Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3937.18

Section 3937.18 does not require a homeowner's policy with limited coverage for nonregistered, non-highway vehicles to offer uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.

Burnett v. Amex Assurance Company, Unpublished Decision (9-13-2001) · filed 2001-09-13

Thus, Davidson held: A homeowner's insurance policy that provides limited liability coverage for vehicles that are not subject to motor vehicle registration and that are not intended to be used on a public highway is not a motor vehicle liability policy and is not subject to the requirement of former R.C. 3937.18 to offer uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. Id. at syllabus. Therefore, Burnett's claim that she is entitled to UM/UIM coverage because non-registered recreational vehicles are covered under the policy is without merit.

Subsection (L) limits the policies subject to Ohio's UM/UIM statute to qualifying proof-of-financial-responsibility policies and umbrella policies written as excess of them; a pre-amendment general-liability policy with limited non-owned-auto coverage can still be subject to UIM coverage imposed by law.

Green v. Cincinnati Insurance, Co., Unpublished Decision (12-7-2001) · filed 2001-12-07(L)

Added in 1997, R.C. 2939.18(L) defined the "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance" subject to the UM/UIM statute as 1) a policy that serves a "proof of financial responsibility" pursuant to R.C. 4509.01(K), 2) an umbrella policy written as excess of an R.C.4507.01(K)policy. ... The Lexington policy, the court noted, was a general liability policy, providing coverage only for non-owned automobiles in limited circumstances. As such, the court found that it was neither a "proof of financial responsibility" policy, nor excess coverage for a "proof" policy. Therefore, the court ruled, the Lexington policy was outside the scope of Scott-Pontzer. ... On appeal, appellant summarily argues that UM/UIM coverage should have been imposed on the Lexington policy "by operation of law," but fails to support this argument with any authority or reasoning. In our view, the trial court's analysis is sound. Consequently, the court committed no error in granting summary judgment to Lexington. ... Thomas Steel's Cincinnati General Liability and Property policy, like Kent Sporting Goods' Lexington General Liability policy, covers non-owned automobiles in limited circumstances, but was issued prior to the addition of subsection (L) to R.C. 3937.18. UIM coverage, therefore, is imposed as a matter of law.

Section 3937.18 does not require a homeowner's policy's limited residence-employee motor-vehicle liability coverage to include UM/UIM coverage.

Trussell v. United Ohio Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (1-16-2002) · filed 2002-01-16

We see no reason, however, not to extend the reasoning of Davidson to the policy at issue in this case. Consequently, the policy at issue in this case cannot be construed so as to provide UM/UIM coverage.

Former § 3937.18 does not require a homeowner's insurance policy providing limited liability coverage for vehicles not subject to motor vehicle registration and not intended for use on a public highway to offer uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.

Combs v. Combs, Unpublished Decision (8-5-2002) · filed 2002-08-05

A homeowner's insurance policy that provides limited liability coverage for vehicles that are not subject to motor vehicle registration and that are not intended to be used on a public highway is not a motor vehicle liability policy and is not subject to the requirements of former R.C. 3937.18 to offer uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.

Section 3937.18 does not impose UM/UIM coverage by operation of law on a homeowner's policy because the policy is not an automobile liability policy.

Brown v. Buckeye State Mututal Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (9-27-2002) · filed 2002-09-27

Consequently, we find, as we did in Sowards, that appellant's homeowner's insurance policy is not an automobile liability policy under R.C. 3937.18. Thus, no UM/UIM coverage is afforded by operation of law under the policy.

Former Section 3937.18 does not require a homeowner's policy to offer uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage merely because a residence-employee exception provides limited coverage involving automobiles.

Lintner v. Midwestern Indemnity Co., Unpublished Decision (10-21-2002) · filed 2002-10-21

We conclude that the residence employee exception does not convert the appellants' homeowner's policies into a motor vehicle liability policy that would render it subject to the requirements of former R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 does not apply to a homeowner's policy because it is not an automobile liability or motor vehicle policy of insurance.

Rice v. Buckeye State Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (1-30-2003) · filed 2003-01-30

Specifically, Appellant argues that her homeowner's insurance policy is an "automobile liability or motor vehicle policy of insurance" subject to the provisions of R.C. 3937.18. We disagree. ... This court has previously addressed Appellant's argument inDicke v. Safeco Ins. Co., Allen App. No. 1-2000-64, 2000-Ohio-1770, where we held that a homeowner's policy, similar to the policy sub judice, was not an automobile policy for the purposes of R.C. 3937.18. ... Accordingly, Appellant's fifth assignment of error is overruled.

Section 3937.18 does not apply to a commercial general liability policy that is not proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified motor vehicles, so underinsured motorist coverage cannot be imposed by law.

Reese v. Barbiere, Unpublished Decision (9-29-2003) · filed 2003-09-29

Since the Commercial General Liability policy does not serve as proof of financial responsibility for motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy, it is not a motor vehicle liability policy. ... Therefore, the Commercial General Liability policy is not subject to R.C. 3937.18 and underinsured motorist coverage cannot be imposed as a matter of law. Consequently, appellants are not entitled to recover uninsured motorist coverage under the Commercial General Liability policy.

Former § 3937.18(A) does not require a homeowner's policy with a residence-employee exception to provide UM/UIM coverage merely because motor-vehicle-related liability coverage may arise incidentally.

Friend v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., Unpublished Decision (12-31-2002) · filed 2002-12-31(A)

We find that the limited liability coverage that may arise under the residence-employee exception in a homeowner's insurance policy is insufficient to transform the policy into a motor vehicle policy for purposes of former R.C. 3937.18 (A).

Section 3937.18(A)(2), as amended by S.B. 20, applies when a policy renewal constitutes a new insurance contract and limits underinsured-motorist benefits according to the statute's setoff rule.

Ryan v. Hartford Company, Unpublished Decision (6-25-2001) · filed 2001-06-25(A)(2)

We therefore conclude that the trial court properly found that the August 20, 1997 renewal constituted a new contract and that R.C. 3937.18 as amended by S.B. 20 applied. As such, the Ryans were not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under the Hartford policy.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) does not bar recovery of underinsured-motorist benefits merely because the insured's coverage limit is no greater than the tortfeasor's limit when other claimants prevent recovery from the tortfeasor's coverage.

Doganiero v. Insurance Co. of Ohio · filed 2001-07-05(A)(2)

The question certified for our consideration is “whether R.C. 3937.18[A][2] precludes recovery of underinsured motorist insurance benefits where the insured’s underinsured motorist coverage limits are less than or equal to the tortfeasor’s liability coverage limits but the presence of other claimants prevents the insured from recovering any part of the tortfeasor’s coverage.” ... Pursuant to our decisions in Littrell v. Wigglesworth (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 425, 746 N.E.2d 1077, and Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 744 N.E.2d 719, the certified question is answered in the negative.

Section 3937.18(D)(2) permits uninsured-motorist coverage for an unidentified vehicle when independent corroborative evidence shows that the vehicle caused the injury; evidence is independent if it comes from another source, even when the witness may have a potential interest in the claim.

Dunne v. Nationwide Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (8-10-2001) · filed 2001-08-10(D)(2)

The court interpreted "independent" to mean "from another source" as opposed to "without all potential or theoretical interest." ... Based on the reasoning of the Hassan case, we find that 1there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not appellants have a cognizable claim for coverage and the court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment.

Section 3937.18(D)(2) permits independent corroborative testimony from a non-insured third party to establish that an unidentified motorist proximately caused the insured's injury, without additional corroboration of that testimony.

Smith v. Neff, Unpublished Decision (1-17-2002) · filed 2002-01-17(D)(2)

Under R.C. 3937.18(D)(2), the only person whose testimony is precluded from constituting independent corroborative evidence is the testimony of any insured of the uninsured motorist carrier who seeks recovery from that carrier. Eversole is not an insured of Grange and his testimony is not barred from constituting independent corroborative evidence. Clearly, Eversole is independent of the insured and he is not seeking damages from Grange personally. ... On the contrary, in this case the independent testimony of Eversole, a third-party, is sufficient without corroboration. ... The necessity of corroboration applies only when the only testimony is that of an insured seeking to recover uninsured motorist benefits from his insurer.

Section 3937.18 requires independent, corroborative evidence that an unidentified driver's negligence proximately caused the injury, whether or not the unidentified vehicle physically contacted the insured's vehicle.

Forrest v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., Unpublished Decision (4-24-2002) · filed 2002-04-24(B)(3)

1. R.C. 3937.18 and public policy preclude contract provisions in insurance policies from requiring physical contact as an absolute prerequisite to recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage provision. ... We conclude that where an insured makes a claim under an uninsured motorist provision of a policy with the "physical contact" requirement, the insured must show by independent, corroborative evidence that the unidentified driver's negligence proximately caused the injury, whether or not there was physical contact with the vehicle of the insured.

Section 3937.18(B)(3) defines an uninsured motorist with an unidentifiable owner or operator by requiring independent corroborative evidence that the insured’s injury was proximately caused by the operator’s negligence or intentional conduct, and an insured’s testimony alone does not qualify unless supported by additional evidence.

Withrow v. Geico Advantage Ins. Co. · filed 2022-05-23(B)(3)

However, if UM coverage is offered, an "uninsured motorist" is defined by statute as, ... vehicle. ... For purposes of this section, "the testimony of any insured seeking recovery from the insurer shall not constitute independent corroborative evidence, unless the testimony is supported by additional evidence." ... Under the more liberal statutory requirements of R.C. 3937.18(B)(3), there is no indication from appellant's medical records to suggest that she was struck by a motor vehicle, and ultimately no independent corroborative evidence to substantiate her claims.

Section 3937.18(B)(1)(c) requires independent corroborative evidence that an unidentified motorist proximately caused the insured’s injury; the insured’s testimony alone does not qualify unless supported by additional evidence.

Rousana v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. · filed 2023-10-19(B)(1)(c)

Thus, R.C. 3937.18(B)(1)(c) and the UM endorsement set forth in Part C of Rousana’s Nationwide policy preclude the use of the insured’s testimony from being considered as independent, corroborative evidence of the insured’s entitlement to UM coverage under the insured’s own policy unless it is supported by “additional evidence.”

