)(2)

The first assignment of error is: "The trial court erred in granting defendant's request for special instructions that `injury does not include injury or disability caused primarily by the natural deterioration of tissue, an organ or any part of the body'" ... The instruction at issue here is a correct statement of law because it essentially restates verbatim the statutory language of R.C. 4123.01 (C)(2).

Section 4123.01(C)(2) does not bar a claim for aggravation of a pre-existing condition when evidence shows a workplace accident caused the aggravation.

Hollar v. Pleasant Township, Unpublished Decision (12-16-2003) · filed 2003-12-16(C)(2)

However, even though Dr. Cook testified that the degenerative disc disease was primarily a natural deterioration of appellee's spine, Dr. Cook also testified the herniated disc was the result of the accident, and that the accident also aggravated the pre-existing disc disease. Dr. Cook did not testify as appellant contends, but, rather, testified that appellee's accident aggravated the pre-existing condition and also caused the herniated disc. The testimony did not entitle appellant to a directed verdict and the trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion.

Section 4123.01(C) permits compensation for an injury that develops gradually from job duties, but wear-and-tear aggravation of a pre-existing non-occupational disease is not compensable.

Paris v. Dairy Mart-Lawson Co., Unpublished Decision (12-12-2003) · filed 2003-12-12(C)

We agree with Dairy Mart that Ohio law does not recognize a claim for wear-and-tear aggravation of a non-occupational disease. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction on wear-and-tear aggravation of a pre-existing non-occupational disease.

Section 4123.01(C) includes wear and tear and gradual onset injuries in its definition of injury.

Brink v. Olson Cold Storage, 4-07-26 (4-14-2008) · filed 2008-04-14(C)

"Wear and tear," "Village-type" and "gradual onset" injuries fall within R.C. 4123.01 (C)'s definition of "injury" because it includes "any injury."

Section 4123.01 permits compensation for aggravation of a pre-existing condition caused by a distinct work injury, but excludes injury caused primarily by natural deterioration.

Swogger v. Hopkins Construction, Unpublished Decision (12-29-2004) · filed 2004-12-29(C)(2)

The aggravation issue in the "injury" context need not look to the Supreme Court's holding Brody, for the statutory definition of "injury" itself precludes worker's compensation recovery for injuries that are caused by the natural deterioration of the body caused by normal wear and tear. R.C. 4123.01 (C)(2) excludes from the definition of "injury" those which are "caused primarily by the natural deterioration of tissue, an organ, or part of the body[.]"

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury that develops gradually from performing job duties.

Harris v. Custom Graphics, Unpublished Decision (1-27-2005) · filed 2005-01-27(C)

R.C. 4123.01 (C) defines "injury" as follows: "Injury includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." ... "An injury which develops gradually over time as the result of the performance of the injured worker's job-related duties is compensable under R.C. 4123.01 (C)." ... Similarly in the case sub judice, the medical evidence supports Harris' claims. ... Construing R.C. 4123.95 liberally in favor of Harris, we find that she is entitled to participate in the fund.

Section 4123.01(C) allows an employee to participate in the workers’ compensation fund for aggravation of a preexisting condition when the aggravation is causally connected to employment.

Cyrus v. Yellow Transportation, Inc. · filed 2006-12-21(C)

An employee may participate in the workers’ compensation fund for aggravation of a preexisting condition, so long as the condition causally connects to the activities, the conditions, or the environment of his employment.

Section 4123.01(C)(2) excludes disability caused primarily by natural deterioration, but does not bar an allowance when the evidence does not establish that natural deterioration primarily caused the disability.

Dunn v. Honda of America, Unpublished Decision (12-18-2006) · filed 2006-12-18(C)(2)

Given Dr. Halley's discrepant statements, we cannot say that the deposition testimony as a whole establishes that the disability at issue, the exacerbated pain and symptoms related to Dunn's pre-existing osteoarthritis, was caused primarily by natural deterioration. Accordingly, we conclude, as did the trial court, that R.C. 4123.01 (C)(2) does not apply under the particular facts of this case and hold that the trial court did not err when it affirmed the Industrial Commission's decision to grant Dunn the right to participate in the workers' compensation system for the additional allowance.

Section 4123.01(C) includes an injury that develops gradually from an employee’s job duties when the evidence establishes that the work caused it.

Warner v. DMAX Ltd., L.L.C. · filed 2015-10-23(C)

It was within the province of the jury to decide that Warner met her burden of proving that her injury developed over time as the gradual result of her work-related duties with the testimony of her treating physician, Dr. Saunders, who testified that repetitive work over a long period of time caused her injuries.

Section 4123.01(C) covers injuries caused by repetitive work activities over a discernible period of time, but excludes injuries caused primarily by natural deterioration.

Day v. Rochling-Glastic Composites, L.P. · filed 2020-03-19(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C) defines “injury” for purposes of workers’ compensation as “any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” ... Therefore, there was sufficient evidence establishing that Day’s shoulder conditions were directly and proximately caused by repetitive work activities performed within a repetitive and discernible period of time.

Section 4123.01(C) permits compensation for a work-related injury that develops gradually without requiring it to occur within a particular time frame.

Given v. Whirlaway Corp. · filed 2022-06-30(C)

Moreover, inapposite to Whirlaway Corporation’s argument, neither R.C. 4123.01, nor the Village decision, place any time-constraint on whether a worker’s gradual injury is compensable under Ohio law.

Section 4123.01(C) excludes disabilities caused solely by emotional stress without contemporaneous physical injury or physical trauma from compensable injuries.

Szymanski v. Halle's Department Store · filed 1980-07-23(C)

We hold that disabilities, such as the one in this cause, which are caused solely by emotional stress without contemporaneous physical injury or physical trauma are not compensable injuries within the meaning of R. C. 4123.01(C).

Section 4123.01(C) does not cover a psychological disability caused by work stress without a physical injury.

Mettes v. Transamerica Ins. Corp. · filed 1987-05-05(C)

Since there was no physical injury involved, appellant’s psychological disability is not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Section 4123.01(C)(1) excludes a mental injury caused by a mental stimulus from compensable injury.

Wolf v. Northmont City Schools · filed 1987-07-10(C)(1)

As we similarly concluded in Rine-hart, the appellant in the case at bar alleges a mental injury resulting from a mental stimulus, which is not com-pensable under R.C. 4123.01(C)(1).