Under subsection (A)(2), as amended by Senate Bill 20, underinsured motorist benefits are unavailable when the tortfeasor's liability limits are greater than or equal to the insured's underinsured motorist limits, superseding Savoie.

Cleek v. Mico Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-16-2001) · filed 2001-08-16(A)(2)

Accordingly, we hold that, as it related to the availability of underinsured motorist benefits under R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), Savoie was effectively overruled by the enactment of Senate Bill 20.

The statute requires UM benefits to be reduced by amounts available for payment under the tortfeasor’s liability insurance policy.

Jones v. Progressive Preferred Insurance · filed 2006-10-18(C), (A)(2)

Under both the present version of R.C. 3937.18(C) — which was enacted in 2001, well before Mr. and Mrs. Jones’s latest policy was signed on May 19, 2002- — and R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) as it existed prior to the enactment of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 97,124 Ohio Laws 44, the amount payable by a UM insurance policy must be reduced by the amount available for payment under the tortfeasor’s liability insurance policy.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) limits UIM protection to no more than the amount available under the insured’s UM coverage if the liable persons had been uninsured, so an insured cannot recover UIM benefits after already receiving that amount.

Brown v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 2008-01-22(A)(2)

As amended by S.B. 20, R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) expressly precluded such a result, stating that UIM coverage shall not provide protection “greater than that which would be available under the insured’s [UM] coverage if the person or persons liable were uninsured at the time of the accident.”

Section 3937.18 requires auto insurance carriers to offer uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage and makes proof of inadequate tortfeasor coverage a prerequisite to an underinsured motorist claim.

Miller v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1996-06-10

R.C. 3937.18 provides that auto insurance carriers must offer uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage to their policy holders. It is an obvious prerequisite to the filing of an uninsured or underinsured motorist claim that it be established that the tortfeasor either has no insurance or that the policy is inadequate to fully compensate the plaintiffs injuries. No underinsured motorist coverage is available where there is no demonstration that the amount of coverage available from the tortfeasor is less than the amount of damages in that case.

Former Section 3937.18 requires an underinsurance claim to be paid under the circumstances identified by the court and governs how the amount of underinsurance coverage is determined.

Eason v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 1996-08-07

Pursuant to former R.C. 3937.18, an underinsurance claim must be paid, when—Determining amount of underinsurance coverage to be paid.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) permits an exhaustion requirement, making exhaustion of the tortfeasor's liability coverage a valid precondition to underinsured motorist coverage.

Atkinson v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (10-30-2001) · filed 2001-10-30(A)(2)

The Ohio Supreme Court has addressed that argument in Bogan, and rejected that reasoning. ... Nevertheless, the court held that a requirement that a tortfeasor's liability coverage be exhausted before an insured is entitled to underinsured motorist coverage is consistent with R.C. 3937.18 and a valid precondition to coverage. ... By failing to even approach exhaustion of the tortfeasor's liability limits, appellant, through the personal representative, failed to satisfy a valid precondition to coverage. Bogan, at 28. Because the exhaustion clause is a threshold requirement, and not a barrier to uninsured motorist coverage, we find that appellant's argument is not well-taken.

Section 3937.18(A) requires UM/UIM coverage for an automobile or motor-vehicle liability policy, but does not turn a homeowner’s policy with only incidental coverage for unregistered, off-road vehicles into such a policy.

Grabowski v. National Fire Ins., Unpublished Decision (11-01-2001) · filed 2001-11-01(A)

Although Davidson specifically left open the issue involving a residence employee exclusion,7 the Ohio Supreme Court lent clarity to Selander's principal that a R.C. 3937.18 will not trigger UM/UIM coverage under a homeowner's policy that provides coverage for vehicles exempt from motor vehicle registration and not intended for use on a public highway. Grabowski's homeowner's policy and the homeowner's policy in Davidson specifically excluded coverage for bodily injury arising out of the use of motor vehicles, and only provided incidental coverage to a narrow class of vehicles not subject to motor vehicle registration or designed for use on public highways.

The former version of § 3937.18 required UM/UIM coverage by operation of law only when the policy provided automobile liability coverage; a parking-only exception did not trigger that requirement.

Gruelich v. the Hartford, Unpublished Decision (12-26-2002) · filed 2002-12-26(A)

Thus, if Hartford's comprehensive general liability policy provides coverage for injuries resulting from the use of an automobile, then UIM coverage applies by operation of law. ... Thus, the "parking" exception contained within the Hartford CGL policy does not constitute an offer of automobile liability coverage. Accordingly, Gruelich is not entitled to UIM coverage by operation of law.

Former subsection (A) required an insurer to offer an equivalent increase in UM/UIM limits when liability limits were increased during the policy period; absent an express rejection, the equivalent coverage arose by operation of law.

Wilson v. Haimerl, Unpublished Decision (4-7-2003) · filed 2003-04-07(A)

We conclude that when Wausau increased the limits of CCESC's liability coverage during the policy period from April 1997 to April 1998, it was required to offer CCESC an equivalent increase in UM/UIM coverage, pursuant to former R.C. 3937.18(A). Failure to make such an offer to CCESC and to obtain CCESC's express rejection of such coverage resulted in an increase in UM/UIM coverage equivalent to the increase in liability coverage, by operation of law. Anderson,96 Ohio App.3d at 345.

Section 3937.18 requires an insurer to offer UM/UIM coverage when a general business policy qualifies as an automobile policy by extending liability to hired and non-owned automobiles, but it does not require that coverage for an employee of a sole proprietorship injured in her own vehicle outside the scope of employment.

Koehlke v. Clay Street Inn, Unpublished Decision (9-30-2003) · filed 2003-09-30

In Selander, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that a general business policy was an automobile policy, pursuant to R.C. 3937.18, because it extended liability for "hired" and "non-owned" automobiles. Hence, in accordance with R.C. 3937.18, the insurer was required to provide UM/UIM coverage. Since coverage was not provided, the court held it arose by operation of law. ... Therefore, there is no requirement, pursuant to Selander or by operation of law, that Cincinnati provide UM/UIM coverage to an employee of a sole proprietorship who is involved in an accident involving her own vehicle outside the scope and course of her employment.

Section 3937.18 requires UM/UIM coverage to be offered only to persons insured under the liability policy; a person who is not an insured cannot recover UM/UIM coverage by operation of law.

Lutterbein v. Gonzales, Unpublished Decision (11-24-2003) · filed 2003-11-24

However, despite appellant's assertion, R.C. 3937.18 requires only that UM/UIM coverage be "offered to persons insured under the [liability] policy" of insurance.

Section 3937.18(L)(1) excludes a commercial liability policy from its automobile or motor vehicle liability-policy definition when the policy does not specifically identify any motor vehicles, so uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage is not required by the statute.

Lane v. State Auto Insurance Companies, Unpublished Decision (5-31-2002) · filed 2002-05-31(L)(1)

Having determined that the Mutual commercial liability policy is not an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance "pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(L)", it follows that Mutual was not required to offer uninsured or under insured motorist coverage as part of the policy. Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that such coverage did not arise "by operation of law" because of any failure to offer such coverage when the Mutual policy was delivered to the insureds.

Under amended § 3937.18(L), a policy qualifies as an automobile or motor-vehicle liability policy only if it specifically identifies covered vehicles as proof of financial responsibility or is an umbrella policy providing excess coverage over such a policy.

Dixon v. Professional Staff Mgmt., Unpublished Decision (9-3-2002) · filed 2002-09-03(L)(1) and (L)(2)

Under the statutory definition in subsection (L)(1), the policy does not meet the requirements for proof of financial responsibility set forth in R.C. 3937.18(L)(1), because neither the declarations page of the policy nor the policy itself "specifically identify" any motor vehicles in the policy of insurance. ... Here, the homeowner's insurance policy does not qualify as an umbrella policy because it is a primary policy of insurance. ... Because the subject homeowner's policy is not an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability of insurance" within amended R.C. 3937.18(L), Travelers was not required to offer UIM coverage as part of the policy.

Section 3937.18(L)(1) requires a policy to serve as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified motor vehicles before it qualifies as an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy subject to the UM/UIM offer requirement.

Gilcreast-Hill v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (9-4-2002) · filed 2002-09-04(L)(1)

The phrase "not owned by or rented or loaned to you or the insured" does not "specifically identify" autos pursuant to the definition of automobile or motor vehicle liability. The policy cannot serve as proof of financial responsibility for "owners or operators of the motor vehiclesspecifically identified in the policy," if the policy does not specifically identify any motor vehicles. Accordingly, Ohio Farmers' CGL policy is not one which "serves as proof of financial responsibility * * * for owners or operators of the motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy of insurance" and cannot, therefore, be an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy pursuant to R.C. 3937.18. ... As the policy is not an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy, Ohio Farmers was not required to offer UM/UIM coverage. Consequently, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Ohio Farmers. Appellant's assignment of error is overruled.

Section 3937.18(L)(1) covers an insurance policy as an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy only when it serves as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified motor vehicles.

Gibbons-Barry v. Cincinnati Ins. Cos., Unpublished Decision (9-19-2002) · filed 2002-09-19(L)(1)

As we recently held in our decision in Dixon, such a general description does not satisfy the requirement of R.C. 3937.18(L)(1) that the motor vehicles be "specifically identified."

Section 3937.18(L)(1) limits an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy to one that serves as proof of financial responsibility for motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy.

Reffitt v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (9-19-2002) · filed 2002-09-19(L)(1)

Because the "hired" and "non-owned" coverage language in the State Auto policy does not "specifically identify any motor vehicles" and is not an automobile or motor vehicle policy of insurance pursuant to R.C.3937.18(L), State Auto was not required to offer uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage as a part of the policy. Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that such coverage did not arise by operation of law due to any failure to offer such coverage when the policy was delivered to the insureds.

For policies issued under this version, § 3937.18 requires UIM coverage only when the policy serves as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified motor vehicles; incidental coverage for off-road or mobile equipment is insufficient.

Lane v. State Auto Ins. Cos., Unpublished Decision (9-27-2002) · filed 2002-09-27(L)(1)

...Accordingly, the fact that OMIG's policy includes coverage for mobile equipment does not convert it into a motor vehicle liability policy. ... There is simply no indication that the OMIG policy was an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy as we have interpreted that term. ... Consequently, we see no basis for distinguishing Jump nor do we see any reason to impute coverage under R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 does not make a homeowners policy an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy merely because it contains a “residence employee” exception to a motor-vehicle exclusion.

Blanchard v. State Farm Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (9-30-2002) · filed 2002-09-30(L)

As appellants note in their brief at 9, this court has steadfastly rejected the argument that "residence employee" exceptions in homeowners policies render the policies "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability" policies of insurance. ... We find no reason to deviate from these holdings.

Section 3937.18 does not require an insurer to offer UM/UIM coverage under a general liability policy that provides only incidental coverage for mobile equipment and does not list specifically identified vehicles.

Pugh v. Erie Insurance Exchange, Unpublished Decision (10-28-2002) · filed 2002-10-28

Erie also argues its Ultrapack policy was not an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy as defined under R.C. 3937.18. ... We find the policy in question here, is similar to the one examined in Pickett. The policy before us has no listing of specifically identified vehicles, and we concludes it is not a motor vehicle or automobile liability policy. For this reason, we conclude appellant Erie did not have offer UM/UIM insurance coverage to appellee, and the coverage does not arise by operation of law.

Under § 3937.18(L)(1), a policy is an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy subject to the UIM-offer requirement only if it serves as proof of financial responsibility for motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy.

Allen v. Transp. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (11-26-2002) · filed 2002-11-26(L)(1)

Initially, we note that this court, following Jump, supra, has determined that amended R.C. 3937.18(L)(1) significantly narrowed the scope of insurance policies that must include UIM coverage as compared to the interpretation of previous versions of the statute. ... In this case, neither the declarations page nor the policy itself "specifically identify" any motor vehicles. Thus, the policy does not meet the requirements for proof of financial responsibility set forth in R.C. 3937.18(L)(1). ... Because the commercial general liability policy at issue is not an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance" within amended R.C. 3937.18, Transportation was not required to offer UIM coverage as part of the policy.

Section 3937.18(L) defines an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy as a policy serving as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified vehicles or an umbrella liability policy.

Jett v. State Automobile Mutual Ins., Unpublished Decision (12-23-2002) · filed 2002-12-23(L)

"(L) As used in this section, `automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance' means either of the following: ... (1) Any policy of insurance that serves as proof of financial responsibility, as proof of financial responsibility is defined by division (K) of section 4509.01 of the Revised Code, for owners or operators of the motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy of insurance; ... (2) Any umbrella liability policy of insurance." ... In the case sub judice, the CGL policy issued to Jett Roofing became effective on May 24, 1999. Therefore, R.C. 3937.18, as amended by H.B. 261, controls the rights and duties of the parties. Because our decision, in Stacy, was based upon the pre-H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18, we conclude our decision, in Stacy, is inapplicable to the matter currently under consideration. ... Accordingly, pursuant to our decision in the Szekeres and Pickett cases, we conclude the "valet parking" provision and "mobile equipment" provision contained in State Automobile's CGL policy does not transform this general liability policy into a motor vehicle liability policy. As did the trial court, we find that because the CGL policy is not a motor vehicle liability policy of insurance, the issue of whether appellants are insureds under the policy is moot.Appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage only for policies that qualify as automobile or motor vehicle liability policies; under (L)(1), a commercial general liability policy that does not specifically identify vehicles is not such a policy merely because it has a parking exception.

Wiley v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co., Unpublished Decision (2-5-2003) · filed 2003-02-05(L)(1)

"The policy under consideration is a commercial general liability policy which does not precisely, particularly, or individually identify any vehicles covered under the policy. Consequently, under the post H.B. 261 version, R.C. 3937.18(L)(1), the "parking" exception contained in the policy does not transform the policy into an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance." ... As a matter of law, the policy in question is not a motor vehicle liability policy pursuant to R.C. 3937.18 under either the pre September 3, 1997 version or the post H.B. 261 version effective on September 3, 1997."

Section 3937.18(L) excludes a commercial auto policy with a self-insured retention and no primary liability coverage from the statute’s definition of an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy subject to mandatory UM/UIM coverage.

Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Genesis Insurance · filed 2003-03-20(L)

Here, there is no primary coverage for the first $250,000 of liability risk; instead, there is a $250,000 self-insured retention. Thus, the Genesis commercial auto policy is not an “umbrella liability policy of insurance,” and it does not satisfy either of the definitions of an automobile liability or motor vehicle policy of insurance set forth in § 3937.18(L).

Section 3937.18(L) treats a policy as an automobile or motor-vehicle liability policy only if it covers specifically identified vehicles or is an umbrella policy written as excess over such a policy.

Werstler v. Westfield Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (3-31-2003) · filed 2003-03-31(L)(1), (L)(2)

Because the policy does not specifically identify motor vehicles, we find the policy is not a motor vehicle liability policy as defined by R.C. 3937.18, as amended by S.B. 261. ... Because the policy did not specifically identify vehicles contained in either the mobile equipment provision or in the valet parking provision, we find the policy was not a motor vehicle policy pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(L)(1). ... Therefore, even if the CGL provided umbrella coverage, it is not an umbrella "written as excess over one or more policies described in division (L)(1)." R.C. 3937.18(L)(2). ... Therefore, it cannot be a motor vehicle liability policy as defined in R.C. 3937.18(L)(2).

Section 3937.18(L) defines an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy as a policy serving as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified vehicles or an umbrella liability policy, and a liability policy covering only hired or non-owned vehicles not used in business does not satisfy the statute's requirements for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.

Leasure v. Perry, Unpublished Decision (4-25-2003) · filed 2003-04-25(L)

Furthermore, when a court interprets an automobile insurance contract, the statutory law in effect at the time of entering into the contract for automobile liability insurance controls the rights and duties of the contracting parties. Ross v. Farmers Ins. Group ofCos. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 281, 287. As the Supreme Court of Ohio correctly stated in both Davidson and Selander, supra, those cases interpreted a previous version of R.C. 3937.18 that did not include the R.C. 3937.18(L) definition of an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance." As a result, it is our position that these cases are inapplicable to the interpretation of R.C. 3937.18(L) as amended by House Bill 261 on September 3, 1997. Therefore, we conclude that our analysis is restricted to a determination of whether the general liability policy is a motor vehicle liability policy within the meaning of the statutory definition. ... R.C. 3937.18(L) states that an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance" means either of the following: ... "[1.] Any policy of insurance that serves as proof of financial responsibility, as proof of financial responsibility as defined by division (K) of Section 4509.01 of the Revised Code, for owners or operators of the motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy of insurance. ... "[2.] Any umbrella liability policy of insurance." ... In the case at hand, only "hired" or "non-owned" vehicles were included within the scope of coverage under the policy at issue. As such, appellee's vehicle, which was owned by appellee, would beclassified as a non-owned auto under the policy issued to R.S.Resources, Inc. However, it is excluded from coverage under the policybecause it was not used in the business at the time of the accident. "Exclusion is the opposite of the concept of inclusion. It is incongruous to say that the exclusion of an "owned" motor vehicle somehow triggers a finding that this is a motor vehicle policy that identifies only hired and non-owned motor vehicles and thus requires the inclusion of uninsured/underinsured coverage." Smith v. The Cincinnati Ins. Co., 11th Dist. No. 2001-L-114, 2002-Ohio-7343, at ¶ 25.1 ... Based on the foregoing reasons, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion in this case, appellant's liability portion of the policy does not satisfy the requirements of R.C. 3937.18. Thus, it is our view that the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment while overruling appellant's motion.

Section 3937.18(L) covers policies that either serve as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified vehicles or are umbrella liability policies; an excess liability policy without drop-down coverage is not an umbrella policy and need not offer underinsured motorist coverage.

McNeeley v. Pacific Employers, Unpublished Decision (6-10-2003) · filed 2003-06-10(C), (L)(1), (L)(2)

In order to qualify as an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance" under R.C. 3937.18(L)(1), a policy must "precisely, particularly and individually identif[y]" the motor vehicles covered. ... Therefore, the excess general liability policy is not a "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy" under R.C. 3937.18(L)(1). ... As the excess general liability policy is not an umbrella policy, it is not an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy" under R.C. 3937.18(L)(2). Given that the excess general liability policy does not satisfy either R.C. 3937.18(L)(1) or (2), Pacific was not required to offer underinsured motorist coverage as part of the policy.

Under former § 3937.18(A), limited automobile coverage that is incidental to a general liability policy does not make the policy an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy subject to the statute's requirement to offer UM/UIM coverage.

Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (6-18-2003) · filed 2003-06-18(A)

Consequently, the "parking" exception and the "non-owned" or "hired" exception did not transform the BOP into an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy" subject to the requirements of R.C.3937.18, and therefore Midwestern was not required to offer UM/UIM coverage under the policy.

Section 3937.18(L)(1) does not treat a commercial general liability policy as a motor vehicle liability policy unless it specifically identifies covered motor vehicles; an umbrella policy qualifies under (L)(2) only when written as excess over an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy, and subsection (C) permits a valid UM/UIM rejection meeting the required offer-and-rejection standards.

Brookman v. Estate of Gray, Unpublished Decision (12-22-2003) · filed 2003-12-22(L)(1), (L)(2), and (C)

We herein hold, pursuant to our prior decision in Reffit v.State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., Allen App. No. 1-02-38, 2002-Ohio-4885, that the commercial general liability policy issued to the Gooding Company by Cincinnati Insurance is not a "motor vehicle liability policy" as defined by R.C. 3937.18(L)(1), as it fails to specifically identify any motor vehicles to be covered under it. Although the commercial general liability policy contains a "hired auto and non-owned auto liability" endorsement, the inclusion of such an endorsement does not convert the policy into a "motor vehicle liability policy." See Reffit, supra.4 It follows that, because the umbrella policy was not written as an excess policy over an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance, it does not qualify as a motor vehicle liability policy in which UM/UIM coverage is required to be offered by the insurer. See R.C. 3937.18 (L)(2).

Section 3937.18(L) limits the definition of an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy to insurance that can serve as proof of financial responsibility for specified vehicles.

Renter v. Anthony, Unpublished Decision (2-5-2004) · filed 2004-02-05(L)

We agree with the common pleas court that the coverage afforded by this exception to the exclusion from coverage does not meet the statutory definition of "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance" under R.C.3937.18(L), as amended by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 261.

Under the post-H.B. 261 version, subsection (A)'s offer requirement applies only to policies meeting subsection (L)'s definition; a lessor's policy for a leased vehicle was not covered here because the lessee was the owner for financial-responsibility purposes.

Armentrout v. Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance · filed 2004-12-23(A) (L)

As a result, the policies issued by Tokio did not have to be construed as providing “automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policies] of insurance” under the post-H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18; therefore, Linko did not apply, as Tokio was not required to offer TMCC underinsured-motorist coverage, and underinsured-motorist coverage did not arise by operation of law.

Under former division (L)(1), an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy is one that serves as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified motor vehicles.

Nichols v. State Auto Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-10-2006) · filed 2006-08-10(L)(1)

We find that the reasoning applied by this court in Benedict, Pyros, and McNeely, is directly applicable to the dispositive issue in this case. In the case at bar, the auto policy provided liability coverage for "hired" and "nonowned" autos. It does not "precisely, particularly and individually identify" the motor vehicles covered, and, therefore, is not an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance," as that term was defined in former R.C. 3937.18 (L). Therefore, State Auto was not required to offer UM/UIM coverage.

Subsection (L) defines an automobile or motor-vehicle liability policy as a policy serving as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified vehicles or an umbrella liability policy; under the circumstances, a policy covering only hired and non-owned vehicles did not qualify.

Smith v. the Cincinnati Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (12-31-2002) · filed 2002-12-31(L)

"In this case, only "hired" or "non-owned" vehicles are included within the scope of coverage under the policy at issue. As such, appellee's "owned" vehicle is excluded from coverage under the policy. Exclusion is the opposite of the concept of inclusion. It is incongruous to say that the exclusion of an "owned" motor vehicle somehow triggers a finding that this is a motor vehicle policy that identifies only hired and non-owned motor vehicles and thus requires the inclusion of uninsured/underinsured coverage. ... Based on the above, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion in this case, appellant's liability portion of the policy, under the circumstances, does not satisfy the requirements of R.C. 3937.18 ."

Section 3937.18(L) defines a motor vehicle liability policy as one serving as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified motor vehicles.

Burkholder v. German Mutual Insurance · filed 2003-06-25(L)

Because the homeowner’s policy is not an “automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance” as defined in R.C. 3937.18(L), I would find that appellee was not required to offer uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage as part of the policy and that such coverage does not arise by operation of law.

Sections 3937.18(J)(1) and (K)(2), as amended by H.B. 261, permit an insurer to exclude coverage for an insured occupying a vehicle owned by or regularly available to a named insured or family member and to exclude that vehicle from the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle.

Johnston v. Johnston · filed 2001-10-25(J)(1), (K)(2)

Allstate’s policy contains an “other-owned auto” exclusion as authorized by R.C. 3937.18(J)(1). The policy also contains an endorsement based on R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) that excludes from the definition of “uninsured auto” “a motor vehicle owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of the insured person, a spouse, or a resident relative of insured person.” ... Viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of Allstate, the court concludes — solely for the purpose of ruling on plaintiffs motion for summary judgment — that (1) the plaintiffs claims are barred by the “other-owned auto” exclusion in the policy, and (2) the motorcycle on which the plaintiffs decedent was riding at the time of the accident was not an “uninsured auto” as that term is defined in the policy.

Section 3937.18(K)(2) permits an uninsured/underinsured-motorist policy to exclude a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or regularly available for the use of a named insured, spouse, or resident relative.

Johnston v. Johnston · filed 2002-03-13(K)(2)

Similarly, the commencement of each policy period brings into existence a new contract of automobile insurance, whether the policy is categorized as a new policy of insurance or a renewal of an existing policy, and the statutory law in effect on the date of issue of each new policy is the law to be applied. ... Accordingly, the court finds that the Allstate insurance policy was governed by the version of R.C. 3937.18 that was amended effective September 3, 1997. This version of the statute includes authorization for the “household exclusion” and the “other-owned auto exclusion” as quoted above. ... Therefore, the “other-owned auto exclusion” and the “household exclusion” apply to the facts of this case. The only remaining question is whether those exclusions were valid under Ohio law. ... In the present case, however, R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) was amended again by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 261 (effective 9-3-1997). Am.Sub.H.B. No. 261 changed some of the very statutory language on which the Moore decision expressly based its holding. This court is unaware of any binding authority holding that the analysis in Moore applies to the amendments in H.B. 261. Accordingly, the court concludes that the plaintiffs claims against defendant Allstate Insurance Company are barred by both the “other-owned auto exclusion” and the “household exclusion.”

Section 3937.18(J) bars an insured occupying a non-covered family-owned vehicle from recovering for that insured's own bodily injury or death, but it does not bar other insureds from recovering their own wrongful-death mental-anguish damages.

Aldrich v. Pacific Indemn. Co., Unpublished Decision (3-26-2004) · filed 2004-03-26(J)

The language of the statute means that the insured who was occupying the non-covered family-owned vehicle is barred from collecting for his own bodily injury or death; it does not mean that other insureds, who are damaged in their own right by a wrongful death, are barred merely because the decedent was occupying a non-covered vehicle. Under the plain language of the statute, an "other owned auto" exclusion cannot prohibit a wrongful death beneficiary from collecting for their mental anguish.

Section 3937.18(J) permits a UM/UIM policy to exclude coverage for bodily injury suffered while an insured operates or occupies an unlisted motor vehicle, including a motorcycle.

Ellis v. Nationwide Insurance · filed 2005-03-28(J)

Because the H.B. 261 version of the UM/UIM statute specifically allows for the exclusion of UM/UIM coverage for a “motor vehicle,” which includes motorcycles according to Horsely, supra, it was appellant’s burden to provide some evidence that he was not driving a motorcycle, or that his particular motorcycle could be distinguished from the types of motorcycles covered by the statutory definition of “motor vehicle.” Appellant failed to produce any such evidence. Therefore, the trial court was correct in interpreting the “other owned auto” exclusion in the Nationwide policy as covering appellant’s motorcycle.

Section 3937.18(A)(2) bases the underinsured-motorist setoff on amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by the claimant, while incidental motor-vehicle liability coverage can bring a homeowner's policy within the statute's mandatory coverage requirement.

Davis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., Unpublished Decision (12-18-2001) · filed 2001-12-18(A)(2)

Shortly before oral argument in this case, the Ohio Supreme Court expressly rejected a strict "limits-to-limits" comparison approach in Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 271 . The court held: For the purpose of setoff, the "amounts available for payment" language in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) means the amounts actually accessible to and recoverable by an underinsured motorist claimant from all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies (including from the tortfeasor's liability carrier). [Id., syllabus.] Following and explaining its Clark decision in Littrell v. Wigglesworth (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 425, syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court stated, "a strict policy-limits-to-limits comparison is untenable." Id. at 432. We apply the Clark and Littrell decisions to the circumstances of this case and hold that, if the policy of homeowner's insurance issued to appellant by appellee provides incidental motor vehicle coverage sufficient to trigger a mandatory offering of underinsured motorist coverage under R.C. 3937.18, then appellant has a potential claim against appellee under the policy in an amount up to the limits provided therein.

Section 3937.18(G) does not bar recovery under a separate uninsured-motorist policy for a different tortfeasor's negligence merely because another household-related policy paid benefits.

Diclaudio v. Progressive Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (12-21-2001) · filed 2001-12-21(G)

In the instant case, the decedent was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his father. Because of a household exclusion, Mr. Landis' insurance company paid the estate the policy limit of $100,000 under its uninsured motorist provision.3 Appellee is now seeking to recover from appellant, her own insurer, under the uninsured motorist coverage because of the negligence of the unknown motorist. If an unknown motorist was partially negligent in the underlying accident, then appellee is not attempting to stack her policy with that of the decedent's father. Instead, appellee is trying to recover for the negligence of a separate tortfeasor. As such, R.C. 3937.18(G) is inapplicable.

Section 3937.18(G) permits automobile liability policies to include terms that preclude interfamily and intrafamily stacking of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.

Lemble v. Belknap, Unpublished Decision (12-31-2001) · filed 2001-12-31(G)

Many appellate courts, including this one, have relied on the reasoning presented in Beagle to uphold the constitutionality of R.C. 3937.18. ... Although Beagle does not specifically address R.C. 3937.18(G), we find the reasoning persuasive.

Section 3937.18 permits an insurer to use an anti-stacking provision in an underinsured-motorist policy; subsection (J) is not an exclusive list of permissible exclusions.

Brooks v. All American Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (12-5-2002) · filed 2002-12-05(J)

Recently, in Zirger v. Ferkel, Seneca App. 13-02-75, 2002-Ohio-2822, we rejected the argument that R.C. 3937.18(J) was the exclusive list of permissible UM/UIM exclusions. In doing so, we citedWallace v. Balint (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 182, 2002-Ohio-480, 761 N.E.2d 598 in which the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the former R.C. 3937.18(G), the applicable law in this matter, permitted insurers to include anti-stacking language in their underinsured motorist policies. Zirger at ¶ 33. Like the exclusion in Zirger, we find Section 5(c) of All America's UM/UIM policy to be a valid anti-stacking provision.

Section 3937.18(G) permits automobile insurance policies to include terms and conditions that preclude stacking of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverages.

Leffler v. State Farm Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (12-4-2003) · filed 2003-12-04(G)

R.C. 3937.18(G) specifically permits the inclusion of anti-stacking provisions in policies of insurance. R.C. 3937.18(G) states that an automobile policy of insurance "may, without regard to any premiums involved, include terms and conditions that preclude any and all stacking of such coverages * * *." State Farm argues, absent this provision, Terry Leffler would be entitled to greater coverage by operation of law than he would had he purchased the UM/UIM coverage. State Farm argues such a result is illogical and inequitable. We agree.

Section 3937.18(G) permits automobile liability policies offering uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage to include terms precluding interfamily and intrafamily stacking.

Lemble v. Belknap · filed 2001-12-31(G)

At the time of the accident in this case, R.C. 3937.18(G), as amended by Senate Bill 20, provided: ... “Any automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance that includes coverages offered under division (A) of this section may, without regard to any premiums involved, include terms and conditions that preclude any and all stacking of such coverages, including but not limited to: ... “(2) Intrafamily stacking, which is the aggregating of the limits of such coverages purchased by the same person or two or more family members of the same household.” ... Although Beagle does not specifically address R.C. 3937.18(G), we find the reasoning persuasive. Since there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and Cincinnati and Owners were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, appellants’ assignment of error is found not well taken.

Section 3937.18 protects an insured’s UIM recovery from an operator’s immunity defense and treats a vehicle as uninsured when its liability insurer denies coverage.

Vancamp v. Vancamp, Unpublished Decision (12-31-2001) · filed 2001-12-31(A)(1) and (D)

Stephen is an "uninsured motorist" based upon the plain language of the Indiana Ins. policy and under the meaning of that term as interpreted under R.C. 3937.18(D). R.C. 3937.18(D) states that for the purpose of this section a motor vehicle is uninsured if "the liability insurerdenies coverage or is or becomes the subject of insolvency proceedings in any jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.) Appellant can prove the necessary elements of her claim in order to be legally entitled to recover damages from the operator of an uninsured auto. Stephen was the operator of the vehicle. Appellant was a passenger in Stephen's vehicle. Stephen caused a single car collision which resulted in appellant's injuries. Stephen's liability insurer denied coverage based on Stephen's immunity. An immunity does not affect appellant's right to recover UIM coverage.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage to be offered when the policy is a motor-vehicle liability policy.

Mattox v. Allstate Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (3-25-2002) · filed 2002-03-25

A homeowner's insurance policy that provides limited liability coverage for vehicles that are not subject to motor vehicle registration, and are not intended to be used on a public highway, is not a motor vehicle liability policy and is not subject to the requirement that uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage be offered.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage by operation of law when a liability policy provides even limited motor-vehicle coverage, and a post-effective-date reduction that does not satisfy the statute's written-offer requirements is invalid.

Cox v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., Unpublished Decision (6-10-2002) · filed 2002-06-10

"Appellants argue the coverage for "parking an auto" is tantamount to the issuance of a motor vehicle policy and therefore the mandates of R.C. 3937.18 apply. ... Based upon this holding, we find the policy sub judice is a motor vehicle policy and by operation of law, uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage applies."

Section 3937.18(C) creates a presumption of an offer when the insured signs a written rejection, but the insurer's offer must still satisfy the Linko requirements, including a brief coverage description, the premium, and the coverage limits.

Minor v. Nichols, Unpublished Decision (6-25-2002) · filed 2002-06-25(C)

We agree with appellant and our colleagues in the Fifth District that the Linko requirements are still in effect following the enactment of H.B. 261. See Pillo v. Stricklin (Dec. 31, 2001), Stark App. No. 2001CA00204. Nothing in H.B. 261 indicates an intent by the legislature to specify what requirements are needed for a valid offer under R.C.3937.18. Had the legislature intended to specify the terms of a valid offer, they could have done so expressly. Nothing in the legislature's creation of the presumption of an offer addresses the mandatory or minimal content of an offer. We will not presume such an intent from silence.

Under the former version of § 3937.18, an insurer's rejection of UM/UIM coverage had to satisfy the formal requirements recognized in Linko; an invalid rejection resulted in coverage being imposed by operation of law.

Allen v. Johnson, Unpublished Decision (7-3-2002) · filed 2002-07-03

The school district insurers essentially conceded that the rejection of coverage did not meet the formal requirements for rejection under the former R.C. 3937.18, as interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Linkov. Indemn. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 445. ... In Linko, the Supreme Court did not announce a new rule of law. Rather, it "merely determined what [R.C. 3937.18] has meant since its enactment." Agee v. Russell (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 540, 543 (applying the principle to a Supreme Court interpretation of R.C. 2151.26). Because the school district insurers failed to demonstrate that Linko does not apply to this case, this argument likewise did not support an award of summary judgment to the school district insurers.

Section 3937.18's self-insurer exemption does not apply when a fronting policy's bankruptcy clause shifts any risk of loss to the insurer.

Tucker v. Wilson, Unpublished Decision (9-30-2002) · filed 2002-09-30

We therefore find that since Heinz does not retain 100 percent of the risk of loss under the bankruptcy clause of the BA policy, Heinz is not a self-insurer in the practical sense and is not exempt from R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage to be offered with qualifying automobile or motor vehicle liability policies, including policies that serve as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified vehicles.

Estate of Heath v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., Unpublished Decision (10-10-2002) · filed 2002-10-10(L)(1)

In light of the statutes, the homeowner's policy does not meet the definition of either an owner's policy or an operator's policy pursuant R.C. 3937.18, as it existed at the time of the accident. Because the homeowner's policy did not serve as proof of financial responsibility as defined by division (K) of section 4509.01 for owners or operators of the motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy of insurance, the homeowner's policy does not qualify under R.C. 3937.18(L)(1).

Section 3937.18 does not require uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage for a general liability policy that is not a motor vehicle liability policy.

Szekeres v. State Farm Fire and Cas., Unpublished Decision (10-31-2002) · filed 2002-10-31

The general liability policy is not a motor vehicle policy and therefore is not covered by R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 does not require a homeowners policy with a residence-employee exception to provide uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage by operation of law because the policy is not a motor vehicle liability policy.

Hough v. St. Paul Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (11-19-2002) · filed 2002-11-19

We held that the inclusion of a "residence employee" exception in a homeowners policy does not transform that policy into an automobile insurance policy subject to the requirements of former R.C. 3937.18.

The 1994 version of § 3937.18 does not allow uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage to be restricted to accidents involving vehicles owned by the insured business because the statute protects people, not vehicles.

Thacker v. Central Mutual Insurance, Unpublished Decision (3-11-2003) · filed 2003-03-11(A)

Based on Alexander and Martin, we conclude that the 1994 version of R.C. 3937.18 does not permit Central Mutual's "owned `autos' only" provision. With this provision, Central Mutual is attempting to restrict uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage to accidents that involve vehicles owned by Dallas Chevrolet. However, R.C. 3937.18 is not designed to protect vehicles; it is designed to protect people. SeeMartin, supra. We find this provision analogous to the "other owned auto" exclusion invalidated by Martin. Both provisions limit uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage based upon the type of auto involved in the accident that injured the insured. Such restrictions do not conform to the 1994 version of R.C. 3937.18. Under Alexander, R.C.3937.18 mandates uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage where "(1) the claimant is an insured under a policy which provides uninsured motorist coverage; (2) the claimant was injured by an uninsured motorist; and (3) the claim is recognized by Ohio tort law. Martin, supra. The estate has satisfied these requirements: (1) under Scott-Pontzer, Ms. Thacker is an insured under the policy; (2) Ms. Thacker was killed by an underinsured motorist; and (3) the estate had a claim recognized by Ohio tort law. Because Central Mutual's "owned `autos' only" provision eliminates coverage to persons with recognized tort claims, it conflicts with R.C.3937.18 as it existed in 1994. See Alexander, supra. Thus, Central Mutual's "owned `autos' only" provision is unenforceable. Accordingly, the estate's third assignment of error is upheld.

Section 3937.18 exempts employers that are self-insured in the practical sense from its uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage requirements.

Churchill v. Gen. Motors Corp., Unpublished Decision (7-28-2003) · filed 2003-07-28

The fronting policies require GM to reimburse National Union for any loss incurred under the policies. National Union's right to reimbursement is protected by the trust established by GM. Because no risk of loss remains with National Union, but rather rests entirely on GM, we find that, under these policies, GM is a self-insurer in the practical sense and is therefore exempt from the requirements of R.C.3937.18.

Section 3937.18 does not invalidate a clearly stated territorial restriction that defines where uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage applies, rather than eliminating or reducing coverage for an Ohio-law cause of action.

Tscherne v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (11-20-2003) · filed 2003-11-20

There is nothing in Alexander that would invalidate the territorial limits of the policy because those territorial limits do not purport to eliminate or reduce UM/UIM coverage for any cause of action recognized by Ohio tort law. The territorial limitation only acts to define the loci in which coverage applies.

Section 3937.18(A) requires UM/UIM coverage to be offered only to persons insured under the policy, so a non-insured employee cannot assert a violation of the offer/rejection provisions.

Hayman v. Diloretto, Unpublished Decision (6-21-2004) · filed 2004-06-21(A)

It is clear that Mrs. Hayman was not a person insured under the policy at the time of accident because she was not in the course and scope of employment. If she was not a person insured under the policy, she has no standing to assert a violation of the offer/rejection provisions of former R.C. § 3937.18.

A knowing rejection of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, supported by evidence showing the costs and coverage, satisfies the statute's requirements.

Mox v. Westfield Co., Unpublished Decision (2-8-2005) · filed 2005-02-08

We therefore conclude this rejection meets the test of R.C. 3937.18, and is presumptively valid given the affidavit of Mr. Dietz.

For policies issued after the 2001 amendment, insurers may include uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage but are not required to offer it or obtain a written rejection.

Wilson v. Aig AKA American Int. Group, Ca2007-11-278 (10-6-2008) · filed 2008-10-06

Significantly, effective October 31, 2001, Senate Bill 97 amended R.C. 3937.18 by eliminating the requirement that insurers offer UM/UIM coverage and the requirement of a written offer, selection, or rejection form for UM/UIM coverage. ... Pursuant to R.C. 3937.18 , effective October 2001, "[a]ny policy of insurance delivered or issued for delivery in this state * * * that insures against loss resulting from liability * * * may, but is not required to, include uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage."

Former division (L)(2) treats an umbrella liability policy written as excess over an automobile liability policy as an automobile liability policy for purposes of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, which flows from the insured's right to coverage under the underlying auto policy.

Selective Insurance Co. v. Wilson, Unpublished Decision (12-31-2002) · filed 2002-12-31(L)(2)

In Martin , the Court held that "[a]n automobile liability insurance policy provision which eliminates uninsured motorist coverage for persons insured thereunder who are injured while occupying a motor vehicle owned by an insured, but not specifically listed in the policy, violates R.C. 3937.18 and is therefore invalid." Id., paragraph three of the syllabus. Martin thus stands for the proposition that UIM coverage cannot be taken from an insured while occupying a vehicle owned by the insured but not listed in the policy. However, we find Selective's policy provision in the case sub judice neither "eliminates" UIM coverage respecting Wilson nor acts as an illegal exclusion. Ohio law recognizes a distinction between an exclusion from coverage under the liability portion of an insurance policy and a condition for coverage. See Luckenbill v. Midwestern Indemn. Co. (2001), 143 Ohio App.3d 501 , 506 , 758 N.E.2d 301 . We find Martin inapplicable to the facts of the case sub judice, as Wilson failed to establish that he is an insured under the Selective policy. ... Former R.C. 3937.18 (L)(2) includes in the definition of an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance "[a]ny umbrella liability policy of insurance written as excess over one or more policies described in division (L)(1) of this section." A right to UIM coverage under an umbrella policy flows directly from the right to coverage under an auto policy.

Section 3937.18 treats uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage as a supplement to the underlying tort action, so contract law cannot be used to impede recovery on a valid claim.

Sarmiento v. Grange Mutual Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (12-4-2003) · filed 2003-12-04

The public policy purpose behind uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage under R.C. 3937.18 is to supplement the tort action, not separate it from the underlying action. Ohio contract law can certainly apply, but it cannot be used as an impediment to recovery under a valid uninsured or underinsured motorist claim.

Section 3937.18 requires a motor vehicle liability policy to offer uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.

Lawler v. Fireman's Fund Insurance · filed 2001-08-28

Therefore, the Court holds that the State Farm Policy, a general commercial general liability policy, does not qualify as motor vehicle liability policy. As such, the State Farm Policy does not implicate the requirements of Ohio Rev.Code § 3937.18. The State Farm Policy does not create uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage as a matter of law.

Section 3937.18 requires uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage for motor vehicle liability policies, but does not require it under this homeowner’s policy’s incidental vehicle coverage.

Tate v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 2002-01-15(A)(1)-(2)

This Court concludes that the policy at issue does not “include coverage for liability arising out of the use of motor vehicles [as in Selander, 85 Ohio St.3d 541, 709 N.E.2d 1161, but] ... provides ‘incidental coverage’ [as does the policy in Davidson, 91 Ohio St.3d 262, 744 N.E.2d 713].”

Section 3937.18 governs the requirements for offering and rejecting uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.

Purvis v. Cincinnati Ins. · filed 2003-03-19

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court of appeals’ decision with respect to appellants/crossappellees’ Propositions of Law Nos. I and II be reversed on the authority of Kemper v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Ohio St.3d 162, 2002-Ohio-7101, 781 N.E.2d 196. ... I voted to reconsider Kemper for the purpose of bringing this court’s rule of law into conformity with R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18(A)'s "delivered or issued for delivery" requirement is assessed by asking whether anyone who qualifies as "you" under the policy owned a vehicle registered in Ohio, not merely whether the corporate named insured did.

McDonald v. Williamson, Unpublished Decision (9-11-2003) · filed 2003-09-11(A)

Hartford's reliance on the "delivered or issued for delivery" language in R.C. 3937.18 is misplaced because the question is not whether Entex owned a vehicle registered in Ohio, but whether anyone satisfying the definition of "you" owned such a vehicle.

Section 3937.18(L)(1) defines a motor vehicle liability policy as one serving as proof of financial responsibility for motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy, requiring precise, particular, and individual identification.

Burkholder v. German Mutual Insurance, Unpublished Decision (3-15-2002) · filed 2002-03-15(L)(1)

Thus, we find the plain meaning of the words "specifically identified" as they are used in R.C. 3937.18(L)(1) is that the motor vehicles must be precisely, particularly and individually identified in order to meet the statutory definition. The German Mutual farmowner's policy does not provide this degree of identification. Therefore, the farmowner's policy is not an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability insurance policy. Accord Pickett v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. (Jan. 14, 2002), Stark App. Nos. 2001CA00227 and 2001CAO0236, unreported; Davis v. State FarmFire and Cas. Co (Dec. 18, 2001), Franklin App. No. 00AP-1458, unreported; Jump v. Nationwide Ins. Co. (Nov. 2, 2001), Montgomery App. No. 18880, unreported; Jones v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (July 23, 2001), Stark App. No. 2000CA00329, unreported, discretionary appeal allowed, Jones v. Nationwide Ins. Co. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 1496. Consequently, German Mutual was not required to offer appellants uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, and its failure to do so does not give rise to said coverage by operation of law.

Section 3937.18(L)(1) treats a policy as an automobile or motor-vehicle liability policy only when it serves as proof of financial responsibility for owners or operators of motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy.

Bowling v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance · filed 2002-09-20(L)(1)

“(1) Any policy of insurance that serves as proof of financial responsibility, as proof of financial responsibility is defined by division (K) of section 4509.01 of the Revised Code, for owners or operators of the motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy of insurance; ... We hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that Weissman’s business policy could not, by operation of law, be construed as an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy such that Nationwide had to provide uninsured- and underinsured-motorist coverage pursuant to R.C. 3937.18.”

Section 3937.18(L)(1) covers an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy only when it serves as proof of financial responsibility for motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy.

Ryan v. Smith, Unpublished Decision (10-18-2002) · filed 2002-10-18(L)(1)

R.C. 3937.18(L) provides, in pertinent part, that an "`automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance' means * * * the following: (1) Any policy of insurance that serves as proof of financial responsibility, as proof of financial responsibility is defined by division (K) of section 4509.01 of the Revised Code, for owners or operators of the motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy of insurance[.]" Accordingly, to constitute an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance herein the policy must serve as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified motor vehicles. R.C. 4509.01(K) defines "proof of financial responsibility" as "proof of ability to respond in damages [for specified amounts] for liability, on account of accidents occurring subsequent to the effective date of such proof, arising out of ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle[.]." ... Specifically, we indicated that the "specifically identified" language contained in R.C. 3937.18(L)(1) requires that motor vehicles be "`precisely, particularly and individually identified in order to meet the statutory definition.'" ... In this case, no vehicles are listed as covered autos anywhere in the policy. Therefore, the narrow exceptions for "parking autos" and "mobile equipment", without any specifically identified vehicles, will not act to impose UM/UIM coverage by operation of law.

Section 3937.18(L)(1) treats a policy as an automobile liability or motor vehicle policy only when it serves as proof of financial responsibility for owners or operators of motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy.

Smith v. Nationwide Prop., Unpublished Decision (10-17-2003) · filed 2003-10-17(L)(1)

This argument directly contradicts Smith's argument about the policy's coverage for non-owned vehicles, i.e, that coverage for "non-owned" vehicles fulfills the requirement in R.C. 3937.18(L) that vehicles be specifically identified in the policy. Putting that point aside, however, we note that R.C. 3937.18(L) does not refer to an "operator's policy," nor does it connect UIM coverage to the status of being an "operator" or an "owner." Instead, R.C. 3937.18(L)(1) refers to "owners or operators of the motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy of insurance." Thus, the relevant connection is between the "owner or operator" and the "motor vehicles specifically identified in the policy." Again, because no such vehicles were identified in the Nationwide policy, UIM coverage would not arise.

Section 3937.18(L) does not treat a businessowners policy covering only hired and non-owned automobiles as a motor vehicle liability policy because those vehicle categories are not specifically identified; therefore, the insurer need not offer UM/UIM coverage.

Benedict v. State Auto Mutual, Unpublished Decision (5-4-2004) · filed 2004-05-04(L)

In following the precedent of this court and other appellate districts that have addressed the issue before us, we find that the categories of "hired" and "non-owned" automobiles in a businessowners policy do not qualify as "specifically identified" vehicles, pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(L).

Section 3937.18 permits uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage and does not prohibit subrogation clauses; such clauses are consistent with the statute's intent.

Thorley v. American States Preferred, Unpublished Decision (3-20-2002) · filed 2002-03-20(E)

Contrary to Appellant's claim, subrogation clauses are consistent with public policy and do not violate the intent of R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18 did not require an insurer to offer or provide UM/UIM coverage under a business policy that was not an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy.

Instone v. Motorists Mutual Insurance, Unpublished Decision (3-22-2002) · filed 2002-03-22(L)(1)

Appellant sets forth the following assignment of error: ... "ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1 "I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE APPELLEE AS THE MOTORISTS POLICY IS AN AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY POLICY FOR THE PURPOSES OF R.C. SEC. 3937.18." ... Appellant's assignment of error is found not well-taken on the authority of this court's decision in Burkholder v. German Mutual Ins.Co. (Mar. 15, 2001), Lucas App. No. L-01-1413, unreported. The judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Section 3937.18(L) limits the policies subject to the uninsured-motorist-coverage offer requirement to specified automobile or motor-vehicle liability policies, excluding a homeowners’ policy that is neither proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified vehicles nor an excess umbrella policy.

Ruiz v. Rygalski, Unpublished Decision (3-29-2002) · filed 2002-03-29(L)

Accordingly, we find that the homeowners' policy was not an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance" as that phrase is defined by R.C. 3937.18(L), in effect at the time of this policy. As such, Frankenmuth was not required to offer UM coverage as part of the homeowners' policy.

Former § 3937.18 did not apply to a matching-deductible/fronting policy treated as self-insurance, and limited automobile liability in a homeowners policy did not trigger the statute's UM/UIM offer requirement.

Rupple v. Moore, Unpublished Decision (9-11-2002) · filed 2002-09-11(A)

Because R.C. § 3937.18 does not apply, the requirements of Gyori v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Group, Inc. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 565 and Linko v. Indemn. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 445 also do not apply. ... We reject Appellant's arguments based on our prior decisions in in Henry v Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Sept. 28, 2001), Muskingum App. No. CT2001-0014, unreported, and Vohsing v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. (Jan. 14, 2002), Licking App. No. 01-CA-56, unreported, wherein we rejected the argument that the residence employee provision which provided limited liability for injuries to a residence employee as sustained in a motor vehicle was sufficient to invoke the requirements of R.C. § 3937.18. ... Consequently, the policy at issue in this case cannot be construed so as to provide UM/UIM coverage.

Section 3937.18 does not require an insurer to offer UM/UIM coverage when a commercial general liability policy provides only incidental, limited coverage for off-road equipment and premises-related vehicle use rather than automobile liability coverage for vehicles used on public roads.

Walker v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (5-19-2003) · filed 2003-05-19

The intent of the CGL policy in this case is to protect those who are injured on the premises, not those who travel on the public roadways in automobiles. It provides coverage only for the parking of vehicles not owned by the insured. This limited coverage does not transform a CGL policy into an automobile liability policy subject to R.C. 3937.18. ... Therefore, the mobile equipment provision does not convert the CGL policy into an automobile liability policy for which UM/UIM coverage must be offered pursuant to R.C. 3937.18.

Section 3937.18, as then in effect, applied to policies covering specifically identified vehicles and to umbrella liability policies, requiring an offer of UM/UIM coverage, with coverage arising by operation of law if it was not offered.

Dean v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, Unpublished Decision (11-3-2003) · filed 2003-11-03(L)(1), (L)(2)

Because appellant's commercial general liability policy does not insure motor vehicles "specifically identified in the policy," R.C. 3937.18 does not apply. ... The inclusion of liability coverage for "hired" and "non-owned" vehicles does not transform American Alliance's CGL policy into a motor vehicle liability policy of insurance, and coverage does not arise by operation of law. ... Thus, according to the version of R.C. 3937.18 in effect on the date of the accident, the American National umbrella policy is an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance subject to the requirements of 3937.18. Accordingly, we conclude American National was required to offer UM/UIM coverage to the policy's insureds, and such coverage arises by operation of law.

Section 3937.18 supports including an enforceable subrogation clause as a precondition to providing underinsured motorist coverage.

Pilo v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., Unpublished Decision (2-4-2003) · filed 2003-02-04

Under the clear mandate of Bogan v. Progressive CasualtyInsurance Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 22, paragraph four of the syllabus, subrogation provisions are enforceable in uninsured/underinsured motorist claims: "Based upon the established common law and further strengthened by the specific statutory provision, R.C. 3937.18, a subrogation clause is reasonably includable in contracts providing underinsured motorist insurance. Such a clause is therefore both a valid and enforceable precondition to the duty to provide underinsured motorist coverage."

Section 3937.18(A) requires an insurer to offer UM/UIM coverage for an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy; incidental vehicle coverage in an education liability policy does not trigger that requirement.

Henry v. Wausau Business Ins · filed 2003-12-08(A)

Accordingly, we find that the education liability policy at issue is not an automobile liability policy for the purpose of O.R.C. § 3937.18.

Section 3937.18(A)(1) protects an insured who is legally entitled to recover for bodily injury from an uninsured motor vehicle, and the presence of an insured vehicle in the same accident does not by itself eliminate UM coverage.

Essad v. Cincinnati Cas. Co., Unpublished Decision (4-16-2002) · filed 2002-04-16(A)(1)

The language in this part of the statute has not changed since the decision in Tomanski. A paragraph has been added after this section, but it does not affect the language or meaning of the section. Therefore,Tomanski is still good law. UM coverage is available to Essad as long as Cincinnati's subrogation rights were not destroyed.

Section 3937.18(E) permits an insurer to enforce its subrogation right only after the insured recovers a complete damages award from the tortfeasor.

Essad v. the Cincinnati Casualty Co., Unpublished Decision (4-16-2002) · filed 2002-04-16(E)

Under Ohio law, in addition to the terms of its policy, an insurer's subrogation right is based upon the specific statutory expression of the General Assembly in R.C. 3937.18(E). Id. at 30-31, 460-461. Pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(E), an insurer can enforce its subrogation right only after the insured recovers a complete damages award from the tortfeasor. Davis v. Nicastro (Sept. 1, 1999), Mahoning App. No. 97 CA 255, unreported at 2.

Section 3937.18 applies to vehicles registered or principally garaged in Ohio and does not govern UM/UIM coverage for a vehicle registered and garaged in Hawaii.

Misseldine v. Progressive Casualty Ins., Unpublished Decision (3-20-2003) · filed 2003-03-20

Further, we note that R.C. 3937.18 is only applicable to vehicles registered and/or principally garaged in Ohio.

Section 3937.18(A) applies only to policies delivered in Ohio for vehicles registered or principally garaged in Ohio, so it does not require UM/UIM coverage for policies issued elsewhere covering vehicles registered or principally garaged elsewhere.

Martin Press v. Westport Ins. Corp., 90052 (6-9-2008) · filed 2008-05-29(A)

Here, neither the business auto policy nor the commercial excess policy issued by Westport to PS Management were issued for delivery in Ohio, and neither were issued with respect to any vehicle registered or principally garaged in Ohio. As a result, R.C. 3937.18 is not applicable to these policies, Westport was not required to offer UM/UIM coverage in accordance with R.C. 3937.18 , and UM/UIM coverage does not arise by operation of law to extend coverage to appellants.

When the insurer fails to offer UM coverage under the policy, the statute provides coverage by operation of law.

Sarka v. Love, Unpublished Decision (4-15-2004) · filed 2004-04-15

Thus, applying the relevant version of R.C.3937.18, Sarka was entitled to coverage by operation of law based on AIU's failure to offer UM coverage under the policy.

The 2000 version of § 3937.18(A) required an express offer of UM/UIM coverage, and if the insurer failed to make that offer during the guaranteed policy period, the coverage arose by operation of law.

Storer v. Sharp, Unpublished Decision (3-30-2006) · filed 2006-03-30(A)

The subject accident occurred during the two-year period when the law still permitted UM coverage to arise by operation of law from a policy that did not expressly offer such coverage.

Section 3937.18 provides UM/UIM coverage by operation of law only to people who qualify as insureds under the umbrella or underlying policy.

Nevergall v. Indemnity Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (12-1-2003) · filed 2003-12-01

If a party does not qualify as an insured as defined in the umbrella liability policy or the underlying policy, then, as in the case before us, that party is not entitled to UM/UIM coverage by operation of law.

Former § 3937.18’s offer and acceptance requirements do not create UM/UIM coverage under an employer’s umbrella policy for a loss outside the course and scope of employment.

Caffro v. Motorist Mutual Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (6-14-2004) · filed 2004-06-14

Many appellate courts have already ruled that, under Galatis, UM/UIM coverage cannot arise as a matter of law for a failure to follow the offer/acceptance provisions of former R.C. § 3937.18 unless the accident occurred in the course and scope of employment. ... Based on the two reasons outlined above, the Caffros are not covered by the Coregis umbrella policy.

Section 3937.18 applies to automobile or motor vehicle liability policies; a policy that does not provide motor vehicle coverage is outside the statute's scope.

Tilley v. American Family Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (4-19-2002) · filed 2002-04-19(L)(1)

On appeal, appellant argues first that the policy issued to Your Place provided motor vehicle coverage and, therefore, was a motor vehicle liability policy subject to R.C. 3937.18. Appellant's argument is found not well-taken on the authority of this court's decision in Burkholderv. German Mutual Ins. Co. (Mar. 15, 2002), Lucas App. No. L-01-1413, unreported.

Former § 3937.18 did not apply to a commercial general liability policy providing only incidental parking coverage because that coverage did not make it an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy.

Holland v. Old Republic Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-27-2003) · filed 2003-08-27

Because the policy was in effect before H.B. No. 231 amended R.C. 3937.18, we must determine whether the policy was a motor vehicle policy subject to the version of R.C. 3937.18 then in effect. Before H.B. No. 231 amended R.C. 3937.18, the statute provided that no automobile liability policy of insurance could be issued with respect to any motor vehicle registered in Ohio unless uninsured motorists coverage in an amount of coverage equal to the automobile liability or motor vehicle liability coverage was provided to the insured. Consequently, if Old Republic's CGL policy provided coverage for bodily injury resulting from the use of an automobile, then uninsured motorists coverage applied by operation of law. ... We agree with other courts that have concluded that the parking exception provided only incidental coverage for automobiles and did not convert the policy into an automobile policy or a motor vehicle policy subject to the provision of uninsured motorists coverage.

Section 3937.18(K) excludes a motor vehicle insured under the policy from the definitions of an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle.

Destephen v. Allstate Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (4-30-2002) · filed 2002-04-30(K)

This exemption is substantively similar to the exclusion contained in the amended version of R.C. 3937.18(K), which controls the parties' obligations under the November 15, 1997 policy. Accordingly, we hold that appellants cannot maintain their action against appellee, and that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for appellee.

Section 3937.18 permits a named insured to reject UM/UIM coverage only through a signed writing satisfying the Linko offer requirements, and it does not apply to an employer's self-insured deductible but applies to amounts above that deductible.

Jordan v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (3-17-2003) · filed 2003-03-17

The rejection in this case is governed by R.C. 3937.18, as amended by H.B. 261, effective September 7, 1997. As amended, R.C. 3937.18 states that a named insured may reject UM/UIM coverage if it is in writing and signed by the named insured. Prior to the amendment of R.C. 3937.18, the Ohio Supreme Court required four elements be met in order to satisfy the statutory requirement of a written offer of UM/UIM coverage.Linko v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 445. In Linko, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the insurer must first inform the insured of the availability of UM/UIM coverage; secondly, set forth the premium for the coverage; thirdly, include a brief description of the coverage, and fourthly, expressly state the UM/UIM coverage limits in its offer. Id. at 447-449. If any of the elements are absent, there is no express offer and no rejection can be made as a matter of law. While Linko was a pre-H.B. 261 case, in Kemper v. Michigan Millers MutualInsurance Co., 98 Ohio St.3d 162, ___ N.E.2d ___, 2002-Ohio-7101, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the Linko requirements are applicable to policies of insurance to which R.C. 3937.18, as amended by HB 261, is applicable. (Affirming this court's decision in Pillo v. Stricklin (January 28, 2002), Stark Appellate No. 2001CA203, 2002-Ohio-363). ... Because Sally Beauty agreed to reimburse the insurance company for payments made by the insurance company under the policy up to the retained amounts (or deductible) and to provide a Letter of Credit upon which Travelers could draw in the case of default, we find that Sally Beauty was self-insured for the amount of the deductible, or $250,000.00. Therefore, R.C. 3937.18 does not apply up to $250,000.00 but does apply to the amounts over $250,000.00. In other words, the UM/UIM coverage would be for damages after they exceeded $250,000.00 and only to the extent the damages did not exceed the One Million Dollar limit of the commercial auto liability policy.

Former § 3937.18 required an insurer issuing an automobile liability policy to offer UM/UIM coverage, and an insurer could not avoid that requirement by labeling a fronting/matching-deductible arrangement self-insurance when formal self-insurer requirements were unmet.

Archer v. ACE, USA · filed 2003-04-08(A)(1) and (2)

In summary, as ultimately decided by this court in Dalton, while fronting, matching deductible and other reimbursement arrangements may well provide for ease of administration, such arrangements do not alleviate an entity’s obligation to register formally as a self-insurer in states in which it chooses to conduct business. An insurance company may not avoid compliance with R.C. 3937.18 by claiming that the policy it issues to a corporate entity is “self-insurance” despite that entity’s failure to comply with R.C. 4509.45. Furthermore, an insurance company may not avoid compliance with R.C. 3937.18 by simply claiming that the policy it issues to a corporate entity is “self-insurance” in direct contravention to the express terms and provisions of said policy.

Section 3937.18 does not require a self-insurer, including one self-insured in the practical sense, to offer uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.

Bentley v. Pendleton, Unpublished Decision (7-9-2004) · filed 2004-07-09

We have previously held that R.C. 3937.18 does not apply to self-insurers, either in the practical sense or in the legal sense, and we will not belabor the point. ... The MCS-90 endorsement in appellee's policy does initially require appellee to pay, but Wal-Mart, pursuant to agreement, must reimburse appellee. Nothing in the MCS-90 endorsement shifts the ultimate, as opposed to the initial, risk of loss to appellee. See Musser, supra. Therefore, the MCS-90 endorsement does not alter Wal-Mart's self-insured status.

Section 3937.18 makes a policy term that offsets medical-payment benefits against uninsured-motorist recovery contrary to public policy and void.

Duskin v. Doe, Unpublished Decision (5-17-2002) · filed 2002-05-17

Even if Allstate's policy provided for subrogation with respect to compensation made under medical-payment coverage, any term providing for a setoff of the medical payments against the amount of the judgment under the UM coverage would be in derogation of the public policy set forth in R.C. 3937.18 and void as a matter of law.

Section 3937.18 does not make the exclusions listed in subsection (J) exclusive, and it permits enforcement of an anti-stacking UM/UIM provision that precludes coverage when the vehicle is already covered by primary UM/UIM insurance; an umbrella policy also falls within the statute's automobile-liability-policy definition under subsection (L)(2).

Zirger v. Ferkel, Unpublished Decision (6-6-2002) · filed 2002-06-06(J), (L)(2)

However, we also disagree that R.C. 3937.18(J) is the exclusive provision regarding permissible exclusions as the Appellees submit. ... Paragraph C(5)(b) is an "anti-stacking" provision as it attempts to preclude coverage when an insured is injured in a vehicle that is already covered for UM/UIM by a primary policy. ... We find that Paragraph C(5)(b) of the Nationwide Commercial Auto Policy issued to the Mohawk school district is a valid anti-stacking provision and as such precludes coverage for Appellees' injuries.

Under the H.B. 261 version of division (J), a UM/UIM policy exclusion must fit one of the statute’s specified categories; an off-public-road vehicle exclusion that does not fit those categories is invalid.

State Automobile Insurance v. Pasquale · filed 2005-09-16(J)

As the exclusion fails to fall into one of the specified categories set forth under R.C. 3937.18(J), it does not comport with the letter of the statute. Thus, without more, we cannot categorically say it comports with the purpose of the statute as a matter of law.

Section 3937.18 allows insurers to exclude insureds in the position of an insured spouse from uninsured-motorist coverage.

Gillette v. Estate of Gillette · filed 2005-09-30(C), (K)(1), and (E)(2)

Second, even if appellant’s speculation is correct, the Ohio General Assembly has allowed insurers to exclude insureds in appellant’s position from uninsured-motorists coverage since it amended R.C. 3937.18 through Am.H.B. No. 261, effective September 3, 1997. See current R.C. 3937.18(C) (Am.S.B. No. 97, effective Oct. 31, 2001); former R.C. 3937.18(K)(1) (enacted by Am.H.B. No. 261; repealed by Am.S.B. No. 97); former R.C. 3937.18(E)(2) (enacted by Am.H.B. No. 261; repealed by Sub.S.B. No. 267, effective Sept. 21, 2000). Accordingly, the Nationwide policy complies with Ohio law.

Section 3937.18(J)(1) permits UM/UIM policies to exclude coverage for an insured injured while operating or occupying a vehicle owned by or regularly available to the named insured if the vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy.

Atterholt v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-10-2006) · filed 2006-08-10(J)(1)

"(J) The coverages offered under division (A) of this section or selected in accordance with division (C) of this section may include terms and conditions that preclude coverage for bodily injury or death suffered by an insured under any of the following circumstances: ... (1) While the insured is operating or occupying a motor vehicle owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use for the named insured, a spouse, or a resident relative of the named insured, if the motor vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy under which a claim is made * * *." ... Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court and this court have concluded, that "other owned auto" exclusions are enforceable to preclude UM/UIM motorist coverage for insured persons who are occupying vehicles that, at the time of the accident, are not listed as covered autos on the insurance policies under which they are seeking UM/UIM benefits.

Former Section 3937.18 required UM/UIM coverage under commercial automobile liability and umbrella policies, with coverage arising by operation of law when the insured did not make a valid written rejection.

Roper v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (6-28-2002) · filed 2002-06-28(L)(1), (L)(2), (A), (C)

By its terms, former R.C. 3937.18(L) required that a policy providing insurance for a motor vehicle and any umbrella policy had to comply with the provisions in section (A). Given that, we hold that former R.C. 3937.18(L)(1) applied to State Auto's commercial policy and former R.C. 3937.18(L)(2) applied to State Auto's umbrella policy. Because the statute clearly contemplated that an umbrella policy be treated separately from any underlying policy, we hold that State Auto was required to provide UM/UIM coverage under both the commercial and the umbrella policies.

Section 3937.18 does not impose UM/UIM coverage on a commercial general liability policy merely because the policy contains a "parking an auto" exception to an automobile-related claims exclusion.

Allgire v. Buckeye State Mut., Unpublished Decision (7-11-2003) · filed 2003-07-11(A)

Subsequently, we found that form of provision insufficient to trigger the requirements of R.C. 2927.18(A) which, per Selander, operate to impress UM/UIM coverage on a GCL policy by operation of law. See: De Uzhca v. Derham (April 5, 2002), Montgomery App. No. 19106, 2002-Ohio-1814. The very same exception is involved here.

Section 3937.18 does not require a commercial general liability policy to offer UM/UIM coverage merely because it contains valet-parking or mobile-equipment provisions.

Fish v. Republic-Franklin Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (8-11-2003) · filed 2003-08-11

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in Heidt, we conclude the "valet parking" and "mobile equipment" provisions contained in Utica's CGL policy do not transform the policy into a motor vehicle liability policy thereby requiring the mandatory offering of UM/UIM coverage even though the policy pre-dates the H.B. 261 version of R.C.3937.18.

Former subsection (L)(1) required the policy to serve as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified motor vehicles before UM/UIM coverage arose by operation of law.

Young v. Plageman, Unpublished Decision (6-12-2003) · filed 2003-06-12(L)(1)

R.C. 3937.18, as it existed at the time of entering into the contract, required that every automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance issued offer UM/UIM coverage to persons insured under the policy. ... Accordingly, to have constituted an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance herein, the policy must have served as proof of financial responsibility for specifically identified motor vehicles. ... In this case, no motor vehicles are listed as covered autos anywhere in the policy. ... As such, UM/UIM coverage did not arise by operation of law.

Section 3937.18 requires insurers to offer uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage with excess liability policies; absent an offer and rejection, the coverage is included by operation of law.

Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. · filed 1999-06-23

In Duriak v. Globe Am. Cas. Co. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 70, 72, 28 OBR 168, 170, 502 N.E.2d 620, 622-623, we held that excess liability insurance must comport with R.C. 3937.18 and thus uninsured (and underinsured) motorist coverage must be tendered. Further, in Gyori v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Group (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 565, 568, 669 N.E.2d 824, 827, we stated that failure by the insurer to offer such coverage results in the provision of such coverage by operation of law. Absent any showing that underinsured coverage was offered and rejected, such coverage is included in the policy. Therefore, we conclude that Pontzer, as an employee of Superior Dairy, was also an insured under Superior ... Dairy’s umbrella/excess insurance policy and that said policy includes underinsured motorist coverage, as such coverage is mandated by operation of law.

Section 3937.18(A) does not require the mandatory UM/UIM coverage offer to a self-insurer in the practical sense.

MacDonald v. Pacific Employers Insurance · filed 2002-07-26(A)

The terms of the Policy at issue in this case ensure that J.E. Merit retains all risk of loss. Thus, this Court finds that J.E. Merit is a self-insurer in the practical sense and the Policy it obtained is not subject to the mandatory offer requirements of O.R.C. § 3937.18. Therefore, UM/ UIM coverage cannot be read into the Policy by operation of law.

Section 3937.18(J)(1) permits an uninsured motorist policy to exclude injuries sustained while the insured occupies a vehicle available for a named insured's regular use if the vehicle is not identified in the policy.

Yoder v. Thorpe, 07ap-225 (11-1-2007) · filed 2007-11-01(J)(1)

Among the circumstances in which insurers may limit UM coverage are those where an insured suffers bodily injury while "operating or occupying a motor vehicle owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of a named insured, * * * if the motor vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy." R.C. 3937.18 (J)(1). ... For the aforestated reasons, we reject Yoder's argument that the regular use exclusion in the Nationwide policy is contrary to the coverage mandated by R.C. 3937.18 and, thus, invalid.

Section 3937.18(J)(1) authorizes an automobile insurance policy to exclude uninsured-motorist coverage for bodily injury sustained while the insured operates or occupies a vehicle furnished to or available for the insured's regular use.

Fleetwood v. Doe, Unpublished Decision (8-1-2002) · filed 2002-08-01(J)(1)

This exclusionary language is in accord with R.C. 3937.18(J)(1), which authorizes the inclusion of such language in a policy of insurance and was the statutory law in effect during the term of the policy at issue. The exclusion is, therefore, valid and enforceable.